Note

This file should be supplemented by the BFHR lab’s T-reduce file, as well as the few other QPQ CP shells that have been turned out in starter/Wave 1 case negs.

Included in this file are:

- definitions to generate/answer arguments about competition- a compilation of general ev against and for conditioning in the context of arms sales- a small leverage good/bad core that can be used to create offense against CPs that leverage

arms sales in exchange for HR reform (or any other condition really) - and some specific CPs that were found along the way

Thank you to the following people for contributing to this file:

Aaron (“the GOAT”)

Ephraim

Adarsh

David

Mark Lam

Jackson

Nikhil

Competition/Definitions

Resolved

Resolved—CertainResolved means certainDictionary No Date Resolved, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolved //AY

adjective

1 firm in purpose or intent; determined.

Resolved means certainOxford Dictionary No Date Resolve, Lexico, Powered by Oxford, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/resolve //AY

2 [no object] Decide firmly on a course of action.

Resolved—Not CertainResolved isn’t certainMerriam Webster No Date Definition of Resolve, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve //AY

1 : to become separated into component parts

also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis

2 : to form a resolution : DETERMINE

3 : CONSULT, DELIBERATE

4 : to progress from dissonance to consonance

Substantially

Substantial—CertainSubstantial requires certainty and immediacyWords and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential , apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain : absolute: real at present time , as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

Substantial—Not CertainSubstantial means considerable—that’s the usual and customary meaning of the termWords and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning , that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value ; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

Prefer it—substantially isn’t a term of artArkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)

Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning, 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable, temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

Should

Should—CertainShould means immediate and certain—Supreme Court agreesSummers 94 Justice for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” 11/8/1994, https://www.leagle.com/decision/19942238885p2d135312225 //AY

13. "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15.

Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability . Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wn.App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligsation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must " when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony").

14. In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

“Should” is mandatoryNieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty , obligation , propriety, or expediency ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative , obligatory sense . HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and

not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word " must " and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning . State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

Should—Not CertainShould means conditional—it’s not certainBlumenthal 16 Cynthia, regulatory engineer at ASQ, Shall vs. Should, American Society for Quality, 6/6/16, http://asq.org/standards-shall-should //AY

SHALL

When used as an auxiliary verb, shall, according to Webster's Online Dictionary, “denotes a requirement that is mandatory whenever the criterion for conformance with the specification requires that there be no deviation” (2). This word implies obligation and is traditionally used by laws and regulations. For example, Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), “Drugs and Devices,” begins with the following:

“A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated –” (3).

Similarly, the FDA’s regulations frequently use shall to indicate mandatory requirements. In CFR - Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, Part 803, the regulation for medical device reporting, the English reporting requirement states:

“All reports required in this part which are submitted in writing or electronic equivalent shall be submitted to FDA in English” (4).

SHOULD

On the other hand, should “denotes a guideline or recommendation whenever noncompliance with the specification is permissible.” When used as an auxiliary verb, it expresses “a conditional or contingent act or state … or moral obligation” (5).

The statement “Incoming materials shall be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is mandatory. All incoming materials must be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. A deviation causes a noncompliance with the document.

In contrast, “Incoming materials should be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is a recommendation by the document writer. It allows the document users to make their own judgment calls.

In reality, the incoming materials will most likely be inspected before they are accepted. However, the document users at any time can make a deviation based on the specific situation, as long as the decision making is reasonable and logical. (Recall also that the word should does imply moral obligation.) Such deviation does not violate the document’s requirement.

Because of the built-in flexibility of the word, if the document writer intends to mandate a requirement, should is not an appropriate choice.

Black’s Law agrees—should isn’t certainBlack’s Law 68 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, Henry Campbell Black, Page 1549 //AY

SHOULD. The past tense of shall, St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Old. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080, ordinarily implying duty or obligation; Scarborough v. Walton, 36 Ga.App. 428, 136 S.E. 830. Kippenbrock v. Wabash R. Co., 270 Mo. 479, 194 S. W. 50, 51; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from "ought," U. S. v. Stickrath, D.C.Ohio, 242 F. 151, 153. It is not normally synonymous with "may", Williams v. Mt. Vernon Car Mfg. Co., 197 Ill.App. 271, 272; Elliott v. May es, 196 Ill.App. 605, 606; and although often interchangeable with the word "would," Barnett v. Savannah Electric Co., 15 Ga.App. 270, 82 S.E. 910, 911, it does not ordinarily express certainty as "will" sometimes does. Hubbard v. Turner Department Store Co., 220 Mo.App. 95, 278 S.W. 1060, 1061.

Strong admonition --- not mandatoryTaylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)

Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significance —one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition —but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

Should—MustShould means mustWords & Phrases 6 (Permanent Edition 39, p. 369)

C.D.Cal. 2005. “Should,” as used in the Social Security Administration’s ruling stating that an ALJ should call on the services of a medical advisor when onset must be inferred, means “must.”—Herrera v. Barnhart, 379 F.Supp.2d 1103.—Social S 142.5.

“Should” means must – its mandatoryForesi 32 (Remo Foresi v. Hudson Coal Co., Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A. 910; 1932 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239, 7-14, Lexis)

As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is also the preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century Dictionary: "Obliged or compelled (to); would have (to); must ; ought (to); used with an infinitive (without to) to express obligation, necessity or duty in connection with some act yet to be carried out." We think it clear that it is in that sense that the word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit, the word 'should' is not used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought to' and carries [***8] with it the sense of [*313] obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion. A natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate claimants who have been injured while doing something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify, provisions which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the hazardous occupation of mining.

Should—Not Must“Should” isn’t certain, as opposed to “must”Kaushik 16 Nimisha, “Difference Between Should and Must,” writer for DifferenceBetween.net, 6/8/16, http://www.differencebetween.net/language/grammar-language/difference-between-should-and-must/ //AY

Should vs Must

The words “should” and “must” are modal auxiliary verbs or simply modals. They provide information about the function of the main verb following it. Both “should” and “must” are similar in meaning except that “ must ” is a much stronger word as compared to “ should .”

“Should” is the past tense of “shall.” “Should” is used to denote recommendations , advice, or to talk about what is generally right or wrong within the permissible limits of society. For instance:

You should chew your food properly.

We should respect our parents.

You should stop smoking.

You must clean our car regularly.

In all these statements, there is a probability or recommendation of some kind.

“Must” is used to talk about an obligation or a necessity . It is used when people are compelled to do something. For instance:

You must clean the house as your mom is not well.

Here, it is imperative that you clean the house or else the house won’t be cleaned and remain untidy.

We must obey the law.

This statement compels us to abide by the law or we will have to face the punishment enforced by the law.

You must hurry if you have to catch the train.

In this statement, it is emphasized that you certainly have to move quickly as you are running late. If you do not hurry up, you will miss the train. This sentence is an example of a compellation for achieving a certain aim.

One must keep his word.

Here again the sentence directs that people are required to or are compelled to do something (here it is keeping one’s word) by the use of threat or force.

The main difference between the two words “should” and “must” is that “must” is a stronger word, as mentioned before. The probability of “must” is much more than that of “should. ” For instance:

You must do your homework now. (It is already late, and if you do not start doing your work now, you will not be able to finish your work on time. This will lead to punishment or a penalty.)

You should do your homework now. (It is the right time that you start doing your work.)

You must rest. (You are not well, and if you continue working, your health is going to get worse.)

You should take a rest. (You are tired, and if you do not take a rest, you are going to get sick.)

The synonyms of “should” include: ought, allow, feel, leave, become, suffer, sustain, allow, etc. The synonyms for “must” are: condition, demand, necessity, requirement, requisite, obligation, etc.

Summary:

“Must” represents more of an obligation while “should” represents a probability or recommendation.

Must

Must—CertainMust is the only certain word—federal law agreesCorsino 13 Dr. Bruce V, What's the only word that means mandatory? Here's what law and policy say about "shall, will, may and must." Federal Aviation Administration, 9/5/13, https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/plain_language/articles/mandatory/ //AY

We call "must" and "must not" words of obligation. "Must" is the only word that imposes a legal obligation on your readers to tell them something is mandatory . Also, "must not" are the only words you can use to say something is prohibited. Who says so and why?

Nearly every jurisdiction has held that the word "shall" is confusing because it can also mean "may, will or must." Legal reference books like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure no longer use the word "shall." Even the Supreme Court ruled that when the word "shall" appears in statutes, it means "may."

Bryan Garner, the legal writing scholar and editor of Black's Law Dictionary wrote that "In most legal instruments, shall violates the presumption of consistency…which is why shall is among the most heavily litigated words in the English language."

Those are some of the reasons why these documents compel us to use the word "must" when we mean "mandatory:"

The Federal Register Document Drafting Handbook (Section 3) states "Use ‘must’ instead of ‘shall’ to impose a legal obligation on your reader."

The Federal Plain Language Guidelines (page 25) (PDF) referred to in the Federal Plain Writing Act of 2010, compel the FAA and every federal department to "use ‘must,’ not ‘shall’" to indicate requirements.

FAA Plain Language Writing Order 1000.36, (page 4) (PDF) says avoid the word "shall" and use "must" to impose requirements, including contracts.

Until recently, law schools taught attorneys that "shall" means "must." That's why many attorneys and executives think "shall" means "must." It's not their fault. The Federal Plain Writing Act and the Federal Plain Language Guidelines only appeared in 2010. And the fact is, even though "must" has come to be the only clear, valid way to express "mandatory ," most parts of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) that govern federal departments still use the word "shall" for that purpose.

With time, laws evolve to reflect new knowledge and standards. During this transition, "must" remains the safe, enlightened choice not only because it imposes clarity on the concept of obligation, but also because it does not contradict any instance of "shall" in the CFRs." Right now, federal departments go through their documents to replace all the "shalls" with "must." It's a big hassle. If you look at page A-2, section q (PDF) of this link, it shows a sample of how a typical federal order describes this shift from "shall" to "must." Don't go through this tedious process. If you mean mandatory, write "must." If you mean prohibited, write "must not."

What should you say if someone tells you "shall is a perfectly good word?" Always agree with them because they're correct! But in your next breath, be sure to say "yes, shall is a perfectly good word, but it's not a perfectly good word of obligation."

Black’s Law agrees—must means mandatoryBlack’s Law 68 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, Henry Campbell Black, Page 1171-1172 //AY

MUST. This word, like the word "shall," is primarily of mandatory effect ; State ex rel. McCabe v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist. in and for Deer Lodge County, 106 Mont. 272, 76 P.2d 634, 637; and in that sense is used in antithesis to "may"; Emery v. First Nat. Bank, 32 N.D. 575, 156 N.W. 105, 109; Reinert Bros. Const. Co. v. Tootle, 200 Mo.App. 284, 206 S.W. 422, 424. But this meaning of the word is not the only one, and it is often used in a merely directory sense. Robinson v. City of Saginaw, 267 Mich. 557, 255 N.W. 396; Munro v. State, 223 N.Y. 208, 119 N.E. 444, 445; State v. Barnell, 109 Ohio St. 246, 142 N.E. 611, 614; and consequently is a synonym for the word. "may" not only in the permissive sense of that word; Tosti v. Sbano, 170 Misc. 828, 11 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323; Pleasant Grove Union School Dist. v. Algeo, 61 Cal.App. 660, 215 P. 726; but also in the mandatory sense which it sometimes has; People v. Highway Com'rs of Town of Anchor, 279 Ill. 542, 117 N.E. 56, 57.

Must is certainMerriam Webster No Date Definition of must, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/must //AY

3a : be obliged to : be compelled by social considerations to

I must say you're looking well

b : be required by law, custom, or moral conscience (see CONSCIENCE sense 1) to

we must obey the rules

c : be determined to

if you must go at least wait for me

d : be unreasonably or perversely compelled to

why must you argue

Must is certainCollins Dictionary No Date Definition of ‘must,’ https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/must_1 //AY

2. modal verb

You use must to indicate that it is necessary for something to happen, usually because of a rule or law .

Candidates must satisfy the general conditions for admission.

Mr Allen must pay Mr Farnham's legal costs.

Equipment must be supervised if children are in the house.

Reduce

Reduce—CertainReduce is certainMerriam Webster No Date Definition of reduce, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce //AY

3 : to bring to a specified state or condition

Reduce—CeaseReduce includes ceaseUS Code 9 (26 CFR 54.4980F-1, lexis)§ 54.4980F-1 Notice requirements for certain pension plan amendments significantly reducing the rate of future benefit accrual.

(c) Elimination or cessation of benefits. For purposes of this section, the terms reduce or reduction include eliminate or cease or elimination or cessation.

Reduce—EndReduce can mean endCFR 8 – Code of Federal Regulations (26 CFR 1.411(d)-3, TITLE 26 -- INTERNAL REVENUE REVISED AS OF APRIL 1, 2008 CHAPTER I -- INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, lexis)

(7) Eliminate; elimination; reduce; reduction. The terms eliminate or elimination when used in connection with a section 411(d)(6)(B) [26 USCS § 411(d)(6)(B)] protected benefit mean to eliminate or the elimination of an optional form of benefit or an early retirement benefit and to reduce or a reduction in a retirement-type subsidy. The terms reduce or reduction when used in connection with a retirement-type subsidy mean to reduce or a reduction in the amount of the subsidy. For purposes of this section, an elimination includes a reduction and a reduction includes an elimination.

Reduce—Not Cease/EndReduce doesn’t mean endWords and Phrases, 2 (vol 36B, p. 80)

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c.203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may “reduce” the witness fees and other costs, but “not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases” which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word “reduce,” in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish , lower, or bring to an inferior state .—Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

Reduce—LimitReduce means limitThesaurus No Date Reduce, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/reduce //AY

11. reduce - narrow or limit; "reduce the influx of foreigners"

tighten

confine, limit, throttle, trammel, restrain, restrict, bound - place limits on (extent or access); "restrict the use of this parking lot"; "limit the time you can spend with your friends"

Reduce means limitMacmillan Dictionary No Date Limit, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/limit_1 //AY

2 to reduce or control someone’s freedom to do what they want or someone’s ability to be effective

Lack of adequate testing limits the effectiveness of the research.

limit someone to something: Our remit limits us to recommendations concerning the law of insolvency.

limit someone to something: Most people limit themselves to a few techniques that work best for them.

be limited by something: They were limited by the amount of money they could spend on the production.

Reduce—Not Limit“Reduce” doesn’t mean “limit”WD No Date Wikidiff, Restrict vs Reduce - What's the difference? https://wikidiff.com/reduce/restrict //AY

As verbs the difference between restrict and reduce is that restrict is to restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine; as, to restrict worlds to a particular meaning; to restrict a patient to a certain diet while reduce is to bring down the size, quantity, quality, value or intensity of something; to diminish, to lower, to impair.

Limit means to set a cap—not reduceMacmillan Dictionary No Date Limit, https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/limit_1 //AY

1 to prevent a number, amount, or effect from increasing past a particular point

The hospital limits the number of visitors a patient can have.

The residents’ main demand is to limit the amount of heavy traffic using the street.

The regulations are designed to limit environmental damage.

limit something to something: The prime minister has pledged to limit classes to a maximum of 30 pupils.

General Conditions Core

Condition CP

1nc conditions – general solvency The CP creates a durable signal that spills over to affect future arms sales Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

When strategically applied, conditionality has the potential to mitigate risks, strengthen security partnerships, and incentivize good behavior. Policymakers can employ punitive conditionality to mitigate the risk that a partner country will abuse U.S. SSA Transparent, positive conditionality, in which U.S. policymakers collaborate with recipient countries to develop a road map for SSA, would help incentivize reform and likely result in stronger partnerships and a better alignment of policy objectives between donor and recipient countries 47 Conditioning SSA to promote interna-tional norms and human rights demonstrates U.S. commitment to these values, mandates better behavior among current partner countries, and may also signal and influence the behavior of those seeking SSA in the future. 48

2nc solvency – empirics Conditioning has empirically worked Erickson ’13 – Department of Political Science, Boston College

(Jennifer, “Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004” Journal of Peace Research 50(2) 159–174, 2013, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343312470472)//AP

From 1991 to 2003, major exporters halted legal arms transfers to Iraq – on paper and in practice.40 But was the embargo successful? Armed with better evidence about sender compliance, such questions deserve further research and debate. The persistence of the Iraqi regime despite severe sanctions might suggest failure (Pape, 1997). Yet the embargo seems to have ‘successfully restrained [the regime’s] military capabilities’ (Cortright & Lopez, 2002: 155), easing the 2003 invasion that contributed to Saddam Hussein’s downfall. What seems clear is that this time, senders complied. Explanations for the outcome – whether the embargo was effective or ineffective, however defined – must take supplier compliance into account. Indeed, this analysis shows that, on average, major exporters do restrict arms to embargoed recipients, although the effect has weakened somewhat in recent years. Policies concentrated on enhancing supplier compliance may therefore only go so far to improve embargo effectiveness. And despite their potential value, material penalties for embargo violations at the international or regional level seem unlikely to become institutionalized in the near future and are dependent on the interests and ability of political groups at the domestic level. Consequently, it is worth considering two additional points I do not test here to potentially explain and improve arms embargo success.

2nc solvency – general Their solvency deficits assume a lack of follow-through – but the CP fiats implementation and enforcement from the US’ side of the bargain Erickson ’13 – Department of Political Science, Boston College

(Jennifer, “Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004” Journal of Peace Research 50(2) 159–174, 2013, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343312470472)//AP

Events like this have contributed to intense debates about the effectiveness of sanctions in general and arms embargoes in particular. Nevertheless, when it comes to punishing states for offending behavior – nuclear weapons development, human rights abuses, conflict, and more – arms supplies are often (at least on paper) the first to go. Arms embargoes are symbolic gestures of disapproval, as well as practical measures to deny parties the means by which they perpetrate offenses. This connection seems straightforward, but while some experts advocate the use of arms embargoes, others question their ability to alter target behavior. Many agree that arms embargoes would be more effective if senders’ implementation were improved (e.g. Bondi, 2001; Boucher & Holt, 2009; Cortright & Lopez, 2001, 2002; Hufbauer et al., 2009; Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1995; Tierney, 2005). Better enforcement, from this perspective, means better compliance and therefore more effective embargoes. Yet important empirical questions about sender practice remain; namely, whether senders implement the embargoes to which they commit.

AT: positive vs negative conditionality DAsThere’s no meaningful difference Youngs ‘10 – Director General of FRIDE, and Associate Professor at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom

(Richard, Sept 2010, date accessed: 6.30.2019, “The end of democratic conditionality: good riddance?” FRIDE European Think Tank for Global Action, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130596/WP102_The_end_democratic_conditionality_ENG_set10.pdf)//AP

In light of the limits to coercive pressure, rewards-based conditionality is widely touted as a more productive policy option. It appears to offer the prospect of encouraging democratic reform without counter-productive intervention from the outside. However, what is presented as incentives-based political conditionality often crosses the line into largely unconditional engagement: rewards are invariably granted on the basis of no more than the vaguest of promises of future reforms. Conversely, the difference between positive and negative conditionality is not always perceived to be that great by many in target states: denial of an expected reward is not always seen as qualitatively different from the removal of an existing preference.

Theory

2nc conditions theory – real world NBProcess debates about conditions are uniquely valuable – “should we engage or use pressure” is a real-world debate with international political implicationsYoungs ‘10 – Director General of FRIDE, and Associate Professor at the University of Warwick, United Kingdom

(Richard, Sept 2010, date accessed: 6.30.2019, “The end of democratic conditionality: good riddance?” FRIDE European Think Tank for Global Action, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130596/WP102_The_end_democratic_conditionality_ENG_set10.pdf)//AP

The calculations of how to mix engagement and pressure judiciously are extremely difficult. The challenge of getting this balance right is reflected in the fact that Western governments and international institutions are criticised from both directions. Some critics berate them for overdoing the use of sanctions, because ministers have to be seen to be ‘doing something’ to assuage domestic public opinion. Conversely, other observers lament that the West unduly eschews democratic conditionality due to strategic self-interest. Debate becomes confused: Western powers are widely criticised for their unethical engagement with dictators; then as soon as they do adopt sanctions they are slammed for the neo-imperial imposition of their own values. Some commentators see the use of sanctions as unadulterated self-interest; but groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International tend to see the lack of sanctions as rendering stated commitments to human rights hollow – rather than as a legitimate tactical calculation.20

This working paper has stressed the highly circumscribed ways in which both negative and positive conditionality have been deployed in support of democratic reform. In formal terms, the commitment to political conditionality has not disappeared altogether. The Swedish development minister has, for example, stated: ‘the implementation of both negative and positive conditionality has been weak. If democratic development is to take place, we must dare to implement the tools we have at hand. While there is a need to recognise the diversity of democratic practices at country level, firmness on principles is still necessary.’21 Sweden’s aid programme for 2009–2011 commits to sharpening up the use of conditionality. Other states often make similar statements of intent.

2nc conditions theory – AT: predictability It’s predictable because conditions CPs access decades of political scholarship – just win a solvency deficit jeezErickson ’13 – Department of Political Science, Boston College

(Jennifer, “Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004” Journal of Peace Research 50(2) 159–174, 2013, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343312470472)//AP

As sanctions have become a more common feature of international governance since 1990 , so too have debates about their utility. Some argue that sanctions are valuable for changing (or helping to change) target behavior when properly specified and implemented (Bondi, 2001; Brooks, 2002; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot, 1990; Kirshner, 1997; Lektzian & Souva, 2007). By imposing material costs on an actor, sanctions can compel changes in its policies or practice. They are also a means by which the international community can signal disapproval, demonstrate resolve, and punish a target without using force (Baldwin, 1985; Guimelli, 2011; Wallensteen, Staibano & Eriksson, 2003). Others, however, are pessimistic about the ability of sanctions to achieve their goals (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 1995; Tierney, 2005; Tsebelis, 1990). Skeptics contend that sanctions cannot generate sufficiently high costs to compel a target to change course (Galtung, 1967; Pape, 1997). Targets may adapt, new suppliers can be found, and citizens may consolidate support around their governments. Some consider ‘smart’ sanctions more effective than comprehensive sanctions, because they can hit a regime where it hurts, without necessarily harming its general population. Yet even among smart sanctions supporters, questions persist about effectiveness (Brzoska, 2001; Cortright & Lopez, 2002; Gordon, 2011; Tostensen & Bull, 2002).

AT: Conditions top level

2ac conditions CP – unconditional key Any continuation of sales demonstrates failure to acknowledge culpability of gross violationsNewton ’17 – Professor @Vanderbilt Law School

(Michael, “An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen,” Vanderbilt University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971208)//AP

The current sale of arms to Saudi Arabia should be carefully assessed in light of the specific duties embedded in Section 502B. As a threshold issue, we have found no evidence that either President Obama or President Trump notified Congress of any “extraordinary circumstances” warranting assistance despite Saudi Arabia’s consistent pattern of gross human rights violations.68 Thus, the threshold exception to Section 502B likely does not apply.

Saudi Arabia presents an apparent prima facie case for the immediate cessation of sales under the FAA. There are consistent and credible reports of clear violations of internationally recognized human rights as defined by the Act. Whether or not the specific assistance provided to Saudi Arabia is used to further violations of human rights is not a statutory factor to this analysis. Instead, the statute only looks to human rights violations—including flagrant denials of the right to life under international humanitarian law—writ large.

For the last five years, in the annual reports required by Section 502B for the purpose of informing the President’s determination of whether a country is eligible for security assistance, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) noted multiple violations that clearly fall within the statute’s definition.69 For example, the FAA defines “prolonged detention without trial” as a grave human rights abuse. 70 The 2016 Human Rights Report found that “[a]uthorities held persons for months and sometimes years without charge or trial”.71

The report also notes a number of abuses amounting to the “flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty or security of person” which are also, by the FAA’s definition, gross human rights violations.72 Saudi authorities sentenced to death several individuals for conduct allegedly undertaken while they were minors,73 in clear contravention of Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,74 to which Saudi Arabia is a party.75 Human rights groups reported that the trials failed to meet international standards because inter alia the courts allowed the admission of forced confessions into evidence.76

2ac conditions CP – fill in DA Empirical examples prove that leveraging arms sales leads to fill-in, which is far worse than the status quoRounds 19 – U.S. Air Force F-15E pilot and a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in International Relations. He is a U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate and a former Mirage 2000 exchange pilot with the French Air Force (Ray, 4-16-2019, “THE CASE AGAINST ARMS EMBARGOS, EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA”, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/, accessed 7-1-2019) //DYang

Arms sales are useful tools for maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is rarely successful . Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead, punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to change behavior.

Consider Indonesia and Egypt. In 2015, Egypt agreed to purchase nearly 50 Russian MiG-29M/M2s and more than two-dozen French Rafales. This represented a shocking turn of events after more than three decades of purchasing only American-made fighter jets. It was also driven largely by the U.S. embargo put in place in 2013, after the Egyptian army’s removal of then-President Mohamed Morsi, who had won the presidency in a 2012 election. The embargo caused significant tension between the two states driven by “an Egyptian sense that they were at a point of mortal peril” while the United States was moralizing about democratic reforms. Remarkably, the United States lifted the embargo in 2015 with virtually no change in Egyptian policies, no official U.S. “democracy certification” , and Egyptian military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen . The U.S. arms embargo as a tool of coercive change was an abject failure.

A similar story played out in Indonesia more than a decade prior. A long-time arms client of the United States with no history of Russian imports , Indonesia announced a deal with Russia in 2003 to purchase Russian Su-27/30s. While Indonesia was always far more politically neutral than Egypt, this remarkable turnaround in arms sourcing diversification appears to be the result of a U.S. arms embargo implemented in 1999 in response to Indonesia’s apparent human rights violations carrying out heavy-handed military actions in East Timor. Furious at U.S. meddling in something the government considered a domestic issue, Indonesia looked instead to Russia with the specific intent to “overcome the effects of [U.S.] arms sales restrictions.” In other words, Indonesia looked to diversify, not capitulate. Indonesia continued sourcing Russian arms even after the United States lifted the embargo in 2005. Perhaps most remarkably, even after the United States agreed to give Indonesia 24 F-16s in 2012 , the archipelago state still agreed to purchase 11 Russian Su-35s . The U.S. attempt at coercion not only failed but continues to perpetuate negative strategic effects today.

2ac conditions CP – conditions fail Unilateral conditions fail – no mutual understanding = no follow-through Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

U.S. policymakers lack a common framework that enables them to assess the various factors at play in a security relationship and make judgments about whether placing conditions on assistance will be effective.49 This deficit has led to the ad hoc use and narrow application of conditions.

One of conditionality's greatest weaknesses results from the narrow way policymakers employ it. Different interests between donor and recipient countries often lead to different policy objectives. To bring goals into alignment, donors place conditions on SSA However, U.S. policymakers often fail to consider partner countries' priorities and political contexts when designing conditions, and they rarely work with partner countries to establish mutually beneficial SSA programs and acceptable conditions. Instead, U.S. policymakers often impose unilateral conditions, exacerbating disagreements between partners.

1ar conditions CP – conditions failA vast consensus of studies agree that leveraging arms sales rarely yields positive effects—structural factors prevent effective bargainingKrause 91 – Canadian political scientist known for his work on international security and armed violence (Keith, September 1991, “Military Statecraft: Power and Influence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer Relationships”, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 35, Issue 3, Pgs. 313-336, DOI: 10.2307/2600702, accessed 7-1-2019) //DYang

Other authors do admit the complex and nuanced nature of the relationship between arms transfers and influence, and their insights in specific cases are often more profound than their Procrustean methodological boxes would allow. Neuman's discussion of the continued dominance of superpower influence in recent wars relies upon an implicit understanding of the structural power the United States and Soviet Union possess, as when she notes the "degree to which the choices of recipients are circumscribed by financial constraints," or that "a subtle blend of LDC needs and the limited capabilities of other suppliers have enabled the superpowers to regulate the flow of major weapons to LDCs" (1986: 113, 114). Perhaps the only other writers who go beyond bargaining power are geostrategists who concentrate on the superpower global conflict, thereby acknowledging the importance of structural and hegemonic considerations as the measure of importance of arms transfer relationships (Harkavy, 1980). But the most interesting observations on influence have not been integrated into an overall analysis of the benefits of arms transfers as tools of influence, and conclusions tend to be of the following sort: "The provision of arms may provide influence and leverage, arms sales can be important tools of foreign policy . . . but experience suggests that the political value of arms sales . . . can be overrated " (Pierre, 1981 b: 18-19); or "Influence gained through arms transfers can be ephemeral; it is difficult if not impossible to measure, and can disappear quickly" (Hammond et aI., 1983:271). As one recent study concluded, "much of the literature focuses on the mechanics of the arms trade. Researchers . . . continue to . . . fail to integrate their insights into a broader conceptual framework" (Neuman and Harkavy, 1980:vii).

There are a number of reasons why the approach outlined in this paper helps advance the debate and is more than an exercise in definitional scholasticism. First, one can now better evaluate the specific claims made for the goals pursued by patron states. For example, if "Soviet military aid is designed to shape the commitments of Third World military elites" (Wharton, 1983:7) (i.e. to gain hegemonic power), evaluations of this claim that show the Soviet Union has not successfully used arms transfers as a tool of bargaining power are inadequate. Or if "arms transfer policies . . . have become central to the process of negotiating peace in the Middle East" (Pierre, 1978: 149), one can ask: "How have they become central: as tools of bargaining, structural, or hegemonic power? What were the conditions under which past successes were enjoyed, and are they likely to persist?"

Second, the distinction between bargaining and structural power clarifies a confusion in the arms transfer literature over the concept of reverse influence (Carr, 1977; Lewis, 1980:187; Pierre, 1981b:17-18). Analysts agree that insofar as a client possesses goods (ports, airfields, a strong anticommunist or antiimperialist stance) the patron desires, its position in the relationship is improved, to the point that in some cases the client has influence over the patron. But because this influence is rarely manifest as bargaining power (with threats or promises in return for military assistance), it is analytically difficult to

capture. Rather, what the client usually possesses is the ability to affect the patron's security complex, which is a form of structural power that will be manifested indirectly. If, for example, Soviet arms transfers are directed towards improving its strategic assets vis-a-vis the U.S. (and vice versa), then the notion of "reverse structural influence" can help explain why with some clients the Soviet Union may not enjoy much bargaining power. The inability of President Gorbachev to nudge Cuba (and Vietnam) to perestroika despite massive financial subsidies, or of the United States to persuade Israel to move on the Middle East peace process, may be examples of this.

Third, one can now understand the continued reliance of policy makers on arms transfers as influence tools, a phenomenon that puzzles those (such as Sylvan, 1977) who point to the repeated failure of attempts to exercise bargaining power. Policy makers' behaviour appears to reflect a belief that the maintenance or creation of structural power is the dominant motive for an arms transfer relationship. The 1985-86 debate in the U.S. over arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan illustrates this: Congressional leaders opposing sales linked them to specific progress in the Middle East peace process (i.e., as tools of bargaining power), while successive administrations have emphasized the broader structural or hegemonic power benefits derived from supplying both sides in an ongoing conflict (Cranston and Levine, 1986). Although at least one author has analyzed arms transfer relationships in terms of the ability of suppliers "to reduce the options of states engaged in conflict" (structural power) and recognized that "despite the conventional wisdom that [such instruments] have little utility, security assistance programs have served the interests of the United States well" (Neuman, 1988: 1045, 1065), the case could be more apposite with the analytical distinctions sketched above. 21

Historically has never worked Sislin 94 – PHD faculty member at the National Intelligence University in Bethesda, MD (John, 12-1-1994, “Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 4, Pgs. 665-689, DOI: 10.1177/0022002794038004004, accessed 7-1-2019) //DYang

Over the 1950-1992 period, the United States frequently attempted to influence other countries by manipulating its arms exports. The United States has tried to restore constitutional democracies in South America, end hostilities in the Middle East, obtain military bases throughout the world, and foster human rights all via the judicious application of its arms transfer policies. These efforts succeeded slightly less than half of the time.

Five variables appear to affect the outcome of an influence attempt. Positive sanctions were found to increase the probability of success, although the fact that "carrots" are more effective must be weighed against the negative consequences of arms sales, such as increased propensity for conflict. Attempts to change the recipient's foreign policy were also more likely to succeed, suggesting that no matter how noble American efforts are, getting a recipient government to be more democratic or advance human rights is very difficult. Contrary to the hypothesis, civilian regimes proved more susceptible to influence attempts, reinforcing the conclusion that it is difficult to make military governments more democratic because both the policy type (domestic) and the regime type (military) hinder such efforts. As the recipient obtained more American arms, it became more vulnerable to United States influence attempts, reinforcing the supplier's use of positive sanctions, which may foster dependence. Finally,

American successes seemed related to American power as influence attempts succeeded more often prior to the period of hegemonic decline.

Among the apparently nonrelevant variables. two points can be raised. Many of the variables that the United States can control, such as the supplier characteristics, did not salient to the outcome of the influence attempt. Moreover. at least two cases, conventional wisdom is Challenged: This analysis failed to support the notion that nations in conflict arc more susceptible to influence or that indigenous arms production reduced vulnerability.

Finally, the question of when influence attempts raises the difficult question of why. Although we can now describe a variety of arms influence attempts and can predict outcomes based the nature pf the five variables suggested above, it is still not entirely resolved why arms influence attempts succeed or fail. The nature of the attempt and some international domestic forces directly affect the recipient's calculus and the attempt's outcome. Moreover, only those international contextual factors that easy to fit into the amount of supplier arms always operate in the same way and apparently are easier to interpret in terms of impact on costs, benefits, and probabilities. Other international factors, such as trade or precedent, presumably are not considered by recipients who are unsure how these factors operate on their calculus. Domestic factors may be important in conjunction with international factors (e.g., defense allocation interacts with dependence on the supplier’s arms), suggesting the possibility of indirect effects between the type of attempt, and international and domestic factors. Together these findings suggest the start of a model based on expected utility and decision making, which explains the determinants of successful influence.

The United States continues to use arms influence attempts. President Clinton in early 1993, for example, suspended US military assistance to Guatemala to attempt to greater stability (New York May 28, 1993). Since then, suspicions have been applied against and Burma and Zaire. That these efforts have not succeeded to date is less surprising and more mysterious given this article’s findings.

2ac conditions CP – permutation The aff’s withdrawal creates pressureGoodman ’18 – founding co-editor-in-chief of Just Security, the Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law

(Ryan Goodman, 10-22-2018, "Options for Congress to Respond to Saudi Transgressions: Here's What Works according to Former Senior U.S. Officials," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/61172/effective-ineffective-congressional-responses-saudi-arabia-arm-sales-sanctions-khashoggi/, accessed 6-25-2019)//AP

Another former senior official supported a clean break from U.S. support for the Yemen war rather than a piecemeal approach. “On Yemen, the best move would be to support the Khanna-Murphy War Powers resolution. A clean end to US military support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen is better than more targeted efforts to police that support (like the bar on in-flight refueling). Suspending existing DCS licenses and placing limits on future foreign military sales for things like air-to-ground strike capabilities would be a natural supplement to this approach,” the former official said.

Jeffrey Prescott, who served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf States on the National Security Council and now a strategic consultant to the Penn Biden Center expressed a similar perspective, “My view is that the callous murder of Mr. Khashoggi — and the Trump administration’s clear impulse to sweep it under the rug — demonstrates how far the relationship with Saudi Arabia has gotten off track, and the need for serious consequences. As a start, we could use this moment to extricate ourselves from military involvement in the disastrous war in Yemen, a step that is long overdue. Ideally we would simultaneously help push for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict – necessary, not easy, and very unlikely given how little effort the Trump administration has put into serious diplomacy. But washing our hands of involvement in the war, even in the absence of a US diplomatic push, will still put pressure on UAE and Saudi to end the conflict.”

1ar conditions CP – permutation And all arms sales include implicit conditions – here’s an expert Shapiro ’12 – Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, served as Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton

(Andrew J. Shapiro (2012) A New Era for U.S. Security Assistance, The Washington Quarterly, 35:4, 23-35, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2012.725021)//AP

This is also why the State Department carefully scrutinizes all arms transfers. When we partner with a country or sell a defense article, that engagement must be deemed to advance broader U.S. foreign policy. In accordance with the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act, the Secretary of State oversees and authorizes all arms sales to ensure they meet this goal. The Bureau of Political—Military Affairs also ensures that all sales and arms transfers are reviewed and assessed. Every item transferred must meet with U.S. legal obligations , foreign policy goals, and values. If an export license or transfer is approved, foreign recipients are bound by end-use restrictions and conditions. This grants U.S. government officials access to monitor how a country will use that defense article throughout its lifetime. The United States also investigates potential violations and takes appropriate action depending on the nature and scope of the infraction. Importantly, the transfer of items above a certain value also requires the approval of Congress, which helps ensure a generally broad support for all significant arms transfers.

2ac conditions CP – no enforcement The CP is un-enforceable – too many flaws within EUMDalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

As indicated in the flowchart above, DOD is taking steps to improve its planning process for SSA, designing a new system to distill partner and U.S. objectives, requirements, and M9E criteria. Policymakers at DOD have developed a "concept-first approach" to encourage upfront analysis and strong program design. Broadly, however, planning of SSA programs and activities is still inhibited by US. agencies' failure to coordinate with partner countries and with each other. U.S. agencies responsible for SSA may not coordinate with partner countries and design projects with both U.S. and partner country objectives in mind. This can result in a misalignment of goals, decreased partner country buy-in, or diminished strategic impact Lack of interagency coordina- tion and a dearth of strategic guidance documents hinder the U.S. government's ability to prioritize funding and resources, though both DOD and DOS are taking steps to improve these gaps_23 In addition, many experts in the DOD operational community worry that a lengthy planning, monitor-ing, and evaluation process will impede the U.S. ability to respond to short-term operational requirements critical to U.S. interests (e.g„ terrorist threats).

Several factors contribute to inadequate monitoring of U.S. SSA. First, the U.S. government lacks a central system that tracks all SSA and is accessible to all the relevant stakeholders. With dozens of offices in different agencies responsible for developing and administering SSA programs, it is difficult for planners and implementers to visualize the full picture of SSA programming for a country or region.24 Second, the system is only beginning to adapt to design programs with SMART objectives and strong feedback loops that facilitate M&E_ Without specific goals and clear metrics identified in the planning stage, effective monitoring and evaluation are nearly impossible. Third, most agencies' workforces do not receive adequate training on program design, planning, and M8E. Thus, instead of focusing on the long-term implications and objectives of SSA programs and activities, agencies instead fixate on present-day relations and short-term outcomes_25

Well-designed and administered ELIM programs reduce the security risks inherent in transfers of arms and equipment. However, the U.S. government occasionally struggles to implement ELIM programs, for several reasons. First, while there is abundant policy guidance for the implementa- tion of DoD's Golden Sentry program, there is a dearth of guidance for Dogs Blue Lantern pro- gram. For instance, Blue Lantern policy does not specify the criteria U.S. embassy employees should use to determine whether to make site visits to partner nation military facilities to validate Blue Lantern compliance_26 Instead, all site visits are deemed optional and are thus unevenly conducted Second, government audits have demonstrated that agencies struggle to maintain record-keeping systems on ELIM implementation. Third, due to staffing transitions and limited staffing, U.S. embassies sometimes lack the personnel to carry out routine ELIM in a timely manner. 2 Finally, "pseudo" FMS programs (those that do not require partner nation signature on requisite program paperwork), such as the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF),

are not subjected to Golden Sentry monitoring and thus rely on other (and at times inconsistent) embassy and intelligence reporting sources to ensure appropriate use_28

1ar conditions CP – no enforcement Lebanon proves Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

Case Vignette: Lebanon U.S. attempts to monitor SSA to Lebanon and evaluate its impact illustrate the importance of rigorous and highlight weaknesses and gaps in this mechanism.

Lebanon is a partner in the fight against al aaeda and ISIS. However, Hezbollah, an Iran-backed Shi'ite militia, political party, and U.S.-designated terrorist organization, plays a significant role in Lebanese politics and security_2g This presents a challenge for IJ_S_ policymakers seeking to increase the capacity of Lebanese security forces but wishing to avoid strengthening Hezbollah_30

In the past decade, US agencies have allocated hundreds of millions of dollars for equipment and training to the government of Lebanon as part of U.S. efforts to build partner capacity, combat terrorism, and support the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.31 In 2016 alone, the United States provided $221 million in equipment and training to Lebanese security forces. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Syria, U.S. efforts to enhance the capacity of the Leba- nese Armed Forces (LAF) to secure its borders have intensified, and U.S. assistance has been designated as "an extremely high priority."32 Nevertheless, long-standing concerns regarding the potential of U.S. assistance and weapons to benefit Hezbollah persist.

U.S. policymakers have attempted to mitigate risks through M8E, including robust ELIM provisions. However, a 2014 government report found gaps in DOD and DOS efforts to document and monitor •the physical security of some U.S. equipment transferred to Lebanese security forces."33 In 2016, photos of a Hezbollah parade featured what appeared to be U.S. M113 armored personnel carriers, raising questions about whether the equipment had been transferred to Hezbollah by the LAF_34 Additionally, policymakers have struggled to predict the impact of military assistance to Lebanon. Will assistance be funneled to Hezbollah, or will it buttress the LAF as a counterweight to Hez- bollah in the control of territory and the use of force in Lebanon?35 If the United States halts or reduces military assistance, will it create a power vacuum for Hezbollah to fi11736 These are issues U.S. policymakers and planners must continually monitor and evaluate at the programmatic and strategic levels when administering SSA in Lebanon.

2ac conditions CP – links to politics The CP requires cuts in political capital Grinberg ’19 – PhD Candidate in Political Science at Stanford University

(Marc Toby Grinberg, Counterbalancing: Preventing Misuse in Military Capacity Building, May 16, 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b6d0f2145776ec70d7e32cc/t/5cdd82a89140b71e5e44c516/1558020782457/Marc+Grinberg+-+Counterbalancing.pdf)//AP

Bureaucratic actors also become invested in the status quo because military transfers have a “lubricating” effect on diplomacy (Stanley and Pearton 1972; Pierre 1982). The former U.S. ambassadors I spoke to emphasized the role that arms transfers play in providing diplomats a “foot in the door” for initiating high-level conversations on other priorities (Author interviews of former U.S. ambassadors 2017). Once an arms-transfer relationship is established, I was told, the recipient comes to expect status-quo levels and any deviation is seen as having “significant political meaning” (Author interviews of former National Security Council officials 2017). This problem is exacerbated by the extended duration of U.S. budget cycles. It can be four years from proposal to disbursement of security assistance, meaning that any change is public and thus “risks blow back.” Diplomats “don’t want to poison relations” and threaten cooperation on other issues with the agent, so they are willing to expend much political capital to prevent Washington officials from making cuts that would 14 “rock the boat” (Author interviews of Defense Department analysts 2016). To the chagrin of the analysts with whom I spoke, who see it as their job to get results from arms transfers, the U.S. rarely punishes agents that misuse (Author interviews of State Department analysts 2016).

2ac conditions CP – AT: uncondo = normal meansHistorically, we’ve used different forms of conditions Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

All US security assistance to foreign partners carries conditions, in terms of how the assistance will be utilized and for what purpose or objective.39 Historically, U.S. policymakers have employed negative conditionality, which entails threatening to end, suspend, or reduce assistance to partner countries if certain conditions are not met.40 For instance, ELIM programs ensure that U.S. defense articles transferred to partner countries are used in accordance with the terms and conditions of the transfer agreement and U.S. law_41 While the threat to curtail aid may be useful in putting pressure on a partner country, the threat is only as good as the donor country's willingness to enforce it and the partner country's dependence on the United States* Additionally, by impossing unilateral conditions on SSA, the United States may undermine efforts to build an effective and collaborative partnership with the recipient country

Since the Cold War, development organizations have sought to positively condition economic assistance to encourage democratic reforms and good governance initiatives. In the realm of SSA, the United States has employed positive conditionality to increase partner country buy-in and incentivize reform. For instance, since 2007 the United States has sought to develop Lebanese Armed Forces' special operations forces (SOF) capacity to counter Sunni extremist groups in Lebanon_43 The United States rewarded Lebanon's improved performance by providing increased capabilities_44 Today, Lebanese SOF are a critical partner in containing the Islamic State and al aaeda affiliates 45

2ac conditions CP – AT: pressure/embargo CPsCP can’t solve – international arms embargos are empirically violated Moore ’10 – University of Missouri–Columbia, Political Science

(Matthew, Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(4) 593-615, May 14, 2010, date accessed: 6.30.2019, “Arming the Embargoed: A Supply-Side Understanding of Arms Embargo Violations” https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002710369085)//AP

Embargoes may risk creating an incentive for violations by increasing the utility of an arms transfer from the exporting state. States can use arms to garner concessions from other states and arms embargoes make the value of the transfer greater. Evidence from the model supports the argument that states violate embargoes to advance political interests in two ways. First, states will make transfers to prevent the embargoed state from becoming vulnerable from a lack of weapons. The predictive power of arms import dependence also provides evidence that states will use weapons to advance other agendas. As the example of the Sudan shows, states will use arms as a form of influence to get future concessions from the state. Second, import dependence can be an indicator of similar political interests. Even though arms transfer relationships may not be formal alliances, they do represent cases of political alignment (Kinsella 1998). High levels of dependence can be indicative of high levels of political alignment. This is further supported by the effect the alliance portfolio standards have on the volume of arms transferred.

Leverage Core

Leverage Good

UQ – yes leverageYes leverage – countries perceive fill-in as infeasible Guay ’18 – Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University

(Terrence Guay, 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998, accessed 6-25-2019)//AP

US leverage

While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term.

First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary.

After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia.

The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies.

That is why the U.S. has significant leverage in this aspect of the relationship. Any Saudi threat to retaliate against a ban on U.S. arms sales by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

UQ – yes leverage – Saudi The Yemen situation is escalating—the US has leverage now but isn’t using itFenton-Harvey 6/14/19 – journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, international relations, and humanitarian issues within the Middle East and North Africa. He has particularly focused on the Yemen conflict, Libya and Gulf Cooperation Council regional foreign policy. He has also studied history and Middle East studies at the University of Exeter, in the United Kingdom (Jonathan, 6-14-19, “Will Yemen’s War Escalate Further?”, LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/will-yemens-war-escalate-further/, accessed 6-24-19) //DYang

For Riyad h however, the attack serves as a perfect justification to prolong their war efforts , destabilize and control Yemen , and empower their own ruling candidate . Furthermore, Saudi Arabia claims that previous Houthi missiles struck close to Mecca, which it presents as a threat to a key Islamic holy site.

Though Houthis have received limited support from Iran, they are not an Iranian proxy and have other reasons for pursuing their goals. This narrative of “Iranian proxies” has been damaging to peace efforts. The UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash has also argued that the Houthis are responsible for the violence and are also a proxy. The UAE, not Saudi Arabia, has already spearheaded the attack on Hodeidah and will likely further up pressure against the Houthis.

According to reports of the Houthis advancing inside Saudi territory, the faction is directly threatening parts of the kingdom. As a result, Riyadh may feel compelled to take harsher action and not just target the Houthis with airstrikes. It has already imposed a harsh blockade on Yemen’s airports, along with multiple sea and land ports, and could now seek to impose harsher restrictions.

Ultimately, Yemenis will suffer the most, especially as Saudi Arabia struggles to suppress the Houthis, who excel at fighting and navigating in Yemeni territory. The war has already restricted the flow of vital goods. Even when goods are available, Yemenis struggle to afford them due to high unemployment and inflation. With cholera once again spreading, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, which the UN already calls the world’s worst, could deepen.

Rather than scaling back support for Saudi Arabia because of its harmful role in Yemen, Donald Trump has embraced the narrative that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy and sold $8 billion of weapons to Riyadh in May, on top of America’s already vast support to the coalition. This comes amid congressional efforts to halt Washington’s support for the Yemen war.

Congressional support for ending America’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s war could be a key factor in forcing Saudi Arabia to back away from Yemen and support peace negotiations, as the United States has leverage over the kingdom. Future peace talks must strongly address Saudi Arabia’s role which increasingly aggravates tensions, rather than just focusing on the Yemen war, to prevent the conflict deepening.

Impact – Saudi/Terror Unquestioned support risks further escalation—only US intervention through leverage can bring about a peaceful resolution and prevent terror Cammack and Sokolsky 17 – Cammack is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Sokolsky is non-resident senior fellow at Carnegie (Perry and Richard, 4-10-17, “Doubling Down on America’s Misadventure in Yemen”, War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/doubling-down-on-americas-misadventure-in-yemen/, accessed 6-28-19) //DYang

While all eyes are focused on Syria, the United States is busy making extremely bad situation in Yemen even worse. In the wake of the recent Washington visit of Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Trump administration has significantly increased its support for the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. But lacking clear objectives, a plausible theory of victory, or an exit strategy, neither the United States nor Saudi Arabia is playing a winning hand in Yemen. While there may be opportunities in Yemen and elsewhere in the region for U.S. cooperation with the Sunni Arabs in containing Iran, siding with Saudi Arabia and its partners in Yemen’s civil war has implicated America in a strategically ill-conceived and morally reprehensible military campaign and risks dragging the United States into a quagmire.

The Trump administration has articulated three primary priorities in the Middle East — aggressive action against Sunni terrorist groups, increased efforts to counteract Iranian influence, and improved relations with traditional regional allies and partners. At first glance, an escalation of U.S. military involvement in Yemen checks all three boxes: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is al-Qaeda’s most dangerous franchise. Iranian influence in Yemen is expanding. U.S.-Saudi relations are emerging from the rough patch of the latter years of the Obama administration. For a new president eager to project a stronger image of the United States, doubling down on the Saudi-led effort to crush the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels seems like a good bet. And what could be more enticing to Trump than succeeding in Yemen where the Obama administration failed?

Dancing to the Saudi Tune

In March 2015, the Obama administration reluctantly agreed to provide limited, but critical, support to the Saudi-led military intervention in the form of intelligence sharing, air-to-air refueling, logistics support, and weapons sales. Expecting perhaps that the campaign would be limited in duration, intensity, and scope, the administration hoped to secure the kingdom’s tacit acquiescence to the pending Iranian nuclear agreement and reassure the royal family of the U.S. commitment to Saudi security. The Saudis played to this anxiety with exaggerated claims that the Obama administration had abandoned Saudi Arabia for the sake of currying favor with Iran. Riyadh also played the credibility card, arguing that America was no longer a reliable security partner because of its failure to enforce the chemical weapons red line in Syria and to topple the Assad regime after Obama said that the Syrian dictator must go. Trump’s April 6 decision to use military force against the Syrian air force should put an end, at least temporarily, to Saudi complaints about Washington’s supposed credibility gap.

Saudi Arabia’s concerns weren’t completely unfounded. The Houthi takeover of the capital of Sana’a in September 2014, coupled with (implausible) fears of a possible strategic U.S.-Iranian realignment,

created a sense of panic in Riyadh that the kingdom might face in Yemen what Israel endures in Lebanon — a well-armed, deeply entrenched, Iranian-supported militia on its back doorstep. But by agreeing to cover the Saudi bet that it could bomb the Houthis into submission, the Obama administration emboldened the kingdom and their coalition partners to take greater risks in Yemen in a textbook example of “moral hazard.”

While America’s overriding strategic priority in Yemen is to defeat and destroy AQAP, the top Saudi priorities were, in the private words of one senior Saudi prince, “Iran, Iran, and Iran.” Saudi diplomacy deserves credit for persuading successive U.S. administrations that safeguarding America’s security interests in Yemen could be safely outsourced to Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states. U.S. interests would have been better protected had Washington heeded the advice of Hans Morgenthau to “never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you.”

Meanwhile, signs of disagreement have intermittently appeared between Saudi Arabia and its key coalition partner, the United Arab Emirates. The announcement last June, by Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, that the Emiratis were ending ground combat operations in Yemen against Houthi rebels was premature. Their forces continue to be involved in the campaign against the Houthis. But the country is prioritizing expanded counterterrorism efforts against AQAP, while deepening cooperation with the United States military. U.A.E. troops took the lead in liberating the port city of Mukalla last spring from AQAP, and Emirati special forces have conducted joint operations in Yemen with U.S. Navy SEALs.

Do No More Harm

The U.S. government has little understanding of Yemen’s complex tribal society and even less ability to affect internal Yemeni politics. However, Washington does have a keen interest in avoiding three disastrous outcomes. The first is state collapse, which would worsen Yemen’s humanitarian catastrophe. The second is the emergence of a Yemeni Hezbollah in the Arabian Peninsula. And the third, which is the most important from the standpoint of U.S. security, is the creation of an AQAP safe haven from which further attacks against the U.S. homeland could be organized. All three outcomes — and, paradoxically, an expansion of Iranian influence in Yemen — appear closer today than two years ago, when Saudi Arabia and their coalition partners embarked on their benighted military adventure with no clear political strategy for how to end it.

The United Nations estimates more than 10,000 civilians have been killed and 3 million displaced from their homes since the Saudi intervention began. But this could be just the tip of the iceberg. According to UNICEF, 2 million Yemini children suffer from acute malnutrition, and 60,000 children died last year of preventable causes associated with malnutrition. On March 22, Greg Gottlieb, the acting assistant administrator for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that with 17 million Yemenis (60 percent of the population) suffering from food insecurity and 7 million unable to survive without food assistance, Yemen is “the largest food security emergency in the world.”

The conflict and humanitarian crisis appear to be converging as Saudi-allied forces mass around the Houthi-controlled city of Hodeidah. An estimated 70 percent of Yemen’s food supplies enters the port city, but the surrounding region, one of Yemen’s poorest, is already at severe risk for famine, and relief

organizations worry that widespread fighting there could have catastrophic humanitarian implications. The Trump administration has yet to decide whether it plans to support this coalition attack.

If the Saudis and their partners had hoped their intervention would project strength, in fact, the opposite has happened. Iran has exploited, on the cheap, the Saudi-led campaign, and thus made the expansion of Iranian influence in Yemen a Saudi self-fulfilling prophecy. The costs of the Saudi air campaign, which makes heavy use of expensive air-to-ground munitions, have been estimated at $200 million a day. By contrast, Iranian support for the Houthis is more cost effective, consisting mostly of training, advisors, and ground munitions. While this support has certainly increased over time, the vast majority of the Houthi arsenal — notwithstanding occasional reports of Houthi use of Iranian-supplied cruise missiles and drones — was seized from Yemeni army stockpiles, including its large Soviet-era SCUD inventories.

Descriptions of the Houthis as Iranian proxies are overstated. But the longer the conflict continues the more likely the Houthis will evolve into the type of IRGC-supported militias operating in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, with Riyadh’s attention increasingly focused on Yemen, Iran’s hand in the Levant has actually been freed, as evidenced by the Saudi withdrawal of financial support from Lebanon and its apparently reduced involvement in Syria.

AQAP has taken advantage of state collapse, growing sectarianism, and civil war, all exacerbated by the Saudi intervention, to dramatically expand both its size and political influence. Notwithstanding U.A.E. efforts to expel AQAP from Mukalla, the Saudi-led coalition has more generally not successfully contested the group’s growth. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, AQAP has become stronger than ever, having grown from several hundred fighters in 2009 to roughly 4,000 today. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s understandable reluctance to embark on a full-scale land invasion of Yemen has worked to AQAP’s favor, since Saudi Arabia is dependent on a constantly evolving patchwork of local tribal militias and loyalist forces which AQAP fighters have penetrated. In Taiz, for example, Yemen’s third largest city and cultural capital, there are reports that AQAP members form an important component of the Saudi-backed anti-Houthi coalition.

In short, over the past two years both Iran and AQAP have greatly benefited from the ongoing civil war in Yemen. Increased U.S. support will allow the Saudi military to escalate its air campaign, but air power alone is unlikely to be decisive, and the results will likely further entrench Iran and AQAP, while doing little to make Saudi Arabia more secure. Moreover, supporting the brutal Saudi air campaign — which U.N. advisors have warned “may amount to war crimes” — risks making America complicit in a humanitarian calamity.

Give Peace a Chance

History has shown that the longer localized Middle East conflicts fester the more likely they are to metastasize into geopolitical contests which empower and embolden the most radical actors. Hezbollah didn’t exist in Lebanon before the 1982 Israeli invasion and al-Qaeda was barely present in Iraq before 2003. But today, Hezbollah is the dominant military force in Lebanon and al-Qaeda in Iraq has given way to an even more brutal progeny, ISIL.

A key to halting the further growth of sectarianism and radicalism in Yemen and the chaos which feeds extremism is to de-escalate the fighting and to negotiate a comprehensive peace based on a formula for power sharing that is acceptable to the country’s warring factions and tribes.

Unfortunately, multiple iterations of U.N.-led peace negotiations have faltered in large part because Riyadh has been unwilling to accept a compromise that would give the Houthis a larger political stake. Progress toward a political settlement would not solve Yemen’s myriad security problems, but it would facilitate the distribution of desperately needed humanitarian assistance. A full rupture in relations between Iran and the Houthis is unrealistic, but in the context of a political negotiation, it might be possible to find creative ways to reinforce U.N. Security Council resolution 2216, which prohibits arms shipments to the Houthis. More importantly, a settlement could create momentum toward increasing the political and military pressure against AQAP and isolating the hard-core international jihadists from the local tribal networks whose hospitality they need to operate.

Washington’s core strategic objective in Yemen, therefore, should be to leverage U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia and their coalition partners in the war against the Houthis to achieve an immediate de-escalation of the fighting. Rather than double down on a bad bet, the Trump administration should put the Saudis on notice that if they do not get fully behind the U.N.-sponsored effort to mediate a negotiated end to the conflict, the United States will contemplate cutting off the military, intelligence, and logistics support it is providing to Saudi and coalition forces for their campaign against the Houthis. As a result of its military response to Syria’s chemical weapons attacks, the administration is now in a stronger position to urge the Saudis to exercise greater restraint in their military operations against the Houthis.

Terrorists have the capability to launch a bioterror attackHeadley 18—(Tyler Headley, "Introducing "the Poor Man's Atomic Bomb": Biological Weapons," National Interest, 12-2-2018, “https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/introducing-poor-mans-atomic-bomb-biological-weapons-37437" )//ML

In 2014, a laptop belonging to a member of the Islamic State (ISIS) was shown to reporters. The device contained information on creating biological weapons including the bubonic plague. While ISIS was never definitively shown to have actively pursued the development of bioweapons, instead using chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, other rogue non-state actors like Al Qaeda have made concerted efforts to develop, obtain and use bioweapons.

Two recent phenomena are reasons to reexamine the threat of bioterrorism. First, renewed tensions with Iran, which previously conducted bioweapons research and development, could potentially recommence the development of bioagents which in turn could fall into the hands of rogue non-state actors. Second, government budget cuts mean that national programs are under increased public scrutiny. The United States reportedly $14 billion dollars on biodefense in the three years following the 9/11 attacks. “A substantial amount of money has been invested in biodefense,” wrote Ari Schuler, author of a notable report on biosecurity, “but the…money is no indication of success or failure.” For these two reasons, this is an opportune moment to reevaluate the threats posed by bioterrorism.

Bioweapons were astutely called by Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of Iran’s parliament in 1988, “the poor man’s atomic bomb.” Biological weapons don’t necessarily require the technical sophistication of a nuclear bomb, yet still have the potential to wreak catastrophic havoc. According to a report at the 1996 North Atlantic Assembly, Several hundred thousand deaths could be caused in a crowded urban area by four tonnes of VX or only 50 kilograms of anthrax spores and a single ounce of anthrax introduced into the air-conditioning system of a domed stadium could infect 70-80,000 spectators within one hour. These frightening statistics, however, belie the relative lack of historical precedent for biological attacks; the Monterey Database indicates that “incidents involving biological agents have been quite rare, with 66 criminal events and 55 terrorist events over the 40-year period from 1960 to 1999.”

ExtinctionMakhan Saikia 14, researcher at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai, was an Assistant Professor at the Symbiosis School of Economics, Challenges of Globalization, Journal of Politics & Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1

The unique feature of invisibility of the biological weapons make them the worst predators. Their ability to disseminate fear and cause chaos amongst the victims has a much more grim effect than a bomb attack. By impinging on the Governing bodies from the roots and snatching away every viable option to control them from the authorities, has made this type of terrorist attack the best innovation brought out of the evil side of the humanity. In order to fight back the horrifying potential of a biological weapon global preparedness and individual response capabilities are the only viable option that come our way at this point of time. This transition of the anti-humane weapons from concrete metal objects to undetectable micro-organisms has quite detrimental effects which need to be dealt [with] effectively and intelligently in order to save life on this Earth .

Impact – Saudi/HR Trump’s failure to apply pressure greenlights conflict escalationNew York Times 17 – (NYT Editorial Board, 5-25-17, “Will President Trump Help Save Yemen?”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/opinion/cholera-yemen-war-humanitarian-crisis.html, accessed 6-28-19) //DYang

President Trump could have used his trip to Saudi Arabia this week to spotlight the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen and push for a political solution to the conflict. Instead, he basked in the adulation of King Salman and his court, uncritically embraced the country’s foreign and domestic policies, and then sold the Saudis $110 billion in arms.

The package includes precision-guided munitions, which President Barack Obama withheld last year in an effort to pressure Saudi Arabia to halt attacks that have killed thousands of civilians and struck hospitals, schools, markets and mosques. He also worried about possible Saudi war crimes in which America could be implicated.

Mr. Trump made perfunctory references to Yemen on his trip, but mostly to praise the Saudi war effort and condemn Iran for supporting militant groups. He could be using the leverage he has with his new Saudi friends to push for a resolution to the fighting. After all, Saudi Arabia and its gulf allies depend heavily on Washington for aircraft, munitions, training and in-flight refueling. The United States also helps Saudi Arabia guard its borders.

Mr. Trump’s failure to apply pressure, combined with the giant arms sale, is raising fears that he may give the Saudis a green light to escalate the fighting, as well as find other ways to beef up America’s own support for Riyadh.

Since 2015, the Saudi-led coalition has been bombing the Houthis to try to push them out of Yemen’s capital, Sana. The war has put seven million people in danger of starvation, crushed the economy and decimated the health system.

The problems are exacerbated by a virtual blockade of the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah, a lifeline for food and medicine entering Yemen. Efforts by the Saudi-led coalition to screen ships for Iranian arms intended for Houthis has disrupted deliveries, and cranes needed to unload supplies have been damaged in the fighting. The country’s public and private reserves are so depleted that employees have not been paid and many have stopped working.

“This is a clear-cut decline into massive famine that is man-made and avoidable,” said Jan Egeland, the Norwegian Refugee Council head who recently visited Yemen. One encouraging development is that Saudi Arabia has not so far made good on threats to bomb and seize Hudaydah, apparently heeding warnings by the United States and others.

After two years, it should be obvious there is no military solution to this war, stoked by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Arab nation, and Iran, a Shiite nation. But the Saudis seem determined to press on. “Time is in our favor,” Mohammed bin Salman, the king’s powerful son who is second in line for the throne, said this month. Separate from the civil war, the chaos is allowing Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen to become stronger, the population more radicalized and drawing American forces further into that fight.

While all the warring parties bear some blame for Yemen’s misery, the Saudis should understand that escalation will only bring more civilian deaths. A comprehensive peace deal may be out of reach, but the United States, Britain and the United Nations could focus on interim measures that would put Hudaydah under the administration of neutral parties and impose the quickest possible cease-fire.

Status quo negotiations are unsustainable—only hardline threats can rein in Saudi ArabiaEikenberry and Kizer 18 – Eikenberry is the director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project, Kizer is the policy director at Win Without War (Eric and Kate, 3-12-18, “The Lesson the Trump Administration has Failed to Learn about Yemen”, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/53635/lesson-trump-administration-failed-learn-yemen/, accessed 6-28-19) //DYang

Rather than promote the kind of de-escalation that could eventually yield peace talks, the United States continues to literally fuel the coalition’s war effort. The U.S. Air Force refuels coalition planes in mid-air in between bombing runs over Yemen, while U.S. Central Command furnishes missions with targeting intelligence and assistance. All of this support enables the high tempo of airstrikes that target civilian sites at least a third of the time. These attacks on civilians and civilian objects are a key driver of Yemen’s horrific humanitarian crisis, and remain the leading cause of civilian casualties in the country. U.S. support doesn’t stop there however. The efforts of U.S. diplomats at the UN Security Council to shield Saudi Arabia and its allies from accountability for its myriad violations of the laws of war, coupled with U.S. military support, allow the Saudi-led coalition to continue its intervention in Yemen indefinitely.

With such unconditional U.S. backing, the coalition has no incentive to reduce civilian casualties, end the bombing campaign, ease the humanitarian crisis, or push the increasingly isolated President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi to engage in serious negotiations to end the war. Absent essential U.S. military support, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would have to consider all three, or risk further sinking themselves in an endless quagmire that risks spilling more blood and treasure for a conflict that has no military solution.

By ending U.S. refueling and targeting assistance, S.J.Res. 54 should serve as a wake-up call to the Saudi-led coalition that it can no longer expect unchecked U.S. support for a military stalemate and it must diplomatically engage its adversaries. Ending U.S. military support, which is essential for the continuation of the coalition’s air campaign, should remove the incentives for the coalition to pursue a military-only strategy in Yemen. With the campaign costing Saudi Arabia an estimated $66 million a day – money that’s supposed to undergird domestic reforms, not trap the country in a Vietnam of its own-making – the end of U.S. material support could significantly change the coalition’s cost-benefit analysis.

In its unconditional backing of the Saudi-led coalition, the Trump administration has promoted an “escalate to de-escalate strategy” in Yemen and resisted having a frank conversation with its allies on steps to end the intervention. Thus far, the United States has only been willing to exert temporary pressure on Saudi Arabia to loosen its blockade, which is less a step toward peace than one to alleviate international outrage and create political space for the coalition to continue its military campaign.

Yet the lesson of the administration’s rhetorical pressure on the coalition about the blockade is an important one: It has changed the Saudi-led coalition’s behavior, albeit temporarily, pushing it to announce temporary openings of Yemen’s most vital port and to hastily publish a Booz Allen Hamilton-drafted humanitarian plan. While woefully inadequate for addressing the crisis, this movement demonstrates the coalition members’ sensitivity to international criticism, particularly from the U.S. If provisional rhetorical criticism gets provisional tangible improvement, imagine what a congressional threat to end all U.S. military support, which would place the war’s full burden on the coalition’s shoulders, could achieve.

Through this legislation, Congress is applying the lesson the Trump administration has failed to learn so far: U.S. military support is an important lever for pushing for peace. Yet such leverage won’t mean anything if the administration fails to utilize it to end an unwinnable military intervention. Thankfully, the Senate bill’s bipartisan sponsors are willing to force the issue with the administration by threatening to end unconditional, unauthorized U.S. military assistance to the coalition. The administration should use this threat to stop U.S. support to communicate to Riyadh that its international isolation will only increase absent genuine de-escalation and renewed peace talks. Instead of lobbying against the resolution, the White House should embrace S.J.Res.54 as a tool to influence an ally, which this administration is reluctant to publicly rebuke.

Impact – Yemen The Yemen conflict is escalating now in the absence of American hardline interventionBehravesh 18 – political analyst at Persis Media and PhD candidate in the department of political science at Lund University in Sweden (Maysam, 6-22-18, “Yemen escalation: Why Houthis ramp up attacks on Saudi Arabia”, Al Jazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/yemen-escalation-houthis-ramp-attacks-saudi-arabia-190622055136031.html, accessed 6-28-19) //DYang

However, in recent weeks, Houthi attacks against military and civilian targets within Saudi territory have markedly escalated, which notably coincided with amplifying pressure from the U nited States and its allies on Iran , a key regional supporter of Yemen's Houthis.

The surge in Houthi attacks may be aimed at showing the US and its allies that any conflict between them and Iran risks igniting a regional war , analysts told Al Jazeera. Others see the attacks as asymmetric retaliation against US regional allies by Tehran, which lacks the economic or diplomatic power to punish Washington in response to US-led sanctions and "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran.

The US and some of its European and Middle Eastern allies have accused Iran of supporting the Houthi rebels, including by providing arms, in an effort to expand its influence in the Arabian Peninsula and build a proxy force similar to the Lebanese Hezbollah that could serve as a source of power and deterrence against its chief rival Saudi Arabia.

In January, the United Nations' experts concluded in an 85-page report to the Security Council that Tehran was illegally shipping fuel to Yemen to finance their war effort. A year earlier, a UN panel had criticised Iran for violating an arms embargo on Yemen by enabling Houthis obtain Iranian missiles. Tehran has repeatedly dismissed these allegations.

In the latest of a consistent string of attacks on Saudi positions, Houthi rebels hit a power station in Al Shuqaiq city in the kingdom's southern province of Jizan with a "cruise missile", the group's Al Masirah TV channel reported on Thursday.

Reacting to the incident, US Navy Commander Rebecca Rebarich said such attacks were "a significant cause for concern and [put] innocent lives at risk".

On Monday, Houthis launched a drone assault against the Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia, less than a week after they targeted the airport with a cruise missile, wounding 26 civilians.

In a significant escalation on May 14, Houthis staged a number of drone attacks on the Aramco East-West pipeline and oil stations deep within the Saudi territory, which caused minor supply disruptions but highlighted an apparent leap in the Houthi drone capabilities.

'Backing the dispossessed'

"The Saudi and Emirati complicity in aiding and abetting tough US sanctions against Iran is, to some extent, driving this surge in Houthi attacks. But Tehran's support for Yemeni rebels is not simply based on Iranian geopolitical interests and cannot be reduced to a personal revenge against the Saudis," a Tehran-based intelligence analyst affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) told Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity.

"It is also ideological and aimed at backing the 'dispossessed' of the world," the analyst added, referring to Article 154 of the Iranian Constitution which stipulates that the Islamic Republic would support the struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors "anywhere in the world".

Houthis themselves blame the "Saudi aggression against our country" for increased assaults and their adverse implications for the Hodeidah agreement, insisting that they will continue attacks against civilian airports and military sites - which rebels now see as "legitimate targets" - until the Saudi-led military intervention, now in its fifth year, persists.

On Wednesday, the Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project (ACLED) - a non-governmental body that collects and analyses data on political violence around the world - announced in a new estimate that the Yemeni civil war has claimed at least 91,600 lives, excluding deaths caused by war-related humanitarian disasters such as starvation and cholera.

The report suggests that the Saudi-led coalition and its allies are responsible for the majority of civilian deaths. In a stark instance, two coalition air raids on a funeral in Sanaa in October 2016 killed 155 and wounded 525 people.

"Houthi attacks against Saudi targets come in response to daily coalition raids on Yemen's hospitals, schools, infrastructure and innocent people as well," Fatik al-Rodaini, Sanaa-based Yemeni journalist and founder of the non-profit Mona Relief aid organisation, told Al Jazeera.

"They regard this a right to respond to Saudi-led military campaign since 2015," al-Rodaini said, adding she sees no link between Houthi retaliation on the one hand and Saudi-Emirati role in ratcheting up US-led pressure against Iran on the other.

Shifting war theatre

The uptick in Houthi assaults against Saudi positions and its possible link with the growing economic and military pressure on Iran suggests that in the event of a US-Iran conflict, Saudi Arabia may be a prime target of Iranian missiles and Yemeni drones. Such an eventuality would further set back Saudi military efforts to restore overthrown President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power and deny Tehran a strategic foothold in the Arabian Peninsula.

Houthis' intensified military campaign against the Saudi-led coalition has cast doubt on the plausibility of the Hodeidah truce, brokered by the UN during negotiations between the warring parties in the Swedish capital, Stockholm, in December.

Under the ceasefire deal, the Houthis agreed to hand over the control of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Isa ports to "local authorities in accordance with Yemeni law".

"While the administration of [Iranian President Hassan] Rouhani was pushing the Houthis to accede to the Hodeidah ceasefire, the IRGC wasn't happy with this course of action absent proper concessions by the Arab coalition states," the IRGC-affiliated analyst explained.

"After the Hodeidah accord, the rebels' focal theatre of operation shifted from Yemeni to Saudi territory."

The Houthis' motive seems to be twofold: take the fight inside the Saudi territory and inflict considerable damage on its infrastructure in retaliation for "daily aggression" by the Saudi-led coalition,

and signal that growing pressure on Iran as the main backer of Houthis would come at a price for Saudi national security.

Arming the conflict

Yet, perhaps the most underreported aspect of the Yemen war is the foreign support provided in particular by the US and the United Kingdom in the form of armaments, personnel and expertise. In early April, Channel 4 aired an investigative documentary - Britain's Hidden War - on the British role in the Saudi-led intervention and "the extent to which the war in Yemen is made in Britain".

According to an employee of BAE Systems, the UK's biggest defence contractor, "If we weren't there, in seven to 14 days, there wouldn't be a jet in the sky." BAE Systems employs over 6,000 people on the ground in Saudi Arabia.

"These bombs that are being dropped on us are made in the UK, US, and France, which are selling arms and providing intelligence and aircraft refuelling services to Saudi Arabia. So if the US and the UK want this war to be over, it will be over, it depends on them," Ahmad Algohbari, a Sanaa-based Yemeni journalist and founder of grassroots aid organisation Yemen Hope Relief, told Al Jazeera.

"They are thus refuelling the war, and as long as they do so the war will see no end, and this is a big problem because they do not care about our lives in Yemen. They only care about building their economy and offering jobs to their own people."

In a highly controversial instance in August 2018, the Saudi-UAE military killed at least 51 people, including 40 school children, in an air raid that used a 500-pound (227kg) laser-guided MK 82 bomb made by Lockheed Martin, one of the top US defence contractors.

"MBS [Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] is a reckless leader also engaged with his own domestic agenda in Saudi Arabia, but I wonder how tenable his approach to Yemen would be in the absence of US and UK support," Anna Stavrianakis, a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Sussex and expert on the British arms export policy, told Al Jazeera.

"My read of Saudi strategy in Yemen is that it is pressuring the population militarily , through air strikes, but also economically, through the blockade, physically, through attacks on infrastructure that have facilitated cholera and famine, and culturally, through attacks on buildings of cultural significance," Stavrianakis explained.

"And it does so to try and pressure Yemen's civilian population away from supporting the Houthis and into supporting its preferred government."

Only US pressure on all parties can solve the crisis in YemenStark 18 – (Alexandra Stark, 11-20-2018, "Yemen's Long Road to Peace," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/yemens-long-road-peace)CWS

What can the United States and its partners and allies do to help overcome these obstacles? Peace talks, now slated for the end of the year, could take several months, if not longer. In the interim, multilateral negotiating efforts should focus on confidence-building measures among the parties . As

access to Hodeidah port, an important point of entry for food and humanitarian aid, is critical in the short-term for relieving the humanitarian crisis and looming famine situation, discussions on governance of the city could help build confidence in the lead-up to more comprehensive talks. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffith’s proposal from the summer should be adopted as it would place the port facility under UN control, allowing humanitarian aid in while also providing additional assurance to the Saudi-led coalition that Iran cannot use the port for weapons smuggling.

Multilateral negotiating efforts should focus on confidence-building measures among the parties.

The United States, working with allies and partners in Europe, can support the UN envoy’s efforts to convene the parties by December 2018 as well. The United States can play a facilitating role by encouraging back-channel talks between the Saudis, Emiratis, and the Houthis prior to and during formal negotiations, since it will be critical to get Saudi and Emirati buy-in for any viable settlement.

U.S. military support to the coalition and arms sales to Saudi Arabia are also sources of leverage. In the aftermath of the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the United States has a window of opportunity to encourage the Saudis and Emiratis to engage fruitfully and in good faith.

Since Saudi Arabia’s stated reason for fighting is to avoid having an Iranian proxy group on its southern border, the United States should also consider providing military assistance targeted at increasing border security. Additionally, the United States could support, and encourage partners to support, continued inspections for goods coming into Yemen via the ongoing United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen to further reassure the Saudis that Iran is unable to smuggle weapons to the Houthis. The United Nations or another international institution could also create inspection and verification measures to ensure that the Houthis surrender ballistic missiles that could be launched towards Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Such measures would be important to sustaining the peace agreement, and could additionally help Saudi officials frame the agreement as a victory for domestic audiences.

Once an agreement has been reached, the United States can employ a combination of carrots and sticks to overcome the commitment problem that all sides of the conflict will face. These measures could include positive inducements like promises of conditional aid and placing international peacekeeping forces on the ground, to negative inducements like the threat of sanctions for parties that fail to comply.

The road to a comprehensive solution to decades of conflict in Yemen is long and fraught with potential obstacles. However, the international interest in the region following the Khashoggi murder has created a critical window for renewed attempts at peace talks. The steps outlined here will help the United States and international community take maximal advantage of this opportunity for peace.

The Yemen humanitarian crisis is the worst in the world – and it is on track to only get worse and escalate furtherFenton-Harvey 6/14 – (Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, 6/14/19, "Will Yemen’s War Escalate Further?," LobeLog, https://lobelog.com/will-yemens-war-escalate-further/)CWS

According to reports of the Houthis advancing inside Saudi territory, the faction is directly threatening parts of the kingdom. As a result, Riyadh may feel compelled to take harsher action and not just target the Houthis with airstrikes. It has already imposed a harsh blockade on Yemen’s airports, along with multiple sea and land ports, and could now seek to impose harsher restrictions.

Ultimately, Yemenis will suffer the most, especially as Saudi Arabia struggles to suppress the Houthis, who excel at fighting and navigating in Yemeni territory. The war has already restricted the flow of vital goods . Even when goods are available, Yemenis struggle to afford them due to high unemployment and

inflation. With cholera once again spreading, Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, which the UN already calls the world’s worst, could deepen.

Rather than scaling back support for Saudi Arabia because of its harmful role in Yemen, Donald Trump has embraced the narrative that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy and sold $8 billion of weapons to Riyadh in May, on top of America’s already vast support to the coalition. This comes amid congressional efforts to halt Washington’s support for the Yemen war.

US pressure can bring peace to YemenByman 18 – (Daniel L. Byman, 12-5-2018, senior fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle Eastern Policy, "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/)CWS

To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen’s fires won’t be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate—a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention.

The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

An abdication of American involvement in Yemen would only invite the rise of an exponentially worse human rights actor—IranTobin 19 – editor in chief of JNS.org and a contributor to National Review (Jonathan, 2-15-19, “Don’t Hand Iran a Victory in Yemen”, National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/yemen-war-iran-shouldnt-be-handed-victory/, accessed 6-28-19) //DYang

The Senate passed a similar resolution 56–41 in the waning days of the last Congress, with several Republicans crossing the aisle to join a unanimous Democratic caucus. If Majority Leader Mitch McConnell allows the measure to come to a vote again, there’s a chance the bill will arrive on President Trump’s desk. That will put the president in the position of having to exercise a veto on behalf of a deeply unpopular Saudi regime and a bloody war that few in Washington understand or support.

Yet as bad as the optics would be, that’s exactly what Trump should do.

Congress and the media will interpret a bipartisan vote on the issue to be a necessary rebuke to the Saudis as well as to a White House that has struggled to find the right tone in response to the Khashoggi murder. But a defeat for the Saudis and their Yemeni allies could bring a far more brutal and despotic regime to power, and the real winner of such an outcome wouldn’t be the cause of reform in Saudi Arabia or even the anti-Trump Resistance, but Iran — which has already been emboldened and enriched in its quest for regional domination by its nuclear deal with President Barack Obama.

The Saudi crown prince’s apparent decision to assassinate Khashoggi illustrated that he recognizes no limits in his efforts to consolidate power in Riyadh and to silence all opponents. Khashoggi was a stern critic of the prince (Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS) and of the war in Yemen. His status as a writer for the Washington Post and a resident of the United States should have rendered him off-limits for the sort of thuggish repression that the Saudi government employs against its own people.

MBS deserved a stern rebuke from the United States. President Trump’s failure to articulate American outrage about the murder in the days after his death was revealed was both morally wrong and a crucial mistake. By continuing to make excuses for MBS and articulate realpolitik justifications for the U.S. relationship with the Saudis, Trump undermined the policy he was rightly seeking to preserve. That continues to this day, as the administration is still stalling on reporting to Congress about Khashoggi’s death, giving critics of the Saudis and Trump more ammunition.

Khashoggi’s death has been a rallying point for the defense of journalists against repressive regimes such as that of the Saudis. This issue is also an extension of the mainstream media’s complaints about Trump’s war on the press. But while MBS is a tyrant and Trump engages in overkill against his press critics, the notion that helping a government that is even more despotic than the Saudis’ gain an advantage in a geostrategic struggle will somehow protect the freedom of the press or the cause of human rights is absurd.

The war in Yemen has been a human-rights catastrophe, causing the deaths of thousands and a famine. The Saudis bear part of the responsibility for these horrors. That is particularly true with respect to their indiscriminate bombing campaign against Houthi targets, which has caused massive civilian casualties. American support for this effort and the fact that the Saudis are largely using U.S. weapons is troubling.

But while the Saudis’ record is difficult to defend, Congress’s invoking the War Powers Act in order to eliminate the U.S. role in the conflict will not lessen the suffering of the people of Yemen. To the contrary, doing so would merely give the Houthis — a force whose human-rights record is probably even worse than that of the Saudis — a leg up in their efforts to topple the government of Yemen. Just as dangerous, it would be widely interpreted as one more victory for Iran in a region that is still reeling from Tehran’s successful intervention in Syria.

Tehran’s role in aiding the Houthi war effort is an example of just how misplaced President Obama’s hopes that Iran would use the nuclear deal to “get right with the world” were. Iran has continued to push for regional hegemony, rightly scaring moderate Arab regimes as well as fueling the fears of Israelis.

President Trump spent the days after news of the Khashoggi murder broke making ill-advised statements about wanting to keep America selling arms to the Saudis. But as much as that was a mistake, the president wasn’t wrong to point out that the alliance with the Saudi government was in the interests of the United States. As unpopular as the Saudis might be, they are still the lesser of two evils when compared with an Iranian regime that is both a human-rights offender and seeking to spread violence and instability throughout the Middle East.

The Saudis have earned American distrust dating back to 9/11, and as the Khashoggi murder demonstrated, MBS is a loose cannon who can’t be trusted to behave responsibly. Yet MBS is also reformer who seeks to modernize the Saudi state and pull back on some repression; he even largely eliminated the kingdom’s dangerous policy of funding radical Islamic educational institutions around the world (a role in which the Saudis have been replaced by Qatar).

The desire of Congress to rebuke MBS and Trump — who has undermined Republican confidence in his foreign policy with attacks on NATO — is understandable. But as frustrating and morally ambiguous as it might be, a Cold War mentality in which America backs a bad actor to stop an even worse one remains the only sensible U.S. policy in the Arabian Peninsula. A vote to end American involvement in Yemen won’t advance peace or the principles of human rights. All it will do is give an undeserved and dangerous victory to Iran.

AT: Unconditional rejection key Maintaining ties with authoritarians is key to maintain regional stability and preventing Russian revisionismBrands 18 – Bloomberg Opinion columnist, Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (Hal, “Saudi Crisis Shows the U.S. Needs a New Way to Deal With Dictators,” Bloomberg, October 15 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/khashoggi-crisis-shows-u-s-needs-new-way-to-deal-with-dictators)//al

The disappearance of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi has precipitated a new crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations. Yet that crisis has also revived a much older dilemma in American strategy: How to deal with allies that also happen to morally abhorrent, even murderous, dictatorships.

The basic predicament has been around for over a century. As the U.S. established its dominance in the Western Hemisphere in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it often cooperated with local strongmen who could provide some semblance of stability. Throughout the Cold War, containing communism required working with partners that were far from morally pure — dictators who ruled key allies such as South Korea, Turkey, Portugal and Greece at various points, as well as a clutch of Latin American and Middle Eastern despots.

The rapid spread of democracy from the 1970s through the early 2000s eased this dilemma, by aligning the frontiers of freedom more closely with the frontiers of America’s European and Asia-Pacific alliances. Yet the problem has now returned, and not just in the Middle East, because of two factors.

The first is the so-called democratic recession that began around 2006, and which has subsequently weakened democracy in dozens of countries around the world. Illiberal and anti-democratic practices have taken hold in key NATO countries: Turkey, Poland and Hungary. In the Asia-Pacific, one U.S. ally — Thailand — has been under military rule since 2014, while another — the Philippines — has reverted to a bloody form of illiberal democracy under Rodrigo Duterte. In the Middle East, George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda and the hopes of the Arab Spring have faded; authoritarianism and instability are again the status quo.

The challenge of handling these friendly authoritarians is greater because of the second trend: the resurgence of geopolitical revisionism. As hostile authoritarian powers — China, Russia and Iran — challenge existing regional orders across Eurasia, they are putting U.S. power and influence under pressure and sharpening the dilemmas America faces in handling its more autocratic allies. Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines may be acting in deeply distasteful ways, but they occupy critical geostrategic real estate in today’s most important geopolitical competitions.

There have traditionally been two schools of thought on coping with this problem. One was expressed most forcefully by Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose famous article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” was published in 1979 and vaulted her to the forefront of U.S. policy-making during the Ronald Reagan years.

Kirkpatrick argued that insisting that authoritarian allies adhere to U.S. standards of political freedom and individual rights was an invitation to disaster. It would destabilize those regimes internally, raising the likelihood of a takeover by more radical and hostile forces. This, Kirkpatrick alleged, was just what

had happened in Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, where U.S. pressure to respect human rights had weakened authoritarian allies against the revolutionaries who toppled them. Preserving a stable strategic environment in which the U.S. and its allied democracies could thrive, and aggressive dictatorships such as the Soviet Union could be contained, meant partnering with some friendly devils along the way.

AT: Terror impact D – general Terrorists have the motive and capabilityBunn 09 - an American nuclear and energy policy analyst, currently a professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School (Matthew, "Reducing the greatest risks of nuclear theft & terrorism," Daedalus, Fall 2009, https://www.amacad.org/publication/reducing-greatest-risks-nuclear-theft-terrorism)//MLThere remains a very real danger that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb, turning the heart of a major city into a smoldering radioactive ruin. Tens or hundreds of thousands of people would be killed, and devastating economic shock waves would reverberate throughout the world, creating a second death toll in the developing world from the ensuing increase in global poverty, as then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned in 2005. The horror of such an event, were it ever to occur, would change America and the world forever.

The al Qaeda terrorist network has been seeking nuclear weapons for years. Osama bin Laden has said that he feels a “religious duty” to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons, and al Qaeda operatives have made repeated attempts to buy stolen nuclear material in order to make a nuclear bomb. They have tried to recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help them, including, but not limited to, the two extremist Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists who met with bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri shortly before the 9/11 attacks to discuss nuclear weapons. Documents recovered in Afghanistan reveal a significant al Qaeda research effort focused on nuclear weapons. This effort included preliminary tests with conventional explosives in the Afghan desert. Long after the removal of al Qaeda’s Afghanistan sanctuary, bin Laden sought and received a religious ruling, or fatwa, from a radical Saudi cleric authorizing the use of nuclear weapons against American civilians. In the 1990s, the Aum Shinrikyo terror cult, which launched the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subways, also sought nuclear weapons. Russian officials have confirmed two cases of terrorist teams, presumably Chechens, carrying out reconnaissance at secret Russian nuclear weapon storage sites. With at least two groups pursuing nuclear weapons in the last 15 years, we must expect that others will, too, in the future.

Repeated government studies in the United States and in other countries have concluded that if a technically sophisticated terrorist group could get the HEU or plutonium they need, they might well be able to make at least a crude nuclear bomb. Making a bomb does not take a Manhattan project: more than 90 percent of that 1940s-era effort was devoted to making the nuclear material, not making the bomb; and that was before the basic principles of nuclear bombs were widely known, as they are today. One study by the now-defunct congressional Office of Technology Assessment summarized the threat: “A small group of people, none of whom have [sic] ever had access to the classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. . . . Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without arousing suspicion would be required.”

Theft of potential nuclear bomb materials is not just a hypothetical worry; it is an ongoing reality, highlighting the inadequacy of the nuclear security measures in place today: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented some 18 cases of theft or loss of plutonium or HEU confirmed by the states concerned (and there are more cases that the relevant states have so far been unwilling to confirm, despite the conviction of some of the participants). In virtually all of the known cases, no one had ever noticed the stolen material was missing until it was seized, suggesting that other thefts may have gone undetected.

AT: Terror impact D – ISIS ISIS is still a threatBBC 19- (BBC News, “Caliphate defeated but IS remains a threat, "BBC NEWS,” 3-23-2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595)//ML

Despite the demise of its physical caliphate, IS remains a battle-hardened and well-disciplined force whose "enduring defeat" is not assured.

The head of the US military's Central Command, Gen Joseph Votel, said in February that it was necessary to maintain "a vigilant offensive against the now largely dispersed and disaggregated [IS] that retains leaders, fighters, facilitators, resources and the profane ideology that fuels their efforts".

And if pressure on the group is not sustained, IS " could likely resurge in Syria within six to 12 months and regain limited territory in the Middle Euphrates River Valley", military officials told the US Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General in January.

Such warnings appeared to persuade Mr Trump not to withdraw all of the 2,000 US troops from Syria, as he had promised in an announcement in December 2018. That plan prompted the resignation of Defence Secretary Jim Mattis and alarmed allies in the Global Coalition to Defeat IS.

The White House said in February that it would leave 400 "peacekeepers" in Syria for a "period of time", 200 of which would be based at the al-Tanf outpost, at the intersection of the Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi borders.

What next for IS?

In Iraq, where the government declared victory in December 2017, the jihadist group has already "substantially evolved into a covert network", UN Secretary General António Guterres said in a report to the Security Council released in February.

"It is in a phase of transition, adaptation and consolidation. It is organising cells at the provincial level, replicating the key leadership functions," he added.

IS militants are active in rural areas with remote, rugged terrain that gives them freedom to move and plan attacks. These include the deserts of Anbar and Nineveh provinces, and the mountains that straddle Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Diyala provinces.

Cells "appear to be planning activities that undermine government authority, create an atmosphere of lawlessness, sabotage societal reconciliation and increase the cost of reconstruction and counter-terrorism", according to Mr Guterres. These activities include kidnappings for ransom, targeted assassinations of local leaders, and attacks against state utilities and services.

The IS network in Syria is expected to evolve to resemble that in Iraq.

Besides the Euphrates valley, the group has a presence in the opposition-held north-western province of Idlib, in government-held areas south of the capital Damascus, and in the Badiya region, a vast stretch of desert in south-eastern Syria.

The militants have access to heavy weapons, and are able to carry out bombings and assassinations throughout the country, according to the US defence department's inspector general. Their leaders also retain "excellent command and control capability".

The location of the group's overall leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is not known. But he has eluded being captured or killed, despite having fewer places to hide.

IS continues to generate revenue through criminal activities. It also receives external donations and is estimated to have between $50m and $300m (£39m-231m) in cash.

How many militants are left?

IS has suffered substantial losses, but Mr. Guterres said it still reportedly controlled between 14,000 and 18,000 militants in Iraq and Syria, including up to 3,000 foreigners.

The US Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat IS, James Jeffrey, said in mid-March that Washington believed there were still between 15,000 and 20,000 IS "armed adherents activ e" in the region, many of them in sleeper cells.

ISIS retains strength in rural IraqFine 19- The lead inspector General of the department of defense (Glenn Fine, “Operation Inherent resolve and other overseas contingency operations Lead inspector general report to the united states congress,”DoD, 2/4/19, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/04/2002085693/-1/-1/1/FY2019_LIG_OIRREPORT.PDF)//ML

According to media reports and to DoD components, security improved in Iraq’s cities during this quarter, but ISIS remained active in rural parts of the country. CJTF-OIR reported that ISIS tactics this quarter included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assassinations, robbery, and money laundering.45 The difficulty of securing remote, rugged terrain has allowed ISIS greater freedom to move and to threaten civilians and security forces, according to OUSD(P)/ISA, CJTF-OIR, and news reports.46 OUSD(P)/CN/GT reported to the DoD OIG that ISIS continued to generate revenue in Iraq through extorting civilians, smuggling, ransom, trafficking, and other criminal activity.47 Poor weather also helped ISIS cells evade the ISF and the Coalition this quarter, as it hampered the use of surveillance aircraft and led to the cancellation of some clearance operations, CJTF-OIR said.48

Despite adverse conditions, clearing operations and raids targeted ISIS’s rural hideouts and urban cells throughout the quarter, CJTF-OIR said. The ISF conducted 77 battalion-size clearance operations, and the Coalition and the ISF carried out a coordinated raid on an ISIS financial network in Baghdad and Erbil.49

Several events this quarter demonstrated improvements in security. The Shia Arbaeen pilgrimage to Karbala City occurred this quarter without major disruption from ISIS.50 In Baghdad, improving security led to the reopening of portions of the fortified Green Zone to civilian traffic.51 The United Nations reported that civilian casualties in Iraq declined this quarter to their lowest level since November 2012.52

According to CJTF-OIR and news reports, challenges to completely defeating ISIS in Iraq include the group’s rural strength, its tunnels and safe houses, the continued trickle of foreign fighters, the difficulty in securing the Iraq-Syria border, and the lack of stability in Sunni areas.53

Leverage Bad

UQ – no leverage – saudi No leverage – Trump is letting MBS off the hook because he needs to maintain Saudi Arabia as a business partner for arms salesJackson ’19 – White House correspondent @ USA Today, has been a reporter for three decades

(David Jackson, 6-28-2019, "Trump says he asked Saudis about Jamal Khashoggi killing, claims they are angry about it," USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/28/donald-trump-no-comment-khashoggi-killing-meeting-saudis/1592766001/, accessed 6-29-2019)//AP

OSAKA, Japan — After repeatedly refusing to answer the question, President Donald Trump told reporters Saturday that he did bring up the murder of a journalist in his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, and he claimed the Saudi leader is concerned about it.

"He's very angry about it," Trump told reporters after his meeting. "He's very unhappy about it."

Earlier, as bin Salman sat across the table from him, Trump said the Crown Prince is doing a "spectacular job," and repeatedly refused to answer questions about the death of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi,

A week after a United Nations report implicated Bin Salman in Khashoggi's death, Trump said it was "a great honor" to meet the crown prince and stressed the business partnership between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Trump did not respond to repeated questions from reporters about the killing of Khashoggi.

Speaking with reporters later, Trump again refused to say whether he discussed Khashoggi with the Crown Prince. He did note that the Saudis are prosecuting people for the crime.

"I'm very unhappy about that whole thing," Trump said.

During their meeting, Trump and the Saudi prince did discuss U.S. weapons sales to the kingdom as well as ideas on how to contain Iran and its threat to renew a program that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Impact – AlliesUS influence causes increased aggression and decreased allied confidence—statistics proveGramlich and Devlin 19 John, writer and editor at Pew Research Center; Kat, research associate at Pew Research Center; “More people around the world see U.S. power and influence as a ‘major threat’ to their country,” Pew Research Center, 2/14/19 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/14/more-people-around-the-world-see-u-s-power-and-influence-as-a-major-threat-to-their-country/ //AY

A growing share of people around the world see U.S. power and influence as a “ major threat ” to their country, and these views are linked with attitudes toward President Donald Trump and the U nited States as a whole, according to Pew Research Center surveys conducted in 22 nations since 2013.

A median of 45% across the surveyed nations see U.S. power and influence as a major threat, up from 38% in the same countries during Trump’s first year as president in 2017 and 25% in 2013, during the administration of Barack Obama. The long-term increase in the share of people who see American power as a threat has occurred alongside declines in the shares of people who say they have confidence in the U.S. president to do the right thing regarding world affairs and who have a favorable view of the United States. (For more about global views toward the U.S. president and the country he leads, see “Trump’s International Ratings Remain Low, Especially Among Key Allies.”)

Despite these changes, U.S. power and influence still ranks below other perceived threats around the world. Considerably larger shares of people point to global climate change (seen as a major threat by a median of 67%), the Islamic militant group known as ISIS (cited by 62%) and cyberattacks (cited by 61%). U.S. power and influence, in fact, is not seen as the top threat in any of the countries surveyed.

Still, in 18 of the 22 countries, there were statistically significant increases in the share of people who see American power and influence as a major threat between 2013 and 2018. That includes increases of 30 percentage points in Germany, 29 points in France, and 26 points in Brazil and Mexico. And while these shares rose substantially in many countries after Trump’s election, they increased further in several nations between Trump’s first and second year in office.

In Germany and France, for instance, the share of people who see U.S. power and influence as a major threat went up by 14 and 13 percentage points, respectively, between 2017 and 2018. Other notable year-over-year increases occurred in Tunisia (11 points), Canada and Argentina (8 points each), South Africa (7 points) and Brazil and Russia (6 points each).

Other nations bucked this trend, however. In Spain, for example, the share of people who see American power as a major threat fell by 17 points between 2017 and 2018 (from 59% to 42%). Still, people in Spain remain much more likely to see the U.S. as a threat today than in 2013.

Overall, there are 10 nations surveyed where roughly half or more now see U.S. power as a major threat, with the biggest shares saying this in South Korea (67%), Japan (66%) and Mexico (64%).

In South Korea, equal shares point to U.S. power and influence and to North Korea’s nuclear program as a major threat to their nation (each is cited by 67% of the public). However, several other perceived threats to South Koreans outrank U.S. power and influence, including global climate change (named by

86% of South Koreans), China’s power and influence (cited by 82%), cyberattacks from other countries (cited by 81%) and the condition of the global economy (cited by 74%). South Koreans have long perceived American power as a major threat to their country: 66% said this in 2013 and 70% said it in 2017.

In many of the surveyed countries, concerns about American power and influence are connected with views of Trump : People who have little or no confidence in the U.S. president to do the right thing regarding world affairs are more likely than those who have confidence in Trump to see U.S. power and influence as a top threat to their country. This includes several longtime U.S. allies, including Canada, the UK and Australia.

The same pattern appears when it comes to views of the U.S. in general, as opposed to its president. In most surveyed nations, people who have a more unfavorable view of the U.S. are also more likely to say that American power and influence is a threat to their nation.

Leverage works – abandoning allies causes democratic backsliding and terrorism globallyBrands 18 – Bloomberg Opinion columnist, Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (Hal, “Saudi Crisis Shows the U.S. Needs a New Way to Deal With Dictators,” Bloomberg, October 15 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/khashoggi-crisis-shows-u-s-needs-new-way-to-deal-with-dictators)//al

From the Kirkpatrick school comes the hard truth that the U.S. can’t afford a break with many of its authoritarian allies today. If holding the line against Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific seems hard now, just wait until the already-weak U.S. alliance with the Philippines falls apart. Putting relations with Turkey, Poland or Hungary into the deep freeze might be morally satisfying; it would also create more opportunities for Russian mischief on NATO’s eastern flank.

In the Middle East, the U.S.-Saudi partnership remains important for counterterrorism cooperation and as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions. Isolating Saudi Arabia might push Riyadh to deepen its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Iran, Russia and China are seeking to expand their influence by weakening the strength and cohesion of U.S. alliances: Washington should not do its rivals’ work for them.

Yet neither should America do what the Trump administration often seems included to do: Give its allies a green light to violate human rights and flout the rule of law. Doing so simply gives incentive for further misdeeds. It erodes U.S. moral standing by leaving Washington vulnerable to charges of selective morality and outright hypocrisy. And as illiberalism spreads, it weakens the liberal ideological glue that helps bind the U.S. to its closest allies; it creates ideological affinities between Washington's friends and its rivals (just look at the warm relationship between Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s strongman, Viktor Orban); it raises the longer-term dangers of serious domestic instability and even revolution. One can hardly look at Turkey or Saudi Arabia today and wonder whether harsh, autocratic rule is not driving up the likelihood of debilitating internal strife.

The U.S. must therefore exact a cost, measured but real, on the illiberal actions of its allies. This could mean reducing — but not fully halting — arms sales, speaking out more strongly against repressive behavior, and perhaps even excluding quasi-authoritarian allies such as Hungary from NATO exercises. Also helpful would be quiet but consistent advocacy of respect for basic human rights in bilateral diplomatic discussions, and — where feasible — increased support for embattled democratic actors through institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy.

These measures can be calibrated according to the specifics of the case and the degree of leverage Washington possesses: America can probably take a harder line with Poland, which has nowhere else to go, than it can with the Philippines, which has already been repositioning itself closer to Beijing.

Above all, the U.S. must avoid conveying its approval of or simple indifference to illiberal practices. Unfortunately, President Trump has repeatedly done just this, by praising Duterte’s vicious drug war, by singling out a backsliding Poland for praise in major international speeches, by uncritically backing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his power grab in Saudi Arabia, and by cultivating an air of presidential indifference to issues of human rights and democracy. In fairness, the president’s comments that the U.S. would exact punishment on Saudi Arabia if it's proved that Riyadh was responsible for Khashoggi’s disappearance were a good sign in this regard; his pre-emptive public refusal to even consider restricting U.S. arms sales, however, was a very bad one.

Striking the right balance in dealing with friendly dictators will always be difficult. But the U.S. risks compromising its ideals and its interests if it doesn’t even try.

Impact – Middle East WarExpanded US leverage causes Middle East war and escalation with IranVaez 19 Ali, Project Director for Iran, “The Risks of Maximising Pressure on Iran,” 4/24/19, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/risks-maximising-pressure-iran //AY

The U.S. decision on 22 April to end sanctions exemptions for Iran’s remaining oil customers, following on an earlier designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), significantly escalates the Trump administration’s coercive campaign against Tehran. The intent is clear: bankrupt Iran into acceding to unilateral U.S. demands or, even better, imploding its regime. But while there is little doubt that the policy of "maximum pressure " has inflicted considerable economic duress – and stands to push Iran’s economy into further decline by starving it of a key source of external revenue – it is far less certain that it will achieve its strategic objectives .

First of all, the strategy’s success now depends more on China, India and Turkey – Tehran’s remaining key oil customers – than either the U.S. or Iran.

Historically, China dislikes unilateral sanctions, which could one day target its own economy. Beijing also has little interest in facilitating regime change in the only country in the energy-rich Gulf region where Washington lacks a foothold. India is in the middle of a general election. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has little interest to take steps that would increase fuel prices or depict him as subservient to U.S. whims. For its part, Turkey appears loath to alienate a neighbour with whom it has had four centuries of peaceful relations in favour of an unreliable ally, which supports Syrian Kurds affiliated with the PKK (Ankara’s arch enemy) and threatens to cut off the sale of F-35 fighter jets if Turkey purchases and deploys the S-400 Russian missile defence system.

Of course, Washington can try both persuasion and – if necessary – pressure to compel the trio to fall in line. The former requires credibility and apt diplomacy, which have been rare commodities with the current occupants of the White House. The latter could backfire. Under U.S. law, the Trump administration can sanction any company or bank engaged in energy-related purchases with Iran’s Central Bank. This could derail U.S. trade negotiations or sour relations with these three major countries; or push them to channel their transactions with Iran through banks that would not mind being sanctioned, as China did in 2012 with Kunlun bank. They could also join the European special purpose vehicle, or establish a new one, to bypass U.S. restrictions through a barter system using credits from Iranian exports to pay for exports of goods to Iran without requiring monetary transfers.

Washington’s present approach makes possible two scenarios, neither of which is promising: either Iran digs in, prompting a frustrated White House to double down yet again on measures that alienate key allies and risk regional escalation ; or Iran calculates that it has little left to lose – especially if its remaining oil customers toeing Washington’s line – and decides to restart its nuclear program to increase its leverage or challenges the U.S. and its regional partners across one of the many tense flashpoints scattered across the region. In other words, between present realities and the idealised outcome of Iranian capitulation wished for by the Trump administration lies a fraught and dangerous path.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’ explicit support for cutting off Iran’s oil exports by flooding the market entails risks too. By encouraging and abetting Trump’s maximum pressure policy they are aiming not only to weaken their regional rival but to turn a neat financial profit, as the oil price rises along with their exports. But as Iranian leaders, both pragmatists and hardliners, have repeatedly warned, Iran is not going to sit on its hands and starve. Options for disturbing an already tense oil market abound. As Sadollah Zarei, a prominent Iranian strategist and advisor to Qassem Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s elite Quds force, recently wrote, Iran could push militants to disrupt Saudi and Emirati oil shipments to Europe through the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, without closing the Strait of Hormuz, through which Iran ships its own oil to Asia. This could not only rattle the markets, but also result in a military clash between the U.S. or its allies and Iran (which, of course, could be the outcome some Iran-hawks in Washington and some of their regional allies seek). Cyber-attacks on Saudi and Emirati oil facilities is another possibility. Neither of these scenarios is far-fetched and both have precedent.

U.S. strategy might make sense if a quick and easy win were assured. But if past is prelude, Iran will not negotiate with Washington unless it has a strong hand, for which it likely would have to restart its nuclear program to accumulate leverage. This means that only a nuclear crisis could lead to a return to the table. But Iran’s abandonment of the nuclear deal is more likely to trigger war than diplomacy given the mood in the U.S. and Israel. In the same vein, there is a long track record of Iran pursuing regional policies it deems critical to its national security, regardless of its economic well-being. And finally, even in the unlikely event that the Islamic Republic collapses, there is no guarantee that a pax Americana emerges from the ruins of the Iranian economy and its shattered middle class. If this is the expectation, then the lessons of Iraq may have been lost on the architects of the 2003 invasion, some of whom are once again in the saddle in Washington.

Unfortunately, history shows that Washington’s response to a policy that fails to deliver is often to double down on it.

Impact – Russia/ChinaGiving Trump leverage causes escalation with China and RussiaCrooke 18 Alistair, former British diplomat, founder and director of the Beirut-based Conflicts Forum, “Asymmetric Financial War and Radical US Leverage – What Will It Bring?” Strategic Culture Foundation, 8/28/18, https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/08/28/asymmetric-financial-war-and-radical-us-leverage-what-will-it-bring/ //AY

It seems that the Chinese leadership has concluded that the Trump Administration is determined to use its full spectrum radical leverage to hobble China as a rival, and to resurrect its own global domination – Xi seems to foresee a long struggle for position in the global future: one that will be played out geo-politically (in the jostling in the S outh China Sea, over North Korea , Taiwan and the BRI ), as much as in the economic domain. If this is so, there is real risk of the ‘jostling’ spontaneously escalating into a military clash , whether limited and contained, or not.

Xi is essentially correct. Until recently, Washington subscribed to the western cultural conviction of the linear itinerary of historical ‘progress’ – that is to say, that the introduction of the western-style economic liberal market, under Deng Xiaoping, constituted part of an inevitable Chinese journey towards ever greater economic and political liberty (i.e. they would become like ‘us’).

But Washington DC had its ‘tipping point’. It slid across, into a very different understanding. This was that China’s liberal economic reforms were all about restoring China’s former global economic primacy and power – and never about ‘empowering the individual’ in the western mode of thinking. In that context, China remaining compliant and well-behaved within the global order made sense for China – so long as it remained on course to become the global Number One, by 2049 (the CCP Centenary Year).

But, like all ‘Road to Damascus’ late converts, US foreign policy élites now have become fervent proselytisers for the Chinese ‘threat’ meme. So, the question arises: does it make sense any more for China to pursue its instinctive policy of not confronting the US, especially if Trump is known for keeping up the pressure, never backing off, and always doubling down? How can China too, stick with its ‘quietist’ posture if Trump ups the pressure in the South China Sea, or in North Korea, or decides to adopt Taiwan as a ‘democracy cause’? Xi can’t .

Russia, on the other hand, is witnessing an extremely defensive US President – a longstanding believer in good relations with Russia, but whose persistent vulnerability to the ‘Russiagate’ hysteria is pushing him to polish his anti-Russian credentials to the extent that he is now becoming holier than the Pope (more ‘hard-on-Russia’ than the Russophobes); more neocon, than the neocons. With rafts of crushing sanctions against Russia already in the Congressional pipeline (over which the US President has minimal ability to limit their implementation), Russia too must prepare for a long period of economic attrition. The depth of the American crisis is such that President Putin (like everyone) cannot guess how it may all turn out.

For Europe, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Venezuela, the outlook is similar: It will be a period in which the US weaponises all the leverage it has at its command to restore the US global primacy – and to bring all into line with the wider US agenda. Trump is escalating – intent, it would seem, on having the first capitulation, or political fissure to burst apart, by November. But what if that doesn't happen?

The ‘market’ (with a few exceptions) take the view of America's victory in the trade war as certain: the US is easily the predominant consumer market and concomitantly, it hurts US trade partners the more to be shut out from it – which is also to say, that retaliatory tariffs imposed by others will hurt US exporters the less (because US outwards exports are the lesser, in most cases).

With states such as China, its exports to the US are at least double the value of US exports to the US, therefore the US owns the leverage (in the White House view) – because there are twice as many possibilities for US to impose import tariffs as China has to impose export tariffs. Additionally, the US uses the US dollar hegemony (i.e. currency war) to create an artificially strong dollar – which weakens emerging markets, and concomitantly weakens their leverage (as their US dollar-denominated debt and interest payments, become toxically elevated, in relation to their domestic currencies).

This ‘market’ view of trade war somehow is a mirror of America’s military zeitgeist. The US has the biggest military by far; it can outgun everyone (except Russia), so anyone challenging the US is bound to be ‘a loser’ (it is assumed). Indeed, the US can, and does, begin its wars with a slick show of destructive capability that pummels the adversary. But what then? Then, the US military doesn’t seem to have answers to the subsequent phases: It bogs down, and then finds itself losing to asymmetric retaliation . Its only answer is the ‘forever’ wars.

AT: Leverage Good Expanded leverage doesn’t solve their impacts—but the constant drive for leverage instead causes conflict—AND Trump is an alt causeKhong 19 Yuen Foong, Professor of Political Science, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, “Power as prestige in world politics,” International Affairs, 1/1/19, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy245 //AY

Conclusion: destined for war?

Power is shifting from West to East . The most obvious and consequential manifestation of this consists in the geopolitical competition in Asia between the established power, the United States, and the risen power, China. By portraying this competition in terms of the struggle for the top spot in the hierarchy of prestige, I have sought to cut to the chase of what is involved in the contest. If this approach is on the mark, we should expect to hear many future statements such as ‘our prestige is at stake’, ‘we do not want to be a paper tiger’ and ‘this will be an irreparable blow to our status and prestige’ when US and Chinese leaders respond to strategic challenges, especially those posed by one to the other. The prestige narrative will feature in their public debate, but it will be especially prominent in their private deliberations.

Prestige—one’s reputation for power or the shadow cast by power—is valued both as an end and as a means. For much of this article, I have focused on the instrumental value of prestige. But prestige is also an end in itself. Daniel Markey’s examination of the role of prestige as a cause of conflict in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau concluded that, for these canonical realists, prestige was ‘an intrinsic end sought by both individuals and stastes’.80 Both the United States and China—and both their leaders and their citizens—derive enormous psychic satisfaction from being at the top of the prestige ladder. The latter validates the success of their respective political–economic systems, as well as the legitimacy of those in charge.

The United States has enjoyed being the most prestigious nation on earth since 1945. In the centuries before 1839, China was the most prestigious nation in Asia. Today, most Chinese and many outsiders view China’s ‘century of humiliation’ (1839–1949) as a historical aberration, when China’s reputation for power was squashed by external invaders and its own internal divisions. Mao Zedong’s achievement was to reunite the country and rid it of imperialists; and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, beginning in the late 1970s, unshackled the entrepreneurial spirit of his people and propelled the economic growth that has put China in the position where it is today.

Yan Xuetong captures the Chinese mindset well when he writes that the Chinese ‘regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than obtaining something new ... [They] consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather than gaining advantage over others.’81 But at the highest levels, the status or prestige game is a zero-sum game: it is about gaining advantage over your competitors. Either you are number one or you are not.82 And if Yong Deng is correct in observing that China ‘may very well be the most status-conscious country in the world’—partly because it assumes that ‘status entails some magical qualities with which core national interests can be secured’83—we should expect the geopolitical competition between China and the United States to intensify in the years ahead.

Prestige, status, credibility and avoiding humiliation—the importance of this strategic narrative to America’s and China’s sense of self is manifest. Is Donald Trump an outlier here? In pursuing his

‘America First’ agenda, Trump seems content to undermine the institutions and practices often viewed as the expressions par excellence of US prestige and leadership: the US-led economic institutions and military alliances, and America’s penchant for promoting democracy abroad. Unlike his predecessors, Trump relishes threatening his G7 economic partners with tariffs, calling America’s NATO allies ‘deadbeats’ whom he may leave in the strategic lurch if they do not raise their defence spending to 2 per cent (or even 4 per cent) of GDP and rejecting ‘promotion of US values worldwide’ while cultivating authoritarian rulers.

Trump’s starting point seems to be an America already low in prestige—hence the need to make it ‘great’ again; an America that under previous administrations has wittingly or unwittingly been exploited economically and militarily by allies and adversaries alike. Trump’s emphasis on threatening and deploying hard US economic and military power to get his (America First) way is undoubtedly eroding US prestige, but he seems undisturbed by this. It is worth reiterating the pronouncements of E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin on prestige: respectively, ‘If your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it’84 and ‘It is for this reason that in the conduct of diplomacy and the resolution of conflicts among states there is actually relatively little use of overt force or, for that matter, explicit threats.’85 By resorting to explicit threats against America’s G7 partners and NATO allies, and by initiating a trade war, Trump is acting on his own resentments: that, far from being the most prestigious nation on earth, the US has been an international sucker, taken for granted and exploited by allies, and ‘raped’ economically by adversaries such as China. That the rest of the world does not see it this way does not matter (to Trump).

AT: This is isolationism Isolationism is a strange way to spell “strategic adaptation”Jentleson et al 12 – Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University

(Bruce W. Jentleson, Andrew M. Exum, Melissa G. Dalton and J. Dana Stuster, Strategic Adaptation: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East, June 2012, date accessed: 6.24.2019, http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/CNAS_StrategicAdaptation_JentlesonExum_0.pdf)//AP

We propose an approach of “strategic adaptation.” While many new and long-standing U.S. policies remain appropriate, we emphasize adapting to a strategic environment that has changed dramatically and is likely to continue to do so. In particular, there are several near-term threats and challenges emanating from Iran, Syria and Yemen, as well as in Israel-Egypt relations, that require immediate attention from U.S. policymakers. But it is equally important that the United States adapt its policies to harness the potential and mitigate the risks of longterm trends in the region, employing a high degree of strategic flexibility and diplomatic ingenuity.

The very notion of adaptation may strike some as “declinist,” since in some cases we recommend the U nited S tates reduce its commitments to the region. The real trap for U.S. strategy in the Middle East, though, is not declinism but denialism – the unwillingness to recognize how profoundly the strategic context has changed. When conditions change or policies are not working, staying the course is less important than the willingness to adapt and to do so in ways that enhance policy effectiveness.7 As the eminent realist Hans Morgenthau once warned, the “residues of formerly adequate modes of thought and action now rendered obsolete by a new social reality” only sap the power of great nations.

Specific Counterplans

Fix EUM CP This is not a conditions CP but it does provide a way to solve the 2ac “no enforcement” deficits about end-use monitoring that are read vs Conditions CPs

1nc EUM CP – sample CP text The United States federal government should:

Acknowledge and coordinate public expectations about SSA goals Develop a common taxonomy for US Security Sector Assistance personnel Incentivize recruitment for Security Sector Assistance personnel Modernize and fully fund Department of State Security Sector Assistance strategic planning and

tech innovation Implement further strict requirements for the monitoring of arms sales and counter terrorism

activities

1nc EUM CP – solvency The CP’s planks resolve every problem with end-use monitoring Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

The following initiatives will be instrumental to operationalizing the oversight and accountability framework outlined above in this section:

Managing Expectations. The administration and Congress should acknowledge and set expectations with the partner and the U.S. public that it takes time for SSA return on invest- ment to materialize.

Defining Taxonomy. The administration should develop a common taxonomy for SSA to avoid confusion as to what policies, tools, and authorities should be included in a holistic oversight and accountability approach. The categories of operational, transactional, and governance-based SSA described in Section 3 could frame such a taxonomy.

Developing the SSA Workforce. As addressed in the FY 2017 NDAA reforms, the SSA work- force must grow and deepen its expertise to provide greater oversight and accountability of SSA The administration and U.S. military should update curicula and training for Foreign Service and security cooperation officers at DOS and DOD to emphasize oversight and accountability principles and processes They should also adapt the incentive structures in career pathways for Foreign Service and military personnel to elevate the priority of the SSA mission, given SSAs prominence in U.S. global strategy. Congress should resource ad- equate personnel for conducting monitoring, evaluation, and Leahy vetting—including through requiring a modest tax on SSA programs to fund these oversight and account- ability functions.

Modernizing DOS SSA. DOS and Congress should examine ways to streamline Doss SSA strategic planning process. DOS should elevate a single conductor to drive and direct SSA planning in close collaboration with regional and functional bureaus and with other U.S. departments and agencies. It should also consider a similar consolidation for SSA program oversight. These may be two different conductors, with the •planning conductor" providing strategic priorities and policy guidance to the •program conductor: The program conductor can provide feedback derived from monitoring and evaluation to the planning conductor to inform possible changes in SSA strategy and policy. Through a sequence of briefings, hear- ings, and reports, DOS and Congress should work together to assess ways to make these structural changes, and to review and modernize Title 22 SSA authorities for twenty-first- century security challenges.

Making Innovation Possible. Congress should consider authorizing a modest "Bishop's Fund" for SSA innovation, to allow competitive proposals to be advanced in support of mainstream Title 22 and Title 10 activities. This would enable DOS and DOD to develop SSA initiatives aimed at addressing emerging partner capability requirements in low-cost but potentially high-reward ways (e.g„ maritime domain awareness, border security, and commercially available cyber-protection tools, among others).

Monitoring Counterterrorism Activities. Congress should bring programs under DoD's Section 1208 authority, which provide material assistance to partner forces, under monitoring and evaluation requirements similar to those stipulated for Section 333 activities, balancing for the need to respond to emergent counterterrorism requirements. Congress and DOD should track clear metrics-driven goals, objectives, and outcomes for Section 1208 activities that complement broader SSA plans for a partner country.

2nc EUM CP – solvency Improving interagency coordination and developing stricter monitoring programs solves any DA to status quo EUM Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf)//AP

Monitoring and Evaluation Recommendations

DOD should continue to institutionalize its new planning process. In parallel, DOS should be devel- oping its own system for holistic planning, monitoring, and evaluation as part of its ongoing reorganization and reform effort. Training and education across the DOD and DOS workforce for SSA planning, monitoring, and evaluation should be prioritized and resourced. Agencies respon- Sible for developing and administering SSA programs should more actively and closely collaborate with partner countries on program design. This will help ensure an alignment of objectives and encourage partner buy-in . Additionally, there should be an increased emphasis on interagency coordination. Specifically, a DOS "conductor" for security sector planning and cooperation should be identified and empowered to bring together interagency actors to develop a common plan for partner countries. To help facilitate this, Congress should conduct a review of Title 22 authori- ties, constructed during the Cold War era, to determine if they should be modernized to address the twenty-first-century competitive landscape. Congress should mandate M9E for Title 22 SSA programs. Enhancing interagency coordination and empowering a DOS conductor will go a long way toward ensuring that SSA is linked to strategic objectives. To facilitate strong program design and M&E, agencies must invest in recruiting and training a workforce fluent in theories of change and capable of designing and implementing regimes? USAID's M8E best practices can serve as a useful guide and training resource for other U.S. agencies conducting SSA.

To improve DOS and DoD's ability to track and monitor the end use of U.S. weapons provided to security partners, the following actions should be taken. First, to improve the completeness and timeliness of Blue Lantern checks, DOS should ensure that its workforce is resourced to consistently conduct checks and should foster greater host government cooperation by utilizing available Blue Lantern outreach programs. Second, to improve partner oversight and accountabil- ity, Blue Lantern implementation guidance should articulate the conditions under which site visits are required to complete a pre-license screening_3 Third, to improve tracking of FMS weapons, the DOD should assess and address gaps in its documentation and record-keeping procedures and subject ITEF programs to EOM.

AT: Fix EUM

2ac EUM CP – fails End use monitoring is structurally impossible to implement – information is in fact dissuasive Smith and Toombs 12 (Zach Toombs; Smith worked for 25 years in a series of key reporting and editorial roles at The Washington Post, including national investigative editor, national security correspondent, national investigative correspondent, and a foreign staff bureau chief based in Rome. He also focused on conflict and terrorism in the Middle East; politics and military affairs in Asia; and arms proliferation; 6-22-2012; "U.S. points finger, and arms exports, at human rights abusers – Center for Public Integrity"; Center for Public Integrity;https://publicintegrity.org/national-security/u-s-points-finger-and-arms-exports-at-human-rights-abusers/; Accessed: 6-25-2019 //GBS Rudolph)

State spokeswoman Beth Gosselin did note that some of the weapons exports listed in the State Department’s report were meant for use by U.S. forces abroad, not by foreign militaries. In Bahrain, for example, $266.7 million of the $280.3 million worth of military arms and equipment were items for the Navy’s “Fifth Fleet” station on the island nation, she said. Gosselin declined to provide similar data for other countries.

Matt Schroeder, director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said the U.S. vetting process for militaries and governments receiving arms is better than that of many nations, but that information on which weapons go to U.S. forces and which weapons go to other users is rarely accessible . “It’s difficult to take the dollar value of arms shipped to a country and extrapolate which section of these items may be vulnerable to misuse,” Schroeder said. “It’s tough to make that call.”

Saudi HR Conditions CP

FYICP’s processNewton ’17 – Professor @Vanderbilt Law School

(Michael, “An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen,” 2017, date accessed: 6.25.2019, Vanderbilt University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971208)//AP

Historically, the bulk of sales to Saudi Arabia and other coalition nations appear to have been authorized as foreign military sales, e.g. government-to-government agreements. 113 Reports indicate that future sales may be structured as direct commercial sales. As discussed above, both foreign military sales and direct commercial sales are authorized by the Arms Export Control Act. Sales under either program to foreign government entities, by law, are subject to Section 502B and Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act. In practice, however, the State Department does not conduct vetting of direct commercial sales under Section 620M. The manner in which the equipment is sold also has implications for oversight of compliance with end use agreements. The Department of Defense manages end use monitoring of foreign military sales while the Department of State is responsible for monitoring of direct commercial sales.114

1nc conditions CP Sample text: The United States federal government ought to condition future arms sales and oil sales on Saudia Arabia’s implementation of significant human rights reforms as well as cessation of aid to the Yemeni conflict against Houthi forces.

That solves – applying more pressure forces Saudi to complyTabatabai and Wasser 18 – Ph.D. in war studies in King's College London, M.P.H.IL in war studies, King's College London; M.S. in foreign service, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Ariane M, Becca, “Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?” RAND, November 15 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html)//al

To many, the United States appears beholden to the kingdom. In actuality, Riyadh needs Washington more than Washington needs Riyadh, and the missteps in Saudi decisionmaking have caused significant damage to the kingdom's reputation, reinforcing its dependence on America. The United States has an opportunity to exert its influence to shape Saudi behavior, perhaps more than ever before.

Saudi Arabia has long relied on the United States as its primary security guarantor. Today, the Middle Eastern nation benefits from U.S. training, arms, intelligence cooperation and, up until recently, refueling efforts for the Saudi-led air war in Yemen.

Yet, despite the Saudi reliance on the United States in key areas pertaining to political and military affairs, America has been reluctant to press the Kingdom's decisionmakers to change their behavior. Domestically, many have long questioned whether the breadth and depth of the ties between the two countries serve U.S. interests, and the relationship has long been a point of contention in American foreign policy circles. Although the United States plays a disproportionate role in the Middle Eastern nation's security, it doesn't always use this to enforce its values and interests, or see this as a point of leverage.

Recent developments heightened long-simmering tensions between Riyadh and Washington. Criticism of the Kingdom's foreign policy has become more pronounced since the beginning of the war in Yemen in 2015 and the Gulf crisis two years later that pit Saudi Arabia and its allies against Qatar. While there is seemingly a push to “punish” Riyadh by imposing sanctions and halting support for the Yemen war, there does not appear to be a fundamental shift taking place in U.S. policy. While the administration is taking some steps to placate critics and Riyadh is reportedly holding officials accountable for Khashoggi's murder inside the Saudi consulate, history suggests that this is unlikely to lead to a significant departure from the status quo.

U.S.-Saudi relations were founded on two core interests that have been the hallmark of the partnership since its inception in 1945—security and oil. Security has played an outsize role in the bilateral ties, particularly as political tensions have historically produced significant strain. Low points in the broader relationship include the 1973 oil embargo and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Despite these fractious issues, the ties between Riyadh and Washington have endured. This durability reflects the reasons behind the cooperation: A convergence of needs and interests that remain today: Oil in return for security. But these driving interests may be changing as the United States pursues

renewable energy in a bid to become less dependent on petro states and as Saudi Arabia aspires to “go it alone” to ensure its security and that of its immediate neighbors. These opposing goals have placed pressure on the relationship without derailing it.

The Trump administration could consider using its influence to encourage Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad.

Since Crown Prince Mohammed consolidated power, however, divergent Saudi and U.S. interests and worldviews have come to the forefront. Initially, many Americans praised the prince as a reformer, bringing the kingdom into the 21st century. But it soon became clear that the reforms were more limited than many had hoped and that the efforts were taking place against the backdrop of problematic policies at home and abroad. Several developments have garnered more scrutiny of Saudi policies: The manner in which the prince has silenced those he views as his opponents—including Khashoggi—coupled with international incidents, chiefly the ongoing devastating Saudi-led efforts in the war in Yemen, creating the world's worst humanitarian crisis, and the internecine rift among the Arab Gulf states.

Both the Obama and Trump administrations watched as the kingdom's policies became more assertive, leading to the widely held assumption that America can't change the Saudi calculus. But this is far from the truth. As the Saudis' chief political and military partner and the undisputed security guarantor in the Middle East, the United States has considerable influence it can wield over Saudi decisionmaking. It has thus far gone virtually unused. In reality, the United States may have more leverage over Saudi Arabia today than at any other time except during the 1991 Gulf War.

Trump's ascension to the U.S. presidency helped alleviate some of Saudi Arabia's concerns that stemmed from President Obama's Middle East policies and, consequently, afforded the United States more influence over the kingdom. The Saudis had grown distrustful of U.S. commitment to the region due to President Obama's plans to pivot to Asia and his administration's response to the Arab Spring and pursuit of a nuclear deal with Tehran. But President Trump made Riyadh the destination of his first foreign trip in office and pledged to support the kingdom while harshly criticizing its archenemy, Iran, and withdrawing from the nuclear deal this past May.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support.

Until recently, President Trump was not inclined to use these developments as leverage. Instead, he stood by the crown prince even as U.S. military support to Saudi forces in Yemen—including aerial refueling and advising on intelligence sharing and targeting procedures—have come under attack in Congress and by international rights groups. Some have argued that the administration has emboldened Riyadh, giving it carte blanche to pursue its more assertive policies. New details pertaining to Khashoggi's murder have emerged, ostensibly tying the young Saudi monarch to the

incident and leading to mounting congressional pressure. But the Trump administration has been willing to give the Saudis only a mere slap on the wrist without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.

The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power.

2nc conditions CP – oil solvency Leverage works – the plan’s disengagement risks further irrational actions due to Saudi Arabia’s fear of Iran – turns the caseWilliams 16 – senior researcher at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and the deputy foreign policy editor for Lawfare (Jennifer, 1-7-16, “Why Saudi leaders keep making bad decisions: they're scared”, Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/1/7/10725896/saudi-insecurity-iran, accessed 6-30-19) //DYang

Though the Saudi royal family has always been aware of how precarious its grip on power really is, the sheer number of destabilizing forces that threaten the regime today is making them more insecure than ever.

Broadly speaking, the two things the Saudis fear the most are losing power at home and losing their dominant position in the Islamic world to Iran. Nearly every threat the regime sees relates to one (or both) of these. Here's a list of some of the big threats the Saudi regime sees today:

A popular, pro-democracy uprising, like the ones that overthrew the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia

A resurgent Sunni extremist threat, whether from al-Qaeda, ISIS, or an ideologically similar group that sees the Saudis as corrupt and un-Islamic

A Shia uprising in the Eastern Province, where the bulk of Saudi Arabia's oil fields and infrastructure are located and where most of the country's Shia minority also happen to live

Increased Iranian influence on its borders (in Bahrain and Yemen, especially)

Abandonment by the United States in favor of Iran, or even just US disengagement from the region in general, thus depriving Saudi Arabia of its great power protector

The loss of credibility as a responsible custodian of the two Muslim holy places (and perhaps even the loss of custodianship entirely, for example to an international body tasked with administering the areas)

When you look closely at this list, you can see that an awful lot of it, at least in Saudi eyes, might appear either connected or potentially connected to Iran.

Consider, for example, the risk of a Shia uprising in the Eastern Province, which could disrupt Saudi oil production. Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland and adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, writes in a recent article in Foreign Policy, "Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, which sits on the Persian Gulf and is a vital economic hub for Saudi Arabia, plays a major role in Iran’s sectarian vision."

The idea of the United States becoming friendlier with Iran, particularly in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal, also terrifies the Saudi regime. If the US stops seeing Iran as an enemy to be countered and restrained at all costs, the Saudis believe Iran will become even more powerful and more threatening to Saudi dominance in the region. Similarly, if the US disengages from the region completely, which the Saudis genuinely believe has been happening under the Obama administration, Iran will be left to its own devices and will fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Americans.

Finally, the loss of credibility as a responsible custodian of the two Muslim holy places plays into both the Saudi fear of losing dominance in the region and the fear of losing power at home. Iran has long sought to portray the Saudis as incompetent custodians in an effort to damage their credibility and has even called for an international body to take over administration of these places. For the Saudi royal family, a loss of credibility means a loss of religious legitimacy in the eyes of Muslims, both at home and abroad. It could also mean losing billions of dollars in revenue the Saudi regime takes in from Muslim pilgrims each year.

How these insecurities explain many of Saudi Arabia's recent actions

The Saudi regime knew full well that the decision to execute Nimr, the dissident Shia cleric, would provoke Iran and the various Shia militias it supports in the region, as both Iran and its proxies warned the Saudis of this loudly and clearly and on multiple occasions. But it apparently felt the message the execution would send at home was well worth the risk.

In other words, the decision to execute Nimr was not only — or even primarily — about sectarianism or the power struggle with Iran. It was mainly about sending a message to all its citizens, both Sunni and Shia, about what happens to people who stir up dissent and threaten the stability of the country. And it was about quashing any ideas the Shia in the Eastern Province might be harboring about staging a serious uprising.

The Saudi regime's decision to intervene in the Yemeni civil war can also be understood through the lens of Saudi fear and insecurity. As Sultan Barakat, director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, explains:

Although one can argue over the extent to which the Iranian threat to the Gulf states is real or imagined, the Saudi-led coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm in March to stop Iran from turning Yemen into another Iraq, where it enjoys significant sway over the government and can pressure its Gulf neighbors.

This is why the Saudi regime sees preventing what it believes would be a pro-Iran regime from taking power in Yemen as a top priority.

Saudi fears of an internal uprising and of losing its dominant position in the region also explain why it is spending billions of dollars shoring up the regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Morocco, and elsewhere in an attempt to prevent and in some cases roll back the pro-democracy Arab Spring uprisings that recently swept across the Middle East. Not only does propping up these authoritarian regimes help dampen revolutionary impulses across the region and keep them from spreading to Saudi Arabia, it also ensures Saudi dominance by making the regimes of these countries beholden to the Saudis for financial support.

Another way Saudi Arabia deals with its fears of Iranian influence is by financing Islamist groups that fight the Iranian-backed regime in Syria. Saudi Arabia also fears US disengagement, and responds with the same policy of funding Islamist groups, to fill what it sees as a leadership vacuum — even though doing so is a risk not just to the United States but to itself as well.

It's this sort of calculus that looks irrational to most outsiders and rational to Saudi leaders — not because they're blind to the risks, but rather because they are so intently focused on what they see as the overwhelming and ever-present threats to regime survival that they're willing to take those risks.

The US is now exports more oil than Saudi Arabia—they can no longer use oil as leverageWald 18 – author of “Saudi, Inc.: The Arabian Kingdom’s Pursuit of Profit and Power” (Ellen, 10-18-2018, “Saudi Arabia Has No Leverage”, New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/opinion/saudi-33arabia-economy-united-states.html, accessed 6-29-2019) //DYang

As the fallout continues over the disappearance of the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the government in Riyadh is putting on a tough face. If there are sanctions over the alleged murder of Mr. Khashoggi, the Saudis want the world to know, they will fight back.

On Sunday, the Saudi government released a recalcitrant statement: “The Kingdom also affirms that if it receives any action, it will respond with greater action, and that the Kingdom’s economy has an influential and vital role in the global economy and that the Kingdom’s economy is affected only by the impact of the global economy.”

These are empty threats. Saudi Arabia is not in a position to harm the United States. In fact, when it comes to relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, Washington has all of the leverage. American policymakers shouldn’t forget that.

One of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s primary objectives is to diversify the Saudi economy and wean his country off its dependence on oil. Unemployment in Saudi Arabia is at more than 12 percent, and some 70 percent of employed Saudis work for the government. The Saudi labor ministry estimates that the economy needs to create 1.2 million jobs by 2022 to lower unemployment to a still dismal 9 percent.

But because the country lacks business experience and special expertise outside of the oil and petrochemical industries, that won’t be possible without foreign — and particularly American — participation. That’s why the Saudis have been making so many deals recently: The Public Investment Fund has partnered with AMC to open and run movie theaters across the country because AMC knows how to manage cinemas. Saudi Arabia is pursuing deals for Snap and Amazon to open facilities in the kingdom because they can offer tech opportunities.

It’s not just the private sector. The Saudi government bureaucracy also relies heavily on American management expertise. Riyadh has been hiring American consultants since the 1950s, and in recent years American firms like McKinsey, Boston Consulting Group and Oliver Wyman have worked on hundreds of projects for the kingdom. In some cases, Saudi government bureaucrats work side by side with these consultants to implement government programs.

The Saudi Public Investment Fund — the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund, which is estimated to have more than $250 billion in assets — is also closely tied to the American economy. To name just a few of its major investments: It put $3.5 billion into Uber in 2016 and almost half a billion dollars in the start-up Magic Leap this year; it invested $45 billion in SoftBank’s Vision Fund, which invests heavily in American technology start-ups; and it made a $5 billion investment with a possible growth to $20 billion in a Blackstone fund for United States infrastructure. Much of the tens of billions of dollars cannot be pulled

out on a whim. These start-ups are private companies without open markets for their shares. Prince Mohammed is building a domestic reputation with this tech portfolio, so its success is politically important, too.

All of this is at risk if the dispute worsens between Saudi Arabia and the United States over Mr. Khashoggi’s disappearance. Not only could the Saudis not retaliate because their economy is so intertwined with that of the United States, but they will also be susceptible to pressure. Targeted sanctions — if it comes to that — could force consultants to withdraw or cut off the Saudi Public Investment Fund’s access to the profits of its investments. More likely, though, is that a continuing dispute would force American businesses like AMC to seriously reconsider involvement in the country because of negative publicity.

What about oil? Whereas Saudi Arabia could once shock the world economy by cutting oil exports or production to raise prices, it no longer has that power. The oil market today is significantly more diverse than it was in 1973, when Saudi Arabia and other Arab petroleum exporters unilaterally raised the price of oil and unsettled the American economy. In fact, the United States now produces more oil than Saudi Arabia, and imports make up a smaller percentage of domestically refined crude oil.

Saudi Arabia cannot embargo or unilaterally raise oil prices for the United States without doing greater harm to its own industry and revenues. If Riyadh directed the national oil company, Saudi Aramco, to halt exports to the United States today, it would primarily hurt Aramco itself. Aramco owns Motiva, the largest refinery in the United States, and Motiva is more reliant on Saudi oil than any other part of America’s energy ecosystem. If Aramco tried to raise prices by cutting oil production or exports, it would face irate customers in Asia and hurt its own refineries in China and Korea, too.

We do not yet know for certain what happened to Mr. Khashoggi, but President Trump has now said that he believes the Saudi journalist is dead and that there was high-level Saudi government involvement. If the United States determines that Saudi Arabia is at fault, the Trump administration will have a real opportunity. Of course, President Trump has so far indicated that he doesn’t have much interest in holding Saudi Arabia accountable. But with calls for a response growing louder on Capitol Hill, the White House should see a strategic opportunity here.

The Saudis are dependent on the United States, and public opinion is increasingly against them. Already, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has backed out of a high profile finance conference in Riyadh next week. Mr. Trump could use this as a chance to pressure Riyadh to come around on some of his real priorities: the peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians that Jared Kushner is trying to broker; a resolution to the dispute with Qatar, which hosts a critical American military base; billions of dollars more in purchases from American industries.

Saudi Arabia is not in a position to threaten the American economy. In fact, the kingdom may be overestimating its own economic clout. It would be a mistake for Riyadh to try to act on its threats against the United States.

2nc conditions CP – arms solvency The CP includes the possibility of resuming sales in the event Saudi Arabia makes durable changes Newton ’17 – Professor @Vanderbilt Law School

(Michael, “An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen,” 2017, date accessed: 6.25.2019, Vanderbilt University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971208)//AP

The United States cannot provide assistance to particular units or individuals under the FAA or the AECA where there are credible reports they have committed gross human rights violations. Where, as here, there is significant information in the public record concerning allegations of widespread abuses but little information on particular units, it is the practice of the United States to seek further information on which units were responsible and to limit assistance to those units that are determined not culpable. Given the extensive re-fueling operations conducted by the United States in support of the air campaign, specific information concerning particular units of concern should be readily available. 109 The re-fueling operations are, as a supportive measure providing supplies, also subject to vetting requirements.110

Assistance may be restored if the recipient government takes effective measures to hold those responsible accountable. 111 As discussed above, Saudi investigations to date have only examined a small fraction of the incidents of concern identified by credible sources and have broadly failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing. 112 It is unclear whether individuals responsible in those cases have been held accountable in an “effective” manner, e.g. in a manner proportionate to the alleged misconduct. This exception, therefore, clearly does not apply to the majority of units in question.

US has all the leverage in the US – Saudi RelationshipFrench 18 – [David French - senior writer for National Review, a senior fellow at the National Review Institute, and a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, October 18th 2018, “Arms Deals Give Leverage to America, Not the Saudis”, https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/arms-deals-give-america-leverage-not-the-saudis/, eph]

Of all the talking points justifying American inaction in response to the indescribably brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, perhaps the worst is the idea that the Saudis somehow have leverage over America because of their large-scale arms deals.

The truth is exactly the reverse.

The Saudi military is highly dependent on advanced American weaponry. American F-15s comprise close to half the Saudi fighter force, and the Saudi variant of the F-15E Strike Eagle represents a substantial portion of the air force’s striking power. On land, the Saudi army is dependent almost exclusively on American M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. They can’t just waltz over to a different country and transform their armed forces — not without suffering enormous setbacks in readiness and effectiveness during a years-long transition. A fundamental reality of arms deals is that a major arms purchase essentially locks the purchasing nation in a dependent posture for training, spare parts, and technical upgrades.

Indeed, one of the reasons for engaging in an arms transaction — aside from the economic benefit — is that the transaction gives America enormous power over the national defense of the purchasing nation. You buy our weapons, and we gain power over you. Well, we gain potential power. The question is whether we have the will to exercise that power.

Moreover, Trump’s claim that the Saudis could simply go to China or Russia betrays an odd ignorance about Chinese and Russian arms. Many of their most advanced weapons aren’t quite ready for prime time. If the Saudis are terrified of Iran, purchasing worse weapons that would require new training cycles, new spare parts, and new technical relationships is a terrible option. It’s a recipe for a serious military setback.

For example — as Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin observes — the State Department just approved the sale of Terminal High Altitude Air Defense missile-defense system to the Saudis. The Saudis are rightfully concerned about Iranian missile attack. Is it the position of the Trump administration that the Saudis have leverage over us if they cancel that deal and seek an inferior missile-defense system from a competing country? As Rogin says, Trump’s thinking is “totally and completely backwards.”

Buying a weapons platform is not like choosing between a Honda Accord and a Toyota Camry — where if one dealer ticks you off, you can just walk across the street and immediately get a substantially similar product. Trump is displaying his ignorance here, and his surrogates on television (many of whom know better) are exploiting understandable civic ignorance to push the administration’s line. We can’t expect Americans to know exactly how arms deals work or how F-15s are serviced and upgraded. But we should expect the president to understand these realities.

For all the president’s bluster, he’s demonstrating a surprising timidity in the face of an undeniable provocation from one of our more mendacious “allies.” We hold the cards in this alliance, and it’s time — for once — to stand up to a repressive and brutal regime, even if we do have a common Iranian foe. The world’s strongest nation, with the world’s largest economy, needs Saudi Arabia far less than they need us. End support for the brutal Saudi bombing campaign in Yemen. Impose conditions on continued American military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. It’s time for the junior partner in this alliance to finally learn its place.

2nc conditions CP – leverage solvencyThe US can use leverage effectively – explicit conditionality is the best approach Tabatabai and Wasser 18 – Tabatabai is an associate political scientist and Wasser is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation (Ariane and Becca, 11-15-2018, “SAUDI ARABIA NEEDS AMERICA. NOW MAY BE THE PERFECT TIME FOR TRUMP TO USE THAT LEVERAGE”, Newsweek, https://www.newsweek.com/saudi-arabia-needs-america-now-may-be-time-trump-use-leverage-1217864, accessed 6-29-2019) //DYang

This approach is not without risk—the Saudi government could, for example, reduce intelligence sharing, or switch off the proverbial oil tap, like the OPEC states did in 1973. But 2018 is not 1973, and the United States is no longer as reliant on Saudi oil. More so, the Saudi government's assertive actions also pose operational and reputational risks to important U.S. interests, as the Khashoggi affair demonstrated, and therefore the benefits of this approach are likely to outweigh any costs Riyadh may seek to impose.

On the surface, making U.S. support provisory may appear to be an unpalatable approach, one that legitimizes the crown prince. But wielded correctly, the White House can use this leverage to recalibrate the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Blanket support need not be granted in a way that emboldens Saudi behavior, leading to actions that are damaging to U.S. interests. Instead, the administration could consider also making conditional its support for the Saudi government's priority programs with the goal of altering and shaping its behavior. This includes making the Saudis take responsibility for Khashoggi's brutal death, putting an end to indiscriminate targeting practices in Yemen, altering the government's harsh response to opposition inside and outside of the Kingdom, and ending the rift with Qatar.

Naysayers of such an approach might claim that it only deepens the transactionalism on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship is presently based. But it is worth recognizing that the partnership was founded on an explicit alignment of interests, not values. By acknowledging this, the United States would be better positioned to adopt an approach that best serves its own interests. At this point, the Saudi government needs U.S. support more than the White House needs Saudi Arabia.

2nc conditions CP – AT: say no Pressure is building on Saudi Arabia – more sanctions mean they will have to complySerhan 18 Yasmeen Serhan is a London-based staff writer at The Atlantic. (The Atlantic. “Why Countries Aren’t Sanctioning the Saudi Government Over Khashoggi.” 6/28/19. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/12/west-punishes-saudis-targeted-sanctions-keeps-ties/577240/)

First the sanctions came from the United States. Then Germany. France soon followed. And now, Canada. Last week, the Canadian government announced it too would impose targeted sanctions against 17 Saudi nationals over the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

This is the latest international reprisal aimed at ensuring that those believed to be responsible for the death of Khashoggi are “held to account.” And in an age where diplomatic considerations often supersede the desire of governments to go after human-rights offenders—especially when it concerns an ally—it offers a look at how some countries are balancing their geopolitical interests with their concern for human rights.

So far, the sanctions that have been issued in response to Khashoggi’s death have focused solely on those believed to have taken direct part in his murder. Absent from these sanction lists, of course, is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is suspected of having ordered the hit. The Saudi government denies the crown prince’s involvement in Khashoggi’s death, and President Donald Trump, in apparent defiance of his own intelligence agency, has done the same.

But Trump isn’t the only one who has shied away from publicly maligning MbS, as the crown prince is commonly known. Around the world, Western leaders have offered muted criticism of the Saudi government’s alleged role in Khashoggi’s killing, opting instead to call on Riyadh to provide a more credible response for what happened to the journalist. More extreme repercussions, such as halting arms exports to Saudi Arabia, have been widely rejected by the U.S., Britain, and France for fear of upsetting a strategic ally.

This is where targeted sanctions come in. Through the Global Magnitsky Act and laws like it, governments have been able to inflict reprisals against human-rights-offending countries by imposing targeted sanctions against those directly responsible for the abuses. The initial version of the act, which President Barack Obama signed into law in 2012, was created as a means to punish the Russian officials responsible for the death of the Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky by freezing their assets in the country and banning them from entry. Since then, the U.S. has passed an updated version allowing targeted sanctions against officials in countries other than Russia. Other governments, too, have implemented their own versions of the Magnitsky Act, enabling them to name and shame human-rights abusers in ways that their geopolitical interests may have otherwise prohibited.

“The old technology for dealing with atrocities was to sanction the country,” Bill Browder, the human-rights activist behind the Global Magnitsky Act, told me, noting that statewide sanctions rarely reach their intended target. “The average person in the country would end up suffering, and the elites, the people who actually committed the crime, would … live exactly how they were living before. It didn’t really work.”

Targeting individuals directly, as Canada and others have done in the case of Saudi Arabia, ensures that those directly responsible for the crime face the consequences. And while such sanctions don’t necessarily result in conviction or imprisonment, they do hit targets where it counts: their wallets. Indeed, assets frozen as a result of such sanctions have totaled hundreds of millions of dollars.

But perhaps most important, targeted sanctions allow governments to save diplomatic face. By going after specific individuals, rather than a broader government, countries imposing sanctions don’t have to worry about the political ramifications of the decision, nor of diplomatic reprisals. This is particularly true for those seeking to respond to Khashoggi’s death without upsetting the energy, security, and regional cooperation that underpins certain countries’ relationship with the Saudi government. By imposing sanctions, “it doesn’t mean one can’t continue to be allies with Saudi Arabia,” Browder said. “It just means you’re going to punish the individuals who committed the crime.”

It’s this kind of approach that Gerald Knaus, the chairman of the European Stability Initiative think tank, is advocating for the European Union to take. Speaking by phone from Berlin, he said that by tasking a commission with highlighting specific human-rights abuses worldwide, the EU can move to impose sanctions against the offending individuals, and inspire other governments to do the same.

“It’s like a negative Oscars, a rotten-apple event,” Knaus said. “Once a year in The Hague, they present these stories and recommend to the EU to put these five people on a travel ban, and then it goes to the [European] council. There is still unanimity required, but it’s much, much harder to veto then because there will be so much visibility on the individual cases.”

Though no such event exists yet, Knaus said it could help combat corruption—particularly within the bloc’s human-rights arm, the Council of Europe. In April, a bribery probe revealed that some members of the organization’s parliamentary assembly accepted millions of euros in bribes from Azerbaijani diplomats in exchange for voting in favor of the oil-rich country, which has overseen a large-scale crackdown on dissent and the media.

Azerbaijan “is really what got us thinking about designing a system that makes it less easy for lobbying and corruption targeting just one or two EU member states or politicians to undermine the possibility to sanction,” Knaus said. “If we bring these [abuses] out into the open, the political cost of vetoing such sanctions becomes harder.”

While targeted sanctions against specific individuals are one way of combating human-rights violations, they’re not the only way. In the U.S., lawmakers have sought out additional ways of applying pressure on Saudi Arabia in the wake of Khashoggi’s death, most recently by seeking to end Washington’s support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In Argentina, a prosecutor is considering bringing charges against MbS for crimes against humanity, though it seems unlikely that such a prosecution would be viable.

Though Browder conceded that targeted sanctions may not necessarily reach the highest levels of government, they’re nonetheless an effective deterrent. “If you’re living in a world where there’s no consequences for bad actions, bad actors will act,” he said. “If there’s consequences, and those consequences are meaningful, then they’ll have to weigh up the cost of the action versus the benefit of the action. It’s as simple as that.”

Europe is already sanctioning them -- U.S. sanctions mean they collapseMcAuley et al 18 James McAuley foreign correspondents focusing on French and European politics and culture University of Oxford, DPhil in history; Harvard University, BA in history and literature. (Washington Post. “European Parliament passes resolution urging arms embargo on Saudi Arabia.” 6/28/19. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/european-parliament-passes-resolution-urging-arms-embargo-on-saudi-arabia/2018/10/25/cb324140-3172-4dc8-b373-4acc065fdb69_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31c8c4b3446a)

BRUSSELS — The European Parliament passed a nonbinding resolution on Thursday condemning the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and urging a European Union-wide arms embargo on Saudi Arabia in response.

The resolution came several days after Germany became the first Western government to suspend future arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer. On Sunday, Chancellor Angela Merkel told reporters that, in light of Khashoggi’s Oct. 2 killing in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul consulate, “arms exports can’t take place in the current circumstances.”

But it remains unclear whether Thursday’s resolution will pressure the governments of individual E.U. member states to follow suit in giving up their own lucrative Saudi contracts

After the United States, Britain and France are Saudi Arabia’s two largest sources of arms. So far, both have issued scathing condemnations of Khashoggi’s killing but have stopped short of heeding Merkel’s example.

According to Britain’s Department for International Trade, Britain exported arms and equipment worth at least $1.4 billion to Saudi Arabia last year, but the real figure is probably higher. In 2017, potential French sales of more than $14.7 billion were approved.

French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Theresa May both spoke via telephone with King Salman, according to a statement issued by the Saudi Foreign Ministry late Thursday, hours after the European Parliament’s resolution passed.

According to an Elysee Palace readout of the conversation, Macron pressed his Saudi counterpart for further clarity on what happened to Khashoggi and emphasized that France considers the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press an “essential priority.”

“France will not hesitate to take, along with its partners, international sanctions against those responsible,” Macron said, according to the readout.

The remarks echoed those of British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, who told Parliament this week that “if the appalling stories we’re reading turn out to be true, they are incompatible with our values, and we will act accordingly.”

But Britain and France have stopped short of suspending arms sales to the desert kingdom.

With lofty rhetoric, the European Parliament, an assembly of 751 elected officials from the 28 E.U. member states, rejected “the explanations provided so far by the Saudi authorities on the matter as lacking credibility.”

They also cast the torture and killing of Khashoggi, a Washington Post contributing columnist, as an affront to European ideals.

His killing, the resolution read, is “part of a pattern of a widespread crackdown against prominent human rights defenders, women activists, lawyers, journalists, writers and bloggers” in Saudi Arabia after Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman began assuming control of the country’s security apparatus.

The statement also decried the fact that Saudi authorities “are seeking the death penalty for several of these activists” and lamented that “surveillance systems and other dual-use items have been used to track and trace the movements of human rights defenders.”

Aside from a potential arms embargo, the resolution sought to push individual European countries to impose sanctions on specific individuals suspected in the Khashoggi killing with “targeted measures” such as travel bans in Europe or the freezing of European assets.

For some lawmakers, targeting specific individuals could send a small but powerful message. Marietje Schaake, a Dutch liberal lawmaker, said in advance of the vote that measures such as visa restrictions and freezing Saudi assets could “make it harder to go shopping in Paris and send children to good universities in Europe.”

The vote came in the wake of an admission from the Saudi Foreign Ministry that Khashoggi’s killing was a premeditated act, a significant reversal from earlier statements saying that he had left the consulate and that he had died following a fistfight with security officials.

Europe’s parliament has already voted to embargo arms sales due to bombingsRankin 16 Jennifer Rankin European reporter for the Guradian. (The Guardian. ‘EU parliament votes for embargo on arms sales to Saudi Arabia”. 2/25/16. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/25/eu-parliament-votes-for-embargo-on-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia)

MEPs have voted for a European Union-wide arms embargo against Saudi Arabia to protest against the Gulf state’s heavy bombing campaign in Yemen.

The European parliament voted by a large majority for an EU-wide ban on arms sales to the kingdom, citing the “disastrous humanitarian situation” as a result of “Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen”.

The vote does not compel EU member states to act but it does increase pressure on Riyadh, in the wake of criticism from the UN and growing international alarm over civilian casualties in Yemen.

British and US military 'in command room' for Saudi strikes on Yemen

The resolution also turns up the heat on the British government, which has supplied export licences for up to £3bn worth of arms to Saudi Arabia in the last year. The UK has been accused of direct involvement in the bombing campaign through the deployment of UK military personnel to the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia began bombing in Yemen last March to support the Yemeni president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was under threat from Houthi forces aligned with Iran.

Richard Howitt, the Labour MEP who drafted the key amendment, said: “This is a clear humanitarian appeal to end the bloodshed in Yemen, and call on Saudi Arabia to pursue a political rather than a military solution to the conflict.”

Howitt, who is Labour’s foreign affairs spokesman in Europe, also called on the British government to stop selling weapons to Riyadh. “The UK is one of the biggest suppliers of arms to Saudi Arabia and needs to heed this call, which has been overwhelmingly supported across the political spectrum and by a vast citizen campaign,” he said.

An earlier draft of the resolution that named and criticised the UK and other EU member states, including France, Spain and Germany, was dropped. The final version said “some EU member states” had continued to authorise transfers of weapons to Saudi Arabia since the violence started, in violation of EU rules on arms control.

The motion was passed by 359 votes to 212, as a diverse coalition of Socialists, Liberals, Greens, Leftists and Eurosceptics overcame opposition from the leadership of the two main centre-right groups, including Britain’s Conservatives. A separate resolution calling for a ceasefire in Yemen was supported by a larger number of MEPs.

Under a 2008 code of conduct, EU member states promised not to sell weapons to countries where they might be used “to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law” and undermine regional peace and stability.

The final resolution on arms control criticised the “intensification of airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition”, despite a heavy lobbying campaign from the Gulf state in Brussels.

Howitt, who has had two meetings with Saudi government officials in recent weeks, said this campaign against the resolution showed its significance. “[The Saudis] don’t like it, they are calling it sanctions,” he said. “It is not sanctions, it is an obligation not to sell arms.”

The Saudi ambassador to Brussels, Abdulrahman al-Ahmed, has defended his country’s military intervention, saying that the kingdom had set up a “high-level independent committee” to “assess incidents” and develop “targeting mechanisms”.

In a letter to MEPs ahead of the vote, he said Houthi rebels being bombed by the Saudi-led coalition had bombed civilians, deployed child soldiers and used starvation as a weapon.

Since the start of the conflict about 7,000 people have been killed and more than 35,000 injured. Earlier this year a UN panel investigating the Saudi-led bombing campaign said it had found “widespread and systematic” attacks on civilian targets in violation of international humanitarian law.

Nearly 740,000 people have signed a petition calling for an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, organised by the campaign group Avaaz.

Alex Wilks of Avaaz said: “For too long Europe has profited from massive arms sales to Riyadh even while the Saudi regime crushed democracy and human rights across the Middle East. Today the European parliament listened to the people and have for the first time stood firmly against Saudi impunity. Now it’s up to capitals to heed this leadership and stop turning a blind eye to massacres in Yemen.”

2nc conditions CP – AT: 1ac Miller Their evidence concedes past US conditions have worked to persuade Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to comply with US pressure1AC Miller ‘5/10 (Andrew; reporter for War on the Rocks; 5-10-2019; "The Case for Arms Embargoes Against Uncooperative Partners"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-arms-embargoes-against-uncooperative-partners/; Accessed 6-24-2019; Recut-AH)

First, the empirical record does not support Rounds’ contention that arms embargoes do not delive r. While these suspensions are not a silver bullet , there is ample evidence to demonstrate that they can be effective in changing the policy of a target country. For example, in 2005, the United States successfully used the suspension of a joint weapons project to persuade Israel to cancel a proposed sale of drone equipment to China. In another example, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson secured commitments from Egypt to resolve a longstanding criminal case against 41 foreign NGO workers , including Americans and Europeans, and to suspend military cooperation with North Korea in exchange for releasing $195 million in suspended military aid. More recently, the legislative hold Sen. Robert Menendez placed on an arms sale to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, when combined with threatened legislation to impose further restrictions on transfers to Saudi Arabia, helped pressure the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to re -engage in negotiations with the Houthis , resulting in an imperfect but still important deal on the port of Hodeidah.

The author’s argument that arms embargoes do not work cites the 2013 suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt following that country’s military coup. This policy clearly failed to reverse the military coup led by current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, but there are good reasons to question the validity of the example. Proponents of the suspension argue with good reason that it was not given a fair chance to work. Shortly after the decision was announced, senior U.S. officials told the Egyptians the aid would soon be restored , undercutting the coercive value of the suspension . From the perspective of the Egyptian government, it would have been irrational to make serious concessions in response to what they believed was an idle threat. Just as important, due to a plethora of exceptions and carve-outs, some U.S. military assistance to Egypt continued throughout the suspension period , including maintenance and sustainment, sparing the Egyptian military from the full force of the hold.

Despite undercutting its own suspension , the hold still produced some good. U.S. diplomats were able to leverage the policy to deter the Egyptian government from enforcing a n arbitrary September 2014 deadline for NGOs to register under Egypt’s draconian 2002 NGO law. And, although Egypt released U.S. citizen Mohamed Soltan from prison two months after aid was resumed, Cairo was partly motivated by the concern that the Obama administration could reverse its decision to resume arms shipments . To be sure, these accomplishments were relatively limited, and we should be careful not to overestimate the efficacy of arms holds. A foreign government is unlikely to fundamentally change its position on what it views as an existential issue. But prior suspensions have yielded tangible gains , and they should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit.

2nc conditions CP – AT: 1ac Jones Their evidence advocates for conditioning arms sales on a cease fire1AC Jones ’19 (Bruce; reporter for the Brookings Institute; xx-January 2019; "The New Geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s Rle in a Changing Region"; Brookings Institute; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190107_new_geopolitics_of_mena_final.pdf; Accessed 6-24-2019; Recut-AH)

MARTIN INDYK: And the United States has viable diplomatic options . U.S. diplomatic leadership can play a positive role in the conflicts between Israel and Iran in Syria, and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In Syria, Israel has no choice but to deal with Moscow because we are absent from the game. And, as Kemal pointed out, Turkey, Iran, and Russia are trying to influence the political and diplomatic outcome there, and we’re not playing. Israel will quickly come to realize the limits to its ambitions in Syria because of the absence of the United States.

In Yemen, the Saudis need an active American effort to get them the hell out of there. It’s the only way it’s going to work. And yet we’re not willing to do anything but supply weaponry .

BRUCE RIEDEL: I want to underscore this point. If you think about smart American politics in this region, helping the Saudis get out of the morass that they’ve created in Yemen is probably the biggest thing we could do in the near term to help stabilize the Kingdom and stabilize the Arabian Peninsula. And it’s doable. We have the means. If we call the Saudis up tonight and say “ Cease fire tomorrow at 6:00 or no arms deliveries starting at 6:01,” they’ll say, “Yeah, okay , we got it.” They would have no choice.

NATAN SACHS: That would have a huge human benefit in Yemen. It’s not necessarily a geostrategic issue, but it is a dramatic tragedy.

2nc conditions CP – AT: 1ac Walt Their evidence concedes shouldn’t give Saudi Arabia a “blank check,” but pursue checks on Saudi arms to prevent recklessness1AC Walt ’18 (Stephen; reporter for Foreign Policy; 1-16-2018; "The Islamic Republic of Hysteria"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/16/the-islamic-republic-of-hysteria-iran-middle-east-trump/; Accessed 6-24-2019; Recut-AH)

Fortunately, no state inside or outside the Middle East was then — or is today — in a position to control it. As a result, the United States does not have to do much to maintain a regional balance of power. Instead of giving Saudi Arabia or Israel a blank check to counter some mythical Iranian hegemon, Washington should seek more balanced relations with all states in the region, Iran included.

This more equitable approach would facilitate cooperation on issues where U.S. and Iranian interests align, such as Afghanistan. The prospect of better relations with the United States would give Tehran an incentive to moderate its behavior. Past U.S. efforts to isolate the clerical regime encouraged it to play a spoiler’s role instead, with some degree of success.

This approach would also discourage America’s present allies from taking U.S. support for granted and encourage them to do more to retain its favor. America’s current regional allies (and their domestic lobbies) would surely protest vehemently if Washington stopped backing them to the hilt and sought even a modest détente with Iran. But that is ultimately their problem, not America’s. Excessive U.S. support encourages allies to behave recklessly , as Israel does when it expands illegal settlements and as Saudi Arabia is doing with its military campaign in Yemen, its diplomatic squabble with Qatar, and its bungled attempt to reshape politics inside Lebanon. If U.S. allies understood that Washington was talking to everyone, however, they would have more reason to listen to America’s advice lest it curtail its support and look elsewhere. Having many options is the ultimate source of leverage .

2nc conditions CP – AT: 1ac Spindel Only a combination of dissatisfaction, coercion, and pressure can cause Saudi Arabia to cave – the plan is only dissatisfaction1AC Spindel ‘5/14 (Jennifer; reporter for War on the Rocks; 5-14-2019; "The Case for Suspending American Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia"; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/; Accessed 6-28-2019; Camp-AH)

By continuing to provide weapons , President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales . Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective . But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction , and serve an important communication role in international politics.

2nc conditions CP – AT: 1ac Seligman Their evidence says the US should restrain Saudi Arabia, not unconditionally stop arms sales1AC Seligman ‘19 (Lara Seligman; Foreign Policy’s Pentagon correspondent, served as the Pentagon editor for Aviation Week and Space Technology and held positions at Defense News, National Journal and The Hill; 10-9-2018; "Starvation and Child Soldiers: On the Ground in Yemen"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/09/starvation-and-child-soldiers-in-yemen/; Accessed 6-24-2019; Recut-AH)

But diplomatic efforts hit a snag recently, when Houthi representatives failed to show up to the first meeting in Geneva convened by the U.N. special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths. Miliband urged all sides in the conflict to engage in the peace process .

He also called on the U.S. government to end its support for the Saudi-led coalition and take a more forceful approach to halting the violence . He disputed the claim that the coalition is doing everything possible to minimize civilian casualties. This argument “obviously sits askance with the reality on the ground,” he said.

The United States has more leverage than it claims , he added.

“Everything we know about the U.S. stance is that it does make a difference because the actors in the drama do look to the U.S. for actions or restraints ,” Miliband said. “The great danger is the Yemeni conflict becomes a terrible stain on the U.S. reputation.”

2nc – AT: Saudi Arabia retal/drives prices They won’t drive up prices – tons of reasons Colgan 18 – expert on oil politics, is the Richard Holbrooke Associate Professor of Political Science and International and Public Affairs at Brown University

(Jeff D., 10-16-2018, "Saudi Arabia hinted at a U.S. oil embargo. It’s not 1973.," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/16/saudi-arabia-hinted-at-a-u-s-oil-embargo-its-not-1973/, accessed 7-3-2019)//JF

This evokes memories of the 1973 oil crisis, when a group of Middle East states refused oil sales to the United States. Gasoline shortages and higher prices followed. But Saudi Arabia’s bark is worse than its bite. Here’s why.

Most people misunderstand the events of 1973. Price controls imposed by the Nixon administration actually created the gasoline shortages — the Saudi oil embargo decreased world oil production by just 2 to 4 percent, and only for a few months.

Even more importantly, a lot has changed since 1973. Back then, the oil market functioned mostly on long-term contracts. Today’s more flexible global oil system mostly uses spot markets — meaning a buyer can easily find oil from another country. So the United States could replace its imports from Saudi Arabia relatively easily with imports from elsewhere .

The United States does not even import much oil from Saudi Arabia . It currently produces domestically more than half the oil it consumes. And its biggest foreign oil supplier, by far, is Canada. Of course, getting Canada’s help with oil might be harder after the Trump administration recently offended Canada by declaring its steel and aluminum a U.S. national security threat.

The global market alone could probably adjust smoothly to a Saudi embargo, but there are other safeguards in place. For instance, in 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger helped create the International Energy Agency. Its primary purpose is to redistribute oil in a crisis, ensuring that its members — mostly in Europe and North America — cooperate to share scarce oil.

The United States also has a massive Strategic Petroleum Reserve. It holds three months’ worth of U.S. imports from all countries — and Saudi Arabia represents less than 10 percent of those imports. If needed, the United States could calm market jitters by releasing oil from the reserve.

Saudi Arabia does have some market power

Still, Saudi Arabia could drive up the world price of oil in the short to medium term. It would have to restrict its own total oil production, not just sales to the United States. That could be costly to American consumers, although oil producers in the United States would benefit from higher oil prices.

In the long term, driving up the price of oil is a bad strategy for Saudi Arabia . It encourages other producers, including those in the United States, to produce more. Over time, that brings the price down while simultaneously eating into Saudi Arabia’s market share.

And high or volatile oil prices have another effect: They encourage consumers to consume less oil, by buying hybrid cars or switching to alternative fuels. For those reasons, Saudi Arabia has often argued against higher oil prices at the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

A Saudi production cut or an embargo could also affect market psychology, driving up prices as buyers fear supply constraints. So far, however, global oil markets remain calm. After Saudi Arabia’s statement and Turki Aldakhil’s op-ed were published, oil prices did tick upward Monday, but by less than 1 percent.

Market psychology also adjusts quickly to events. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, when prices spiked in anticipation of the U.S. war with Iraq over Kuwait, they quickly settled down. Within a few weeks , oil prices returned to their pre-crisis levels .

Overall, the United States has little to fear from Saudi Arabia’s oil policies

And while Saudi Arabia could take other steps, like halting arms purchases, experts say this would inflict only minor damage on the U.S. economy. Indeed, with its ongoing war in Yemen, the Saudis needs those weapons more than the United States needs to sell them.

That is true of the broader relationship. The United States is Saudi Arabia’s guarantor of military security, as it proved with Operation Desert Shield in 1990. The Saudis have no viable alternative for that protection — neither Russia nor China is yet capable. The United States could let Riyadh know, in blunt terms, that protection is conditional on Saudi behavior.

The Trump administration can afford to express its disapproval of recent Saudi actions — and not just on the Khashoggi disappearance. Saudi Arabia’s military incursion in Yemen’s civil war and reckless behavior toward Qatar and others are cause for global concern.

U.S. can get all its oil outside of the middle eastWeissmann 6/27/12 Jordan Weissmann is a former senior associate editor at The Atlantic. (The Atlantic. “It Really Doesn't Matter If We Stop Buying Middle Eastern Oil”. 6/24/19. https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/it-really-doesnt-matter-if-we-stop-

buying-middle-eastern-oil/259058/

There are many, many things that influence the price we pay for a barrel of oil. Terrorists. Weather. What people think might be happening inside China's black box of an economy. The whims of the Saudi royal family.

Here's something that doesn't much affect it, though: Where the oil comes from. Crude trades on an amazingly liquid international market, where price is determined by supply and demand across the globe. Unlike fine wine or cigars, buyers have no reason to care about oil's provenance.

Hence, there really isn't much to be excited about in the news that the United States may be weaning itself off Middle Eastern oil, as reported in today's Wall Street Journal. The paper tells us that rapidly

expanding U.S. production, along with new resources in Canada and Brazil, may one day make our reliance on OPEC oil a relic of history. Here's the core of the story:

By 2020, nearly half of the crude oil America consumes will be produced at home, while 82% will come from this side of the Atlantic, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. By 2035, oil shipments from the Middle East to North America "could almost be nonexistent," the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries recently predicted, partly because more efficient car engines and a growing supply of renewable fuel will help curb demand.

The change achieves a long-sought goal of U.S. policy-making: to draw more oil from nearby, stable sources and less from a volatile region half a world away. "Whereas at one point there were real and serious concerns about the ability to maintain sustainable access of supplies to the United States if there were disruptions in the Middle East, that has changed," Carlos Pascual, the top energy official at the State Department, said in an interview.

Let's take a moment to unpack what Pascual is actually saying. At one point, Washington policy-makers were worried that if there were a catastrophic event that crippled Middle Eastern production (think revolution in Saudi Arabia), we might not be able to get all the oil we needed. Now, we're supposedly protected should disaster strike. Except that we're not. We would still have to pay a massive premium for whatever oil was coming out of the ground in North Dakota or Texas as companies adjusted their prices to match global levels.*

Don't get me wrong -- there are positive developments about our drilling boom. Expanded North American production is helping to keep a lid on crude prices. Oil drilling regions here at home are reaping the economic rewards. And importing less crude will improve our trade balance.

But saying goodbye to Saudi oil is not some sort of geopolitical panacea that will absolve us of our need to be involved in the Middle East. Nor does it mean we will be paying appreciably less to fill up our gas tanks. The ripple effects of whatever happens to production around the Gulf region will influence the price of oil in North Dakota so long as there are still tankers to ferry crude around the world.

Saying we could be oil independent is just a nice way of saying we'll still be oil dependent. The only way to fix that problem is to reduce our need for crude, regardless of where it comes from. Thankfully, that's already begun happening. Part of the reason the United States has been able to shift away from Middle Eastern oil is that we've restrained demand here at home by driving less and using more efficient vehicles while also producing more biofuels. That process of substituting away from oil is what we should be celebrating. Not the fact that we might be buying it in house, or from a friendlier country.

2nc – AT: Tehran WarThere’s alt causes to Tehran war – their ev says lack of a direct line of communication is what causes miscalculation, not a reduction in arms sales1AC Depetris ‘5/28 (Daniel R. Depetris; reporter for the American Conservative; 5-28-2019; "Trump’s Decision to Arm the Saudis Against Iran Will End in Disaster"; American Conservative; https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/trumps-decision-to-arm-the-saudis-against-iran-will-end-in-disaster/; Accessed 6-24-2019; Recut-AH)

Developments in the Persian Gulf are heating up, and they are heating up fast.

An additional 1,500 U.S. troops are packing their bags for the region—this on top of an accelerated deployment of an American aircraft carrier battle group and B-52 bombers. Add to that pledges of steadfast resistance from Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and personal animus between American and Iranian officials, and you’ve got a very real possibility that an abrupt miscalculation could become a war that almost no one wants.

It’s obvious what this situation calls for : a direct line of communication between Washington and Tehran with the express purpose of calming the waters and preventing a conflagration. And yet the Trump administration seems to be gunning for the opposite —more bellicose threats, more military assets, and more sanctions.

AT: Saudi HR Conditions CP

2ac saudi conditions – fill in Leverage fails—Saudi Arabia will retaliate by artificially inflating oil prices and filling inDavies 18 – reporter on the business desk. He covers industries including gambling, tobacco, alcohol and secondary ticketing (Rob, 10-15-2018, “How much damage can Saudi Arabia do to the global economy?”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/15/how-much-damage-can-saudi-arabia-do-to-the-global-economy, accessed 7-1-2019) //DYang

Saudi Arabia enjoys a privileged position both in geopolitical and economic terms. It will have a powerful hand to play if tensions with the US and the west escalate and it follows through with Sunday’s warning of retaliation.

Its vast oil reserves – it claims to have about 260bn barrels still to extract – afford the most obvious advantage. The kingdom is the world’s largest oil exporter, pumping or shipping about 7m barrels a day, and giving Riyadh huge clout in the global economy because it wields power to push up prices.

An editorial in Arab News by Turki Aldhakhil, the general manager of the official Saudi news channel, Al Arabiya, offers a hint of what could be in the offing.

He said Riyadh was weighing up 30 measures designed to put pressure on the US if it were to impose sanctions over the disappearance and presumed murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the country’s Istanbul consulate. These would include an oil production cut that could drive prices from around $80 (£60) a barrel to more than $400, more than double the all-time high of $147.27 reached in 2008.

This would have profound consequences globally, not just because motorists would pay more at the petrol pump, but because it would force up the cost of all goods that travel by road.

Saudi Arabia also supports thousands of US jobs via its arms purchases. It is the world’s second-largest arms importer after India and 61% of those imports come from the US.

It was the US’s biggest arms customer last year, signing $17.5bn worth of deals, a trend that looks set to continue after Donald Trump signed a $110bn defence agreement in Riyadh last year.

The alliance stands to benefit US employers such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Electric and ExxonMobil. Some of the firms are reported to have expressed concern to Trump already about the impact that a freeze in Saudi-US relations might have. Riyadh could, for example, simply switch its purchases to other major arms exporters such as Russia and China.

Trump’s trip to the Arabian peninsula last year also yielded an agreement that the kingdom’s Public Investment Fund, which manages its vast oil wealth, would invest in US infrastructure programmes. The PIF is to stump up $20bn of a $40bn pot overseen by the global asset manager Blackstone. The fund, however, has yet to gather any serious momentum.

Saudi Arabia has shown in the past that it is not afraid to leverage its unique political and economic position to get its own way. An investigation into allegations of bribery involving the British defence firm BAE Systems in the country was dropped under Tony Blair’s government in 2006.

Seth Frantzman, the executive director of the US-based Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis, said the kingdom’s importance to US strategy in the Gulf, particularly as a bulwark against Iran, gave it great influence.

“They’re part of an American-Saudi-UAE alliance, and the current US administration is tough on Iran, so in some ways the US is more beholden to Saudi Arabia than in previous years,” he said.

“They don’t want to be humiliated in this exchange. The US press says Trump will punish Saudi Arabia, and they don’t want to come out of this looking like the child being punished.

“Saudi probably feels it’s on a winning streak economically and if it has to take a hit, which it already is in terms of its image, it will be made up for by the fact they’ll find markets somewhere else.”

2ac saudi conditions – AT: oil plank Unconditional reduction is key—US dependency on oil is exponentially decreasing and it’s unjust to continue supporting Saudi abuse Lang 19 – writer at HPR (Johannes, 6-6-2019, “Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of America’s Middle East Policy”, Harvard Political Review, https://harvardpolitics.com/columns-old/iran-saudi-arabia-and-the-failure-of-americas-middle-east-policy/, accessed 6-29-2019) //DYang

Two Shaky Pillars

There is no good reason, idealistic or realistic, for the divergence in U.S. foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia and Iran. The shale revolution has significantly reduced U.S. dependence on oil imports. Within only eight months in 2014, Saudi oil exports to the United States halved . Today, Washington has no reason to continue its commitment to an alliance that destroys America’s international credibility as a supporter of human rights.

In an ideal world, the United States would not have to interact with regimes like Saudi Arabia’s or Iran’s. However, in order to defend its interests in the Middle East, America should engage with both without antagonizing either. From 1969 to 1979, the United States pursued a “two-pillar strategy” in the Middle East, relying on both Iran and Saudi Arabia to uphold order throughout the Middle East. Today, America should return to a similar balancing strategy.

Without an American blank check, the Saudis will likely think twice before invading and bullying their neighboring countries and arming radical terrorists. At the same time, assuaging Iran’s fears about drastic American intervention might allow Iran to shift away from its continued reliance upon Hezbollah, Assad, and Shia militias in Iraq. By forcing Iran and Saudi Arabia to the negotiation table, Trump could bring an end to conflicts in Yemen and Syria and the Qatar blockade.

Such a rebalancing would no doubt present the most significant change in America’s Middle East policy since 1979. However, given the civil war in Syria, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, sectarian infighting in Iraq, the terrorist activity of ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliates, and persistent anti-Americanism throughout the region, it is high time for a change. A new, more balanced foreign policy would be both more fair and more effective in pursuing American interests in the region.

Taiwan QPQ CP

2nc Taiwan QPQ – solvency – pressure Pressure exploits Chinese divisions---forces face-saving concessionsBlumenthal 11 – resident analyst and expert @ AEI (Dan, “International Pressure on China Works,” https://www.aei.org/publication/international-pressure-on-china-works/)

Does the Chinese leadership respond to international pressure when they behave badly? This was a question I was asked on PRI/NPR/BBC’s “The World” yesterday. In the case of Chinese artist Ai Weiwei’s release from prison the answer is yes. The condemnation of his imprisonment rang from many quarters, public and private, government and civil society. Finally, on the eve of Chinese Premiere Wen Jiabao’s trip to Germany, the Chinese caved. Ai Weiwei will be forced to remain silent about his political views, but there are many more like him, increasingly willing to speak out against the rampant repression, injustice, and corruption that has come to characterize modern China. Why does this kind of pressure on China work? The Chinese people are dynamic, entrepreneurial, and creative. The growing middle and upper classes want to be accepted by the West and thought of as cosmopolitan and law-abiding.

Legions of Chinese businessmen, intellectuals, and artists do business and shop in European and American cities (and increasingly illicitly take their money and families out of China). There is an increasing divergence between the parochial party cadre who run China’s government and the country’s vibrant populace. Many talk about how the Chinese leadership is constrained by “hyper nationalist netizens” in forging more responsible policies. But the Communist Party is equally beholden to a more cosmopolitan elite who are embarrassed by their leadership’s policies. This development is one lesson of Ai Weiwei’s release.

There is a line of thinking among some foreign policy observers that the Chinese play the long game, and can withstand public and private pressure in order to obtain their strategic objectives. Henry Kissinger is the dean of this school of thought (for example, see his new book On China). But it is easy to get carried away by China’s supposed strategic subtlety and hyperopia. Arresting a world renowned artist is not subtle. In foreign policy, antagonizing most of your neighbors in a period of three years is not farsighted.

The key to good China policy is the proper assessment of relative leverage. We still have the upper hand, particularly if we work with allies in Asia and in Europe. Our leverage ought not to be used to “keep China down” as the Chinese leadership likes to say. Rather it should be used to push and prod China to play by the rules internationally, and support the growing segment of the Chinese populace who wants justice at home. We have tried Kissinger’s way. How about trying more unified pressure?

AT: Taiwan QPQ CP

2ac Taiwan QPQ – pressure fails Economic pressure failsHarrison 10 - founder of Credit Writedowns and a former career diplomat, investment banker and technology executive with over twenty years of business experience (Ed, “Can external pressure precipitate change in a command economy like China?,” https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/03/can-external-pressure-precipitate-change-in-a-command-economy-like-china.html)

So, here’s my question again: How effective is external pressure in precipitating regime change or economic policy moves?

We see that most Americans believe it was very effective in bringing down the Soviets. Most believe it was effective in ending Apartheid in South Africa. It has not been so successful in Cuba or North Korea. But could external pressure work in Iran or even in China?

My general take is no; politicians, especially in command economies, are relatively unconcerned with external pressure. I used to be a foreign policy specialist. And, despite my role, I was keenly aware of the primacy of domestic issues over foreign ones in a politician’s decision-making. What the ruling elite in command economies care about is social unrest that stems from a lack of civil liberties and economic progress. Even in the United States, this is true. Do you think American politicians will yield to Brazilian threats to retaliate for American cotton subsidies? Of course not.

Threats don’t work. The only thing that can work is inflicting economic pain and creating social unrest. Yes, autarky hasn’t brought the North Koreans or Cubans to heel; nor did it topple Saddam Hussein. However, implicitly, this is the power that some American political historians ascribe to the policies against South Africa and the Soviets. They assert that it was the economic pain that caused those governments to eventually yield.

So, as Americans look to threaten to punish China for China’s protectionist exchange rate policy, we should all understand that these threats will have no effect. The Chinese will not do anything because of threats. More likely, they will dig in their heels. The Telegraph’s Liam Halligan has it right when he says:

When it comes to China, the West needs to face the truth. The more America calls for China to revalue the longer Beijing will take to do it. Chinese politicians are as unlikely to buckle in the face of Western pressure as their Western counterparts would be given a tongue-lashing from Beijing.

China’s government is petrified of social unrest. Given the importance of the export sector for continued high growth and jobs, this again makes it impossible to Beijing to be seen yielding to pain imposed by the West.

Gulf States CP

1nc conditions – gulf states solvency The counterplan solves, conditioning Human Rights fixes on military aid is key to leverage changeJentleson 12 – Jentleson is a Professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy, Exum is Andrew Exum is an American scholar of the Middle East, a former U.S. Army officer, Dalton is a senior fellow and deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program (ISP) and director of the Cooperative Defense Project (CDP), and Stuster is s a Middle East and security policy specialist with extensive writing and editing experience. ( Bruce W. Jentleson, Andrew Exum, Melissa Dalton, and J. Dana Stuster, " Strategic Adaptation Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East,”Center for a New American Security, 6/6/2012 http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/CNAS_StrategicAdaptation_JentlesonExum_0.pdf)//ML

As the United States seeks to prioritize reform in the region, it will face an uphill battle in the Gulf. In the eyes of many Gulf states, fundamental political and economic reform poses an existential threat to the prevailing regimes.167 The United States will have trouble making the case that resistance to reform is the greater threat to regime stability, and U.S. leverage is limited in the Gulf. Since the United States continues to depend on Gulf states for strategic basing access, Gulf states have their own counter-leverage.

To implement a consistent and credible policy of prioritizing reform across the region, the United States should apply more pressure on Gulf states and should condition arms sales on political reform measures. While U.S. criticisms of Gulf states’ oppression and heavy-handed measures could raise tensions, both regimes and their oppositions may perceive the U.S. approach of confining pressure principally to private channels as a sign of a limited U.S. commitment to prioritizing reform. The United States would thus weaken its leverage and undermine its credibility. Accordingly, affirming and enforcing red lines against the use of U.S. equipment for internal political repression will be particularly important for credibly demonstrating U.S. commitment to reform. Arms sales should be more conditioned on political reform through partial waivers and other mechanisms that allow for ongoing monitoring.

168 These issues are most pressing in relations with Bahrain (see text box). With regard to Saudi Arabia, the power of Riyadh’s cash diplomacy, support for counterterrorism initiatives and quiet but effective pressuring of Arab partners have been essential to advancing U.S. interests in the region for years.169 It is difficult, nonetheless, for the United States to ignore that Saudi Arabia effectively bought off the Saudi public’s attempt to mount a “day of rage” in March 2011 by offering significant economic incentives not to engage in public protest.170 And Saudi repression of its Shia minority in the oil-rich Eastern Province is certainly not solely based on concerns of the intentions of a malevolent Iran. Via sustained diplomatic pressure, the United States should hold even its closest allies responsible for their actions and encourage meaningful reform measures that respond to the needs and aspirations of Arab publics.

We recognize the tension inherent in both conditioning arms sales on reform and building the capacity of Gulf militaries to take more of a lead in regional security. If reform is slow or nonexistent, this will constrain the U.S. ability to give its Gulf partners the capabilities and training they need lead regional security initiatives. If pressed hard enough on conditionality, Gulf partners may threaten to purchase

arms from other suppliers – such as the Chinese or the Russians. The United States will need to be prepared to accept this risk – and a possible loss of influence with Gulf states.171 But even if GCC countries turn to other security partners, common security interests (e.g., containing Iran and countering terrorism) will likely ensure that GCC security policies and force posture are largely consistent with and complementary to U.S. objectives.