State Mobilized Contention in China

Research Memo

Jingkai He

Theoretical Approach

China's turbulent history in the 20th century provides ample cases to study state mobilized contention. While many cases have already been studied intensively by scholars of different disciplines, few researches have tried to theorize state-led mobilizations or look at cases from that particular perspective. In terms of existing literature on state-led mobilization in China, Feng (2011), Cai (2012), Zhou (2011, 2012) and Lian (2014) contributed to an academic debate over how to conceptualize the Chinese state's governance model. Feng (2011) argues that mobilization was an essential part of the Chinese state's governance model. Limited in infrastructure state capacity, the state often choose to concentrate its limited resources and power to focus on particular goals and hence mobilize national movements to serve that end. Zhou (2011, 2012) argues that mobilization was an important governing technique that complements normal bureaucratic governance. When the bureaucratic governance and norms break down, a mobilizational state would emerge in extraordinary times. Cai (2012) provides an additional angle on regime legitimacy, he argues that authoritarian regimes would gradually lose charismatic legitimacy and therefore need to mobilize movements to build new legitimacy. As the marginal benefits of movement-based legitimacy declines, the state would find it more difficult to return to normal bureaucratic rule. Lian (2014) focuses on struggles as a particular mode of mobilization and argues that the struggle mobilization model, though highly powerful, is not sustainable. Frequent invoking this mobilization model would only drain the mobilization resources and force the state return to normal bureaucratic rule.

Zha (2015) proposes a theoretical framework to explain the outcome of state-mobilized nationalist movement. She argues that when there is high level of foreign threat perception in the public and the state establishes pro-majority institutions that guarantees the interests of the majority of the society, state-led nationalist mobilization is most likely to succeed; when the foreign threat perception is low and the state establishes pro-minority institutions that only benefit privileged groups, state-led nationalist mobilization is least likely to succeed.

This research memo assembles multiple cases across time to highlight three sets of theoretical issues in the presentation of multiple cases. The first issue is the mobilization actor. As the cases would show, the state would often not act as a unitary actor. Organizations that mobilizes popular contention could be a part of the state or

an agent of the state, which brings about principle-agent problems. The conflicts between the mobilizing actor and the state would often shape the movements in a particular manner. The second issue is the motivation and goals of mobilization, with the focus on unintended consequences of state mobilization. It turns out that the state may not be able to retain control of the movement they seek to mobilize, or the mobilization structure and outcomes of the movement would later divert original state goals. The third issue is the strategies the state adopt to mobilize, the Chinese state in this memo's cases adopted strategies of incorporation, initiation, control and forbearance to deal with movement mobilization. As it turns out, the state often have limited choices in what strategies they could adopt and that choices certainly always had an impact on the outcome of the mobilized movements.

The Boxer Rebellion

Late Imperial China had experienced almost endless flow of popular uprisings. These rebellions generally targeted local governments and sought to build local bases for sustained struggles. Some of the most prominent uprisings, such as the Taiping Rebellion and the Nien Rebellion, almost took down the imperial rule. Scholars have argued that rural rebels were motivated by religious beliefs and ties(Naquin 1976), pressure to prey or guard resources (Perry 1980), or class consciousness (Marks 1984). Unlike most rebellions that primarily fought against the state, the Boxer Rebels had received state supports and had been mobilized by various levels of local authorities for a significant amount of time, making it an unusual case for popular uprisings in that period of time, but also possibly one of the earliest cases of state mobilized contention in modern China.

Originated from various local secret sects and societies in Shangdong province (Esherick 1986), the Boxer Movement started out by targeting local Christian communities and foreign missionaries and quickly grew to a regional movement in 1898. Prior to the rise of the Boxer Rebels, there had already been a steady flow of popular uprisings against Christian missionaries and communities, resulting in multiple "missionary incidents" (Jiaoan). The Qing government, under foreign pressure, would often repress the anti-Christian activists and cover the damages for missionaries. State strategies toward such uprisings often oscillated between "Jiao" (suppression) and "Fu" (pacification) (Liao 1982), but always aimed at neutralizing the movement. State responses as such only stoked anti-imperialism and nationalism sentiments (Sato 2007). Under the slogan of "Fuqing Mieyang" (support the Qing, annihilate the West), the Boxer Movement soon drew wide support from local societies and earned sympathies from local governments. In Shandong, Governor Yuxian reported to the imperial court that "Christian persecution of ordinary villagers had forced the latter to study boxing in self-defense" (Esherick 1986: 199). Yuxian eventually became one of the most prominent supporter of the Boxer Rebels in the Imperial Court, his tenure in Shandong and later in Shanxi provinces had witnessed

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the most rapid and violent growth of the movement (Li 1980). In 1900, he along with conservative factions of the imperial court advocated for tough stances against foreign power and tried to recruit and mobilize the boxers as a potent military force to fend off foreign aggression. In January 1900, the imperial court issued an edict pronouncing the Boxers as not "outlaw associations" but "law-biding citizens" (Esherick 1986: 272), marking the first official recognition of the movement from the central government. As the Boxers quickly spread to Beijing's suburban area, they became an immediate threat to the foreign diplomatic missions. Meanwhile, exaggerated reports on the Boxers' mysterious superior power were sent back to the Empress Dowager Cixi, the de facto ruler of the court, to embolden her determination to fight against the foreign power. By June 1900, the government military force, along with the Boxers, engaged in the siege of the International Legations and triggered the Boxer war. Facing imminent foreign military retaliation, the imperial court ordered local governments to organize and mobilize the Boxers to defend Beijing (Xiang 2003: 224-229). The Boxers' slogan was then changed to "Fengzhi Mieyang" (annihilate the west on imperial edicts) to honor the support and recognition they received from the state (Sun 1981). The Boxers were then resoundingly defeated by foreign forces and the imperial court was forced to evacuate and flee from Beijing. The imperial court then changed its tone and ordered the Boxers be completely suppressed in Spetember 1900 and brought the Boxer Rebellions to its end.

A much debated theme in the study of the Boxer Rebels is its relationship with the Qing government. Early studies in China have maintained that the imperial court was never active in mobilizing the Boxers and the later development of the movement was only recognized when the imperial court was militarily unable to repress it. They argued that the Qing government was sufficiently weakened after several losses in previous wars and opened a vacuum for the Boxer Rebels to quickly spread (Lin 1981). Later studies have highlighted the role of internal politics in the imperial court and argued that the power struggle between the conservative faction and the reform faction shaped the government's changing attitudes toward the Boxer Rebellion. The conservative faction seemed to genuinely believe in the magic power of the Boxers and dreamed about relying on its military force to boost . When foreign power intervened in the imperial court's decision over succession and jeopardized the conservative faction's standing, the conservative faction swayed the imperial court and mobilized the Boxers (Liao 1980: 1985). It should be noted that the imperial court, in particular Empress Dowager Cixi, had taken a very ambivalent view toward the Boxer Movement. The Empress Dowager initially ordered local governments to incorporate the Boxers into local military forces, then informally asked local governors to repress the movement as they see fit, and later decided to fully mobilize the Boxers, before she finally turned against the movement. Local governments also showed varying attitudes toward the movement. In Shandong province, despite his sympathy toward the nationalism sentiment of the movement, governor Yuxian still organized several military campaigns to capture movement leaders deemed as bandits (Li 1980, Lin 1989, 2002). Nonetheless, the Boxers still considered Yuxian a patron;

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some Boxers accepted fiscal support from the governor and agreed to change its official banner with his titles (Qi 2000). When Yuxian was transferred to Shanxi for his lenient attitude toward the Boxers, the new governor Yuan Shikai took a more hard-line approach toward the movement. Under Yuan's rule, the government's military force vehemently battled the Boxers and neutralized the movement's prominent leaders. In other provinces such as Zhili, local authorities also oscillated between suppression and mobilization. It was not until mid 1900 when the imperial court issued supportive edicts that most North China local governments became supportive of the Boxers.

In terms of state support, the imperial court did not stop at issuing edicts. After the Qing government declared war against foreign powers and recruited the Boxers to fight, the government provided 100,000 taels of silver and 200 piculs of rice to Boxers flooding into Beijing (Yihetuan, 1951 a: 42). Prince Zhuang, the commander in charge of Beijing's defense, established a boxer branch in his own residence and used government funding to register and train the Boxer Rebels (Yihetuan, 1951 b: 487). He also mobilized several thousands of Boxers from nearby regions to join the Beijing defense force and provided them with equipments (Yihetuan, 1951 a: 414). Local authorities in Zhili, Shanxi and Shandong also provided logistic supports for the Rebels (Yihetuan, 1951 b: 191). Moreover, the state recognition provided legitimacy for the Boxer Movement, as the new slogan "Fengzhi Mieyang" (annihilate the west on imperial edicts) revealed, many more residents in Beijing and suburban area joined the movement after the imperial court openly endorsed it (Sato 2007).

In terms of state strategy toward the movement, despite the ambivalence and local variations, the imperial court did try to incorporate the movement into its own military campaign in 1900. The incorporation process was never complete, as the rebels were never fully integrated with the conventional armed force. The Boxers were indeed mobilized but not fully incorporated by the state, but this strategy was again adopted by local governments in subsequent cases. As Perry's study showed (1980: 224-234), the Red Spears rebels were enlisted in the Communist army and was incorporated and later replaced by new state-initiated movements in 1940s. While the Communists' incorporation of the Red Spears movement demobilized the movement, the Qing government's effort to incorporate the Boxer Rebellion actually intensified the mobilization of the movement.

It should be noted that since the Boxer Movement lacked a centralized national command, the relationship between the Boxers and the state varied in different regions. In some places such as northern Jiangsu, the Boxers were more confrontational toward local authorities and were met with harsher repression. In places like Beijing, the Boxers essentially penetrated into local society and fought along with the government force. And when the conservative faction was in control of the imperial court, the Boxers were mobilized and supported by the state, once the conservation faction was purged amid the defeat of the Boxer War, the Boxers were

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again heavily repressed. We could characterize the state mobilization and support for the Boxer movement as opportunistic and sporadic, but it still marks an important beginning in that the State made an effort to mobilize popular uprisings for its own goals.

The Constitutional Petition Movement

In early 20 century, as the Qing Empire headed to its finale, the imperial court faced increasing pressure to adopt constitutional rule and evolve into a constitutional monarchy. a constitutional petition movement emerged across China. The imperial court issued an edict promising constitutional rule upon further consultation with the society. Professional groups and business associations immediately started to organize and mobilized to petition to the imperial court for the convention of a parliament and a constitution. Zhang Jian, a prominent businessman in Jiangsu province, initiated the Association for Constitutional Preparations (ACP, Yubei Lixian Gonghui). From 1906 to 1910, the ACP and its provincial branches organized four national waves of constitutional petition movements. The first two movements rallied thousands of supporters from more than 14 provinces, organizers collected petitioners' signatures and presented them to the imperial court, and was met with tepid official response (Jeans 1997: 14-16; Hou 1993: 268-292). The third wave of petition claimed to have collected more than a million signature and mobilized rallies and demonstrations in multiple localities (Geng 1980, Hou 1993: 297-305). It was also during this time period that the court agreed to establish local assemblies in provinces and provides another avenue for pro-reform activists to coalesce and mobilize for the petition movement (Thompson 1995). The final response from the imperial court was still not enthusiastic, political reform was only partially implemented and was aborted when the 1911 Revolution brought down the imperial rule.

The constitutional petition movement seemed like a classic case of the bourgeois class autonomously organize to push for democracy and more representation. That was only half true. From the beginning of the movement, the state had been involved in various organizations and provided support to the movement. When Zhang Jian and his associates form the ACP, Cen Chunxuan, then governor of Guandong Province, donated 10,000 silver dollars and promised to raise 1,000 dollars annually to cover the association's expenses (Zheng 1988). Other provincial governors, along with some Manchu aristocrats, were also supportive of the ACP and recruited ACP activists to be their staff members or recommend them to Beijing (Li 2014, Zheng 1988). Rui Cheng, then mayor of Shanghai and a Manchu princeling, was even listed as a founding member of the ACP (Rhoads 2000: 127). In the third wave of the petition movement, local governors agreed to present the petitions to the imperial court on behalf of the movement and collectively wrote to the court, urging the Prince Regent to take decisive moves toward constitutionalism (Li 2006, Zhang 1971: 438-440). When the imperial court was determined to stall the political reform process and

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rebuked local governors, the movement lost its momentum and eventually faded. Moreover, it would also be over-simplifying the case to argue that the local governors were always the supporting force behind the movement, several governors had expressed disapproval of certain actions of local ACPs and assemblies, particularly when their own policy priorities became targets of the movement (Liu 1996). The ACP also had experienced internal splits, with the more moderate factions stayed with the cause of constitutional monarchy, and the more radical factions grew sympathetic to a republican revolution (Hou 1993: 481-484).

The case of the constitutional petition movement brings two points to our attention regarding state mobilized contention. First, state may not act as a unitary actor in cases of mobilization, a mobilized event. In the constitutional petition movement, it was the local state authorities who mobilized the movement against central state authority in order to promote their own political agenda. Second, state mobilized contention may have unintended consequences. Local governors initially mobilized local assemblies to petition for constitutional rule but soon found that local assemblies would also check their own power and interfere with their policy priorities.

Petition movement later become a repertoire of state mobilization, state would often mobilize the public to petition for a particular goal. Unlike the Boxer movement in which state mobilization provided legitimacy to the movement, in cases of state mobilized petition movement, a large scale movement in favor of state goals provided additional legitimacy to state actions. This pattern was quickly followed by Yuan Shikai in his brief restoration campaign in 1915. When Yuan, the newly elected President of Republic of China, wanted to restore the monarchy and became emperor himself, he first plotted to mobilize popular support. In August 1915, Yang Du, a Yuan confidant, initiated a group named "Chouan Hui". Liang Shiyi, another Yuan confidant, formed "National Petition Association" in September 1915. Both organizations branded itself as independent civil society group but was indeed organized, controlled and funded by the Yuan government. Yuan provided 200,000 silver dollars to Chouan Hui as its primary fund source, and Liang was then state tax commissioner and had direct access to state funding (Tang 2002). While Chouan Hui primarily organized a media campaign to recruit intellectuals in support of the restoration campaign, the National Petition Association was more involved in mobilizing popular support of the restoration, as its leaders called upon local branches to hold rallies and collect signatures to be sent to Beijing (Gao et. al. 2015). They infamously enlisted people of different profession to form various professional petition groups in Beijing and organized demonstrations to prove the public's urge to welcome restoration. Groups mobilized even included prostitutes and beggars (Fang 2000). Yang Du was said to be inspired by beggars' quarrels and convened leaders of Beijing's beggar society and offered 1 dollar for each beggar's signature in support of the restoration campaign. About half of Beijing's beggar population then participated with 10,000 signatures collected. Yang further mobilized the beggars to march in Beijing and "plead" Yuan to accept the emperor title (Lu 2005: 39-41). While Yuan's

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restoration campaign eventually failed in 1916 and the popular support he mobilized was widely laughed off as disingenuous, the case could still shed light on how the Chinese state tried to mobilize popular movements.

The KMT Regime

The New Life Movement

In 1934, Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT leader, decided to laugh a national campaign named "New Life Movement". The movement was aimed at rejuvenating the Chinese ethos by promoting traditional Confucian values and correcting unhealthy living habits. Facing an escalated Japanese invasion and a growing Communist rebellion, Chiang decided that a campaign to touch the daily life of Chinese was necessary to solve the nation's problem from its root. As the KMT regime had gained control over most part of mainland China, the campaign quickly expanded nationwide and affected different classes and social groups. In the course of the movement, the KMT state founded numerous civil society groups (possibly one of the earliest cases of Chinese GONGOs) and launched campaigns such as the anti-opium drive, the campaign to advocate the use of national goods, and the People's Economic Reconstruction Movement (Li 1987). The New Life Movement lasted throughout KMT's rule of mainland China, was suspended in 1949 as the KMT lost the civil war, and was again revived in 1960s in Taiwan (Guan 2002). Unlike previous cases of state mobilized social movements, the New Life Movement was initiated, organized, funded and controlled by the state at every stages.

One key feature of the New Life Movement is its focus on organization building and penetration. In the summer of 1934, Chiang Kai-shek formed the National Association for the New Life Movement and ordered all local authorities to establish branches. By 1937, the New Life Movement had opened branches in 24 provinces and 1355 counties (Lin 1995). Most of these branches were headed by local administrative heads and Chiang was himself of the national movement association. In Jiangxi Province, where the movement was originally mobilized, the KMT government organized mass organizations such as the Youth Vacation Service Corps, the Women’s Civil Servants Service Corps and the Labor Service Corps to specifically mobilize targeted social groups. Trade associations were ordered to establish study groups under the review of the national movement association.(Ferlanti 2010). Professional groups and unions were assigned to organize rallies and speech sessions to promote the ideas of the movement as well (Wen and Li 2006). Rural societies were mobilized under the Baojia system to reorganize the elementary education system and local militia (Averill 1981).

As the movement developed nationwide, the KMT invested considerable resources to mobilize people to promote state priorities. The Labor Service Corps established

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across the country was used as an important tool to mobilize the public to provide voluntary labor. In Hubei, the government mobilized thousands of students, public servants and residents to complete a dam in a month. In Suiyuan province, the New Life Movement association mobilized people to finish road constructions works (Lin 1995). As the second Sino-Japanese war escalated, the New Life Movement associations turned to support wartime logistics. Soong May-ling, Chiang Kai-shek's wife, headed the New Life Movement's women association and organized multiple campaigns mobilizing women from 1938 to 1942. The women movement association mobilized women to make half a million winter coats for troops in 1938, helped to train and assign female refugees to work in factories, and organized nursing care to the military (Ferlanti 2012, Li 2007, Xia 2009). Chiang also used the New Life Movement associations to initiate a series of fundraising campaigns in support of the anti-Japanese war, more than 6 million dollars were raised in 4 large campaigns between 1938 and 1942 (Guan 1991). The New Life Movement faded after 1942 as the KMT regime was plagued by continuous Japanese aggression and later the civil war, and Chiang formally suspended the operation of the New Life Movement associations in 1949.

Much discussion in the academic literature has geared toward the motivation and ideological foundation of the New Life Movement. Despite listing Confucian values as its core tenet, the New Life Movement could also find ideological roots in Fascism, Christianity and anti-Communism. Chiang Kai-shek became attracted to Fascism in early 1930s and considered Germany and Japan and developing models for China. One of the motivation for him to mobilize the New Life Movement was simply to copy what Germany and Japan had achieved. He established secret societies (Lixing She and Fuxing She) that operated in the fashion of fascists and these organizations were later proved to have laid the groundwork for the New Life Movement's organization structure (Eastman 1971, Wakeman 1997). As Chiang and his wife were devout Christians, they sought to solicit and mobilize support from the Christian community in the beginning of the movement, and eventually penetrated local YMCAs and enlisted high-ranking priest to endorse the movement and serve as directors of the movement associations (Ferlanti 2010). Dirlik (1975) argued that the New Life Movement was indeed a counterrevolution that not simply aimed at mobilizing the public, but tried to subject the public under the KMT's modern control. Wen (2003) characterized the early stages of the New Life Movement as KMT's own search for legitimacy. He argued that the New Life Movement was Chiang's response to China's ideological vacuum and hence the mobilization was not only to promote policy priorities, but also to reinforce regime legitimacy through value indoctrination and propaganda.

Youth and Student Movement

As a party born out of revolution, the KMT was closely associated with social 8

mobilization from its foundation. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 proved the mobilization power and influence of student movements and has hence attracted KMT's attention (Lv 1994: 264). In 1924, after Sun Yat-sen had transformed the KMT to a Leninist party, the KMT issued an official document on its student policy, stating that students should be incorporated into the national revolution and should be indoctrinated with KMT tenets (Lv 1994: 271). KMT student members soon grew in numbers and KMT branches were established in colleges. Before the KMT and the Communists broke off in 1927, the KMT allowed the Communists to work and recruit in KMT college branches but was keenly aware of the threat of the Communists' youth branch, the Socialist Youth League, and took measures to counter the Communists' recruitment effort (Lv 1994: 279). One of the most successful case of KMT mobilization was the May Thirtieth Movement: the KMT Shanghai branch mobilized workers and students to protest the local government

After the KMT purged the Communists in 1927 and effectively became the ruling government of China, it took a sharp turn regarding the student policy. Fearing the mobilization technique and power of the Communists, the KMT elites sought to demobilize social groups and reorient students' focus from political disputes to national construction. As the ruling party, KMT adopted a two-pronged approach toward students: restrict students' participation in politics and indoctrinate students with KMT ideology (Huang 1996: 77-79). This strategy of depoliticization was soon proved to be a failure. As China continuously lose ground to foreign aggression, KMT's depoliticization strategy only ceded ground to Communists to establish underground student organizations and mobilize student movements.

To reclaim the student as a supporting force of the KMT rule, Chiang Kai-shek first copied the Fascist model and organized secret societies (Fuxing She) that primarily recruited youth members (Wang 1998: 55-56, Jia 2005). In 1938, Chiang decided to form a new organization, Sanqingtuan (SQT, the Three People's Principles Youth Corps). The biggest debate in the literature on SQT is about Chiang's motivation to form it. One group of scholars (Hu 1989, Mulready-Stone 2014: 62-66, Jia 2009) argue that the SQT was established to mobilize and incorporate the youth. They point to SQT's heavy involvement with military training of students and the growing number of the SQT student members. Another group of scholars (Huang 1996, Ma 1996, Zhou 1996) contend that the SQT was Chiang's effort to incorporate the Communists and reestablish a more encompassing political party. They point to the founding documents of the SQT and Chiang's speeches in late 1930s, and find that Chiang once even intended to abandon the KMT and make the SQT the new ruling party. Unlike the Communist Youth League that was subordinated to the CCP, the SQT indeed developed to be a political apparatus parallel to the KMT. The installation of Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, as leader of the SQT further boosted SQT's political standing against the KMT. Throughout 1930s and 1940s, the SQT was mired in factional conflicts with other KMT power groups (Wang 2003: 276-283) and was far less successful than the Communists in mobilizing the youth. One of the few

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accomplishments of the SQT was its effort in the intellectual youth enlist movement in 1944. The SQT led the charge to mobilize tens of thousands of college students to join the KMT army and cooperated with the military command to indoctrinate these students with KMT political work (Zhou 1996).

In the post WWII era, the KMT and the Communists again engaged in competition over student and youth support. The Communists clearly had an upper hand in mobilizing students as they had led several prominent student movements against the KMT government in Kunming, Beijing and Nanjing (Liao 1994). Mao Zedong, the Communist Party leader, famously call the student movement as the "second front" in the Chinese civil war (Chen 1998). The KMT tried to counter these anti-government and relied on the SQT for mobilization. For instance, in May 1947, the SQT mobilized pro-government student organizations in Chongqing and Nanjing to counter the national student protest against "poverty and hunger", a movement orchestrated by Communist underground student organizations. In June 1946, the SQT organized a "anti-rebellion" parade to counter the pro-Communists "anti-civil war" student parade. The SQT also (Liu 1988). The national anti-Soviet student parade on February 22nd, 1946 was also believe to be at least partially mobilized by the SQT. The parade in Shanghai was spotted to have food supply from the government and the parade in Chongqing ended up attacking CCP offices (Shi 1992, Wasserstrom 1997: 248-250).

Despite the SQT's efforts to mobilize student movement as a counter measure to the Communist mobilization, Chiang Kai-shek grew increasingly frustrated with the KMT internal conflicts. The competition between the SQT and other factions culminated in the KMT's 6th Party Congress in 1945 and led to the SQT openly preparing to form a new party in its 2nd congress (Wang 2003: 354). In 1947, Chiang ordered the SQT to be dissolved and assimilated to the KMT, marking the end of the KMT's effort to mobilize students in its mainland rule (Jia 1996, Zhang 1991).

The Communist Regime: 1949-1966

Land Reform Campaign

The Land Reform Campaign was the first nationwide popular movement mobilized by the new PRC state. Early in 1930s, the Chinese Communists who started to consider land reform as a key agenda for the Communist Revolution, started a series of land reform campaign in its Jiangxi guerilla bases. When the Communists marched to northwest China and entered the era of the second Sino-Japanese War, the land reform campaign was suspended and was replaced with a more moderate "rent reduction" campaign that sought to court local gentries and ensure stability (Li 2015). In 1946, the Communists reinstated the campaign in its quickly expanding bases and finally pushed it nationwide as the party won the Civil War in 1949. The Land Reform Campaigns confiscated lands from landlords and redistributed them to landless

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peasants and was done through peasant mobilization under close control and design of the Communist state (Zhang 2003). The campaign for the first time gave millions of peasants lands and effected a profound change in the Chinese society (Hinton 1967, Crook and Crook 1979). On the other hand, the campaign also became notoriously violent and radical (Friedman et. al. 1993), attesting to the Communist belief in violent revolution (Mao 1971).

While some literature on the land reform campaign has focused on the change it brought to rural societies and argue that the rural inequalities and the need for redistribution was the primary motivation of the movement (Hinton 1967, Lee and Selden 2009), others have argued that the campaign was more politically motivated than economically motivated. Yang's analysis (2009) on the possibility of a more peaceful land reform in 1940s showed that the CCP was determined to use the campaign to make the peasants break off with the landlords. Li (2008) and Moise (1983) both view the land reform campaign as a state-building process and the Communist Party was indeed trying to reorganize and control the rural society by mobilizing peasants. Strauss (2007) compared the different conditions between South and North China in the land reform campaign and concluded that the campaign was not really about address exploitation and enforce redistribution, but to consolidate the revolution by incorporating peasants into the political process and eradicating the landlord class as a potential threat. It seemed that the PRC state was mobilizing the public for the sake of mobilization, the mere fact that millions of peasants were mobilized and organized into the revolution was more important for regime consolidation than achieved goals of redistribution. This pattern was somewhat changed when the Communists entered the collectivization era in late 1950s, as the state tried to seize land away from the peasants, but state mobilization still played a role. Bernstein's comparison (1967) between the Chinese and the Soviet collectivization argued that the Chinese process went more smooth with less popular opposition was because the Chinese state tried to mobilize peasants and made them participate in the process, whereas the Soviets simply completed the process with administrative commands.

The PRC state adopted various strategies to mobilize the public in the Land Reform Campaign. The most often studies method was class struggle. The state would send working teams to each locality and mobilize peasants to identify the class label of local residents and target poor activists to lead the charge for the campaign (Zhang 2003). The second method was Suku (speaking bitterness). The party working teams worked to "induce" poor peasants to develop hatred toward landlords from their own private experiences. In the case that peasant failed to develop animosity against landlords, the working teams would even prepare standardized scenarios and persuade peasants to find connections and similarities in their own experiences (Li 2006). Public sessions were then hold and peasants would be invited to share their stories with the public, often promoting anger and condemning landlords. Under a rather theatrical mobilization scene, the audience would be moved by the stories and

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volunteer to share their own stories, often similar to the ones already presented, thus completing the transformation of private experiences to "collective and homogenous memory" (Li 2009, 2013). As Perry (2002) pointed out, emotion work had always been a unique technique the Communists used to mobilize the mass and this pattern of psychological engineering was continuously picked up by the state in future mobilizations.

Other Mass Campaigns

Yundong, the Chinese word for campaign, was such a frequent word in Chinese people's public life in 1950s and 1960s that they would experience at least 3 campaigns each year (Cell 1977: 187-190). Cell (1977) divided the PRC campaigns into three categories: economic, ideological and struggle. He studied 36 campaigns in 1950s and 1960s and found that the campaign system was a utilitarian method foe the state to promote its goal of socialist transformation. Economic campaigns such as Socialist Reform of Private Business Campaign were the most successful type in terms of achievement, while the ideological campaign were least fruitful. Cell also developed a series of indicators to quantitatively measure the mobilization intensity of each campaign. Bennett (1976) also researched on campaigns in the same period and argued that these movements offered the public an important avenue of political participation, a view shared by Towsend (1967).Bennett summarized the function of campaign in the PRC as to implement existing policies, emulate advanced experiences, popularize new polices, correct deviations from norms and effect changes in individual attitudes.

Both Cell and Bennett's studies emphasized the success of mass campaigns in promoting economic goals of the State, as shown in cases of the Combat the Four Evils Campaign and the Mass Irrigation Campaign. The mass mobilization during the Korean War offered a different case on how state mobilize popular movements for ideological purposes. During the Korean War, the PRC state mobilized numerous public parades and demonstrations to support its troops and protest against the U.S. imperialism. Large rallies involving tens of thousands of participants were planned and mobilized through the administrative hierarchy. Each party cadre were assigned to mobilize a set number of participants and local party leaders were made responsible to lead their own parade units (Hou 2006). Emotion works were also deployed as "grassroots cadres found that to rouse ordinary peasants and workers to patriotic participation, it was important to link personal grievances directly to the Americans." (Zha 2015: 113). The motivation for the state to mobilize such movement was to consolidate public support for the military campaign, which was translated into campaigns with material goals such as the donation campaign and the voluntary production campaign. It might also be interpreted as a movement that aimed at international audience, the number of protestors against the U.S. troops was used by state authorities for international propaganda (Hou 2006). State mobilized rally became a routine for China to express its attitudes in international politics, as a brief

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search of the official newspaper People's Daily found dozens of such rallies in Beijing in 1950s and 1960s. The number of participants of the rallies ranged from 10,000 to a million, themes included supporting Egypt's fight against the British and the French (11/04/1956), supporting the Japanese people's anti-imperialism struggle (05/13/1960), supporting Congo's independence war against Belgium (07/24/1960), supporting Cuba's struggle against U.S. aggression (04/22/1961), supporting the U.S. Civil Rights Movement (08/13/1963), and supporting the Communist Party of Vietnam inng in the Vietnam War (02/11/1965) etc.

Last but not least, scholars also analyzed the struggle campaigns. Bennett (1977) considered struggle campaigns that purge people with bad class labels as a method of social control for the PRC state, while Greenblatt (1977) pointed out that many deviances identified in the movements were indeed manufactured and the standard for such identification was quite elastic and subject to political needs. However, such struggle campaigns, like the anti-rightist movement in late 1950s, was more about demobilizing the rightists than about mobilizing the public.

Cultural Revolution

The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 marked the apex of state mobilized contention in Chinese history. Mao Zedong formally launched the Cultural Revolution in August 1966. He shut down China’s schools, and during the following months he encouraged students to become Red Guards to attack all traditional values and “bourgeois” things and to test party officials by publicly criticizing them. The movement quickly escalated; many elderly people and intellectuals were not only verbally attacked but were physically abused and died. key Politburo leaders were removed from power—most notably President Liu Shaoqi, Mao’s designated successor until that time. In January 1967 the movement began to produce the actual overthrow of provincial party committees and the first attempts to construct new political bodies to replace them. Meanwhile, the Red Guards splintered into zealous rival factions, each purporting to be the true representative of Maoist thought. Large armed clashes between factions of Red Guards were occurring throughout urban China The resulting anarchy, terror, and paralysis completely disrupted the urban economy and led the country to widespread urban disorder (Harding 2011, MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006).

The Cultural Revolution was a unique and outstanding case in many ways. For one, this is probably the only case in which the state actively mobilized the society against itself. Mao called senior leaders "monsters and demons" and government departments "hell" and proclaimed that all "black departments" should be "completed smashed". One important debate in the literature is the motivation of Mao's moves. Why would the top leader of the Communist party-state mobilize against the very state machine he established? One group of literature argues that Mao's primary motivation was to

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rectify and rejuvenate the revolution he initiated (Dittmer 1989). Mao's concern over the bureaucratization (Whyte 1974, 1980, 1989; Nee 1975) of the Communist party-state machine and disagreement with other pragmatic leaders over policy priorities made the Chairman believe that radical measures were needed in order to reorient the country to the revolutionary track he envisioned. A second group of literature focused on elite politics and concluded that the power struggle between Mao and his comrades was the biggest factor that pushed the Chairman to seek popular support through mobilization. As Liu Shaoqi continued to expand his clout, Mao felt his power was threatened by the Communist establishment and hence decided to resort to popular mobilization to knock off intra-party enemies and revamp the political order. (Gao 2003, Gao 2004, Wang 1983). MacFarquhar (2006) recognized merits in both approaches and argued that the Cultural Revolution was Mao's effort to make sure that revolution would continue after his death, and his motivation hence included both rectifying the party line and purging the party elites who disagreed with him.

The second relevant issue is to what extent was the mass mobilized and why. Scholars working on different mobilized groups have all unveiled a picture of divided groups and multiple participation motivation. Lee (1978) argues that the alienated and outside class was most enthusiastic about Mao's mobilization calls and people who are more closely associated with the establish tended to minimize the influence of Mao's revolutionary calls. Walder (2006, 2009) argues that the Red Guards were not merely an instrument for political leaders. Preexisting identities, interests, and networks shaped students' choices to join factions and these choices would change as the factional conflicts escalated. Perry and Li's study (1997) of Shanghai workers also find that the working class demonstrated variation in faction choice and behaviors. Both structural condition and personal background shaped workers' decision to rebel and to join factions. Walder's work (1986) on Chinese factories in the Cultural Revolution find that patron-client relationship was still rampant in working units, despite the revolution's effort to mobilize people to engage in political struggles. As Su (2011:242) noted in his study of collective killings in the Cultural Revolution, "ordinary citizens did not follow a master plan in the revolutionary transformations but rather reacted to reality – in specific times and places – in a pragmatic and often ad hoc fashion, improvising as they went along".

The literature's emphasis on social groups' autonomous and varied responses to state mobilization leads to the third relevant issue: how did the state actually mobilize the mass? As Mao’s own personality cult, encouraged so as to provide momentum to the movement, assumed religious proportions in the movement, scholars paid attention to the role of Mao's charisma. Andreas (2007) points out that the Cultural Revolution was Mao's response to failed bureaucratic mobilization in earlier times. When he could not effectively mobilize the bureaucrats to achieve his political goals, he used his own charisma to mobilize the mass more efficiently. By replacing formal state organizations with informal ones, Charismatic mobilization was made easier to penetrate into informal popular associations and became a critical element to hold

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these associations together. Mao's encouraging tones such as "it's right to rebel" provided legitimacy for rebel groups to take radical actions (Wang 1988). It should also be noted that unlike previous campaigns, the state invested relatively little material resources to organize and mobilize the Red Guards. One way to characterize the state strategy in mobilizing the youth would be forbearance, as the state offered little more than charismatic mobilization appeals. The rebels were able to smash down the state machine and take down leaders because no one dared to really resist, the state simply tolerated rebel actions. Before the PLA forces were deployed to address the escalating conflicts between rebel groups in 1917, the state did not make an effort to organize or to control the red guards. No official endorsements were made to any particular rebel groups and virtually all groups fought against each other over the claim of Maoism orthodox. It was the lack of substantial action of the state in this state-mobilized contention that gave social groups greater space to improvise and mobilize. The result was a far more intense, violent and chaotic scene than Chinese social mobilization had ever seen.

The Contemporary Regime

The post-Cultural Revolution era had witnessed the decline of political zeal and the state, having learned a lesson from the catastrophic outcome of the Cultural Revolution, have since refrained from mobilizing large scale popular contentions and was instead occupied by growing numbers of autonomous popular protests.

One notable development was the introduction of NGOs into China in the 1980s. Suspicious about the NGO's role in authoritarian politics, the Chinese government evolved to develop a space for NGOs to play certain roles in the public life (Saich 2000, Hsu 2010). Meanwhile, the state organized its own NGOs as GONGOs and tried to get involved in mobilizing the civil society and complete state policy goals. Unger and Chan (1996) called such moves as new form of corporatism in that the state tried to enter the space of civil society and sanction and control its operation. Wu (2003) disagreed and showed in his analysis of Chinese environmental GONGOs that the state only set up these institutions to fulfill specific policy goals and did not try to control environmental politics in civil society with the operation of GONGOs. Wu further find that the creation of GONGOs may have unintended consequences: powerful and semi-autonomous GONGOs may in turn try to lobby the state to promote environmental protection.

Other than environmental politics, the state also actively engaged in establishing GONGOs to mobilize students. The Communist Youth League established multiple youth volunteer organizations to promote volunteerism among college students. The 2008 Beijing Olympics and Wenchuan earthquake further inspired youth to join volunteer organizations to serve, and by the end of 2008, the Communist Youth League claimed to have registered more than 30 million volunteers. A comparison

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between Chinese and Canadian youth volunteers find that Chinese students are less likely to join on-going volunteer work and prefer project-based works, a pattern consistent with the way Chinese GONGOs plan and organize volunteer works (Hustinx et. al. 2012). Chinese students also consider collective benefits to be more important than private benefits in making decisions to join volunteer works. Malfrid and Rolandsen (2008) argue that students take ownership of their volunteer work and are not attracted by political mobilization but by desire to expand social space and recognition. The PRC state has clearly moved beyond the ages of radical mass mobilization, whether and how will it try to mobilize the society in a sustained and effective fashion remains an issue for future researches to explore.

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