Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

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Geoforum

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Water and power networks and urban fragmentation in Los Angeles:Rethinking assumed mechanisms

Fionn MacKillop a,*, Julie-Anne Boudreau b

a University of Durham, Department of Geography Science Site, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UKb Institut national de la recherche scientifique (INRS), Montreal, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 13 April 2007Received in revised form 18 June 2008

Keywords:Splintering urbanismSprawlUrban fragmentationLos AngelesSecessionIncorporationIntegrationUrban networksWater and power networks

0016-7185/$ - see front matter � 2008 Elsevier Ltd. Adoi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.07.005

* Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: fionn.mackillop@durham.ac.uk

boudreau@ucs.inrs.ca (J.-A. Boudreau).

a b s t r a c t

Los Angeles is often described as the epitome of urban fragmentation, a notion which in this context isfrequently connected to, or even conflated with urban sprawl. At the same time, the city features inte-grated water and power networks which have been under public ownership for over 70 years. We thushave an apparent paradox in the context of the debate on ‘splintering urbanism’, between socio-spatialfragmentation and the integration of networks. In discussing the idea that deregulation of infrastructuralnetworks exacerbates urban fragmentation, the authors use the case of Los Angeles in order to highlightthe central role of private interests in management decisions concerning infrastructure networks. Theauthors carry out their analysis in an historical perspective, revealing that network integration and uni-versal access can often serve private interests more than the public good. Urban fragmentation in LosAngeles, they conclude, is the result of a complex process of instrumentalisation of network developmentand management.

� 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In Splintering Urbanism (2001), Graham and Marvin offer anincisive critique of deregulation and the unequal development ofnetwork infrastructure. Their main thesis is that under the umbrel-la of a neoliberal ideology and with new mechanisms (deregula-tion, unbundeling, etc.), infrastructural networks can serve aspowerful instruments of fragmentation, resulting in increasinginequalities. Our purpose in this paper is to demonstrate that in-deed, infrastructural networks are important political instrumentsmobilised by elites and decision-makers to further their interests,often times with fragmenting consequences and increasinginequalities. This has always been the case, not merely under neo-liberalism. However, the use of network management as an instru-ment of power does not necessarily lead to the expectedfragmentation. In other words, it is not necessarily in the interestof the elites to deregulate or de-integrate infrastructural networks.Or, to put it in a more critical perspective, an integrated organisa-tion of networks does not necessarily lead to more urban cohesionand fewer social inequalities.

This is particularly visible in the case of Los Angeles, a citywhich has been described since the 1920s (Deverell and Sitton,

ll rights reserved.

(F. MacKillop), Julie-anne.

2001), as the cutting edge of the (Western) urban experience, withits massive conversion to the automobile and its sprawling patternof growth that seemed to prefigure today’s urban dynamics. In thecontext of current debates over the fragmentary tendencies atwork in (urban) societies, it comes as no surprise to see the Cityof Angels portrayed as the ‘fragmented metropolis’ par excellence,to paraphrase Fogelson (1967). More recent research (Davis,1990) has tended to focus on L.A.’s ‘fragmentation’, linking it to awide array of issues: segregation, sprawl, pollution, transportation.Despite this wide-ranging and long-lasting agreement on the mat-ter, one feels slightly puzzled by this use of the notion of ‘fragmen-tation’ in this context. Indeed, it often seems to be used as abyword for a particular kind of sprawl. In effect, L.A. has long beenlabelled, not just in popular culture, but also in academic fields, asthe epitome of the sprawling city (Bruegmann, 2006) with all thenegative stereotypes attached to this. It seems to us that L.A.’s spa-tial shape is all too rapidly interpreted in social and political termsas meaning that it is a profoundly de-integrated city, i.e. a frag-mented city.

While sprawl as such is not directly our issue here, we discussthe links between networks, urban sprawl, and urban fragmenta-tion. In relation to the ‘splintering urbanism’ debate, the case ofLos Angeles represents an apparently paradoxical situation wherea city widely characterised as ‘fragmented’ from a socio-politicaland spatial point of view, presents a high degree of network inte-gration that even withstood the tide of liberalisation of the

Table 1Incorporation and secession in California

Who can initiate it? Is it viable? Who decides?

Incorporation: Creation of anew municipality onland formallyadministered by thecounty

– A political entity such as a district or countycan vote a resolution in order to launch theincorporation procedure

– Residents can initiate the process by gather-ing signatures on a petition from at least25% of residents registered to vote in the sec-tor concerned with incorporation

Demands for incorporation are submitted to aCalifornia agency (LAFCO). They evaluate thefeasibility and revenue-neutrality of theproposed municipality

Incorporation has to be approved bythe voters by a simple majority

Secession: Creation of a newmunicipality byseparation from anexisting municipality

Residents can initiate the process by gatheringsignatures on a petition from at least 25% ofresidents registered to vote in the sectorconcerned with secession

Demands for secession are submitted to aCalifornia agency (LAFCO). They evaluate thefeasibility and revenue-neutrality of theproposed municipality

Secession has to be approved by thevoters by a double majority: (1) in thesecessionist area; (2) in the cityaffected by secession

1834 F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

1990 s. One of the important and a priori surprising characteristicsof Los Angeles is the fact that its water and power networks areintegrated in one company (the Los Angeles Department of Waterand Power, LADWP) and under municipal management since thebeginning of the 20th century. Of course, to put this in perspective,it is not uncommon for water to be managed by municipalities inthe United States, but it is probably more so for power, and allthe more uncommon for both services to be provided by the samemunicipal company, and over such a long period of time.

We argue here that the development and preservation of inte-grated and municipal water and power networks supported ten-dencies towards a particular kind of segregated urban sprawl,which, in turn, laid the groundwork for other forms of urban frag-mentation.1 The latter took the shape of unravelling social and polit-ical links. Networked services can thus be made to serve differentgoals, and understanding this entails analysing socio-politicaldynamics of power surrounding their management. Inspired by re-gime and growth-machine theories, we demonstrate that the caseof Los Angeles, far from being a paradox, can be explained by analys-ing long-term links between the elite’s interests in the managementof water and power networks and urban socio-spatial dimensions.

In order to carry out this analysis, we opted for an historical per-spective of the role of urban technical networks in the dynamics offragmentation.2 We selected two key moments to help us under-stand how network-related sprawl can be connected to sprawl-re-lated fragmentation: the municipalisation and subsequentuniversalisation of water and power in Los Angeles (1890s–1930s),and, more recently (1990s–2000s), the debate over network deregu-lation and privatisation in Los Angeles in the context of increasingfragmenting tendencies. This selection of two key moments is not in-tended as a comparison: we emphasise these moments because wehave identified them as two periods when the links between urbannetworks, sprawl and fragmentation appear in a particularly strong

1 We use the typology of fragmentation established by Navez-Bouchanine (2002).She distinguishes between fragmentation of the urban form, socio-spatial fragmen-tation, and, political and organisational fragmentation. The fragmentation of theurban form (commonly identified with urban sprawl) corresponds to a growingheterogeneity between city spaces, the multiplication of intra-city boundaries, theprivatisation of public space, as well as deconcentrated and polarised sprawl. Socio-spatial fragmentation, on the other hand, refers to increasing inequalities betweenparts of the city, the gradual breaking down of social cohesion (or at least of the ideathat the city was once more of a community). Finally, political and organisationalfragmentation is also particularly relevant in the L.A. case. It corresponds to themultiplication of uncoordinated administrative organisms in the metropolis, such asthe thousands of special-purpose districts in Southern California. Moreover, thiscategory refers to the process whereby government gradually yields to a risinginvolvement of private actors, for instance in the field of networked service provision.

2 Archival work was conducted by the authors for their respective doctoraldissertations. For the 1990s–2000s period, 4 semi-structured interviews were addedto the 17 interviews conducted by one of the authors for her dissertation onsecessionist movements in Los Angeles.

and problematical manner and allow us to further the debate on‘splintering urbanism’.

The paper is organised in two main sections before a long con-clusion. We begin with a review of existing work on fragmentationin Los Angeles (Section 2) in order to set the stage for our focus onthe mechanisms linking fragmenting processes and network man-agement. This enables us, in Section 3, to enter the debate onGraham and Marvin’s ‘splintering urbanism’ thesis through anempirical analysis of how water and power networks were inte-grated in Los Angeles (1890s–1930s) and how this network inte-gration was maintained in a period of otherwise strongfragmenting tendencies such as deregulation and secession(1990s–2000s).3 In light of this empirical examination, we discussin conclusion the importance of distinguishing between differenttypes of fragmenting tendencies (urban form, social integration,and political organisation) and their changing relation with networkmanagement over time. That is, an integrated network can have po-sitive effects on political cohesion at some point in time, but this canyield negative impacts on the continuity of urban form and on socialinequalities at other times.

2. Fragmenting tendencies in Los Angeles: Urban form, socialties, and political organisation

Los Angeles, as already noted, has been at the centre of numer-ous studies of fragmentation, often coated with an alarmist over-tone. Our purpose here is not to offer a complete review of thiswork. However, given that we aim to use the case of Los Angelesin order to nuance the causal relationship between deregulatedand de-integrated infrastructural networks and urban fragmenta-tion proposed by Graham and Marvin (2001), it is important to rap-idly review some of the main diagnostics of fragmentation in L.A.Let us simply categorise this abundant work in three types of frag-menting tendencies (Navez-Bouchanine, 2002): urban form, socialties, and political organisation.

2.1. Los Angeles and the fragmentation of urban form: precocious post-suburbanisation

When one thinks of fragmentation of the urban form, sprawl isthe first idea that comes to mind. From a spatial point of view,sprawl is mostly described as the result of a massive suburbanisa-tion (Bruegmann, 2006). The latter is often portrayed as a post-warphenomenon, with, for instance, in the case of California, the G.I.Bill and its subsidies for returning servicemen, and massive free-

3 In the 1990s, the City of L.A. had to face three important secessionist claims,whereby parts of the municipal territory would have been separated from the existingmunicipality and incorporated into a new autonomous city if the voters had approvedthe initiative (see Table 1 for an explanation of the legal nuances between secessionand incorporation).

4 Aside from those political aspects, it is important to note that annexations to theCity of Los Angeles also stopped because the city no longer held such sway overregional water resources. Indeed, the completion, in 1940, of the Colorado Riveraqueduct (Mulholland, 2001) effectively created a ‘water wall’ (Erie, 2006) around LosAngeles municipal boundaries, because water management was mutualised throughthe creation of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD or Met),adding yet another layer to the already complex regional infrastructure of watersupply. Likewise, the electricity sector in southern California was from the onsetdivided among several private companies (MacKillop, 2003) that supplied differentcommunities, but the political drive for municipal power provision was much weaker,and therefore power provision was not related to the annexation (or resistance toannexation) of communities to the City of Los Angeles.

5 An exception to the relative incorporation quietness of the 1980s in Los AngelesCounty was the incorporation of West Hollywood in 1984.

F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842 1835

way construction programmes. However, L.A. emerged as a ‘city ofsuburbs’ much earlier, in the 1920s, when White elites began tosettle away from downtown with dreams of being closer to ‘nat-ure’, in single-family housing, away from other ethnic groups.The post-war trend towards urban sprawl is therefore better char-acterised as a process of post-suburbanisation. Indeed, while theturn of the century suburb depended on the central city for work,cultural activities, and administrative services, post-war peripheralsettlements were characterised by residential, industrial, commer-cial, cultural, and administrative decentralisation, thus ending thepattern of suburban dependency on the central city (Deverell andSitton, 2001; Fishman, 1987; Jackson, 1985). The process of post-suburbanisation saw the gradual fall of downtown as a focal pointfor the metropolis, from an economic, cultural and symbolic pointof view. Until then, for instance, transportation networks were cen-tred around downtown (the Los Angeles tramway network, at itsacme, illustrated this). With the advent of the automobile, trans-portation networks were intentionally decentralised. The historicaldowntown was thus increasingly bypassed, in favour of an ever-increasing number of ‘mini-downtowns’ with their own culturalinstitutions and a thriving neighbourhood life that displaced cen-tral L.A. in material, but also symbolic terms.

In L.A., as early as the 1930s, post-suburbanisation became themain defining process of urbanisation. In other words, urbansprawl in L.A. was caused by more than a ‘bourgeois utopia’(Fishman, 1987); it was a planned process of deconcentration(Hise, 1997). This gradual and precocious deconcentration ofhousing, and then industry, followed by parts of the administra-tion, are the characteristics of fragmentation in Los Angeles asdefined by Robert Fogelson in his classical study (Fogelson, 1967).

2.2. Los Angeles and the fragmentation of social ties: racial tensionsand the ‘fortress city’

Pulido (2000) explains that sprawl, or, rather, planned decon-centration, was based on a desire to escape downtown congestionand to provide a good quality of life to White workers, concernswhich intensified after the 1965 Watts rebellion (Pulido, 2000).Los Angeles had been characterised by racial and class tensionsfrom the beginning of its US history (i.e. from the 1850s), creatinga segregated residential landscape. Developers were able to en-force residential segregation through strict deed restrictions(Abu-Lughod, 1999). The ‘redlining’ practices of the Home OwnersLoan Corporation (HOLC), which ranked neighbourhoods along ra-cial lines, had the effect of pushing economic development out ofcentral city neighbourhoods (Pulido, 2000).

While redlining was declared illegal as a result of the civil rightsmovement, segregation pursued its course with the appearance ofgated communities in the Palos Verdes peninsula, west SanFernando Valley and adjacent Ventura County (Soja, 2000,p. 317). This kind of residential development is in fact a more ex-treme version of the widespread process of gentrification and theappearance of ‘premium networked spaces’ and other mechanismsof social control (Davis, 1990; Graham and Marvin, 2001). Thesedynamics have led many observers to speak of a ‘fortress city’(Davis, 1990) and ‘defensive architecture’ (Graham and Marvin,2001). These processes of deconcentration, both residential andindustrial, and the dynamics of racial and class tensions, reachedtheir acme in cyclical incorporation rushes, or, alternatively, insecessionist backlashes.

2.3. Los Angeles and the fragmentation of political organisation: taxrevolts and the lack of social solidarity

Incorporation is when the majority of the population in an areavotes to become a city, with the prerogatives enjoyed by city gov-

ernments in California, such as home-rule and control over taxa-tion rates and resources. This incorporation can occur fromscratch, in the case of a previously unincorporated (county) terri-tory, or as the result of secession from an established municipality(Table 1).

A first cycle of incorporations began at the turn of the centuryand lasted until the 1930s. For many incorporationists, it was ameans to exclude saloons and other ‘immoral’ venues or to im-prove municipal services. Real-estate developers and land-use con-cerns also played a central role in many incorporation movements.The apprehension of being annexed by the City of Los Angeles orother larger cities such as Long Beach or Pasadena, precipitatedseveral other incorporation movements. From the onset, thedynamics of incorporations were connected to the provision ofwater. Indeed, many communities were annexed to larger cities,especially Los Angeles, to obtain water they had been unable orunwilling to procure.

Incorporation activity dropped between 1930 and 1954, due tothe Depression and the preference for special purpose districts forservice provision. The postwar period was characterised by a spec-tacular boom in suburban real-estate development and large-scaletract subdivisions on which lower middle-class and middle-classhomes mushroomed at an impressive pace (Hoch, 1984; Waldie,1997). It is in this context that the Lakewood Plan was crafted in1954, under the initiative of incorporationists in the newly-builtsubdivided tracts. The plan allowed the county to keep control overservices while permitting the incorporation of smaller cities, agood way to stop the growth of the City of Los Angeles, becauseincorporated territories could resist absorption.4 As Miller demon-strates, 33 incorporations (1954–1980) in Los Angeles County weremotivated first and foremost by a desire to avoid taxes: affluentareas, or those dominated by business or industry (the post-Lake-wood cities of Commerce and Industry are a case in point) incorpo-rated to avoid having to pay for less well-off citizens, or simply tonot have to provide any services at all (the city of Vernon, forinstance, has only a handful of residents). Control over land use, aprimary motivation for earlier incorporations, came far behind(Miller, 1981).

Incorporation slowed down a little in Los Angeles County in the1980s, while it continued in Orange County following populationgrowth and development of suburban communities there.5 Morevisible than incorporations though, the 1990s brought a resurgenceof secessionist claims. ‘Secession’ is a different process than incorpo-ration as it involves breaking apart from an established municipalityand re-incorporating as a new one. It occurred only twice in Califor-nia history, once in San Diego, with the detachment of Coronado in1890, after the first beach resort was built. The second case was inLos Angeles County with the amicable detachment of Montebellofrom Monterey Park in 1920 (Bigger and Kitchen, 1952; Abu-Lughod,1999).

1836 F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

Triggered by a change in state legislation easing secession in1997, secessionist movements surfaced in the San Fernando Val-ley, Hollywood, the Harbor area, Eagle Rock, Venice, Mt. Washing-ton, South Central. But the only two secessionist movements thatwere able to secure enough signatures and progress to the nextstages of the new secession procedure established in 1997 werethe San Fernando Valley and Hollywood, although the Harbormovement came very close as well. As we shall analyse later,water and power networks and their management played animportant role in the dynamics of secession, as they did in thatof annexation (see Fig. 1).

SANTA MONICA

Pacific OceanLAX

MALIBU

CALABASAS

Woodland Hills

Sherma

Van Nuys

ChatsworthNorthridge

Pa

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

Municipal boundaries before secessionBoundaries of proposed cities

Sources: Clarke 2002, Calemine 2002, Los Angeles Times 200Conception and realization by JA. Boudreau

0 10 km

WESTHOLLYWOOD

BEVERHILLS

Mulholland Drive

San Fernando Valley secessionist area

Hollywood secessionist area

Harbor secessionist area

Fig. 1. Secessionis

Sprawl, racial tensions, and tax revolts are often what fragmen-tation means in Los Angeles. A quintessential image of fragmenta-tion, we thus chose Los Angeles as our case study to engage in the‘splintering urbanism’ debate. In their provoking and thoughtfulargument, Graham and Marvin (2001) suggest one possible expla-nation of such fragmentation: deregulation and de-integration ofinfrastructural networks would either cause, or at least exacer-bate, such spatial, social, and political processes of urban fragmen-tation. While they develop this argument based on numerouscases, we offer here a reflection on their proposal from a differentapproach based on an in-depth single case study and a historical

CITY OF SAN FERNANDO

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F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842 1837

analysis. This enables us to add other dimensions to theirargument.

6 Such as the Major Traffic Street Plan of 1925 which set forth an ambitiousprogramme of urban freeways to adapt Los Angeles to the automobile.

7 This oligarchy was composed of figures such as Harrison Otis, editor of the LosAngeles Times, and his son-in-law Chandler; together with other developers, bankersand politicians, they formed a ‘power structure’ (Davis, 1998) that advocated never-ending growth of Los Angeles; indeed, their personal fortune was linked to that of thecity.

8 The promotion of Los Angeles was summed up in the slogan ‘Oranges for Health –Southern California for Wealth!’ coined by the Los Angles Chamber of Commerce, andcarried by trains loaded with oranges which crossed the country (especially theMidwest) at the end of the 19th century.

3. ‘Splintering urbanism’ in Los Angeles: an historical analysis ofthe role of water and power networks

In order to better understand fragmenting tendencies in LosAngeles and the specific role of water and power networks, weposit as a starting hypothesis that the creation and enduranceof an integrated and public network is not the product of a uni-versalist belief in the public interest, but rather of a state devel-opmental strategy aiming to serve private interests. This use ofpublic institutions to favour business efficiency, would in turn re-sult from strong growth coalitions between locally-embeddedbusiness and municipal actors. Indeed, to understand how waterand power networks (in this case, but the analysis can apply toother networks in other spatial and/or historical contexts) canmediate socio-political and spatial dimensions of urban life, it isfundamental to analyse the issue of power in relation to networkmanagement. Such a perspective, of course, has been thoroughlydeveloped in the literature on urban regimes (Stone, 1989) and‘growth machines’ (Molotch, 1976), which analyses how coali-tions of urban elites (from the business and/or political spheres)muster public resources to achieve private goals. The literaturealso analyses how these coalitions succeed in obtaining wide-ranging public support in the community, and create a sense ofpurpose that cements the coalition over sometimes very longperiods, such as in the classical case of Atlanta described by Stone(1989). Coalitions and their dynamics have an impact on the builtenvironment of cities, through the policies that are enacted. Inthe case of Los Angeles, there was an oligarchy of businessmenthat contributed to shaping water policy and, through it, landuse at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 20th cen-tury. Although this oligarchy subsequently declined and growthcoalitions are much more fragmented in the city and region to-day, we will see that groups of actors pursuing private interestsstill shape public policy in significant ways, including networkservice provision and its socio-spatial impacts.

3.1. Understanding how water and power networks shape the urbanform (1890s–1930s)

Our primary focus in analysing this first historical period is toillustrate how the development of water and power networkswas intimately linked to both fragmenting and integrating pro-cesses. Indeed, water and power networks enabled sprawl, whilepermitting organisational and political integration through annex-ations. We will see later how in the more recent period, these infra-structural networks contributed to political integration in the faceof secessionist threats. L.A. illustrates how integrated infrastruc-ture and service provision are no guaranty of urban cohesion, as of-ten assumed in the ‘splintering urbanism’ debate. When and whereintegrated infrastructural networks contribute to preventing frag-mentation, they rarely do so in the name of a universalistic beliefin the public good and the reduction of social inequalities.

3.1.1. Sprawl, urban networks, and cultural factorsWe do not imply here that water and power networks were the

only factor in urban sprawl, or indeed that they ‘caused’ sprawl,let alone fragmentation. Indeed, sprawl in the City of Angels is alsolinked to the history of transportation. First with the tram linesdeveloped from the end of the 19th century with funding fromreal-estate and business magnates such as Moses Sherman or thepervasive Southern Pacific railway company, as part of a strategyof relentless land development. Then, from the 1920s, with the ra-

pid rise of the automobile and public policies6 that deliberately sac-rificed public transportation, sprawl emerged on a wider scale, in aneven more uncoordinated and sometimes chaotic manner.

But, behind this oft-stressed importance of transportationmodes and infrastructure, lie deep-seated ideologies: that of the‘garden city’ advocated by L.A.’s ‘founding fathers’ and embracedby the Midwesterners that peopled the city in waves from the1880s. These relatively wealthy people came in search of the ‘goodlife’ (McWilliams, 1946): the best of city and country, without thedensity identified with ‘decaying’ East coast cities (Starr, 1990). L.A.was the first city to be sold to the country as a resort, by an enter-prising oligarchy of businessmen7 who touted its climate, naturalbeauty and an ‘open shop’ approach to business.8

3.1.2. The pivotal role of water and powerHowever, it is necessary to take into account the history of

water provision, and to a lesser extent, power provision. Indeed,one must keep in mind that such a pattern of deconcentrateddevelopment would not have been possible in the semi-arid set-tings of Los Angeles without a good water supply and efficientwater distribution system, covering the whole city and its ever-expanding subdivisions. This suggests ties between thedevelopment-oriented oligarchy, and the planning of water supplyand distribution (Kahrl, 1986; Mulholland, 2001; Erie, 2006),pointing once more to the local political context. The latter canbe defined as a regime (Stone, 1989; Dowding, 2001) due to theprocess and characteristics of bargaining between public and pri-vate interests, the role of business, and the relatively long-livedconsensus on growth, its tools, and its socio-political goals. What’smore, L.A. could not have become the industrial powerhouse, or, inother terms, a ‘mercantile’ regime (Kantor et al., 1997), without agood power supply too, which was instrumental in attractingindustry. Moreover, industry siting and workforce housing playeda key role in the acceleration of sprawl coupled with the deconcen-tration of activities in the city of Los Angeles(Deverell and Sitton,2001). Industry was thus able to settle throughout Los Angelesand contribute, in a cumulative process (as described earlier), toa sprawling, and ultimately, fragmenting city, due to the develop-ment of water and power networks. The latter did not follow hous-ing and industry, but preceded them and opened up the city’sterritory to deconcentrated growth, whilst transportation, in a dia-lectic process, built upon the opportunities offered by increasinglywidespread water availability. A closer look at the history of waterand power network development in L.A. can help us analyse thispoint and emphasise the importance of the local context and itsevolution. We distinguish between different periods, as waterand power networks did not always play the same role in relationto sprawl.

Between the annexation of California, in 1850, to the turn of thecentury (MacKillop, 2003; Mulholland, 2001), water was under pri-vate management in Los Angeles: private individuals first, and thenthe Los Angeles City Water Company (LACWC) incorporated in the1860s, which represented an evolution towards more professionalwater management. But the narrow focus on financial returnsprecluded the necessary investments, thus impeding more than

1838 F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

stimulating growth, let alone sprawl. Transportation and realestate moguls played a greater role at the time, often leaving devel-opments without water to sustain them. This situation hit theworse-off harder, as many inhabitants had to resort to water carri-ers(Mulholland, 2001), although some wealthy neighbourhoodswere also affected. In the case of power networks, which startedto develop in the 1880s, and were quickly divided between South-ern California Edison, Los Angeles Power and Electric and PacificGas and Electric, all private companies, the same pattern of insuf-ficient coverage appeared. However development of the networkproceeded rather fast, due to the fact that power networks are rel-atively easier and cheaper to set up than water networks, andplayed a less strategic role in the development of L.A. Investmentstended to concentrate on profitable areas, such as the downtownbusiness district, which benefited first from modern technologies.

Thus, in the early days (1850–1900), water and power networksseem to have played a limited role in urban sprawl: although theytended to catch up on urban development, they were not ahead ofit, especially during the several periods of population booms thatcharacterised a speculative economy. The fact that networks werenot up to the task was made manifest by reactions of the popula-tion in general, and of the business oligarchy, joined by the politicalworld, in particular. Dissatisfaction focused on the costly and gen-erally antiquated water supply, as well as the fact that the LACWChad shown itself incapable of and/or or unwilling to, procure anew, larger water supply than that of the Los Angeles River and lo-cal aquifers. The business and political elites, and the population ingeneral, agreed on the idea that Los Angeles was to become ‘thegreatest city in the world’ (McWilliams, 1946) and therefore re-quired a water supply adequate to this destiny. Thus, in reactionto the apparent inertia of the LACWC, the water service was mun-icipalised at the turn of the century. Eventually, the power systemwould be too, albeit more slowly and with greater controversy(municipalisation of power was achieved in 1936). The fact thatwater and power were municipalised in the first place, in a cityknown for its socially conservative, pro-business mores, on theone hand, but also the discrepancy in the chronology betweenmunicipalisation of the two networks on the other hand, must beanalysed with more detail to understand how a connection be-tween networks and sprawl was historically forged in L.A.

In 1902, by referendum,9 the population of Los Angeles mas-sively accepted the municipalisation of the LACWC. Moreover, muni-cipal control was actively supported by the Los Angeles Times, ownedby Otis, a leading figure of the business oligarchy, always ready toviolently denounce rampant ‘socialism’ in his leaders (McWilliams,1946). Thus, the oligarchy found itself supporting municipal controltogether with the Progressive10 politicians of the city, some of whichwere also rather conservative businessmen, but others, such as JohnRandolph Haynes, were more left-leaning and would later face thewrath of Otis (Deverell, 1994). How can we explain this wide-rang-ing support, and what did the advent of municipal managementchange concerning the relationship between networks and processesof sprawl and fragmentation? On the part of the oligarchy, supportfor municipal management was clearly a very pragmatic move,based on the failure of the LACWC to ensure the growth of the cityand its business. A municipal utility would benefit from communityresources (bond issues to fund improvements) and would thus beable to invest more than the LACWC was willing to. Furthermore,

9 California law requires a 2/3 voter majority for any project implying cityindebtedness, which was the case here, as L.A. issued bonds to pay for the purchase ofthe LACWC, its rights to water, and its infrastructure.

10 Progressivism was a very important movement in Californian politics from the1880s to the 1920s; Progressives consisted mainly of Republicans who advocated amore professional politics, based on scientific knowledge, rationality and an apoliticalapproach to local affairs. The movement featured varying sensitivities from moreconservative to more liberal.

the oligarchy had certain provisions included in the managementof the new Bureau of Water Works and Supply: a panel, selectedby the mayor, would manage the utility, keeping it ‘out of politics’.Indeed, the first panel nominees were considered by Mulholland,the former superintendent of the LACWC freshly named to the posi-tion of Chief Engineer of the municipal utility,11 a body of ‘fine busi-nessmen’, with figures such as Moses Sherman, head of a bigstreetcar company and involved in several real estate projects, to-gether with other prominent bankers and real estate interests (Mul-holland, 2001).

The big change in policy brought by the municipal utility was indeveloping a new water supply which allowed the city to expand.Mulholland set himself to the task selecting the Owens River, sev-eral hundred miles away, as the best option. A gigantic aqueductwas built between 1906 and 1913. When it came online,12 the oli-garchy, aware of municipal plans since they were on the board of theutility, started to purchase relatively cheap land in the then-arid SanFernando Valley north of the city, to speculate on its value. The vastvalley is now the epitome of suburbia,13 with miles upon miles ofcommercial strips and mini-malls. Real estate moguls, with theircontrol of the land as well as transportation networks, paved theway for this, and needed cheap and abundant water to do it. But thismajor new supply would not have played the same role withoutpipes to deliver it throughout the expanding city. Indeed, heated de-bates took place over the modalities of network planning and fund-ing (MacKillop, 2003). Mulholland apparently advocated a moreconcentrated, compact design to fill in the holes in the cityscape,but a more spread-out pattern finally emerged to allow for wide-ranging development (ibid.). The oligarchy had clearly pursued itsinterests in advocating municipal control. But the Progressives werealso quite content, as Owens Valley water had another effect: terri-tories began to annex to the city, in order to benefit from the boom;in the 1910s, the city’s surface doubled. This satisfied the desire foran ‘imperial Los Angeles’ (Starr, 1990), and also shows that networksplayed a role in territorial integration, at that period, paving the wayfor a metropolitan Los Angeles. Thus, the municipalisation of water,and the network development policies pursued by the department,did not just open up new territories for development, and, ulti-mately, support sprawl: the annexations brought political integra-tion of outlying communities into the city of Los Angeles.

The new territories opened up by the aqueduct would not beginto really fill in before the boom of the 1940s, but settlements al-ready emerged, around agricultural activities essentially, creatinga pattern of low density, deconcentrated urbanisation. Indeed,throughout the city, heavy investments and personal dedication(embodied by Mulholland at the head of the water department) al-lowed for universal access to a dependable and cheaper water ser-vice, stimulating growth and also making more and more areas(such as hills and previously badly-supplied zones) available fordevelopment. This combined with a mindset favouring low densityto produce an ever-deconcentrating city.

The same goes for power under municipal control, although thiswas achieved with greater difficulty. Indeed, several private powercompanies, with ties to the local oligarchy, were operating in thecity of Los Angeles when the aqueduct was being developed. Atfirst, there was no question of the city going into the power busi-ness, although municipally-generated power was used in thebuilding of the aqueduct. Yet, the immense potential of the aque-duct as a source of hydropower led the city to gradually enterthe market in the 1910s, becoming a de facto competitor for private

11 This illustrates the very ‘incremental’ approach that characterised municipalisa-tion: it was no ‘revolution’, and the structures of the private utility only underwentgradual change.

12 It was at the time the biggest public works project in the world.13 This city is a focal point of the secessionist movement, as we shall see later.

14 According to the home rule principle, the California legislature cannot interfere inmunicipal affairs and must respect city charters. Municipal services are thusaccountable only to Council and the mayor.

15 The DWP estimated that its generation costs were twice as high as anticipatedrates in a deregulated market (Department of Water and Power, 1997, p. 12).

16 Stranded costs refer to the difficulties utility companies have in reimbursingdebts accumulated for their investment in plants and equipment because customersswitch to other providers, thus leaving the company alone to pay back its debts forthe plants that were built to serve them.

17 Starting in June 2000, intentionally-engineered power outage hit several thou-sand customers several times over a year-long period. This was a response to theinability to meet demand for electricity because of insufficient supply and priceinstability.

18 LADWP put people ahead of profits through its ‘Power California First!’ policy andalways said yes in providing out extra energy when other generators turned theirbacks during California’s time of greatest needs’ (Department of Water and Power,2002a, p. 2).

F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842 1839

interests, with an important edge due to cheap generation. This ledto a collision with the oligarchy, which consistently criticised mu-nicipal power, branded as dangerous ‘socialism’ by Otis in his LosAngeles Times. Nevertheless, private utilities were gradually takenover, as they could not face the competition nor manage to pur-chase the city’s generation capacities. In 1934, the last private util-ity, Pacific Gas and Electric, was taken over. Indeed, power, from aby-product of water management, had become a crucial businessfor the city. It generated cross-subsidies for the costly water net-work. Moreover, it was key to L.A. becoming an industrial metrop-olis in the ‘balanced growth’ perspective, helping to attractindustries such as tyres, automobile, aeronautics or even militarybases. Thus, the case for a unified utility controlling water andpower in Los Angeles was strong, giving birth in 1936 to theLos Angeles Department of Water and Power, as it is still called to-day. The development of power production and distribution undermunicipal management mirrored the pattern followed by water:heavy investments, modernisation, innovative tariff structures,aggressive customer base building (MacKillop, 2003). The develop-ment of such an efficient power network was the next step in pro-ducing a deconcentrated city, as sprawl accelerated with thegrowth of industry, which scattered throughout the city, enjoyingthe abundance of available land, and its connection to good waterand power networks.

3.1.3. Water and power networks between fragmentation andintegration

Thus, we can see that the development of water and power net-works in Los Angeles from the turn of the century to the 1930s, to-gether with a mindset favourable to low density settlement, and inthe specific political context of the time, combined to supportsprawl. The groundwork was laid for even more sprawl after WorldWar II, and a growing feeling of an unravelling city, not only in itsshape, but also socially and politically, as the 1965 riots, for in-stance, would dramatically illustrate.

However, networks played an important role in forging politicalintegration with outlying territories and contributing to the emer-gence of a politically and fiscally unified city, in contrast to themultiplication of incorporations from the 1950s. Therefore, policiesin the field of networks in Los Angeles saw the gradual political andterritorial integration of the city, whilst also supporting tendenciestowards social and symbolic fragmentation. Indeed, the universalavailability of water and power at relatively cheap rates and withgood quality of service provided the physical infrastructure forthe advancement of an explicit project of physical deconcentration.

After having analysed the historically crucial period of themunicipalisation of water and power, we will now focus on theequally important decade of the 1990s. Indeed, whereas munici-palisation saw the emergence of the mode of governance thatwould characterise the LADWP for several decades, the 1990s werea moment of turmoil, that threatened to unravel the organisationof the municipal department and its relationship with the cityand its development patterns.

3.2. The sustained integration of network management in a period ofturmoil (1990s–2000s)

We now jump several decades, not so much because nothinghappened between 1920 and 1990, but to focus on another intenseand fundamental period of debates around water and power net-works. Indeed, in the seventy years between our two historicalperiods, the management of water and power networks in L.A.was consolidated rather than challenged.

Just as in the 1920s, the 1990s was a period of demographicgrowth. The city-region was also dealing with a series of socio-eco-logical disasters (the Malibu fires of 1993 and 1996, the Northridge

earthquake of 1994). A climate of racial tensions culminated in the1992 riots. Right-wing politicians and activists responded withanti-immigration measures (Propositions 187, 226, 209). Privatisa-tion and neoliberalisation reigned. At first glance, it seems surpris-ing that L.A. decided to maintain a municipalised water and powersystem in this context. However, as it will become clear, just as inthe 1920s, municipal water and power services were not (mainly) aresult of a belief in the inherent benefits of serving the public inter-est, but rather a means to serve private businesses efficiently.

3.2.1. The decision not to privatise the DWPIn 1996, the California legislature unanimously voted to dereg-

ulate the electric power market (AB1890). Investor-owned utilities(IOU) such as Pacific Gas, Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electricwere forced to break their monopoly by opening their service areato competition and separating generation and transmission func-tions, a process known as unbundling. IOUs did not oppose the leg-islation given that they could recover losses in profits caused bythe breakdown of their monopoly through a competitive transitioncharge (CTC). Publicly-owned utilities such as the DWP had thechoice to follow or not.14 In 1997, the L.A. municipal council decidednot to deregulate.

AB1890 was based on the generally consensual idea that com-petition would lower rates. Despite the decision not to deregulate,the new legislation nevertheless prompted a debate on the gover-nance of the DWP in order to prepare the municipal enterprise toface the pressures of a new competitive market. Indeed, DWPcommercial and industrial rates were higher in order to subsidiseresidential rates, as is generally the case in the ‘‘modern infrastruc-tural ideal” characterised by a belief in the virtues of public gover-nance and universal access. Many were afraid that these higherrates would drive firms to move outside of the DWP’s service areain order to benefit from (expected) lower rates in deregulatedareas.15 According to the DWP, difficulties in competing with privateutilities were caused by: (1) its obligation to keep residential ratesdown (due to electoral pressure) and commercial and industrialrates high; (2) difficulties in financing its high stranded costs ($4billion).16

In 1997, there was a generalised consensus on the benefits ofderegulation. The DWP was following the mood, but L.A. Councilrefused to go as far as deregulation (while it did accept manyDWP internal restructuring changes to ‘enhance competitiveness’).Council’s rationale was that it did not make sense to sell lucrativeassets such as the DWP, particularly when there was no electoralpressure to do so. Nobody at the time was anticipating the 2000–2001 fiasco. With the blackouts hitting deregulated sectors duringthose years, the DWP made $2 billion in profits by selling its sur-plus at the same advantageous rate L.A. residents were enjoying.17

The 2000–2001 DWP annual report explains this policy in terms ofthe need to be accountable to the people as a public agency.18

1840 F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

In brief, the role of DWP bureaucrats was central in elaboratinga universalist discourse on the public good in order to legitimate adecision that was essentially aimed at creating more revenue forthe City of L.A. (at least from the point of view of the Council). In-deed, the decision not to deregulate was mostly motivated by thefear of losing an important revenue source for the City of L.A., aswell as the power to control electricity rates (something that cancome handy in electoral campaigns). Indeed, the City of L.A. hasthree financially independent proprietary departments: the DWP,LAX (the international airport), and the Harbor. These departmentsmanage their own budget, assets and liabilities; and they transferfunds to the City budget. They have a combined annual budget of$4 billion ($2.95 billion for the DWP alone in 2001–2002), whichis about the equivalent of the City of L.A.’s general funds budget.The DWP has about 7500 employees, more than the Los AngelesPolice Department. These proprietary departments are thus verypowerful and important. They are nevertheless not politicallyautonomous. A Board of Commissioners governs them, but dailymanagement is ensured by the executive director (appointed bythe mayor with the approval of Council). Rates and the amountof annual transfers to the City budget are controlled by Council.19

But debates around deregulation have given DWP bureaucrats, andexecutive director D. Freeman in particular, the opportunity to claimmore autonomy from Council. He argued:

We face a change of circumstances in our industry that isakin to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Fierce competitors are pre-paring to lure away commercial and industrial customerswho represent 2/3 of our $2.4 billion annual electric sales.We must have a governance structure that will make surethat we can compete, and preserve the benefits to the Citythat flow from those sales (Freeman, 1998, p. 5).

Similarly, Water and Power Associates, a non-profit formed out offormer DWP bureaucrats in order to defend public utilities,explained:

The Department of Water and Power (DWP) needs to be ableto respond like a business. The DWP also needs to reachdecisions within the purifying light of public scrutiny. A pub-lic forum is important to give people the advantage of access.As the DWP enters the uncharted waters of deregulation, itshould function more like a business, with decisions thatare free from daily politics (deposition by Ken Downey,President of Water and Power Associates, quoted in City ofLos Angeles Charter Reform Commission, 1998, p. 19).

While these tensions between City Hall and the DWP remaineddowntown-centred, discontent against this concentrated powerhad been growing in the 1990s, culminating in secessionist refer-enda in November 2002. Indeed, the roots of the secessionist move-ment is resentment against the old downtown oligarchy (or growthmachine).

3.2.2. Secessionist movementsSecessionism arose in various parts of the city, but appeared on

the ballot only in the San Fernando Valley (36% of the City of L.A.population, 45% of its land area) and in Hollywood (183,000 resi-dents, 4% of the City of L.A.’s land area and about 4% of the city’spopulation). In both cases, it was defeated.20 Water and power net-

19 In 2000–2001, profits from the sale of surplus electricity to areas affected byblackouts increased transfers to the City of L.A. to $206 million. Projections for 2002–2003 were $185 million (Department of Water and Power, 2002b, pp. 25–26).

20 In order to pass, secession had to be approved by a double majority: (1) in thearea claiming secession (support ranged from 51% in the San Fernando Valley to 31%in Hollywood); (2) in the City as a whole (74% opposed secession). This very narrowmajority in the San Fernando Valley was heavily concentrated in the western,wealthier parts.

works are significantly intertwined with the dynamics of the seces-sionist process: LAFCO (the California state agency charged withreviewing the feasibility of secession) decided that if secession wasto occur, the DWP would not be divided between the remaining Cityof L.A. and the new cities. This would have led to a publicly-owned,integrated utility, servicing a fragmented political and fiscal terri-tory. Private utilities often deal with more than one municipal juris-diction within their service area; but in this case, it would haveoccurred for a public agency, which is generally based on the princi-ple of political and fiscal solidarity.

According to Larry Calemine, executive officer of LAFCO, it didnot have the authority to change the laws regulating the DWP be-cause the City of L.A. had received exclusive water rights on the L.A.River basin dating back to the Spanish colonisation. The complexityof the legal apparatus concerning water was too great to attempt tobreak up the supplier (interview with Larry Calemine, June 12,2003). Other interviews nevertheless revealed that LAFCO wereinitially open to secessionist claims over DWP assets and infra-structure located within secessionist areas and their demands forjoint authority over the DWP (interview with Xandra Kayden,UCLA professor and policy analyst, June 11, 2003). In the end, LAF-CO’s decision was the following: in the advent of secession: (1) theDWP would keep all its assets and remain accountable to the Cityof L.A. Council and Mayor; (2) new cities would compensate theDWP for past debts; (3) new cities would be required to contractwith the DWP for water in order to ensure a stable customer base;(4) the DWP would be required to offer water at the same rate asfor L.A. residents. This last element launched a public debate thateventually played against secessionists. Indeed, L.A. Council re-sented the idea of not being able to control rates offered to a futurenew city. They first contested LAFCO’s power to impose the samerate structure; then they argued that even if it was decided thatLAFCO had that authority, there were many ways to go around this.For example, given that residents of a new city would not receivetheir water from the L.A. River (given that L.A. residents haveexclusive rights over the river), the DWP would be forced to im-pose higher rates in a new city in proportion to the higher costsof these alternative sources.21 Moreover, should property taxexemptions not be provided for DWP facilities in new cities, thenresidents from these new cities would need to cover these extracosts in their rates (interview with Richard Helgeson, general coun-sel for the DWP, June 16, 2003). Finally, costs from used water treat-ment would increase in a new San Fernando Valley city given thatL.A. Council could easily decide to base its rate structure on summerusage. Indeed, residents in a new city would be subject to L.A.Council decisions without being able to respond given that theywould not have electoral power in L.A. anymore. The San FernandoValley is much more sprawling than the rest of the City of L.A., lotsare bigger, summer temperatures are higher. All these factors con-tribute to a much heavier water consumption, which is currentlysubsidised by areas of L.A. where consumption is lower (all L.A.esidents enjoy the same rates, irrespective of volume and costs).22

As Water and Power Associates argue:

Elected officials will recognise they can shift costs from thevoters that elect them to those that have no vote and theywill act in their own political interest and take care of theirvoting constituents. For similar reasons the Valley andHollywood should expect deteriorating reliability andslower restoration of service during storms and natural

21 Approximately 13% of the water distributed by the DWP comes from the L.A.River, 48% is bought by the DWP from the Metropolitan Water District. The latter isabout a quarter more expensive, in operating costs, than the former.

22 The San Fernando Valley represents about 40% of DWP’s water sales, and $200million of revenue annually (League of Women Voters of Los Angeles, 2002).

F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842 1841

disasters as the City’s leadership gives higher priority andmore resources to Los Angeles voters (Water and PowerAssociates, 2002, pp. 18–19).

In addition to these arguments against secession in terms of politi-cal access to decisions about water rates, anti-secessionists furtherargued that dividing the DWP would be impossible given the tech-nical complexity of the system. Moreover, many commentators pre-dicted endless legal battles (One Los Angeles, 2002; League ofWomen Voters of Los Angeles, 2002).

In brief, the water question played against secessionists. Voterswere afraid of jeopardising quality, reliability, political access todecision making, and higher rates.

23 In Ecology of Fear (1998), Mike Davis provides many other examples ofinequalities in political access.

4. Conclusion: the political role of network governance

In the context of Los Angeles, universal access to networks andpublic management are quite compatible with fragmentary ten-dencies, albeit through a complex process: in the short term, waterand power networks in Los Angeles were a factor of integration,but gradually the network’s accessibility and quality supportedthe emergence on an unprecedented scale of a low-density, poly-centric and fragmented metropolis. In the long run, the fear of los-ing the suburban dream made possible on a grand scale by thedevelopment of water and power networks led to fragmentary ten-dencies, of which secessionist movements are the most acuteexample, but not the only one. All considered it is not that surpris-ing that in the case of Los Angeles integrated networks should belinked to such fragmentary tendencies, as the emergence and pres-ervation of integrated municipal network provision must be seenin relation to a particular local context which called for the emer-gence of such a city.

This can be connected to differing conceptions of the idea of ur-ban cohesion: whereas in Western Europe, it refers to the notion ofan urban society and is intimately connected to efforts directed atensuring a modicum of equality between city dwellers, in the con-text of Los Angeles, we see that the integration achieved and sus-tained through network policies inter alia is of a different nature.Indeed, it was long part of an ‘imperial’ approach, the desire tobuild an economic and political powerhouse in California, whichrequired the accumulation of resources, especially water, to ensuresustained growth in an unlikely physical setting. Moreover, theintegration of various territories achieved through water andpower networks was also part of the accumulation of power andwealth by the city’s business elite: the availability of water playeda crucial role in the development of the San Fernando Valley, aswell as countless subdivisions that brought wealth to developers,bankers and transportation interests. When the threat of secessiongrew louder and louder, maintaining the integrated form of LosAngeles, and thus of its water and power networks, was intimatelyconnected to issues of revenue protection for the city, as water andpower are also a lucrative business for the city’s government. Thus,integrated water and power provision, as well as a nominally inte-grated metropolis, in part achieved thanks to the former, are com-patible with growing social, cultural, racial, and other forms offragmentation.

4.1. The role of water and power networks in urban sprawl

Technical developments (such as the construction of water andpower networks) are obviously not the only factor explainingsprawl in L.A. Yet, they can be viewed as powerful ‘technologiesof deconcentration’ (Fishman, 1987) used in support of a socialideal: the American Dream of suburban life. The story of L.A. dem-onstrates how public power was used to further this ideal and sup-port private accumulation by the same token. The municipalisation

of water and electricity can be seen as a public subsidy (in the formof low rates, the extension of quality services, massive transfers ofwater, etc.) to private welfare. In a word, the planning, funding andmanagement of water and electricity networks in L.A., as soon asthey were identified as efficient tools for deconcentration, sup-ported urban sprawl, seen as a socio-political project. As privateentities, water and power companies did not play such a role, giventhat private companies made profit-maximising decisions ratherthan attempting to support suburbanisation and sprawl as such.

4.2. The role of water and power networks in socio-spatial segregation

In the case of L.A., the integrated organisation of water andpower networks seems to have played against solidarity and fa-voured segregation because municipalisation was meant to rein-force individual profit-making interests more than the publicgood. Moreover, while the DWP serves all sectors of the City ofL.A. at the same rate (despite differences in costs), inequalities per-sist in terms of the quality of water offered, of the location of facil-ities and the potential nuisances they create (tanks, water filteringplants, and so on), and of political access to decision-making. Wedid not gather sufficient empirical material on socio-spatial segre-gation to make solid conclusions here. However, a brief look at dif-ferentiated consumption practices and environmental justiceclaims raises some doubts over the ability of the DWP to providesafeguards against fragmentation, despite the fact that it remainsa public, integrated, agency. Controversies surrounding tap waterquality (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002) have encour-aged differentiated consumption practices. While the richest turnmore and more to bottled water, the poorest develop their ownstrategies as well, such as buying water within ethnically-basedsocial networks based on trust, the waterias. Some activists are alsopushing for a subsidised distribution of bottled water in order toequalise water quality across the city (personal conversation withan activist, June 8, 2003). We are thus facing a paradox: the DWP’sdecision not to deregulate has not prevented the individualisationof consumption practices.

Another indicator of differentiated practices is the level of con-sumption. In the San Fernando Valley, as mentioned above, lowdensity, larger lots, and higher temperatures tend to translate intohigher consumption (particularly during the summer). In order toprevent other areas from having to subsidise this heavy use, thecity council attempted in 1992 to impose a surcharge based onthe level of consumption in order to encourage conservation ef-forts. San Fernando Valley residents pressured the council not topursue that avenue, and finally won. The threat of secession hasalso given these residents means to influence the council morethan marginalised populations.23

4.3. The role of water and power networks in political andadministrative fragmentation

The creation, at the turn of the 20th century, of an integratedand municipalised water and power system reinforced the powerof a downtown-centred elite. The City of L.A. has relied on its threeproprietary departments (DWP, LAX, Harbor) in order to foster eco-nomic development. As Erie writes:

Until the multiple crises of the early 1990s (recession, riots,and earthquake) shook civic confidence, the City of theAngels never behaved as a city with limits. Instead, LosAngeles acted as a sovereign city-state, using the extensivepowers of local government (particularly development

1842 F. MacKillop, J.-A. Boudreau / Geoforum 39 (2008) 1833–1842

bureaucracies and massive infrastructure investments) tocreate, in an unlikely setting, one of the world’s great cities,regions, and hubs of global commerce (Erie, 2004, p. 20).

But this downtown-centred power based on close ties betweenbureaucrats, experts, and business, continues to anger secessionists.Municipalisation was decided on technical and profit-making con-siderations, just as the decision not to deregulate or dismantle theDWP was based on efficiency and profit-making. This is not surpris-ing in the United States, where fear of ‘big government’ and ‘bigbusiness’ has long been part of the political culture, from the begin-ning of the anti-trust and Progressive movements at the turn of the20th century, to the fall of Enron and the dismantling of the Welfarestate at the turn of the 21st century. Belief in competition, expertise,and efficiency as a means to fight corruption is widespread. Waterand power are not considered a citizen right (as in Europe), but vec-tors of economic development. In brief, ideals of profit-making andefficiency (where the public sector helps private accumulation), oflocal control, and the American Dream were central in creatingwhat might be seen as the L.A. paradox: the creation of a publicand integrated water and power network which has fostered andexacerbated fragmenting processes.

In brief, Graham and Marvin’s (2001) suggestion that networkde-integration and deregulation exacerbate urban fragmentationdoes not hold in the case of Los Angeles. However, the ‘splinteringurbanism’ thesis has stimulated more empirical research that hasyielded reflections on the importance of local contexts, politicalcultures, and configurations of actors in the analysis of urban andinfrastructural governance. While indeed, neoliberal influenceshave been extremely important in L.A., the long-standing cultureof using public institutions to serve business interests in the UnitedStates has meant that neoliberal policies of deregulation and de-integration have been avoided in some local contexts, not becausethey encountered resistance from forces that wished to maintainthe welfare state intact (as it was often the case in Europe), but be-cause they did not serve the business interests well.

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