Watson y Hoffman Managers as Negotiators a Test of Power Versus Gender as Predictors of Feelings, Behavior, And Outcomes

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MANAGERS AS NEGOTIATORS:

A Test of Power versus Gender

as Predictors of Feelings,

Behavior, and Outcomes

Carol baronRider University

L. Richard HoffmanRutgers University

This study explores the impact of gender and power on the feelings, behavior. and outcomes achieved by

managerial men and women engaged in an intm-organizational conflict. Forty pairs of practtcing

managers (40 men and 40 women in same- and mixed-gender pairs) took part in a simulated negotiation

in which the parties differed in ~~r~ani~ation~ power. This design permitted the testing of several

hypotheses about the direct effects of gender and power. as well as the question of whether gender and

power would accumulate to men‘s advantage and women’s disadvantage. Results show that managerial

women expressed less confidence and less satisfaction with their own performance than managerial men

but did not differ in their behavior or in the outcomes they achieved. High-power managers, of bothgenders, attempted to engage in cooperative behavior with their partners. and believed they achieved

cooperative outcomes. But low-power managers were more competitive and felt they gained their own

ends at the expense of the other party. Some interactions between gender and power are suggested by the

results, but none of them match predictions from existing theory. implications and limitations of the study

are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The ability to negotiate effectively has long been recognized as an integral and im~o~ant

aspect of managerial success. Indeed, “negotiator” and “disturbance handler” were

* Direct all correspondence to: Carol Watson, College of Business Administration, Rider Ilniversity,

Lawrenceville, NJ 08648.3099.

Leadership Quarterly. 7( 1 , 63-85.

Copyright 0 1996 by JAI Press Inc.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

ISSN: 10489843



64 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 7 No. 1 1996

identified by Mintzberg (1973) as key managerial roles, representing formal and informal

types of managerial negotiations. Managers negotiate with peers and superiors within the

organization, suppliers and customers outside the organization, and even with subordinates

when the manager prefers not to, or is unable to, use legitimate authority or coercion (e.g.,

Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Mechanic, 1962).

While negotiation has always been an important part of a manager’s job, its importance

will likely be increased by current trends toward more networked organizations, employee

empowerment, and team structures which dramatically alter the nature of relationships

between organizational members (e.g., Lawler, 1986; Weisbord, 1987). The negotiation

skills required to develop these kinds of collaborative working relationships may well be

different from those associated with competitive negotiation (Fisher & Ury, 198 1; Lax &

Sebenius, 1986; Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989).

Accompanying these kinds of changes in the nature of managerial work is the growing

presence of women in managerial ranks, a presence which increasingly puts women into

positions of authority (Morrison, White, & VanVelsor, 1987). Will women and men fare

differently in the new organizational environments that are beginning to emerge? Can men

and women be expected to negotiate similarly with peers, superiors, and subordinates or

will they bring different attitudes and skills to such negotiations? Moreover, can they be

expected to negotiate similarly with male and female peers, superiors, and subordinates, or

will gender and organizational status and power interact to produce different expectations

and patterns of behavior? These questions motivated the study reported here.

Gender and Negotiation

Our focus on gender addresses the question of whether there are gender differences in

negotiating attitudes and behaviors. Many researchers agree with the conclusion Vinacke

and his colleagues (e.g., Vinacke et al., 1974) drew from their studies of coalition

formation in bargaining that women show “a concern for interpersonal relationships, an

orientation toward discussion rather than competitive bargaining, and a reliance on rules of

fairness,” whereas men engage in “ruthless bargaining, the exercise of power, and an

orientation toward maximizing individual gain” (Vinacke et al., 1974, p. 511). Rubin and

Brown’s (1975) review of all the negotiation and bargaining studies that had been

conducted up to that time found some studies in which women were more cooperative than

men, others in which they were less cooperative, and still others in which there were no

differences. While recognizing that there were no consistent gender differences, Rubin and

Brown still concluded that women are more highly sensitive to the interpersonal aspects of

their relationship with their partners and would probably be more likely than men to

approach negotiations with a cooperative orientation. More recently, Thompson (I 990)

also found support for this view.

Kolb and Coolidge ( 1988) have offered a feminist rationale for the assertion that women

are more relationship-oriented than men. Drawing on the work of Gilligan (1982) and

Chodorow (1978), they argued that women find the negotiating table an alien place

because it puts them in opposition to others and calls for aggressiveness, which isantithetical to women’s prescribed supportive role in society (Eagly, 1987). Consequently,

Kolb and Coolidge expect women to feel disadvantaged and uncomfortable when they

need to negotiate. Further, they express the concern that women’s tendency toward



Power and Gender 55

empathy and their preference for problem-solving approaches may lead to their

exploitation in negotiations, especially when confronting a competitive male opponent.

Despite the general assumption that women are more cooperative, pleasant, and

relationship-oriented in negotiations, empirical support for it is far from consistent. As

noted earlier, Rubin and Brown (1975) found a substantial number of studies in which

there were either no gender differences or in which women were actually less cooperative

than men. Some researchers have actually concluded that women are more vindictive than

men (e.g., Rapoport & Chamm~, 1965). This conclusion has been drawn primarily from

laboratory studies of gaming behavior which tend to use tasks with limited choices and

highly constrained interactions (e.g., Prisoner’s Dilemma studies in which participants

may either “compete” or “cooperate” and seldom can communicate with their opponent).

However, Kanter (I 977, 1979) observed lower-level women managers to be mean and

petty in their treatment of subordinates, so the possibility exists that women become

petulant, threatening, and vengeful when they fail to get their way in bargaining situations.

In light of this conflicting evidence concerning the nature and even existence of gender

differences, we examine the question in the context of an intra-organizational negotiation

simulation involving practicing managers. The following hypotheses are tested in the

present study:

Hypothesis la. Manage~al women will feel less confident, more cooperative,

expect more cooperation from their opponents, feel less powerful before the

negotiation, and less effective as negotiators afterwards than will managerial

men.

Hy~thesis lb. Manage~al women more often will use acquiescence and

concession as tactics and will seek out the other party’s preferences and needs

than will managerial men.

Hypothesis lc. Managerial women will obtain more win-lose outcomes in which

they give up more than they get than will managerial men.

Structural Power and negotiation

The bargaining and negotiating literature has generally assumed that gender per se leads

men and women to negotiate differently, but a completely different explanation has been

offered in the literature on structural power and social status. Both status and structural

power have been shown to determine such things as perceptions of one’s competence,

frequency of attempts to use power, and success at influence attempts (Berger, Cohen, &

Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977). Women historically have been

excluded from the higher ranked positions in organizations (e.g., Kanter, 1977, 1979;

Morrison et al., 1987; Schwartz & Zimmerman, 1992), have had lower status than men

(e.g., Lockheed & Hall, 1975), and have been viewed as less competent, less powerful, and

less successful influencers than men (Eagly & Wood, 1982; WiIey & Eskilson, 1983).Thus, it has been argued that women’s more cooperative and compliant behavior in power-

oriented interactions arises from their experience in adapting to low-power, low-status

positions in organizations and in society generally, not from their gender or from




internalized gender roles (Kanter, 1977; Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neill, 1977). This

proposition has received little empirical investigation (see Watson, 1994a, 1994b), but

some support for it has been found with regard to social exchange behavior (e.g., Molm,

1985, 1986; Molm & Hedley, 1992), visual dominance (Dovidio et al. 1988), tactics in

labor-management negotiations (Putnam & Jones, 1982), and expressions of hostility in

group discussions (Siderits, Johannsen, & Fadden, 1985). We therefore propose the

following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. High power managers, regardless of gender, will feel more

confident, more competitive, more certain that their partners will cooperate

with them, more powerful, and more satisfied with the outcomes they achieve

than will low-power managers.

Independent of possible gender differences in negotiating behavior is the question of

how managers negotiate from different organizational power positions. Although a

manager’s power may derive from many sources-for example, position, reward,

expertness, and so forth (French & Raven, 1959)-recognition and acceptance by the other

are necessary to legitimate the manager’s attempts to influence even when the other has

less power. The latter also has some power, if no more than the willingness to break off the

relationship on which the high-power person depends. Thus, in negotiations between more

and less powerful managers, one may ask whether people with greater power will simply

attempt to dominate to attain their own ends or whether they will consider the other

person’s needs and try to maximize joint outcomes.

The dominant models of conflict management behavior (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964;

Pruitt, 1983a; Rahim, 1983; Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989; Thomas, 1979, 1992;

Walton & McKersie, 1965) classify negotiating tactics in terms of two independent

dimensions: ( 1) degree of concern with one’s own needs and (2) degree of concern with the

needs of one’s opponent. Tactic choice is presumably dictated by one’s degree of concern

for own and other’s needs and ranges from competitive behavior (based on concern for

own needs only) to accommodative behavior (based on concern for other’s needs only) to

problem-solving behavior (based on simultaneous and strong concern for both own and

other’s needs).

There is ample evidence from studies of bargaining and negotiation that more powerfulpeople focus on their own needs and, therefore, dominate the less powerful in gaining their

own ends (e.g., Bartos, 1970; Gifford, 1989; Lawler, Ford, & Blegen, 1988; Rubin &

Brown, 1975; Wall, 1985). In fact, some theorists recommend that high-power parties use

their power to exploit a weaker opponent rather than “waste” their resources trying to get

their way by improving their relations with the opponent (Wall, 1985), a view that assumes

that ongoing relations between the parties are unimportant. Yet, recent studies of

managers’ influence behaviors by Yukl and others (Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey,

1992; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) have shown that

managers vary their choice of intluence tactics when dealing with peers, superiors, and

subordinates. Perhaps because they recognize that these are all ongoing relationships,managers have been found to be more likely to use consultation and ingratiation tactics

initially to influence peers and subordinates, resorting to pressure tactics only when these

fail. On the other hand, managers usually attempt to influence their superiors through



Power and Gender 67

rational persuasion. Thus, it appears that experienced managers may use a power

advantage to collaborate rather than to compete, whereas they are likely to engage in what

has been called soft competition (Savage, Blair, & Sorenson, 1989) when they have less

power.

We therefore propose the following hypotheses concerning the impact of structural

power on tactic choice:

Hypothesis 3a. High-power managers will enact both more problem-solving

behaviors and more coercive behaviors than will low-power managers.

Hypothesis 3b. Low-power managers will enact more soft competitive tactics

(e.g., use of reason and logic to persuade) than will high-power managers.

The expected impact of these tactics on the outcomes of negotiations is implied by their

descriptions. Accommodating is expected to lead to low personal substantive gains, though

it may also produce the positive outcome of good relations with the other (e.g., Savage et

al., 1989). Competing is expected to lead to high personal gains but often at the expense of

future relations, especially when threats and abuse occur. Integrative, problem-solving

behavior is expected to yield high personal gains as well as build good relations between

the parties. Nevertheless, it is clear that the outcomes one can achieve depend not simply

upon one’s own behavior but also upon that of one’s opponent as well (e.g., Putnam &

Jones, 1982; Savage et al., 1989). For example, while competitive tactics are supposed to

lead to high individual gains, if both parties compete, impasses are likely to result, leading

to low personal outcomes for both parties. Furthermore, while problem-solving seems to be

the most desirable approach, since it leads to high substantive and relationship outcomes,

it is considered a risky tactic because one’s opponent might not reciprocate, leaving one

open to exploitation (e.g., Pruitt, 1983a; Savage et al., 1989).

Assuming the studies of managerial influence attempts are correct (e.g., Yukl & Falbe,

1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993; Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson,

1980). high-power managers and low-power managers can be expected to employ

antithetical approaches. Since it is unclear how this situation will be resolved, we will treat

this as an exploratory aspect of the study rather than fo~ulating a specific hypothesis.

Gender and Power

The discussion so far has considered only the direct and independent effects of

gender and power. However, the theories of structural power and status suggest

possible interactive effects of gender and power. Since gender confers higher status on

men and lower status on women, some (e.g., Lockheed & Hall, 1975) have suggested

that being male should enhance structural power and being female should detract from

it (Fagenson, 1990; Powell, Posner, & Schmidt, 1984; Terborg, 1977). Thus, male high-

power managers can be expected to feel especially powerful and attempt even moredominating forms of influence, while female low-power managers would feet

especially powerless and be even more accommodating. In the other two conditions,

the gender and power effects would presumably cancel each other out. On the basis of




this argument, we test the following hypotheses that gender and power will combine

additivefy such that

Hypothesis 4a. For participants with equal structural power, managerial women

will feel significantly less confident, competitive, powerful, and trusting

before negotiation and less successful afterward than will managerial men, but

managerial women with high structural power will not differ from managerial

men with low structural power.

Hypothesis 4b. For participants with equal structural power, managerial women

will engage in more yielding and accommodating behavior than will

managerial men, but managerial women with high structural power will not

differ from managerial men with low structural power in their use of

negotiating tactics.

Finally, an even more complex prediction about the interaction between gender and

power has been offered by expectation states theory (Berger et al., 1972; Berger et al.

1977), another prominent theory of social status. According to this perspective, status

characteristics affect feelings, behavior, and outcomes only when they are activated. Status

characteristics are activated when members of a pair differ on those characte~stics.

Because members of negotiating pairs always had different power positions in this study,

power should be activated in all pairs. Gender, however, should be activated only in mixed-

gender pairs, resulting in the prediction that gender and power will combine additively inmixed-sex pairs of negotiators but not in same-sex pairs.

Hypothesis 5a and 5b. The predictions of Hypotheses 4a and 4b will hold only in

mixed-gender pairs of negotiators, not for same-gender pairs.

To test these hypotheses about the impact of gender and power on managerial

negotiations, we developed a realistic, intra-organizational, simulated negotiation suitable

for practicing managers. The simulation placed two managers in a situation of high versus

low structural power to negotiate the selection of a vendor for an important company

project and the means of implementation of the project. By assigning actual male andfemale managers randomly to the high- and low-power roles, we created an experimental

design capable of assessing separately the effects of gender and structural power on the

feelings, behaviors, and outcomes of negotiations, The possibility that experienced male

and female managers might negotiate differently in high- and low- power positions and

with a same- or opposite-gender partner can also be examined within this design.

METHOD

Participants

A sample of 80 practicing managers from 18 firms in manufacturing, service, and

educational fields formed 40 negotiation pairs. The 40 men and 40 women were

comparable on almost all demographic measures. On average, these managers were 38



Power and Gender 69

years old, had 4.7 years of education beyond high school, and were middle managers

(46%) with 13 direct reports. They generally spent little time handling formal negotiation

(11% of their time on average) but considerably more time handling informal negotiations

(42% of their time on average). Most (82%) had received no more than a day or less of

training in negotiation. They differed significantly only in how long they had been in their

current managerial positions (4.5 years for men, 2.7 years for women, F,,, = 6.02, p <

.02). Because the number of years in current position was moderately (negatively)

correlated with several dependent variables, it was used as a covariate in all statistical

analyses so we could isolate the effect of gender.

Procedure

Participants took part in half-day sessions devoted to data collection via a simulated

in&a-organizational negotiation and subsequent processing of the simulation. They hadbeen told that they would receive training in negotiation, but there was no training in, or

even discussion of, negotiation until all participants had finished the simulation and

completed all questionnaires.

Participants were paired with either a same- or opposite-gender opponent, in most cases

with someone they did not know. Their partners were pointed out to them before they

negotiated so they knew if they would be negotiating with a male or female. They were not

allowed to meet or talk before they negotiated, however. They read their role instructions,

completed a battery of questionnaires, negotiated for 20 minutes in private rooms, and then

completed another battery of questionnaires.

The Negotiation Simulation

The simulation developed for this study involves two managers who work for the same

division of a large conglomerate. The division is about to purchase and install a turn-key

computer system to track sales activity in its numerous field sites. The two managers, the

Head of Field Sales Operations and a Division Staff Specialist, have been assigned to the

turnkey project by the division’s president. They are to select a vendor to provide the

system and then to oversee the implementation of the system. The project has high

visibility because the division has been experiencing significant declines in sales and the

division president is hoping the sales tracking system will help them overcome thisproblem.

The Field Manager is given more structural power in the role-play than the Staff

Manager. This power derives from the Field Manager’s higher rank in the division

(indicated through an organization chart included in the role descriptions), formal authority

over all phases of the project (Staff is in strictly an advisory capacity), longer tenure with

the division (15 years versus 2 years), and being a line manager in what is described as a

historically line-run organization. In addition, the meeting is held in the Field Manager’s

office and kept to 20 minutes due to his/her busy schedule.

The Staff Manager has little structural power but has expertise in computer systems. S/

he wants to obtain a strong hand in the project, since this is the kind of thing his/herdepartment was created to do. The Staff Manager’s boss has instructed him/her to try to

control which vendor is selected and to secure the right to oversee system imple-mentation,

because the Field Manager is not believed to have the relevant expertise.




The power manipulation was highly successful. Immediately prior to negotiating,

participants in the Field Manager role reported that they had significantly more power

(mean = 4.1 on a 5-point scale where 5 = “I have much more power than my partner”) than

those in the Staff Manager role (mean = 2.1 where 1 = “S/he has much more power than I;”

F 1.78=71.74,p < ,001).

The conflict between the two parties revolves around three key issues: which vendor

should provide the system, whether to include a penalty clause in the vendor’s contract, and

oversight of the implementation of the system. The simulation was designed to be a mixed-

motive situation with integrative potential. This was done by manipulating how important

the issues were to each party so that each had something to trade off for what they wanted

most. Post-negotiation manipulation checks (all measured on 9-point scales) verified that

Staff Managers cared more about which vendor would be selected (mean = 6.8) than did

Field Managers (mean = 1.8; F,,,, = 63 1.14, p < .OOOl); that Field Managers cared more

about the penalty clause (mean = 6.6) than did Staff Managers (mean = 2.0; F,,,,y =343.33,

p < .OOOl); and that both cared equally about project oversight (Staff = 6.4, Field = 6.6;

F 1,7s = .64, n.s.).

Dependent Measures

Scales were constructed from questions asked of the participants immediately before and

immediately after the negotiation concerning their perceptions of and feelings about the

negotiation. These scales provided three types of dependent measures: Pre-Negotiation

Feelings, Post-Negotiation Feelings, and Outcomes. In addition, audio tapes and

transcripts of the negotiation sessions were analyzed to determine participants’ behavior

during the negotiation.

Pre-Negotiation Feelings

Prior to taking part in the simulation but subsequent to having their partners pointed out

to them and reading their roles, participants rated their feelings of confidence,

competitiveness, power, and the degree of cooperativeness they expected from their

opponents. The items designed to assess confidence were a set of six semantic differential

scales (e.g., confident/nervous, prepared/unprepared, calm/tense, self-assured/hesitant).

Scores on these items were combined and formed a scale with standardized item alpha =

JO. Participants’ feelings of competitiveness versus cooperativeness were derived from

another set of three semantic differentials (competitive/cooperative, guarded/open,

untrusting/trusting). These items formed a scale with standardized item alpha = .6 1. We

also included a rating (single item, 5-point scale) of the degree of expected cooperation

since Pruitt (1983b) has argued that this provides an operational definition of trust. Finally,

to verify that the power manipulation had worked, we asked participants to indicate

whether they believed they or their partners had more power in the situation depicted in the

role-play (single item, 5-point scale).

Behavioral Measures

The negotiation sessions were audio taped and transcribed. Coding of the tapes and

transcripts proceeded in two stages. First, two trained coders divided the transcripts into



Powerand Gender 71

Table 1

Factor Loadings and Reliabilities for Coded Behaviors

Justifies Own Position (72)

Brags of Own Competence

Criticizes Other’s Position

Builds up to Own Position

Questions Other’s Position

Expresses Negative Affect

Interrupts Other

Releases Tension

Is Interrupted

Seeks Approval of Own PositionAgrees with Other

Expresses Positive Affect

Makes Self-Deprecating Remark

States Own Position

Discloses Underlying Concern

States Joint Concern

Questions Joint Solution

Rejects Joint Solution

Backchannel Agreement

AcknowIedges Other’s Concerns

Eigenvalue

Percent Variance Explained

Standardized Alpha

Norr: a Pearson r bcrwecn coders.

(.83)

(.84)

(.72)

(68)

(69)

1.72)

1.87)

1.83)

(85)(.78)

(.79)

(57)

(.72)

(.63)

(.63)

(.74)

(88)

1.99)

(.78)

.7O

.61

.65

.49

.79

.74

.67

.68

.66

.63

.42

.I3

58

Sl

.52

.48

.83

.79

.83

.77

3.83 2.33 2.03 1.74 1.62 1.31

18.2 Il.1 9.6 8.3 7.7 6.3

.52 .8S .68 .72 .80 .77

codable speech acts following guidelines spelled out by Morley and Stephenson (1977).

The mean intercoder agreement on speech acts was .86. Next, each speech act was coded

for content (position, underlying need, etc.), referent (self, other, etc.), and mode

(statement, clarification, rejection, criticism, etc.), which were ultimately collapsed into 20

general codes (e.g., stated own position, criticized other’s position, expressed negativeaffect toward partner, etc.). The mean intercoder correlation on these 20 codes across pairs

was .74, with only one code below .60 (see Table I for a complete reporting).

The 20 codes were analyzed by principal components factor analysis with varimax

rotation. This analysis yielded six factors with eigenvalues z=- , which accounted for 61.2%

of the variance. Factor loadings, eigenvalues, intercoder reliabilities, and standardized

alphas are presented in Table 1 for the six scales that emerged from this analysis.

We have labeled the six factors Placates (alpha = .77), Discloses (alpha = .72), Pleads

(alpha = .6X), Argues (alpha = .52), Bullies (alpha = .85), and Won’t Cooperate

(alpha = .80). They depict tactics that are closely related to the general negotiation

strategies (accommodating, competing, integrating, and compromising) that have beenidentified by two-dimensional models of conflict (e.g., Blake & Mouton, 1964; Rahim,

1983; Thomas, 1979, 1992) as discussed above. Placates refiects a cooperative,

accommodating orientation since it involves acknowledging the other’s concerns.




Discloses represents a problem-solving orientation in that it includes disclosures of

underlying concerns and statements of joint concerns. Pleads, Argues, and Bullies are

examples of different types of competing behaviors since they ah reflect attempts to get

one’s own way, though with varying degrees of demandingness. Pleads appears to be avery soft competing approach in which the party seeks agreement with his/her position but

nervously, allowing interruptions and taking pains to agree with the opponent. Arguing is

a stronger competing approach that relies on the use of reason and logic to persuade the

opponent of the correctness of one’s own position and the incorrectness of the opponent’s.

Bullies seems to be the most aggressive of the competing approaches and reflects a

dismissal of the opponent as a person as well as of his/her position. The sixth factor, Won’t

Cooperate, appears to be the obverse of collaborative problem-solving

Outcomes

following the role-play, p~icipants completed a questionnaire in which they indicated

what decisions, if any, had been reached about each of the key issues: choice of vendor,

inclusion of a penalty clause in the contract with the chosen vendor, and which manager

would oversee system design and implementation. In any informal negotiation in which the

final settlement is not written down (as in a formal contract), each individual may leave the

meeting with his or her own perception of what the final terms were. Therefore, in the

present case, each party was asked independently to report his or her understanding of the

resolution of the three principal issues (choice of vendor. penalty clause, and oversight of

the project). These reports, which reflect each party’s belief about how the specific issues

had been resolved, provided the data from which the various outcome measures were

derived, Naturally, if parties’ beliefs differ. there will be no unified measure of outcome to

examine. Nevertheless, we are still able to look at the effects of power and gender on the

perceived outcomes reported by each member.

Competitive success in negotiations represents the amount a party “wins” for him/

herself, both in terms of the total amount (Absolute Success) and relative to the amount

achieved by one’s opponent (Relative Success). Although parties in our simulation were

not negotiating over dollars or other such readily quantifiable commodities, each was

trying to achieve certain outcomes. A person was given 2 points for each personally

illlportant outcome he/she reported attailli~g, 1 point for gaining some of that goal or

gaining some reduction in the other’s important outcome, and 0 if they failed to achievetheir goal in any way. Absolute Success for each party was the sum of these scores for the

three issues at dispute and could vary from 0 to +5. Relative Success was the algebraic sum

of the subject’s Absolute score minus the opponent’s and could vary from -5 to +S.

The quanti~cation of cooperative success (Quality) was based on the assumption that

integrative, “win-win” solutions, in which the outcomes met both parties’ needs, were of

highest quality (+4), since they ensured both that the tasks are accomplished and that long-

term relations between the managers would be good. The integrative solution was defined

in this instance as one in which the parties traded off the issue they were indifferent about

(either choice of vendor or penalty clause, depending on role assignment), got what they

wanted on their important issue (again, either vendor or penalty), and agreed to worktogether on the issue of mutual irnp~~~~ance (oversight of system inlplemen~tion~.

Compromise solutions (+3) were deemed as somewhat less cooperative and were defined

as those in which each party obtained one of his/her desired outcomes but compromised on



Power and Gender 73

the other or left it unresolved. Win-lose outcomes (+2) were those in which one party

obtained more of his/her desired outcomes than the other and were considered of much

lower quality, since only one party’s needs were satisfied. Finally, lose-lose outcomes (+1)

were those in which none of the issues was resolved.

Post-Negotiation Feelings

Following the negotiation, participants completed another questionnaire on which they

rated how much power they felt they had had during the negotiation and how satisfied they

were with the results achieved and with the process. A post-negotiation rating of power was

included to determine whether there had been any shifts in felt power during the negotiation.

To explore feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction following the negotiation, we included

a variety of ratings. Three ratings were included to assess satisfaction with the decisions that

had been reached (e.g., “How satisfied are you with the decision you and your negotiating

partner reached. 7” “To what extent do you feel you got what you wanted in this negotiation?”

etc.). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale labeled Satisfaction With Decision,

with standardized item alpha = .88. Two items were included to evaluate participants’

satisfaction with their own behavior during the negotiation (e.g., “How satisfied are you

with the way you negotiated just now/“). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale

labeled Satisfaction With Self, with standardized item alpha = .56. Finally, fourratings were

included to evaluate participants’ reactions to their opponents (e.g., “How well do you like

your partner as a person. 7” “If the two of you had to continue working together on this project,

how well would you work together?’ etc.). Combined ratings on these items yielded a scale

labeled Satisfaction With Partner with standardized item alpha = .73.

RESULTS

To aid in understanding the many analyses that were conducted to evaluate the five sets of

hypotheses concerning gender and power, we present the results for each grouping of

dependent variables in essentially the sequence that they were generated in the experiment:

pre-negotiation feelings, negotiation behaviors, outcomes, and post-negotiation feelings.

The means and intercorrelations of the measures used as dependent variables are presented

in Table 2, grouped according to these categories. The hypotheses were tested through a

three-factor MANCOVA design, in which each of the four types of dependent variables was

analyzed simultaneously. Main effects for gender, power (high versus low), and pair

composition (mixed- versus same-gender partner), as well as all the two- and three-way

interactions, comprised the model for each of these analyses. The top part of each table reports

the means of each variable (high numbers represent greater amounts) for each experimental

condition, while the bottom part shows the source and magnitudes (eta2) of all effects significant

at p < .10. This value was chosen so that small effects, which the design lacked sufficient power to

detect, would not be overlooked. The covariate was years in current managerial position, since that

variable showed small but significant correlation with two of the dependent variables.

Pre-Negotiation Feelings

After being paired with their partners, but before starting the negotiation, participants

rated their feelings of confidence, competitiveness, how much cooperation they expected






Power and Gender 75

from their opponent, and how much power they had vis-a-vis their opponent. The means of

the resulting indices are reported for each experimental condition in the top part of Table

3. The MANCOVA revealed multivariate main effects for gender (F4,67 = 2.62, p < .04),

and power (FdlG723.71, p < ,001). There were no significant interactions. Results of the

univariate analyses are reported in the bottom part of Table 3.

Prior to negotiating, women reported feeling significantly less confident than men

(means = 4.9 for women, 5.4 for men) and expected somewhat more cooperation than

men (means = 3.0 for women, 2.5 for men). However, women felt neither more nor

less competitive or powerful than men. Thus, Hypothesis la received partial support.

The gender effects are small, accounting for 4%-S% of the variance in feelings.

In contrast, high-power parties felt significantly more powerful before negotiating than

did low-power parties (means = 3.94 for high-power parties, 2.03 for low-power parties) and

expected more cooperation (means = 3.06 for high-power parties, 2.44 for low-power parties)than did low-power parties. High-power parties felt neither more confident nor more

competitive than low-power parties prior to negotiating. Thus, Hypothesis 2 received partial

support. The power effects range from small to large with power accounting for 10% of the

variance in expected cooperation and 50% in feelings of power before the negotiation.

Negotiation Tactics

Analyses of participants’ behavior during the negotiation revealed the six tactics which

we labeled: Placates, Discloses, Pleads, Argues, Bullies, and Won’t Cooperate. Table 4

Table 3

Pre-Negotiation Feelings by Condition

Mkd-Gender Pairs Same-Gender Pairs

Reported Feeling High Power Low Power High Power Low Pm,er

MC& Fern& Male Funale Male Femcde Mule Fumcde

Confidence

Competitiveness

ExpectedCooperation

Power

5.4

4.4

2.6

3.9

Reported Feeling_

Confidence

Expected

Cooperation

Power

4.8 5.2 5.1 5.5 5.0

4.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 3.6

3.4 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.1

3.8 1.8 2. I 3.9 4.2

Significant Effects 0, < (10. f‘ 1.7 I)

Model Vm+hlr F

Gender (Male > Female) 3.89**

Gender (Female > Male) 3.25*

Power (High > Low) 7.87***

Power (High > Low) 71.74***

***p<.oI.

5.4 4.8

3.7 3.8

2.0 2.5

2. I 2.1

2r

.05

.04

10

.50




presents descriptive statistics, by condition, on each of these scales. The MANCOVA

revealed multivariate main effects for power (F,,,, = 14.57, p < .OOl) and a marginally

significant main effect for pair composition (F,,,, = 2.07, p < .07). Results of univariate

tests are presented in the bottom part of Table 4.Managers in the high-power role engaged in more problem-solving (Discloses) than did

low-power parties (means = 10.32 for high-power parties, 7.75 for low-power parties), but

in neither more aggressive nor threatening types of competitiveness (e.g., Bullies or Won’t

Cooperate) than did low-power managers. Low-power parties significantly more often

Pleaded (means = 6.93 for low-power parties, 4.72 for high-power parties), Argued

(means = 10.54 for low-power parties, 4.96 for high-power parties), and Placated

(means = 13.63 for low-power parties, 7.60 for high-power parties) than did high-power

parties. These results support the first half of Hypothesis 3a, that high-power managers

would choose cooperative, problem-solving approaches more so than low-power manager.

They also support Hypothesis 3b, that low-power managers would choose soft competition

as their key strategy. The power effects are generally small, accounting for less than 10%

of the variance in Placating, Disclosing, and Pleading. However, power accounted for 33%

of the variance in Arguing.



Power and Gender 77

Although no specific hypotheses were developed for pair composition, the analysis

revealed that people behaved differently in pairs of different gender composition. Mixed-

gender pairs displayed significantly more Pleading (means = 7.0 for mixed, 4.7 for same)

and marginally more Placating (means = 13.1 for mixed, 8.1 for same) than did same-

gender pairs. The effects of pair composition are small, accounting for 4%-10% of the

variance in these behaviors.

In summary, there was no support for Hypothesis lb that there would be consistent

differences in the behavior of the men and women in this negotiation, nor did gender and

power interact to make men more dominant or women more passive generally (Hypothesis

4b) or in mixed-gender groups in particular (Hypothesis Sb). In fact, contrary to

Hypotheses 4b and 5b, the means in Table 4 show that low-power women tended to be a

feisty bunch, refusing to cooperate (Won’t Cooperate) more than other participants in the

study and displaying a tendency to bully high-power male opponents. Although gender had

no impact on behavior, structural power did, with high-power managers primarily

attempting to develop a problem-solving climate as predicted in Hypothesis 3a and low-

power managers preferring to compete “softly” in accord with Hypothesis 3b. Low-power

managers also accommodated (Placated) more than high-power parties.

Outcomes

As discussed in the Method section, we obtained each party’s independent report about

the resolution of the three principal issues (choice of vendor, penalty clause, and oversight

of the project). Interestingly, we found little agreement between the parties about how the

three issues were resolved. Only 20% of the pairs agreed on the final settlement of all three

issues, while half (48%) agreed on only one or none. Furthermore, there were essentially

no differences in the degree of agreement between parties by experimental condition (chi-

square = 1 O, n.s.). Therefore, we are unable to examine the effects of power and gender on

the “outcomes” of these negotiations, since in most pairs the members disagreed about the

results. Rather, we can only ask what the effects of these variables were on the perceived

outcomes reported by each member and on their relationship to each other. For example,

are high-power parties more likely to perceive that they achieved their goals, regardless of

how they think the low-power person fared?

As described in the Methods section above, the way the issues were resolved was

quantified into several indices of the competitive and cooperative success of thenegotiations. These measures included Absolute Competitive Success (own total points),

Relative Competitive Success (own points less partner’s points), and Quality (assumes

cooperative outcomes are of higher overall quality than competitive outcomes). The top

part of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics on these three outcome measures respectively

by experimental condition.

The MANCOVA revealed a multivariate main effect for power (F 4,66 = 2.8, p <: .03) and

a marginally significant three-way interaction between gender, power, and pair

composition (F 4.66 = 2.33, p < .07). No effects for gender were found for any of the

outcome measures. Results of the univariate analyses are reported in the bottom part of

Table 5.In general, almost all parties reported that the issues had been resolved in their favor

(mean Absolute Competitive Success = 2.8 out of 5.0) although that was marginally

(p < 10) less often true for high-power managers (mean Absolute Competitive Success =



LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 7 No. 1 1996

Absolute Sucess 3.0 2.9 2.1 3.5 2.2 2.3 3.2 2.9

Relative Success -33 .32 -.2x .39 p.85 -.‘I4 .99 .I6

Quality of Solution 2.9 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.4 3.7 2.4 2.2

Oh.rmY4 B&Il’iOI

Absolute Sucess

Relative Success

Quality of Solution

Significant Effects (p < 10. df 1.7/)

Modrl Vuihlr 6

Power (Low > High) 2.92*

Power (Low > High) 4.06””

Power (Low > High) 7,62”*”

Gender x Power x Pair 7.59***

Composition

Nr>re\: N = IO per cdl.

* ,I < IO **/I < .05 ***p < .Ol

2.62 for high-power managers, 3.06 for low-power managers). In fact, high-power

managers reported that they gave low-power managers significantly more than they

themselves got (mean Relative Competitive Success = -.37 for high-power managers,

+.34 for low-power managers). However, high-power managers reported achieving

significantly more cooperative outcomes (win-win and compromise) than did low-

power managers (means Quality = 2.64 for high-power managers, 2.28 for low-power

managers). The power effects are small, accounting for 40/o-10% of the variance.

There was also a three-way interaction between group composition, role, and gender

for quality of outcomes. High-power men reported more cooperative outcomes inmixed-gender than in same-gender pairs, whereas there were less marked differences

when women were in the high-power role. When paired with females, high-power

males reported “win-win” outcomes in 70% of the pairs (and the women agreed in

40% of them), but when paired with other males, only one reported such a result. This

interaction, however, in no way supports the predictions from expectation states theory

that men in high-power roles would completely dominate the women (Hypotheses 5a

and 5b).

In summary, there was no support for Hypothesis Ic-that managerial women would

obtain less competitive success than managerial men. Structural power did affect perceived

outcomes, however, with high-power managers believing they had achieved morecooperative, high quality outcomes and low-power managers believing they had out-

negotiated their high-power peers. High-power men were especially likely to believe they

had obtained win-win solutions when they negotiated with a low-power woman, but to

admit to having given up more to a low-power man.



Power and Gender 79

Table 6

Post-Negotiation Feelings by Condition

Mix&Gender Pairs

High Power Low Porrer

Male Fern& Mole Femtrle

Same-Gender Pain

High Power Low Pm-vrr

Mole Frmule Male Ferntde

Had Power 4.1 4.1 2.1 2.1 3.8 3.6 2.0 1.8

Satified with Decision 4.5 4.7 3.1 3.9 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.2

Satified with Self 4.2 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.4 3.1 3.8 3.3

Satisfied with Partner 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.1 4. I 3.9

Rrprted Feelings

Had Power

Satified with Decision

Satified with Self

Significant Effects (p < 10. df 1.71)

Model Vuricrhle F

Power (High > Low) 68.18**

Power (High > Low) 16.26**

Gender (Male > Female) 7.17**

e7

.49

.I9

.09

Notr.r: N = IO per cell

** ,I < .os.

Post-Negotiation FeelingsFollowing the negotiation, participants completed a questionnaire designed to assess their

feelings of satisfaction with the decisions reached, with their own performance, and with

their opponents. In addition, the power manipulation was checked again to see whether high-

power parties had indeed felt more powerful during the interaction. Descriptive statistics for

these measures are reported by condition in Table 6.

The MANCOVA yielded a marginally significant multivariate main effect for gender

(F5,67 = 2.23, p < .06) and a significant multivariate main effect for power (F5,67 = 17.65,

p < .OO1). There were no interaction effects. The results of the univariate analyses are reported

in the bottom part of Table 6.

High-power members of both genders felt they had had much more power during the

negotiation than did low-power parties (means = 3.89 for high-power, 2.01 for low-power).

High-power parties also felt significantly more satisfied with the decisions reached than did

low-power parties (means = 4.50 for high power, 3.64 for low power). These power effects

are large, accounting for 19%-49% of the variance.

Gender also had some effect on post-negotiation feelings. Women reported feeling

significantly less satisfied with their own performance during the negotiation than did men

(means = 3.64 for women, 4.10 for men). Gender did not affect feelings of power during

the negotiation, satisfaction with the decisions reached, or reactions to one’s opponent. The

impact of gender was small, accounting for 9% of the variance in feelings about oneself.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study have implications for three somewhat separate aspects of

negotiation: (1) gender differences, (2) differential managerial power positions, and (3)

effective negotiating behavior in organizations. We discuss each of these in turn.




Women’s Negotiating Skill versus Their Lack of Confidence

Although our review of the literature on gender and negotiation found a continuing belief

that women are nicer, if possibly less effective, negotiators than men, our study has found

no evidence of any simple gender effect. These experienced managerial women were

neither worse nor better negotiators, neither more cooperative or open to the other, and

neither more or less persuasive or threatening than were men. Whether they were in the

high-power role or the low-power role, men and women could not be differentiated in

either their behavior or in the outcomes they and their partners reported. There was as much

variability in observed behavior among the women as among the men, thus precluding any

basis for gender stere~)typing. The concept of women as “nice” negotiators may, in fact,

represent a confusion of the effects of gender and the low-power statuses that women

generally occupy in U.S. organizati~~ns. The low-power managers in our study, regardless

of gender, attempted to placate their opponents and to use softly persuasive tactics ratherthan direct confrontation and threats (see Table 4). Our conclusion, then, is that managerial

women should not be expected to be any more or less nice or successful negotiators than

managerial men.

Furthermore, the results provide no support for any of the theories that suggested

possible interactions between gender and power (e.g., Berger et al., 1972, 1977; Powell et

al., 1984). Although a few suggestive, marginally significant interactions were found , in

no case did they support the notion that gender and power would accumulate to men’s

advantage and women’s disadvantage. One of the more intriguing of these occurred in

mixed-gender pairs in which the men had more power than the women-the traditional

power imbalance. These managers reported higher rates of cooperative outcomes (Table 5)than did managers in any of the other combinations. Why this happened in these pairs is not

clear from our data but may warrant further examination with a larger sample. Overall,

then, this study adds to the growing body of empirical literature which shows that women

are as likely as men to enact appropriate behaviors when they are placed in managerial

positions (e.g., Powell, 1990; Kanter, 1977, 1979).

There is one caveat to this conclusion, however. Women’s attitudes toward

negotiation and toward themselves as negotiators appear to be quite different from

men’s, These managerial women felt less confident in anticipation of negotiating and

were less satisfied with their performance after the meeting, despite the fact that their

performance and the outcomes they achieved were similar to the men’s. To the extent

that women lack confidence in their negotiating abilities and find the experience

distasteful, they may penalize themselves by failing to negotiate with other managers to

achieve their own legitimate ends. Research is needed in organizations to determine

whether managerial women are more likely than men to avoid negotiating because they

lack confidence, and if so, whether it serves as an impediment to their effective

performance or advancement.

The Behavior of More and Less Powerful Managers

In striking contrast to the lack of gender effects, structural power differentials made asubstantial contribution to the process and the perceived outcomes of the negotiations.

Although the managers in this simulation were not in a superior-subordinate relationship,

the parties were both aware of, and reacted to, the power differences created by the line



Power and Gender 81

(high power) versus staff (low power) responsibilities for the outcomes of the project about

which they were negotiating. Both prior to the negotiation and afterward, high-power

parties felt signi~cantly more powerful than did low-power parties (Tables 3 and 6) and, as

well, expected their low-power opponents to cooperate with them.

Perhaps because they expected cooperation, experienced managers placed in the high-

power role attempted to create a problem-solving type of interaction in which both parties’

needs might be met, rather than a competitive, win-iose one. By being open about their own

concerns and preferences and behaving in a friendly way toward their opponents, they invited

the low-power parties to express their views on the issues and to participate in creating a

mutually satisfactory decision. This behavior contrasts sharply with the competitive attempts

to dominate found in most laboratory studies of negotiation (e.g., Lawler, Ford, & Blegen,

1988), but it is consistent with the practices that more progressive managers have been found

recently to take toward their subordinates (Heller, I97 I, 198 1; Karambayya, Brett, & Lytle,

1992; Sheppard, Saunders, & Minton, 1988; Yukl & Falbe, 1990).

However, this approach seems not to have stimulated a reciprocal response from the low-

power managers. Although cognizant of their own lack of power, the low-power managers

did not feel completely powerless (mean rating of power before the meeting = 2.03, after

the meeting = 2.01). Their role instructions suggested that they were knowledgeable about

the computer systems being discussed. Perhaps because of this, they appear to have

misinte~reted the openness of the high-power managers as a willingness to be persuaded,

rather than an invitation to jointly problem-solve. Therefore, they tended to argue for their

own preferred solutions. Their expert power base (French & Raven, 1959) may have given

them the confidence to argue assertively when given the opportunity by the high-powermanagers. The low-power managers generally avoided hard competition in favor of softer

versions-such as pleading and using reason and logic to persuade plus some

accommodation in the form of placating. They thought that this approach worked well for

them since most of them reported that they were the winners of win-lose outcomes. That

they had to argue and plead so hard to gain their “wins” (Table 4) may account for why

they felt dissatisfied with the outcomes they achieved. Nevertheless, these results are

instructive with regard to the strategic choice of tactics for low-power parties. They indicate

that low-power parties can obtain good substantive outcomes for themselves if they persist

in soft competition.

General Issues about Negotiations and Negotiating Styles

The lack of agreement between 80% of the negotiating partners about how the issues had

been resolved indicates a failure of the parties to effectively communicate with each other

about the central issues discussed. In the present case, a vendor may be hired, timelines

developed, and meetings scheduled, all in conflict with the expectations of the other party.

One of the fundamental skills recommended for concluding meetings is to summarize the

agreements reached and check that everyone’s understanding is the same (e.g., Whetton &

Cameron, 1991).

This basic failure in a majority of these pairs is consistent, however, with the way inwhich the two parties’ typical approaches to the meeting were at odds with each other. As

noted before, the high-power parties typically attempted to create a conciliatory,

collaborative atmosphere by inviting the other person to join them in identifying and




solving a common set of problems. Most of the low-power parties, however, declined the

invitation and adopted a competitive stance, which then led to impasses, grudging

concessions, or rejection by the high-power person. From an overall organizational

perspective, this form of negotiation is less than optimum. Had a more problem-solving

approach to the negotiation been adopted, the parties might have achieved truly “win-win”

settlements, which both parties agreed to and with which the low-power managers might

have been more satisfied.

However, it is difficult to convert negotiations to problem-solving discussions. The

implicit norms associated with each are quite different. The norms of negotiation dictate

competition and obfuscation, not the openness expressed by the high-power parties in

attempting to identify and solve a mutual problem (e.g., Hoffman, 1979). To turn

negotiations into problem-solving meetings in which jointly satisfactory outcomes are

achieved, one or both parties must not only take the risk of making conciliatory overturesand hope that the other will respond similarly, but be explicit about their view of the need

for a collaborative, problem-solving process so they can develop cooperative norms

jointly. Our observations of these sessions indicate that none of these managerial pairs ever

adopted this strategy.

Our conclusion, then, is that while situational power may encourage the adoption of

facilitative, problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution by experienced managers,

they do not necessarily do it effectively. Even managers with the level of experience of

those in the present study (I 3 years of experience on average) need training in how to

conduct joint problem-solving meetings, a long-standing prescription of scholars interested

in management training (e.g., Maier, 1963; Hoffman, 1982).

Limitations of the Study

The results of this experiment, while consistent with studies of managerial behavior,

clearly fly in the face of many other studies of the impact of power on behavior and

outcomes. What accounts for these contradictions? Probably most obvious is the fact that

the subjects in this study were experienced managers while much of the evidence for

theories of negotiation are based on studies of students. The latter are likely to be more

naive and unsophisticated in the uses of power, while our subjects had experience in both

the advantages and limitations of using power in a dominating way.

The reader might argue, on the other hand, that we are overemphasizing differences in

subject populations when, in fact, the artificiality of the experimental situation accounts for

the results obtained. While this is clearly an important consideration, our experience in the

experimental sessions suggests that the participants took the role-playing situation quite

seriously and acted as if the decision was an important one for them and the company.

Others have reported similarly high involvement in negotiation simulations (e.g..

Karambayya et al., 1992). Previous research (e.g., Geller, 1978) has shown that when

subjects are highly involved in role-playing, their feelings and behavior are

indistinguishable from those of people in actual situations.Other studies in which these limitations have been removed will help to clarify the

validity of the conclusions we have drawn. In the meantime, however, the results from this

study suggest new directions in theorizing about the impact of gender and power on



Power and Gender 83

negotiators and, as well, provide useful new avenues to pursue in order to better guide

managers in handling organizational conflicts.

Acknowledgments: This research was supported by Grant No. G3-90-026 from the

Fund for Research on Dispute Resolution. The opinions expressed herein do not

necessarily reflect the position of the Fund.

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Watson y Hoffman Managers as Negotiators a Test of Power Versus Gender as Predictors of Feelings, Behavior, And Outcomes