WHICH WAY NEXT FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL POLICY IN EUROPE? THE DILEMMAS FOR THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY AND THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

Paper for ESPANET conference, University of Edinburgh, September 6th-8th, 2012

Robert M. PageReader in Democratic Socialism and Social Policy,School of Social Policy,University of BirminghamUK

r.m.page@bham.ac.uk

Abstract

The growing influence of neo-liberal ideas and policies in recent decades has created major dilemmas for European social democrats. Should they attempt to defend more `traditional’ social democratic ideals and practices in relation to social policy or make pragmatic adaptions to the neo-liberal advance? In the main it has been the latter course which has been adopted as witnessed by greater acceptance of non-state provision, acquiescence with the tenets of `new’ public management, the promotion of choice, competition and personalisation and the dilution of universalist principles. By advocating accommodations of this kind social democrats have, however, found it difficult to maintain a distinctive `welfare’ narrative.

In order to highlight the current dilemmas facing contemporary social democrats, this paper will consider the situation of two social democratic political parties who are seeking to construct `new’ welfare narratives after losing office in recent years – the British Labour Party and, more briefly, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP). _

Social Democracy

Before considering the contemporary dilemmas for both the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democrats it is useful, first, to consider briefly what might be described as the core tenets of social democracy. In broad terms Social Democrats believe that the political process should be used to control or constrain market forces to ensure that it does not privilege particular sectional interests. Crucially, this is to be achieved through democratic means rather than through violent forms of revolutionary change. Social democracy can thus be distinguished from liberalism (which is based on the notion that unfettered markets and limited government are the best ways of promoting freedom and prosperity), Marxism (which contends that class based revolutionary change is `scientifically’ inevitable within capitalist societies ) and national socialism and fascism (which is premised on undemocratic and ethnically exclusive state responses to the economically and socially disruptive consequences of capitalism).

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According to Berman (2006), social democracy was `the most successful ideology of the twentieth century: its principles and policies under girded the most prosperous and harmonious period in European history by reconciling things that had hitherto seemed incompatible - a well-functioning capitalist system, democracy and social stability’ (p.6). While many commentators might concur with this assessment it leaves open the question of what range of political arrangements and policies come within the social democratic remit. According to Gamble and Wright (1999), social democracy `is not a particular historical programme or political party or interest group, or even an unchanging set of values. As a political movement its only fixed point is its constant search to build and sustain political majorities for reforms of economic and social institutions which counter injustice and reduce inequality’ (p.2). Clearly, a broad definition of this kind can encompass those political parties or governments which believe that relatively modest interventions are necessary to constrain market `failures’ as well as those that believe that the pursuit of social justice requires more extensive forms of state action. Given the lack of doctrinal purity within social democracy, such diversity is to be expected though it is far from unproblematic (see: Pierson, 2001: Hinnfors, 2006).

Despite definitional `fluidity,’ it can be argued that social democracy at least tended to be associated with particular patterns of economic and social intervention at specific points in time. In the second half of the twentieth century, for example, Western European social democracy has been equated with `Keynesian’ forms of economic interventionism designed to secure full employment and economic growth, as well as redistributive forms of state welfare. Those nation states which have been most active in their pursuit of such policies, such as Sweden, have come to be regarded as emblematic social democratic nations or regimes.

Social Democratic Social Policy

State action to protect and promote the welfare of citizens, irrespective of labour market participation, has been seen as a hallmark of social democracy. For social democrats the welfare state has come to be regarded as a vital means of promoting `social security’ of this kind. As Berman (2006) points out, `with the development of full-fledged welfare states, governments became committed to doing, on a massive, impersonal scale, what families and local communities had done in pre-capitalist times - namely, take care of people when they couldn’t help themselves’ (p.181).

Given the elasticity of the concept of social democracy, one might expect to find a diverse range of social democratic `welfare’ arrangements. Certainly, it is possible to tackle injustice and pursue equality by various configurations of public, private, voluntary and informal provision. From this perspective, the key feature of a social democratic welfare state might boil down to a willingness to use state action to achieve `progressive’ outcomes rather than adherence to a particular principle (`universalism’), method (public provision) or form of governance (national rather than local). This would enable a diverse range of national welfare arrangements to be classified as social democratic. However, there is a case for suggesting that the definition of a social democratic welfare state should be defined more narrowly. In his influential book The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen (1990) contends that social democratic welfare regimes need to be distinguished

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from both their liberal and conservative variants. For Esping-Andersen, a social democratic welfare regime is characterised by decommodified, comprehensive, universal, state welfare services provided on the basis of citizenship with relatively minor or marginal roles played by the private, voluntary and informal sectors. Social democratic regimes of this kind have tended to flourish in Scandinavia. One of the strengths of an `ideal’ type definition of this kind is that it can provides a basis for discussing how much variation from this benchmark type should be permissible under the Social Democratic `imprimatur’ (see Pierson, 2001).

Social Democratic Social Policy: New Labour and Beyond

After consecutive defeats in General Elections from 1979 to 1992, the British Labour Party attempted to construct a `modernised’ social democratic approach to social policy following Tony Blair’s election as leader in 2004. Relying heavily on the `sociological’ determinist insights of Anthony Giddens (1998:2000:2002:2007) and others, New Labour concluded that `traditional’ forms of social democracy lacked resonance in an era marked by the demise of communism, the growth of global markets, changing family and work patterns and more diverse forms of personal and cultural identity. The left-right division was deemed obsolete and increasingly irrelevant. Instead, it was contended that it was possible to combine economic dynamism and social justice.

For New Labour, as for the New Democrats in the United States, welfare reform was accorded a key role in detoxifying the party’s image as business- sceptic `tax and spenders’ who were prepared to put the interests of welfare providers above those of service users and funders and who were more concerned to promote the rights, rather than the responsibilities, of the poor and disadvantaged. It was deemed necessary to move away from the notion that the role of social policy should be to resist market values rather than complement them (see Taylor-Gooby et al, 2004). The welfare arrangements devised during the Attlee years (1945-51) were no longer deemed appropriate in the contemporary era given not least the emergence of more `assertive citizens’ (Griffiths et al, 2009). In addition, a number of normative, communitarian based arguments were used in order to highlight the way in which the post war welfare state had operated on unrealistic assumptions about the `altruistic’ capacities of citizens giving rise to negative side effects such as dependency, fraud, passivity and producer inertia (Etzioni, 1997: Field, 2000: Le Grand, 2003: 2007). The New Labour Approach

These ideas formed the basis of New Labour’s `modernized’ social democratic approach to social policy. It had seven key features.

1. Active rather than passive welfare system

A modern welfare state should be active rather than passive. All those of working age who were capable of paid employment were to be encouraged by a mixture of incentives and sanctions to return to the labour market in order to avoid the debilitating effects of long term dependency on state benefits.

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2. Diverse range of publicly funded providers

Although key services such as education and health care would continue to be publicly funded, there was no automatic need for them to be publicly provided. Public forms of provision should be subjected to contestability in terms of effectiveness and efficiency and the enhancement of the public interest. The choice of welfare provider (social enterprise, private companies or voluntary sector organisations) was to be made on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. Ideological prioritisation was rejected.

3. Consumer focused Provision

In an era of growing consumerism, the welfare state had to be more adaptable and responsive to the needs and preferences of service users. Although many services would continue to be funded collectively, more individually tailored services needed to be developed to meet individual tastes and aspirations to replace the uniform and undifferentiated services of the past. New service providers were seen as having a key role to play in this development while those currently involved in service delivery were encouraged to reconfigure their services to better meet the demands of their `customers’.

4. A Better Balance Between Universal and Selective Provision

It was no longer deemed necessary for social democrats to be wedded to the principle of universalism on ideological grounds. Although it was recognized that contemporary citizens were not indifferent to the well-being of their neighbours, New Labour doubted whether citizens gained additional `benefit’ from the knowledge that both they and their neighbours could access similar services at time of need on the basis of common citizenship. Modern social democrats should be prepared to provide some services on a universal basis and others on `selective’ criteria having regard to the legitimate interests not only of those requiring assistance but also of those funding such services through taxation.

5. A focus on equal opportunities not outcomes

Although New Labour remained fully committed to the idea that the welfare state could play a vital role in promoting equality of opportunity, they rejected the idea that welfare policies should be designed in ways to secure greater equalities of outcome on the grounds that this was out of kilter with popular sentiments concerning aspiration and desert (Brown, 1999: 2003). In practical terms, this meant focusing on the removal of socially constructed opportunity barriers such as poorly performing schools, inadequate health services and sub-standard housing rather than trying to tackle the market driven growth in income and wealth inequalities.

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6. Promoting active and responsible citizenship

Individuals should be encouraged to take more responsibility for promoting their own well-being and to participate in their local community. Citizenship involves both rights and duties. State support was no longer to be seen as an unconditional right but rather a conditional `gift’. Government efforts to enhance education and training opportunities and to improve access to health services was to be matched by concerted efforts on the part of recipients to attend school regularly and follow preventative health advice in terms of diet and exercise.

7 Rigorous monitoring of service outcomes

State funded welfare services should be regularly monitored to ensure that they are providing good outcomes for service users and taxpayers. Unlike `traditionalists’, modern social democrats are more wary of claims that welfare providers can be `trusted’ to deliver high quality, cost efficient services in the public interest. Target setting, audit and inspection are deemed necessary to ensure that producers deliver specified outcomes.

It remains a matter of debate as to whether New Labour’s approach to social policy or record in government should be classified as social democratic (Mulgan, 1998: Driver and Martell, 2006: Powell (ed) 2002: 2008: Toynbee and Walker, 2001:2010). Critics contend that the party’s rapprochement with neo-liberal economic ideas undermined their `socialist’ approach towards the welfare state (Hall, 1998, 2011: Hay, 1999: Faucher-King and Le Gales, 2009). Certainly, it can be argued that three key features of traditional social democratic welfarism were abandoned by New Labour. First, the use of non-state providers and the incorporation of a market vocabulary and practices served to undermine the non-commercial ethos of public services. In particular the decision to ensure that the welfare state operated in accordance with consumerist rather than citizenship values corroded the solidaristic underpinning of the welfare state. Second, New Labour’s narrow focus on tackling opportunity barriers led them to ignore growing levels of income and wealth inequalities. Third, New Labour’s decision to equate `good’ citizenship primarily with labour market participation served to devalue other socially valuable forms of non-commercial activity such as community service.

Social Policy Beyond New Labour

Following their election defeat in 2010 and the subsequent choice of Ed Miliband as its new leader, Labour has begun the process of reformulating its welfare strategy. As yet there has been limited indication of the direction of travel although this may become clearer following the appointment of Jon Cruddas to head up the party’s policy review. Two strands of thinking within Labour circles, which present a challenge to traditional social democratic thinking about the welfare state, are likely to be influential in this process. The first of these is `Blue’ Labour, which is promoted by Maurice Glasman (2010), Jonathan Rutherford

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(2010:2011) and Marc Stears (2011) amongst others (see also commentaries by Davis, 2011: 2012: Cooke, 2011: Finlayson, 2011). Blue Labour is highly critical of the traditional social democratic focus on abstract and `unachievable’ goals such as greater material equality and social justice and the reliance on an impersonal, technocratic, central state to achieve these objectives.

Instead, they believe that Labour needs to return to a more localist approach in which citizens build relationships with one another and construct creative and diverse ways of dealing with the difficulties and problems which concern them rather than relying on a remote and inflexible central state. They favour `postcode’ lotteries (geographical disparities in levels and quality of welfare services) on the grounds that diversity in provision better reflects the democratic views of local citizens. Blue Labour also believes that Labour needs to re-connect with the more socially conservative attitudes of its working class supporters even if this means abandoning some of its more ` liberal’ credentials. This has led opponents to label them as a backward looking movement with too great an emphasis on patriotism (flag), religious beliefs (faith) and traditional relationships (marriage and the family).

Proponents of `Purple’ Labour (revisionist New Labour) are also attempting to `revive Labour’s decentralising tradition’ (Philpot, 2011, p. 12). This mixture of red and blue is deemed to represent the centre ground of British politics. Unlike Blue Labour, Purple Labour believes there is no electoral traction to be gained by embracing a more `conservative’ agenda on social issues. They do, however, recognise the importance of responding to public concerns about immigration and some elements of the welfare state. According to Purple Labour it is vital to retain the image, cultivated by New Labour, that Labour is a modern, progressive party which appeals to both working class and the growing number of aspirational middle class voters. They maintain that it is important to retain the New Labour objective of marrying economic dynamism with social justice. In terms of social policy, Purple Labour concede that many `top down’ attempts to achieve social justice under New Labour failed to resonate with a public which remains sceptical about the benevolent potential of state initiatives funded by increased taxation. Accordingly, Purple Labour is seeking to disassociate itself from statist attempts to deliver greater `fairness’ by focussing, like Blue labour on localism and diversity. Drawing on the guild socialist tradition of earlier British socialists such as William Morris and G.D.H. Cole, Paul Richards (2011) argues, for example, that Labour must promote its co-operative and mutual tradition so that `new centres of governance, power and wealth creation’ can be established as `an alternative to both the centralised state and the private sector’ (p.46).

Although there are `cultural’ differences between the `conservatism’ of Blue Labour and the `modern liberalism’ of Purple Labour, this is unlikely to lead to be major differences of opinion over the future direction of Labour’s social policy. The two sides share broadly similar views about the role of the central state, the promotion of localism, the extension of non-state provision and the need to devise a welfare system which is more in tune with the `reciprocal’ sentiments of the British public. It is useful to look at each of these issues in turn.

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The Role of the Central State Despite attempts to resurrect traditional social democratic arguments concerning the beneficial effects of central state action in combatting inequality, protecting citizens from the adverse effects of unemployment and providing security during periods of sickness and old age (Hattersley and Hickson, 2012: Horton and Gregory, 2009), there are few signs that Labour will seek to advocate a major role for the state in order to halt rising levels of inequality and insecurity in society. In part this reflects an acceptance of the conventional wisdom that state welfare has too often proved to be inflexible, paternalistic, inefficient, sexist, racist, inequitable and unresponsive to the diverse needs of citizens. Although the state is still seen as having important enabling and funding functions, it is no longer seen by Labour as necessarily the most appropriate provider of welfare services. It is also deemed prudent to limit public expectations about the capacity of the state to resolve emerging problems such as the growing demand for social care at a time of demographic `adversity’ and funding constraints (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Moreover, it is recognised that there is little public appetite to pay more taxes to secure improvements in the range and quality of public services, particularly if the recipients of such `largesse’ are adjudged to be part of an `undeserving’ section of society (see, Kellner, 2012a, 2012b: Park et al, 2012).

The Promotion of Localism

At a time when public regard for politicians is low and where there is considerable scepticism about the benevolent potential of central government action, Labour has sought to promote the devolution of power to localities as a way of re-engaging with voters and fostering a greater sense of mutual responsibility. According to Reed and Bryant (2011), `the time has come for Labour to trust local people more. A new form of enabling local government can reinvigorate communities and give them back the power that top-down public services have taken away’ (p.268). At the heart of this approach is the idea that `public’ services require the active involvement of citizens if they are to be supported and sustained. This will involve so-called `double-devolution’ in which local government will be given increased autonomy on the understanding that they will then encourage local citizens to take greater control over setting service priorities and delivery. This might involve for instance `community’ ownership of social housing, children’s centres and leisure facilities. Local citizens might also be encouraged to act as facilitators in designing crime prevention strategies and commissioning appropriate providers. Those receiving personal budgets for social care might be helped to form micro-mutuals so that they can pool their combined resources in an effort to obtain services that better meet their needs.

The Extension of Non-State Provision

Both Blue and Purple Labour are sceptical of traditional social democratic arguments that key welfare services should be funded and provided within the public sector because they are of such major significance to well-being. They contend that unitarist services of this kind

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are producer dominated, lacking in innovation, of questionable efficacy and indifferent to opportunity costs. They are also convinced that this model is both unsustainable and unaffordable. According to Tony Wright (2010), social democrats `should relish the opportunity opened up by David Cameron’s “big society” initiative to revisit arguments about the proper size, shape and role of the state’ (p.5). In terms of state welfare, Wright contends that `it will not be enough for Labour just to defend state services (and the taxation needed to pay for them): it must offer a kind of state that people themselves will want to defend and pay for. Those critics (from the left) of New Labour’s public service reforms are notoriously silent about the reforms they think would drive continuous improvements in how the state operates - genuinely empowering users in the process - preferring instead to defend the principle of public service and demand that ever more money be spent. `This kind of conservatism has no future’ (p.9).

For Blue and Purple revisionists there should be an increase in personalised provision, greater user choice and competition and enhanced forms of co-production. Such innovations are seen as requiring greater reliance on innovative services providers who are likely to operate as co-operatives, mutuals or social enterprises. Crucially, from a social democratic perspective, these challenges to `traditional’ systems of service delivery are not intended to confer greater advantages on more discerning middle class households. Rather, they are intended to help to ensure that disadvantaged groups such as low income households and ethnic minorities to gain better access to high quality services (see Le Grand, 2007).

Reciprocity and Conditionality

In devising a new social democratic welfare settlement both Blue and Purple Labour contend that Labour must distance itself from the idea of unconditional rights to welfare, based on the `citizenship’ ideas of T.H.Marshall (1950) and the `quasi-Titmuss’ school (Deacon, 2002) on the grounds that they fail to resonate with public notions of fairness (Byrne, 2011). In order to move closer to the public’s conception of fairness, commentators such as White (2010) contend that social policy should be underpinned by the principle of reciprocity, as advanced by early 20th Century New Liberal thinkers such as Hobhouse. According to White, there is no `necessary conflict between the conditionality implied by reciprocity and the idea of social rights’. He attempts to square this circle by arguing that a `social right should be conceived as a right of reasonable access to goods or income. Society’s duty, correlative of a social right, is to ensure that every citizen has access on reasonable terms to particular goods and/or a given level of income’ (p.23). In some cases this may involve the unconditional granting of a cash benefit because of illness or old age. However, as White continues, `if I am able to work and society offers me a range of jobs, which are not degrading or exploitative, then it might well have secured me reasonable access to a minimum income. If I then refuse to take any job, society does not thereby violate my social rights by refusing me, on grounds of reciprocity, an income’. Society has, he concludes `secured the relevant right - a right of reasonable access to a decent income’ (p.23).

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This notion of fair reciprocity has given rise to the suggestion that `good’ citizens should be rewarded by being offered priority for social housing, while tougher sanctions should be meted out to anti-social citizens. Philpot (2011b), echoing Field (2003), suggests that anti-social residents could potentially be banned from living within five miles of their current residence.

Towards A `Progressive’ Labour Social Policy?

Although Labour has yet to establish its central welfare narrative, the likely direction of travel is beginning to emerge. It seems probable that Labour will attempt to present itself as a `progressive’ party with blue and purple elements which will appeal to left-leaning liberal democrats, revisionist social democrats and communitarian socialists. This will result in an emphasis on an enabling central state, a greater emphasis on more diverse local provision, a more relaxed approach to non-state provision and an enhanced role for community led action. In practice, this will mean that there will be no return to monopoly forms of state delivery. Semi-autonomous Foundation NHS Hospitals, academy and free schools will be retained although they will be expected to deliver improved outcomes and conform to broader social objectives. In order to ensure that the welfare state retains popular support, Labour will continue to make stringent demands on those seeking social support in the form of income (robust availability for work rules) and housing (demonstrations of community service/merit). These measures are likely to be complemented by one or two more `traditional’ social democratic policies such as more equitable funding for both child care and adult social care The main difficulty that Labour will face is trying to distinguish itself from both a Conservative Party and a Liberal Democratic Party, which are also attempting to present themselves as parties of progress (see Page, 2010: Dorey, 2011). As the next General Election approaches, Labour may find it increasingly difficult to distinguish its form of `progressivism’ from its main political opponents.

Which Way Next For Social Democratic Social Policy in Sweden?

Background

Revisionist Social Democrats in Sweden have tended to regard ` traditionalists’ who detect signs of the demise of the Swedish welfare `model’ on the basis of modest downward adjustments to welfare provision, such as the pension reforms in the 1990s, as failing to recognise the importance of policy adaptation. For revisionists, the key to sustaining a `progressive’ form of social policy over the longer term is being prepared to respond imaginatively to a fast changing global economic environment. However, their second consecutive defeat in the 2010 General Election, which represented the Party’s worst showing since 1914, would seem to indicate that they may be finding it harder to persuade the electorate that it is only social democrats who are able to manage the economy effectively and protect the welfare state.

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Various factors have been advanced for the poor showing of the Social Democrats in the 2010 General Election. The then party leader, Mona Sahlin has been criticised, for instance, for the haphazard way in which she constructed her pre-election coalition with the Greens and the Left Party as well as her failure to develop a coherent economic message. The party only managed to secure the support of 50% of all trade unionists, while it could only persuade 20% of the Stockholm electorate (falling to 13% amongst those in paid work) to support the Party (see Miliband, 2011).

The success of the Moderate party, under the leadership of Frederik Reinfeldt, in presenting itself as a progressive alternative to the Social Democrats has been a significant factor in the latter’s loss of electoral traction. The Moderates have proved successful in appealing to both aspirational middle and working class voters by emphasizing the need for lower taxes, a more efficient welfare state and a solidarism linked more closely to paid work and a notion of social justice that emphasises desert as much if not more than need (see Miller, 1992). The Moderates stress on the importance of paid work rather than welfare `dependency’ has led them to claim that they are the only authentic `Workers’ party of today‘. The Social Democrats have also had to contend with the emergence of a new party on the `right’, the Sweden Democrats, who gained parliamentary representation for the first time on an avowedly anti-immigrant platform laying claim to being the new champions of the `people’s home’.

It may now be the case that the revisionist Social Democratic approach to welfare policy is beginning to unravel. As Kuisma (2011) points out, `a financialised and politically diluted social democracy was unable to fight the centre-field battle without becoming, eventually, on the one hand too ineffective and unambitious for right-leaning conservatives and, on the other, untrue and watered-down in the eyes of its traditional base’ (p.2).

Following the post-election resignation of Mona Sahlin, the Social Democrats selected Hakan Juholt as their new Party leader in March 2011 under what might be termed the `Bradbury’ method (1). Following his election in March 2011, Juholt showed signs of returning to a more traditional form of social democracy by calling for an end to child poverty, reductions in youth unemployment, increased public sector pay and a review of the pension system as well as curbs on the privatisation of public services. However, his brief period as Party leader was marked by criticisms over his failure to take a concerted stance over government cuts in unemployment benefits and health insurance and for his apparent support for a controversial statement by the SAP Mayor of Malmo, Illmar Reepalu, who suggested that newly arrived immigrants might be granted temporary rather than full citizenship on the grounds that those subsequently found guilty of criminal acts could be deported more easily. This was seen as betraying a fundamental social democrat tenet of equal citizenship. On the personal front, Juholt, like his predecessor Sahlin, was the subject of intense media scrutiny over his financial affairs. These setbacks coupled with an inability to make much headway in the opinion polls led Juholt to resign in March 2012. Under their new leader, Stefan Lofven, the SAP will have to consider whether a return to the pre- Juholt revisionist approach to key welfare issues will need to be adapted to regain electoral support. In particular, the party will need to consider three inter-related questions - the

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`social’ role of the state, the long term future of `social’ universalism and the role of non-state welfare provision. _

(1) Steven Bradbury became Australia’s first Olympic winter sports gold medalist in 2002 after his fellow competitors in the 1000 meter speed skating final slipped over on the final bend. Juholt was elected leader after better known rivals fell by the wayside for various reasons.

1. The `Social’ Role of the state

One of the tensions in Swedish social democracy has been reconciling two competing approaches to the `social’ role of the state. On the one hand it could be argued that the role of the state should be to create autonomous self-sufficient individuals. On the other hand, the state is also seen as an important vehicle for the creation of social solidarism and the good society. It is useful to look at each of these themes in turn.

Statist `individualism’

From a `statist’ individualist perspective, the role of the state should be to create confident, autonomous individuals who have the capacity to chart their own life course. As Berggren and Tragardh (2010) have suggested, Pippi Longstocking (who has captivated successive generations of children and adults since Astrid Lindgren (2007) first brought her to public attention in 1945) can be regarded as the leitmotiv of statist individualism. Here is a nine year old girl with superhuman powers whose mother is dead and who has what American commentators are fond of describing as a `deadbeat dad’. Although Pippi lives alone in unsanitary conditions with animals residing in both her kitchen and bedroom, she has access to a chest of gold coins that provides her with substantial financial autonomy. It can be argued that the social role of the state is to create a nation of autonomous Pippi Longstockings. By ensuring that each individual is able to act independently and become self- sufficient, the state protects all citizens from the possibility of undesirable forms of dependency on other family members, the local community or employers. From this perspective those who are forced to depend on their fellow citizens for their well-being are regarded as subservient and unequal. Those in subordinate positions of this kind are unable to live an `honest’ or authentic life as they are forced to maintain `good’ relations with people they may not particularly like.

According to Berggren and Tragardh, one of the key functions of the welfare state, therefore, is to liberate the citizen from all forms of dependency and subordination in society including religious bodies and repressive local communities. Those experiencing poverty must be freed from the shackles of charity. Workers must be able to escape from repressive employers, wives from controlling husbands, children from neglectful and exploitative parents (and vice versa). Various welfare initiatives could be said to be based on this ethos of statist individualism, including taxation policy, family law, day care provision, and children’s rights. As Anderson (2006) has argued, this `individualistic’ approach to social policy gathered pace in the 1980s forming an integral part of the revisionist social democratic welfare policy developed by Carlsson and Palme that

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endeavoured to provide citizens with improved welfare `choices’ in what were straightened economic times.

Statist `communitarianism’

Alongside statist individualism, the Social Democrats have also been highly supportive of what might be termed statist communitarianism (see Andersson, 2006: 2010). The `Folkhem’ (People’s Home) strategy that developed in Sweden from the 1920s onwards was intended to dissolve class barriers in society and strengthen social integration. In his famous speech in 1928 Hansson used the notion of the family to set out what he saw as the relationship between the state and the citizen. `The foundation of the home is community and solidarity. The good home knows no privilege or neglect, no favourites and no stepchildren. There, no one looks down on another, no one strives to gain advantage at the expense of others, and the strong do not repress and rob the weak. In the good home equality, thoughtfulness, cooperation and helpfulness prevail. Applied to the great people’s and citizens’ home this would mean the breakdown of all social and economic barriers that now divide citizens into privileged and deprived, into the rulers and the ruled, into rich and poor, the propertied and the destitute, the robbers and the robbed. Swedish society is not yet the good citizens' home. If it [is] to become [so] class differences must be banished, social care must be developed, there must be an economic levelling out’ (quoted in Hilson, 2008, p.106).

This emphasis on the common good and similarities rather than the differences between citizens retains resonance in Swedish society. Universal access to a broad range of welfare services was developed by influential social democrats such as Alva and Gunnar Myrdal who championed universal provision such as day care for children, well equipped family homes, communal restaurants and laundries as well as unemployment and sickness protection. This pursuit of the `Good Society’ also led to strict controls being maintained in the distribution of alcohol and zero tolerance of illicit drugs. Significantly, statist communitarianism was not seen as necessitating a strong legal framework. Public spirited officials were to be trusted to pursue appropriate policies in pursuit of the common good. For some, of course, paternalism of this kind proved stifling. Those who wanted to be left alone found it difficult to avoid the benevolent `crook’ of the state official or neighbour bringing them back into the fold (see Brown, 2009).

Significantly, the statist communitarianism approach was subjected to increasing criticism from both neo-liberals and the more libertarian new left in recent decades as examples of some of the undesirable side effects of invasive or controlling forms of social engineering came to light. It was argued, for example, that the supposedly benevolent application of Sweden’s sterilisation laws, which had been introduced in 1934 before finally being repealed in 1977, resulted in 63,000 `compulsory’ sterilisations (see Hirdman, 2010). Critics argued that the Swedish welfare state had crossed a `liberal’ boundary by using such laws to create `purer’ citizens (see Broberg and Tyden, 2005). By the 1980s the controlling aspects of the welfare state were being highlighted more frequently, not least in the governmental

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commission on Power and Democracy (1985-90), which suggested that the rapid expansion of the public sector and provider monopolies had been problematic. State monopolies were seen as overly controlling and pervasive with the result that individual autonomy was threatened. Alternative, and possibly more attractive, forms of non-state provision were being crowded out. The citizen was now seen to be in need of greater protection from an over bearing state rather than `civil’ society or the market.

2. `Social’ Universalism

Universalism has been the hallmark of the Swedish welfare state. As Steinmo (2010) notes, `rather than attempting to identify the poorest, most needy or most deserving families or individuals in society and then target social spending or tax breaks on them, the Swedish social welfare system extracts heavy taxes and showers extensive benefits on virtually all citizens regardless of their social or economic circumstances. In other words everyone benefits and everyone pays’ (p.34). It is often argued that one of the reasons why universalism has retained its primacy in Sweden is due as much to its economic rationale as to its social propensities. Universal welfare initiatives were seen as a highly effective way of ensuring that the workforce of today and tomorrow could contribute to the economic prosperity of society safe in the knowledge that they would be protected during periods of sickness and unemployment. Significantly, these universal programmes were seen as cost effective avoiding as they did the expensive screening and administrative costs associated with private insurance and means testing and the limited incentives for providers to over-treat or over-charge. The inclusion of better off citizens within these programmes is also seen as helping to maintain service standards by bolstering `voice’.

Although the social case for universalism with its stress on the similarities between citizens, the promotion of greater equality and the provision of high quality services for all retains contemporary relevance, it can be argued that the revisionist social democratic desire to avoid the charge of paternalism has resulted in limited resistance to welfare `reforms’, which tend to be presented as pragmatic modifications rather than `systemic’ challenges. Goul Andersen (2012) contends, for example, that the `de-universalization’ of unemployment protection in Sweden should be regarded as an example of the latter given that the scheme is now `less adequate’, `less inclusive’, and more heavily dependent on individual contributions rather than tax subsidies (p.180).

Social universalism is also challenged by the growing emphasis on more diverse, tailored forms of welfare provision. Those who argue for more diverse welfare arrangements so that the needs and preferences of users can be more effectively responded to often contend that significant changes need to be made to uniform types of universal provision. This is likely to prove increasingly problematic for a society like Sweden, which has found it difficult to devise ways of developing more responsive services for those with different cultural traditions, who may express a desire for forms of provision which run counter to deep-rooted notions of individual autonomy or gender equality (see Ahmed, 2012).

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Non-State Provision

One of the outcomes of the statist individualistic turn within social democracy in Sweden has been a greater acceptance of non-state welfare provision. Up until the 1980s, there had been relatively few non-state providers in fields such as education, primary health care and social care. Since the Independent School Reform of 1992, for example, parents have been able to choose to send their children to either `traditional’ state schools or publicly funded private schools. Now around 20% of upper secondary school pupils are educated in `independent’ schools (Hultin, 2009). These schools, which can be run on a for-profit or not-for profit basis, often have a specialist focus such as religion, art, music or sport. However, they still have to meet national educational requirements including the delivery of the `social’ curriculum (the importance of equality, democratic values, respect for the individual and the need to confront bullying and racism). They are not permitted to charge user fees. The largest private sector provider is Kunskapsskolan (Knowledge School), who own 30 schools catering for around 10,000 pupils.

Contestability with public sector providers has also been the order of the day in primary health care where non-state providers have gained a significant foothold in major cities and in the area of social care. These developments have been welcomed by some social democratic revisionists who have been persuaded of the merits of arguments first put forward by public choice theorists such as Tullock (1965) and Buchanan (1986). Like many New Labour strategists, Rothstein (2012) contends, for example, that `the one size fits all’ syndrome is outdated. He claims that `monopoly’ public providers lack creativity and innovation and are prone to neglect the needs of users due to the lack of competitive pressure. Accordingly, exit rather than voice (Hirschman, 1990) is seen as the best way to ensure that the highest possible standards are maintained in services such as care homes provided that they are well regulated. In part this reflects Rothstein’s belief, that it is unrealistic to pursue welfare strategies which rely on unrealistic degrees of altruism, or a pervasive `public service’ ethic. However, once a service such as social care is opened up to non-state providers a more differentiated form of provision based on ability to pay is likely to take hold. According to Vabo and Szebehely (2012), financial incentives introduced by the Moderate-led government have, all too predictably, led to a flight of better off citizens into the private care system leaving poorer citizens in a second best `public’ home care system. In terms of education, it seems equally likely that schools may become more socially segregated as parents seek out the `best’ schools for their children (see Orange, 2011)..

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Towards A Distinctive Social Democratic Social Policy in Sweden?

Like their British counterparts, the Swedish social democrats are finding it rather difficult to establish a distinctive social democratic narrative concerning the welfare state which will allow it to distinguish itself more clearly from their Moderate-led opponents, who appear to have established themselves as supportive of, rather than hostile to, the welfare state (Svallfors (2011). As was noted previously, the Moderate Party has proved highly adept at presenting itself themselves as a party which will continue to use state power to enhance individual autonomy not least through tax cuts and modifications to unemployment and health insurance whilst simultaneously reassuring Swedish citizens that such initiatives do not undermine Sweden’s welfare state. Although the Social Democrats may try to present themselves as more authentic defenders of the welfare state, their unwillingness to contemplate returning to a more overt `communitarian’ or `egalitarian’ statist strategy is likely to result at best in modest policy adjustments such as a slightly more generous unemployment or sickness insurance scheme and tighter regulatory frameworks on private, state funded, welfare providers. It remains to be seen if `pragmatic’ social policy of this kind will enable the SAP to re-engage with the Swedish electorate.

Concluding Comments

Given the inherent difficulties in comparing welfare arrangements in nations with different cultural and social traditions, caution should be exercised when trying to draw policy parallels. Certainly, there are some key differences between the social and economic `histories’ of the UK and Sweden, which help to explain policy divergence. Arguably, it might be possible to undertake more meaningful comparisons between the welfare strategies of parties with a similar `ideological’ outlook (Andersson, 2006: 2010). Certainly, both the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party would still identify themselves as centre-left parties with more `progressive’ policies than their Conservative or Moderate rivals (see Blaazer, 1992: Marquand, 1999: Robinson, 2012). However, the success of their political opponents in contesting the `progressive centre’ has left both searching for a convincing and distinctive social democratic narrative. In the absence of major `revision’, both may have to content themselves with being perceived as just one of a number of pragmatic centre parties seeking `non-ideological’ solutions to contemporary problems with limited reference to any broader political purpose. Perhaps this may prove, eventually, to be the fate of all western Social Democratic parties.

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