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https://defenseissues.net/2013/06/08/quality-and-quantity/

"Quality vs. Quantity of Weapons"posted by picard578 on June 18, 2013 / defenseissues.net

Introduction

In modern materialistic society where the value of everything (including human life) is considered in monetary terms, many people see more complex and more expensive weapons as being automatically more capable than cheaper weapons, thus justifying the costs. Defense spending proponents argue that “nothing is too good for troops”, thus justifying procurement of ultra-expensive weapons.

But in reality, more expensive is not automatically better if there is no discipline to specify what is important and stick to it. Mounting requirements will start requiring very heavy trade-offs, thus compromising specifications in primary mission.

For example, the battle rifle has to have a powerful round capable of reaching long ranges which also means lot of recoil. This means that bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles are best for that role. The assault rifle’s primary requirement is to put lots of rounds down the range quickly enabling suppressive fire, which does not allow for powerful rounds. As infantry combat has ever since World War I usually happened at ranges of 100 meters and below, it can be seen that the assault rifle and not the battle rifle is best suited for the standard infantry weapon with bolt-action and semi-automatic rifles being relegated to special roles. Yet for the person who does not understand reality of infantry combat, bolt-action rifles with their very long range may seem superior to assault rifles.

Thus the only way to see what works and what not is to study combat data over a long period and understand what makes an effective weapon. That is what I am going to do here.

Lanchester laws

While in ancient combat where lines of soldiers fought, each unit of an army that was outnumbered by factor of 2 had to be twice as effective as each unit of outnumbering army in order for it to break even (or as more commonly said, force a stalemate). But that does not hold true in modern combat today.

Modern combat is a ranged affair. Individual units are highly mobile and do not fight in relatively static formations. The result is that combat between units becomes several-on-one affairs unlike the phalanx’ one-on-one affair. Which automatically means that equation is different. No longer does an army outnumbered by 2-to-1 have to have 2 times as effective units but rather 4 times as effective. It is not always applicable as ground combat (particularly infantry combat) still faces force-size-to-area constraints so the exponent is often adjusted to 1.5.

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But while it would appear to give large advantage to quantity, there are times where a numerically inferior force won over a numerically superior one. These victories, however, could only very rarely to never be attributed to the quality of weapons alone.

Quality versus Quantity – a false dilemma

This lack of understanding among general populace and even many military personnel has led to a definition of effectiveness as “how loaded with high technology this weapon is”. Hugely costly weapons are being justified under “troops deserve the best” and “we can’t win the war with inferior weapons”.

But while at first look it would seem a reasonable assumption, the reality is often that when combined with above-mentioned lack of understanding of combat, it results in costlier weapons that are less effective than cheaper ones both individually and as a system.

Still, in some cases the more effective weapon is also more costly and expensive. Such is case with air-to-ground precision-guided munitions when compared to dumb munitions dropped from same altitude.

Quality vs Quantity through history

Antiquity

A lot has been said about decline of the Roman Army in 3 rd and 4th century A.D. Impressive lorica segmentata (segmented armor) -- which according to some accounts was capable of stopping ballista arrows -- got replaced by chain and scale armors which could not even stop ordinary arrows. Scutum changed shape from a square curved shield to a round flat shield more reminiscent of Middle Ages. And the Imperial Gallic helmet was also replaced by types more similar to Middle Age helmets in way of production if not look. But what were causes of that change? And what effect did it have on Roman military capability?

Causes were primarily strategic and economical in nature. Mounting barbarian pressure on borders increased the number of troops required at the same time that the economy suffered. Barbarians themselves, having often served in the Roman military in past centuries, took home knowledge of Roman tactics. They were also better equipped than before.

All of this put strain on imperial logistics. Thus replacement of lorica segmentata which according to one documentary had “more knots to tie than an evening dress” with hamata (chain armor or maille) and squamata (scale armor). Segmentata could seem to be easier to make and maintain at first impression by having far less parts than other two. But that is wrong.

First, it had relatively small number of large thick plates which required skilled workforce to produce. Bronze connections were no easier to make and they caused problems with maintenance of armor. Hamata and squamata, while being made of far larger number of parts, were far easier to mass-produce with less educated workforce, being fairly simple in design. Hamata was also self-maintaining as rust is rubbed off the armor just by wearing it.

A flat round shield was also easier to make than square curved one. But it was even more indicative of changes in tactics. No longer able to afford huge losses, the Roman army used what was basically a

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phalanx formation with front ranks stopping the enemy and rear ranks showering enemy with missiles. This was combined by outflanking maneuver by cavalry (a tactic used by Macedonean phalanx).

Still, well-trained and disciplined Roman armies often won against larger numbers of barbarians despite latter often having equipment that was quality-wise (if not comparable) then at least close to what Romans had. The end result is clearly in favor of personnel and command quality combined with personnel and material quantity.

But in the end despite the Roman military itself remaining capable, huge military expenditures did their work and support structure collapsed without Romans being any wiser initially. But they only thought about it as a temporary setback. The cause of that was that as their society, military, and supporting structures became more complex in response to various crises, the costs of maintaining them started exceeding benefits. At that point, the Empire started draining more resources than producing them. And when reserves were drained, the entire system collapsed.

The same effect of forced simplification of system will later repeat itself in the Eastern Empire in 7 th

and 8th centuries AD although with less politically catastrophic results. The complex system basically ate itself. It was less effective in adapting to problems while requiring more resources, simply because complexity itself caused friction which caused additional resource depletion because of greater amount of resources required to maintain it. (Good article here.)

As it can be seen, after a certain point increased complexity resulted in performance actually decreasing. The effect was magnified by number of health and climate problems (lead poisoning, droughts, and similar) that hit at about the same time. A simpler society may have been able to adapt. But the high complexity of late Roman society rendered it inert. The situation is same for any system be it social or technological. The more complex weapon may be more effective up to a point. But soon, resources required to keep it in operation will start to increase faster than effectiveness which can justify expenses as the system enters area of diminished returns. And sometime after that, increased complexity will cause it to enter area of negative returns where increased complexity causes performance to fall. This effect can be clearly observed with modern aircraft (but more on that later).

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The Roman Republic suffered losses during the Punic wars that were militarily far worse than any sustained by the Roman Empire, suffering 3 major military defeats in short order and loosing around 130.000 troops in total. However, being able to raise large numbers of conscript – but still well-trained – troops as opposed to better-equipped and at least as well trained, but very expensive professional troops of the Empire meant that Republic was still able to withstand these losses and win while fighting two-front war against Hannibal in Italy and his brother Hazdrubal in Spain.

For comparison, the Battle of Mursa, in which 54.000 soldiers were killed had devastating consequences for the Late Roman Empire. It is important to note about the Republic military that all citizens eligible for military service had to participate in military exercises and maneuvers at set times. These were carried out at “Mars’s field”, named after Roman god of war (Mars, originally god of spring, later to become god of war under Greek influence). During the later part of his operations in Italy, Hannibal was basically confined to southern part of the pennisula, unable to attack Sicily and forced to constantly move because foraging parties weren’t allowed to go far away from main body, else they risk being destroyed by Roman patrols.

If we go further back, the ancient Spartan military was full-blown “quality over quantity” example since there never were many Spartiates available. Spartan forces were most respected and feared in Greece. But they never went on long campaigns outside Pelopones and the relied a lot on allies as they were needed to keep helots in check. When Thebe defeated Spartan army, Sparta was unable to replace losses, especially after Pelopida freed helots. The result was the permanent loss of Spartan power.

Earlier still, Greek phalanx consisting of hoplites brought an end to an era of individual duels fought by well-equipped aristocrats, thus causing early forms of democracy to be formed. Both a greater number of fighters and their mutual support meant that “heroic” type of individual combat disappeared.

Homeric phalanx itself was an imitation of an Assyric formation. Expensive Mykenaian bronze armor was replaced by “inferior” but cheaper hoplite armor which by the time of Greco-Persian wars came to be made from leather (which was cheaper than bronze). This allowed larger number of well-equipped and well-trained fighters to be fielded.

The Macedonian phalanx itself, often seen as ultimate evolution of Greek phalanx, was a very capable formation. But it was not long spears (sarissa) which made it so capable but rather the combined-arms approach which combined heavy and light infantry, archers, and cavalry. Soldiers were also well-drilled, being able to deploy and redeploy quickly. Armor used by Macedonean phalanx was stiff linen-textile armor with bronze and iron plate armor being used in small quantities. Nevertheless, cheap linothorax proved to provide acceptable protection.

Numbers weren’t always helpful, though. In the Battle of Marathon, the more numerous Persian army was annihilated by tactical genius of Miltiades. It did not help that Persians were primarly relying on missile troops which have not proven effective in face of well-equipped and well-drilled Athenian army. While the Persians won the later Battle of Thermopylae, their fleet was defeated in Battle of Salamis which meant that they were unable to supply their forces. Effectively, Greeks forced them to fight the battle against the earth, one that the Persians could not win. As a result, the Persians had to pull most of their forces back to Persia leaving behind a (relatively) minor force that was defeated in Battle of Plaetea. In fact, much of the Persian force died of starvation and disease, never returning to Asia.

It must be noted that in all three battles, the Greeks managed to counter maneuver advantage given to Persians by their cavalry through clever use of terrain. In the Battle of Plaetea, the Persians had believed that Greeks were running away and thus attacked from a disadvantageous position. Also during Battle of Thermopylae, the Greeks did not carry armor (though they did not fight almost-naked as

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300 would have it; they did carry garment), instead relying on large shields, training, and a wall built previously by Phocians to carry the day and keep Persians at bay until they had no choice to retreat. It would have happened had not Persians managed to outflank defenders through the mountain pass. In the end, a 2,000-strong Greek rearguard was annihilated while covering retreat of main army. In the following Battle of Salamis, the Greek fleet managed to draw large and unwieldy Persian ships into narrow pass of Salamis, outflanking and ultimately defeating them.

People in antiquity had ideas about superweapons such as the author of the so-called (original title is lost) “Of Matters of War”. The author, while aware that Roman Empire was in trouble, obviously did not understand real problems the Empire was facing such as collapsing economy, depopulation, and apathy. He like everybody else saw problems as temporary and incidental, not structural, in nature. So he proposed numerous wishful weapons.

A similarity can be found in many later authors and even weapons designers and “strategists” up to and including the modern day. To them, the answer to all problems is “more, more expensive weapons” and “more money”. Yet it only serves to worsen (not solve) the problems in question. Rarely is the question asked whether a weapon in question could be replaced by a better cheaper one.

Middle Ages

While Western armies had knights whose charge could not be withstood by Ottoman heavy cavalry, Ottomans won almost all large battles. Reasons were better coordination between troops and larger numbers of troops (particularly infantry). In smaller engagements, Christians often won as their system of command could cope with requirements of battle when smaller forces were used.

But this did not really help and the Ottomans only took relatively small number of fortified cities in direct attacks. Reason was that Ottomans practiced strategy of raids, devastating the countryside, and forcing people living in it to move to safer areas. Without people around, fortified cities had to either be abandoned or be supplied over long distances, thus rendering them vulnerable. This generally happened in depth of 50 kilometers from nominal borders.

Ultimately, Christians adopted same tactics, especially in Croatia and Hungary. Croatian troops put lessons learned during 230 years of warfare with Ottomans in use during 30 Year War using tactics for which the West proved mostly unprepared. In fact during the war, the name “Croatian” was more often used as a designation of a type of cavalry specializing in irregular and “blitz” warfare than for nationality as both numbers and ethnical composition of such (originally exclusively Croatian) units increased as their usefulness was realized. From that time also comes “kravata” (necktie, cravat), having developed from piece of cloth that Croatian soldiers tied around neck so as to have emergency bandage readily available if wounded.

While the Battle of Krbava Field is often cited as start of true troubles for Croatia, tactical successes against Ottomans were achieved both before and after it. The Ottoman strategy however rendered these successes superfluous as it meant that Ottomans were taking territory without having to win battles. It also meant that Western heavily-armed and -armored knights -- despite being long regarded as most important part of the army -- were strategically of minor importance despite their great tactical shock value (similar to modern tanks). Of far greater strategic value proved to be light irregular and semi-regular raiders such as hussar cavalry which appeared in Croatia and Hungary during 15th century, most likely as a response to Ottoman raiders (as well as predominantly infantry units of similar nature) which served both as raiders and as garrisons in fortified strongholds. (Hussar or huszar comes from Croatian word “gusar” meaning “privateer” or “pirate”).

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Tactically when forced to face Western heavy cavalry in the field, Ottomans used a mass of infantry to stop their charge. Once that was achieved, Ottoman cavalry would outflank and annihilate Western cavalry with a rout of often-underequipped and undertrained Western infantry to follow soon thereafter.

John Hunyadi countered this by placing heavy infantry at center and heavy cavalry on flanks. Both were supported by bow- and crossbow-equipped infantry and cavalry, respectively. In order not to be outflanked, Ottomans had to send their own cavalry to flanks where it would be annihilated by Western cavalry.

But the problem with idiotic commanders persisted. At the Battle of Varna, Hunyadi was initially given command and managed to get Ottomans into a very disadvantaged position. Given time he would have broken them. Yet King Vladislav, concerned more about glory than about saving kingdom (or his own head), mounted head-on attack on mass of Jannissaries. The result was that the King was killed and his army broke apart.

The same scenario would repeat itself at the Battle of Mohacs where Ludovic II decided on a head-on attack against Ottomans without waiting for reinforcements from Croatia. The Battle was ultimately decided by Ottoman numerical and command superiority and training superiority of Jannissaries.

Modernity up to 20 th Century

While muscettes would at first glance seem that they are more complex than the longbow (which they are), the situation is more complex than that. Early hand cannons of the 14th century indeed did not replace bows as they were slow to reload and were not much more effective against armor. Later muscettes still suffered from similar problems. So why did the longbow and crossbow get displaced?

In early modernity, we witness the appearance of modern state and modern manufacturing in the West. This means that weapons could now be easily produced in large quantities even if relatively complex. Gunpowder weapons also got more effective (albeit bows were still superior in some aspects) such as superior rate of fire and effective range, especially against massed formations which still dominated the battlefield. Bows were also still cheaper. However they had a number of important disadvantages.

The first disadvantage is a material one. Wood and string could get wet. If that happened, the bow was literally useless until it dried. The same happened to gunpowder. But it was easier to protect and would dry faster.

The second disadvantage is in their nature as weapons that require high physical strength from user. This meant that they required highly-trained users that would spend large amount of time doing nothing but training. In contrast, even with 18th century gunpowder weapons it took only several weeks at most for soldiers to become adequately competent in using muscette which meant that larger armies could be fielded and losses could be replaced faster as long as weapons were available (which with industrial and logistical capabilities of new states was not exactly a problem).

The third disadvantage is s logistical one. Rounds and gunpowder that came with them required less space for same amount of ammunition and as mentioned earlier were easier to store. This meant smaller supply trains and a smaller force required for their protection.

So while it may be hard to believe with now-available gunpowder weapons, the choice between arrow and gunpowder was Quality vs Quantity one. And Quantity won.

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In 18th century, battles were dominated by large dense formations of soldiers firing at each other. Weapons were not precise (they did not need to be). Battles were won by side that had best drilled soldiers who fired and reloaded their weapons fastest and whose artillery was best coordinated with infantry. The first to stop using such tactics were French revolutionary troops, achieving huge successes such as in one battle where Napoleon defeated a 3 times larger army (more because of their lack of training than because of ingenuity). But when Napoleon later reverted to massive columns, it caused French casualties to skyrocket.

In 1588, Sir Francis Drake’s fleet of ships used superior agility of smaller warships to defeat larger, more heavily-armed ships of the Spanish Armada. While the Spanish Armada was slightly more numerous in the beginning, it was skill of English crews which truly decided the battle. Unable to return the same way it came or to link up with invasion force (which was likely just a play), the Armada was forced to sail around Scotland where it was caught in storm and devastated.

Spanish Conquistadors are sometimes used as an extreme example of Quality trumping Quantity. But this is not so. They worked by subterfuge and decapatitation and ultimately amassed large numbers of local troops to help them. The most devastating weapon in their arsenal were European diseases to which locals were rather susceptible.

The greatest military advance of the 19th century is a conical bullet. Its precursor – the Minie ball – was created by British Captain John Norton and later perfected in 1849 by French army captains Claude-E’tienne Minie and Henri-Gustave Delvigne. This weapon demonstrated its effectiveness in Crimean war. In 1866 Prussian military armed with breechloading weapons including needle guns completely outclassed Austria during Austro-Prussian war. It also massively increased lethality of defensive fire. But even 48 years later, Napoleonic war era tactics were still being used resulting in massive casualties.

Weapons disparity, however, was not the only reason for the Austrian defeat. Austria was rather sluggish in mobilization and this allowed Prussia to attain strategic initiative.

World War I

In World War I, like at beginning of World War II, battleships were thought of as measure of naval power. But it also marked first combat use of modern submarine.

At beginning of the War, Germany had 29 U-boats. In the first 10 weeks, they sank 5 British cruisers. In the Dardanelles campaign of February 1915 – January 1916, 3 battleships were sunk by mines. U-21 sank 2 Allied pre-Dreadnough battleships (HMS Triumph on 25 May, HMS Majestic on 27 May). The remaining battleships were unable to provide close support for troops due to danger from German submarines. Two more were damaged by mines but did not sink.

In the Mediterannean, Otranto Barrage only ever caught two submarines while in 1916 the Allies lost 415 merchant ships. At beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, Germany had only 105 submarines, later to increase to 120.

In April 1917, Britain’s supply of wheat shrank to 6 weeks' worth. The German submarine blockade was proving as effective as British naval blockade but at far lesser cost. Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 tons of shipping were sunk per month. Even when anti-submarine measures such as convoys were introduced, losses continued at rate of 300,000 to 500,000 tons per month for the remainder of 1917. This was despite the fact that Germany failed to develop anti-convoy measures such as "wolf packs". The U.S. was also forced to lay down massive mine barrage across all accesses into Atlantic. But only 6 submarines were sunk by it.

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In the end, 350 German submarines sank 12.85 million tons of shipping at cost of 178 submarines lost. The 5 most successful sank 1.72 million tons of shipping.

In the Adriatic, Italian torpedo boats sank Austro-Hungarian pre-dreadnought Wien in 1917 and in 1918 the dreadnought Szent Istvan. Wien was torpedoed while at anchor and Szent Istvan was hit en route with full escort. Still later, dreadnought Viribus Unitis (then under jurisdiction of newly-formed State SHS) was sank by Italian diversants despite State SHS not being in war with Entente so Italy could annex Croatian coast. Diversants managed to avoid all security measures and plant charges under the hull.

This clearly shows that cheap torpedo boats and submarines proved a great danger to capital ships and a far more effective weapon of war than expensive capital ships. But even among capital ships themselves, the situation was strategically in favor of Quantity. The German High Seas Fleet had higher-quality ships and crews that were better trained in naval gunnery. Dnd during the Battle of Jutland, it managed to inflict far higher losses on stronger Royal Navy force than it received. (There were 3 main reasons for this. Poor performance of British shells whose faulty detonators meant that they detonated on impact; this in turn meant that even thinnest armor was enough to prevent shell from penetrating. German shells, being equipped with reliable delayed fusing systems, did not suffer this deficiency. Secondly, Royal Navy crews ignored even most basic safety measures in order to increase rate of fire which resulted in two battlecruiser losses that most likely would not have happened otherwise. The third reason was that German crews spent more time practicing with their range finding devices. Germany had superior range-finding procedure firing three shots at highest, lowest, and most likely range to enemy ship. This system was superior to British “ladder” system which consisted of firing salvos at lowest likely range and then working up to actual range).

However, battle was a strategic victory for Great Britain as it was made clear that even if Germany did manage to keep advantageous exchange ratio, Royal Navy would win in a war of attrition. As a consequence, the High Seas Fleet never sortied in force again and Germany turned to unrestricted submarine warfare. This in turn brought about intervention of the United States by affecting public opinion and allowing U.S. politicians to push for the war they wanted anyway.

Another reason for the poor performance of Royal Navy ( especially allowing German fleet to escape) was the rigid system of control which caused lower-level officers to avoid acting without orders from the top. This was worsened by fleet standing orders which attempted to govern all actions by naval officers in all possible situations. Beatty (commander of battlecruiser squadron) left behind 4 fast battleships that were also part of his force and failed to provide Jellicoe with updates on German fleet’s position.

World War II

Luftwaffe was before and through World War II dominated by heavy bomber advocates as were the RAF and the USAF. But despite each heavy bomber being 5 times as expensive as the German Ju-87 and 5 times more heavy bombers being produced than Stukas, they accomplished far less. Out of 114,000 aircraft produced, 25,000 were heavy bombers but only 4,900 were Stukas. Heavy bombers received 26 times as much funding as Stukas did.

In the Spanish Civil War, heavy bombers achieved nothing of value (except for providing Picasso with an event to paint). During the 1939 invasion of Poland, Stukas acted in close air support attacking vehicles and ground troops, making movement problematic for Polish military units with many not

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making it to their designated positions in time or at all due to Stuka harassment. The only thing the heavy bombers achieved was destroying some cities.

During the bombing of Warsaw, Luftwaffe heavy bombers managed to hit some Heer units outside the city. They dropped 572 tons of bombs on Warsaw in effort to force city to surrender. But resistance still continued until ground troops captured 3 key forts on outskirts of the city. At the same time, outdated and outnumbered Polish fighter aircraft flown by well-trained pilots successfully engaged far faster, more modern, capable and numerous Me-109s. But with only 36 fighters deployed (out of total of 170 compare to 1,180 fighters deployed by Luftwaffe), they were defeated through weight of numbers. The ability to operate aircraft outside known air fields prevented most Polish aircraft from being destroyed on the ground. Only one of the dispersal air fields was found and attacked by Luftwaffe, destroying 17 light bombers.

Another problem for the Polish Air Force were inadequate logistics, especially with regards to aircraft repair and maintenance. The sheer number of German aircraft caused confusion as many Polish ground units assumed that any aircraft were hostile; ace fighter pilot Stanisaw Skalski wrote in his memoirs that “Everyone was shooting at us: Germans and Poles alike — the Poles often more accurately.” The 7TP light tank was also superior to German Panzers as were imported R35 and Vickers E tanks. But being incorrectly used and outnumbered, they did not have appreciable impact on fighting. With Stuka squadrons flying as many as 10 sorties per day per squadron, what modern tanks Poles did have was in great danger of destruction from the air.

During the invasion of Norway, Luftwaffe coordinated with Heer on unit level. While Operation Weseruenberg was originally seen as a unified command with Falkenhorst commanding both Heer, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe units, he ended up commanding only Heer units due to Luftwaffe (Goering’s) protests. As a result, actual coordination happened entirely on level of individual units.

Stavanger was taken by dive-bomber attack followed by parachute assault. After that, reinforcements arrived by ship with air reconnaissance allowing German ships to avoid the Royal Navy. Level- and shallow dive-bombing Ju-88s and He-111s, despite being less suitable for mission than Stukas (which lacked range required), damaged Rodney and achieved near hits on three cruisers. Despite the Home Fleet shooting off 40% of 4-inch ammunition available, only 4 Ju-88s were shot down. As a result, Admiral Forbes withdrew Home Fleet to the north with only submarines being left in the south to deal with German ships.

In 1940, two-day campaign in Benelux countries, Luftwaffe suffered loss of 67 heavy bombers and 16 Stukas. When Germans built bridges to cross Meuse river, RAF heavy bombers failed to eliminate them, incurring 56% losses. Later at Dunkirk, Luftwaffe heavy bombers failed to eliminate both Allied troops and Allied ships. The RAF lost 60 fighters destroyed and 120 damaged whereas Luftwaffe lost 240 aircraft destroyed, mainly heavy bombers. Whereas RAF fighter pilot casualties were around 50%, bomber crew casualties were likely over 80% (a figure taken from Allied heavy bomber statistics). At the same time, destroyed were 6 destroyers and 230 smaller boats plus 23 warships damaged. This was mainly achieved by dive bombers.

It will continue through the War. No major warship was ever sunk by heavy bombers.

At beginning of Battle of Britain, the RAF had 741 fighters (only 279 were Spitfires) against the Luftwaffe’s 1.109 fighters (809 Me-109s), 1.134 heavy bombers, and 316 Stukas. The Battle began on July 1st 1940 with Stukas sinking 1 out of 3 British ships using the Channel. As a result, on July 27 British ships ceased to use the Channel. Heavy expensive bombers played no role in that success.

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In Phase II of the battle, heavy bombers failed to achieve the air superiority despite 3 months of bombing RAF bases. Between July and September 1940, the Luftwaffe lost 621 heavy bombers and 88 Stukas. Losses were 12 heavy bombers and 1.3 Stukas per day (Stukas were out of battle for 3 weeks before end of September) despite Stukas flying 3 times as many sorties per day as heavy bombers. Once heavy bombers started attacking cities (despite the RAF being at the verge of collapse by then), British morale and production both increased.

German focus on heavy expensive bombers harmed its war effort. As Gen. Adolf Galland, commander of German day fighters said: “In the beginning of 1940, the monthly production figure for the ME-109 was approximately 125 … the peak was reached with a monthly production of 2,500…in autumn 1944. At the end of 1944, we had a fighter production about 20 times larger than it had been when the Luftwaffe entered the Battle of Britain. Had the fighter production reached in 1944 been reached in 1940 or even 1941, the Luftwaffe would never have lost air supremacy and the tide of the War would have taken an entirely different course. Neither technical reasons nor shortages of raw material prevented it. …It was the fundamental ideology of the German leadership with regard to aerial warfare according to Douhet that this was to be done by annihilating the enemy on the ground by surprise attack with bombers. …Fighters were only to be tolerated as a necessary evil, a concession to the unpopular act of defense.”

From this statement, we can see several things. First, fighter and dive bomber production suffered due to bomber production to an extent that it caused Germany to lose air supremacy (while the U.S. did have far larger industrial capability, they were also wasting money on heavy bombers). Second, German war production reached peak in autumn 1944 after year-and-half long massive strategic bombardment campaign against German production facilities. It was shortages of raw materials and oil (Ploesti oil fields were captured by Soviet troops in August 1944) which caused war production to drop in late 1944 and 1945, not the bombing campaign. Heavy bombers used by Luftwaffe contributed to these shortages: as early as July 1941, bomber sorties had to be reduced due to fuel shortage. Yet only 300 Stukas were available to cover entire Eastern Front, thus preventing Germans from exploiting numerous opportunities for destroying disorganized Soviet armored units and aircraft while in retreat.

The entire Stuka production run cost 25 million USD in then-year dollars (about cost of single battleship). In September 1941, Stuka pilot Lt. Hans Rudel sank the Soviet battleship Marat (then in a harbor) with a delayed-fuze bomb which exploded in the magazine, justifying entire Stuka production run with a single sortie. In contrast, RAF heavy bombers made 8.000 sorties trying to sink German battlecruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Ships were not sunk, and Luftwaffe lost 17 fighters and 11 airmen defending them. Compare that to RAF loss of 60 bombers and 345 airmen while trying to sink them.

On the Eastern Front, 2 leading Stuka aces combined had around 800 confirmed tank kills. 2 leading Tiger I aces had 329 confirmed kills combined. Yet Stuka production stopped in July 1944 and replacement (though developed and far more capable CAS aircraft) was never fielded in sufficient numbers (only 878 produced). When Allies started bombing Germany, Germans produced 12,000 heavy guns manned by 1.25 million men by 1944. These proved utterly ineffective. In contrast, smaller, cheaper 20 mm and 30 mm AA guns, often camouflaged near roads, caused many losses among Allied ground attack aircraft. Less than 400 fighters available for defense of Reich in 1943 caused more than 20% losses on unescorted B-17 raids.

The German V-2 missile was inaccurate. It was an ineffective weapon even when compared to other “strategic bombardment” weapons. For 6,000 V-2s, Germany could have produced 24.000 Stukas or 48,000 tanks in addition to 4,900 Stukas and 28,000 tanks that they did produce during the War.

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It can be seen that production of heavy bombers and ballistic missiles instead of cheaper single-seat fighters and dive bombers cost Germany any possibility of success on the Eastern Front. The Russians on the other hand produced 36,000 of deadly Shturmovik IL-2 close support fighters. The German Me-262 Messerschmitt -- which was superior to any Allied fighter -- was often shot down when taking off or landing. This was the result of German High Command’s (and especially Hitler’s and Goering’s) focus on expensive "wonder-weapons" (wunderwaffe). There are also accounts that Hitler, aside from his love for wonderweapons, liked enormous battles (with proportionate casualties). If true, it would explain many of his more questionable decisions and confirm him as the "best enemy general" the opposing Allies had (a position already secured by his decisions about weapons procurement).

One of reasons for the Luftwaffe’s successes despite mismanagement of resources was that Luftwaffe units were attacked to Heer at corps (not army) level. In practice, smaller Luftwaffe units could be attached to Heer units below corps level. Stuka pilots were trained in ground warfare tactics and lived alongside ground troops during both training and campaign. This radically cut down their reaction time and improved flexibility.

Allies would not learn from German mistakes. In 1942, RAF Bomber Command had no more than 500 heavy bombers at any single point. Yet in the same year they managed to lose 1,404 heavy bombers. Between January 1943 and March 1944, 5,881 bombers were lost along with 20,000 – 30,000 crewmembers. Fortunately for the Allies (and especially Allied bomber crews), after March 30, 1944 Operation Overlord took priority and bomber losses dropped sharply. The total loss of heavy bomber crews in 4 years of bombing would end up to be 70,000.

In North Africa, strategic-bombing-focused USAF failed to provide any appreciable help to ground troops. Rommel’s defeat was mainly result of 21 outdated RAF Swordfish torpedo bombers sinking 4 Italian battleships guarding the Mediterranean supply lines as well as German failure to prevent aircraft, submarines, and ships based on Malta from attacking supply convoys.

Despite Axis aircraft dropping over 7,000 tons of bombs on island, Malta persisted. In the attack on the island Pantelleria, Allied bombers flew 7,000 sorties dropping 5,600 tons of bombs. The Italians only surrendered when a 600-ship invasion force appeared. Less than 5% of bombs came to within 100 meters of their targets.

Rail transport in France was almost stopped by air power. While heavy bombers failed to as much as slow it down, P-47s destroying valuable locomotives and anything that moved on railroads had huge effects.

As for U.S. European operations, expensive P-38 Lightnings and P-47 Thunderbolts failed as dogfighters although the P-47 proved excellent in CAS (close-air support) and battlefield interdiction missions. The P-51 Mustang -- a small, light, and cheap dogfighter ($51,000 USD vs P-38's $125,000 USD) -- proved to be the best air superiority aircraft available to the U.S. Over 15,000 were produced, most of them with Merlin engine. It had better cruise and top speed, better dive acceleration, and better roll performance than either the German Me-109 Messerschmitt or the FW-190 Focke-Wulf.

The Mustang's turn performance was superior to the Me-109 but inferior to the FW-190. When flying against FW-190, pilots compensated by avoiding protracted turning maneuvers and relying instead on P-51s superior roll rate. It also had longest range of all Allied fighters and was the only one capable of escorting bombers which acted as a bait to draw out German fighters so that P-51s can shoot them down.

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By September 1944 despite receiving 3,000 new fighters per month, the Luftwaffe was only receiving 1,000 new pilots per month. Losses to P-51 Mustangs were huge. The Me-262 did not change equation. Many were shot down by Allied patrols over the air fields or by superior numbers of Allied fighters when they slowed down to attack bombers. They shot down around 150 Allied aircraft and 100 were destroyed in aerial combat (maybe 75 by fighters).

During night raids, German night fighters despite lacking onboard radar until late 1943 extracted a heavy toll on Allied bombers, being vectored in by ground radars. By March 1943, 350 night fighters were equipped with radar. After that, British night bomber losses increased to beyond 6% per raid.

U.S. heavy bombers proved utterly ineffective at destroying German fortifications overlooking Omaha beach despite throwing thousands of tons of bombs. 1,500 P-47s had more success. 23 German divisions trying to reach landing site were mauled and delayed by as much as 6 weeks, averting a potential rout of huge proportions.

During the War, average US heavy bomber loss rate was 4.5% compared to less than 1% for fighters. The only thing the heavy bombers did manage to do was to lure German fighters to sky to be destroyed. But dive bombers could have done the same thing.

Strategic bombing did not force a decision. Japan only surrendered after the USSR offensive obliterated 32% of Japan’s ground forces and the U.S. Navy and Air Force destroyed the majority of what few ships it had remaining by the time Okinawa fell. Despite heavy bombers bombing Japan for 3 months, they failed to eliminate any of assigned high-value targets. Due to that, incendiary bombing was commenced killing 100.000 people in Tokyo alone. It did not force Japan to surrender. Even after first atomic bomb was dropped, Japanese generals were against surrender.

The situation was similar with tanks. In fact, General Guderian considered the German Panzer IV G, H, and J models a superior choice to heavy Panther and Tiger tanks. The Panzer IV was cheaper, more reliable, and used lesser quantities of scarce fuel. It was also strategically more mobile as many bridges were unable to carry Tiger’s excessive weight. Guderian was unable to cancel their production in favor of Pnazer IV, however, as both tanks were favorites of Hitler who was obsessed with superweapons.

(Note: Ausf F2 designation which is sometimes used was not official designation. These were in fact early G model tanks but had a turret which, although mounted with long-barrel 7,5 cm gun, was more reminiscent of the Ausf F model rather than boxy turret of later models).

In fact, for a single Tiger, two Panthers or 4 Panzer IVs could have been produced as not only the Panzer IV was cheaper but could have been produced on cheaper machines and by less skilled workforce. Estimates put losses in Panzer IV production due to unreliable Panther being produced prematurely as 1,000 – 2,000.

The Panzer IV's 7.5 cm cannon also had superior penetration characteristics to the Soviet 76.2 mm cannon. And the Panzer IV Ausf. J in addition to being least complex Panzer IV variant had an operational range that was 28% greater than Panther’s and 64-191% greater than Tiger I’s on road.

The Panther itself was actually better than Tiger having higher-velocity cannon and better range as well as being lighter, faster, more maneuverable, and (in latter versions at least) more reliable. The Tiger’s weight also meant that very wide (over 70 cm) tracks were needed for it to have acceptable ground pressure when off-road. But these rendered tank too wide for rail transport which meant that outer wheels had to be removed and narrower tracks fitted for tank to fit within width constraints required for rail transport. Overlapping roadwheels could also get frozen or stuck with mud.

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During the attack on France, Germany was outnumbered in tanks. All German tanks were technologically inferior to French Char B and British Matilda tanks. German tanks, however, were fast and easy to maintain. Once German armored units achieved strategic surprise by going through the Ardennes Forest (thought to be untraversable by tanks), there was nothing the Allies could do to stop them from rampaging through rear.

Most importantly, Germans had superior personnel. Guderian and Rommel constantly ignored orders by High Command. In Rommel’s case, it was not unusual for both Allies and German High Command to completely lose track of where his forces were. Both of these facts allowed Germans to operate at tempo so fast that Allied command could not cope with it, breaking its OODA loop and causing panic. Guderian and Rommel used their inferior tanks to full effect wreaking havoc behind frontline, cutting off supply lines, destroying headquarters, and taking French staff prisoners leaving their units headless and withering on the wine.

On the Eastern front after 1942, Soviet tanks often slipped through overextended German lines and attacked supply lines, showing that they have learned lessons of Blitzkrieg well. But excellent tactical performance of German tanks continued. At the Battle of Prokhorovka despite having only 109 AFVs (of which 4 Tigers, 42 Panzer IV, 20 Marder III, and 20 StuG III as well as Panzer I and IIs (18 present) which, while inferior to T-34 and Su-122, were comparable to 142 T-70s) against 353 Soviet tanks, Germans lost 7 AFVs destroyed and 25 damaged compared to 134 Soviet AFVs destroyed and 125 damaged. 144 of Soviet tanks fielded were T-34s which were superior in combat to anything Germans fielded with exception of Tigers. But the Battle of Kursk itself was won – and lost – by infantry.

Still, this excellent performance was not enough. Despite regularly causing disproportionate losses to Soviet tank units (which was more due to personnel superiority than to mechanical superiority of tanks as evidenced on numerous occasions when elite crews in Panther and Tiger I tanks defeated superior numbers of technically superior Joseph Stalin II tanks), Panther and Tiger units were too few to change anything. The few tanks available were constantly in combat. And this, when coupled with already less than good mechanical reliability of these tanks, meant that by mid-1944 more Panther and Tiger tanks were undergoing repairs and maintenance than were available for combat duties.

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On more than one occasion, tanks that were ready for transport to repair yards were blown up and abandoned when the Soviets overran railway stations and collection points. Recovering Tiger I tanks was exceedingly difficult due to their large weight. Very often 3-or-more were required to tow single Tiger. It was not unusual for Tigers to tow damaged comrades out of battle (effectively, 2 kills with a single stone).

The Soviet T-34 is held by military historians to be best tank of World War II. That is not without reason. It was crudely designed which made it easy to produce in large quantities and easy to maintain. Sloppy tolerances meant that even when German tanks became frozen in mud or ice, T-34 kept rolling. Its wide tracks allowed it to move over very heavy terrains be it mud or swamp. Its sloped armor meant that the short cannon of original Panzer IV was incapable of penetrating it whereas T-34 itself was equipped with high-velocity 76.2 and later an 85 mm cannon. Even in a one-on-one slugfest comparison, it was superior to all German tanks save for Panther and Tiger.

Yet despite its undeniable superiority to German tanks available for Operation Barbarossa and the fact that over 3.000 were available in late 1941, it did not have much impact early in fighting. The reasons were wrong tactical employment which had T-34s being employed individually and often without infantry cover resulting in them being destroyed by engineers. German air superiority which meant that Stukas (operating closely with ground forces) were often available to blow them up; undertrained crews. Lack of recovery vehicles available to recover damaged tanks. Speed of German advance. Lack of coordination between tanks due to few radios available. And the gunner was also tank commander. As a result, 2,300 T-34s and 900 KVIs were lost in 1941.

Even later, German crew superiority meant that Panzer IV F2 and later models at least enjoyed exchange superiority in combat against T-34 tanks. In 1942, 6,600 T-34s were lost as well as 1,200 KV tanks. Despite the only German weapon capable of destroying T-34 at long range from June 1941 to September 1942 was the 8.8 cm Flak 36, 3/4 of T-34s were destroyed by standard issue 5 cm cannons.

In 1943, the Panther appeared (Tiger was in service from late 1942) and Germans still achieved 3-to-1 kill ratio in tracked AFVs destroying 23,500 Soviet AFVs including 14,700 T-34s, 1,300 heavy tanks, and 6,400 light tanks. In 1944 despite deploying T-34/85, IS-2 heavy tanks, ISU-122, and ISU-152 assault guns, the Soviets lost 23,700 tracked AFVs of which 2,200 were light tanks and 58% losses were T-34s.

So why was it credited with winning a war? Aside from being reliable which meant that T-34s could easily penetrate deep behind German lines and cut off supply lines, destroy depos, and generally wreak havoc, it was very simple which allowed Soviets to produce a total of 64,549 T-34s with total output of tracked AFVs being 109,815 fully tracked AFVs plus 11,900 being received via Lend Lease. Germany produced 27,769 tanks (including 612 command tanks and 232 flame tanks) as well as 10,550 assault guns, 7,831 tank destroyers, and 3,738 assault and SPA AFVs for a total of 49,888 fully tracked AFVs. At the other side of the ocean, the United States produced 49,234 M1 Shermans and 10,613 M-10, M-18, and M-36 tank destroyers.

Tank destroyers were a very effective weapon in both German and Allied arsenal. The German ones were the Panzerjager I, Marder II, Marder III and IV based on Panzer I-IV chassis; Stug-III based on Panzer III chassis; heavier Jagdpanther and Jagdtiger based on Panther and Tiger I chassis; and Nashorn and Elephant. Unlike relatively multipurpose tanks, these were designed solely to destroy armored vehicles. Panzerjager I was ineffective due to s design that limited visibility, high silhouette, and relatively weak gun which while very precise lacked necessary punch to penetrate armor of tanks such as the T-34 at combat range. The situation was somewhat better when using tungsten ammo.

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Marder I, II, and III were cheap, very reliable, and packed a large punch. Marder I was converted from French Lorraine artillery tractors, FCM36 light tanks, and Hotchkiss H-39 light tanks. They were armed with the 7.5 cm PaK 40/1 L/46 anti-tank gun. While their open top made them vulnerable to indirect fire and infantry ambushes, it also allowed for excellent visibility which made it easy to spot enemy tanks and maneuver into position (German tanks commanders, especially those in Tigers, preferred to watch out of open hatch for that reason despite danger for themselves).

Marder II was based on the Panzer II chassis. 576 Marder IIs were produced and another 75 converted from existing tanks. Marder III was based on Pzkfw 38(t). 1,562 were produced and another 194 converted from existing tanks. All versions of Marder II and III proved very effective against enemy tanks and other armored vehicles. Marder III in particular was very effective against Matilda tanks in North Africa and was thought by British forces to be a self-propelled version of Flak 8.8 cm gun.

StuG-III, while intended as assault gun, was widely implemented as a tank destroyer. In that role its low silhouette made it easy to camouflage and difficult to find. By 1944 StuGs have destroyed 20.000 enemy tanks. They were also cheaper and faster to produce than tanks. While the Panzer III cost 103,200 RM, StuG III cost 82,500 RM. For comparison, the Panzer IV cost 103,500 RM, Panther 117,000 Rm. and Tiger I 250,000 Rm (25,.000 Rm is ~$1,300,000 USD when adjusted for inflation).

Nashorn, while having thin armor and high silhouette, had a very good cannon, was relatively light, and very mobile. Its tungsten-carbide round could penetrate 190 mm or RHA at 30 degree angle of impact at 1.000 meters making the Nashorn capable of penetrating most or all Soviet tanks at standard combat distances (500-1.000 meters). When combined with excellent mobility, it made the Nashorn a very dangerous opponent to enemy tanks.

U.S. tank destroyers likewise proved very effective against German tanks. The M-10 suffered from very slow turret traverse speed. But this was not as important as it may sound due to the vehicle itself being very mobile (German tank destroyers did not have turret). The M-36 (a M-10 follow-up) mounted a better cannon and turret. Standard tactics for both tank destroyers were to exploit the Panther’s and Tiger’s slow turret rotation speed and hit them from sides even though the M-36 was capable of destroying both even from front at relatively long distances. Some units achieved kill:loss ratios against German heavy tanks that were reminiscent of what these same tanks achieved against Russian tanks. At maximum speed of just under 100 kph, the M-18 Hellcat tank destroyer is actually faster than any modern MBT which served them well in combat.

Germans also deployed U-boats. Unlike in World War I, these only hunted large prey. It was beyond them to attack small fishing vessels. From September 1939 to December 1941, 1,020 ships were sunk by submarines compared to 66 submarines lost. Ships sunk included an aircraft carrier and a battleship.

During the entire War, 1,154 German submarines sank 3,500 merchant vessels totaling 14 million tons of shipping. Around 70% of all shipping lost at a cost of 757 submarines. The 5 most successful sank 1.72 million tons of shipping. A further 175 warships were sank including 9 capital ships. If Germany had enough dive bombers or surface units to force convoys to disperse, these attacks would have been far more damaging at far lower cost. And had German submarines received snorkels earlier, the U.S. would not have been able to transport ground troops to Great Britain.

The Type XXI submarine had 6 torpedo tubes in the bow which could be reloaded faster than Type VIIC could reload a single tube thanks to hydraulic reload system. This allowed it the ability to fire 18

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torpedoes in under 20 minutes. Ind it could travel submerged at 5 knots for 2-or-3 days before having to recharge batteries. This took 5 hours with snorkel. Its sprint speed when submerged was faster than its surface speed and it had submerged range of 550 kilometers (25,000 when surfaced). A fleet of these submarines broke through the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap in 1945 annihilating a fleet of ASW (anti-submarine warfare) boats awaiting them.

They were cheap, too. While Tirpitz cost 181.6 million Rm fully outfitted and had a crew of 2,608, Type VII C cost 4.8 million Rm and had a crew of 52. On October 14, 1939 U-47 crept into Scapa Flow and sank old battleship HMS Royal Oak with loss of 833 out of 1.200 crewmembers. Luckily for the British, more modern units were not present as they left port on 8th October with battleships sailing to Loch Ewe rather than returning to Scapa Flow after unsuccessful sortie (the goal of sortie was to catch Gneisenau, Koln, and their destroyer escorts). The reason for the British decision was low-level Luftwaffe reconnaissance flight on October 12 which British (correctly) interpreted as a prelude to air attack.

U-47's attack, while very successful on its own, was even more successful in proving to Hitler damage that could be done by U-boats. But the British did not leave favor unreturned. In September 1943, UK midget submarines placed four 2-ton charges under Tirpitz’s hull crippling it for 2 months.

U.S. submarines also performed well. In the Pacific, U.S. submarines (operating under rules of unrestricted submarine warfare) sank 1,314 merchant ships totaling 5,320,094 tons thus starving Japanese industry and military of badly-needed supplies and 201 naval ships totaling 540,192 tons. These included 4 fleet carriers, 1 battleship, 4 light carriers, 3 heavy and 8 light cruisers, 43 destroyers and 23 submarines. Ships sank by submarines accounted for 48% of all Japanese ships sank and 55% in tonnage.

Submarines accounted for more Japanese aircraft carriers than air power did. 201 submarines were built during the War adding to 87 already present. At the same time, one British battleship, one battlecruiser and one aircraft carrier, two Japanese super-battleships and several other capital ships, and several U.S. capital ships were sunk by air power or combination of air power and submarine attacks (such as USS Yorktown which was disabled by dive bombers and then sunk by submarine, I-56). In January 1943, USS Wahoo sneaked into Wewak harbor, sank a destroyer, and left. The next day, it sank entire 4-ship convoy headed for the harbor.

Yet despite these successes, U.S. submarines never composed more than 2% of the fleet in cost and personnel terms. It should be noted that when the COs of submarines left the boat, scores went with them, not with crew left behind. The most successful 15% COs accounted for more than half ships sunk and submarines under their command were 3 times as likely to return safely from patrol than submarines under remaining 85%.

During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, one of 5 midget submarines managed to penetrate torpedo nets and launch 2 torpedoes at battleships Oklahoma and West Virginia. The Oklahoma capsized.

Despite myth about aircraft carrier supremacy, it was submarines and land-based aircraft deployed at island air bases that were decisive in the U.S. victory against Japan. In fact, ground-based aircraft sank 688 ships totaling 1,592,482 tons and carrier-based aircraft sank 520 ships totaling 2,101,477 tons, far less than submarines did.

The USS Ranger in Atlantic, meanwhile, was busy launching Army aircraft from its flight deck such as the P-38, P-40, and P-47. The primary value of aircraft carriers is performing air superiority and

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close air support missions as former DoD director of air warfare Chuck Myers wrote. But even more important was escort of convoys and anti-submarine warfare (Japan never built any submarine as advanced as Type XXI). Yet President Roosevelt had to order the US Navy to convert merchant ships to escort carriers. Japan and Germany never took advantage of deficiencies of submarines used during the war and thus failed to build up ASW capabilities such as escort carriers

In short, had Germany produced reliable and relatively cheap weapons instead of “superior” imagination-catching but unreliable and complex weapons, it would have had greater numbers of more useful weapons on its disposal. Instead of 25,000 useless heavy bombers and 6,000 equally useless V-2 rockets as well as 5,987 Panther, 1.347 Tiger I, and 492 Tiger II tanks, Germany could have produced 125,000 additional single-seat fighters and dive bombers as well as 68,000 additional Panzer IV tanks (in addition to ca 7,000 long cannon Panzer IVs produced) or 100,000 additional single-seat fighters and dive bombers and 11,.000 additional Panzer IV tanks.

Even if these numbers are cut into one-half or to one-quarter (to compensate for maintenance and fueling costs), they would still have meant massive increase in Wehrmacht’s military effectiveness. The situation was similar for infantry weapons. While the MG-34 and MG-42 were highly effective weapons, they harmed German warfighting capability by delaying introduction of new semi-automatic and assault rifles. In their case, the choice was doctrinal and bureaucratic but no less harmful for that. It should be noted that MG-42 is simpler and more reliable than MG-34 and also has higher rate of fire but is less accurate.

The key to German early successes were personnel and organizational superiority over its opponents. Whereas the Allies had highly centralized command and uncoordinated services, Germany had built Blitzkrieg on close cooperation between various components of armed forces. The best example of this is invasion of Norway where despite bickering of questionably competent Reichs Marshall Goering which led to lack of unified command structure, the Luftwaffe closely cooperated with Heer and Kriegsmarine.

Korean War

150 B-29s flew 1.000 sorties in 3 years accomplishing nothing and loosing 107 aircraft. For the same cost, 1,200 P-47d could have been used preventing a rout of UN forces by the Chinese. B-29s proved useless in both strategic bombing, close air support, and deep interdiction roles. In May 1952, electric plants were added to target list. The U.S. Air Force stated that with heavy bombers, it would need 29 days to shut down 50% of electricity production capability. In 4 days, the 5th Fighter Command with no help from the Strategic Bombing Command (fortunately) managed to shut down 90% of electric power plants.

500 Korean MiG-15s failed to defeat 90 US F-86s. Later, 1,300 MiG-15s also failed to defeat 200 F-86s. The main reason for that was USAF's pilot superiority. The secondary reason was the F-86's advantage in roll and pitch rates due to then-new hydraulic control system. Other parameters were similar. This allowed the F-86 to transit quickly between maneuvers. The and F-86 achieved a 10-to-1 exchange rate against MiG-15s although against experienced Russian pilots it was closer to 1-to-1. 4.8% of pilots achieved 48.6% of kills. Both the F-86 and MiG-15 have been known to survive heavy damage. Experienced F-86 pilots went back to US to train new pilots.

The Korean War has also shown that exchange ratio decreases as total number of aircraft in the air increases. Furthermore, larger formations have worse exchange ratios compared to smaller ones. Thus fighters should not fly in squadrons (12 fighters per squadron) or flights (4 fighters) but in pairs. Aside

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from improving flexibility and increasing number of formations available, it allows for covering more ground, better mutual support between formations, and better ability to concentrate rapidly if needed.

The conclusion is thus that advantage of Quantity over Quality holds true not only for weapons but also for organization.

Vietnam War era

In Vietnam, the U.S. used F-105 Thunderchief nuclear bombers, F-4 Phantom bomber interceptors, and F-100 Super Sabre fighters in air superiority and strategic bombing roles. Against the MiG-21, these were hopeless. NVAF MiG-21s shot down 320 US aircraft including 110 F-4s against a loss of 54 MiG-21s. The F-104 Starfighter and F-105 performed about as well as F-4 although the kill:loss ratio improved after domestic "Red Flag" and "Top Gun" courses were established.

From 23 August 1967 to 5 February 1968, MiG-21 pilots racked up a 16-to-1 kill advantage. It should be noted that the F-104 and F-105 often flew as bombers with F-4s providing escort. When the B-52 was sent to bombard North Vietnam cities, 15 were lost in 724 sorties. But in South Vietnam, 1944-designed A-1 Skyraider propeller attack aircraft carried out effective Close Air Support.

2 missiles were used. The AIM-9D WVR Sidewinder IR missile and the AIM-7D/E BVR Sparrow radar-guided missile. The AIM-9D cost $14,000 USD, far less than $44,000 USD that was paid for the AIM-7 (not inflation-adjusted). Yet it performed far better. Despite both missiles being used primarily from visual range, the AIM-9 had a Pk of 15% as opposed to 8% for AIM-7. All AIM-7 models had a multi-target centroid problem (i.e., homing at a point between the 2 fighters that were close enough).

Strategic bombing of North Vietnamese cities proved useless despite 3 times larger tonnage than what was dropped on Germany. And even when redirected to battlefield interdiction, heavy bombers and fast jets achieved very little. But the cheap rugged turboprop A-1 Skyraider proved far more valuable, preventing many US outposts and units from being overrun.

On the infantry side of things, there were 2 candidates for the US rifle: $75 AR-15 and $295 M-14. The M-14 was a battle rifle, long-ranged semi-automatic derivative of M1 Garand whereas the AR-15 was a new design of assault rifle. The M-14 proved virtually useless due to its weight and slow rate of fire so the US military was forced to deliver the AR-15 for field testing. It performed outstandingly being lighter, more reliable, and more accurate. Soldiers requested its delivery in larger numbers. But what they got instead was the heavier, more complex, “more capable”, “militarized” (that is, more expensive) M-16 which was outperformed by the cheap, rugged, reliable Soviet AK-47 (itself influenced by German StG-44, the world’s first true assault rifle).

During the Arab-Israeli wars of 1963 and 1973, the huge pilot quality advantage of Israelis secured them exchange ratio of 20-to-1. Israeli pilots preferred the French Mirage III referring to the F-4 as B-4. The reason stated was Mirage’s smaller size and better agility. Two-thirds of kills were by guns or by guns supported by IR missile launches in order to force a hard break. General Hod stated later than on-board radar was “essentially useless”.

In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Pakistani Air Force had 96 Mark VI Sabres equipped with Sidewinders plus 75 Mirage IIIs, F-104s, and MiG-19s. Pakistani had advantage in training. The Sabres achieved 6-to-1 exchange ratios over MiG-21s, Sn-7s, and Hunters. The only Indian aircraft that was able to successfully engage Sabres was the small and cheap subsonic-only Folland Gnat which was smallest fighter in the world. Gnats killed several Sabres without suffering any losses.

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Falklands War

During the Falklands war, the British sub threat neutralized the Argentine surface navy after the Belgrano was sunk (by a World War II unguided torpedo). However, a poorly-maintained Argentine diesel-electric submarine easily penetrated British ASW defenses (the best in NATO), attacked, and then eluded 72 hours of ASW search. HMS Sheffield, meanwhile, was found and sunk by an Exocet missile because of failure to shut down radar.

Fighters with dumb bombs proved very hazardous for British ships. Of 5 ships sunk and 12 damaged, only two were by Exocet missile hits. 10 Harriers were lost in 200 sorties although the British only admitted 4 lost to guns and 1 to SAM. At the same time, Harriers achieved 74% Pk for IR missiles shooting down 20 aircraft in 27 launches whereas Argentine BVR Matra Super 530 missiles all missed. The reason for high Sidewinder’s Pk was that Argentine pilots were using wrong tactics (“rotating the vulnerable cone” instead of trying to evade missile physically). [StealthSkater note: also the newer model Sidewinders were capable of front-on locking rather than having to position the aircraft behind the enemy's tail.]

In order to defend against missiles, UK ships mounted as many light AA guns as could be found. For Argentina, the most important early warning/search sensor was a Boeing 707 loaded with passive receivers.

1990s and later

Even after Vietnam, the USAF didn’t learn from mistakes. It was forced to accept good dogfighters. But even those were expensive technology-loaded BVR F-15 Eagles and “multirole” (that is, mostly bombing) F-16 Falcons. The only aircraft the USAF did not screw up was the Close Air Support A-10 Warthog. But its production ended after only 715 were produced.

In Gulf War I, the F-117 stealth Nighthawk flew 1,250 sorties out of 41,000 total making 2,000 laser bomb attacks with 15 strikes being made in Baghdad on first night. It proved perfectly survivable in SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Defenses) mission as did “Wild Weasel” jamming aircraft and other non-stealth platforms which also engaged air defenses. But of 15 SAM batteries attacked by the F-117, 13 continued to operate. Radar-guided SAMs made 20% of their kills in the last week.

Iraqi Republican Guards divisions suffered very little damage to high-altitude bombing. But when Saddam sent significant elements of his army into Saudi Arabia, two A-10s and a single AC-130 destroyed 58 targets in 71-vehicle convoy. Later, two A-10s killed 23 tanks in single encounter and the other two destroyed 20 Scud launchers.

In the Kosovo war, NATO flew 36,000 sorties. Only 3 of 80 radar-missile batteries were destroyed, 387 enemy combatants killed, and 1,400 civillians killed. The Yugoslav army launched 845 radar SAMs killing two2 F-117s and one F-16. The F.16 flew 4.500 sorties and the F-117 1.300 sorties.

In Gulf and Kosovo wars, night-flying F-117s suffered 2 losses from 2.600 sorties, one mission-killed and one shot down. B-2 Spirit stealth bombers flew 49 sorties in Kosovo war and no sorties in Gulf War I and suffered no losses. Day-flying A-10 CAS Warthogs suffered 4 losses in 12,400 sorties (3 losses to man-portable IR missiles and 1 loss to SAM). The A-10 had 95.7% in-commission rate. The F-16 suffered 6 losses in 17,840 sorties (most sources state more than 5 F-16 losses in Gulf War I, but they count some aircraft twice).

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In total, 41.404 sorties were flown in Gulf War I, 1.250 were flown by stealth aircraft. In Kosovo war, 38.004 sorties were flown, with 1.350 flown by stealth aircraft. Yet while non-stealth aircraft suffered 15 losses in both wars (1 per 5.294 sorties), stealth aircraft suffered 2 losses (1 per 1.300 sorties). In short, non-stealth aircraft were 4 times as survivable as stealth aircraft. Loss rate was 1 per 1.300 sorties for F-117, 1 per 3.100 sorties for A-10 and 1 per 3.000 sorties for F-16. As it can be seen, stealth reduced number of aircraft and per-aircraft sortie rate while not improving survivability.

In Afghanistan, A-10s proved able (when not operating under altitude restrictions) to provide Close Air Support (CAS) to troops on the ground even in complete absence of radio communication. In one case, A-10s saved troops and escorted them 6 hours until they reached the base.

Gulf War II proved no different than Gulf War I. USAF dropped 1,500 precision bombs on the first 2 days. 34 Tomahawk missiles and 2 F-117s failed to assassinate Saddam. Yet the ground campaign toppled Saddam in 21 days.

While U.S. leadership proved to be utterly incompetent (which may not have been apparent when compared to “competence” of Iraqi leadership), soldiers at the tactical level performed excellently. The reason for this is that while soldiers are taught in spirit of Blitzkrieg tactical-level improvisation, generals think like engineers and thus could not adapt to changing conditions.

Still, some have repeated observation made by General Schwartzkopf after Gulf War I. Had Iraqi and U.S. militaries swapped weapons, the results would have been the same. It comes to no surprise. Despite generals’ incompetence, initiative by troops at tactical level shielded soldiers from full brunt of its effects. At the opposite side, Iraqis with demoralized troops, incompetent commanders, and centralized command system proved inflexible and unadaptable. This brought about strategic paralysis of Iraqi forces which was actually responsible for overwhelming Coalition victory as opposed to claims that Coalition’s technological superiority was a decisive factor.

Highly-complex helicopters proved ineffective and vulnerable. In second Gulf War, 103 helicopters and 18 fixed-wing aircraft were lost.

Post-Gulf War II, the U.S. assumption that it can easily win with smaller quantity of higher quality units has (as one journalist put it) “bogged down in an urban attritional slog”.

Tests and Exercises

During the 1965 Featherduster test, the F-86H Sabre achieved lopsided superiority over the F-100 Super Sabre, F-104 Starfighter, F-105 Thunderchief, F-4 Phantom, and the F-5 Freedom Fighter. Even when tactics were developed to counter the F-86's extreme maneuverability, only the smaller F-5 managed to achieve a 1-to-1 kill/loss ratio. Most kills were due to surprise with the F-5 and the F-86 being similarly hard to detect.

In AIMVAL/ACEVAL, the F-14 Tomcat and F-15 Eagle scored around a 1-to-1 exchange ratio against the F-5. After engagement rules were “adjusted” to suit modern fighters better, the F-15 achieved a 2-to-1 exchange ratio and the F-14 got slightly above 1-to-1.

All engagements were 4-v-4 and 8-v-8. Pilots that were replaced in F-5 were up to full proficiency after 2 or 3 weeks whereas F-15 replacements were still learning after 3 months. In 1-v-1 situations, the F-14's rear operator was help. But in many-vs-many he overloaded pilot with inputs. Ground control

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assistance was also more important to complex fighters and off-bore missiles improved results only slightly.

In Naval exercises, diesel-electric submarines often achieve lopsided kill ratios. Especially when skippers deviate from script or script allows deviation. During the 1981 NATO exercise “Ocean Venture”, a 1960s vintage Canadian diesel submarine “sank” carrier USS America without being detected once and another “sank” the USS Forrestal.

In 1989 NATO exercise Northern Star, Dutch diesel submarine Zwaardvis stalked and “sank” USS America. In RIMPAC 1996, Chilean diesel submarine Simpson “sank” the carrier USS Independence.

In 1999 NATO exercise JTFEX/TMDI99, Dutch diesel submarine Walrus “sank” carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, American exercise command ship USS Mount Whitney, a cruiser, several destroyers and frigates, and nuclear fast attack submarine USS Boise.

During RIMPAC 2000, Australian Collins class diesel submarine HMAS Waller “sank” two US fast attack nuclear submarines and got dangerously close to the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln before being “sunk” itself. During 2001 Operation Tandem Thrust, HMAS Waller “sank” two US amphibious assault ships in waters between 60 and 110 meters deep while an unnamed Chilean diesel sub “took out” nuclear fast attack submarine USS Montpelier – twice.

In October 2002, HMAS Sheehan successfully hunted down and “killed” nuclear fast attack submarine USS Olympia near Hawaii. In September 2003, several Collins class subs “sank” two US fast attack submarines and a carrier. In October same year, another Collins class “sank” nuclear fast attack submarine. In 2005, Swedish Gotland-class submarine “sank” the USS Ronald Reagan.

Modern Weapons

Much like Hitler, many today (especially in the United States) are obsessed with “invulnerable” “do it all” superweapons. But reality as always is different. The simpler something is, the more likely it is to work. How complex modern weapons have become is shown best by the fact that the U.S. DoD has placed an emergency order for cruise missiles only several days into war on Kosovo and that European NATO countries started running out of ammunition just few days into intervention in Libya.

There is political reason for this. The World (especially the West) looks for what the U.S. does and then emulates it as the U.S. are perceived as the primary military power in the World. But the U.S. Military is inwardly focused with good mechanical training but lacking comprehension of why things are done as opposed to how to do them.

For example, submariners are taught far more about the nuclear reactor of a submarine than how to use submarine effectively in combat. Promotion depends on social skills, politics, and ambition. As a result, most senior US military leaders never learned how to think in their own profession but stick to things that have been drilled into them despite all evidence to the contrary. Signs are that many other Western militaries may be similarly deficient.

F-15 Eagle

Due to the F-15's problems with flameoff (which meant that F-15s had to stay in afterburner), F-5Es frequently managed to run F-15s out of fuel during AIMVAL/ACEVAL tests. The F-15 also has a low fuel fraction which certainly didn’t help things. Other than that, it is a relatively capable aircraft but very expensive.

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F-16 Falcon

YF-16 was armed with Sidewinders, two M-39 20mm cannons, range-only radar, and computing gunsights for missiles and guns. It weighed 9,072 kg fully armed with a wing loading of 346.6 kg per square meter and a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.18. There was potential to reduce its weight between prototype and production stage to 8,392 kg which would give a wing loading of 321 kg per square meter and increase TWR to 1.28.

It is also not likely that it would cost more than $20-25 million USD flyaway if sold new. When adjusted to inflation, its original cost works out to $16 million USD flyawa, and is actually most likely cost. If IRST and DRFM jammers are added, cost would go up to $18-20 million USD.

Even as delivered, YF-16 was the finest air superiority aircraft in the World and would be among better fighter aircraft even today.

But production F-16 went in opposite direction: nose was widened to accommodate radar, which reduced maximum angle of attack to 26,6 degrees due to lateral stability issues, preventing it from achieving maximum turn performance; weight increased by 25%, maintenance man hours increased by over 25%, and cost increased by 67%. End result was costlier, less capable aircraft that could fly less often – F-16A costs 30 million USD, and even more complex F-16C costs 70 million USD.

Despite all that, F-16 in Israeli service achieved as many air-to-air kills as F-15; yet it was primarily used for ground attack, while F-15 was primarily used for air superiority.

Draken

Out of all Cold War era European fighters, the Saab 35 Draken was the most difficult opponent faced by F-16. It has small size, low wing loading, good TWR, high lift coefficient, good fuel fraction, and good cruise persistence typical of single-engine delta-winged planes. It may have been a better dogfighter than the F-15 Eagle. But it had complex electronics.

Its successor -- the Saab 37 Viggen -- was the first fighter to use canards. Other than that, however, it was most similar to the F-4 Phantom. The Viggen is estimated to cost $40-45 million USD flyaway est. if sold new at present (when compared to YF-16, it indicates YF-16's cost as being around $20 million USD).

M1A2 tank

Compared to the M-60, the M-1 is 3 times as expensive and has availability rate of 45% as opposed to the M-60's 85%. In short, effective force size is 6 times as large for the M-60 as it is for the M-1.

The M-1 needs 1 hour of refueling every 3 hours and 1 hour of filter cleaning every 2 hours. Its machine guns cannot sweep down low enough to clear roadside ditches.

Both tanks can be penetrated by modern anti-tank missiles and some types of armor-piercing projectiles such as APFSDS. The M-1 is inferior in short-track acceleration but superior in long-track one.

Considering the actual usage of tanks in the war, it is obvious that the M1 is an inferior weapon to the M-60. In the Gulf War, a huge part of Saddam’s army escaped because M1s broke down too often.

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When everything is taken into account, the M1 is most similar to the Tiger I. An amazing weapon that is very expensive and not very useful because it ignores some basic facts of warfare.

Stealth aircraft

Most talked-about stealth aircraft in the West are the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. The F-22 costs $250 million FY-2011 USD flyaway and $425 million FY-2012 USD unit procurement. The F-35A (the cheapest of the 3 model variants) costs $197 million FY-2012 USD and around $300 million USD unit procurement. Their costs are being misrepresented by using outdated values. In 2010, each F-22 cost $61,000 USD to operate per hour. Yet they are nothing special.

Being stealth aircraft, they are based on promise of radar-based BVR (beyond visual range) combat. But this promise simply cannot be counted on as against maneuvering opponents with no ECM, BVR missiles achieved a Pk (probability of kill) that was never above 10% (and even that only from visual range). At actual BVR distances, Pk was 6.6% which means that an F-22 with 8 missiles carries enough missiles for a Pk of 53% (half of what it should be for BVR to be decisive against capable opponent at best). And even that Pk does not take ECM (electronic countermeasures) into account nor the fact that capable opponents will know that missile is inbound from the start, thus lowering Pk considerably.

Further, stealth does not mean visual invisibility. Rather, t means reduced detection range against some types of radars. Longwave search radars can detect stealth aircraft at very long distances as can other sensors such as IRST.\

[StealthSkater note: however, detecting an aircraft is different from achieving a radar lock-on to guide a missile. If the stealth aircraft can shoot first when it has a lock on an enemy aircraft, the odds are in its favor. Now if he misses and both aircraft close to within visual range (WVR), then the odds shift to the more maneuverable aircraft with IR-guided missiles. What is really needed is a passive radar lock-on. That's like seeing a light glow on the ground but you can't see the light source when you look. Or a track-while-scan built into the AAM missile.

In addition, I read the following. I don't know if it's 100% valid, however: " Stealth is very expensive and Russia and China are shifting to radar that can detect stealth

Shaping provides 90 percent of the stealth of the invisibility cloak of a stealth aircraft with the remaining 10 percent coming from the RAM coating. The operational doctrine of the F-22 is based on the F-22 flying around without its radar on and not making any other electronic emissions either. At the same time, it is vacuuming up the electronic emissions of enemy aircraft, triangulating their position and then pouncing at a time of its choosing.

The World has moved on from that. Stealth as practiced by the F-22 and F-35 is optimized on radar in the X band from 7.0 to 11.2 gigahertz. Detection in other parts of the electromagnetic spectrum has improved a lot over the last 20 years. Chief of these is Infrared Search and Track (IRST) which enables an F-35 to be detected from its engine exhaust from over 60 miles away.

The latest iteration of the Su-27 Flanker family -- the Su-35 -- has IRST and L band radar on its wings. L band and lower frequency radars can see stealthy aircraft over 100 miles away. So an Su-35 can see a F-35 well before the F-35 can detect it. Stealth as an end in itself has outlived its usefulness and maintaining that RAM coating is killing the budget for no good reason." ]

An equally bad folly of stealth fighters is their reliance on the assumption of even BVR combat being radar-based. If the enemy uses passive sensors only and stealth aircraft uses radar, the assumed

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advantage of stealth in surprise is reversed. Any radar can be detected by modern RWRs long before it detects even largest-RCS fighters, facilitating completely passive launch of IR-based BVR missiles assuming that IFF issue is solved (and if your aircraft are not using radar, it is easy). Aircraft carrying such missiles need not be large and complex either. The RWR (radar-warning receiver) can also detect when radar has locked on which means that not only missile launch is imminent but also that the fighter in question is blind to other threats that are beyond visual range unless equipped with IRST (infrared search and track).

Neither are stealth aircraft invisible to radar. From a few angles, F-22 slips past. But from most angles, in words of one Senate staffer: it “lights up like the Budweiser blimp.” Not that it is likely to be important anyway as both the F-22 and the enemy are unlikely to use radar due to problems discussed in the previous paragraph. Radar stealth requirements have meanwhile increased its visual and IR signature to far higher levels than F-16s or even F-15s. As Col. Everest Riccioni put it: “The only way to make the F-22 stealthy is to tear the eyes out of enemy pilots’ heads”. [StealthSkater note: from what I've read, decades of determining optimum attack angles to minimize radar lock-ons have been implemented into complex algorithms of the F-35 and F-22.]

On one of 2 most important characteristics of weapon system – reliability – the F-22 is a disappointment with pilots getting only 8-to-10 hours of air training per month. The aircraft itself suffers from myriad of technical problems. Considering that history shows user skill to be the dominant characteristic deciding performance of a weapon, this lack of training does not bode well for the F-22 in a real war.

One F-22 can only support 0.5 sorties per day (compare to the F-117's 0.7 sorties per day which is also likely to be – at best – F-35's sortie generation performance and F-16C's 1.2 sorties per day). When compared to proposed YF-16 II, it is at huge numerical disadvantage. 24 F-22s cost $6.3 billion USD and can support 12 sorties per day. For the same amount of money, 349 YF-16 IIs supporting 419-1,047 sorties per day could be bought (a 35:1 numerical advantage at very lowest). One of reasons is that stealth coating is very hard to maintain and is vulnerable to rain. The other is simply a complexity of systems required for radar-based combat.

But the cult of stealth carefully promoted in the West by the U.S. Air Force and uncritical media is used as a marketing tool. In many circles, it is being treated as “I win” button for any tactical aircraft, asserting that aircraft with inferior pilot, weapons, and flight characteristics is going to emerge victorious just because it is harder to detect by monostatic radars operating in X-L band range. Yet to other types of sensors and other radar bands, stealth aircraft are as detectable as “legacy” aircraft.

F-15E Strike Eagle

When compared to the A-10 Warthog, it has faster ground attack speed and greater turn radius but no 30 mm cannon. It costs 5 times as much as the A-10, has 1/5 the loiter time and 1/2 sorties per day, and has no armor protection. While the A-10 can take off from a 1,500 m long dirt strip runway, the F-15 needs a 3,700 m long concrete air strip.

UCAV

High-technology drones are now expected to provide both quality and quantity replacing manned aircraft in both air-to-air combat and strike missions. But they provide neither.

As I have shown in another article, drones are more complex, maintenance-intensive, and expensive than well-designed fighter aircraft. At the same time, far higher losses will be experienced due to

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increased complexity. Yet due to control lag and bad situational awareness, they are incapable of effectively engaging manned fighter aircraft.

Nuclear Submarine

While a typical AIP submarine costs $100-500 million USD, the typical nuclear submarine costs $1-3 billion USD. AIP subs generally provide submerged (AIP) endurance of 14-30 days and total endurance of 45 to 90 days as AIP systems cannot yet replace oxygen-dependant diesel engine. Nuclear subs, on the other hand, typically have endurance (submerged or not) of 90-100 days, limited by the food storage for the crew. Gotland-class has submerged endurance of 14 days at 5 knots while Type-212 submarine has submerged endurance of over 30 days at 4 knots,and can cruise for ca 3,000 miles.

While nuclear submarines being faster are more suited for open ocean combat against enemy submarines, smaller AIP submarines are far less detectable. In closed shallow waters like found in western Pacific, a group of AIP submarines can easily outmaneuver and kill a nuclear submarine or any surface vessel.

It should be noted, however, that during World War II diesel submarines have achieved many kills even against fully-functioning warships cruising at high speeds despite having submerged speeds that were in single-digit knots and surface speeds far lower than those of contemporary surface warships. Even in open waters, AIP submarines are deadly. Despite skewed setups, diesel-electric submarines have regularly punched way above their weight in exercises with a common result being single diesel-electric submarine sinking several surface ships and/or nuclear submarines.

In fact, a Chinese Song-class submarine shadowed the US aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk undetected before surfacing 5 miles from carrier on October 26, 2006. And it takes 5 years to build nuclear aircraft carrier. Battle group included attack submarine and ASW surface ships. After surfacing, the submarine was spotted by a routine flight of one of carrier group’s ASW aircraft. Andrew Cockburn noted that during Cold War exercises, crews of European diesel-electric submarines were more concerned about colliding with noisy US nuclear submarines running fast (and thus blind) than about the threat from surface ships.

As AIP submarines have eliminated one of only 2 “disadvantages” of diesel-electric submarines when compared to nuclear ones having an endurance of up to 30 days when submerged (90 days total), the only advantage of nuclear submarine remains its higher speed. However, in light of its higher cost ($1-3 billion USD vs $100-500 million USD for AIP sub), vulnerability, and more complex maintenance, its advantages are rather questionable. Already questionable performance advantage of nuclear submarines becomes even more so when one remembers that historically submarines were most often used for severing enemy supply lines.

More about nuclear and AIP submarines here. In the end, the U.S. ignorance of basic but mundane capabilities has led it to being dependent on allies for anti-mine warfare and provision of conventional undersea capabilities.

AH-64 Apache attack helicopter

While the Apache costs $60 million USD, a MH-6 Little Bird costs no more than $4.5 million USD. Little Bird can also easily be towed on truck and co-located with ground units, towed on trucks and trailers. Instead of using wannabe-A-10s from concrete air bases, the actual A-10 and Little Bird could be co-located with ground troops to provide superior Close Air Support capability. The Little Bird could act as a spotter for the A-10 Warthog CAS aircraft.

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Considering costs, $60 million USD paid for single Apache could buy 2 A-10s, 2 MH-6 Little Birds and 4 OV-10 – a several times better CAS capability. Further, the MH-6 can be configured so as to quickly transport troops (up to 6 passengers per helicopter) whereas the Apache cannot.

Stryker

An M-1126 Stryker combat vehicle costs $3.3 million USD per copy ($4.3 million with R&D) which goes even higher when add-ons (including slat armor) are considered. Yet they have been shown vulnerable to automatic arms fire and IEDs. Its 19 tons distributed over 8 wheels means that it cannot be used in some types of terrain that even 60-ton Abrams tanks have no trouble with. A single infantry company in Diyala lost 5 Strykers in less than a week. Canadians soon started using M113 MTVL Gavins,

Aside from being cheaper at $320,000 USD and more survivable, the M113 is also amphibious. Like all tracked vehicles when compared to similar-capability wheeled ones, the M113 exhibits smaller, lower silhouette, reduced volume, enhanced maneuverability, and better ballistic protection than Stryker. All of which translates into superior survivability as well as better mobility (4-6 times faster long-distance travel over sand and 2-3 times faster long-distance travel over wet Europe-type terrain).

While the M113 can achieve speeds of 120 kph on road and 42 kph cross-country, the Stryker’s official speed is 100 kph on road and 64 kph cross-country. But it gets stuck in bad terrain (mud, sand, etc) so often that in actual off-road conditions in all but easiest of terrains, the M113 will get to destination far faster than the Stryker (assuming that the Stryker even makes it). In fact, the Stryker is so bad that it managed to get itself stuck on a paved road (sewer was not covered… I guess that shit does happen. Not that it is the only danger to the Stryker’s mobility).

Its mobility in other areas is also bad. Only the latest C-130J transport plane can carry the Stryker due to its high weight. The M113 Gavin is not only transportable by any C-130 model but can also be deployed via parachute drop. Unlike the Stryker, it is also transportable by helicopters.

According to soldiers who serve in them, slat armor is only effective against about half of RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) attacks. At the same time, it adds 1 meter in width and 3 tons in weight to an already large and heavy vehicle. The Stryker is also incapable of using its theoretical maximum speed in practice as it risks overturning the vehicle even when on road. Slat armor makes it more top-heavy and thus even more unstable and speed-limited.

The Stryker is a maintenance nightmare. 9 tires-a-day are changed after failing due to additional weight of slat armor. The vehicle’s computers freeze up at critical moments or overheat in desert temperatures. Its grenade launcher fails to hit targets when vehicle is moving.

Its Remote Weapon System machine gun has a narrow field-of-view and only rotates very slowly. In contrast, manually-operated weapons of the M113 have far better coverage and far faster rotation speeds. Soldiers can also use personal weapons to shoot at high-up targets, something the Stryker’s RWS is incapable of.

All of this makes the Stryker more danger to soldiers inside it than to the opponents. In 2004, Strykers made up less than 2% of vehicles in Iraq and yet suffered 4% of casualties. More people died in 300 Strykers than in 1,700 Gavins. Since 4th generation warfare is all about morale and propaganda, having Strykers destroyed by cheap RPGs is definitely not a way to win it.

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BVR (radar-guided) missiles

An AIM-120D radar-guided AMRAAM costs $1,470,000 USD whereas the German IRIS-T heat-seeking missile costs $276,000 USD. With a maximum range of 160 kilometers as opposed to IRIS-T's 18,5 kilometers, it would appear to have a clear advantage. Reality, however, is something different.

BVR missiles never were effective. Their complexity made them both more expensive and less reliable while not providing significant range advantage. Most kills in Vietnam and all later wars happened from visual range. Yet the Pk against competent opponents with no ECM was never above 10% compared to 19% for IR missiles. The average Pk was 8.1% for BVR missiles and 15% for IR missiles.

With probability of kill against modern fighters being 0.86-1.46%, fighter aircraft would have to carry 68-116 missiles to achieve a single kill. At most, Pk may be 2-3% if Pk against aircraft with no ECM is still assumed as 8%, requiring 33-50 missiles. But even the largest modern fighters, Russian Flanker variants, can only carry up to 14 missiles for a combined Pk of 12% to 42%. Modern Western fighters can carry no more than 10 missiles which means that combined Pk of entire fighter's missile loadout would be between 8.6 and 30%.

As it can be seen, 11 AIM-120Ds cost $16 million USD and yet at best equalize Pk of 2 IRIS-T missiles costing $552.000 USD against a competent opponent. Even if only maneuvering performance of missile vs fighter is counted, 4 AIM-120Ds costing a total of $5.88 million USD would be required to equalize Pk of a single IRIS-T. From that, it can be easily seen that the AIM-120D is a less effective weapon.

For a Pk of 100% against a modern fighter, anywhere between 12 and 116 AIM-120Ds costing $17.6 to 170.5 million USD would be required. Yet such a fighter would need not to cost more than $18-22 million USD flyaway.

This is actually even worse for a BVR fighter than it seems. Jamming and simple noise can cut radar’s range to 30% of theoretical maximum. Fighters have a frontal RCS (radar cross section) between 1 and 5 m2 when loaded for AtA which gives a lock-on range of 50-290 kilometers. This means that it can only start locking on enemy at distance of 15-87 kilometers if jamming is present. Fighters are likely closing at combined speed of Mach 2 – 4 so they will reach each another in 11-128 seconds. As radar-guided missiles require 10-15 seconds of electronic acquisition for cooperative target, jamming means that fighters will get to merge before managing to lock on to each another. Even if that does not happen, they are unlikely to get more than few radar-guided missile shots. IR missiles are 5 times faster to lock on and harder to fool. Furthermore, an enemy can use emitted radar signals to target radar-using aircraft.

Using radar is equally suicidal for surface ships. During the Vietnam War, the USS Worden was accidentally attacked by Shrike missiles which homed in on and destroyed ship’s radar as well as disabling command center. In other examples, missiles successfully attacked US Marine units that did not shut down their radars.

Active radar can only detect targets in line of sight (exception being ground-based-only HF radars). Yet it itself can be detected from over the horizon. Furthermore, ships using radars at same time must use different frequencies to avoid interference, making them more easily detected. Thus surveillance should be carried out through combination of passive infrared and visual sensors.

Neither fighter nor ship radar can be shut down quickly.27

Nuclear Aircraft Carriers

When Adm. Hyman Rickover, a proponent of building nuclear-powered carriers, was asked in a Senate hearing how long those carriers would survive in a war with the Soviet Union, he replied: “About 2 days.”

Worse, they do not really provide greater force presence than even equal number of conventional carriers. In fact, the same number of conventional carriers can provide 10% greater force presence. And each can carry more aircraft than similarly-sized nuclear carrier, can deploy more quickly, and spend same amount of time on-station as both types carriers are limited by perishables (no matter how the U.S. Navy may want it, Star Trek replicators still don’t exist).

Losses in conventional carriers can be replaced far more quickly than nuclear carriers (in peacetime, nuclear carriers take 71% longer to construct than conventional ones) – 7.2 against 4.2 years between funding and commissioning. As proven in World War 2, construction time of conventional carrier can be reduced to one-third in case of massive war whereas such reduction in construction time of a nuclear carrier is questionable at best. A conventional carrier costs 10 times less to operate and retire than a nuclear carrier and takes 4.2 years to construct compared to 7d2 years for a nuclear carrier.

The result of US Navy’s reliance on highly complex ships is that part swapping (a.k.a. cannibalizing other ships) is standard procedure to keep fleet running. More than one-fifth of ships are not combat ready. And while Navy is planning to have ships that help maintain themselves, not everyone agrees. Smaller crews also mean lesser capability for damage control.

During days of Canadian carrier aviation, it was well known that HMCS Bonadventure could put more aircraft in the air than U.S. nuclear carriers. Carrier aviators are not any better than land-based ones while flying less capable aircraft. In early 1980s, the average Canadian pilot flew 300 hours per year compared to 160 hours for U.S. Navy aviators.

This probably had a lot to do with beatings inflicted on USN pilots in exercises. In USN-IAF exercise in 2000, Israeli F-16s squared off against (admittedly less capable) F-14s and F-18s “shooting down” 220 US aircraft while “loosing” only 20 of their own. Later, Chile air force pilots flying unsophisticated but nimble F-5s achieved a 10-to-1 kill exchange ratio against USN fighters.

On October 2000, Russian Su-24 and Su-27 aircraft approached USS Kitty Hawk, remaining undetected until they were virtually on top of the carrier.

Not that aircraft are the only danger. Just as important danger are submarines. And as Captain John L. Byron has noted, even noisy nuclear submarines have little difficulty in approaching strike range of nuclear carriers. To quote him: “Operating against a carrier is too easy. The carrier’s ASW protection often resembles Swiss cheese.”

In 2002 exercise Millenium Challenge, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper used small boats to destroy 16 U.S. ships including an aircraft carrier and 2 helicopter carriers. In display of cheating similar to what is often used by USAF to allow stealth aircraft such lopsided kill ratios, the U.S. Navy simply reactivated “destroyed” ships and continued the exercise as if “attack” never happened.

These failures in exercises, often happening despite rules that favor USN, indicate that training is far more important than hardware. A 2002 study by the RAND Corporation confirmed that U.S. Navy

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training in fighters, ASW aircraft, and surface ship ASW does not compare favorably with the training received by members of the French Navy and the British Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Also unlike British and French crews, U.S. Navy aviators do not maintain consistent readiness to go in to battle through the fiscal year.

LCS

The LCS (Littoral Combat Ship) was expected to be affordable. It isn’t. It was also expected to be survivable. It isn’t.

Neither should be surprising as even though LCS had better idea – modularity as opposed to “one-configuration-does-it-all” disasters – it is still too small to be truly multirole. And just the fact that it was designed to be stealth limits its affordability and maintainability.

Mines

Naval and anti-tank mines are cheap and effective. They can be constructed from fiberglass or plastic to make detection more difficult. By detonation system they can be contact, influence (subdivided into magnetic, acoustic, seismic, underwater electric potential, pressure and video mines based on type of sensors used), and command detonated mines. Mines are area/access denial systems and are static, however, so their effectiveness is not so much in denying access completely as much as forcing opponent to act in a more predictable way or delaying him from reaching time-critical objectives.

Moored naval mines can be armed with torpedoes, greatly increasing their reach. In that case, IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) becomes a problem. Limpet mines, however, are attached to ships by divers. These can disable or sink even a large warship. Some naval mines can be launched as torpedoes by submarines from large distances.

The problem with mines is that often large numbers are required to be effective and mines alone are almost worthless. They are most effective when used in choke points (such as El Alamein) but are not insurmountable obstacle even there. And if misdeployed, they can be easily circumvented.

Conclusions

As it can be seen, the Quality of weapons is overshadowed by their Quantity. And both are overshadowed by quality of troops using them. Definition of “quality” as “weapons’ superiority in one-on-one combat” is wrong. If analysis of weapon’s ability does not include its presence on the battlefield and its impact on user’s skill, it is useless.

Even a smaller force fighting with inferior weapons will usually win if it is better trained and more flexible at both tactical and strategic level. But a smaller force using superior weapons will only win against larger force if it has superior training if training is at similar level and numerical superiority of opposing force isn’t large or if disparity in weapons is fundamental and situation allows advantage to be exploited (squadron of A-10s against Napoleonic war dragoons or a dreadnought against 18 th century ship-of-the-line). This reality places emphasis on weapons’ quantity and even more its reliability. Both of these are achieved by austere design that must be based on objective analysis of realities of war.

For these reasons, military historians are far more important in analyzing likely success of a new weapon than engineers. Comparing weapons without understanding their usage through History is useless. Using just statistical comparison of technical characteristics, the Tiger tank would have been

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far superior tank to a T-34 or a Panzer IV. Yet even the man who designed rulebook of Blitzkrieg (at least where armored warfare is concerned) considered the cheaper and more reliable Panzer IV far superior weapon to the Tiger.

The reason is simple. The easiest way to win is if you can cut off enemy supply lines. Both Guderian and Patton considered that -- and not anti-tank combat -- the main purpose of tanks. For such maneuver, tanks have to be long-ranged, mobile, and reliable. Heavy German tanks were neither. And neither is the M1 Abrams. (Leopard II may be, but I am not sure about it).

And even in one-on-one combat, a more expensive weapon won’t necessarily be superior if it is built without a clear idea on which characteristics are important. Weapons are exercises in tradeoffs and adding performance in one area reduces it in another. If there is no clear idea on which areas are important, it is easy to end up with weapon that is underperforming in important areas while still being cripplingly expensive. In fact, the more expensive the weapon is, the greater the likelihood of exactly that outcome.

This holds true as much between weapons of same type as between weapons of different types. Assault rifles are most important weapon of any modern military. And submarines are far more important in naval warfare than aircraft carriers even though their ground support (and diplomatic) possibilities are limited. Cheap rugged close air support aircraft are far more important weapon in any war than expensive long-range bombers.

Increased Quality of weapons can negatively affect their performance simply due to higher officers refusing to put them into Harm’s Way. Smaller number of platforms also leads to higher operational tempo, wearing them as well as personnel out sooner. The result is that contrary to conventional “logic”, cheaper weapons are often better-performing than more complex ones, both individually and as a system. And people are far more important than weapons.

And while genuine game changing technologies emerge now and then, all of them are relatively simple even by standards of the Time and are result of addressing problems with old technologies by changing to a new concept rather than fixing one that does not work. To apply it to modern warfare, IRST is far more likely to change nature of aerial warfare than is any advance in radar or radar stealth.

In the end, a dumb weapon and a smart user always beat a smart weapon and a dumb user. Just check 1990s Yugoslav wars. And while having dumb soldiers is rather exceptional occurrence, having dumb leaders forcing soldiers to act like they’re dumb is a rather regular one. This situation seems unlikely to change. Especially in United States where promotion boards select people that board’s members are most comfortable with, thus actively maintaining status quo.

After both World War II and Vietnam (the latter of which United States lost), U.S. military brass ignored lessons made obvious by the wars opting for more gold-plated weaponry. And to use Medieval metaphor, while pure-gold armor may be more expensive and nicer to look at, ultimately it is useless when compared to cheaper, uglier but reliable steel armor.

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https://www.wearethemighty.com/gear-tech/missile-barges-secret-weapon-pacific

'Missile barges' could be America's secret weapon in the Pacificby Alex Hollings / Sandboxx , August 18, 2020

In recent years, the United States has begun to shift its military focus away from counter-terror operations and back toward the possibility of a large-scale conflict with near-peer opponents like China. Unfortunately, nearly 2 straight decades of the Global War on Terror has left the American defense apparatus on the wrong footing for such a war. In some important respects, America now finds itself playing catch up working to close capability gaps that have presented themselves in Europe and the Pacific.

While America retains the largest military on the Planet, it also has further reaching obligations than any other force on the Planet as well. In every corner of the Globe, America's military serves in a variety of capacities from providing a stabilizing presence, to training foreign militaries to defend themselves, to enforcing international norms on the high seas.

As we've discussed in some depth before, America's Navy may be huge for this era of relative Global stability. But it would find itself significantly outnumbered in a Sino-American war in the Pacific. That issue becomes even more clear when you consider that the U.S. Navy couldn't deploy the entirety of its fleet to any one waterway without leaving a number of other important interests un-guarded.

When you combine China's rapidly growing Navy with its well-armed Coast Guard and its maritime militia, you get a positively massive 770-ship Chinese presence in the Pacific. For context, the massive U.S. Navy currently boasts only around 293 ships. And while President Trump has pushed for growth to

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reach a 355-ship Navy, no real plans to get there have yet to materialize. That means the U.S. Navy would be left to face China's massive sea fairing presence while outnumbered at least 2-to-1 !

When the most powerful military in the World isn’t enough

Having a massive fleet alone isn't enough to win a 21st century conflict on the high seas. It's equally important that you have the right kinds of ships to leverage for specific roles.

Over the years, advancing technology has enabled the United States to move away from the massive fleets of ships and aircraft it maintained during the Second World War and toward a lower number of assets that are capable of filling multiple roles. Ships like the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers, just like multi-role aircraft like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, are properly outfitted to serve in a number of capacities. This mindset has allowed the United States to expand its capabilities while reducing its personnel requirements and the overhead costs of maintaining far more assets with far more specialized roles.

But there are downsides to America's love affair with "multi-role" platforms. They dramatically increase the cost of research and acquisition. And that increased cost forces purchases in fewer numbers. It also forces military assets into positions that don't fully leverage their broad capabilities.

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3 Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers -- the USS McCampbell (DDG 85), USS Lassen (DDG 82), and USS Shoup (DDG 86) -- steam in formation during a photo exercise.

For some useful context into how more advanced technology has enabled the U.S. to increase capability while decreasing volume, consider that America's military apparatus wielded a whopping 6,768 ships and an astonishing 300,000 combat airplanes at its peak during World War II. As America poured money into better military technology throughout the Cold War, it transitioned to an era of valuing technology and capability over volume. And today, the U.S. Navy boasts just 293 ships and America maintains a comparatively paltry 13,000 military aircraft.

With so many fewer platforms to utilize, these multi-role ships and airplanes are left doing a wide variety of work that has to be prioritized. Despite being capable of filling multiple roles, these platforms can often only fill one role at a time making them more effective for strategic posturing, but less effective in a combat situation.

Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers are incredibly powerful ships equipped with a variety of guns, missiles, and torpedoes. But they are often relegated to simplistic missile defense operations because of their role within the Aegis missile defense apparatus. These destroyers serve as a shining example of how a ship with a number of uses may get stuck in a single defensive role during large scale conflict.

As former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson put it, BMD (ballistic missile defense) ships are restricted to very confined operating areas that he refers to as "little boxes".

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A cargo ship packed with missiles? Really?

If the United States were to find itself on a collision course with China, one of the Nation's first priorities would be finding ways to rapidly expand both America's military presence and strategic capabilities in the Pacific. China owns a positively massive ballistic missile stockpile (including hypersonic anti-ship missiles) which would mean missile defense would be considered a significant priority for America's Aegis destroyers. Unfortunately, that would limit the ability for America's destroyers to operate in a more offensive capacity as they steamed in circles around their area of responsibility waiting to intercept any missiles lobbed their way.

(Left-to-right) the guided missile cruiser USS Vicksburg (CG 69) and the guided missile destroyers USS Roosevelt (DDG 80), USS Carney (DDG 64), and USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) launch a coordinated volley

of missiles during a Vandel Exercise (VANDALEX).

This would be a significant waste of destroyers which would in turn limit the capability of other battle groups that couldn't rely on the offensive power of these warships. In a real way, America would simply need more vertical launch missile tubes (commonly referred to as VLS cells or Vertical Launch System cells) in the Pacific to bolster both offensive and defensive operations. And it would be essential to get them as quickly and as cheaply as possible.

That's where the idea for missile barges (or missile ships) comes into play. In a 2019 article in the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings, 5 experts including a retired Navy captain and a retired Marine Corps colonel offered their suggestion for rapidly procuring and equipping commercial cargo ships for combat operations.

"The Navy should acquire and arm merchant ships, outfitting them with modular weapons and systems to take advantage of improving technology and shipping market conditions while providing capability more rapidly and less expensively than traditional acquisition efforts."

-Captain R. Robinson Harris, U.S. Navy (Ret.); Andrew Kerr; Kenneth Adams; Christopher Abt; Michael Venn; and Colonel T. X. Hammes, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

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The premise behind missile barges has been around for some time. After all, at its most simplistic levels, this idea boils down to "just stick a bunch of missiles on a ship you have laying around".

But what differentiates this modern missile barge concept from past iterations is the technology of our day. America has long possessed "containerized" missile platforms that would sit comfortably on the deck of large cargo ships. Further, with data-fusing supercomputers like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, America has also already demonstrated the capability of engaging targets with surface-based weapons via targeting data relayed by nearby aircraft.

Put simply, we already have modular weapon systems that would work when operated off the decks of cargo ships. And we've already proven that weapons of that sort can be leveraged to engage targets identified by aircraft… That means this concept would require very little in the way of infrastructure building or development which equates to both cost and time savings.

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How would missile barges work?

Procuring the hulls

The first step to building a fleet of missile barges would be procuring the hulls of commercial cargo ships which would likely be a fairly easy endeavor if a war in the Pacific were to occur. It's estimated that as much as 1/3 of all Global commerce sails across the South China Sea on an annual basis. A conflict between the United States and China would curtail a majority of these trips due to both the drop in trade between these 2 economic power houses and the perceived danger of sending commercial ships through what would effectively be the site of the greatest naval conflict in all of recorded History. As a result, purchasing these vessels would likely come at a significantly reduced cost.

Purchasing a new commercial double hulled cargo ship would normally run the United States between $25 and $50 million dollars. But cargo ships that are already in use can be procured on websites like NautiSNP for pennies on the dollar with some vessels currently on the market for just over $1 million.

Again, a significant drop in trade through the Pacific would likely result in even greater cost savings as firms liquidate their assets in the region to recoup some of their losses.

Modifying commercial ships into missile barges

Once the U.S. Navy had procured the ships themselves, it could begin the relatively significant task of refitting them for service as missile barges. This can be accomplished in one of two ways.

The Navy could utilize containerized missile and drone assets stacked on the ship which would make it more difficult to discern from traditional cargo vessels while dramatically reducing the actual work required to convert each ship. While the vessels would have to be marked as U.S. Navy ships and flagged as such, the similar profile to commercial ships would force the Chinese Navy to positively identify each vessel before engaging, as many weapons systems rely on inverse synthetic-aperture radar that assesses targets through little more than low-resolution profiling.

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That front-end investment could be further curbed by relying on external assets like nearby Aegis destroyers for command-and-control relying on the warship's radar, targeting, and command apparatus for what is effectively little more than an arsenal ship or "floating magazine". In this regard, missile barges would effectively serve as a supplement to a destroyer's existing weapons loadout.

Conversely, these vessels could be modified to carry traditional VLS tubes just like those employed by America's guided missile destroyers today. A container ship could be modified to carry a slew of vertical launch tubes carrying Tomahawk missiles in as little as 3-to-6 months. The costs would be higher. But the trade-off benefit would be utilizing the same basic systems found on other Navy ships, reducing the required training and logistical concerns associated with standing up a different weapon system.

Gunner's Mate 2nd Class Charles Coleman inspects missile cell hatches on one of two Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) aboard the guided missile cruiser USS Hue City (CG 66). The VLS is capable of launching

numerous missiles including the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile and SM-2 Standard Missile.

As the proposal in Proceedings suggests, it would be important for the Navy to carefully consider how many missile barges they intended to build and how many missiles they intend to keep on each.

While it's possible to place more than a hundred VLS tubes and associated missiles on one of these vessels, that would represent both a massive expense and a massive target for the Chinese military. Instead, the proposal suggests converting 10-to-15 cargo ships into missile barges, each carrying between 30 and 50 Tomahawk missiles. That would limit the potential losses if such a vessel were lost while giving it enough firepower to benefit the Navy's overarching strategy.

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The hybrid-crew model

Of course, another shortfall we have yet to discuss in a Pacific conflict could very well be trained Sailors. As the U.S. Navy rapidly procured and modified ships into missile barges, it would also have to rapidly staff these vessels. Which likely wouldn't be feasible leveraging a traditional Navy recruiting pipeline. Instead, the hybrid crew model proposed by Navy Captain Chris Rawley seems most logical.

Each missile barge would have a crew comprised of both U.S. Navy officers and civilian sailors that have experience operating these commercial vessels. By recruiting from the private sector, the U.S. Navy could rapidly field these ships with crews that are already trained and proficient at the tasks they'd be assigned while placing Naval officers in command of the vessel and in other essential combat roles.

By using a military command element, operating missile barges in war with a crew made up in part of civilians would still be legal under International law. Indeed, this model is already in use aboard some specific Naval vessels like the recently decommissioned USS Ponce amphibious transport dock.

These missile barges could be crewed with as few as 30 people split between U.S. Navy and civilian personnel. Because the missile payloads would not come close to these ship's total capacity, they could also utilize buoyant cargo sealed in the hull to help make these ships more survivable in the event of an attack.

It's possible that these ships could be crewed by even fewer people in the near future as the Navy has already earmarked $400 million in the 2020 budget for the development of 2 large unmanned surface ships. The Navy's Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vessel dubbed "Sea Hunter" has already successfully traversed the open ocean between San Diego and Hawaii all on its own demonstrating the capability for unmanned Navy ships to come.

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Are missile barges actually realistic?

Although the U.S. Navy is in the early stages of what may come to be a transformative era, it seems unlikely that the United States would shift away from its current love affair with high-cost, multi-role platforms any time soon. The new USS Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers serve as a good example of how the U.S. military prefers new, shiny, and expensive hardware over old, rusty, and more cost-efficient options. While some within the Defense Department are questioning the future of America's supercarriers, the alternative posited is usually something akin to smaller but still rather large and expensive Lightning Carriers built for short-take off vertical landing F-35Bs.

However, it's important to note that the Navy of today is a product of the past 50 years of foreign policy posturing. But that may not be the right Navy to see us through a return to large scale conflict. Today, war with China remains a distant threat. But as that threat looms closer, we may see a transition in the Navy's mindset similar to that of the Air Force's recent push for "attritable" aircraft to bolster our small volume of high-capability assets.

Attritable ( a word seemingly designed to give copy editors stress wrinkles) is the term used by the U.S. Air Force to describe platforms that are cheap enough to be used aggressively with some degree of losses considered acceptable. This has led the Air Force to investing in drones like the Kratos Valkyrie which is a low-observable drone capable of carrying 2 small-diameter bombs for ground strikes while costing only a few million dollars apiece.

Kratos Valkyrie

While it would cost more than a few million dollars to field each missile barge, the price may still be discounted enough to be considered attritable when compared to $13 billion behemoths like the Ford. As unmanned ships become more common (and as a result, more affordable), it may become even more cost effective to leverage existing commercial hulls as a means of offsetting China's huge numbers advantage in the Pacific.

Does it seem likely that the U.S. Navy would start strapping missiles to old container ships any time soon? The answer is a resounding No. But if America and China continue on this collision course,

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America's defense apparatus may find itself being forced to make some hard decisions about just how much capability it can squeeze out of America's already massive defense budget.

If that day comes, missile barges may represent one of the most cost effective force multipliers that America could leverage.

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