CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Allan A. Ryan, Jr.Director, Office of Special InvestigationsCriminal DivisionDepartment of Justice OECLAGGIFIEDAND RELEAGEODY1375K Street, N.W. CENIFM INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWashington, D.C. 20530 SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTIONMO

4AZIWARERIMESOISCLOSONtAt1Dear Mr. Ryan:GATE 7007

This is in response to Mr. Martin Mendelsohn's letterto c n of this Office, dated 6 December1979 informing us that an action had bean filed in the U.S.District Court in New Jersey to revoke the citizenship ofTscherim Soobzokov. In that letter Mr. Mendelsohn askedthat six documents be made available for use by the Officeof Special Investigations. In response to that request, theappropriate offices of the Agency have examined the documentsand the circumstances surrounding their acquisition. As aresult of that review, we have determined that the use ofthese documents in unredacted form or a discussion of thecircumstances surrounding their acquisition cannot be madeon the public record without jeopardizing intelligence sourcesand methods. Accordingly, we may make these documentsavailable only in redacted form, or if necessary, inex parte, in camera proceedings; or under an appropriateprotective order, as discussed in detail below. (C)

Documents 1 and 2

CIA is prepared to make these documents available foruse in this case, and indeed, we would be willing to provideas a witness the custodian of the documents of the Directorateof Operations who can testify that the documents were foundin the records system of the Directorate of Operations andthat the documents had been in our files since 1952. (C)

However, for reasons stated below, this officer willnot be permitted to testify on the public record as to thecircumstances surrounding the acquisition of the documents;that is, that these documents were placed into the CIArecords system by a staff employee who received them fromSoobzokov in C 31952. (S)

41,ASIMMUUSTIMICIMIEMP

A statement of the circumstances surrounding theacquisition of these documents would constitute an It_

. Asrecent developments in the Middle East have clearly indicated,even mere allegations of CIA activity often provoke seriousreactions by the governments and citizens of Middle Eastcountries. y:

:3 A parallel concern is that any admission ofCIA activity r would most certainly damage, if notdestroy, our ability to withhold that information frompublic disclosure during the processing of FOIA and PrivacyAct requests or in other civil or criminal cases. (S)

For the following reasons the CIA witness also will notbe permitted to identify the original recipient of thedocuments. In 1952 this officer was assigned C

flcover,

1. To disclose the fact thatr.:transmitted information directly to CIA

would only exacerbate the potential for adverse reactionsmentioned above. To disclose the fact that this individualwas, in fact, a CIA employee would have even more seriousconsequences. First, the individuals he was known to havecontacted C -I could be placed in danger. Second hiscovers:. --awould most certainly be compromised. c

would initself be damaging.C.7_,-1 has expressed itsserious concern over 4:- -clacknowledgment of the use of

cover and the continued willingness and ability of C-:lof provide cover to the Agency is, in our view,

dependent on CIA's ability to prevent public disclosureof those instances where cover has been extended. (S)

Finally, the circumstances surrounding the career ofthe recipient of the document and his immediate associatepresent additional concern. As stated earlier, the firstindividual was assigned L -1 under c_ lcover.He remained under C. 3 cover for some time followingthat assignment, and to our knowledge was never surfaced asa CIA employee. Given the success of his cover, a decisionwas made to assign him to an even more covert status,and for the remainder of his career with CIA, this individualoperated under c cover. When this individualretired from CIA he did so under L ,a cover. (S)

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The individuals he dealt with had no indication thathe was associated with the CIA, American Intelligence,or the U.S. Government. Consequently, he was able tooperate in areas that are closed to U.S. Government officialsand to contact and recruit individuals who would normallynot associate with representatives of our government. Evenin retirement the government has continued to make use ofthis individual and of the contacts he established. Mostrecently his unique services are being used in operationsinvolving efforts to protect the lives of a number ofgovernment employees placed in jeopardy overseas, an actionthat will be foreclosed if his CIA affiliation becomesknown. (S)

The duty of handling Soobzokov t .3 fell not onlyto the Agency officer described above, but to his immediatesubordinate who also was unde)z a cover. There is thedanger, therefore, that the use of these documents may lead tothe disclosure of the identity of this second officer andhis activities. In contrast to the first officer, thisindividual remained under z cover for the remainderof his career with CIA, and recently retired underCcover.c-

21 . Thistact is not unknown to opposition intelligence services.Accordingly, the disclosure of the identity of one CIAofficer E:

. Disclosureof the identity of this second individual and his CIAaffiliation would cause damage to Agency operations not onlyin E: _3 but in the many other places this officer served.It would, for certain, place his immediate contacts inpersonal danger, damage the security of installations andoperations with which he was associated, and weaken ourability to maintain similar cover. The resultant damage ofsuch disclosure could conceivably be wide ranging--theidentification of other individuals could lead to theidentification of still more covert employees, thus endangeringsources and compromising operations that had no direct nexusto the original employee. (S)

In sum, it is necessary to avoid any action and any useof these two documents that would lead to: 1) the identi-fication of the presence of the CIA facility azidentify or describe the activities conductedr— s".32) the identification of the original recipient of thedocument, and 3) identification of the immediate subordinate ofthe recipient of the document. (S)

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Document 3

CIA is prepared to provide a redacted version of thedocument for use in this case and to provide as a witnessa representative from the Office of Security who can testifythat the document was prepared by a representative of thatoffice following an interview with Soobzokov in 1953 andthat the document had been in our files since that date.However, neither this officer, nor any CIA witness, will bepermitted to discuss on the public record the full text ofthe document or the circumstances surrounding its acquisition.(C)

The document was prepared following a polygraphinterview conducted on Soobzokov in -1 in1953. The interview was conducted at the request of Soobzokov'scase officer, the first individual described in the discussionof documents 1 and 2. Accordingly, our primary concern isthat the use of this document may lead to the disclosure ofidentities of this individual and his associates and thedetails of the C J operation. (S)

Because the interview took place in a second country,the use of the document may also lead to the disclosure ofCIA activities in that country, which would damage ourrelations with that country, inhibit our ability to covertoperations, and place in jeopardy CIA and government officerscurrenty assigned to that country. (S)

Although this document is relatively brief, it containsa significant amount of information concerning intelligencemethods. First, it confirms that CIA polygraph agents, and la(*S40in j. The document indicates that thepolygraph interviewer was not assigned toc butprepared his report elsewhere, and names that location.Thus, the report discloses the fact that CIA possessed afairly mobile polygraph facility, headquartered at anidentified central location. The text of the document alsogives some insight into the methodology employed by CIApolygraph interviewers by identifying the areas of interestto the interviewer, and his reaction to Soobzokov's answersto particular subjects. The text of the report is alsoinformative in what it does not state: what we did notconsider important, or did not know, about Soobzokov at thetime of the interview. (S)

Document 4

CIA is prepared to make this document available inredacted form for use in this case and we would be willingto provide as a witness the custodian of the DDO records whowill be able to state that the document was maintained byCIA since 1956. However, this witness may not be permittedto discuss on the public record the full text of the documentor the circumstances surrounding its creation. (C)

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The document itself is a report of a counterintelligencedebriefing conducted on Soobzokov in 1956 by a third CIAstaff officer. The interview was conducted in the UnitedStates. This interview was not conducted during the courseof any on-going operations, but was part of the pre-clearancescreening of Soobzokov as a potential asset. The interviewwas apparently conducted under the auspices of an Armycover unit. Accordingly, any discussion of the circum-stances surrounding CIA's acquisition of the document woulddisclose that the CIA, not the Army, conducted the interview,and disclose the identity of this CIA cover unit. Such dis-closure would endanger the security of the individuals whohad been assigned to, or dealt with the unit. It would alsodamage our ability to provide such cover in the future, asthe Army's willingness and ability to provide cover is in nosmall degree tied to our ability to prevent disclosure ofthe existence of such cover. (S)

The document cannot be released in full text as itcontains substantial amounts of information concerningcovert installations and personnel assigned to them; identi-fies uses made of Soobzokov and uses contemplated for him(thus identifying CIA's operational targetting); and identifiesthose subjects which were of counterintelligence interest toCIA and, by omission identifies subjects which had not cometo our attention. (This last point is of no mean significancein that it may disclose a weakness in our counterintelligencecapacity.) (S)

Document 5

CIA is prepared to make this document available foruse in this case in full text, and to provide as a witnessthe custodian of the records of the Directorate of Operationswho will be able to state that our records indicate thatthe document was received from Soobzokov in the United Statesand that it has been maintained since then in CIA files. (C)

CIA witnesses may not discuss on the public record thecircumstances surrounding the acquisition of the document,nor may we identify the recipient of the document. (C)

Although the document contains only informationconcerning Soobzokov's personal activities, the circum-stances surrounding the creation and acquisition of the

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document bear heavily on CIA equities. At the date thedocument was created Soobzokov was engaged in a trainingprogram designed to provide an ethnic cadre of trainedpartisans to fight in a "hot war" against the Soviet Union.This operation was conducted under Army cover at an Armyinstallation and was not identified as CIA to the trainees.If a discussion of this document were to disclose CIA'sinterest in this operation it could place in jeopardyunwitting individuals who may have returned to hostilelocations, reveal the affiliation of CIA personnel assignedto the operation, and damage our ability to obtain suchcover in the future. (S)

It should be noted that the cover of the operationremains intact, in spite of parallel developments in otherlitigation involving Mr. Soobzokov. It has come to ourattention that Mr. Soobzokov has introduced copies ofletters from this cover unit into the record of a pendingdefamation action in New York. His action has led to atleast one FOIA request to the Department of the Army forinformation on this unit and Soobzokov's relation to it.Thus far, the response has been based on Army's minimalrecords. Should CIA's affiliation with the project becomeknown, the request's scope will broaden to include ourrecords and the threat of disclosure will increase sig-nificantly. (S)

Document 6

CIA is prepared to make a redacted version of thisdocument available for use in the case and is prepared toprovide a witness from the Office of Security who cantestify that the document was prepared following an inter-view with Soobzokov by a CIA security officer and that ithas been in our files since 1959. Neither this officer, norany other CIA witness, will be permitted to discuss on thepublic record the full text of the document or the circumstancessurrounding its acquisition. (C)

The document contains a large amount of detail con-cerning Soobzokov's personal history, but also details insome depth his past associations with CIA, and our effortsto establish his bona fides during his prolonged associationwith CIA. Of additional concern is the amount of detailthis document contains on polygraph methodology, includingspecific questions and the analysis of Soobzokov's answers

to them. It is our opinion that the release of this informationcould be especially damaging in that the informationwould provide a valuable tool to aid opposition services indeveloping procedures to defeat our polygraph testing.(S)

Ex parte, In Camera Proceedings

If required for the government's prosecution of thiscase, CIA would not object to providing the full text ofdocuments 3, 4, and 6 for ex parte, in camera review by theCourt, provided that the following steps are taken to ensurethe security of the information contained in the documents:

a. That the Court agrees to in camera inspection. Cbditid

b. xi 1)1 0 u

That access be limited to the judge aloneljr

trL-=-4==*ed

07c. That a4-1 documents be placed under sealof the Court and returned to the CIA for safekeeping, orstored in a facility approved by CIA.

d. That all notes, records and transcripts whichcontain information derived from the .Feeltrutud—pUrt4e446.tit thdiaocuments be placed under seal of the Court andstored in a safekeeping facility approved by CIA.

Similarly, CIA would also provide witnesses who camtestity in camera to the record of the circumstances surroundingthe acquisition of all 6 documents, if such testimony wasrequired, and if the safeguards described above were provided. (U)

Proceedings Under Protective Order

CIA would agree to give access to the defendant andcounsel to sanitized versions of documents 3, 4 and 6, ifsuch access were ordered by the Court and provided thataccess was subject to an appropriate protective order.(Sanitized copies of these documents would be full textcopies of the documents, with the names of intelligencesources deleted.) Copies of protective orders issued inother cases are enclosed with this letter. Inasmuch as anappropriate order must be tailored to the specific intendeduse of these documents, I suggest that representatives fromyour Office and the undersigned meet at the earliest opportunityto draft an order to meet the particular requirements ofthis case. (U)

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Conclusion

CIA is prepared to make all 6 documents availableto your Office for use in this case, provided that your useof the documents is coupled with adequate procedures toprotect the sensitive information described above. In thatregard, I suggest that representatives from your Office meetwith the undersigned at the earliest opportunity to discussyour actual use of these documents and the procedures thatwill govern such use. (U)

Sincerely,

Office of General Counsel

Enclosures

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