Weapons Management in World Politics: Proceedings of the International Arms Control Symposium, December, 1962 || Some Industrial Aspects of Arms Control

Some Industrial Aspects of Arms ControlAuthor(s): Arthur BarberSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, No. 3, Weapons Management in WorldPolitics: Proceedings of the International Arms Control Symposium, December, 1962 (Sep.,1963), pp. 491-494Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/173058 .

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Some Industrial Aspects of Arms Control

ARTHUR BARBER

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

I would like to take exception to an assumption held by a great many people. To wit: that arms control is an isolated profes- sion or discipline, which when properly ap- plied, can provide both scholarly disserta- tions and large industrial programs. I do not believe it. If discussion of disarmament and arms control is to play a significant part in our national strategy, then it will do so only if it is, in fact, considered as an integral element of our national strategic planning and our popular attitudes. Similarly, arms control and disarmament will not play a significant role in American industry unless it is considered as an integral element of cor- porate plans and operations.

A number of distinguished authors have alleged that arms control programs will not reduce our defense expenditures; that any inspection system will require such instrumentation and special operations that disarmament will not reduce defense costs. This novel idea, while intellectually stimu- lating, is simply not true. Let me explain why. There are those in this country who have developed a certain pedagogical ratio- nale, which supports the concept of arms control and/or disarmament without significant disarmament, apparently in the be- lief that such a course represents the best interest of the United States. I can assure

you that the President and Mr. McNamara do not share this view. This administration is making a major effort to achieve strategi-

(Arms Control)

cally sound disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union.

For some time the Soviet Union has at- tempted to take the initiative in espousing disarmament. Our carefully prepared posi- tion on the test ban has made it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to espouse a test ban, for example, while failing to permit the most elementary inspection. In my opinion, an increasingly effective United States effort in this vital arena will force a choice on the Soviet leadership. They will be forced to choose between disarmament with adequate inspection, or they will have to abandon their campaign for General and Complete Disarmament as a complete fraud.

All of this is merely to argue that, when and if the Soviet Union considers disarmament as a realistic possibility, then I think the nature of agreement and the break with the past will be profound, deep, and fundamental. If, for example, we are success- ful in obtaining an agreement to stop weapons production and reduce our force levels, the cost of the inspection forces required would, in my opinion, be relatively small compared to the cost of maintaining and operating the force which we would be dis- mantling. While Cuba cannot be termed an adequate comparison, the fact remains that visual inspection of the removed missiles and aircraft has, in fact, provided reasonable assurance of the removal. It did not, of course, provide any assurance that all the



ARTHUR BARBER

weapons were removed. Furthermore, if an inspection team of a few hundred men were permitted to travel freely through Cuba, I personally believe that this would be more than adequate inspection to check the removal and reintroduction of offensive weapons. Certainly such a program does not require an elaborate contractor study program, nor would its implementation be at all com- parable to a weapons system management operation. No vast amounts of numbers of computers, sensors, special aircraft, or instrumentation would be required. If we do address the fundamental problem, which is the continuing arms buildup, then we will not need the vast and intricate inspection systems envisioned by some.

In the even more specialized field of instrumentation for arms control, contractors have prepared volumes of detailed and complex instrumentation proposals which appear to assume that our international problems will be determined, according to the jargon of our time, "by a technical breakthrough in the development of new sensor systems." This is poppycock! I can think of no arms control or disarmament problem in which there is the slightest chance of resolution through the application of new scientific information. To be sure, the Soviet Union claims to have instruments that identify underground nuclear tests from outside nat- ural borders. Such claims, however, simply will not bear examination.

In short, then, I do not believe that there is a large role to be played by American industry in the analysis and implementation of any United States arms control or disarmament program. There are modest jobs, to be sure, in which the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will call upon Ameri- can industry to assist in the implementation of programs such as Project Cloudgap. Such programs are important and will require

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significant contractor assistance, but it is clear that the budget for ACDA or the operation of any inspection force will remain very small when compared to the current Defense Department budget of $50 billion.

If industry cannot make a major contri- bution to the formulation of arms control policy, what can industry do to assist in the evaluation of a sound strategy in a time of possible disarmament? American industry, which has played so vital a task in de- veloping the weapons required for our defense, now finds an equal, if not more challenging, task in planning its allocation of resources so as to be capable of engaging in a thermonuclear arms race, if necessary, and yet capable of shifting to equally vital but more prosaic tasks, when and if agreements with the Soviet Union are achieved.

Under any disarmament program it must be recognized that campaigns of revolution and subversion, such as we have witnessed in the past, will be likely to continue. In fact, Premier Khrushchev himself has said that the policy of disarmament and peace- ful coexistence will encourage "wars of national liberation." The United States Draft

Treaty Outline proposes, in the final stages of disarmament, to deal with this problem by a substantially strengthened peace-keeping machinery for the settling of international

disputes so that these problems can be dealt with on a political basis. But these proposals are in the final stages of a disarmament

program. They will require substantial

changes in the structure of our international organizations. In candor, we cannot plan on making these changes in the immediate future and must plan on a world in which

campaigns of revolution and subversion may continue. As a result, the means of combat- ing revolution and subversion must also continue and be strengthened. Thus, the equipment needed for effective counter-

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Some Industrial Aspects of Arms Control

guerrilla operations and nation building would not decrease following a disarmament agreement. Indeed, it is likely that there would be major increases in such programs as communications and air, land, and sea transport. Mr. Gilpatric recently said:

Too many contractors may be attempting to crowd into the space spotlight, while other important but less highlighted defense problems do not receive the attention which they deserve. For example, Research and Development accounted for 58% of all defense awards for space technology and missiles in fiscal 1961, while R & D accounted for only 21/2% of the contracts let for military vehicles. Yet our need for improved vehicles has increased, not de- creased. In Vietnam the problem of rapid surface transportation across rice paddies and swamps has yet to be solved.

But in the final analysis, our programs in the field of nation building and guerrilla operations will depend not upon equipment but upon people. They will depend on the quality of the personnel who represent the United States in this vital task. In the past, when our nation faced major complex problems in the development and production of weapons, it turned to industry not only for equipment but for management assistance. I see no reason why the government should not turn, to an ever increasing extent, to industry to provide management and equipment for many parts of our foreign aid programs in nations under threat of Com- munist subversion. In Korea, for example, an industrial contractor assumed responsibility not only for rebuilding Korean communications but for organizing and training the Koreans to operate their own communications system. The government's require- ments for competent industrial contractors and industrial managers will not disappear when a disarmament agreement is achieved, but the nature of the supplies and services will undergo a major transformation.

In his final speech to the American people,

President Eisenhower said: "Until the latest of our world conflicts the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, 3.5 mil- lion men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corpora- tions. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual-is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Govern- ment. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society."

We must recognize that there is more than an element of truth in the President's statement. A recent study by a Senate For- eign Relations Subcommittee showed that although the Defense Department estimates that 18,000 companies participate in defense work as prime contractors, 24 companies account for 70 per cent (or almost $16 billion of the $22 billion) of defense work covered

by the study. But having said this is not to admit to the constant Soviet claims that American industry is motivated to continue the arms race.

My experience indicates that most, if not all, American industries currently engaged in weapons production would welcome a disarmament agreement under adequate inspection. It should result in major tax re- ductions and permit a significant reallocation of national resources including the conver-

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ARTHUR BARBER

sion of many R & D skills to the development of new commercial products. Let me illustrate by quoting two replies to the study conducted by the Subcommittee. One com-

pany said:

There is no doubt that a sudden withdrawal of defense business would create serious problems for our company and its employees. At the same time we do not believe that such problems of transition should constitute a barrier to a workable and effective arms reduction program. If that can be achieved on a basis that will not reduce the security of the United States, the problem of economic dislocation incident thereto should not be allowed to be an obstacle. The ingenuity of industry and government should be equal to the challenge of such a problem.

Another indicated the impact such steps might have on Soviet-American relations:

The Soviet Union is now convinced that any extensive disarmament would cause so great an economic depression in the United States that the result would be the destruction of the capitalistic system. Therefore, the Soviet leaders do not believe that the United States is sincere in its disarmament proposals. Extensive Gov- ernment planning to deal with the economic problems arising from drastic disarmament would go a long distance toward convincing the Soviet Union of United States sincerity in the field of arms control.

Clearly, industrial planning to anticipate disarmament agreement is both necessary and desirable. It is equally clear that such industrial planning cannot be carried out in

Washington. The overwhelming majority (from 62 to 77 per cent) of the companies queried indicated that they believed the pri- mary responsibility for adjustment to a reduction in defense outlay rests with private industry. I heartily agree. Yet only 16 per cent of the companies surveyed had conducted any type of disarmament study. Ex-

cept for the aircraft and missile industry,

where ten companies have carried out

studies, no one industry has more than two or three companies which have conducted studies on this problem.

I suggest that if companies are to fulfill their responsibilities, they should undertake such studies if they have not already done so. To assist industry in drawing its corpo- rate plans, we are planning to modify the Armed Services Procurement Regulations to

permit, if not suggest, that the industrial contractors conduct planning studies to an-

ticipate the effects of disarmament agreements.

During the past few years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a number of contin-

gency plans to permit American policy- makers to use our military force as a flex- ible instrument of policy. Now is the time for American industry to provide contin-

gency plans for the future. We in the

Department of Defense want American in-

dustry to be prepared to turn out the

weapons which we require, and yet, on the other hand, we do not wish them to become

permanent responsibilities of the Department of Defense, unable to survive in a world characterized by ever-increasing competition in international trade. Through contract

changes and the establishment of an indus-

try-Department of Defense study group we

hope to evolve contingency plans for the

government. We hope that industry will take this opportunity to develop its own

contingency plans, for the future of Ameri- can industry will be determined by the initiative of industrial leaders. American indus-

try has faced major management challenges before-at the end of World War II and at the time of Korea. I am sure they will face this new challenge with equal imagination and initiative.

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Documents

Weapons Management in World Politics: Proceedings of the International Arms Control Symposium, December, 1962 || Some Industrial Aspects of Arms Control