Field Theory: Kurt Lewin Quotes

"A successful individual typically sets his next goal somewhat but not too much above his last achievement. In this way he steadily raises his level of aspiration."

"Learning is more effective when it is an active rather than a passive process."

"If you want to truly understand something, try to change it."

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Kurt Lewin: groups, experiential learning and action researchKurt Lewin was a seminal theorist who deepened our understanding of groups, experiential learning, and action research. What did he actually add to theory and practice of informal education?

Kurt Lewin's (1890-1947) work had a profound impact on social psychology and, more particularly for our purposes here, on our appreciation of experiential learning, group dynamics and action research. In this article we provide a very brief outline of his life and an assessment of his continuing relevance to educators.

Kurt Lewin was born on September 9, 1890 in the village of Mogilno in Prussia (now part of Poland). He was one of four children in a middle class Jewish family (his father owned a small general store and a farm).

They moved to Berlin when he was aged 15 and he was enrolled in the Gymnasium. In 1909 Kurt Lewin entered the University of Frieberg to study medicine. He then transferred to the University of Munich to study biology. Around this time he became in involved in the socialist movement. His particular concerns appear to have been the combating of anti-Semitism, the democratization of German institutions, and the need to improve the position of women. Along with other students he organised and taught an adult education program for working class women and men (Marrow 1969). 

His doctorate was undertaken at the University of Berlin where he developed an interest in the philosophy of science and encountered Gestalt psychology. His PhD was awarded in 1916, but by then he was serving in the German army (he was injured in combat). In 1921 Kurt Lewin joined the Psychological Institute of the University of Berlin - where he was to lecture and offer seminars in both philosophy and psychology. He was starting to make a name for himself both in terms of publishing, and with regard to his teaching (he was an enthusiastic lecturer who attracted the interest of students). His work became known in America and he was invited to spend six months as a visiting professor at Stanford (1930). With the political position worsening considerably in Germany and in 1933 he and his wife and daughter settled in the USA (he became an American citizen in 1940). Kurt Lewin was first to work at the Cornell School of Home Economics, and then, in 1935, at the University of Iowa (this was also the year when his first collection of papers in English - A Dynamic Theory of Personality - was published). 

The University of Iowa remained Kurt Lewin's base until 1944. There he continued to develop his interest in social processes, and to undertake research in that area. Significantly, he became involved in various applied research initiatives linked to the war effort (from 1940 onwards). These included exploring the morale of the fighting troops, psychological warfare, and reorienting food consumption away from foods in short supply. His social commitments were also still strong - and he was much in demand as a speaker on minority and inter-group relations. He wanted to establish a centre to research group dynamics - and in 1944 this dream was realized with the founding of the Research Center for Group Dynamics at MIT. At the same time Kurt Lewin was also engaged in a project for the American Jewish Congress in New York - the Commission of Community Interrelations. It made use of Lewin's model of action research (research directed toward the solving of social problems) in a number of significant studies into religious and racial prejudice. It was also out of some of this work in 1946 with community leaders and group facilitators that the notion of 'T' groups emerged. He and his associates were able to get funding from the Office of Naval Research to set up the National Training Laboratories in 1947 in Bethel, Maine. However, Lewin died of a heart attack in Newtonville, Mass. on February 11, 1947, before the Laboratories were established.

Field theory

Here we will not enter into the detail of Kurt Lewin’s field theory (it is beyond our remit). However, it is necessary to note its key elements. To begin it is important to recognize its roots in Gestalt theory. (A gestalt is a coherent whole. It has its own laws, and is a construct of the individual mind rather than ‘reality’). For Kurt Lewin behaviour was determined by totality of an individual’s situation. In his field theory, a ‘field’ is defined as ‘the totality of coexisting facts which are conceived of as mutually interdependent’ (Lewin 1951: 240). Individuals were seen to behave differently according to the way in which tensions between perceptions of the self and of the environment were worked through. The whole psychological field, or ‘lifespace’, within which people acted had to be viewed, in order to understand behaviour. Within this individuals and groups could be seen in topological terms (using map-like representations). Individuals participate in a series of life spaces (such as the family, work, school and church), and these were constructed under the influence of various force vectors (Lewin 1952).

Hall and Lindzey (1978: 386) summarize the central features of Kurt Lewin’s field theory as follows:

Behaviour is a function of the field that exists at the time the behaviour occurs,

Analysis begins with the situation as a whole from which are differentiated the component parts, and

The concrete person in a concrete situation can be represented mathematically.

Kurt Lewin also looked to the power of underlying forces (needs) to determine behaviour and, hence, expressed ‘a preference for psychological as opposed to physical or physiological descriptions of the field’ (op. cit.).

In this we can see how Kurt Lewin drew together insights from topology (e.g. lifespace), psychology (need, aspiration etc.), and sociology (e.g. force fields – motives clearly being dependent on group pressures). As Allport in his foreword to Resolving Social Conflict (Lewin 1948: ix) put it, these three aspects of his thought were not separable. ‘All of his concepts, whatever root-metaphor they employ, comprise a single well-integrated system’. It was this, in significant part, which gave his work its peculiar power.

Group dynamics

It is not an exaggeration to say that Kurt Lewin had a profound impact on a generation of researchers and thinkers concerned with group dynamics. Brown (1988: 28-32) argues that two key ideas emerged out of field theory that are crucial to an appreciation of group process: interdependence of fate, and task interdependence.

Interdependence of fate. Here the basic line of argument is that groups come into being in a psychological sense ‘not because their members necessarily are similar to

one another (although they may be); rather, a group exists when people in it realize their fate depends on the fate of the group as a whole’ (Brown 1988: 28). This is how Lewin (1946: 165-6) put it when discussing the position of Jews in 1939:

[I]t is not similarity or dissimilarity of individuals that constitutes a group, but rather interdependence of fate. Any normal group, and certainly any developed and organized one contains and should contain individuals of very different character…. It is easy enough to see that the common fate of all Jews makes them a group in reality. One who has grasped this simple idea will not feel that he has to break away from Judaism altogether whenever he changes his attitude toward a fundamental Jewish issue, and he will become more tolerant of differences of opinion among Jews. What is more, a person who has learned to see how much his own fate depends upon the fate of his entire group will be ready and even eager to take over a fair share of responsibility for its welfare.

It could be argued that the position of Jews in 1939 constitutes a special case. That the particular dangers they faced in many countries makes arguing a general case difficult. However, Lewin’s insight does seem to be applicable to many different group settings. Subsequently, there has been some experimental support for the need for some elementary sense of interdependence (Brown 1989).

Task interdependence. Interdependence of fate can be a fairly weak form of interdependence in many groups, argued Lewin. A more significant factor is where there is interdependence in the goals of group members. In other words, if the group’s task is such that members of the group are dependent on each other for achievement, then a powerful dynamic is created.

These implications can be positive or negative. In the former case one person’s success either directly facilitates others’ success of, in the strongest case, is actually necessary for those others to succeed also… In negative interdependence – known more usually as competition – one person’s success is another’s failure. (Brown (1989: 30)

Kurt Lewin had looked to the nature of group task in an attempt to understand the uniformity of some groups’ behaviour. He remained unconvinced of the explanatory power of individual motivational concepts such as those provided by psychoanalytical theory or frustration-aggression theory (op. cit.). He was able to argue that people may come to a group with very different dispositions, but if they share a common objective, they are likely to act together to achieve it. This links back to what is usually described as Lewin’s field theory. An intrinsic state of tension within group members stimulates or motivates movement toward the achievement of desired common goals (Johnson and Johnson 1995: 175). Interdependence (of fate and task) also results in the group being a ‘dynamic whole’. This means that a change in one member or subgroups impacts upon others. These two elements combined together to provide the basis for Deutch’s (1949) deeply influential exploration of the

relationship of task to process (and his finding that groups under conditions of positive interdependence were generally more co-operative. Members tended to participate and communicate more in discussion; were less aggressive; liked each other more; and tended to be productive as compared to those working under negative task interdependence) (Brown 1989: 32; Johnson and Johnson 1995).

Democracy and groups

Gordon W. Allport, in his introduction to Resolving Social Conflicts (Lewin 1948: xi) argues that there is striking kinship between the work of Kurt Lewin and that of John Dewey.

Both agree that democracy must be learned anew in each generation, and that it is a far more difficult form of social structure to attain and to maintain than is autocracy. Both see the intimate dependence of democracy upon social science. Without knowledge of, and obedience to, the laws of human nature in group settings, democracy cannot succeed. And without freedom for research and theory as provided only in a democratic environment, social science will surely fail. Dewey, we might say, is the outstanding philosophical exponent of democracy, Lewin is its outstanding psychological exponent. More clearly than anyone else has he shown us in concrete, operational terms what it means to be a democratic leader, and to create democratic group structure.

One of the most interesting pieces of work in which Lewin was involved concerned the exploration of different styles or types of leadership on group structure and member behaviour. This entailed a collaboration with Ronald Lippitt, among others (Lewin et. al 1939, also written up in Lewin 1948: 71-83). They looked to three classic group leadership models - democratic, autocratic and laissez-faire – and concluded that there was more originality, group-mindedness and friendliness in democratic groups. In contrast, there was more aggression, hostility, scapegoating and discontent in laissez-faire and autocratic groups (Reid 1981: 115). Lewin concludes that the difference in behaviour in autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire situations is not, on the whole, a result of individual differences. Reflecting on the group experiments conducted with children he had the following to say:

There have been few experiences for me as impressive as seeing the expression in children’s faces change during the first day of autocracy. The friendly, open, and co-operative group, full of life, became within a short half-hour a rather apathetic looking gathering without initiative. The change from autocracy to democracy seemed to take somewhat more time than from democracy to autocracy. Autocracy is imposed upon the individual. Democracy he has to learn. (Lewin 1948: 82)

This presentation of democratic of leadership in groups became deeply influential. Unfortunately, as Gastil (1994) notes, Lewin and his colleagues never developed their definition beyond this rough sketch. This has left them open to the charge that their

vision of democratic leadership contains within it some worrying themes. In particular Kariel (1956, discussed by Gastil 1994) argued that the notion is rather manipulative and élitist. What is more there has also been some suggestion that Mao’s mass-line leadership in China, ‘used a model like Lewin’s to mask coercion under the guise of participative group processes’ (discussed by Gastil 1994). Such a possibility would have been disturbing to Lewin, whose commitments and intentions were democratic. He argued that democracy could not be imposed on people, that it had to be learnt by a process of voluntary and responsible participation (1948: 39). However, the problem becomes clearer when he discusses the nature of democratic leadership at moments of transition. Change needed to be facilitated and guided.

To instigate changes toward democracy a situation has to be created for a certain period where the leader is sufficiently in control to rule out influences he does not want and to manipulate the situation to a sufficient degree. The goal of the democratic leader in this transition period will have to be the same as any good teacher, namely to make himself superfluous, to be replaced by indigenous leaders from the group. (Lewin 1948: 39)

There are some elements here that ring a little of Rousseau’s view of the tutor’s role in Emile. Is it up to the leader to manipulate the situation in this way – or is there room for dialogue? 

‘T’ groups, facilitation and experience

In the summer of 1946 Kurt Lewin along with colleagues and associates from the Research Center for Group Dynamics (Ronald Lippitt, Leland Bradford and Kenneth Benne became involved in leadership and group dynamics training for the Connecticut State Interracial Commission. They designed and implemented a two-week programme that looked to encourage group discussion and decision-making, and where participants (including staff) could treat each other as peers. Research was woven into the event (as might be expected given Lewin’s concern for the generation of data and theory). The trainers and researchers collected detailed observations and recordings of group activities (and worked on these during the event). Initially these meetings were just for the staff, but some of the other participants also wanted to be involved.

At the start of one of the early evening observers' sessions, three of the participants asked to be present. Much to the chagrin of the staff, Lewin agreed to this unorthodox request. As the observers reported to the group, one of the participants - a woman - disagreed with the observer on the interpretation of her behaviour that day. One other participant agreed with her assertion and a lively discussion ensued about behaviours and their interpretations. Word of the session spread, and by the next night, more than half of the sixty participants were attending the feedback sessions which, indeed became the focus of the conference. Near the conference's end, the vast majority of

participants were attending these sessions, which lasted well into the night. (NTL Institute)

Lippitt (1949) has described how Lewin responded to this and joined with participants in ‘active dialogue about differences of interpretation and observation of the events by those who had participated in them’. A significant innovation in training practice was established. As Kolb (1984: 10) has commented:

Thus the discovery was made that learning is best facilitated in an environment where there is dialectic tension and conflict between immediate, concrete experience and analytic detachment. By bringing together the immediate experiences of the trainees and the conceptual models of the staff in an open atmosphere where inputs from each perspective could challenge and stimulate the other, a learning environment occurred with remarkable vitality and creativity.

It was this experience that led to the establishment of the first National Training Laboratory in Group Development (held at Gould Academy in Bethel, Maine in the summer of 1947). By this time Lewin was dead, but his thinking and practice was very much a part of what happened. This is how Reid (1981: 153) describes what happened:

A central feature of the laboratory was “basic skills training,” in which an observer reported on group processes at set intervals. The skills to be achieved were intended to help an individual function in the role of “change agent”. A change agent was thought to be instrumental in facilitating communication and useful feedback among participants. He was also to be a paragon who was aware of the need for change, could diagnose the problems involved, and could plan for change, implement the plans, and evaluate the results. To become an effective change agent, an understanding of the dynamics of groups was believed necessary.

What we see here is the basic shape of T-group theory and the so-called ‘laboratory method’. Initially the small discussion groups were known as ‘basic skill training groups’ but by 1949 they had been shortened to T-group. In 1950 a sponsoring organization, the National Training Laboratories (NTL) was set up, and the scene was set for a major expansion of the work (reaching its heyday in the 1960s) and the evolution of the encounter group (Yalom 1995: 488).

The approach was not without its critics – in part because of what was perceived as its Gestalt base. In part, because it was seen by some as lacking substance. Reid (1981: 154) reports that Grace Coyle, who had spent time at Bethel, felt that many of the training groups handled group situations badly; and that the leaders were starting to believe that they had ‘discovered everything there was to know about group relations and were unaware of the inquiry and work of others’. There may have been some element of this – but there was also innovation here. Four elements of the T-group are particularly noteworthy here according to Yalom (1995: 488-9) (and they owe a great deal to Lewin’s influence):

Feedback. Lewin had borrowed the term from electrical engineering and applied it to the behavioural sciences. Here it was broadly used to describe the adjustment of a process informed by information about its results or effects. An important element here is the difference between the desired and actual result. There was a concern that organizations, groups and relationships generally suffered from a lack of accurate information about what was happening around their performance. Feedback became a key ingredient of T-groups and was found to ‘be most effective when it stemmed from here-and-now observations, when it followed the generating event as closely as possible, and when the recipient checked with other group members to establish its validity and reduce perceptual distortion’ (Yalom 1995: 489).

Unfreezing. This was taken directly from Kurt Lewin’s change theory. It describes the process of disconfirming a person’s former belief system. ‘Motivation for change must be generated before change can occur. One must be helped to re-examine many cherished assumptions about oneself and one’s relations to others’ (op. cit.). Part of the process of the group, then, had to address this. Trainers sought to create an environment in which values and beliefs could be challenged.

Participant observation. ‘Members had to participate emotionally in the group as well as observe themselves and the group objectively’ (op. cit.). Connecting concrete (emotional) experience and analytical detachment is not an easy task, and is liable to be resisted by many participants, but it was seen as a essential if people were to learn and develop.

Cognitive aids. This particular aspect was drawn from developments in psychoeducational and cognitive-behavioural group therapy. It entailed the provision of models or organizing ideas through the medium brief lectures and handouts (and later things like film clips or video). Perhaps the best known of these was the Johari Window (named after, and developed by, Joe Luft and Harry Ingram). Yalom (1995: 490) comments, ‘The use of such cognitive aids, lectures, reading assignments, and theory sessions demonstrates that the basic allegiance of the T-group was to the classroom rather than the consulting room. The participants were considered students; the task of the T-group was to facilitate learning for its members’.

Action research

Kurt Lewin is also generally credited as the person who coined the term ‘action research’.

The research needed for social practice can best be characterized as research for social management or social engineering. It is a type of action-research, a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to social action. Research that produces nothing but books will not suffice (Lewin 1946, reproduced in Lewin 1948: 202-3)

His approach involves a spiral of steps, ‘each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action and fact-finding about the result of the action’ (ibid.: 206). The basic cycle involves the following:

 

This is how Lewin describes the initial cycle:

The first step then is to examine the idea carefully in the light of the means available. Frequently more fact-finding about the situation is required. If this first period of planning is successful, two items emerge: namely, “an overall plan” of how to reach the objective and secondly, a decision in regard to the first step of action. Usually this planning has also somewhat modified the original idea. (ibid.: 205)

The next step is ‘composed of a circle of planning, executing, and reconnaissance or fact finding for the purpose of evaluating the results of the second step, and preparing the rational basis for planning the third step, and for perhaps modifying again the overall plan’ (ibid.: 206). What we can see here is an approach to research that is oriented to problem-solving in social and organizational settings, and that has a form that parallels Dewey’s conception of learning from experience.

The approach, as presented, does take a fairly sequential form – and it is open to literal interpretation. Following it can lead to practice that is ‘correct’ rather than ‘good’ – as we will see. It can also be argued that model itself places insufficient emphasis on analysis at key points. Elliott (1991: 70), for example, believed that the basic model allows those who use it to assume that the ‘general idea’ can be fixed in advance, ‘that “reconnaissance” is merely fact-finding, and that “implementation” is a fairly straightforward process’. As might be expected there was some questioning as to whether this was ‘real’ research. There were questions around action research’s partisan nature – the fact that it served particular causes. There were also questions concerning its rigour, and the training of those undertaking it.  However, as Bogdan and Biklen (1992: 223) point out, research is a frame of mind – ‘a perspective that people take toward objects and activities’. Once we have satisfied ourselves that the collection of information is systematic, and that any interpretations made have a proper regard for satisfying truth claims, then much of the critique aimed at action research disappears. In some of Lewin’s earlier work on action research (e.g. Lewin and Grabbe 1945) there was a tension between providing a rational basis for change through research, and the recognition that individuals are constrained in their ability to change by their cultural and social perceptions, and the systems of which they are a part. Having ‘correct knowledge’ does not of itself lead to change, attention also needs to be paid to the ‘matrix of cultural and psychic forces’ through which the subject is constituted (Winter 1987: 48).

Action research did suffer a decline in favour during the 1960s because of its association with radical political activism (Stringer 1999: 9). However, it has subsequently gained a significant foothold both within the realm of community-based, and participatory action research; and as a form of practice oriented to the improvement of educative encounters (e.g. Carr and Kemmis 1986). The use of action research to deepen and develop classroom practice has grown into a strong tradition of practice (one of the first examples being the work of Stephen Corey in 1949). For some there is an insistence that action research must be collaborative and entail groupwork.

Action research is a form of collective self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own social or educational practices, as well as their understanding of those practices and the situations in which the practices are carried out… The approach is only action research when it is collaborative, though it is important to realise that action research of the group is achieved through the critically examined action of individual group members. (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988: 5-6)

Just why it must be collective is open to some question and debate (Webb 1996), but there is an important point here concerning the commitments and orientations of those involved in action research. One of the legacies Kurt Lewin left us is the ‘action research spiral’ – and with it there is the danger that action research becomes little more than a procedure. It is a mistake, according to McTaggart (1996: 248) to think

that following the action research spiral constitutes ‘doing action research’. He continues, ‘Action research is not a ‘method’ or a ‘procedure’ for research but a series of commitments to observe and problematize through practice a series of principles for conducting social enquiry’. It is his argument that Lewin has been misunderstood or, rather, misused. When set in historical context, while Lewin does talk about action research as a method, he is stressing a contrast between this form of interpretative practice and more traditional empirical-analytic research. The notion of a spiral may be a useful teaching device – but it is all too easily to slip into using it as the template for practice (McTaggart 1996: 249).

Conclusion

As this brief cataloguing of his work shows, Lewin made defining contributions to a number of fields. He had a major impact on our appreciation of groups and how to work with them; he pioneered action research; he demonstrated that complex social phenomenon could be explored using controlled experiments; and he helped to move social psychology into a more rounded understanding of behaviour (being a function of people and the way they perceive the environment). This is a formidable achievement.  Sixty years on, he still excites discussion and argument, and while we may want to qualify or rework various aspect of his work (and that of his associates) we are deeply indebted to him both for his insights and the way he tried to bring a commitment to democracy and justice to his work. The consistent theme in all Kurt Lewin’s work, according to David A. Kolb (1984: 9) was his concern for the integration of theory and practice. This was symbolized in his best known quotation: ‘There is nothing so practical as a good theory’ (1951: 169). It’s a lesson that we still need to learn.

Further reading and references

Bogdan, R. C. and Biklen, S. K. (1992) Qualitative Research for Education, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Bradford, L. P., Gibb, J. R., Benn, K. D. (1964). T Group theory and laboratory method, New York: John Wiley.

Brown, R. (1988) Group Processes. Dynamics within and between groups, Oxford: Blackwell.

Carr, W. and Kemmis, S. (1986) Becoming Critical. Education, knowledge and action research, Lewes: Falmer Press.

Correy, S. M. (1949) ‘Action research, fundamental research and educational practices’, Teachers College Record 50: 509-14.

Deutch, M. (1949) ‘A theory of cooperation and competition’, Human Relations 2: 129-52

Elliott, J. (1991) Action Research for Educational Change, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Gastil, J. (1994) ‘A definition and illustration of democratic leadership’ Human Relations 47/8: 953-75. Reprinted in K. Grint (ed.) (1997) Leadership, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gold, M. (ed.) (1999) The Complete Social Scientist. A Kurt Lewin Reader.

Hall, C.S. and Lindzey, G. (1978) Theories of  Personality 3e, New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Johnson, D. W. and Johnson, R. T. (1995) ‘Positive interdependence: key to effective cooperation’ in R. Hertz-Lazarowitz and N. Miller (eds.) Interaction in Cooperative Groups. The theoretical anatomy of group learning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kariel, H. S. (1956) ‘Democracy unlimited. Kurt Lewin’s field theory’, American Journal of Sociology 62: 280-89.

Kemmis, S. and McTaggart, R. (1988) The Action Research Planner, Geelong, Victoria: Deakin University Press.

Kolb, D. A. (1984) Experiential Learning. Experience as the source of learning and development, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.

Lewin, K. (1935) A dynamic theory of personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lewin, K. (1936) Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lewin, K. (1948) Resolving social conflicts; selected papers on group dynamics. Gertrude W. Lewin (ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1948.

Lewin, K. (1951) Field theory in social science; selected theoretical papers. D. Cartwright (ed.). New York: Harper & Row.

Lewin, K. and Lippitt, R. (1938) ‘An experimental approach to the study of autocracy and democracy. A preliminary note’, Sociometry 1: 292-300.

Lewin, K., Lippitt, R. and White, R. (1939) ‘Patterns of aggressive behaviour in experimentally created “social climates”’, Journal of Social Psychology 10: 271-99.

Lewin, K. and Grabbe, P. (1945) ‘Conduct, knowledge and acceptance of new values’ Journal of Social Issues 2.

Lippitt, R. (1949) Training in Community Relations, New York: Harper and Row.

McTaggart, R. (1996)  ‘Issues for participatory action researchers’ in O. Zuber-Skerritt (ed.) New Directions in Action Research, London: Falmer Press.

Marrow, A. J. (1969) The Practical Theorist. : The Life and Work of Kurt Lewin, New York: Basic Books

Reid, K. E. (1981) From Character Building to Social Treatment. The history of the use of groups in social work, Westpoint, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Schein, E (1995) 'Kurt Lewin's Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom: Notes Toward a Model of Managed Learning', Systems Practice, http://www.solonline.org/res/wp/10006.html

Stringer, E. T. (1999) Action Research 2e, Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.

Ullman, D. (2000) 'Kurt Lewin: His Impact on American Psychology, or Bridging the Gorge between Theory and Reality', http://www.sonoma.edu/psychology/os2db/history3.html

Webb, G. (1996) ‘Becoming critical of action research for development’ in O. Zuber-Skerritt (ed.) New Directions in Action Research, London: Falmer Press.

Winter, R. (1987) Action-Research and the Nature of Social Inquiry. Professional innovation and educational work, Aldershot: Avebury.

Yalom, I. D. (1995) The Theory and Practice of Group Psychotherapy 4e,New York: Basic Books.

Links

Force field analysis - brief article at accel-team.com

Kurt Lewin - timeline and and brief biography - prepared by Julie Greathouse plus a brief description of his theoretical contribution to psychology

the groupwork pioneers series

Picture and diagram credits: Detail of plaque commemorating Kurt Lewin on the house where he was born.

Action research cycle (we believe to be in public domain)

Bibliographical reference: Smith, M. K. (2001) 'Kurt Lewin, groups, experiential learning and action research', the encyclopedia of informal education, http://www.infed.org/thinkers/et-lewin.htm

© Mark K. Smith 2001

First published June 2001. Last update: May 29, 2012

Force Field AnalysisForce field analysis is a management technique developed by Kurt Lewin, a pioneer in the field of social sciences, for diagnosing situations. It will be useful when looking at the variables involved in planning and implementing a change program and will undoubtedly be of use in team building projects,when attempting to overcome resistance to change.

Lewin assumes that in any situation there are both driving and restraining forces that influence any change that may occur.

Driving Forces

Driving forces are those forces affecting a situation that are pushing in a particular direction; they tend to initiate a change and keep it going. In terms of improving productivity in a work group, pressure from a supervisor, incentive earnings, and competition may be examples of driving forces.

Restraining Forces

Restraining forces are forces acting to restrain or decrease the driving forces. Apathy, hostility, and poor maintenance of equipment may be examples of restraining forces against increased production. Equilibrium is reached when the sum of the driving forces equals the sum of the restraining forces. In our example, equilibrium represents the present level of productivity, as shown below.

Equilibrium

This equilibrium, or present level of productivity, can be raised or lowered by changes in the relationship between the driving and the restraining forces.

For illustration, consider the dilemma of the new manager who takes over a work group in which productivity is high but whose predecessor drained the human resources.

The former manager had upset the equilibrium by increasing the driving forces (that is, being autocratic and keeping continual pressure on subordinates) and thus achieving increases in output in the short run.

By doing this, however, new restraining forces developed, such as increased hostility and antagonism, and at the time of the former manager's departure the restraining forces were beginning to increase and the results manifested themselves in turnover, absenteeism, and other restraining forces, which lowered productivity shortly after the new manager arrived. Now a new equilibrium at a significantly lower productivity is faced by the new manager.

Now just assume that our new manager decides not to increase the driving forces but to reduce the restraining forces. The manager may do this by taking time away from the usual production operation and engaging in problem solving and training and development.

In the short run, output will tend to be lowered still further. However, if commitment to objectives and technical know-how of the group are increased in the long run, they may become new driving forces, and that, along with the elimination of the hostility and the apathy that were restraining forces, will now tend to move the balance to a higher level of output.

Managers are often in a position in which they must consider not only output but also intervening variables and not only short-term but also long-term goals. It can be seen that force field analysis provides framework that is useful in diagnosing these interrelationships.

Dialogue and Conversation'Dialogue', Freire says, 'is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world'. Here we explore this idea - and its roots.

Conversation and dialogue are not simply the means that informal educators use, but are also  what educators should seek to cultivate in local life. They may be approached as relationships to enter rather than simply as methods. We focus on the thinking of four people in particular:

Paulo Freire - with whom the notion of dialogue has been linked as an educational form;

Hans-Georg Gadamer - the philosopher who uses the metaphor of conversation to think about how we may come to understand the subject matter at issue; and

Jürgen Habermas - the social theorist who argues for the need for ‘ideal speech situations’ in fostering both understanding and a humane collective life.'[A] humane collective life’, he said (1985: 82), ‘depends on vulnerable forms of innovation-bearing, reciprocal and unforcedly egalitarian everyday communication'.

David Bohm - the eminent physicist and friend of Krishnamurti, whose example and practical proposals for dialogue have met a response from a number of different areas - but particularly those, like Peter Senge, who are concerned with organizational development.  

Martin Buber has also made a significant contribution to the appreciation of encounter and dialogue in education.

Gadamer - horizons of understanding

I want to begin by approaching conversation as a way of coming to an understanding (sometimes called a dialogic structure of understanding). This particular way of

approaching matters is linked to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. He describes conversation thus:

[It] is a process of two people understanding each other. Thus it is a characteristic of every true conversation that each opens himself to the other person, truly accepts his point of view as worthy of consideration and gets inside the other to such an extent that he understands not a particular individual, but what he says. The thing that has to be grasped is the objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, so that they can agree with each other on a subject. (Gadamer 1979: 347)

In conversation, knowledge is not a fixed thing or commodity to be grasped. It is not something ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered. Rather, it is an aspect of a process. It arises out of interaction. The metaphor that Gadamer uses is that of the horizon. He argues that we each bring prejudices (or pre-judgments) to encounters. We have, what he calls, our own 'horizon of understanding'. This is 'the range of vision that includes everything that can be see from a particular vantage point' (ibid: 143). With these pre-judgments and understandings we involve ourselves in what is being said. In conversation we try to understand a horizon that is not our own in relation to our own. We have to put our own prejudices (pre-judgments) and understandings to the test. ‘Only by seeking to learn from the 'other', only by fully grasping its claims upon one can it be critically encountered’ (Bernstein 1991: 4). We have to open ourselves to the full power of what the 'other' is saying. ‘Such an opening does not entail agreement but rather the to-and-fro play of dialogue’ (op cit). We seek to discover other peoples' standpoint and horizon. By so doing their ideas become intelligible, without our necessarily having to agree with them (Gadamer 1979: 270), we can come to terms with the other (Crowell 1990: 358).

The concern is not to 'win the argument', but to advance understanding and human well being. Agreement cannot be imposed, but rests on common conviction (Habermas 1984: 285-287). In this, the understanding we bring from the past is tested in encounters with the present and forms what we take into the future (Louden 1991: 106). We experience a 'fusion of horizons'.

The horizon of the present is being continually formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudices. An important part of that testings is the encounter with the past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come... In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new continually grow together to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other. (Gadamer 1979: 273)

Whether 'fusion' is quite the right word is a matter of debate. It does not quite fit the 'ruptures that dis-turb our attempts to reconcile different ethical-political horizons' (Bernstein 1991: 10). However, what we do know is that in that 'moment' our own horizon is enriched and we gain knowledge of ourselves.

Emotions and virtues

For there to be dialogue in the dictionary or etymologically sense we look to dia meaning two or between or across and logos speech or ‘what is talked about’. Dialogue is , thus, speech across, between or through two people. It entails a particular kind of relationship and interaction. In this sense it is not so much a specific communicative form of question and answer, ‘but at heart a kind of social relation that engages its participants’ (Burbules 1993: 19). It entails certain virtues and emotions. Burbules lists some of these:

concern. In being with our partners in conversation, to engage them with us, there is more going on than talk about the overt topic. There is a social bond that entails interest in, and a commitment to the other.

trust. We have to take what others are saying on faith - and there can be some risk in this.

respect. While there may be large differences between partners in conversation, the process can go on if there is mutual regard. This involves the idea that everyone is equal in some basic way and entails a commitment to being fair-minded, opposing degradation and rejecting exploitation.

appreciation. Linked to respect, this entails valuing the unique qualities that others bring.

affection. Conversation involves a feeling with, and for, our partners.

hope. While not being purely emotional, hope is central. We engage in conversation in the belief that it holds possibility. Often it is not clear what we will gain or learn, but faith in the inherent value of education carries us forward.

So it is, Martin Buber believed, that real educators teach most successfully when they are not consciously trying to teach at all, but when they act spontaneously out of their own life. 'Then he can gain the pupil's confidence; he can convince the adolescent that there is human truth, that existence has a meaning. And when the pupil's confidence has been won, 'his resistance against being educated gives way to a singular happening: he accepts the educator as a person. He feels he may trust this man, that this man is taking part in his life, accepting him before desiring to influence him. And so he learns to ask….' (Hodes 1972: 137).

Habermas: conversation, power and distortion

As soon as we think about what is required for a conversation - mutual trust, respect, a willingness to listen and risk one's opinions - we can see that we have 'a powerful regulative ideal that can orient our practical and political lives' (Bernstein 1983: 163). This regulative ideal is what Habermas calls an ‘ideal speech situation’. This is a

situation that where each has an effective equality of chances to take part in dialogue; where dialogue is unconstrained and not distorted. What the idea of an ideal speech situation does is to provide us with some ways of identifying and exploring the distortions that exist. Is it the case, as Freire suggests, that dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world, and those who do not want this naming; or between those who have been denied the right to speak, and those who deny the right (Freire 1972: 61)?

Writers such as Gadamer can be criticized for not fully addressing how great inequalities in power condition dialogue; or how the meanings of the words we use can be systematically distorted. This is certainly a point that Habermas took up with Gadamer in a famous series of exchanges. Dialogue does not require egalitarian relationships but is does entail some sort of reciprocity and symmetry. Otherwise the response we may make could be distorted by the concern that what we say may be used against us by the more powerful ‘partner’. Furthermore, we have to recognize that the language we have to use is itself limited and populated, in Baktin’s words, by other people’s intentions. Meanings associated with words can dispose to this understanding or that

Yet, problems of ideology and distortion can be addressed - hegemony can never be complete. In the movement of social relations, actions and ideas still have to be justified, people have to talk and be convinced. For as long as people require others to do their bidding, or to join with them in some enterprise, there has to be conversation, otherwise they cannot hope to fully achieve their aims. For subordinated groups the room for manoeuvre here may be small for much of the time, but in any system there are moments of crisis and dysfunction where voice takes on new meaning and levers can be placed under oppressors' positions.

Once there is conversation there is hope. As Habermas argues, in dialogue there is a 'gentle but obstinate, a never silent although seldom redeemed claim to reason' (Habermas 1979: 3) (what Goffman calls the requirement to demonstrate sanity). However distorted our ways of communicating are, there is within their structures a 'stubbornly transcending power' (Habermas 1979: 3).

When we assert a belief that we hold, we also offer an implied promise to provide at least some of the evidence and reasons behind that belief, if asked. We may not be asked; we may not be able to provide those reasons fully; and we may not convince others if we do - but by making the assertion we commit ourselves to that broader obligation. (Burbules 1993: 75)

The claims each and every statement has to make as to its own validity hold some possibility of dialogue and hence of furthering understanding.

Bohm on dialogue

David Bohm (1917-1992) was a distinguished physicist best known for his work on the fundamentals of quantum theory and relativity theory and their implications for other fields. His approach was distinctive:  he saw science as ‘a quest for truth, and, in this spirit, he unpacked and revealed the epistemological foundations of science (in his study of order), and he utilized these insights to conceive a profound ontological hypothesis (the holomovement and implicate orders)’ (Keepin 1993). We do not need to go into the detail of this here, but we should note that he sees ‘reality’ as involving ‘unbroken wholeness in flowing movement’. Thought could be seen largely as a collective phenomenon: ‘As with electrons, we must look on thought as a systematic phenomena arising from how we interact and discourse with another (quoted by Senge 1990: 240). Will Keepin (1995) comments, ‘what is remarkable about Bohm's hypothesis is that is it also consistent with spiritual wisdom down through the ages’.

This orientation allowed him to enter into a well-known dialogue (and friendship) with Jidhu Krishnamurti. Their explorations ranged widely including why humanity has made thought so important, cleansing the mind of ‘accumulation of time’, breaking the pattern of ego-centred activity and the wrong turn humanity has taken (Krishnamurti and Bohm 1985). One important outcome of this collaboration was David Bohm’s continuing interest in the cultivation of dialogue itself as a path to greater wisdom and learning.

Dialogue, as we are choosing to use the word, is a way of exploring the roots of the many crises that face humanity today. It enables inquiry into, and understanding of, the sorts of processes that fragment and interfere with real communication between individuals, nations and even different parts of the same organization. In our modern culture men and women are able to interact with one another in many ways: they can sing dance or play together with little difficulty but their ability to talk together about subjects that matter deeply to them seems invariable to lead to dispute, division and often to violence. In our view this condition points to a deep and pervasive defect in the process of human thought. (Bohm, Factor and Garrett 1991)

We are dealing with Dialogue with a capital ‘D’ here. Dialogue is set against discussion. ‘A key difference between a dialogue and an ordinary discussion is that, within the latter people usually hold relatively fixed positions and argue in favour of their views as they try to convince others to change. At best this may produce agreement or compromise, but it does not give rise to anything creative’ (Bohm and Peat 1987: 241). ‘The purpose of dialogue’, David Bohm suggests, ‘is to reveal the incoherence in our thought’. In so doing it becomes possible to discover or re-establish a ‘genuine and creative collective consciousness’.  The process of dialogue is a process of ‘awakening’, it entails a free flow of meaning among all the participants:

In the beginning, people were expressing fixed positions, which they were tending to defend, but later it became clear that to maintain the feeling of friendship in the group was much more important than to hold any position. Such friendship has an impersonal quality in the sense that its establishment does not depend on a close personal relationship between participants. A new kind of mind thus beings to come into being which is based on the development of a common meaning that is constantly transforming in the process of the dialogue. People are no longer primarily in opposition, nor can they be said to be interacting, rather they are participating in this pool of common meaning which is capable of constant development and change. In this development the group has no pre-established purpose, though at each moment a purpose that is free to change may reveal itself. The group thus begins to engage in a new dynamic relationship in which no speaker is excluded, and in which no particular content is excluded. Thus far we have only begun to explore the possibilities of dialogue in the sense indicated here, but going further along these lines would open up the possibility of transforming not only the relationship between people, but even more, the very nature of consciousness in which these relationships arise. (Bohm 1987: 175)

We can see some well-trodden themes here – such as the exploratory nature of the process, its unpredictability and the extent to which we are led by it, rather than us leading it. As Bohm et. al. (1991) put it, ‘no firm rules can be laid down for conducting a Dialogue because its essence is learning… as part of an unfolding process of creative participation between peers’.

David Bohm sets out three basic conditions for Dialogue:

Participants must suspend their assumptions. ‘What is essential here is the presence of the spirit of dialogue, which is in short, the ability to hold many points of view in suspension, along with a primary interest in the creation of common meaning’ (Bohm and Peat 1987: 247). Suspending an assumption does not mean ignoring it, but rather ‘holding it in front of us’ ready for exploration. (This links very closely with Gadamer’s view of pre-judgements).

Participants must view each other as colleagues or peers. Dialogue occurs when people appreciate that they are involved in a mutual quest for understanding and insight. ‘A Dialogue is essentially a conversation between equals’ (Bohm et. al. 1991).

In the early stages there needs to be a facilitator who ‘holds the context’ of dialogue. ‘Their role should be to occasionally point out situations that might seem to be presenting sticking points for the group, in other words, to aid the process of collective proprioception, but these interventions should never be manipulative nor obtrusive’ (Bohm et. al. 1991). They continue, ‘guidance, when it is felt to be necessary, should take the form of "leading from behind" and preserve the intention of making itself redundant as quickly as possible’.

He and his associates also make some concrete suggestions concerning the size of groups involved in Dialogue (around 20-40 people), and the duration of the process (it takes some time to get going).

David Bohm’s linkage of dialogue with the possibilities of glimpsing a deeper order in things, and of connecting with ‘unbroken wholeness in flowing movement’ is very reminiscent of Martin Buber’s account of the possibilities of encounter between ‘man and man’. The recognition of the need for facilitation also has some echoes in Buber’s belief in the need for a ‘builder’ in communities.

A significant factor in the appeal of Bohm's vision was the promise that Dialogue could increase and enrich corporate activity – in part through the exploration and questioning of ‘inherent, predetermined purposes and goals’ (Bohm et. al. 1991). There was a clear parallel here with Argyris and Schön’s work on double-loop learning, but interestingly one of his associates has subsequently suggested that their view was too optimistic: ‘dialogue is very subversive’ (Factor 1994).

No organization wants to be subverted. No organization exists to be dissolved. An organization is, by definition a conservative institution. If you didn't want to conserve something, why would you organize? Even if an organization runs into serious trouble - if, perhaps, its market or reason for existence vanishes - there remains a tremendous resistance to change. (And, by the way, our larger culture is also an organization.) I suggest that the most one can hope for is a change in the more superficial elements which would naturally occur as an organization co-opts … some of dialogue's ethic of inquiry. And maybe that is all that is required to accomplish its aims. But any deeper change, any change that might threaten the very meaning and therefore the existence of the organization or its power relations would tend to be rejected - perhaps subtly and tacitly - because such vulnerability would not only be threatening to those within the group, but almost certainly to those who perceive from without - perhaps from higher up the corporate ladder - what this subgrouping of their organization is getting up to. (Factor 1994)

The presentation of clear guidelines, the publication of actual dialogues, and Bohm’s social and spiritual concern struck a chord. It led to the his work being used by a number of key writers especially around organizational development e.g. Senge (1990), to the formation of groups to engage in ‘Bohmian dialogue’ (and a thriving web community), and a Dialogue Project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His particular innovation was to link Dialogue into a view of ‘reality’ as involving ‘unbroken wholeness in flowing movement’.  

Dialogue and conversation

I want to finish by putting dialogue and conversation side by side. For much of the time as local educators we are talking in an everyday way about children, television, school, the lack of things to do. What we might readily identify as ‘conversation’. It all seems a bit pale when compared with the process Freire (1972) describes as dialogue. Through dialogue people are supposed to create new understandings which are 'explicitly critical and aimed at action, wherein those who were formally illiterate now begin to reject their role as mere "objects" in nature and social history and undertake to become "subjects" of their own destiny" (Goulet 1974: viii).

Yet we overlook two aspects here at our peril. First, the very fact that much of the subject matter is the stuff of everyday life means there always is the possibility of unmasking the taken-for-granted. We can ask why things are as they are in relationships; or why is it that there is so little provision in a neighbourhood. Second, and crucially, conversation like dialogue is, at heart, 'a kind of social relation that engages its participants' (Burbules 1993: 19). The act of engaging with another - whatever the subject matter - is significant in itself. The process entails the same virtues and emotions such as concern, trust, respect, appreciation, affection and hope (ibid: 36-46).

We should, therefore, not make too much of the differences between conversation and dialogue. In common sense terms dialogue could be seen as a form of conversation - a particular ‘serious’ format. For us as informal and community educators a focus on conversation rather than dialogue is, perhaps, more useful. First, most workers I do not, for the most part, describe their interactions in terms of dialogue. Instead we use words like talk, chat and conversation. At this basic level it is perhaps useful to stay as close to worker’s vocabulary as possible.

Second, when we analyze the types of activities that informal and community educators are involved in, the word conversation seems appropriate and to allow the necessary fluidity. Describing an exchange about the state of the kitchen or the price of children's clothes as dialogue sounded rather pretentious. It is more comfortable to talk about different forms of conversation: some were 'passing', some were 'playful', some were 'serious'. One tends to flow into another - they were, in effect, changing conversations.

Third, I do not want to privilege too strongly 'serious conversation'. Yes, local educators engage in activities directed towards discovery and new understanding (what Burbules 1993: 8 describes as 'dialogue'), but they are also concerned with being and belonging. Here, seemingly trivial exchanges are of central importance and if neglected lead to major problems. Dialogue in the sense that Freire uses the term is only one element of the work local educators do. We should remember that Freire's pedagogy was constructed around formal educational situations. While Freire may

not have been originally concerned with schooling, but with the less structured world of 'non-formal' education, the educational encounters he explores remain formal Torres (1993: 127). They remain curriculum-based and entail transforming settings into a particular type of pedagogical space.

There is a special danger here of unthinking application - that of the pedagogization or 'schooling' of the everyday (Street and Street 1991). As we have seen informal educators do not make use of a formal curriculum for much of their work. They work in settings not usually associated with education. Much of their conversation, as a result, is not immediately distinguishable from what might be said between friends or neighbours. This is the way it has to be - if they attempt to problematize things that are said in the way they might in a classroom or in some formal session, they would soon be shunned. They have to work within the boundaries set by 'daily round' to make openings for conversation.

In conclusion

Cultivating conversation lies at the centre of what informal educators do. It is not simply the form that their work takes, but also part of their purpose. Through conversation, testing out prejudices (prejudgments), searching out meaning, we become more critical. Language, discourse 'exists not for the sake of expression alone but for the sake of the community it makes possible among those who become parties to it' (Gunn 1992: 90). We become better able to name our feelings and thoughts, and place ourselves in the world. We can develop a language of critique and possibility which allows us to act (Giroux 1989: 208). We may even to be able, as Martin Buber would have put it, to glimpse God in our encounters, or to catch the collective consciousness (Bohm 1997).

Recommended readin

Here I have tried to include a mix of texts - some of which deal with the everyday world of conversation, some with the practicalities of education and dialogue, and yet still others that explore the philosophical and political significance of conversation and dialogue. The choice is rich - and there were plenty of other texts that I could have included.

Bohm, D., Factor, D. and Garrett, P. (1991) ‘Dialogue – a proposal’, the informal education archives. David Bohm’s championship of dialogue as a means of going beyond individual understanding has been influential in a number of circles. This 1991 paper sets out the main elements of his thinking and the mechanics of his approach. See, also, Bohm, D. (1997) On dialogue edited by Lee Nichol, London: Routledge. 

Burbules, N. (1993) Dialogue in Teaching. Theory and practice, New York: Teachers College Press. 184 + xviii pages. Detailed and important exploration of the subject area. Chapters on why dialogue, why theory and practice?; the dialogical relation; playing the dialogue game; rules in the dialogue game; moves in the dialogue game; types of dialogue; and why dialogues fail.

Freire, P. (1972) Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 153 pages. Classic account of dialogical / transformative education. See, also, the 'talking book' - P. Freire and I. Shor (1987) A Pedagogy for Liberation. Dialogues on transforming education, London: Macmillan. 203 + xiii pages.

Gadamer, H-G. (1979) Truth and Method, London: Sheed and Ward. 552 + xvi pages. Brilliant discussion of conversation, understanding, hermeneutics and praxis. New edition now available. For a good introduction see the opening section of his (1976) Philosophical Hermeneutics, Berkeley: University of California Press. 243 + lviii pages.

Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, London: Penguin. 251 pages. Views social encounters as a dramatic performance in which people use various props, and act in 'teams'. For an overall assessment and exposition of his work see T. Burns (1992) Erving Goffman, London: Routledge. 386 + viii pages. Another possibility is C. Lemert and A. Branamamn (eds.) The Goffman Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. 278 + lxxxi pages. With a couple of substantial and interesting pieces, this collection includes key extracts and some important articles such as 'The interaction order' and 'Felicity's condition'.

Habermas, J. (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1, Cambridge: Polity Press. 463 + xxxix pages. Includes an important discussion of 'ideal speech situations' and communicative action. For an introduction, see M. Pusey (1987) Jürgen Habermas, London: Tavistock (now Routledge). 128 pages

Haroutinian-Gordon, S. (1991) Turning the Soul. Teaching through conversation in the high school, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Excellent discussion of the use of conversation in education.

Malone, M. J. (1997) Worlds of Talk. The presentation of self in everyday conversation, Cambridge: Polity. 182 + xiv pages. As the title suggests this book picks up on Erving Goffman's insights about the interaction order to our self-presentations in talk - the process of 'crafting our behaviour' so that it makes sense to others. Malone uses conversation analysis to discover how selves are 'created and transformed in everyday talk. There are chapters on the interactional order and the self; the foundations of interactionism; the construction of conversations; gender and talk; doing things with friends; and disagreements.

Mercer, N. (1995) The Guided Construction of Knowledge. Talk among teachers and learners, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 135 + ix pages. Focuses on the talk around people who help others to learn. Chapters examine ways of talking; guidance strategies; the learner's angle; a theory of practice; talking and working together; and teachers, researchers and the construction of knowledge.

Tannen, D. (1989) Talking Voices. Repetition, dialogue and imagery in conversational discourse, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 180 + xi pages. Any of Deborah Tannen's books are worth reading - but this book is a fascinating study of the rhythm and imagery of conversation. For a popular introduction see her (1992) That's Not What I Mean!, London: Virago; or (1992) You Just Don't Understand. Women and men in conversation, London: Virago. 330 pages.

Vella, J. (1994) Learning to Listen, Learning to Teach. The power of dialogue in educating adults, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 224 pages. Practical guide organized around 12 basic principles of adult learning that are supposed to transcend cultural differences.

Wardhaugh, R. (1985) How Conversation Works, Oxford: Blackwell. 230 pages. Still the best introduction to conversational process that I have come across. Chapters examine the social basis of talk; locating an agenda; co-operation and playing the game; beyond and behind words; context; getting started and keeping going; topics, turns and terminations; and requesting, informing, advising, agreeing, apologizing, promising.

Zeldin, T. (1998) Conversation: How Talk Can Change Your Life, London: Harvill Press. A short and somewhat quirky book that, nevertheless, manages to convey some of the trials and excitement of engaging in conversation, whether for pleasure, self-education or work. It is the text of a series of six talks broadcast by BBC Radio Four.

Other references

Bernstein, R. J. (1983) Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Science, hermeneutics and praxis, Oxford: Blackwell.

Bernstein, R. J. (1991) The New Constellation. The ethical-political horizons of modernity/postmodernity, Cambridge: Polity.

Bohm, D. (1980) Wholeness and the implicate order. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (New edition 1995, Routledge).

Bohm, D. (1987) Unfolding meaning: A weekend of dialogue with David Bohm, London: Ark. (Republished 1996 by Routledge)

Bohm, D. (1997) On dialogue edited by Lee Nichol, London: Routledge. (Extended version of 1990. On dialogue. Ojai, Calif.: David Bohm Seminars)

Bohm, D., and Peat, D. (1987) Science, order, and creativity, New York: Bantam.

Crowell, S. G. (1990) 'Dialogue and text: re-marking the difference' in T. Maranhao (ed.) The Interpretation of Dialogue, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Factor, D. (1994) On Facilitation and Purpose, http://www.muc.de/~heuvel/dialogue/facilitation_purpose.html

Giroux, H. A. (1983) Theory and Resistance in Education. A pedagogy for the opposition, London: Heinemann.

Habermas, J. (1979) Communication and the Evolution of Society (trans. T. McCarthy), London: Heinemann.

Hodes, A. (1972) Encounter with Martin Buber, London: Allen Lane/Penguin. 245 pages. (Also published as Martin Buber: An Intimate Portrait, Viking Press, New York, I971).

Keepin, W. (1991) Lifework of David Bohm - River of Truth, http://www.shavano.org/html/bohm.html

Krishnamurti, J. and Bohm, D. (1985) The Ending of Time, New York: HarperCollins

Louden, W. (1991) Understanding Teaching. Continuity and change in teacher's' knowledge, London: Cassell.

Peat, F. D. (1997) Infinite Potential. The life and times of David Bohm, Addison-Wesley.

Senge, P. (1990) The Fifth Discipline. The art and practice of the learning organization, London: Random House.

Smith, M. K. (1994) Local Education, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Taylor, P. V. (1993) The Texts of Paulo Freire, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Torres, C. A. (1993) 'From the Pedagogy of the Oppressed to A Luta Continua: the political pedagogy of Paulo Freire' in P. McLaren and P. Leonard (eds.) Freire. A critical encounter, London: Routledge.

Links

Selected Websites on Dialogue  - listing by the Union of International Associations.

Illustration: artist's models - copyright (c) 2005 infed.org and its licensors. All rights reserved.

How to reference this piece: Smith, M. K. (2001) 'Dialogue and conversation', the encyclopaedia of informal education, www.infed.org/bibio/b-dialog.htm.

© Mark K. Smith 2001

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