WATER AND POWER The case of Israel-Palestine

Copenhagen Business School 2017 International Business and Politics: 2nd Year Project Supervised by Hubert Buch-Hansen STU count: 90.944, 40 standard pages 29th of May 2017

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 3

DELIMITATION 4

STRUCTURE 4

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND HYDROPOLITICS 5 CONSTRUCTIVISM 6 CRITICAL REALISM 6 ONTOLOGY 7 EPISTEMOLOGY 8

METHODOLOGY 8 CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 9

EMPIRICAL DATA 10 CONDUCTION OF INTERVIEWS 11

CHOICE OF THEORY 12

THEORY 14 1ST DIMENSION OF POWER 15 2ND DIMENSION OF POWER 16 3RD DIMENSION OF POWER 17 SECURITISATION 18 HYDRO-HEGEMONY 18

CASE STUDY 20 CONTEXT OF THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE WATER CONFLICT 20 1ST DIMENSION OF POWER APPLIED 22 HARD POWER CAPACITY COMPARED 22 EXERCISE OF HARD POWER IN THE WATER CONFLICT 23 WATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND MILITARY FORCE 24 LAND AND WATER ‘GRABBING’ 25 2ND DIMENSION OF POWER APPLIED 27 EXERCISE OF BARGAINING POWER IN THE WATER CONFLICT 28 STRUCTURE OF THE JWC 28 LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY AS KEY COMPONENTS IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS 29 ISRAELI CONTROL OVER LICENSING PROCEDURE 30 ISRAELI AGENDA SETTING 30 3RD DIMENSION OF POWER APPLIED 31

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ISRAELI HYDRO-HEGEMONY 34 MEANS VS. AIM 36 FRAGMENTATION OF LAND 37 PALESTINIAN DEPENDENCY ON ISRAEL 37 SETTLEMENT EXPANSION (JWC) 38 DONORS 38

REFLECTIONS 40

CONCLUSION 42

LIST OF SOURCES 44

APPENDIX I: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 48

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Introduction

Unlike most other natural resources, water has no alternatives. As with any limited resource

vital for human survival, water has been a political concern through all time. With no avail-

able alternatives, water is a condition for societal development at any level and therefore

becomes the source of power struggles. The question of who gets what, when, how and

where and the significant human consequences that follow from the conclusions make it

crucial for social science to deal with.

This has led to numerous water conflicts across the world, notably the case of the Israel-

Palestine conflict. With the Israeli occupation of the West Bank reaching its 50th year in

2017, the study of the relation between water and power seems nowhere more relevant than

in this conflict. Throughout the whole period of occupation, the conflict has been charac-

terised by a substantial asymmetry in the distribution of water. While the average Israeli

citizen consumes 287 litres of water per day, the average Palestinian consumes only 79

litres1 (Israeli Water Authority at Btselem.org 2016). Despite having their needs covered,

Israel continues to acquire more water resources and restrict Palestinian development of

water infrastructure. Therefore, it is tempting to ask whether water in itself is attractive for

Israel or if there is an underlying agenda behind their water strategy? This begs the ques-

tion, how can water resources be used as a political power tool and how is this reflected

in the Israel-Palestine conflict?

This paper seeks to find an answer to this research question. To do so, we base our analysis

on a critical realist (CR) philosophy of science (PoS) stand, considering the structures and

mechanisms that turn water into a political power tool. We employ theories from political

science to elucidate these structures. We thereafter consider these theories in the specific

case of Israel-Palestine to identify the concrete mechanisms at play in that specific context.

In the pursuit of a comprehensive and up-to-date understanding of the role of water in the

conflict, we decided to travel to Israel and the West Bank and further explore the question

through field work.

1 The WHO recommends 100 litres of water per person per day (World Health Organisation 2003: 3)

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Delimitation

In order to answer the research question thoroughly, delimitations and definitions are nec-

essary. The concept of power is employed by use of Steven Lukes’ three-dimensional view

of power. Lukes (2005: 37) defines power by saying that “A exercises power over B when

A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests”. Power is successfully exercised when

B’s actions corresponds to A’s wishes, and affecting then becomes control (ibid: 43). This

is done through three dimensions, which will be expanded upon in the theory section. This

definition will allow us to engage with hydropolitics in terms of hard power, bargaining

power and ideational power and thus investigate underlying structures of power relations

that may not be visible. We consider water as a political concern that creates winners and

losers.

Dealing with the case of Israel-Palestine, this paper concerns the situation in the West Bank

rather than the transboundary resources located in Israel and Gaza. Whereas, Israel controls

resources in Israeli territories and Palestinians largely control resources in Gaza, the West

Bank resources are controlled by the two parties in collaboration (Zeitoun 2008: 51). The

situation in the West Bank is of a more complex nature, and we thus concern ourselves

with the area identified by the Green Line2 in a timeframe from the establishment of the

Israeli state in 1948 until today. The main crux of the paper concerns the use of water in

the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the identified mechanisms are dependent upon the context

and agents which they concern. The analysis that follows thus aims to be an insight into

the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Structure

The first part of the paper consists of the introduction, delimitation as well as the outline

of the paper’s structure. The second part provides a general introduction to PoS and three

common positions with a detailed focus on the paper’s PoS position, CR, as well as reflec-

tions on research design, empirical sources and the choice of theories. In the third part, the

paper will explain its theoretical framework, Lukes’ three dimensions of power, as well as

2 The Green Line from the ceasefire agreement of 1949 was intended as a temporary separation line based on military factors, but has evolved into a de-facto border between Israel and Palestine (Khamaisi 2008: 85)

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the supplementary concepts accumulation by dispossession, securitization and hydro-he-

gemony. The fourth part lays out the paper’s empirics seeking to analyse and explain how

water is used as a power tool in the Israel-Palestine conflict by applying the outlined theo-

ries. Furthermore, it assesses whether water can be considered as an aim or a means. Lastly

the strengths and weaknesses of the applied theories will be discussed and the paper con-

cludes by providing a summary of its findings.

Philosophy of science and hydropolitics

All science builds on certain assumption about how the world is and how we are able to

obtain knowledge about it. The perception of knowledge and being affect the methods we

choose to study social phenomena, and the choice of any research design and method will

therefore always reflect the researcher’s understanding of how the world is perceived and

understood (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 1). Similarly, our perception of the world has in-

formed our level of analysis and choice of method.

PoS expounds these very assumptions by forging discussion on the ontology, epistemology

and methodology of scientific research. Ontology deals with the notion of ‘being’ and con-

cerns what exists and how. It asks whether there is a ‘real’ world independently of our

understanding of it and what the nature of this reality is (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 18).

Epistemology consequently treats the questions of what we can know about the world and

how we can know it. The two concepts are interlinked, i.e. one’s ontological position on

causalities will have epistemological consequences for the generalisability of conclusions.

The third brick, methodology, deals with how to generate reliable knowledge based on the

ontological and epistemological assumptions (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 5). Within PoS

there is much debate on these three concepts, which can be captured by the three dominant

positions discussed below: naturalism, constructivism and CR.

Naturalism

Naturalists have a natural scientific approach to social science. Their ontology is based on

the assumption that there is a real world ‘out there’, independent of our experience of it

and characterised by regularities, that we can gain access to by logic reasoning, experience

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and objective studies. The naturalist epistemology entails that social scientists should pur-

sue prediction and explanation by discovering causal laws and correlations through the

falsification method (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 30-40). Applied to our subject, naturalists

would obtain empirical knowledge in order to make inferences about how water resources

are used as a political power tool and seek to discover consistent regularities between water

and power. However, the naturalist assumption that we can reveal regular patterns and ob-

tain completely objective knowledge is not suited for our study. Instead of aiming to iden-

tify regularities and correlations between variables, the study seeks to create in-depth con-

text dependent knowledge consisting of multitude of factors. Moreover, where naturalist

studies concern observable phenomena, this paper focuses on the underlying structures

causing these observable events. Therefore, we will not use naturalism as our PoS position.

Constructivism

As opposed to the naturalist ontology, constructivists challenge the notion of a real world

independent of our understanding of it. The world thus exists through people’s experience

of it and can therefore be considered a social construction. To constructivists, the objective

of social study is to interpret and understand, not predict. The constructivist epistemology

involves understanding social life and how people construct meaning. Constructivists tend

to conduct discourse analysis or process tracing, and use narrative reasoning to expand the

understanding of why we observe different patterns and phenomena rather than uncovering

universal “truths” as naturalism suggests (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 10). Using a construc-

tivist approach, one could shed light on the ideational factors and normative understanding

of power in relation to water resources. While we are interested in power as an ideational

entity, we wish to also include material and objective structures in our analysis, for which

a constructivist framework is ill-suited.

Critical Realism

CR presents a distinct PoS that retains a realist ontology, but seeks to expand the conception

of reality to go deeper than observable phenomena. Bhaskar (1997) described reality as

containing three domains. The empirical (observations and experiences) and the actual

(events and phenomena occurring without observation) domains make up the naturalist

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perception of reality. CR adds a third crucial domain, the real, which contains all the un-

observable structures and mechanisms (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005: 24). The implica-

tion is that the mechanisms in the real domain cause and support phenomena in the actual

domain, and scientific focus thus shifts from the identification of regularities to the study

of underlying structures.

Ontology

Maintaining that reality is deep, structured, stratified, differentiated and open, CR empha-

sises the multitude of mechanisms at play to construct any phenomena (ibid, 43). Likewise,

this paper acknowledges the true existence of mechanisms other than thirst at play in the

struggle over water resources - and places these at the centre of analysis. We look at water

resources as not only an aim, but also a means - a mechanism by which other aims can be

achieved. The notion of expansionary nationalism is an example of an unobservable mech-

anism that interacts with other mechanisms such as military superiority and settlement con-

struction and emerges in the control of water resources. The real domain (the full range of

structures at play in hydropolitics and their interactions) is thus considered more important

than the empirical domain (the observed unequal use of water).

As part of the ontology, CR breaks with the understanding of structure and agency as mu-

tually exclusive. CR holds that structures are pre-existing, but continuously reproduced

through the actions of agents, which in turn are affected by the prevailing structures (Buch-

Hansen & Nielsen 2005: 49). This has influenced our choice of theory where we employ

Lukes’ three dimensions of power. Lukes focuses on agency in his work, but does so from

a seemingly critical realist starting point. He writes, “Social and institutional structures

(...) limit, guide, and shape individuals’ behavior. Nevertheless, these constraints are never

uniquely determining. (...) The requirements of roles and norms are always subject to

agents’ interpretations” (Hayward and Lukes 2008: 8). Our focus on power structures is

thus connected to the agents that carry the structures out. An example of this is found in

the negotiation over transboundary water resources, where the actions of negotiators are

influenced but not determined by the structure of the negotiation forum (i.e. veto right).

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Epistemology

Despite the prioritised focus on ontology, there are philosophical consequences for the

epistemology of CR, which makes it distinct. As the world is considered an open system,

reality is constituted of a multitude of (unobservable) elements, which means that phenom-

ena in the actual domain are a result of several intertwining mechanisms in the real domain.

This emphasis on multi-causality and context-specificity renders the positivist understand-

ing of causality (whenever A, then B) and any attempts at making predictions impossible

(Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005: 26, 31). In line with this commitment to multifaceted ex-

planations, we employ a case study approach to explicate the interaction between events,

actions, structure and context that determine the role of water in Israel-Palestine (Wynn &

Williams 2012: 795). As we are unable to observe all aspects of the water issue and value

neutrality is an impossibility, our conclusions should be considered as the best possible

representation of the “real world” at this point in time given the existing knowledge and

context rather than definitive truths (ibid).

Methodology

The classical approaches of induction and deduction allows researchers to reach substanti-

ated conclusions from given premises. However, CR suggests a third way in retroduction,

in which given conclusions or phenomena are considered starting points for analysis and

the aim of study is to discover the underlying premises (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005: 62).

This is the basic premise of this paper. We consider the water inequalities in Israel-Pales-

tine as a phenomena and seek to uncover the underlying mechanisms that explain it. This

leads us to ask how water is divided and why it is divided as it is and consequently informs

our methods. In our investigation we thus consider the impact of structures such as settle-

ments, occupation, material capacity, the separation barrier3, the Joint Water Committee

(JWC) decision-making framework and the ‘needs vs rights’-based discourse on the actual

division of water. This is illustrated in figure 1. CR philosophy takes a pluralist approach

to methodology but lean towards qualitative methods and reject universalist conclusions

(ibid: 66). We thus employ a case study method, seeking to draw context-specific conclu-

sions and present an informed social critique.

3 The 700km long separation barrier consists of a combination of 6-metre tall cement wall and fence (Hu-man Rights Watch 2017, 6)

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Case study research design

In order to answer our research question, the assignment uses a case study research design

comprising the conduction of expert and elite interviews. According to Yin (1984: 23), a

case study is an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within

its real-life context, when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not

clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”. Case studies are ide-

ographic, since unique features of only a small geographical area or number of subjects of

interest are examined in detail (Zainal 2007: 2). This paper employs a single case study

research, where the focus it to gain in-depth context specific knowledge in order to depict

and describe how water can be used as a power tool. Thereby the case exemplifies how

water is more than just a natural resource.

Our case study research focuses on the West Bank, where is water constitutes the object of

analysis. The aim is to understand the underlying structures of water and how water is used

in political conflict. The case study research design allows for the use of a variety of sources

and identify the interplay between structures and agents.

The advantages of using a case study research design to answer our research question are

many. First, case studies prove particularly useful because they allow for combination of

qualitative and quantitative data that provide a diverse depiction of a given phenomenon.

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Secondly, according to Flyvbjerg (2006: 26), good social science is problem-driven and

not methodology-driven seeing that it utilises the methods that provides the best help to

answer the given research question (ibid). Lastly, Zainal (2007:1) argues that by using both

quantitative and qualitative data, a case study can explain both the process and outcome of

a phenomenon and thus, we will incorporate a variety of data.

Despite the usefulness of the case study method, there are some weaknesses. According to

Zainal (2007: 5), case study methods have been criticised for their lack of rigour and the

tendency for a researcher to have a biased interpretation of the data. Moreover, single case

studies might face challenges in providing scientific generalisation and external validity,

because the method is characterized by knowledge generated from a particular context

(ibid). Furthermore, due to its intensive examination and context dependent research, it can

be difficult to replicate (Bryman 2016: 62). However, with a CR perspective, it can be

argued that the aim of using a case study is neither to find generalising laws nor seek to

depict a static view of a particular phenomenon. Critical realists are rather interested in

understanding underlying structures and mechanisms for a certain real-time object.

Empirical data

The case study employs both quantitative and qualitative primary and secondary empirical

sources. The qualitative secondary sources are academic articles and textbooks whereas

interviews constitute primary source. The quantitative secondary data are used from World

Bank, the UN and Israel Water Authority (IWA). The combination of primary and second-

ary sources strengthen the arguments presented in the paper, where the primary sources in

terms of interviews are used to support the secondary sources. The variety of employed

empirical data allows the case study to assess how water is used a political tool from dif-

ferent angles. Through triangulation, which is the use of more than one method or source

data, we assure the validity of the research by cross-checking the sources, which gives the

paper solidity and robustness (Bryman 2016: 697).

A part of the case study contains individual semi-structured expert interviews conducted in

Israel and the West Bank. Interviews provide first hand information and contribute with in-

depth understanding of the case. When conducting semi-structured interviews, a list of

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questions is usually prepared in order to allow for some consistency. However, the se-

quence in which the questions are asked might vary in accordance with the interviewees'

responses. Often this will encourage more interesting and unexpected answers making the

data collection process more fruitful (Bryman 2016: 467-468).

Conduction of interviews

In order to gain updated information, it is relevant to conduct expert interviews. When

interviewing experts, researchers should have a thorough understanding of the topic be-

forehand where questions should reflect this knowledge (ibid). We conducted four expert

interviews with professor Clemens Messerschmid, dr. Jad Isaac and Jane Hilal from Ap-

plied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ), Environmental Coordinator Mahmoud Driaat

from AUJA EcoCenter and Adam Aloni from B’Tselem as well sa one elite interview with

General Director of Strategic Planning from the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA),

Yousef A. Awayes. These interviews were chosen in order gain insights from different

perspectives, i.e. human rights (B’Tselem), peace (AUJA EcoCenter), scientific (Clemens

Messerschmid and Jad Isaac) and political perspectives (PWA). We were furthermore in

contact with IWA and the Israeli state-owned water company Mekorot in order to get their

perspectives, however, we were not able to arrange meetings with them.

When conducting the interviews, we had prepared questions that provided some con-

sistency in the semi-structured approach. We were four people attending the interviews,

where two people were the interviewers and the two others were observers who remained

silent in order to make the interviewee feeling most comfortable. The interviews were rec-

orded and notes were taken to be able to extract relevant information from the interviews.

We have not transcribed the interviews, however important quotes and information are

used to underpin the assignment's arguments.

The strength of interviews is the ability to gain first-hand information that otherwise is not

available in academic articles and literature. Moreover, interviews can provide information

about recent developments. Particularly the elite interview can give an understanding of

the different discourses with regard to the water conflict.

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Interviews might provide biased information or information, which does not correspond

with reality and thereby be unreliable if they are not triangulated. Furthermore, there is a

risk that the interviewee will provide the researcher with answers she or he thinks the re-

searcher wants to hear. In addition to that, it can be difficult for the researcher to differ

between the analysis of the interview and the actual interview. With regard to our inter-

views, we are aware that we conducted four interviews in the West Bank and only one in

Israel, where there is a risk of biased towards the Palestinian perspectives. The assignment

seeks to overcome this potential bias by including qualitative data published on Israel Wa-

ter Authority’s webpage and academic articles focusing on the Israeli perspectives.

Choice of Theory

In the following section, we present an analysis utilising a select number of theories and

concepts. In line with our PoS position of CR, we have chosen theories that allow us to

approach the relation between observable phenomena and the deeper reality of the world

and to shed light on the relation between water resources and power. Subsequently we

outline other potentially relevant theories used in hydropolitical research and evaluate their

usefulness in relation to our research question and philosophical position.

This paper will apply Lukes’ three dimensions of power theory as a theoretical framework

to assess the nature of hydro-power and power asymmetries. Lukes’ framework attempts

to classify power, but as neat categories only serve as a tool for structured analysis we add

aiding concepts in order to qualify and nuance the framework (Zeitoun 2014: 29). This

approach enables the paper to unveil diverse power structures and power mechanisms un-

derpinning hydropolitics. In line with our PoS position of CR, Lukes’ power theory has

been chosen with the aim of uncovering the deeper reality. Lukes argues that by consider-

ing three dimensions of power, one can obtain a deeper and more fulfilling analysis of

power relationships as each level is progressively more profound and hidden than the last

(Lukes 2005: 16, Zeitoun & Warner 2006: 442).

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The 1st dimension allows us to analyse elements of hydropolitics on the actual level of

reality relating to material capacity such as riparian position4, relative size and strategic

value of a state’s land. To highlight the mechanisms at work in the 1st dimension, we fur-

ther apply David Harvey’s (2006) concept of accumulation through dispossession. Though

the principle has primarily been applied in the field of economic policy, we argue that it

provides useful insights in relation to dispossession of and control over water and land in

the actual domain. This 1st dimension is important but insufficient as it deals primarily

with the actual level of reality. Therefore other dimensions are needed for adequate analy-

sis.

The 2nd and 3rd dimensions provide the possibility to consider hydropolitics in the deep

realm, where unobservable mechanisms of legitimacy and preference-shaping influence

the outcome of water allocation. To analyse the 3rd dimension, we the concept of securiti-

sation to transboundary water conflicts to analyse how a discourse of security is used to

legitimise water grabbing.

The three dimensions will be connected to Joseph Nye’s concepts of hard and soft power

providing a framework to understand how states can exercise power in different ways. This

enables us to apply Lukes’ theory to our analysis of interstate relations. Furthermore, we

bring the three dimensions together in an analysis of hydro-hegemony that can illustrate

how the strength of power is elevated in the interplay between the three dimensions. As

such, these theories and concepts will allow us to dig into underlying structures and mech-

anisms such as legitimacy, authority and discourse. The weaknesses of the applied theories

will be discussed after the empirical analyses.

Furthermore, the assignment seeks to approach power analysis through a hydropolitical

view. Whereas early understandings of hydropolitical power came from geography and

emphasised the importance of geographical positioning, Jerome Warner qualified the geo-

graphical analysis by adding a social dimension as he argued that “upstreamers use water

to get more power, downstreamers use power to get more water” (Zeitoun & Warner 2006:

4The term ‘riparian position’ denotes a nation’s position along a shared river basin. Upstreamers have a ‘natural’ advantage over nations with downstream positions (Zeitoun, 2008: 20)

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436). This explicates that there are more factors than geographical positioning that affects

hydropolitics, which has informed our decision to engage with water through a multi-di-

mensional power analysis. The following section will provide a theoretical answer to our

research question by utilising the outlined theories.

Theory

Power has many faces and may be gained in ways that are not always intuitive. Power and

compliance can be achieved through diverse methods. As noted, this paper employs Lukes’

broad three-dimensional understanding of power as the theoretical framework for the sub-

sequent analysis. In 1974, Lukes presented his theory in Power: A Radical View in which

he stressed that “we need to think about power broadly rather than narrowly (Lukes 2005:

1). Lukes’ theory was developed in the context of two related debates. First, the question

of how to perceive power theoretically and how it should be studied empirically. Second,

the question of whether American politics should be characterised as dominated by a ruling

elite or manifesting a pluralist democracy. The debates gave rise to various theories of

power that, in turn, triggered Lukes’ own contribution, the three dimensional view of

power. In particular, Lukes criticised Robert Dahl’s one-dimensional view of power argu-

ing that it was too narrow, because it only focused on observable behaviour in identifying

power relations in decision-making (ibid: 17). Furthermore, even though Lukes acknowl-

edged Bachrach and Baratz’s two-dimensional view of power involving non-decision mak-

ing and agenda control, he finds their view too focused on observable behaviour as it does

not account for latent conflicts. Lukes thereby presented the three-dimensional view of

power, which added the power aspect of shaping others perceptions and preferences (ibid:

28).

As Lukes’ theory primarily focus on how power is exercised in American politics, the paper

includes Joseph Nye’s (2009) conception of power. This enables us to employ Lukes’ the-

ory in our analysis of interstate relations. Nye’s distinction between ‘hard’ power and ‘soft’

power is a simple frame for understanding relations between states (Nye 2013: 7). Hard

power concerns the ability to get others to do what you want through coercive, military and

economic measures (Nye 2009: 4). In contrast, ‘soft’ power “rests on the ability to shape

the preferences of others” and is related to the capability to get what you want through

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attraction rather than threats or payments (ibid). Lukes’ (2005) view of power can be per-

ceived in relation to Nye’s conception of soft and hard power. Lukes’ 1st dimension can

be considered ‘hard’ power in line with Nye, and the 2nd and 3rd dimensions, also seen as

‘bargaining’ power and ‘ideational’ power, belongs to the category of ‘soft’ power (Zeitoun

2008: 29). In terms of overall power, what matters the most is the capability to mix the

three dimensions which can lead a state to a position of a hydro-hegemon (ibid). The three

dimensions supplementary concepts and theories will be elaborated in the following para-

graphs.

1st dimension of power

Lukes’ 1st dimension (hard power) is concerned with the material ability of one party to

achieve compliance of another. This form of power builds on Dahl’s identification of power

through the study of concrete, observable behaviour, e.g. through “careful examination of

a series of concrete decisions” (Dahl 1958: 466 in Lukes 2005: 17). Illustrating a one-

dimensional view, the focus of the 1st dimension of power is on actual behaviour in deci-

sion-making processes. These decisions are taken in relation to issues involving observable

conflict of (subjective) interests or preferences (Lukes 2005: 19). Thus, the direct exercise

of power is essential and power is understood to be when “A can get B to do something

that B would not otherwise do” (Lukes 2005: 17, Dahl 1957: 203). In relation to state or

government power, hard power is associated with national material capacity. Hard power

denotes the ability to deploy national capacity such as economic strength or military force

(Zeitoun 2008: 27).

Asymmetry in this form of power, also denoted ‘power as might’, can be overriding with

far-reaching consequences. A weak state will have little say in negotiations in which a

strong state lay down the rules of the game. In such a case, pressure to cooperate or enter

into negotiations can successfully be avoided or fended off by the (materially) powerful

state. Instead, the stronger state is allowed to act unilaterally and ‘coerce’ outcomes with

no notice given to the weaker state (ibid). In the case of transboundary water conflicts, hard

power relates to riparian position, relative size and strategic value of a state’s land, and the

capacity to rule over and defend water resources. The higher the degree of capacity in these

attributes, the higher the endowment of hard power. The exercise of hard power can be

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identified by looking at coercive measures relying on the use of force or threat of force

such as destruction of water infrastructure or water ‘grabbing’(ibid).

The 1st dimension of power will be further emphasised by considering David Harvey’s

principle of accumulation through dispossession (Harvey 2006). The concept is rooted in

the accumulation processes set out by Marx, but Harvey has adapted it to the present con-

text by focusing on contemporary capitalism and the continuous need for accumulation

through dispossession to uphold (any degree of) stability in the system (Harvey 2006: 72).

New opportunities to make profits must constantly be made available in the capitalist sys-

tem, and the result is accumulation by dispossession; power and wealth is centralised to

benefit the few through dispossessing the public of their wealth, natural resources or land.

As noted, the principle has primarily been applied in the field of economic policy, but we

argue that it is equally applicable at the level of water and land. Harvey (2006: 71) argues

that dispossession occurs in a variety of ways and that power over geographical terrain is

an advantage. As such, the exercise of hard power as well as political power structures can

be identified by looking at the winners and losers of dispossession of and control over water

resources. However, another form of power can identified in less visible settings, such as

in negotiations, which the subsequent paragraphs will consider.

2nd dimension of power

The 2nd dimension (bargaining power) builts on Barchrach and Baratz’ two faces of power

which argues that power is exercised when “A reinforces social and political values and

institutional practices that limit the political process to focus on political topics that are of

interest for A” (Lukes 2005: 20). The 2nd dimension of power embraces five ways of

viewing power, namely coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation. Another

important element of the 2nd dimension is the ability to control the political agenda through

creating and reinforcing institutional frameworks (ibid: 22).

The 2nd dimension of power concerns both decision-making and non-decision-making.

Where a decision is the opportunity to choose between different “modes of action”, a non-

decision is “a decision that results in suppression and thwarting of a latent or manifest

challenge to the values or the interests of the decision-maker” (ibid). Thereby the non-

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decision is a way to suffocate new demands for change before they are voiced or even

considered in relevant decision-making arenas. In order for nondecision-making to be real,

it is crucial for the researcher to identify a conflict of interests, covert or overt, that the

nondecision-making has prevented from becoming actual. Thereby, the 2nd dimension al-

lows for emphasis on an agent’s ability to constrain and influence the available options and

thus remove the weaker party’s choice between compliance and non-compliance (Lukes

2005: 25, Daoudy 2009: 365 and Zeitoun & Warner 2006: 443).

The 2nd dimension of power is also designated as bargaining power since this kind of

power stems from being a legitimate actor in negotiations (Daoudy 2009: 365, Zeitoun &

Warner 2006). Authority and legitimacy is thus an important measure in bargaining power

where legitimacy can be achieved through a number of methods such as effective negoti-

ating strategies, official recognition through international treaties and the establishment of

moral high ground and discursive engagement at the global conference level. Therefore

bargaining power can result in relative equality and thus it contributes to a different ap-

proach to understand how power conflicts that go beyond the imbalances of hard power.

Whereas the 2nd dimension of power only concerns the covert and overt power conflicts,

in which agenda control, decision and nondecision-making are central, it is relevant to un-

derstand power that is profound in the depths of the real domain, namely the 3rd power

dimension.

3rd dimension of power

The 3rd dimension of power (ideational power) is according to Zeitoun (2008: 28) not only

the most abstract, but arguably also the most effective of the three power dimensions. The

3rd dimension adds an extra layer to the behavioural focus of the 1st and 2nd dimensions

by adopting the role of hidden social forces and conflicts. These forces exercise power by

shaping the consciousness of an individual or an organisation by controlling thoughts and

ideas through the control of information and socialisation. The ideational power is accord-

ing to Lukes the “power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by

shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their

role in the existing order of things” (Lukes 2005: 28, 12). In this way, Lukes’ (2005) argues

18

that the strong implant their ideas in the minds of the weak, so they get to believe that the

value judgements of the strong are universally right (Zeitoun, 2008: 29).

Whereas the 1st and the 2nd dimensions of power explain how power without any attempt

at concealment can be used to get someone to do what you want them to, even if it is against

their own will, the 3rd dimension describes how power can convert others to do something

they might not actually want to do by changing what they want. These mechanisms are best

understood as power, since the shaping of the preferences of the dominated violates their

real interests, and they enable the powerful to assure willing compliance by the weaker

(Lukes 2005: 40). The absence of grievance does not mean that power has not been exer-

cised, and thereby the 3rd dimension can provide an explanation of how political systems

prevent demands from becoming political issues (ibid).

Securitisation

An important concept, which relates to the 3rd dimension of power, is the concept of secu-

ritisation. Securitisation concerns the social construction of security and thereby provides

a break from the state-centric understanding of the concept of power. Zeitoun (2008: 23)

defines securitisation as a “speech act that legitimises a state taking exceptional measures

over an issue by propelling it into the realm of security”. According to Balzacq (2005: 179)

one important feature of securitisation is that the success of the process “does not neces-

sarily depend on the existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively

endow a development with such a specific complexion”. This implies that issues that be-

come securitised are issues where an actor successfully constructed a issue into an fictitious

threat. Consequently, a successfully securitised threat will receive disproportionate

amounts of attention compared to issues that in reality may constitute a greater material

threat. The securitised threat is thereby able to justify and legitimise the use of extraordi-

nary measures (Balzacq 2005: 179).

Hydro-hegemony

As previously mentioned, the strongest power is found in the combination of the three di-

mensions as they come to mutually reinforce one another. To address the degree of overall

power for a state in possession of all three dimensions of power, the concept of hegemony

19

proves useful. According to Williams (1997), ‘hegemony’ has traditionally been defined

as ‘a political rule or domination’ and typically been understood in terms of hard power

and applied in the relation to states. Marxism extended the definition to concern relations

between social classes and Antonio Gramsci widened the concept to include ideational

power by emphasising the importance of ideas, persuasion and consensus in achieving heg-

emonic control (ibid, Phillips 2000: 7). Gramsci’s hegemonic theory can be understood as

a balanced mix of force and consent. In other words, consent is backed up by coercion for

a hegemon to gain dominance over others (Gramsci 1971 in Howson and Smith 2012: 41).

While Gramsci predominantly deals with a matter of class and not states, this understand-

ing of hegemony can also be applied to interstate relations (Phillips 2000: 7)

In order to apply the concept of hegemony to transboundary water conflicts, Zeitoun and

Warner (2006: 435) have developed a framework of hydro-hegemony drawing on Lukes’

three dimensional power view. They define hydro-hegemony as “hegemony at the river

basin level” (ibid). Much in line with Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony, this frame-

work argues that the hegemon can use a combination of force (“coercion, pressure”) and

consent (“treaties, knowledge construction”) in order to maintain power over water re-

sources (ibid: 435). Zeitoun and Warner identify elements of coercion and consent in

Lukes’ three dimensions of power, and argue that the exercise of all three power dimen-

sions provides ground for hegemonic control. The combination of the three gives the

hegemon “considerable ability to (re)write the rules of the game” (ibid: 443). In other

words, the combination provides the ultimate form of control.

20

The next section of the paper will apply the outlined theoretical framework to the empirical

case of Israel and Palestine.

Case Study

Context of the Israel-Palestine water conflict

The analysis of this case study is set in a context of unbalanced opportunities between co-

riparians. This section offers a contextual understanding of the use of water as a power tool

by presenting the historical and current state of water availability in Israel and Palestine.

The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 marked the beginning of the developments to-

wards asymmetrical water access. Following the acquisition of land in 1948, the period

saw major groundwater development projects in Israel, most significantly the development

of the National Water Carrier (NWC) system that connected the entire country into a cen-

tralised water system. The NWC transported water from the Northern Sea of Gallilee to the

population in the coastal plain (Katz 2016: 3). The water company Mekorot (2017) takes

pride in the Israeli water network as it “facilitates the delivery of running water at all times,

during all seasons, that is available, reliable and of the finest quality”. In contrast, Pales-

tine was under Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967 and experienced only minimal develop-

ment of water infrastructure (Messerschmid 2005: 3).

Following the Six Day War of 1967, Israel took full control over resources in the West

Bank and water resource authority was transferred to the military. Palestinian water rights

were abrogated and Israel began developing wells in the West Bank to supply the growing

number of settlements. The network, run by Mekorot, was integrated into the NWC. Set-

tlements today consume around 44MCM5 from wells in the West Bank (out of a total of

601MCM available) and an additional 10MCM is extracted in the West Bank by Mekorot

and sold back to Palestinians (The World Bank 2009, 5-14, Hilal 2017). The occupation

5 1 MCM = 1 million cubic metre. 1 cubic metre = 1000 litres.

21

period saw close to no development of wells to supply the Palestinians but rather the de-

struction of already existing wells – significantly around the Jordan River, which Palestin-

ians lost permanent access to (The World Bank 2009, 5-14).

In 1995, the peace process known as

the Oslo Process ended with the

signing of the Oslo II agreement.

This was intended as a five-year in-

terim agreement before permanent

status negotiations, but became in-

stitutionalised as the peace process

broke down in the late 1990s (Selby

2009: 132-147). Herein, the West

Bank was divided into area A, B and

C as can be seen on the map. Area A

were to be under full Palestinian

military and civil control, area B un-

der shared control between Israel

and Palestine, and area C remained

under full Israeli control (Oslo II

1995). In Article 40 of Oslo II, Pal-

estinian water rights were recognised by Israel but remained undefined. Moreover, the

agreement divided the content of the transboundary water resources in the Mountain Aq-

uifer6 after a principle of “maintaining existing levels of resource use” (ibid). This meant

that 71% of the resources were allocated to Israel, 17% to the Palestinian Authority (PA)

and 12% was left to be developed as can be seen on figure 2 (The World Bank 2009: 7). In

addition, the agreement returned water services and resources within area A and B to the

PA. Israel maintained control over management and development in the 60% of the West

Bank classified as Area C, and all issues of infrastructure ownership were left for perma-

nent status negotiations (ibid).

6 The Mountain Aquifer consists of the Eastern, the North Eastern and the Western aquifers.

22

Concretely this manifests itself in a vastly unequal distribution of water resources. Today,

Palestinians abstract about 20% of the estimated potential of the shared water resources.

Israel abstracts 80% as well as an additional 50% of over-abstraction (World Bank 2009:

6-14). Israel has managed ”to maximize this limited resource and create a green and

blooming environment, paralleling water-rich nations” (Israel Ministry of National Infra-

structures, Energy and Water Resources 2017). Water availability per capita is 4 times

higher for Israelis than Palestinians – in the West Bank, the 520,000 Israeli settlers use six

times as much water as the 2.6 million Palestinians (Oxfam International 2013). Water

extraction in Palestine has in fact declined from 1999 to 2007 despite a 50% growth in

population (World Bank 2009: 6-14). Since Oslo, an additional 50% of the West Bank

Palestinian population has become covered by network water, but one third remain uncon-

nected. These households pay 1/6 of their income for tanked water (ibid). The economic

impact extends from the household level to the national level. Agriculture contributes with

12% of Palestinian GDP and employs 117.000 people compared with 2.4% of Israeli GDP.

Despite the relatively larger importance of the agricultural sector to Palestine than Israel,

the Palestinian per capita agricultural water budget is 1/5 that of Israel (ibid). With this

overview of the current water allocation, we proceed to analyse how this is affected by the

three dimensions of power.

1st dimension of power applied

Hard power capacity compared

As touched upon, hard power is measured in terms of national material capacity. Consid-

ering capabilities in economic, military and human capital, international support, and ri-

parian position, a picture of extensive asymmetry in hard power between Israel and Pales-

tine is revealed; hard power rests in Israeli hands.

23

Firstly, in terms of economic capability, Israel enjoys a much higher gross national product

per capita than Palestine (US$35,730 for Israel and US$2,860 for Palestine, a twelve-fold

difference in 2015) (data.worldbank.org, 2017). Likewise, while the shape of the Israeli

economy is adaptive and differentiated, the Palestinian economy is either a client of or

constrained by that of Israel. Second, with regard to military force, the well-trained Israeli

military outnumbers the almost non-existing Palestinian military by many lengths. As of

2004, Israel possessed over 600,000 soldiers, 51 warships, 474 warplanes, and over 4300

tanks, whereas Palestine’s security force only amounted to hundreds of inadequately

equipped and poorly trained policemen (Zeitoun, 2008: 146). Third, Israel also overshad-

ows Palestine in degree of human capital; the economic advance and the level of education

is much higher in Israel, especially with respect to water resource development (ibid).

Fourth, looking at ability to draw on international support, Israel enjoys higher relative

capability than Palestine. Even though Palestine enjoys a marginal degree of support from

the UN and the Arab States, Israel has the powerful US on its side (ibid). Lastly, with

respect to riparian position, the two states are (formally) equal in hard power endowment

as Israel enjoys an upstream advantage on the Jordan River, while it sits downstream in the

case of the aquifers that span the West Bank (Messerchmid 2005: 7).

Evidently, the scope of Israeli hard power largely outstrips that of Palestine. But what are

the consequences of the power asymmetry? How is hard power expressed in the water

conflict?¨

Exercise of hard power in the water conflict

The paper will now turn to look at the directly observable effects of hard power asymmetry

in relation to water resources. Exercise of ‘hard’ power can be identified by looking at

coercive measures relying on the use of force or direct threat. Examples of these types of

measures are numerous in the Israel-Palestine water conflict.

24

Water infrastructure and military force

A direct result of the Israel-Palestine asymmetry in hard power can be seen in the Israeli

military operations following the second intifada of 20007. Israel had promised not to dam-

age water facilities in the ‘Joint Declaration for Keeping the Water Infrastructure out of

the Cycle of Violence’ (2000) (henceforth: Joint Declaration), made by the Israel-Palestine

Joint Water Committee (JWC) and signed in the beginning of the intifada. Even so, the

intrusion of Israeli military forces into the West Bank caused excessive damages on and

destruction of Palestinian water infrastructure. During one single operation, operation De-

fensive Shield in April 2002, the costs of the damages amounted to US$7 million (Messer-

schmid 2005: 5, Zeitoun 2008: 91).

The direct violation of the Joint Declaration by Israel (and the failure of water officials to

carry it through) was nowhere more evident than in the case of Israeli military intrusion

into Jenin in April 2002. The case of Jenin is a very concrete example of the exercise of

hard power through measures of coercion in the Israel-Palestine water conflict. Firstly, Is-

rael’s military supremacy was expressed through the continuous military intrusions in

which force was used to siege the city (often preventing aid from reaching civilians in need

during the obstruction), and damage water infrastructure (only on the Palestinian side)

(ibid). The drinking water infrastructure of the Palestinian city was both damaged and de-

structed by Israeli military activity with an estimated cost of US$ 2.1 million (World Bank

2002 in Zeitoun 2008: 91). Moreover, attempts to repair the damages were regularly dis-

rupted by the Israeli military forces, while access to the only water transmission line that

was not damaged, the Mekorot line, was denied (ibid). Secondly, despite the good inten-

tions of the Joint Declaration, none of the water officials from the two sides had a say in

the case of Jenin. Even though the Mekorot line could have compensated the Palestinian

water loss, military interests trumped the water issues and thousands of people in Jenin

were left with no water supply while Mekorot continued to deliver water to near Israeli

military camps and settlements (ibid). This reflects that the asymmetry in hard power also

encompasses the relationships between Israeli and Palestinian water authorities.

7 The term intifada refers to the violent Palestinian uprisings in 1987-1993 and 2000 onwards against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (Palmowski and Riches, 2016).

25

Another important expression of hard power is the direct use of Israeli military might that

has averted the development of water infrastructure, particularly well development, in Pal-

estine since the occupation of 1967. Since 1967, Israel has been able to retain total control

over water resources in the West Bank by enforcing three Military Orders (MO) (Messer-

schmid 2005: 3). MO 92 authorizes all control of water resources under an Israeli official

assigned by the Israeli Military, MO 158 specifies a water project permit system in which

permits can be rejected without justification, and MO 291 empowers the Military Com-

mander to cancel prior ownership in respect of land and water and overrule Israeli civil

courts (Badil Resource Center 2005: 90). The result is that Palestinian water infrastructure

is still at an insufficient level of nearly 40 years ago. Very few wells were drilled from

1967 to 1996, only in the Northern and Eastern basin and only under Israeli control. No

Palestinian wells have been added since 1967 in the Western basin (Messerschmid 2005:

3).

Land and water ‘grabbing’

The effects of the great asymmetry in ‘hard’ power between Israel and Palestine can fur-

thermore be observed by looking at coercive measures taken that deny Palestinians access

to their lands and water resources.

The construction of the separation barrier provides a concrete example. Built in the begin-

ning of the 2000s, the barrier can be seen as a result of the existing asymmetry of hard

power between Israel and Palestine. The decision by Israel to construct the separation bar-

rier primarily on Palestinian territory (85% of the barrier falls within the West Bank) was

a completely unilateral act made possible by Israel’s superior capacity of hard power (Hu-

man Rights Watch 2017: 4, Zeitoun 2008: 98). Due to the large disparity in hard power,

the PA was powerless and merely objected the action. The building of the separation barrier

inside the West Bank (and around Palestinian wells) also highlighted two further conse-

quences of the power asymmetry. Firstly, it directly violated the Joint Declaration (as in

the case of Jenin), and secondly, it revealed that the JWC failed as a joint decision-making

body as it was unable to prevent Israel from acting unilaterally against the will of the PA

(Zeitoun 2008: 96-98).

26

The separation barrier damagees Palestine’s vulnerable water system and impacts shared

water flows both locally and nationally. At the local level, the barrier affects Palestinian

farmers in particular as they are denied access to their wells and fields (Hilal 2017). At the

national level, land is put off access to Palestinians and instead the water-rich land on the

Palestinian side of the Western Aquifer is effectively appropriated by Israel (ibid). About

30% of Palestine’s share from the productive and valuable Western Aquifer is lost, and this

severely restrict national development plans (Zeitoun 2008: 97). Here, Harvey’s principle

of accumulation by dispossession serves to highlight the process. The Palestinians are ‘dis-

possessed’ of their land and water resources to the advantage of the superior power, Israel.

By appropriating land, Israel accumulates wealth and power as they “generate a series of

valuable and economic assets” (Alfosea 2013: 556). For example, capital is accumulated

by the cultivation of 9,300 hectares of agricultural land, from 20 Israeli-administered in-

dustrial zones and from taxing foreign companies - all placed on appropriated territories in

the West Bank (Human Rights Watch 2016: 1-8, Driaat 2017). In the shape of occupancy,

Israel creates facts on the ground by ‘grabbing’ (or accumulating) Palestinian land,

defragmenting the Palestinian water areas and obstructing Palestinian access to water in

the future (Messerschmid 2005: 6). Essentially, 90% of the future water resource potential

in the Western basin (which is among the key areas for future groundwater resource devel-

opment) will be off access to Palestine if the separation barrier rests in place (ibid).

The process of water grabbing should furthermore be seen in the light of the area division

of the West Bank following Oslo II. The West Bank was divided into area A (Palestinian

authority), B (joint authority) and C (Israeli authority) comprising 18, 22 and 60% of the

West Bank respectively (BTselem.org 2013). This ‘space compartmentalization’ divides

the highest possible quantity of Palestinians in ghettos (Area A) and facilitates the Israeli

occupation of valuable land with water resources (Area C) (Alfosea 2013: 556, Selby

2013:16). The arrangement works as a result of two factors. Firstly, the separation barrier

creates a substantial enclosure that prevents internal movements (642 obstacles to move-

ment exists in the West Bank). Secondly the settlements and their continuous expansion

that, apart from being “built strategically to use the water resources” (Isaac 2017), result

in an increasing takeover of Palestinian water springs, undermine the livelihoods of Pales-

tinians and any Palestinian attempt to gain economic independence or sovereignty (Alfosea

27

2013: 556, United Nations 2012: 1). Accumulation through dispossession of and control

over water resources is indeed present with clear winners and losers.

In sum, hard power asymmetry between Israel and Palestine is expressed in a number of

ways. Firstly, through the use of military force Israel damages and destructs Palestinian

water infrastructure, while also preventing development in the field. Secondly, through

unilateral action, barrier construction and settlements, Israel ‘dispossesses’ Palestinians of

their land and water resources. The expressions of hard power strikingly result in very

asymmetric outcomes; Israel is the winner while Palestine is the loser having to endure

dispossession, obstruction and violence. In the subsequent paragraphs, the paper will turn

to look at expressions and effects of the 2nd dimension of power.

2nd dimension of power applied

In Oslo II signed in 1995, Palestine was given responsibility of water and sewage in the

West Bank written in article 40. The Israelis had agreed to recognize the Palestinians’ water

rights which would be defined in permanent status negotiations (Oslo II 1995). Moreover,

it was agreed upon to coordinate and cooperate the management of water and sewage re-

sources and systems in the West Bank. In connection with the Agreement, the Joint Water

Committee (JWC) was established where representatives from the Israel Water Authority

(IWA) and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) would meet in order to realise article

40 (Oslo II 1995).

The JWC was intended to work as a platform for cooperation around water drilling projects

and the establishment of new wells and infrastructure, and thereby find solutions that would

be beneficial for both sides. However, the JWC did not turn out to be equally structured

resulting in unequal resource distribution and thereby added to the uneven relationship be-

tween Israel and Palestine. Israel has been able to control and set the agenda in the JWC

and thereby maintain the status quo8 (World Bank 2009: 48). After the occupation of the

West Bank in 1967, the West Bank Water Department (WBWD) was under direct Israeli

8 The status quo is referred to as the occupation time where the Israeli had full control over shared water resources from 1967 until 1995 in Oslo II (B’Tselem 2010)

28

control until 1995. During that period, the WBWD underwent vast restrictions and de-de-

velopment, where no Palestinian hydrogeologists were hired and different departments

were dismantled (Zeitoun 2008: 102). All water resources in the West Bank were placed

under the authority of the Civil Administration (CA)9, who had the authority to approve,

revoke or amend proposed water projects by the Palestinians in the West Bank (Selby 2013:

7).

Exercise of bargaining power in the water conflict

Now a couple of decades after Oslo II and the establishment of the JWC, the distribution

and management of water and sewage has been subject to power battles, bargaining and

negotiation. The outcome of these processes have been determined by various factors, such

as (a) the structure of the JWC, (b) legitimacy gained through recognition at the interna-

tional and national level as well as internally in the JWC, and (c) Israel’s ability to set the

agenda. The following sections will investigate how the 2nd dimension of power has been

exercised through these factors.

Structure of the JWC

Even though Oslo II was expected to provide a governance structure that would increase

Palestinian access to water resources, management of infrastructure and improve water and

sanitation services, this has not been the case. The establishment and structure of the JWC

is a distinct example of the limitation the PA faces with regard to water supply and devel-

opment (World Bank 2009: 47). Critical aspects of the JWC suggest that power asymmetry

is structured into the committee. Firstly, the jurisdiction of the JWC only covers areas

within the Green Line in the West Bank and does therefore not extend to the transboundary

resources located within the political border of Israel (Zeitoun 2008: 100). Secondly, as-

pects of the licensing procedure - crucial to JWC operations as it approves all projects

concerning new water initiatives - fosters further power asymmetry. In this licensing pro-

cedure, it is the CA that makes the ultimate decisions on all projects in Area C. The CA

9 “The Civil Administration is a civil-military body that is charged with implementing Israel’s civil policy in the territory. It operates as a civilian operation, but sits under the command of the military authority in Judea and Samaria” (cogat.mod.gov.il, 2017)

29

controls around 66% of the territory within the borders of the West Bank (Area C + settle-

ments) and thereby have veto power for projects proposed in this area (Hilal, 2017). More-

over, the JWC do not have authority in the parts of the Mountain Aquifer placed on the

Israeli side of the Green Line. This leaves about 34% of the land within the Palestinian

territory subject to the negotiation in the JWC. Consequently, it can be questioned how

‘joint’ these agreements are since they are solely one-sided ‘sharing’ activities.

Legitimacy and authority as key components in the bargaining process

The 2nd dimension of power underlines the crucial aspect of legitimacy and authority that

influence the exercise of power in the bargaining process. Legitimacy can be achieved

through a number of methods. The international recognition of the state of Palestine con-

tinues to be a disputed topic. Today, though Palestine is recognised as a state by 137 states,

about 50 states have not accepted this notion, including almost all European countries, the

US, Canada, Australia, and a few states in South America, Africa and Asia (Palestinian

Authority, 2017). Israel is still not accepting the notion of a Palestinian state which leaves

the PWA with limited authority and legitimacy in bargaining and negotiation situations.

Given that the PWA was established right after Oslo II, there was an urgent need to gain

legitimacy from their Israeli counterpart as well as from their own population. However,

the PWA’s limited control over water resources and Israel’s non-recognition of Palestine

as a state gave them low legitimacy and authority, and thereby a weak position in the bar-

gaining process (World Bank 2009: 56, Zeitoun 2008: 105).

The PWA’s desire to attain legitimacy from their population have resulted in a pragmatic

modus vivendi at the JWC as they prioritise interest alignment (Zeitoun 2008: 105). This

was the case during the Israeli Likud government shortly after Oslo II. The need for Pales-

tinian water development and Israel’s right-wing government’s foreign policy aimed at

greater dependence of Israeli water infrastructures, resulted in more Palestinian villages

becoming connected to water lines of the Israeli settlements. The PWA could now provide

more Palestinian villages with water and became legitimised in the eyes of the villages but

in the process the PWA legitimised the continuation of Israeli settlements (ibid). Further-

more, as emphasised by General Director of Strategic Planning in PWA, Yousuf A.

Awayes (2017) there was an urgent need from the villages to get access to water after Oslo

30

II, and therefore PWA choose to focus on providing water access rather than “arguing with

the Israelis about our water rights”.

Israeli control over licensing procedure

Referring to Lukes’ 2nd dimension of power, that emphasises the importance of non-deci-

sion making, this following paragraph will outline examples of how that is executed in the

JWC. The record of approvals in the JWC suggests that the PA has limited space for de-

veloping water facilities due to structural constraints in the JWC and Israel’s veto power.

Between 1996 and 2008, the PA proposed 417 projects that were presented in the JWC,

but only 57% of them were approved and only 19% were implemented after receiving ad-

ditional approval from the CA. Only 38 projects were realised in this time span (World

Bank 2009: 48). For the approval of Israeli projects, the case is slightly different. The ap-

proval rate was 98% indicating that Israel holds substantial power in approval decisions.

Furthermore, the average JWC approval time was 347 days for Palestinian projects but

only 68.2 days for Israeli projects (Selby 2013: 12). The long approval time and the asym-

metry in approval rates discourage applications for approval of projects and the use of the

licensing procedure in general to the interest of Israel. As an example of non-decision mak-

ing, counter to Palestinian interests, the PA has refrained from submitting applications for

new wells in the Western basin because it knows that it will be met with the Israeli veto

(ibid: 16).

Israeli agenda setting

Another crucial element in the 2nd dimension of power is the ability to set the agenda. First

of all, Israel has controlled the agenda in the JWC bargaining process by using ‘gentle

coercion’ to keep some issues off the agenda. It has long been a dilemma for the PWA to

decide between putting water rights and the need for new wells on the agenda to JWC

meetings or instead prioritise getting a permit for access to already contested wells. At the

same time, Israeli members of the JWC have been known to successfully convince the

Palestinian side to avoid bringing water rights and new wells up by promoting pragmatism

and camaraderie (Zeitoun 2008: 105). Thereby the Israelis have been able to swipe off the

water rights and new wells on the agenda at the JWC meetings. Secondly, Israel has been

able to set the agenda by controlling attendance at meetings. The IWA controls who may

31

attend the JWC meetings. For example, the Palestinians have requested to bring American

and Norwegian engineering project partners to discuss and evaluate technical issues, but

the request has been refused (ibid). Lastly, Israel has been able to control the agenda by

breaching the JWC procedure. Israel constructed a 1000 MCM reservoir for the Israeli

settlement of Beit Horon in 2001 and a 6 inches line along the Nablus-Ramallah road to

feed the Israeli settlement of Shile. These projects were not taken up for approval in the

JWC, not even at the technical level. Despite protests and complaints about such breaches

from the PWA, there has been no consequences. It has thus been an effective way for Israel

to bypass the JWC for such projects and thereby control the agenda in the JWC (Hilal

2017).

This section has provided an understanding of how the 2nd dimension of power has been

exercised to gain water and power through the JWC. The skewed distribution of power in

the JWC has allowed Israel to control most of the licensing procedure as well as the agenda.

Moreover, PWA has due to its limited legitimacy had a weak position in the bargaining

process, which has resulted in a mostly pragmatic approach to negotiations. Subsequently,

Israel has been able to control the nondecision-making in the JWC by deterring applications

from Palestinians. Thereby the 2nd dimension of power has provided an insight into the soft

form of power. The next section will deepen this insight by analysing ideational power.

3rd dimension of power applied

There are competing discourses about the distribution and management of water resources

in the West Bank. These discourses inform discursive and ideational battles whose out-

comes indeed have real and material consequences for those affected by it (Karner 2012:

50). Competing discourses occur not only between, but also within Israel and Palestine and

between them and third actors, i.e. foreign governments and international donors (ibid).

The following section will focus on how ideational power is exercised in the competition

between two different discourses, namely the Palestinian ‘water rights’ discourse and the

dominant Israeli ‘needs, not rights’ discourse (Zeitoun 2008: 123).

Whereas Palestinians have advocated a ‘water rights’ perspective, which demands an equal

and non-discriminatory share of the transboundary water resources in the West Bank and

32

Israel (Selby 2003: 142), the Israeli water authorities’ have had greater success by the im-

position of the ‘needs, not rights’ discourse. ‘Water needs’ refer to the “minimal water

requirements that a human being must have met in order to be able to lead a decent life”

(Karner 2012: 52). Even though Israel formally recognised Palestinian water rights in the

Oslo Process (Israel Water Authorities 2013: 3), the needs discourse was, according to

Zeitoun (2008: 122), also generated by Israeli actors in this period, where they consistently

advocated needs as the basis of cooperation with Palestinians. According to Dr Jad Isaac

(2017), who participated in the negotiations, the discourse indeed has changed completely

since the negotiations in 1994: “When we used to discuss water, we had so much in com-

mon across the two countries. When we went to the Oslo negotiations, we never saw any

of our interlocutors, but only army generals. When you asked them about water rights, they

told us ‘what water rights?’. Things changed considerably.”

By suggesting an increase of water supplies available to the Palestinians of 28.6 MCM,

Israel accepted the existence of legitimate domestic water needs (Selby 2003b: 142, The

World Bank 2009: 7), and in turn they received goodwill and legitimacy (Selby 2003b:

142). By implementing the needs discourse, they furthermore avoided negotiations about

a transfer or reallocation of resources, which would inevitably have led to a reduction in

Israeli water quantities (Karner 2012: 52). Consequently, it generated a generally narrow

understanding of the water negotiations, where governments are only morally bound to

guarantee the very basic needs, meaning that as long as they are able to secure the basic

needs of the “weak” (the Palestinians), the agreements will have no implications on exist-

ing asymmetries in the allocation of water (ibid). In this way, the ‘needs, not rights’ dis-

course became the prevailing discourse about water management both bilaterally, among

Israeli and Palestinian officials, and internationally in the minds of donors (ibid: 54).

As a part of this dominant discourse, further ideas propagated by the Israeli government

has gained momentum, such as the ideas of a scarcity situation, without enough water for

everyone, as well as ideas about how the Israeli goodwill (their securing of water needs)

will be obstructed if the Palestinians stubbornly insist on principles about rights, instead of

being pragmatic and cooperative (Israel Water Authority 2009, Zeitoun 2008: 123). Ac-

cording to Israeli Water Authority (2009: 1) “the sides must dwell less on theoretical, legal

33

or ideological aspects relating to the sharing of existing water sources, and focus more on

practical and effective planning and preparation for coordinated water resources manage-

ment”. Such ideas are reinforced by ideational mechanisms, which reward compliance and

punish disagreement. These mechanisms punish the Palestinians who adhere to the rights

perspective by making them seem illogical and obstructionist, while those who speak in

terms of the ‘needs, not rights’ discourse are rewarded as ideal examples of Palestinians

aiming at goodwill and cooperation (Zeitoun 2008: 123).

Strikingly, Zeitoun (2008) finds that the Palestinian political elites have adopted the needs-

based arguments established by Israeli politicians and that these elites are now naturally

using the discourse in their argumentation. This behaviour is to be expected, since Pales-

tinian elites would lose a great part of their legitimacy if they chose not to act consistently

with the discourse, and it is therefore simply not an option not to follow the discourse (ibid:

115). Their position in the middle of the two discourses is reflected in table 2. Nevertheless,

this behaviour puts the Palestinian officials at odds with the Palestinian water NGOs and

other experts, who are less dependent on treaties. It is easier for these outsiders to maintain

a critical perspective as they do not have to reach any formal agreements. In this way, a

paradigm of ‘you’re either with us or against us’ divides the Palestinian side and prevents

the emergence of a common Palestinian approach (ibid). All in all, agreement and cooper-

ation appears on the surface, where grievances and conflict remains beneath.

Through such methods, the ‘needs not rights’ discourse has also been implanted in the

minds of donors and consequently had a substantial effect on their behaviour (Zeitoun,

2008: 115). Most importantly, the USAID, which is one of the most important donors in

water sector projects, adopted the idea of natural regional water scarcity and the needs

34

discourse. The organisation’s fundamental links to the United States diplomatic position,

meant that the US’ role in the negotiation of water resources was strongly affected by the

prevailing discourse. This became clear in the 2010 Camp David negations, where the US

avoided negotiation over the political responsibility for Palestinian lack of water by main-

taining that it was an issue of natural water scarcity. In this way, they further marginalised

the notion of Palestinian water rights (Giglioli 2010: 61). While other countries’ develop-

ment agencies and some international NGOs have been more critical, the Israeli side has

been able to hinder operations by not giving permits to the import of material, territorial

mobility and access to foreign staff (Giglioli 2010: 62). According to Messerschmid (2017),

water is generally a very popular area for donors, however, since Israel is able to control

the development of projects through the permit system, many donors either give up their

projects or make their projects in cooperation with Israel under a needs based approach.

Another ideational power tool, which is used by Israel, is the concept of securitisation.

Palestinian protests over Israel’s control of the West Bank aquifers are disregarded through

Israel’s claims for ‘national security’ (Mansour 2016: 238). There are several examples of

how Israel successfully justifies their control of the water resources by consistently equat-

ing water security with national security. For instance, Israel has claimed that water wells

and water pipelines in the Palestinian territories are persistently targets of terrorist attacks

and used this to justify the destruction of water infrastructure (Mansour 2016: 239, Isaac

2017). Another example is how Israel Water Authority (2009) claims that ‘shortages of

water’ in the Hebron area are due to Palestinians that ‘steal’ water, which was meant for

the Israeli settlements. According to Hilal (2017): “Even small projects are being de-

stroyed, claiming that it is for security reasons. The question is, what security reasons? If

you confiscate or destroy small tanks, it is not a matter of security”.

Israeli hydro-hegemony

As it has been shown, Israel holds significant power relative to Palestine in all three of

Lukes’ dimensions. However, when it comes to water control, the whole is more than the

sum of its parts, and it is in the combination of the three dimensions of power that we find

the ultimate control. Considering hydro-hegemony as water resource control through a mix

of coercion and consent, the rule of the Jordan River and the transboundary aquifers in the

35

West Bank can be considered Israeli hegemony (Isaac 2017, Selby 2009: 69, Cascão and

Zeitoun 2010: 33). As illustrated in the three dimensions above, the situation today is

largely a combination of domination through coercion (hard power) and compliance (bar-

gaining and ideational power). Table 3 provides an overview of the aspects of each dimen-

sion identified in the case of Israel-Palestine. The sections that follow focus on how the

combination of hard, bargaining and ideational power eases the expansion of Israeli con-

trol.

For example, the exercise of hard power in terms of water grabbing through the construc-

tion of settlements and the separation barrier is eased by exercising power in the other two

dimensions. In the current situation of vast asymmetry in bargaining power, Israel is able

to force Palestine to implicitly legitimise the settlements by pushing them to accept devel-

opment of water systems for settlements in return for permits to develop Palestinian water

infrastructure (Selby 2003: 135). This makes it much easier for Israel to expand settle-

ments, which furthers their water grabbing strategy. Moreover, as the construction of the

separation barrier is framed in a discourse of securitisation, this limits the consequences of

the water grabbing strategy for Israel’s reputation. The three powers in combination eases

the exercise of coercion and consent.

Another example of the combination of the three dimensions brings us back to the signing

of the Oslo II agreement in 1995. According to Selby (2009: 97), the agreement cemented

the status quo of the occupation period. Israel possessed vast bargaining power at the onset

36

of the Oslo negotiations and insisted on the fact that shared water resources was to be di-

vided in order to “maintain existing resource use” (ibid, The World Bank 2009). As the

interim agreement has become permanent, such a principle solidifies the needs-based dis-

course. Among other things, this has enabled Israel to emphasise sections of Oslo II that

manifests Israeli control (i.e. the segmentation of the West Bank into A, B and C areas)

while downplaying sections that could be of benefit to Palestinians (i.e. the recognition of

Palestinian water rights) (Zeitoun 2008: 150). In turn, if Palestinians cannot claim the right

to their water resources as long as their basic needs are satisfied, it becomes easier for Israel

to exercise hard power by rejecting and destroying the infrastructure that provides Pales-

tinians access to these resources. The three forms of power are thus mutually reinforcing

and coalesces into a coherent hegemonic structure.

However, the Palestinians are not yet completely subordinated, and not all agents are work-

ing to preserve the structures – some are reacting to the oppressive structures. Elements of

counter-hegemonic strategies such as documentaries, reports and conferences documenting

the domination are organised in the civil society by organisations such as B’Tselem and

ARIJ, and local protests take the shape of demonstrations and civil disobedience (Wessels

2015: 603, B’Tselem 2016, Selby 2013). Despite this local level agency, civil society is

dealing with water policy from the fringes of decision-making and have very limited influ-

ence (ibid).

Thus, looking at the three dimensions and the definition of hegemony as a mix of coercion

and consent combined, we thus argue, that Israel is in possession of a complete compliance-

producing structure and can therefore be said to have successfully constructed a hydro-

hegemony where the ability to determine the allocation of water resources is in their hands.

Means vs. Aim

As has been made clear, extreme water resource asymmetry persists to the benefit of Israel.

On the surface, one might be led to presume that the main aim of Israel’s exercise of power

is simply to get more water. But does Israel solely use power in the water conflict as a tool

for acquiring more water or are there underlying factors at play? Do they seek to achieve

other interests? Looking at the outcomes of the expressions of power in all of Luke’s three

37

dimensions, they seem to have benefited Israel beyond the acquisition of water. This leads

us to the ongoing discussion of whether water conflicts should be seen as an aim to get as

much water as possible or as a means “to achieve other objectives” (Messerschmid 2017).

Stating that water is used as a tool, this paper maintains that, while water can be considered

an aim in the Israel-Palestine water conflict, there are many indications that water is being

used as a means, a political power tool, for other aims. In the following section, we outline

how water is used as a tool to fragment Palestinian land, to increase Palestinian dependency

on Israel, to legitimise and expand Israeli settlements and to limit donor support and hinder

Palestinian economic development. Combined this continuously destabilises and under-

mines the notion of a Palestinian state allowing Israel to maintain and expand control over

the area.

Fragmentation of land

First of all, through water strategies, Israel is able to fragment the Palestinian space in the

West Bank by pushing Palestinians out of Area C. According to Adam Aloni, human rights

researcher with B’TSelem (2017), Israel pursues a strategy of pooling Palestinians in ter-

ritorial islands by connecting water pipes to areas, where they wish to concentrate the Pal-

estinian population (such as Area A), and make the areas they want to control or settle

uninhabitable to Palestinians by disconnecting and destroying water resources. In fact, “in

all of Area C, Israel is not connecting Palestinians to water because they [Israel] want to

dry them out of there” (ibid). 88% of villages in area C are not recognised by Israeli plan-

ning authorities, and consequently their projects are by default rejected in the JWC (Selby

2013: 9). This strategy is confirmed by Mahmoud Diraat, manager of Auja Eco-Center

(2017), who adds that the cultivation of appropriated agricultural land in the West Bank by

settlements amounts to considerable profits that could have gone to Palestinians. In this

sense, water is not simply an aim in itself, but may be considered an Israeli tool to fragment

and control the West Bank.

Palestinian dependency on Israel

Second, by connecting Palestinians to water pipes coming from Mekorot, Israel maintains

Palestinian dependency on Israel for access to water (Aloni 2017). In many areas in the

West Bank, water pipes go from Mekorot through settlements to secondary water reservoirs

38

and then onto the Palestinian villages (ibid, Isaac 2017). Whereas settlers get water through

demand, Palestinians get water through fixed quotas. And when settlers need more water

in the hot summer months, it causes less pressure in the pipes for Palestinians. This forces

villagers to buy tanker water, which is often 4 to 6 times the price of tap water; “Settlers

who are Israeli citizens have a privilege. They get water, and the Palestinians do not get

water if the settlers need a bit more” (Aloni 2017). Moreover, Palestinians can only control

water infrastructure within the territorial islands of A and B. However, in order to construct

efficient infrastructure, Palestine needs to lay water pipes that cross Area C, and all of the

water infrastructure that has to go through the continuous space of Area C is now controlled

by Israel. This creates general Palestinian dependency on Israel beyond water, and the fact

that Israel has control over the water can be seen as “a bargaining chip that gives Israel

power over the Palestinians” (ibid).

Settlement expansion (JWC)

Third, Israel has shown to be highly effective in exploiting a bargaining opportunity that

has ‘gently’ forced Palestinians to legitimise settlements by accepting water development

projects for settlements in return for permits (Zeitoun 2008: 104). In order for the Palestin-

ians to gain permits to develop infrastructure from other water resources than the Eastern

aquifer, the Palestinians have been forced to accept new and enlarged water systems within

the Green Line to Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Selby 2003: 135). Thereby, the

PWA faces a limited choice to either reject the ‘price’ they have to pay for the approval of

their own project or accept the Israeli project and thereby, implicitly legitimise settlements.

As an example, the PWA official, Yousef A. Awayes explained that in 1998, the negotia-

tions in the JWC broke down for years due to Israel using the JWC as a forum for legiti-

mising settlements. If the Palestinians had given approval for water projects that supplied

settlements, Israel could proclaim that settlements were legitimate and should not be sub-

ject to criticism by the international community (Awayes 2017).

Donors

Fourthly, Israeli control over water resources hinders donor support to Palestine in two

ways. First of all, since the ‘needs not rights’ discourse has been adopted by many donors,

39

Israel has indirectly been able to shape the kind of projects that donors choose to imple-

ment, and thereby prevent projects that strengthen the Palestinian society through water

rights. Secondly, Israel has been able to hinder donor operations by not giving permits to

the projects (Messerschmid 2017). Since Israel is able to control the development of pro-

jects through the permit system, many donors either give up their projects or make their

projects adopt to the Israeli wants. Nevertheless, Israel's power over donors seems not only

to secure Israel more water. It circumvent projects, which through providing Palestinian

access to water, potentially would be able to strengthen a Palestinian state, and it also averts

donor money to Palestine in general (Mayer 1994: 10). The discourse around water and

water itself thereby becomes a tool to hinder general economic development in Palestine.

All together, this serves to continuously undermine the notion of and development towards

an autonomous Palestinian state and maintain Israeli control. As Adam Aloni from

B’TSelem (2017) argues, “water and water infrastructure is indeed used as a tool for con-

trol in the West Bank”. On the face of it, we observe an unequal access to water between

Israel and Palestine. However, through our analysis we have found that water in itself

serves as a mechanism in the struggle for land and control. This is illustrated in figure 2.

Israel ‘dispossesses’ Palestinians of more than water resources; they obstruct future devel-

opment, damage the livelihood for Palestinians, destabilize the society and thereby prevent

any future Palestinian attempt to achieve sovereignty (Alfosea 2013: 556, United Nations

2012: 1).

40

Reflections

The theoretical framework of the paper enabled us to identify power structures and asym-

metries in the Israel-Palestine water conflict by investigating how power appears in differ-

ent forms and dimensions. However, no theoretical framework is without shortcomings.

The following paragraphs will outline and discuss the weaknesses of applying Lukes’ three

dimension of power to the case of Israel-Palestine. Lastly, we reflect upon the possibility

of bias in our conclusions.

The first shortcoming of Lukes’ theoretical framework is that it is intended for explaining

power relations and policy making at the national level and does not per se extend to inter-

state relations. Thereby, with respect to the paper’s aim of investigating water and power

relations between Israel and Palestine, Lukes’ framework may seem inadequate. This paper

has namely applied Lukes’ theory into a setting of international relations and has thereby

not taken the power relations and public policy-making that take place within Israel and

Palestine into consideration. However, being aware of this limitation, we related Lukes’

three dimensions of power to Nye’s hard and soft power that illustrates how Lukes’ theory

could readily be utilised in an inter-state perspective.

41

The second shortcoming is that Lukes’ theory in itself is mainly able to provide an under-

standing of how Israel in different ways has exercised power and thereby gained more

water and not how water can be used as a means for a greater political agenda. To accom-

modate this weakness, the theory was complemented with the use of academic articles and

especially the conduction of elite and expert interviews on the topic of water as a means

for other aims. Since we faced a gap in the academic literature concerning water as a polit-

ical power tool in the Israel-Palestine conflict, a main purpose of our interviews were to

provide insights into the means versus aims discussion.

A third shortcoming of Lukes’ theory is the lack of combination of the three dimensions.

Lukes emphasises the importance of possessing all three dimensions for ultimate control,

but does not provide a framework to analyse this combination. The concept of hegemony

in combination with Lukes’ three dimensions provided this framework as it allowed us to

analyse the strength in Israel’s combined use of coercion and consent.

On background of these reflections, we can conclude that Lukes’ three-dimensional view

of power combined with aiding concepts and methods has enabled us to identify how water

is more than just a natural resource. This theoretical framework can fittingly be utilised for

other investigations that seek to uncover how natural resources are used as a political power

tool. Indeed, the use of water as a political power tool is not restricted to this specific con-

text. Further research could deal with analysis of power relations in cases of transboundary

water resources in other parts of the world.

Aside from theoretical limitations, a general weakness of this paper is the risk of bias, due

to the highly contentious nature of the topic of analysis as well as the imbalance of view-

points in the conducted interviews. We recognise that reaching a neutral “truth” is an im-

possibility within any social science research, in particular in a conflict as politicised as

that of Israel-Palestine. An important aspect of investigating power relations and water

conflicts is to look at power asymmetries, however, this may lead to an emphasis on the

perspectives of the weaker part. Likewise, our interviews provided us primarily with a Pal-

estinian perspective. This has inevitably influenced our approach and argument, yet we

42

have strived for neutrality by employing a vast array of academic literature as well as offi-

cial Israeli sources that could provide an insight into their perspective. Consequently, it

should also be noted that the findings of this paper must not be perceived as final, but rather

as offering explanations that can be build upon by further research.

Conclusion

In order to uncover how water resources can be used as a political power tool and how this

is reflected in the Israel-Palestine conflict, this paper has used Lukes’ three-dimensional

view of power as a framework to provide insights into the underlying structures and mech-

anisms in struggles over water. We have provided a theoretical answer to the research ques-

tion and subsequently applied the theoretical framework to the case of the water conflict in

Israel-Palestine, and lastly investigated how water can be used as a tool to achieve desired

political objectives.

Lukes’ framework combined with supplementary concepts has allowed us to investigate

the power structures behind the profound asymmetry in water distribution between Israel

and Palestine. We can conclude, that Israel is superior to Palestine in all three of Lukes’

power dimensions. Firstly, Israel has exercised hard power by use of military force to de-

stroy and prevent development of water infrastructure. They have further dispossessed Pal-

estinians of their land and water through the separation barrier, area division and settle-

ments. Secondly, the skewed power structure in the JWC has put Israel in a powerful posi-

tion in the bargaining process. Thereby, Israel has been able to set the overall agenda and

largely control the licensing procedure as well as the development of water projects in the

West Bank. Thirdly, whereas Palestine has advocated a discourse of ‘water rights’, Israel

has been more successful in exercising ideational power. Through the imposition of a

‘needs, not rights’ discourse, they have been able to change the perceptions of water rights

in the minds of both Palestinian officials and international donors. Moreover, Israel has

used a strategy of securitisation to gain added control and in this way limited Palestine’s

access to water. By exercising a combination of all three power dimensions, Israel has

achieved close to full control in the position of hydro-hegemon with the ability to determine

the allocation of water resources.

43

By looking at the outcomes of Israel’s use of power in the water conflict, the paper has

found that Israel has gained more than just water. This suggests that Israel uses water re-

sources as a means to achieve other objectives than the acquisition of water, namely frag-

mentation of Palestinian land, Palestinian dependency on Israel, settlement expansion and

influence on donors. On the surface, we thus find a system of wells, dams, pumps and

walls. Below it we find a coherent set of structures and mechanisms performed by agents,

that secure the dominance of Israel over Palestine, inhibiting the development of viable a

Palestinian state.

44

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Appendix I: List of Abbreviations

ARIJ Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem

CA Civil Administration

CR Critical Realism

IDF Israel Defence Force

IWA Israel Water Authority

JWC Joint Water Committee

MCM Million Cubic Meter

MO Military Order

NWC National Water Carrier

PA Palestinian Authority

PoS Philosophy of Science

PWA Palestinian Water Authority

UN United Nations

US United States

WBWD West Bank Water Department