Upload
hani
View
17
Download
1
Tags:
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government. Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices. Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
Citation preview
Weaponizing Space: Technologies and Policy Choices
Dana J. Johnson, Ph.D.
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
20 April 2005
Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely the views of the author and not of her employer, the Northrop Grumman Corporation, the RAND Corporation, or of the U.S. Government.
04-20-0504-20-0522
Agenda
Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate
National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.
Space Control and Force Application missions
Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
Policy choices and conclusions
04-20-0504-20-0533
Characterizing the “Space Weaponization Debate”
Pro Arguments Just as other environments are used for offensive military purposes, so will the
environment of space be used Emerging threats to our national interests and assured access to space require
we develop and maintain capabilities to protect our space assets The U.S. economy and way of life depend on space systems The space weaponization debate is a red-herring. Space was weaponized long
ago by the transit of ballistic missiles
Con Arguments Space should remain a sanctuary for peaceful scientific uses Space weaponization is:
Not inevitable and international agreements barring weaponization are possible and desirable
Pre-mature and the sanctuary status of space is in the interests of the United States
Use of space weapons would create harmful orbital debris There is no conceivable scenario in which space weapons provide a benefit
greater than their harm
04-20-0504-20-0544
Agenda
Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate
National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.
Space Control and Force Application missions
Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
Policy choices and conclusions
04-20-0504-20-0555
National Space Policy (1996)
The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. "Peaceful purposes" allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from space. The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights.
04-20-0504-20-0566
National Space Policy (1996) (Cont.)
National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national security by:
(a) providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and friends;
(b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack; (c) assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space; (d) countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile
purposes; (e) enhancing operations of U.S. and allied forces; (f) ensuring our ability to conduct military and intelligence space-related
activities; (g) satisfying military and intelligence requirements during peace and
crisis as well as through all levels of conflict; (h) supporting the activities of national policy makers, the intelligence
community, the National Command Authorities, combatant commanders and the military services, other federal officials, and continuity of government operations.
04-20-0504-20-0577
Importance of Space to the U.S.
Contributed $100 billion to US economy in 2000
Weather satellites – improved severe weather predictions
Communications – point to point and broadcast
GPS– Navigation—commercial and civil exceed military applications– Ubiquitous timing signal—enables global Internet
Environmental monitoring– Geodesy– Mapping– Terrain Characterization
04-20-0504-20-0588
Space: An Economic Center of Gravity and Thus, a Vital National Interest
Today:
Over 600 Active Satellites (200+ US Satellites)
Over $100 Billion US Dollars Invested
Future: Forecast 20% annual growth in space investments
GPS-related products: $8 Billion (2001) projected to grow to $50 Billion by 2010
ResourceManagementPrecision
Farming
WeatherPrediction Communications
Surveying
04-20-0504-20-0599
Agenda
Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate
National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.
Space Control and Force Application missions
Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
Policy choices and conclusions
04-20-0504-20-051010
Space Missions*
Space Force Support: launching satellites and day-to-day management of on-orbit assets
Space Force Enhancement: includes all space operations aimed at increasing effectiveness of terrestrial military operations
Space Control: ensuring our use of space while denying the use to our adversaries
Space Force Application: combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the course and outcome of conflict
*United States Strategic Command Fact File, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/spacemissions.htm
04-20-0504-20-051111
• Ensure Use of Space Assets• Enhance Survivability
• Maneuver• Harden• Redundancy
Protect• Detect, Identify and Track Man-made
Space Objects• Worldwide Network
• Radar• Optical Trackers• Infrared
Surveil
NegatePreventPrevent Adversaries From Exploiting US or Allies Space Services
Disrupt, deny, degrate, deceive or destroy adversary space capabilities
• Encryption• Shutter Control Lin
k
Space Control
Assure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny SameAssure Freedom of Action in Space and Deny Same
SPACE SEGMENT
GROUND SEGMENT
04-20-0504-20-051212
Space Control: ASAT Concepts
Direct Ascent (Ballistic Trajectory) Ground-launched Air-launchedCo-orbital Interceptor Space mineDirected Energy Weapons Ground-based Air-based Space-basedElectronic Warfare Ground-based Space-based
Conventional explosive Nuclear warhead Pellet cloud Aerosols Hit-to-kill Induced fragmentation Component burnout Power disruption Jamming Takeover Physical tampering
Source: Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Military Strategy in Space, Jane’s, 1987, p. 138.
Types of NegationASAT Systems
04-20-0504-20-051313
Legacy ASAT Development Project SAINT (SAtellite INTerceptor) (1950s-1962) Early Spring: conventional ASAT, Polaris launch (1960s) Program 505: prototype Nike Zeus DM-15S ABM (1962-1966) Program 437: Thor launch, Mk 49 nuclear warhead (1964) Program 922: Thor IRBM launch, non-nuclear suborbital ASAT in development
(late 1960s)May 1972 signing of SALT I Treaty prohibited interference with NTM SPIKE: suborbital conventional ASAT air-launched from F-106; MHV with non-
nuclear kill capability (1970s) Conventional ASAT: low-risk, off-the-shelf technology alternative using pellets
(1970s) USB: platform for space-borne weapons, crewed, Proton launch (late
1970s/early 1980s) Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile: F-15 launch, 2-stage + MHV, successful
intercept 1985 (1977-1980s) Terra-3: ground-based laser, Sary Shagan (1970s-1980s) RP: space-based rocket interceptor (similar to US Brilliant Pebbles) (1980s)
Note that dates are approximateUS Activity USSR Activity Other
04-20-0504-20-051414
Legacy ASAT Development (Cont.) Zenith Star: prototype space combat satellite using Alpha laser (1987) KS: space station with military free-flying autonomous modules dispensing
nuclear warheads (1980s) Polyus: combat satellite testbed using Energia launcher; launch failure in 1987
(1985-1987) KE ASAT: Army direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT, with kinetic kill vehicle
launched by rocket booster (1989-1990s) Gun-launched ASAT: supergun design by Gerald Bull for Iraq, for blinding
Western satellites (1995) Star Lite: space laser concept, to be launched on Titan 4 (1991) HERTF: High Energy Research and Technology Facility, Kirtland AFB, NM,
high-powered microwave and advanced technology weapon system development
Space-Based Laser: Operational SBL Orbital Vehicle, chemical laser system, part of SDI program (1996)
Space Laser Demo: concept (1996)
Note that dates are approximateUS Activity USSR Activity Other
04-20-0504-20-051515
Polyus (USSR)
04-20-0504-20-051616
Space Control: Protecting Space Assets
Hardening/shielding of system
components
Developing robust battle management
Improving system maneuverability
Attaining adequate force protection
Developing adequate defensive
information operations
Threat warning and assessment
reporting
Space weather sensor systems
Mobile mission processors
Diagnostics and repair technology
Quick launch recovery
Modeling and simulation
Detect and report
threat/attacks
Identify, locate, and classify
threats
Withstand and defend
Reconstitute and repair
Assess missions impact
Functional CapabilitiesOperational Needs
04-20-0504-20-051717
Space Force Application
Apply Force From SpaceApply Force From SpaceApply Force From SpaceApply Force From Space
• Currently no weapons in Space
• DoD Space Policy (1999) tasks US military to plan for Force Application from space
• International law & treaties prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space
• “Conventional” weapons are not prohibited
04-20-0504-20-051818
Space Force Application:Influencing the Terrestrial Battlespace
Defined as: “…things intended to cause harm that are based in
space or that have an essential element based in space. The degree of harm…may range from temporary disruption to permanent destruction or death.”*
Generic alternatives: Space-based directed-energy and kinetic-energy
weapons against missile targets Kinetic-energy weapons against ground targets Conventional weapons against ground targets
*Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002, p. 23.
04-20-0504-20-051919
Comparison of Weapon Types and Their Operational Utility
Targets
Effects
Responsiveness
Number of Weapons in Constellation
Directed Energy Mass-to-Target Weapons
Laser, RF, particle beam, etc.
Kinetic energy against missile targets
Kinetic energy against surface targets
Space-based conventional weapons
Soft, located from the surface to space, any speed
Hardened targets above 60 km moving at great speed
Hardened fixed or slow-moving targets on Earth
Hardened targets, either fixed or moving at moderate speeds, surface or air
Several dozens for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time
Lethal impact Vertical, limited-depth penetrator
Inherited from conventional munitions
Seconds A few minutes A few hours About 10 mins plus time it takes weapon to reach target after delivery from space
Several dozens
Range from nonlethal jamming to lethal heating; finite, inherently “thin” defense
About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time
About 6 in reserve for each needed to reach a particular target in desired time
Source: Preston, et. al., Space Weapons Earth Wars, RAND, 2002.
04-20-0504-20-052020
Agenda
Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate
National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.
Space Control and Force Application missions
Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
Policy choices and conclusions
04-20-0504-20-052121
Emergence of Space Competitors? Currently, no peer in space to threaten U.S. national interests However, concern for developments in:
China Human spaceflight Navigation, communications, remote sensing, weather, oceanography,
microgravity, science and astronomy, and microsatellites KE ASAT, jammers, “parasite” satellites, ground-based lasers
Russia: long-standing interests and capabilities Nuclear proliferation and weapons delivery programs in North
Korea, Iran, Libya, Pakistan Continued transfer of ballistic missile-related technology by
Russia and China Bottom line:
Technically challenging but doable Legal constraints on WMD do not prohibit space weapons Countermeasures are possible – asymmetric strategies by
competitors, allowing competition without having to become space-faring nations
04-20-0504-20-052222
Concern for Vulnerability of U.S. Space-Based Assets
“If U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems”*
What might be a “Space Pearl Harbor”? Lethal actions, such as:
Debilitating/destroying attack on U.S. and allied space assets through electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event staged by hostile forces in orbit
Non-lethal actions (i.e., for a limited period of time, for specific objectives)
Jamming, spoofing, blinding
*Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (January 2001)
04-20-0504-20-052323
If the U.S. Were to Acquire Space Weapons, How Might It Happen?
Under what circumstances might the U.S. decide to acquire? Deliberately Incidentally
Once the decision is made, how might the transition occur? Possible strategies Possible consequences
04-20-0504-20-052424
Possible Circumstances Requiring Purposeful Decision-Making
Responding to threat(s) by undeterred adversaries
Responding to another nation’s decision to acquire, whether adversaries or allies
With another nation(s), to forestall, control, or influence their independent acquisition of space weapons
Unilaterally, in absence of compelling threat, to demonstrate global leadership, protect U.S. and allied economic investments, improve efficiency and effectiveness of military capabilities, etc.
04-20-0504-20-052525
Possible Circumstances Involving Incidental Decision-Making
Commercial or civil development of technologies with applicability to military purposes
Incremental decision – hedging strategy as way to shape security environment
Monolithic decision and implementation – reactive strategy to deal with emerging threat that may be defensive and stabilizing in nature
04-20-0504-20-052626
Transition Period (1)
Ideally, no consequences for U.S. deployment Worst case:
Adversaries take lethal action to deny U.S. ability to launch and deploy first space weapon
Adversary’s options are numerous Deterrent capability, possibly nuclear, leading to
possible launch on warning/launch under attack policy Physical attack – on launch sites Burying targets Developing/deploying “silver bullets,” such as ASATs “Seize moral high ground against U.S. hegemony”
04-20-0504-20-052727
Transition Period (2)
Responses by allies Potential political pressure Potential fallout in other non-space-related areas (e.g.,
foreign policy issue of great importance to U.S. interests) Adversary attempt at coercive behavior to influence ally Commercial companies’ reaction to possible orbital
debris that, depending on orbits, may last forever World may view U.S. acquisition and deployment decision
as risky behavior, with long term consequences for U.S. global leadership
04-20-0504-20-052828
Policy Context for Deciding to Acquire and Deploy Space-Based Weapons
Some sensitivities have underpinning them the notion of space as a sanctuary: U.S. has most to lose because of dependence on space assets Absence of imminent threats to U.S. freedom of space could lead to
perceptions of U.S. aggressive behavior Potentially trigger arms race in space
Others argue that U.S. inhibitions against space weapons deployment do not necessarily apply to others U.S. needs to press ahead with development and deployment
• From a narrow, operational viewpoint:– Technical feasibility
– Strategic desirability
– Cost
• However, other sensitivities:– Political will
– Legal restrictions and ramifications
– Reactions of allies, neutrals, and adversaries
04-20-0504-20-052929
What If Others Decide to Acquire Space Weapons? Range of “others”
Peer competitors U.S. friends and allies Non-peer competitors Neither friend nor foe Non-state coalition of entities (possibly state-assisted)
Decisions will be driven by national interests Security, e.g.:
Regional threats requiring long-range force projection Overcoming competitor’s military strengths
Economic and technological Political:
National prestige, peer recognition Global reach and power projection Enhanced freedom to act regionally/globally Promotion of internal security
04-20-0504-20-053030
Agenda
Characterizing the “space weaponization” debate
National space policy and the importance of space to the U.S.
Space Control and Force Application missions
Decision-making rationale and factors for space weapons acquisition by U.S. and/or others
Policy choices and conclusions
04-20-0504-20-053131
Policy Choices Facing the United States
Continue to maintain consistency in long-held space-related principles, yet be prepared to acquire and deploy space-based weapons should circumstances change
Move now, through explicit policy, programmatic, and budgetary decisions, to deploy space-based weapons based on national interests and emerging threats
Prepare for the inevitable: pursue a deliberate, long-term hedging strategy
04-20-0504-20-053232
Irregular Unconventional methods adopted
and employed by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. (Erode our power)
Disruptive International competitors developing and
possessing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant U.S. advantages in particular operational domains. (Marginalize our power)
Traditional States employing legacy and advanced
military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict. (Challenge our power)
Catastrophic Acquisition, possession, and possible
employment of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against vulnerable, high-profile targets by terrorists and rogue states. (Paralyze our power)
LIKELIHOOD
VU
LN
ER
AB
ILIT
Y
Lower Higher
Higher
Lower
Impact of Security Challenges Facing U.S. Defense Planning in 2006 QDR
Do space weapons contribute to “filling the gaps” in capabilities to respond?
04-20-0504-20-053333
Conclusion
Space will become yet another environment for the full spectrum of human activities, including conflict
Not a matter of should space weapons be deployed, but when
Prudent approach to protect U.S. national interests is a proactive strategy for shaping political, technological, diplomatic, and security environment