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Weak governance in Pakistan
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THEME
A stable socio-political and economic order, strong national
institutions together with selfless and able leadership are the main
pillars of effective governance. The quality of governance in a
country is reflected by the national cohesion and the freedom enjoyed
by the masses in various spheres of activity. Besides this, the
domestic stability also establishes the respect and credibility of a
country among the comity of nations.
Ever since the independence of Pakistan, our national scene
has been dominated by leadership crisis, political disharmony and
economic mismanagement, thereby seriously affecting the National
pride and cohesion. The inability of the leadership to circumvent the
persistent ills, speaks not only of the weak governance but also the
lack of resolve and capacity of the leadership to check the down ward
trends.
Foregoing in view, analyse the causes of weak governance in
Pakistan with a view to proposing a viable strategy to improve the
system of governance in the Country.
THESIS STATEMENT
Pakistan is gifted with tremendous resources which
unfortunately could not be harnessed primarily due to inept political
leadership characterized by self centered approach and weak
governance. Institutionalizing the political order with effective judiciary
steered by selfless and capable government can rescue the country
out of the crisis.
CHAPTER – I
INTRODUCTION
1. Governance, being a dynamic concept, can mean different things to
different people depending upon the vantage point from which you see it. For
instance for a common man it means the equality and rule of law, security and
stability, participatory form of government. To the decision-making elite,
governance is about the ability to exercise authority and enjoy legitimacy. Then
there is also a temporal dimension. For instance at a given point of time,
governance could concentrate only on maintenance of law and order function
and other more peaceful times, the demand might be for taking up welfare
activities. Thus the term 'governance' changes with time, space, context and the
referent object. It is an Omnibus concept that includes processes like interest
jockeying, grievance redressal, resource allocation, practices like norm setting,
rule making relationships between the state and civil society, ruler and the ruled
and structures like government, police, civil society, extra-governmental
organizations. It is important here to state that there exists a symbiotic
relationship between governance and security, which form the twin pillars on
which the state edifice stands. If one collapses the other cannot and will not
remain unaffected. For instance if governance fails, security cannot remain
unaffected. Similarly, when security is imperiled, one can invariably trace its roots
to governance.
3. “Government & Governance” are the two words which are often used
interchangeably, which is incorrect, because, governance does not mean just
government. Government is just a part of the entire process of governance,
though an important part but not the only one part, there are other agencies
involved like the State and the Civil Society. Government is the agency through
which the act governance is carried out. Government is the negotiating agency –
at best it can be termed as the 'captain of the ship'.
4. The process of governance in Pakistan has been flawed in many
respects– a centralized rule, weak political institutions, widespread corruption
and lacking in a tradition of political accountability. The implications have been
far reaching for the political-economic system. Bureaucrats, military and feudal
leaders continue to seek to control the political and economic institutions and
with the avowed purpose of governing the nation. Their attempts to seize and
hold power fails to recognize and establish the traditions of democracy and they
have paid very little attention to achieving peoples’ participation in national
decision making. This pattern of governance has seriously compromised the
principles on which the effective functioning of national institutions, formulation
and implementation of policies, quality of economic structures, and the
impartiality of the legal system depends.
5. Political intrigues and attempts at self-aggrandizement began with the
birth of Pakistan and paved the way for interventions in the political process.
After a decade of misrule prompted by many bureaucratic interventions, the
army, in the name of saving the country, declared the first martial law in 1958,
cancelled national elections and abrogated the constitution. The hallmark of this
new regime was the attempt to manipulate basic democracy. This attempt failed.
Yet another military regime came to power in 1969 and held the first and the last
free and fair election in 1970. Unfortunately it deemed the results unsatisfactory
and refused to transfer power to the properly elected representatives of the
people.
6. The elected successor government which assumed power in 1972 in the
wake of the national debacle of December 1971, tried to pursue populist policies.
It promised its people freedom and paved the way for still another period of
martial law. Another military regime overthrew the government elected in 1977
first suspending and later amending the 1973 constitution. The legacy of this
regime was a misuse of religion, mismanagement of the economy and the gross
violation of human rights. Moreover, under this regime many excesses took place
during attempts to silence political dissent.
7. Starting in 1988, the next two so-called democratic governments have
taken economic corruption to new heights. This new breed of leadership
emerging from a younger generation proved even more incompetent in
attempting to serve public interest and often indulged in mimicking the lifestyle of
the “rich and famous” as seen on western television. One government made
headlines in The New York Times on January 9, 1998 for leaving a trail of
corruption extending across the world while the other had become famous for its
financial scandals (The New York Times, 8 January 1998).
8. There has been systematic pattern of undermining of the existing political
and economic institutions-democratic system, constitution, judiciary, commercial
banking, labor unions, small business and small farm owners in particular. The
democratic system has not been given a chance to function. The constitution has
been tampered with so as to serve the needs of each successive ruler. The
judiciary has been seriously weakened. The banking sector after having been
nationalized is being used for politically driven loans, which are often non-
performing. Only big business and large-scale industry have received generous
support by the government in subsidies, tax relief, licensing privileges and
cheaper investment financing. Small businesses are left on their own. Labor
unions have been kept weak. Policies that led to declining real wages have
seldom been reviewed. Agriculture has remained subject to unfavorable pricing,
disinvestments, and an out-dated land tenure system. In the absence of real land
reforms rural life remains in tight feudal grip and remains the victim of share-
cropping. Economic institutions that underwrite and promote popular welfare
have come under frequent assault. Official irregularities in economic areas have
been rather widespread.
9. Corruption and bribery have become institutionalized and accepted as a
way of life in the Country. Economic policies and political activities are tied up in
a cycle, which evolves around the corrupt system of licenses, controls,
government approval for investments, imports, exports, employment, land
purchase, hiring and dismissals, and virtually every other aspect of economic
activity. Pervasive corruption greases the wheels of civil service at local state and
federal levels, and industry and commerce are badly affected by it. Red tape,
abuse of authority for personal gain, and widespread bribes undermine economic
efficiency. In the absence of a credible process of accountability and in total
disregard of adherence to minimum standards of economic management and
efficiency, public money is spent on projects, which have little social or economic
value. This culture of corruption discourages an inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI).
10. Project-based development in Pakistan has adversely affected the
economy. The economic landscape is full of distortions and dislocation. It has
deprived the nation and its people of basic necessities. The existence of excess
capacity in industry and the concomitant shortfall in essential raw materials and
spare parts has increased the costs for private investors.
CHAPTER-2
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTAN’S FRAGMENTED
SOCIETY
11. Democratic institutions, indeed, failed to function effectively and to take
root in Pakistan. Recent re-imposition of the military regime solicited little protests
from Pakistani citizens. This chapter will examine Pakistan’s democratic
experiment in the framework of governance defined as the process of exercising
power in the pursuit of common goals. Legitimacy, institutions and performance
are the three major elements in governance process. Legitimacy refers to the
consent of the governed and the rule of law. Institutions include deliberately
created legal frameworks, laws, legislatures, executives and judiciary. Informal
institutions emerge through practice, including unwritten conventions, values,
norms and ideologies. Effective governance requires congruence between the
formal and informal institutions. Performance refers to the accomplishment of
common objectives and judicious use and allocation of public resources. Good
governance assumes the existence of democratic institutions. Governance
occurs in a context and environment that not only shapes the process but over
time it is shaped by it. The civil society and the market institutions provide the
large part of the environment.
12. Elections and Legitimacy. Despite frequent recourse to martial law,
Pakistanis still regard the elections as the primary source of legitimacy. Pakistan
held four general elections during 1988-1999. The legitimacy they conferred on
victorious governments is a function of peoples’ participation in elections and
their perception about the fairness of the electoral process. The 1970 election
attained the highest turnout (64%) in Pakistan’s history. Since then the turnout
has spiraled downward, which is consistent in all the four provinces of Pakistan.
Evidently people have become cynical about the validity and utility of elections.
Elected governments have performed poorly and they have failed to live up to the
peoples’ expectations. Popular perception is that the democratic governments
are corrupt, wasteful, and inefficient. It is becoming clear that the people do not
feel that the ballot box is a sufficient condition for legitimacy. Four successive
elections tended to return many of the same discredited politicians time and
again. Three of the four elections resulted in weak coalition governments at the
Center. At the provincial level, elections resulted in either bickering coalitions or
strong government of a rival faction, leading to bitter center –province rivalry.
13. Executive: The Power Struggles. The country has never seen a
smooth transfer of power. Only two out of the 11 heads of the state since 1947
managed to complete their constitutional terms. Out of Pakistan’s 16 Prime
Ministers, only three of were elected. Ironically only Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto managed
to complete his term. In Pakistan’s early history, under an adapted vice-regal
system, the military and senior bureaucracy established the tradition of
supporting the Governor General or President. Prime Ministers were hired and
fired at whim. The 1973 Constitution postulated parliamentary form of
government, in which the president was intended to be a figurehead. A rubber
stamp Parliament under General Zia approved the Constitution (Eighth
Amendment) Bill 1985. The amendment gave the President the power to dissolve
the legislatures and provided a safeguard for army’s institutional interests. It not
only created an ambiguity in executive powers, but also bound the hands of the
Prime Minister. The 1988 transfer of power to the newly elected Peoples Party of
Pakistan (PPP) was conditional on a tacit agreement that the important decisions
were to be taken jointly by the Prime Minister, the President and the Chief of the
Army Staff (COAS). The basic parameters of foreign policy would remain intact.
The Acting President, Ghulam Ishaque Khan, would be elected the President. He
had successfully served two military regimes in the past. This unstable Troika
and the 8 th amendment set the stage for an insidious power struggle between
the President and the PM and the COAS. The Prime Ministers felt it necessary to
have control over the appointments of the COAS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee (CJCSC) and the head of the Inter Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI) to govern effectively. They believed that as the elected
representative of the people, they should be the appointing authority. Three
governments were successively sacked by the President on the charges of
corruption and misuse of power. The 1973 constitution of Pakistan copied the
British system, where all executive power is vested in the Monarch. The exercise
of this power, however, is subject to the advice of the Prime Minister, the political
head of the elected government. The Heads of the state in the Anglo Saxon
countries of the Commonwealth never complain about being kept out of the
political arena. This, however, is the result of the evolution of centuries of
tradition. Not only such traditions failed to emerge in post-colonial Pakistan, but
also Pakistani leadership established the opposite tradition. The written
constitution compromised the parliamentary tradition by providing discretionary
powers to the President. During Zia regime, the presidency had acquired a
pivotal position. The parliamentary and democratic norms had to be recreated.
The administrative chaos and ethnic strife that accompanied the democratic
change created an environment that was not conducive to creating such norms
and institution building.
14. Rubberstamp Legislature. The legislatures have traditionally played
minimal role in country’s governance. During 1948-58, they were dismissed at
executive’s whim. Ali Bhutto’s government assigned a limited role to the
legislature. He was used extensive patronage and coercion to control and
manipulate the legislators. Zia regime created a dummy legislature to emasculate
the 1973 Constitution and concentrate power in the office of the president. During
1988-1999, National Assembly was dissolved three times by the President and a
fourth time by a coup d’état. Repeated dissolution of elected legislatures eroded
their prestige. It created cynicism about the significance and power of the
institution. Parliament devoted little time to lawmaking. The governments ruled by
ordinance rather than by laws. Governments abused their power to issue
ordinances for a period of four months. Despite the Supreme Court ruling to the
contrary, the ordinances were blatantly re-promulgated. The notion of executive
accountability to the legislature, the corner stone of parliamentary government,
was destroyed. The Ministers and MNAs often used public funds for patronage.
The defense budget was presented as a line item and the Parliament refrained
from any discussion. The members of the Provincial and National Assemblies
(MPAs,MNAs) completely ignored the distinction between the legitimate service
to their constituents and illegitimate favors for their cronies.
15. Judiciary: The Creature of The Executive. By and large the judicial
structure left by the British still remains intact. Its norms, values and ethos have
undergone a radical change. In Pakistan’s conflict ridden polity, bitterly
contentious issues between political actors have frequently resulted in judicial
recourse. The failure of a weak political system to resolve these issues placed a
heavy burden on the superior judiciary. It introduced partisan politics into the
hallowed halls of the higher courts. Pakistani State’s penchant to use military and
Islam has led to the creation of parallel systems of judicial institutions. The latter
have constantly posed a challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the courts.
Pakistani Judges have tried to match their constitutional ideals and legal
language to the exigencies of the current politics. Their judgments have often
supported the government of the day. Early in its history, the Federal, later
Supreme Court created the ‘doctrine of necessity’ and ‘revolutionary legality’ to
justify the executive’s illegal dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly,
abrogation of the constitution and imposition of martial law. It declared military
intervention to be necessary and validated all actions pursuant to the military
take over, thus providing General Zia the legal basis to amend the constitution.
During the military regimes, politicians viewed the judiciary as the protector of
their rights. During the democratic decade the relations between the elected
Prime Ministers and the superior Judiciary were marked by constant conflict. Ms.
Bhutto’s relations with superior judiciary remained severely strained, particularly
in the second term. The superior judiciary endorsed the president’s decision to
dismiss the Prime Minister. Appointment of judges, often on the basis of
patronage and transfer of ‘uncooperative’ judges were the root cause of the
conflict. The apex court’s landmark ruling popularly known as the judges case
practically took away the PM’s power to appoint judges, thus ending the practice
of appointing temporary judges, acting Chief Justices and transferring judges.
Government publicly ridiculed the judiciary and even tried to intimidate the Chief
Justice. Ignoring the advice of the Chief Justice and the Law Commission, Sahrif
bulldozed his Anti Terrorism Act through the Parliament. He tried to block the
Chief Justice’s elevation of five judges to the Supreme Court by reducing the
total number of judges on the bench. The conflict resulted in a public rift in the
bench for the first time in country’s history. The Chief Justice went out of his way
to entertain any petition against the government. The PM led an unprecedented
campaign against the judiciary in the Parliament and the media. The Chief
Justice retaliated with a writ against the PM for contempt of court. Prime
Minister’s party mobbed the court chambers and interrupted the contempt
porceeding. The conflict escalated to a level that there were virtually two
governments under the President and the Prime Minister and two apex courts
issuing notifications countering each other. The conflict ended with the
resignation of the president and the Chief Justice. By now the President’s power
to dissolve the legislature had been taken away by a constitutional amendment in
1997. Many eminent lawyers and judges believe that the ordinary litigants have
lost faith in the legal system and are clamoring for justice to be carried out in the
streets rather than in the courts. Judiciary in Pakistan has rarely stood up to
defend the constitution and the rule of law. The appointment of judges at all
levels is tainted with nepotism and favoritism. Provincial governments remained
reluctant to separate the lower level judiciary from the executive because it gives
the administration a great deal of power. The lack of separation seriously
compromises the independence of lower courts and erodes the police
accountability. Traditionally magistracy and police have enjoyed a close working
relationship. This often works against the public interest. Magistrates tend to
favor the demands of the police in matters of bail and remand. The provincial
governments and politicians for their political ends have readily manipulated the
magistracy. Successive governments have used the police for harassing
opponents and winning elections. The 1973 Constitution had provided that the
judiciary and executive at the lower level are separated within 5 years. The
implementation of this directive was repeatedly postponed despite a government
decision in 1996 separation remains incomplete. Case disposal data indicate a
better disposal rate in Pakistan than other south Asian countries. Many legal
experts believe that the case disposal remains slow. In November 1997, Lahore
High court alone had 65,000 pending cases.
16. Political Culture. The institution of “Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition”
remains unknown in Pakistan. Military regimes have destroyed the institution of
democratic opposition. Jailing and torturing of political opponents was
commonplace even under democratic regimes. The opposition did not recognize
the legitimacy of the party in power to govern. Election victories were rarely
conceded. The opposition would go to extremes to discredit the government and
was too impatient to wait for the incumbents to complete their term of office.
Instead of dialogue in the parliament, the opposition often took its issues the
courts or the streets. The ruling parties traditionally dealt harshly with the street
agitation. Most political parties do not have grassroots organization. Neither do
they hold regular elections to choose their officials. Even when elections are
held, they are unopposed. Leadership tends to be dynastic. Factionalism often
based on lineage or caste is commonplace. The governments were run by the
well-known kitchen cabinets – a coterie of non-elected and unaccountable
sycophants. The support base for most of the political parties remains narrow
and regional. Major political parties tend to be associated with one dominating
ethnic group. Some political parties are more like ethnic movements rather than
political parties. Ascriptive divisions characterized the political process and inhibit
political integration.
7. The Civil Society. The civil society is the network of ties and groups
through which people connect and are drawn into community and political affairs.
The number of NGOs is considered a good proxy for the degree of civic
engagement and good governance.39 Estimated number of NGOs in Pakistan
stands at about 10,000. Relative to its South Asian neighbors, Pakistan has the
lowest number of number of NGOs. Pakistan’s Civil Society reflects its ethnic and
religious fragmentation. It reflects the division between the traditional and modern
segments of society. Ironically a large number of Pakistan’s modern and
traditional NGOs owe their emergence to the Afghan war during the 1980s. The
“other” civil society in Pakistan works in the vernacular mode. Their leadership is
indigenous and from the grassroots. They have no linkages with the western
foreign aid donors. They do appear to have a broader base of support and
networks in the lower and lower-middle classes. Most of them are religious and
based in mosques and madrassahs. Some of them are sectarian and violent
militia-like organizations. The activities of the latter often verge on terrorism – in
the name of religion. Some allegedly are fronts for criminal organizations. The
activities of the militant sectarian organizations pose a serious threat to the rule
or law and justice in the country. They are a serious impediment in the
development of a relatively cohesive civil society and a potent threat to the work
of modern NGOs. They have a different worldview, a different agenda and a
radically different image of Pakistan’s future development. They do not win
elections. They have the street power. Governments and secular NGOs are
reluctant to challenge the traditional and religious institutions.
8. The Army and its Relations with Civilian Authorities. Weak political
institutions, corruption and perennial political instability paved the way for military
intervention. The exigencies of cold war politics facilitated military takeovers in
the past. (54-55) Pakistan’s Military became “state” within the state. Despite the
burgeoning defense expenditure limiting Pakistan’s policy options, the military
budget remains sacrosanct.43 The public opinion on military spending is divided.
A Herald poll indicated 49 % of the respondents for cutting military spending
while 51 % were against.44 The military has benefits enormously from the state.
All the three defense services – Navy, the Air Force and the Army—have created
trusts and foundations with large investments in industry. The Army’s Fauji
Foundation, an industrial conglomerate, neither pays taxes nor is subject to any
regulatory legislation.45
The army has become an “increasingly powerful vested interest in society
through its institutionalized business activities.”46 The military’s intelligence
agencies, particularly the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) operates
like a parallel government. The army lost its overt role in governing the country
when democracy was restored. Nonetheless, the military leadership believed that
it must continue to have input in important political decisions and play a
mediating role.47 The army chiefs participated in the governing Troika, courtesy
of the notorious 8 th amendment until it was removed. Throughout the
democratic interlude, the Prime Ministers solicited army’s support in their
quarrels with the President and the judiciary. They called upon the army to
restore law and order. The army conducted and supervised the elections. The
army took over the.10 Water and Power Development Authority because the
civilian regimes failed to deal with its mismanagement and corruption. The
Punjab government invited the army to supervise the matriculation examinations
to curb cheating. The provincial government used the army to check out the
“ghost” schools and basic health units. This repeated resort to army to deal with
routine administrative problems not only strengthened army’s claim to intervene
in civilian matters but also underscored the administrative incapacity of the
civilian regimes. During 1997-98 in the wake of nuclear tests, Sharif’s removal of
the 8th Amendment and the looming fiscal crisis the army sought a more
institutional role in country’s governance. They warned that in a nuclear South
Asia the threat to national security arises is internal and not external. A well
defined, institutionalized role for the army was necessary to counter these
threats. The strained relations of the PM with COAS over a host of issues then
the former’s clumsy attempt to replace the COAS ended not surprisingly, in a
coup. Almost total lack of civilian control on country’s armed forces imposes a
major constraint on civic, political and economic governance. The limits on
initiating foreign policy, cutting the defense budget, control of the nuclear
program and over covert intelligence activities are awesome constraints on
civilian regimes. Pakistan’s democratically elected Prime Ministers have
repeatedly failed to live with this reality. Ironically the same leaders, when in
opposition, repeatedly appealed to the army to intervene and bring down an
elected government before completing its term.
9. Entrenced Bureaucracy. Pakistan’s bureaucracy remains largely bound
by the legacy of the vice-regal system. In this age of knowledge based, learning
organization the system still dominated by the generalist administrators. The
generalist bias is partially responsible for the relative lack of policy capacity and
policy analysis. Fifty two years after independence, the system still clings to the
top down “Governing Corporation” model based on the artificial policy /
administration dichotomy established in the 19 th century 51. During the last
decade, the public service has become more politicized. Grand scale corruption
required close collaboration between the politicians (Ministers) and the senior
bureaucrats. The use of district and local level administration during the elections
eroded their neutrality. Bureaucracy was involved in the President-PM conflicts
as well as the power struggle between the provinces and the federal government.
Finally in Pakistan’s traditional culture kinship and religious ties tended to
compromise the impartiality of the public service.11 Bureaucracy remains
bloated. The government employs 20 % of the non-agricultural work force 52 .
The huge cost of maintaining such a large civil service draws resources away
from the development sectors. During the last decade, governments filled
thousands of positions in the lower ranks of strategic departments on the basis of
patronage 53. On a scale of 0 (worse) to 10 (best) Mauro rates the efficiency of
Pakistani bureaucracy at 4.3, the lowest score among South Asian countries 54 .
11. Structural Constraints On Good Governance. The combination of
poverty, rapidly growing population and scarce resources make a lethal
combination against good governance. There are no examples of good
governance in low income, heavily populated, resource scarce countries. Penury
of resources and a very high demand for services imposes quasi-insurmountable
constraints on allocative efficiency In addition to these fundamental constraints
on good governance; Pakistan is burdened with awesome structural constraints.
Pakistan is a deeply divided society. Its five major ethnic groups – Punjabis,
Pushtoons, Balochis, Sindhis and Muhajirs – have defied national integration.
They have significant cultural and linguistic differences. Islam, a uniting factor in
pre-independence era is no more a sufficient condition for national integration.
The Islamization of the last two decades has brought dormant sectarian
differences to the surface. The emergence of militant sectarian organizations is
threatening the very fabric of social life. These ethnic and religious divisions are
reflected in the state and political institutions, thus creating a fragmented state
with little institutional or social cohesion. The ethnic and religious fragmentation
makes governance a formidable challenge.
12. Ethnic Diversity. The last four elections have consistently revealed the
regional character of political parties and their ethnically based support. This
ethnic and political fragmentation often results into relatively fragile coalition
governments which spend most of their time devising survival strategies rather
than constructive policy design and good governance. The demands from ethnic
minorities constantly challenge the legitimacy of the state apparatus. During the
democratic era a Punjabi or Sindhi Prime Minister found it extremely difficult to
govern the country if ethnically dominated regional parties controlled three out of
four provincial governments. Competition for political power took the form of
ethnic conflict leading to endemic violence. Sindh remained engulfed in ethnic
violence for almost two decades. During the operation Sindh (1992-95), the MQM
was practically engaged in a civil war against the army.56 The generous US
financing (including weapons) during the Afghan war led to the rise of militant
religious groups 57 . Zia’s politically expedient alliances with religious groups and
ban on secular political activity lead to the resurgence of religious groups.58.12.
There are about 8000 registered and about 25,000 unregistered such institutions
in Karachi alone. Out of 2512 religious educational institutions in Punjab, over
870 subscribe to violent sectarian philosophies 59. Madrassahs are producing a
large number of committed cadres. Majority turns to militant religious
organizations and political parties for work. Khan lists five major militias
functioning out of sectarian belt in central Punjab 60 . The sectarian
organizations remain a defiant challenge to the rule of law. Their leaders have
assumed the mantle of divine laws. Their followers believe they are carrying on a
divine mission, a holy war. They break the law of the land and get away with
murder. Weak coalition governments sometimes had to seek the support of the
religious parties in legislature. These linkages explain the ambivalence of the
elected governments in dealing with the religious parties.
13. The Rule Of Law And Corruption. The rule of law remains an
anathema to Pakistani culture. The inherent cultural propensity to take the law in
one’s own hands has been reinforced by feudalism, customs, sectarian creeds
and religious traditions. Police brutality and lack redress are also cited as
reasons to circumvent the due process of law. A parallel system of traditional
justice operates in defiance of the rule of law and judiciary in many regions of
Pakistan. Even though most of its verdicts may be diametrically opposed to the
norms of justice and codes of human rights.62 The Special Courts dealing with
heinous crimes and terrorism form yet another layer of legal institutions that pose
a challenge to the rule of law. In these situations, illegal actions are justified by a
“higher law” that bestows legitimacy on them. The overall effect, however, is a
condition of endemic lawlessness and a total disrespect for the rule of law and
judicial institutions. Violation of rules is commonplace in everyday life. Traffic
rules, customs and income declaration, school and university admissions, plane
reservations and excess baggage rule are rarely respected. Recovery of bank
loans, collection of taxes, telephone and utility bills remains problematic.63 The
idea of universal rules and laws that treat everybody equally is an anathema.
People, particularly elite and middle classes prefer to be treated as special
cases. Those who cannot have their way through influence, family connections,
sifarish (recommendation), would often resort to bribe. Normal services that
should be provided as a matter of course are allocated on the basis of ascriptive
criteria or bribes.13 Public is totally alienated from the police and the judicial
system. Use of police by politicians, fabrication of evidence and registration of
false cases against opponents is a common practice. During 1998-1999, some
50 people in Karachi and over 100 in Punjab died in police custody.64 The police
bitterly complain of shortage of personnel, weapons, transport, and forensic
capacity and above all of political interference. Their working conditions are
appalling and salaries are extremely low. The violation of the due process of law
by the Police appears to be a serious obstacle in establishing the rule of law in
the country.
14. Corruption. During the last decade, four democratic governments were
dismissed on charges of corruption. Two Prime Ministers have been personally
accused of corruption. Ms Bhutto has already been convicted for receiving
kickbacks from SGS and Cotecna. Stories of their legendary corruption have
been published in national and international press.65 Pakistan is considered to
be one of the most corrupt countries in the world. In 1996, the Transparency
International ranked Pakistan the second most corrupt among 53 countries
examined, second only to Nigeria. Corruption skews priorities, reduces allocative
efficiency, compromises the quality of programs, undermines accountability and
reduces transparency. Corruption in police and judiciary particularly leads to
gross injustice and violation of human rights.
CHAPTER-2b
The Governance and Democracy in Pakistan (by Syed Atiq ul Hassan)
CHAPTER-3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN
1. Economic Development in Pakistan since 1950s has used the framework
of a mixed economy. This concept combines the economic activities of both
public and private sectors. In this framework the government plays a dominant
role by regulating and guiding all economic activity. Management of the national
economy under a mixed economic system produces two potential effects: the
predominance of government in both national economic affairs and private sector
activities. These effects make it difficult to predict the course of the economy and
complicate economic management. The widespread failure of development
efforts especially in poor countries has created doubts about the effectiveness of
employing these mixed economy strategies.
2. During the post-World War II era, there was strong justification for an
active role of government and adopting the framework of mixed economy.
Development economists and the profession considered these factors critical for
economic growth. In the present environment of open competition in major parts
of the world, the strategy of free markets has become more popular. The
development experience of the past five decades (1950-2000) and the record of
performance in both social and economic areas in Pakistan make a strong case
for thorough re-examination of economic policy in both its formulation and
implementation. This chapter’s focus is on the identification of problems, their
impact on the economy, strategies for reform, and suggestions for possible
improvements in future endeavours.
3. The framework of mixed economy in Pakistan has remained strictly under
official authority. Government intervention has determined the pattern of
development, defined the roles of public and private activities, and entrusted the
bureaucracy with the tasks of implementation. This government control and
sponsorship of business monopolies has failed to create a competitive
environment in the free market. The mixed economy, instead of becoming an
instrument of balanced development and dynamic performance, has created an
administrative and bureaucratic economy. The overwhelming bureaucratic
involvement in economic affairs has affected the efficiency of economic
institutions. Over the years the availability of external resources has allowed the
Pakistan economy to make some economic gains, but the gains from these
efforts went mainly to those who held market power or were politically influential
and the bulk of the population felt little or no improvement.
5. Overall, the mixed economy has failed to produce people-friendly benefits
and trickle down gains in Pakistan. The control over economic institutions, by a
dominated market structure, the lop-sided distribution of income, its ignorance of
people’s potential and their needs, and economic inefficiency has failed to
achieve socially acceptable results. The nation and its people have paid a heavy
price; the dismemberment of their country in December 1971 may be attributable
at least in part to the denial of political participation and economic opportunity to
its people.
Problem Identification
6. In an international conference on economic development organized by the
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in Islamabad in January 1997,
many bureaucrats and policy-makers (both former and current incumbents) made
presentations and participated in discussions during a public forum (PIDE, 1997).
They were able to arrive at a rare consensus on the many shortcomings that
have continued to haunt the economy of Pakistan. They acknowledged poor
governance, priority of projects over policies and fiscal imprudence as the three
main causes which led to this poor socio-economic performance.
7. Governance. The process of governance in Pakistan has been flawed in
many respects – a centralized rule, weak political institutions, widespread
corruption and lacking in a tradition of political accountability. The implications
have been far reaching for the political-economic system. Bureaucrats, military
and feudal leaders continue to seek to control the political and economic
institutions and with the avowed purpose of governing the nation. This pattern of
governance has seriously compromised the principles on which the effective
functioning of national institutions, formulation and implementation of policies,
quality of economic structures, and the impartiality of the legal system depends.
There is a legacy of politically directed lending of non-performing loans from the
nationalized banks. Special development funds and rural development programs
are clear examples of rent seeking behavior.
8. Priority of Projects Over Policy. Regarding the priority of projects over
policy the picture that emerges is even more dismal. Administrative decision
making and bureaucratic management have made the economy of Pakistan even
more tightly controlled. Foreign assistance and western advisors played a key
role in selecting and financing projects in industry, agriculture and infrastructure
development and investment in human capital. These have failed to meet the
criteria of long-term goals of industrialization, infrastructure building, and
agricultural modernization. The development projects that were undertaken were
of low national priority and of questionable merit. By and large, they have proven
to be expensive and of doubtful value.
14. Some of the high priced projects were at odds with national priority and
needs. For example, railway electrification in Punjab, development of urban
centers, and settlement of Punjabis on virgin lands in Sind. The latest is the
construction of a Lahore-Peshawar motorway. This on-again, off-again planning,
has cost the country dearly in terms of cost escalation, foregone commercial and
business activities, investment constraints and has failed to create employment
opportunities while reducing state revenues. Other white elephants, projects of a
non-developmental character, include the palatial President and Prime Minister
Houses, and several other status symbol government structures in Islamabad.
Their opportunity cost is high and can be measured in terms of forgone
investment in social programmes and other more productive sectors of the
economy.
15. Project-based development in Pakistan has adversely affected the
economy. The economic landscape is full of distortions and dislocation. It has
deprived the nation and its people of basic necessities. The existence of excess
capacity in industry and the concomitant shortfall in essential raw materials and
spare parts has increased the costs for private investors.
16. Fiscal Imprudence. Fiscal prudence in public finance is the key to
macroeconomic stability and sustained economic development. Shortfalls in
revenues and wasteful non-development expenditures emanate from poor fiscal
management. In a political system, which places few constraints of accountability
at any level of government, public borrowing and big budget deficits have
become the easy way out. Federal deficits exceed 7 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP), domestic debt outstanding and interest payments account for 45
percent and 8 percent of GDP. Besides, there is a huge external debt of $ 33
billion with financing charges absorbing 35 percent of the annual export earnings.
Currently, external debt stands at about 60 percent of the GDP.
17. Policies such as building a new capital city of Islamabad, the not so well
thought out programme of industry and banking nationalization, the phony
programmes of rural development and public works, run-away military defense
expenditures and so-called programmes of national pride have increased the
cost of capital, wasting and diverting it from more productive investments.
Socio-Economic Impact
18. The socio-economic impact of the above-mentioned problems has been in
the form of a lop-sided pattern of development, economic dislocations and social
inequalities. The economic costs can be defined in terms lost human capital and
wasteful use of capital. The social costs to Pakistani society are in the form of
unemployment, inflation, environmental degradation, violence and crime. The
burden of these costs on the people has reinforced social inequalities. Among
the following are a few illustrations of development-based social costs in
Pakistan and their implications.
a. Market distortions have created income disparities and apparently
free lunches-by taxing the poor and subsidizing the influential.
b. Involuntary unemployment has resulted in lost wages and output
causing the depreciation of human capital.
c. Development generated inflation has discouraged productive
investment and curtailed purchasing power and the social welfare
of the common people.
d. Environmental degradation has lowered the quality of life and
increased health costs.
e. Crime and social deprivation have adversely affected investment
and productivity environment in Pakistan.
19. A survey of the current socio-economic landscape in Pakistan reveals
glaring deprivations. Recent estimates indicate that seventy percent of its 40
million people are illiterate; 60 million people lack access to health services, safe
water and sanitation. The gross enrollment in elementary education is less than
24 percent and over 30 percent of population lives in poverty; only 35 percent of
the population is in the labor force (United Nation Development Program, 1997-
98). The future outlook is not optimistic either. Population growth is nearly 3.2
percent, one of the highest in the world. Annual public expenditure on education
and health is 2.7 and 1.8 percent of GDP, which is even lower than other
countries with lower incomes. Overall, the profile of human development is
dismal.
20. The irony is that while the wealthy and influential are being compensated
for social costs in a system of government welfare the poor have been forced to
pick up the tab.
21. The adoption of a mixed economy in Pakistan has affected adversely
performance levels in both private and public sectors. In the private sector, there
are striking examples of “market failure”. Agriculture is far from being modernized
and has not become a vibrant sector of the economy. A big segment of farm life
is affected by sharecropping and suffers from feudal culture. Public sectors
contribute to government failures. The economy is captive to bureaucratic
incompetence and inefficiency. The economic gains Pakistan has made in the
last five decades would have been made irrespective of role of the government
and its so-called planning and the costs could have been much smaller.
25. Examining the nature and scope of the problems and costs inflicted on the
economy and the people does not mean that the problems encountered and cost
inflicted have gone unchallenged. These issues are not new to national debate
and have been widely acknowledged in official, professional and national forums.
Reforms in the areas of governance, economic policymaking and fiscal
management have been instituted and tried but without much success precisely
due to the problems identified by the architects of failed development
approaches.
Reform Regimes
26. The nature and scope of economic problems reveals how flawed the
process of national policy-making has been in Pakistan. It is not only that projects
took precedence over policy making in the official decision-making but also the
policy making over the years was not adequately institutionalized and remained
an ad hoc process giving power and discretion to individuals rather then pursuing
the rules of institutions.
27. Other evidence also indicate that very few concerted efforts were made to
formulate a worthwhile industrial policy, modernize agriculture and develop
human capital. Policy decisions have largely responded to domestic political
expediencies and external influences and pressures. Reforms in four key areas
are worth mentioning: governance (1960s-80s), industrial reforms (1972), land
reform (1959, 1973), and economic reforms (1988-98).
28. Governance based reforms were introduced in the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s. These reforms amounted to introducing poor models of democracy,
arbitrary firing of civil servants charged with corruption, instituting numerous anti-
corruption programmes and expanding the security apparatus to maintain law
and order. But the root causes of poor governance such as tampering with the
constitution and the political process itself were rarely addressed. Frequent
interventions in the political process by the leadership coupled with the
bureaucratic, military, and feudal controls on the economy have been the real
stumbling blocks. The road to good governance and accountability is through a
stable and free democratic process, transparency and popular participation in
national governance.
29. Industrialization in Pakistan started in 1950s by establishing consumer
goods industries. The industrial reforms of 1972 focused on restructuring and
diversification. These strategies were aimed at expanding an industrial base by
building a steel mill in Karachi, a heavy tool factory in Taxila, capital goods
industries, and agro-based industries such as fertilizer and food processing at
various sites throughout the country. However, frequent disruptions in the
political process mismanaged the industrial reforms.
30. The commissioning of land reforms spread over two decades from 1958 to
1977. These reforms were aimed at changing the land tenure systems,
distributions of land and loosening the feudal grip and redistribution of land
among the landless tenants. But these attempts did not succeed. Land reform
programmes in each period were neither effectively designed nor efficiently
implemented. At the dawn of the 21st century, the country is still clinging to a
feudal dominated land tenure system whose dominant features are
sharecropping and backward relations of production subservience of tenants to
landowners.
31. The economic reforms of 1983-97 were based on supply-side
approaches– liberalization of the economy, trade, investments and privatization.
However, their success depended upon a concerted effort in implementation and
obedience to the “rules of the marketplace.” Due to half-hearted efforts, the
expected outcomes of the economic reforms such as rapid economic expansion,
export-led growth, higher incomes for all groups, expanded health and education
benefits, better housing, and building of “social safety net” have not been
adequately realized.
CHAPTER-4
Foreign Policy and Crisis of Governance
1. There exists a symbiotic relationship between the foreign policy of every
country and between two specific factors; the geo-strategic context (regional and
global) within which a country is located and the domestic compulsions of a
country which include governance issues and economic constraints that exists.
Depending on the economic strength, the military power and the leadership of a
country, a country's foreign policy to a varying degree impacts upon these two
elements and vice versa the foreign policy is influenced by these two elements. A
dynamic connectivity is in fact constantly at work between foreign policy,
governance and the geo-strategic environment. Autonomy, admittedly of varying
degrees, is therefore available to all states to make their choices on the foreign
policy. Their choices therefore define regional and global geo-strategic
environments. Today however the supra-state actors like the United Nations, the
IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD as well as sub-state actors including multi-nationals,
NGOs, various shades of liberation movements, transnational militant
movements and the media also define the geo-strategic environment.
2. Pakistan's foreign policy has been no exception to this rule. Ever since
1947 Pakistan's successive foreign policies have been defined by both
Pakistan's geo-strategic environment and by issues of governance, specifically
economic issues. Conversely, though to a lesser degree, Pakistan's foreign
policy too has had an impact on governance-related issues. Whatever the
content, orientation and conduct of Pakistan's foreign policy it has been a policy
that has been determined by successive governments who made autonomous
and calculated choices .
3. That their autonomy initially was circumscribed by the pressures that a
new born state, with a three front situation (India, Afghanistan and China) and an
ill-equipped newborn state, did not completely deny them independence of
choice. The nature of the choices made by successive governments can be
debated upon but not the fact that each government exercised, Pakistan's
sovereign right to opt and reject allies. A review of Pakistan's foreign policy
underscores the fact that foreign policy-making has been undertaken
autonomously by the state and in content has not been responsive to populist
pressures.
5. In a country whose political history has been marked by discontinuity and
upheaval, foreign policy-making has been perhaps the most professionally
handled arena. Foreign policy-making was conducted largely through an
institutionalized framework as opposed to other aspects of policy-making. Kargil
perhaps was an exception. That this professionally managed policy did not yield
positive benefits for the country's economy, points to broader issues of
governance that remained neglected over the decades. Now we are experiencing
their cumulative effect.
The Foreign Policy Yield
6. In the fifties prompted by the security and economic concerns Pakistan
adopted a foreign policy whose main pillar was an alliance with the United
States. Economic and military advantages accrued to the state from this alliance.
Concessional assistance, military training and equipment came. The domestic
fall-out of this alliance and other factors like a newborn state, confronted with
threats and therefore insecure, was that leftist leaning dissent was dealt out from
the political arena.
7. In the sixties too it was a continuation of the fifties policy. The opening up
with China took place in the late sixties and with it the initiation of a strategic
relationship with China which continues to be the central pillar of Pakistan's
foreign policy. However, sixties was a period of economic boom in the industrial
sector. Its exports were more than that of Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and
combined. In the sixties Pakistan's foreign policy however yielded rich dividends
in the form of large amounts of concessional flows.
8. In the seventies too the reorientation of a divided Pakistan by the brilliant
and flamboyant Zulfikar Ali Bhutto towards the Muslim world yielded multiple
advantages. The Middle East connection ensured flow of petrodollar, defence
alliances and a special stature for a divided and defeated Pakistan. By the mid-
eighties the flow of funds from around 3 million Pakistani workers amounted to
around 6 billion dollars. This largely covered the trade imbalances caused by the
increase in oil prices .
9. The period of the eighties was an aberration in Pakistan's history. More a
nightmare. The military dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, the hangman of
an elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, military dictator and a domestically
isolated man ended up ruling the country for eleven long years. On the foreign
policy front he converted his foes into friends; he spent his eleven years
befriending the India, China, warring Iran and Iraq, the Arab states, China and
the United States. However, for the United States and especially the Reagan
administration Zia became the man who led the roll-back of the evil Soviet
empire.
10. Whatever Zia's successes on the foreign policy front otherwise his Afghan
policy which yielded the Washington-Rawalpindi nexus helped Pakistan to earn a
3.2 billion dollar aid and loan package. Together the CIA and Pakistan's ISI co-
authored and engineered the Afghan jihad.
13. In the eighties and nineties a fairly large part of the deficit was financed by
short-term borrowings at high rates. Earlier in the sixties the gap between the
gross domestic savings and investment was financed by highly concessional
assistance , mostly from the World Bank and the United States. By the middle of
the nineties Pakistan carried a very large debt burden of over 30 billion dollars.
14. In the nineties while policy on the security front remained on track, the
inept state and inept leadership steered the country from crisis to crisis. Against
the backdrop of sectarian and ethnic violence problems of corruption, nepotism
and inefficiency the country got deeply mired in the debt trap. Significantly as
economists like Shahid Javed Burki and others argued that it was less the
nuclear test and more the cardinal error of freezing the foreign currency accounts
adding to Pakistan's economic troubles.
15. Clearly until the eighties Pakistan's foreign policy continued to provide
easy cash injections and military windfall to the Pakistani state. However, the
state failed to convert this windfall into a lasting strength especially in the
economic arena. Domestic policy led to low domestic savings rates, also
prevented from us from capitalizing on our own potential, perpetuated inefficient
banking systems, retained a narrow tax base, minimal effort was made to
document the economy. Collapse of public sector began, the railways, WAPDA,
KESC etc, by 1997, 34% of Pakistan's population was living on the poverty line.
Issues of distributive justice were overlooked.
Where Do We Stand Today
16. On the military security front Pakistan has done well. A nuclear
deterrence, a professional army and a national will to defend the country inspires
confidence. However, on a broader, crucial level what is happening in the hearts
and minds of our people? What is the economic situation in the country? The
answer is evident: organized and armed hate and anger exists within our own
ranks; economic crisis we confront needs no elaboration as we are confronted by
a $40 billion worth of external debt and finally according to Washington and some
Arab countries those committing and planning acts of sabotage in the United
States are being tracked back to training camps functioning in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
17. Today's economic crisis is the cumulative outcome of flawed policies and
a failure to make tough choices opt for documentation of the economy for
instance, because the Middle East remittances, the Afghan jihad money, petro-
dollars and the aid money came easy. It has been a ruling class that has been on
a perpetual picnic. On the internal security front too the situation has
continuously deteriorated. Pakistani commentators endlessly cautioned against
the fall-out of the klashnikov culture, the drug culture, the sectarian curse etc.
Until recently all this has continued to flourish because of the failure of
successive governments because of their own weaknesses and the lack of
consensus among different state institutions on a strategy to deal with the
problem.
What is the Solution
18. Principally more effective and rational governance. Foreign policy needs
to be contextualized in the broader framework of the failure of the state.
Pakistan's objective should be to construct a developmental state rather than a
predatory state. The need of the hour is to generate growth in the economy so
that conduct of foreign policy is not dictated by economic shortcomings.
19. Specifically on the governance front the state must take the following
actions:
a. Enforce rule of law within the country and undertake to de-weaponize
all non-state actors.
b. Establish a code of ethics for all opinion making forums including the
masjid, politician and the press banning all actions that spread hatred
against various sects and ethnic groups.
c. Ensure tighter controls at border check-points especially with China
and Iran.
d. Banning of political parties should be out, taking strict action against
those that incite hatred and preach violence against non-Pakistanis,
should be in.
e. Government should continuously reiterate that Islam cannot be used
for political opportunism.
f. Narrow the divide between the have and the have-nots and between
the western educated elite and the locally educated. Bridge-building
must replace the us versus them divide.
g. Advocate freedom of expression within the parameters of Pakistan's
Constitution. This must be at the core of a society dedicated to
progress and development. Because it is a rough and risky path we
should not abandon it. Thought cannot be suppressed. Freedom of
expression will enable logical and credible ideas to survive in the
marketplace of ideas. We must recognize that thought control breeds
resentment, bitterness and violence.
h. Address the genuine and reasonable concerns of other countries
which relate to our territory.
j. It is these credible moves that alone that will earn the Pakistani state
respect and peoples' confidence at home and credibility among other
states. There are, however, limits to state control. Given the broader
context , there exists a supra-national consciousness among the
Pakistanis of the problems of Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, and
Bosnia. While the Pakistani state addresses these issues within a
statist realpolitik framework the non-state actors will continue their
support, political, moral , material and even maybe military, depending
on what avenues are available to them.
20. What is clear is that the current crisis of governance in Pakistan is not
linked to foreign policy and, therefore, the solution to this crisis does not lie in
altering the objectives and content of foreign policy .
21. There is no demonstrable connection between Pakistan's foreign policy
objectives and our current crisis of governance. Since the early nineties Pakistan
has demonstrably played an important role in trying to bring peace to
Afghanistan. Significantly the only negotiated instrument which ensured peaceful
transfer of power was the 1993 Islamabad Accord.
22. In the region, however, there continues a power play in which all of
Afghanistan's neighbours are involved. Pakistan's proposals for peace and call
for ceasefire, the 1997 shuttle diplomacy efforts at initiating an intra-Afghan
dialogue , its 1998 proposals for enforcing an arms embargo were as
unambiguously undertaken as the aborted attempt by a neighbouring state to
supply of 900 metric tons of weapons to the Northern Alliance. Pakistan has
facilitated the policy of constructive engagement between many regional states
including China, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhistan and the Talibaan.
23. On issues like the Afghan Transit Trade, Pak-India relations, Pak-US
relations the nuclear issue, Kashmir Pakistan has adopted a wisely thought
through policy the Kargil episode being the exception.
Need to Alter Conduct of Foreign Policy
24. Pakistan's weakness lies in ineffective projection of Pakistan's foreign
policy. Unwarranted and counterproductive secrecy in a media context which
ensures complete transparency. Weakness on information management enables
others to define the story, the reality of Pakistan's policy. An excessively cautious
approach in managing foreign policy related information has contributed to
undermining what has arguably been a viable and valid policy on for example
Afghanistan, India, Gulf and the US.
25. Until recently populist rhetoric on key foreign policy issues became the
passport for public acceptance for corrupt and inept politicians and cabinet
members. A sobriety in the conduct of policy is therefore required.
26. Increased coordination among foreign policy-making institutions.
27. Restructuring of foreign policy setup to integrate economic agenda in the
mainstream of foreign policy-making and implementation.
Impact of the Crisis of Governance on Foreign Policy
28. Concrete Level . Minimal benefits that translate into peoples' prosperity
and a nation's progress have been harvested from Pakistan's foreign policy.
There has been a complete failure to capitalize on the economic front. For
example our special relations with countries like China, Malaysia, Iran, the Gulf
States and even South Africa have not been used. All these three countries have
continuously indicated specific interest in broadening trade and investment
relations. Yet because of the mess on the economic front on the home front, no
headway has been made with any of the three countries. Only under an
improved system of economic direction backed by efficiently functioning
institutions leading can radically alter the status quo on the trade and investment
front.
29. Living off cash windfalls over the years the Pakistani state acquired a
predatory non-productive character.
30. Psychological Level. A psychologically handicapped decision-making
elite; one with a somewhat dependant and derivative mindset.A commenting
class that judges itself through the eyes of others and that tends to become
overwhelmed by external criticisms, whether valid or invalid. This has taken away
from our own ability to dig our teeth into our own internal problems and instead
tempted us to look for external sources of sustenance.
Myths That Continue to Flourish
31. Reduced military budget will ensure social development.
32. Our Nuclear Policy has cost us foreign investment.
33. Signing the CTBT will help to end our so-called 'isolation.'
Patterns that Emerge
34. The state has consistently been able to take autonomous decisions in the
foreign policy arena on key security issues.
35. Pakistan's foreign policy has helped Pakistan to effectively deal with the
security threats it has confronted. The tragic breakup of 1971 however was
caused by the failure of the Pakistani state , weak governance and Indian
aggression.
36. Pakistan has never reconciled with the illegal occupation of Jammu and
Kashmir by India. As a party UN-acknowledged party to the Kashmir dispute
Pakistan will continue to support the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination.
Foreign policy was not able to 'deliver' on the economic front because of a
continuing crisis of governance. A proactive foreign policy conducted only on the
security front. On the economic front the focus has been on acquiring aid and
loans. Minimal effort was made to develop economic relations with our regional
and distant friends.
37. The economic benefits from successive foreign policy have fed the non-
productive predatory state.
38. Because of a weak state and a weak commercial activity operationally
Pakistan has pursued a one-dimensional relationship in which economic relations
have not been cultivated. Unidimensional relations have led to developing
tenuous and fragile relations with even our close friends. For example problems
with Iran over Afghanistan has led to a crisis in our relations.
Conclusion
39. Pakistan's current foreign policy is not responsible for the prevailing crisis
of governance. It is the character of the state and the character of those who
wielded state power has been responsible for the current crisis of governance.