Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Management of ... Library/Other... · 2.2.1.2 CSA . The project will design and construct the CSA, which is expected to consist of a concrete

CHPRC-02236Revision 1

Waste Encapsulation and Storage FacilityManagement of Cesium and Strontium capsules(Project W-135) Safety Design Strategy

Prepared for the U.S. Department of EnergyAssistant Secretary for Environmental Management

Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energyunder Contract DE-AC06-08RL14788

P.O. Box 1600 Richland, Washington 99352

Approved for Public Release; Further Dissemination Unlimited


EDC#: ECR-17-000200

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Management of Cesium andStrontium capsules (Project W-135) Safety Design Strategy Project No: W-135 Program/Project: WM

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company

Date PublishedNovember 2017

Prepared for the U.S. Department of EnergyAssistant Secretary for Environmental Management

Contractor for the U.S. Department of Energyunder Contract DE-AC06-08RL14788

P.O. Box 1600 Richland, Washington 99352

Release Approval Date Release Stamp

Approved for Public Release; Further Dissemination Unlimited

Nov 15, 2017DATE:


TRADEMARK DISCLAIMERReference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service bytradename, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarilyconstitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by theUnited States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors orsubcontractors.

This report has been reproduced from the best available copy.

Printed in the United States of America

Total pages: 29

CHPRC RECORD OF REVISION (ROR) (1) Document Number

CHPRC-02236

(2) TitleWaste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Management of Cesium and Strontium capsules (Proiect W-135) Safety Desiqn Strateqy

Change Control Record

(3) �DD ROY\� Authorized for Release(4) Description of Change- Replace, Add, and Delete PagesRevision (5) DA/TA Date

0 Initial release. (ECR-14-000901)

R Sl

Update Project W-135 Safety Design Strategy and reflect change

in project title. (ECR-17-000200)

.

Page 1 of 1 A-6004-786 (REV 3)

CHPRC-02236, Rev. 1

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Management of Cesium and Strontium Capsules

(Project W-135)

Safety Design Strategy

Prepared by:

CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company

Richland, Washington

February 2017

CHPRC–02236, Rev. 1

ii

Contents

1.0 Purpose................................................................................................................................1

2.0 Description of Project ........................................................................................................1

2.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................1

2.2 Facilities and Processes............................................................................................3

2.2.1 Facilities .......................................................................................................3

2.2.2 Processes ......................................................................................................4

2.3 Major Hazards..........................................................................................................4

2.3.1 Capsule Packaging .......................................................................................4

2.3.2 Transportation ..............................................................................................5

2.3.3 CSA Facility.................................................................................................5

3.0 Safety Strategy....................................................................................................................5

3.1 Safety Guidance and Requirements .........................................................................5

3.1.1 Safety Goals and Philosophies .....................................................................5

3.1.2 Safety Functional Classification ..................................................................6

3.1.3 Safety Design Criteria ..................................................................................6

3.1.4 Radiological Design Criteria........................................................................6

3.2 Hazard Identification................................................................................................7

3.3 Key Safety Decisions ...............................................................................................7

3.3.1 Seismic .........................................................................................................7

3.3.2 Confinement Strategy ..................................................................................8

3.3.3 Fire Mitigation Strategy ...............................................................................9

3.3.4 Anticipated Safety Functions .......................................................................9

3.3.5 Security ........................................................................................................9

4.0 Risks to Project Safety Decisions ......................................................................................9

5.0 Safety Analysis Approach and Plan .................................................................................9

5.1 Activities and Deliverables ......................................................................................9

6.0 Safety Design Integration Team – Interfaces and Integration ....................................10

7.0 References .........................................................................................................................11

Appendices

A DOE Memorandum from E. J. Moniz to all Department Elements................................ A-1


iii

Figures

Figure 1. Proposed Cask Storage System...................................................................................2

Tables

Table 1. Safety Analysis Activities and Deliverables Relating to Safety in Design for the WESF MCSC Project..........................................................................................10

Terms

CD Critical Decision

CHPRC CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company

CRD O Contractor Requirements Document Order

CSA Capsule Storage Area

CSDR Conceptual Safety Design Report

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DSA Documented Safety Analysis

DTS Dry Transfer System

FHA Fire Hazards Analysis

HC Hazard Category

IPT Integrated Project Team

MCSC Management of Cesium and Strontium Capsules

PDSA Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

PFHA Preliminary Fire Hazards Analysis

PHA Preliminary Hazards Analysis

PSDR Preliminary Safety Design Report

RL U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office

SDC Seismic Design Category

SDIT Safety Design Integration Team

SDS Safety Design Strategy

SSC structures, systems, and components

TSC Transportable Storage Canister

TSR Technical Safety Requirements

UCS Universal Capsule Sleeve

VCC Vertical Concrete Cask

WESF Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility


1

1.0 Purpose

This Safety Design Strategy (SDS), a required element of DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, provides details to support the safety basis documentation

required by the Management of the Cesium and Strontium Capsules (MCSC) Project (W-135).

The SDS documents applicable safety design expectations for the early project phases. This SDS will be revised during project performance as the design matures and additional safety

requirements are identified. Consistent with the requirements of DOE-STD-1189-2008,

Appendix E, this strategy:

Provides a high level description of the project

Describes the overall safety strategy

Defines known risks to project safety decisions

Defines a safety analysis approach and plan

Defines interfaces between design, safety, and operational organizations

2.0 Description of Project

2.1 Introduction

The Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF) is located in the 200 East Area of the

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site north of Richland, Washington. The Waste

Encapsulation and Storage Facility stores 1,312 cesium capsules, 23 Type-W capsules (overpacked cesium capsules), and 601 strontium capsules underwater in pool cells. The

capsules are currently managed as mixed high-level waste and are regulated under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.

The MCSC Project (W-135) will provide the capability for removal of cesium and strontium capsules from WESF pool cell storage and placement of the capsules into a Cask Storage System

as an interim storage configuration, pending final disposition. The project is currently in the

conceptual design phase and the Cask Storage System is expected to consist of a Universal Capsule Sleeve (UCS), Dry Transfer System (DTS), Transportable Storage Canister (TSC)

Basket, TSC, and Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) (see Figure 1).


2

Figure 1. Proposed Cask Storage System


3

The MCSC Project scope includes the following major activities to prepare for movement of the

1,936 cesium and strontium capsules into the interim storage configuration.

Construction of the capsule storage area (CSA), including storage pad, fencing, lighting,

and road access

Completion of WESF modifications necessary to support retrieval, packaging, and

transfer of capsules from WESF

Acquisition of storage and transfer systems, and associated equipment necessary to

support retrieval, packaging, and transfer of the capsules to the CSA

Completion of startup operations and demonstration of readiness for capsule transfer

operations.

The SDS will treat the MCSC Project as two parts: the activities performed for the new CSA and

the activities performed at WESF. The CSA is a new facility requiring development of

DOE-STD-1189-2008 safety design basis documents. A major modification determination (CHPRC-03108) was completed for the activities performed at WESF and the initial conclusion

was that the changes to WESF would not constitute a major modification. If DOE Richland

Operations Office (RL) agrees with this conclusion, only a revision to the existing WESF safety basis documentation would be required. Therefore, the SDS will focus on the activities for the

new CSA.

2.2 Facilities and Processes

2.2.1 Facilities

Transfer of the capsules to an interim storage configuration will involve operations at two

facilities: WESF and CSA. In preparation for the transfer of the capsules, the MCSC Project will

construct the CSA, modify WESF, and design and procure a Cask Storage System.

2.2.1.1 WESF

The Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility will be modified as necessary to accommodate the

Cask Storage System and package the capsules. Expected modifications to WESF include

design, fabrication and installation of a modified G Cell coverblock to allow for interface with the DTS, and strengthening of the truckport floor to support the transportation/storage cask.

Welding and leak test equipment will also be installed in G Cell.

2.2.1.2 CSA

The project will design and construct the CSA, which is expected to consist of a concrete pad,

fencing, lighting, and road access to support interim storage of the capsules. The location of the facility is expected to be in the 200 East Area to the west of WESF and east of the Canister

Storage Building. The CSA is expected to be similar to spent fuel storage pads in use elsewhere

and should consist primarily of passive systems.


4

2.2.2 Processes

Transfer of capsules from WESF to the CSA will encompass three major processes: capsule

packaging, capsule transfer, and capsule storage. The actual transfer of capsules is not part of the MCSC Project; however these processes will be reflected in the safety basis documentation

and are described in more detail in the following sections. This is needed as an understanding of

these processes and the associated hazards is required to support the development of the MCSC

Project engineering and safety basis documentation.

2.2.2.1 Capsule packaging

Activities that are expected to occur at WESF to package the capsules for interim storage

include:

Movement of capsules from their current pool cell storage location into a UCS in G Cell.

Movement of the capsules into G Cell will be performed using existing WESF methods (i.e., G Cell capsule transfer cart). It is expected that a UCS will hold six cesium or

strontium capsules or two Type W capsules.

Welding and leak testing of the UCS in G Cell.

Movement of the UCS out of G Cell using the DTS. The VCC will be staged in the

truckport, the TSC will be located inside the VCC, and the TSC Basket will be located inside the TSC. The UCS will be transferred out of G Cell into the TSC Basket and once

the TSC Basket is full, the TSC will bolted closed. It is expected that the TSC Basket

will house two UCS inside each of the 11 openings.

2.2.2.2 Capsule transfer

Once loaded at WESF, it is expected that the VCC will be transferred from the truckport to the

CSA with a cask transporter.

2.2.2.3 Capsule storage

It is expected that the VCC will be placed on a pad at the CSA. A surveillance and monitoring

program will be established as required by safety basis controls and regulatory permits.

2.3 Major Hazards

A preliminary hazards analysis will be performed to address the construction of the CSA and storage of the capsules in the Cask Storage System. The existing WESF Hazards Analysis will

be revised to address capsule packaging and transfer within the facility. A brief discussion of the

hazards expected to be encountered during each major activity is included below.

2.3.1 Capsule Packaging

Movement of capsules between the pool cells and G Cell is an analyzed and authorized activity

in the current revision of the WESF safety basis. Welding and leak testing, as well as loading of capsules into and out of a transportation cask, was authorized in previous revisions of the WESF

safety basis. The major hazards associated with these capsule packaging activities are expected

to be similar to those of previously authorized activities and include drops, high radiation

exposure, and fires.


5

2.3.2 Transportation

The expected major hazard associated with the transportation of the capsules from WESF to

CSA is vehicle accident involving the transporter.

2.3.3 CSA Facility

The expected major hazard associated with activities at the CSA are natural phenomena, high

radiation exposure, and heat transfer. A cask drop or accident involving a transportation vehicle

will also be of concern until transfer operations are complete.

3.0 Safety Strategy

3.1 Safety Guidance and Requirements

The health and safety of facility workers, collocated workers, and the public will be protected by

designing a safe and effective Cask Storage System to protect the facility worker and prevent offsite release that complies with applicable environmental, safety, and health regulatory

requirements specified in the CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CHPRC) contract

with DOE (DE-AC06-08RL14788, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company Plateau

Remediation Contract).

The MCSC Project will follow the Safety Design Guiding Principles in DOE-STD-1189-2008,

primarily by following the design criteria of Contractor Requirements Document Order (CRD O)

420.1C, Facility Safety, and the safety design approach incorporated in the standard, as well as using a tailored approach in the application of DOE O 413.3B, Program and Project

Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets.

A safety basis for transportation of the capsules from WESF to CSA will be prepared in

accordance with DOE/RL-2001-36, Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document. This

will meet the requirements of DOE O 460.1C, Packaging and Transportation Safety.

3.1.1 Safety Goals and Philosophies

Consistent with CRD O 420.1C, the overall objective is to ensure that new Hazard Category (HC)-1, -2, and -3 nuclear facilities and major modifications to existing HC-1, -2, and -3 nuclear

facilities are designed and constructed in a manner that ensures adequate protection to the public,

workers, and the environment from nuclear hazards.

The CSA is a new facility and is expected to be classified as a HC-2 nuclear facility. Because it is not expected that the WESF activities will be a major modification (see Section 2.1), the CSA

activities are the focus of this SDS.

The Safety Design Guiding Principles in DOE-STD-1189-2008 establish a hazard control

selection hierarchy to address uncontrolled releases. The following hierarchy of controls will be

used during the development of safety documentation for the project:

Minimization of hazardous materials (material at risk) is the first priority.


6

Safety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) are preferred over Administrative

Controls.

Passive SSCs are preferred over active SSCs.

Preventive controls are preferred over mitigative controls.

Facility safety SSCs are preferred over personal protective equipment.

Controls closest to the hazard may provide protection to the largest population of

potential receptors, including workers and the public.

Controls that are effective for multiple hazards can be resource-effective.

3.1.2 Safety Functional Classification

DOE-STD-1189-2008, Chapter 4, "Hazard and Accident Analysis," provides guidance for the performance of hazard and accident analysis in which design basis conditions and the bounding

consequences of unmitigated releases provide the basis for selecting safety class and safety

significant SSCs.

The CSA is a new facility so the guidance for the performance of hazards and accident analysis provided in DOE-STD-3009-2014, Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented

Safety Analysis, will be used. The WESF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was developed

consistent with the guidance for the performance of hazard and accident analysis provided in DOE-STD-3009-94 and the requirements in PRC-PRO-NS-700, Safety Basis Development. The

WESF safety basis revision, in support of the MCSC Project and capsule transfer activities, will

continue to use DOE-STD-3009-94 except, in accordance with Section 3.2.4.2 of DOE-STD-3009-2014, a X/Q value of 3.5E-03 sec/m3 at 100 m will be used in radiological dose

consequence calculations for classification of safety significant SSCs. This exception is

consistent with Revision 12 of the WESF DSA (HNF-8758, Waste Encapsulation and Storage

Facility Documented Safety Analysis).

Development of new safety basis documents and changes to existing WESF safety basis

documents, including development of new accident analyses and control selection, will be

compliant with 10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” and performed following the requirements of PRC-PRO-NS-700 and PRC-STD-NS-8739, CHPRC Safety Analysis and Risk

Assessment Handbook (SARAH).

3.1.3 Safety Design Criteria

Consistent with the Safety Design Guiding Principles in DOE-STD-1189-2008, CRD O 420.1C

will be utilized and addressed in all design activities. Design standards incorporated into

DOE G 420.1-1A, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C,

Facility Safety, shall be followed unless specific exceptions are approved by DOE.

3.1.4 Radiological Design Criteria

Radiological design standards, controls, and review processes shall be followed unless specific exceptions are approved by DOE. Radiological design review processes and design and control

standards are listed below:


7

10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” Subpart K, “Design and Control”

CHPRC-00072, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company Radiation Protection

Program

PRC-PRO-RP-1622, Radiological Design Review Process

3.2 Hazard Identification

WESF is a HC-2 nuclear facility as described in HNF-8758. Once the capsules are removed

from WESF, the facility categorization will be re-evaluated. The CSA is expected to be a HC-2

nuclear facility.

A preliminary hazards analysis will be performed for the CSA activities during conceptual design. The hazards for the CSA activities are expected to include standard industrial hazards,

heat transfer, high radiation, cask drops, vehicle accidents, and natural phenomena. The

preliminary hazards analysis will be reviewed and revised as necessary during preliminary/final

design.

A revised WESF hazards analysis will also be performed for the WESF activities during

conceptual design and updated as necessary during preliminary/final design. The revised WESF

hazards analysis will address hazards associated with packaging capsules in G Cell (e.g., welding and leak testing), installation and use of the new G Cell coverblock, the modifications to the

truckport floor, and transfer operations.

WESF is an exempt facility regarding criticality and the CSA will also be an exempt facility.

3.3 Key Safety Decisions

As defined in DOE-STD-1189-2008, key safety decisions are those that potentially result in significant cost or have resulted in costly rework in past projects. The selection, design,

construction, and installation and testing of preventive and mitigative SSCs represent a

significant project cost.

3.3.1 Seismic

DOE-STD-1189-2008 and ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004, Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures,

Systems and Components for Seismic Design, were used to determine the general seismic criteria

for the new CSA.

DOE-STD-1189-2008, Appendix A, states that the seismic design classifications of

ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 are to be used in association with the DOE radiological criteria provided

in the appendix. It is intended that the requirements of Section 5 of ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 and the guidance in Appendix A of ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 be used for selection of the appropriate

Limit States for SSCs performing the safety functions specified. The resulting combination of

Seismic Design Category (SDC) and Limit State selection provides the seismic design basis for SSCs to be implemented in design through ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for

Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities, and ASCE/SEI 7-10, Minimum

Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures. Therefore, the SDC will be assigned based on


8

radiological criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Appendix A, Table A-1. The Limit State

designations will be derived using Section 5 and Appendix B of ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004.

SDC Determination: Using the guidance provided by DOE-STD-1189-2008, Appendix A, for seismic design of SSCs and the unmitigated consequences from a

seismic event in the existing WESF DSA, a Seismic Hazard Category of SDC-2 will be

used for the CSA, which includes the cask system and pad.

Limit State Determination: Section 5 and Appendix B of ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 were reviewed to support determination of a Limit State. Limit State C for building structural

components was chosen for the CSA pad. The Section 5 definition of Limit State C for

buildings and structural components is that the SSC retains nearly full stiffness and retains full strength, and the passive component it is supporting will perform its normal

and safety functions during and following an earthquake. Limit State C for structures or

vessels for containing hazardous material was chosen for the CSA Cask Storage System. The Section 5 definition of Limit State C for structures or vessels containing hazardous

material is applicable to low-pressure vessels and tanks with hazardous contents where a

release may potentially injure workers. Damage will be sufficiently minor and usually

will not require repair.

PRC-PRO-EN-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation Natural Phenomena Hazard, provides

seismic design criteria based on SDC and Limit State designation. Seismic design criteria for

SDC-2/Limit State C will be specified in design documentation. According to PRC-PRO-EN-097 the Seismic Response Modification Coefficient, Ra, for SDC-2/Limit State C

is approximately 83 percent of that for SDC-2/Limit State B, resulting in an increase in the

seismic base shear of approximately 17 percent. SDC-2/Limit State B is equivalent to Performance Category-2 criteria, which corresponds to a safety classification of safety

significant. The actual classification for the CSA will be determined in the new safety basis

generated for this project.

Natural Phenomenon impacts, other than seismic, will be in accordance with DOE-STD-1020-2012, Natural Phenomenon Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for Department of Energy

Facilities, and PRC-PRO-EN-097.

The 225B Building is credited as safety significant to survive a design basis earthquake (0.25 g

peak horizontal ground acceleration). Engineering documentation and seismic criteria for the WESF modifications will comply with PRC-PRO-EN-097 and will consider the failure effects of

the interfacing Cask Storage System components particularly if the seismic criteria is different.

3.3.2 Confinement Strategy

Multiple layers of protection (i.e., defense-in-depth) will be provided to prevent and mitigate

uncontrolled releases of hazardous materials to protect facility workers, collocated workers, and

the public.

The capsules themselves are welded and provide the first layer of confinement. The Cask Storage System is expected to include a welded UCS and a bolted TSC. Loading, welding and

leak testing of the UCS is expected to be performed in the shielded G Cell. The UCS is expected

to be transferred within the shielded DTS and stored within a shielded cask. While the facility


9

has a confinement ventilation system for G Cell and the truckport, it is not expected that this

system will be required to support a safety significant function for capsule transfer activities.

3.3.3 Fire Mitigation Strategy

DOE-STD-1066-2012, Fire Protection, will be followed for this project to ensure adequate

protection of WESF and the CSA. A preliminary Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will be performed to determine the applicability of the requirements in DOE-STD-1066-2012 and will

be used to revise HNF-SD-WM-FHA-019, Fire Hazards Analysis for Building 225-B Waste

Encapsulation and Storage Facility (WESF), as appropriate, and develop a new FHA for the

CSA.

3.3.4 Anticipated Safety Functions

Safety SSCs will be selected based on results of facility-specific and process-specific hazard analyses. These analyses will initially be performed during conceptual design and will be

reviewed and revised as necessary during preliminary/final design. It is anticipated that the

design of the Cask Storage System will provide credited confinement. The CSA is expected to

have no active safety SSCs.

3.3.5 Security

A safeguards assessment will be performed during conceptual design and the results of the

assessment will be incorporated as appropriate.

4.0 Risks to Project Safety Decisions

The MCSC Project is maintaining a risk register with risk management strategies. The only risk

identified, related to the key safety design decisions in Section 3.0, is that the adaptation of

commercially available storage technologies may not be achievable based on limitations of

WESF and the capsules.

5.0 Safety Analysis Approach and Plan

New safety basis documentation for CSA activities will be developed and will be consistent with

DOE-STD-1189-2008 and DOE-STD-3009-2014, as implemented by PRC-PRO-NS-700 and

PRC-STD-NS-8739. Existing WESF safety basis documentation will be revised as needed to address the MCSC Project and capsule transfer activities. Revisions to existing safety basis

documentation will be managed per the requirements of PRC-PRO-NS-8317, Safety Basis

Implementation and Maintenance.

Any required transportation safety documentation will be developed in accordance with

DOE/RL-2001-36.

5.1 Activities and Deliverables

The MCSC Project will perform safety analysis activities and develop safety analysis

deliverables for each project phase in accordance with Table 1.


10

Table 1. Safety Analysis Activities and Deliverables Relating to Safety

in Design for the WESF MCSC Project

Pre-Conceptual Phase Conceptual Design Phase Preliminary/Final Design Phase

SDS PHA

PFHA

CSDR

Updated SDS

Updated PHA

Updated PFHA

PDSA

Updated SDS

CD-0 CD-1 CD-2/CD-3

CD Critical Decision

CSDR Conceptual Safety Design Report

PDSA Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis

PFHA Preliminary Fire Hazards Analysis

PHA Preliminary Hazards Analysis

PSDR Preliminary Safety Design Report

SDS Safety Design Strategy

DOE-STD-1189-2008 describes development of a Preliminary Safety Design Report (PSDR) prior to Critical Decision 2 (CD-2). Per the June 8, 2015, DOE memorandum from E. J. Moniz

titled “Project Management Policies and Principles,” projects designated as Hazard Category 1,

2, and 3 nuclear facilities shall achieve at least 90 percent design completion before CD-2 (see

Appendix A for copy of memorandum).

For safety documentation, this memorandum describes that the 90 percent design includes

preparation of a Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA), as required by 10 CFR 830.

The tailoring design strategy for this project will combine the CD-2/CD-3 package. Requiring preparation of the PDSA prior to CD-2 removes the necessity for development of a PSDR. As

described in DOE-STD-1189-2008 and DOE O 413.3B, the PDSA is an evolution of the PSDR

and both documents have similar format and content with the PDSA containing more detail on activity level hazards and controls. Because a PSDR will not be prepared and the PDSA

submitted for CD-2 will represent a 90 percent design completion, it is possible that RL’s input

would be obtained too late to be effectively incorporated. Therefore, the PDSA will be drafted at 60 percent design and an RL review of the draft PDSA will be obtained to ensure comments are

obtained early enough in the process to be incorporated into the 90 percent design PDSA.

Final DSA, Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), and FHA documents will be developed,

approved, and implemented prior to the start of operations at the CSA. Necessary revisions to the existing WESF safety basis documentation (DSA, TSR, and FHA) will be developed,

approved, and implemented prior to the start of capsule transfer activities.

6.0 Safety Design Integration Team – Interfaces and Integration

The WESF MCSC Safety Design Integration Team (SDIT) provides the contractor focal point

specifically charged with executing the project with support to the Federal Program Lead and the

Integrated Project Team (IPT).


11

The Project IPT members represent all competencies required for the project including the

Project Manager, Engineering, Quality Assurance, Nuclear and Industrial Safety, etc. The Project Manager is the Chair of the SDIT. The Project Manager may assign additional project

support functions to the team as necessary.

The Project SDIT is a component of the Project IPT. The role of the Project SDIT is to:

1. Identify and analyze hazards associated with project

2. Evaluate the appropriateness and adequacy of design alternatives considered.

The core SDIT represents the set of dedicated personnel supporting the IPT and is supplemented

as necessary by other subject matter experts and specialists.

The core SDIT consists of the following:

Project Manager (also designated as the SDIT chairperson)

Nuclear Safety

Quality Assurance

Fire Protection

Radiation Protection

Environmental Protection

Safety and Health

Design Agent/Engineering

Operations

Transportation

The Project SDIT will be supplemented as necessary by the assistance of specialists and subject matter experts in areas including Emergency Preparedness, Maintenance, Safeguards and

Security, Testing, and Structural Engineering.

Responsibilities for the IPT are described in DOE-STD-1189-2008.

7.0 References

10 CFR 830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended.

ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004, R2010, Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems and

Components for Seismic Design, American National Standards Institute/American

Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.

ASCE/SEI 7-10, 2010, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, American

Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia.


12

ASCE/SEI 43-05, 2005, Seismic Design for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear

Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, Reston, Virginia.

CHPRC-00072, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company Radiation Protection Program, as

amended,, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.

CRD O 420.1C, Facility Safety, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DE-AC06-08RL14788, 2007, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company Plateau Remediation

Contract, as amended, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office,

Richland, Washington.

DOE G 420.1-1A, 2012, Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Design Guide for use with DOE O 420.1C,

Facility Safety, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE O 413.3B, 2010, Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,

U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE O 460.1C, 2010, Packaging and Transportation Safety, U.S. Department of Energy,

Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-1020-2012, 2012, Natural Phenomenon Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for

Department of Energy Facilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-1066-2012, 2012, Fire Protection, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, U.S. Department of

Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-3009-2014, 2014, Preparation Of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety

Analysis, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE-STD-3009-94, 2006, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Change Notice No. 3, U.S. Department of

Energy, Washington, D.C.

DOE/RL-2001-36, 2011, Hanford Sitewide Transportation Safety Document, Rev. 1-E, U.S.

Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington.

HNF-8758, 2015, Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Documented Safety Analysis,

Rev. 11, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.

HNF-SD-WM-FHA-019, 2016, Fire Hazards Analysis for Building 225-B Waste Encapsulation

and Storage Facility (WESF), Rev. 8, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company,

Richland, Washington.

PRC-PRO-EN-097, Engineering Design and Evaluation (Natural Phenomena Hazard), as

amended, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.

PRC-PRO-NS-700, Safety Basis Development, as amended, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation

Company, Richland, Washington.

PRC-PRO-NS-8317, Safety Basis Implementation and Maintenance, as amended, CH2M HILL

Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.


13

PRC-PRO-RP-1622, Radiological Design Review Process, as amended, CH2M HILL Plateau

Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.

PRC-STD-NS-8739, CHPRC Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH), as

amended, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company, Richland, Washington.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 USC 6901, et seq.


A-1

Appendix A

DOE Memorandum from E. J. Moniz to all Department Elements

Dated June 8, 2015


A-2


A-3


A-4


A-5


A-6


A-7


A-8


A-9

Documents

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility Management of ... Library/Other... · 2.2.1.2 CSA . The project will design and construct the CSA, which is expected to consist of a concrete