Giovanni Barbieri

Populism, parties, and democracy (1 st draft )

1. Populism as a thin-centred ideology

Every scholar or author is in some way forced, when he or she tackles a specific object of

study, to shed light on the meaning he or she gives to the concept; so, not even we can avoid

clarifying what we mean by the term “populism”, how we use it.

Although nowadays there is a broad agreement among scholars to consider “populism” as a

thin-centred ideology, as suggested by Cas Mudde (2004; see also Mudde and Kaltwasser,

2013), it’s however here important to highlight why we tend to discard other kinds of

definition, why, in other words, we share the Mudde’s point of view too.

Usually, the word “populism” has been intended at least in three different ways, which are not

necessarily mutually exclusive: populism as a political or a political communication style, as a

set of rhetorical patterns (Taguieff, 2002; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt and Turney,

2013); populism as a political strategy involving a specific form of organization (Weyland,

2001; Betz, 2002; Kriesi, 2015); populism as an ideology (Mudde, 2004; Mudde and

Kaltwasser, 2013; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; van Kessel, 2015).

In the first meaning, populism pertains to specific features of both the form and the content of

discourses, expressive aspects, political performances. It involves simplicity and spontaneity,

bluntness and coarseness, antagonism between friends and foes, the appeal to the people as a

source of legitimization; and it can therefore be used, as a set of rhetoric expedients, by all

politicians, without regard to their own ideas, political tendencies, and objectives.

According to the second perspective, a political strategy or type of government is defined by a

combination of three different factors: main political actors or rulers (individuals, informal

groupings, formal organizations); power capabilities (numbers, special weights); main

political actors’ relationships to support base (fluid and unorganized, firm informal ties, stable

organizational links). Populism is therefore considered as a strategy to win and maintain

government power based on individual, personalistic leaders, on support from large number

of followers, and on direct, quasi-personal contact between leader and followers (Weyland,

2001).

Both in the first and in the second approach, populism is seen as something of temporary,

linked to the achievement of the most varied objectives, without any reference to the content

of such objectives. Furthermore, nowadays almost all leaders prefer to adopt, as an effect of

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the political personalization and the mediatization processes, direct forms of communication

that bypass the party mediation, to use the language of the common man, to focus on their

owns personal and charismatic qualities. In this sense, it could be argued that the populist

political style has become a sort of koiné for many leaders of the overall political spectrum.

Therefore, as Mudde has pointed out, even if «charismatic leadership and direct

communication between the leader and “the people” are common among populists, these

features facilitate rather than define populism» (Mudde, 2004, p. 545).

Populism is then something more – and also more long-lasting – than just a political strategy

or a style of communication. So, in defining populism we think it might be more valuable to

take into account the set of ideas it promotes, i.e. to consider populism as an ideology. In this

respect, it’s important to bear in mind that any ideology, as highlighted by many authors –

from the Marxist Lenin and Althusser to the liberals Aron, Shils and Geertz – has got both a

cognitive function and a pragmatic-social one; as well as that no party or movement has ever

defined itself as “populist”. “Populist”, in other words, is a term used to label a posteriori

parties and movements very different from each other, on the basis of a minimal ideological

content that they share among them. As has been recognized (Stanley, 2008; Kriesi and

Pappas, 2015; van Kessel, 2015), this minimal content include four components:

1. the existence of two homogeneous groups: the people and the élite;

2. an antagonistic relationship between the aforementioned groups;

3. the idea of popular sovereignty;

4. a Manichean outlook, that promotes a positive valorization of the people and a

denigration of the élite.

Populism can so be defined as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated

into two antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues

that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”

(Mudde, 2004, p. 543). To be more precise, it constitutes a specific kind of ideology, that is a

thin-centered ideology. In a different way from the thick or full ideologies (conservatism,

liberalism, socialism), populism is indeed based on a small number of core concepts, shows a

restricted morphology and a lack of internal consistency, and isn’t able to provide neither a

framework for “decoding” and “interpreting” the social world nor answers to the political

requests that stem from the civil society; in addition, it doesn’t have any theorist to refer – a

Mill, Marx, or Freud – as well as “sacred” texts to draw inspiration from (cfr. Freeden, 1996).

Because of its own characteristics, populism shows an irrepressible tendency to borrow

concepts and ideas from other (thick or full) ideologies, or even to mix up with them; this

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means that populism can assume many different configurations, that is many sub-types of

populism can be detected.

2. A thin-centered ideology among other weak ideologies?

Populism, as it has just been argued, is a weak ideology that, as such, needs the support of the

strongest ideologies. I believe, however, that this is true, as I shall try to show below, only if it

is related to the past; indeed, I’ve many difficulties to asses as strong, thick, or full, any of the

currently available ideologies – unless we don’t consider neo-capitalistic liberalism the

victorious ideology that permeate, sometimes in an sort of invisible way, each aspect of our

life.

The three paramount ideologies of the modernity – conservatism, liberalism, and socialism –

tended to have universalist aspirations. Indeed, they were quite cohesive and well organized

worldviews; in other words, they were able to represent the world and the reality in their

entirety, and, furthermore, both to forge the individual and collective identity of millions of

persons and to mobilize them. At the end of the thirties, however, many scholars warned that

all ideologies reflect the interest of specific social classes, and are therefore partial; a

privileged perspective, that allows to indicate the path of righteousness, doesn’t exist, and no

one owns the truth (cfr. Mannheim, 1929). Later, the industrialization process and the

enhancement of the living conditions that followed the end of the second world war furthered

the idea that the main State’s decisions should have been taken on the basis of technical and

scientific criteria, with no reference to the existing political ideologies; as a result, it seemed

that ideologies were in crisis, or that they were coming to their owns end (cfr. Bell, 1960;

Lipset, 1966). Finally, the sunset of the communist regimes of eastern Europe in 1989 seemed

provide further evidence to the merits of the “end of ideologies” thesis.

Nowadays, the ideologies seem then to have lost, in the western world, that strength they had

in the past years; indeed, they seem no longer able neither to excite the human passions nor to

mobilize millions of individuals. Even if the ideologies aren’t so really coming to their end,

they are however much weaker than before. This means that the thin-centered ideology of

populism is surrounded by other weak ideologies; merging with other ideologies can be then

find fruitful not just by populism.

3. Populism and democracy

As a thin-centred ideology, populism is faced with two general views of politics showing the

opposite characteristics: elitism and pluralism. Elitism argues, in the same way of populism,

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that the society is divided in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the people and the

élite. But, differently, it considers the élite as virtuos, gifted, and endowed with the highest

qualities; and the people as ignorant, coarse, and inferior both from a moral point of view and

from an intellectual one. Pluralism, on the contrary, doesn’t share such a dichotomous and

Manichean perspective; indeed, it holds that society is cross-cut by a plurality of groups with

different ideas, values, and interests (Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Kaltwasseer, 2013).

These three different perspectives entail three distinct concepts and practices of democracy:

elitist, constitutional, and participatory. In conceiving democracy as a method through which

individuals acquire the power of decision by means of a competitive struggle for the popular

vote, the first approach takes inspiration from the Joseph Shumpeter’s works; the citizens’

participation to the democratic life would exercise only during the elections, and politics

should continue to be an élite affair. The second perspective considers as democratic that form

of government characterized by a plurality of centres of power, none of which prevails over

the others; a strong separation of powers and the development of a set of checks and balances

are deemed as necessary conditions for enhancing the quality of democracy; finally, politics is

seen as the arena of agreement and compromise. In contrast with the aforementioned

conceptions of democracy, the last one is based on the active, strong, and continuous citizens’

participation in the decision making processes; the institution of the referendum, the recall

election, the citizens’ initiative, and the majority rule are firmly fostered; politics should

consist in the immediate expression of the general will of the people (Abts and Rummens,

2007).

Most, if not almost all, of the current western democracies denote undoubtedly a

constitutional characterization, that isn’t however permanent. Indeed, the three different form

of democracy are in friction one with each other, that is the imbalance towards one of them

and its radicalization bring about the appearance of opposite forces which tend to rebalance

the situation. Populism, in other words, arises when the gap between the people and who

governs has become too wide, when the political establishment merely complies with the

formal rules and procedures, when the general will of the people isn’t taken into account as it

would deserve; it then incites the democracy to revitalize itself, remembering that the Popular

sovereignty represents its unique principle of legitimization, and that democracy can’t come

down to mere compliance with procedural rules (Canovan, 1981; Mény and Surel, 2000;

Taguieff, 2002).

It has thus to be highlighted that populism emerges only with the appearance of the people in

the political background, that is with the glorious English revolution – in an imperfect and

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incomplete way –, with the American revolution – in a triumphant but suspect way –, and

with the French one – in a radical but chaotic and inconsistent way (Mény and Surel, 2000).

These revolutionary episodes have to be included, as Barrington Moore observed many years

ago, among the factors that triggered the democratization processes after all; the first because

it helped to limit the royal absolutism, the others because they helped to brake, in different

ways, the power of a rural aristocracy that hindered the achievement of the democratic

political system (Barrington Moore, 1966). Indeed, the debate on the actual role of the people

arouse as soon as democracy began to consolidate, that is when the principle of popular

sovereignty was broadly accepted; the awareness of the distance between the real and the

ideal democracy as well as that of the existence of different conceptions of democracy

brought out a set of questions regarding the exercise of the power by the people, the

relationship between the citizens and the elected representatives in Parliament, the institutions

called upon to express the people’s will, etc. (Mény and Surel, 2000).

Ultimately, a strain among different ideas and practices of democracy has affected western

countries since the democratic revolutions. It’s not by chance, indeed, that as far back as

1793, the revolutionary Maximilien de Robespierre exhibited the populist point of view

arguing that in the people’s virtues and sovereignty it can be found a barrier against the

government’s vices and despotism, and adding that achieving the common good is the main

interest of the people, whereas seeking his own advantage is that one of the single man

(speech on 10 May to the Convention).

We should then wonder if this strain can be considered, in a rokkean perspective, as a

cleavage. Indeed, according to Stein Rokkan and Seymour Martin Lipset (1967; 1985), the

cleavages represent the main oppositions within the national communities that stem from the

multiplicity of conflicts rooted in the social structure; these oppositions, which are often in a

latent state, usually break out when certain critical junctures – that is times of radical change –

arise; finally, they cause the birth of both specific parties and specific parties’ systems. Is it

then possible that populist parties do emerge from a peculiar cleavage too?

3. Populism, parties, and cleavages

The rokkean theory is based on the Tacott Parsons’ AGIL model. In focusing on the I

(Integration) subsystem, that is considered as the place where, in people’s democracies, both

parties and constellations of parties have been developed, Rokkan and Lipset argue that the

crucial cleavages and their possible political outcomes can be identified within a space formed

by two diagonal lines of a double dichotomy: the territorial dimension or axis, which stretches

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from the l pole – where we find the purely local oppositions to the national aspirant or

dominant élites’ usurpations – to the g pole – characterized by the conflicts over the

organization, goals and decisions of the political system as a whole; and the functional

dimension or axis, which goes from the a pole – that pertains to the conflicts over the

allocation of resources, goods, and profits in the economy – to the i pole – embodied by a

strong sense of belonging and strong ideological oppositions.

On the basis of this framework, Rokkan and Lipset identify the nowadays well known four

different cleavages. Two of them – the conflict between the central culture of the nation

building and the growing resistance of the subjugated populations; the conflict between the

nation-state and the church – are caused by the national revolution; the others – the conflict

between the rural interests and the emerging class of the industrial entrepreneurs; the conflict

between the owners and the employers, on the one hand, and the tenants, the hired men and

the blue-collar workers, on the other hand are begot by the industrial revolution.

These cleavages foster, according to the authors, the birth of different kinds of parties: parties

for the territorial defense (for instance Fianna Fáil in Ireland, or Volksunie in Belgium);

Christian parties (moreover in The Netherlands, Austria, Norway, and Italy); parties for the

agrarian defense (in Scandinavia, and in the protestant cantons of Switzerland); working class

movements (throughout western Europe).

In the course of time, several scholars have revised the rokkean theory and have attempted to

apply it to the current democracies. One of the most promising and valuable effort is certainly

that of Hanspeter Kriesi (1994; 2008; see also Kriesi and Pappas 2015). The author maintains

that the four classic cleavages can be actually reduced to two. Indeed, the first two cleavages

linked to the national revolution – the centre/periphery and the state/church cleavages – are

essentially cultural divides dominated by religious issues; the last two cleavages – the

rural/urban and the owner/worker ones – represent the socio-economic class divisions.

Ultimately, religion and class constitute the two dimensions that contribute to shaping the

system of parties in Europe, but, according to Rokkan, the religious dimension outweighs the

social class one (Kriesi, 1994).

The thesis of Kriesi is that the meaning of these dimensions – especially the cultural one – has

been transformed over the years, particularly during two critical events or junctures: the

cultural revolution of the 1960s, and the processes of globalization and denationalization that

occurred in 1990s.

Indeed, in the late 1960s new conflicts emerged, as those, for instance, between the managers

and the socio-cultural professionals, and new social movements that, in addition to foster the

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birth of new parties – the New Left as well as the Green –, on the one hand, strengthened the

traditional class cleavage, and, on the other hand, altered the meaning of the cultural

dimension, weakening the traditional moral and religious issues and emphasizing, on the

contrary, issues such as environmentalism, peace and gender equality.

Afterwards, the process of globalization has triggered off a new structural conflict, opposing

the “winners” and “losers” of globalization; the first include the entrepreneurs and the

qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as the cosmopolitan

citizens, whereas the others encompass the entrepreneurs and the qualified employees in

traditionally protected sectors, all the unqualified employees, and the citizens who strongly

identify themselves with their national community.

Kriesi has referred to this antagonism as a conflict between integration and demarcation. This

conflict too remains embedded in a two-dimensional political space, but the processes of

globalization transformed the meaning of the cultural dimension once again, emphasizing

issues such as European integration and immigration. On the economic dimension, therefore,

a neoliberal, free trade position contrasts with a defensive, protectionist one; on the cultural

dimension, an universalist and multiculturalist position is opposed to a position in favor of

protecting national identity, culture and values (Kriesi et al., 2008).

Accordingly, both old political parties and new ones have been compelled to reposition

themselves within this transformed political space. Focusing on the party families differences,

Kriesi shows how the new challengers from the populist right tend to take the “losers’” side,

and to combine a position of economic integration, that is in support of market integration

and economic liberalization, with a position of cultural demarcation, being seriously

concerned by the threats to national identity caused by the European integration process and,

more generally, by the opening of borders – it is no coincidence, the author points out, that the

new populist right parties are primarily characterized by xenophobic, if not racist, stances or

restrictive positions with respect to immigration (ibidem).

Whilst appreciating the Kriesi’s suggestions – who may not agree that the cleavages’ nature

has changed, or that globalization represents one of the main factors of this change? –, if we

would like to identify the origins of the populist parties we have to go back to an antecedent

period the phenomenon of globalization; indeed, the first parties we nowadays consider as

populists were the Russian narodnichestvo, of the 1870s, and the American People’s Party, of

the 1890s. To this extent, it’s furthermore important to resume the previous reflection on the

strain (or cleavage?) among the different ideas and practices of democracy that should have

permeated western political systems since the democratic revolutions.

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4. The fifth cleavage

Focusing on the fully-mobilized nation states, that are those characterized by suffrage

extension and organizational growth, Rokkan highlights the appearance of different protest

alignments. Indeed, in these contexts the protest was directed against the new élites, their

rising networks and the institutions which fostered them, and it had often an anti-system

feature. Fascism in Italy, National Socialism in Germany, Poujadism in France, and radical

rightism in the United States represent the main ideologies and movements that embodied this

kind of protest.

Referring once again to the schema AGIL, Rokkan clarifies that such protest movements

would cut across the g-l territorial axis near the g pole. The conflict, indeed, focused on the

different conceptions both of the constitution and of the national political system’s

organization; the democratic system of decision-making and control was at stake; and the

aforementioned movements aimed to implement authoritarian forms of government in behalf

of the nation as a whole. At the intersections of the poles (a-g; g-i; i-l; l-a) outside what

Rokkan calls the “competitive politics” diamond, we find four different types of exercising

power/ four different movements: functional corporatism (nationwide interest bargaining) at

the a-g intersection; nationalist totalitarianism (nation vs. enemies) at the g-i intersection;

irredentist totalitarianism at the i-l intersection; finally, communal federalism at the l-a one

(Rokkan, 1985).

In other words, Rokkan sheds light on the vertical dimension of the conflict that pertains to

the constitution and the organization of the national policy, which is the one between

authoritarianism and democracy, but he overlooks the quite important horizontal dimension of

the conflict, which is the one between different conceptions and practices of democracy. It’s

on this second dimension that populism is based. Indeed, as we have seen before, three main

different types of democracy can be distinguished: elitist, constitutional, and participatory; as

well as that populism tends to emerge when the people’s participation in the decision making

processes has been restricted, when a merely formal and procedural conception of democracy

has been achieved.

Differently from the vertical dimension of the conflict, that, being essentially anti-systemic, is

located outside the “competitive politics” diamond, the horizontal dimension may show two

different faces: demanding the implementation of a set of measures that enhances the people’s

political participation it’s usually pro-systemic, and therefore inside the diamond; but

sometimes, as we shall see later, it can also assume an anti-systemic configuration, and it can

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therefore slip towards the outside of the diamond – an opposite movement as well as a

movement from one angle of the square to another are however possible (fig. 1).

The socio-economic populism would have to be placed at the a-g intersection. Many South

American parties and leaders constitute the main manifestations of this kind of populism:

Juan Domingo Péron, in Argentina, but also, more recently, Hugo Chavez, in Venezuela, or

the current president of Bolivia Evo Morales. In this populist discourse, the main distinction

between the people and the élite is of socio-economic status; the people is here intended as

demos, and it is indeed identified with the common man, with those who live at the bottom,

with the exploited working class. It’s not by chance that these leaders were able to mobilize

different popular constituencies and to foster a change in the relationship between the State

and the civil society, embodying social groups not included in the political community until

then: the descamisados, the indigenous tribal peoples, and so on (cfr. Mudde and Kaltwasser,

2013).

At the g-i intersection are placed the nationalist populism and the parties that refer to it. Being

identified with the nation, the people is here intended as ethnos; the élites are perceived as

agents of a foreigner power, if not even as aliens per se, bowed down the cosmopolitanism

and the globalism; moreover, specific groups of others (as, for instance, ethnic minorities,

immigrants, or underserving beneficiaries of the welfare state) become the scapegoats of the

people’s difficult living conditions.

This kind of populism characterized, in the 1960s, the reactionary policies of politicians like

George C. Wallace, in the United States, and Enoch Powell, in the United Kingdom.

Currently, it represents one of the main feature of both the traditional radical right-wing

parties: the British National Party (BNP) and the British National Front (NF) – and the post-

industrial ones – The Republicans (REP) in Germany, the now dissolved Belgian Front

National (FN), the French Front National (FN), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), the

Norwegian and Danish Progress Parties (FKP) (cfr. Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007).

At the i-l intersection an ethno-regional populism and the ethno-regional parties can be found.

A strong feeling of belonging towards a community and the regional territorial concentration

represent the main features of these parties, that obviously adopt the typical populist discourse

too. The Belgian Flemish Interest (VB) is probably the most remarkable example of this type

of party.

Finally, a sort of socio-economic regional populism would have to be found at the a-l

intersection. In this case, the peripheral protest is based more on economic issues than on

ethnic ones; the Italian Northern League (LN), for instance, represent the interests of the high-

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power and wealthy regions against the backward areas of the countries and the wastes of the

central government (cfr. De Winter and Türsan, 1998, ; De Winter, Gomez-Reino, and Lynch,

2006).

Fig. 1 – The competitive politics diamond

5. Inside and outside the competitive politics diamond

As we have argued above, populism arises when democracy has sharpened and radicalized its

elitist traits, that is when both politics is considered as a matter that only the élite have to deal

with and the citizens participate to the political life only by means the vote. Populism, in this

sense, represents a sort of antidote that helps democracy to revitalize itself, fostering the

appropriate measures to reduce the gap between the people and the élite; it’s, therefore,

essentially pro-systemic, because it doesn’t strive to go beyond the democratic form of

government; rather, it may lead, on the contrary, to a sort of hyper or radical democratism.

It may happen, however, that populism, taken to the extreme, comes out from the competitive

politics diamond and transforms itself in authoritarianism. At the root of this change there are

some integral features – both defining and facilitating – of populism, as well as the specific

characteristics of the ideologies with which populism mixes itself.

The monolithic conception of the people as a homogeneous unity, for instance, implies not

only, as previously highlighted, processes of marginalization of specific groups but also the

rejection of the opinions of those who disagree with the majority; this entails, accordingly, the

erosion of pluralism and deliberation. Furthermore, conceiving verbatim the “people’

government” means to discard the liberal system of checks and balances (Kriesi, 2015).

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Opposition to «System»

Opposition to Central Culture «Sistema»

g

i

l

a

Nationalist Populism

Ethno-regional Populism

Socio-economic Populism

Socio-economic regional Populism

Perceiving the people as a homogeneous entity involves that the people’s will is something of

transparent, immediately accessible to the charismatic leaders who aim to hear the people’s

voice. These latter are usually outsiders that embody the people’s demands; they have a

direct, unmediated way in to the complaints of the people, and they act as spokespersons of

the people’s voice. Most of the time, these leaders tend to overcome the political parties’ role

– as such as that of other organizations or agencies – and to reduce their power; indeed, in

their opinion the parties bring about artificial divisions within the homogeneous people, and

corrupt the bond between the leaders and the supporters. It’s not by chance that the populist

parties are usually personal parties, which means that the charismatic leader dominates his

party, that the length of the party life depends from the length of the leader’s political life, and

that the political communication is focused on the leader (Mudde, 2004; Abts and Rummens,

2007; Kriesi, 2015).

Finally, when the thin-centered ideology of populism merges with ethno-nationalism, it

suddenly acquires authoritarian traits; the anti-immigrants xenophobia prevails on the anti-

elitist discourse; accordingly, the democratization requests become secondary, if not even

decorative, whereas the appeal to defense of the group identity does obtain greater relevance

(Taguieff, 2002).

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