Warsaw_Pact_-_Study_Guide.pdf

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December 1981


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Welcome Letter

Dearest delegates of the Warsaw Pact, it is with great pleasure that we welcome all of you to ourOrganisation. Firstly, we would like to thank you for choosing participating in the Warsaw Pact and also tocongratulate you for your approval. It means you all were granted with our confidence. It also means that fromnow on we share the responsibility of attaining the goal of having a great event: productive debates, good

resolution(s), a pleasant time together... In sum, an unforgettable experience. As founders of TEMAS, we are very proud to present to you one of the best simulations ever held . The

proposal of TEMAS to be a thematic simulation could not start better with the theme of the Cold War, a periodso mysterious, emblematic and important in our recent history. It is difficult to bring up to our memory anotherperiod in which we had so many political and ideological disputes as this one. Few of us really lived the Cold Warat its harshest times. What we have in our minds is its collapse, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of theSoviet Union, one of the world’s superpower. But we all know the Cold War was not only that. TEMAS will giveus all the opportunity to experience a time in which there was the bipolar world and the fear of the nucleardispute. Never the world was so close to an end, never weapons were so powerful, never tensions were so high!

We now invite you to go into a time machine and travel to a glorious world, the world of the SovietUnion! For the first time ever simulated in Brazil will the East version of the facts be simulated. We could not bemore excited about it! This unique experience will certainly be forever remembered for those who will have theopportunity to take part in it, and we are very glad to have you all with us in this journey.

In a very few words, each one of us will introduce oneself:

Lucas Rezende: “Having participated in Mini-ONU twice as a delegate, once as Assistant Director, onceas the Director of the Security Council (2003), and also as a delegate in many other models, such as AMUN,Harvard WorldMUN and MONU, I can say I am one of the oldest fans of simulations nowadays in PUC-Minas.This is my last opportunity to be a member of the chair, what at the same time makes me sad and also very proud. I just think this is going to be the best model I have ever took part in, I am personally very involved withit and I just hope you all enjoy it as much as I do!”

Shênia Kellen: “I study International Relations and this is my last year at PUC. As a real fan of modelling I participated in some events such as Mini-ONU (as the Director of the Security Council, 2004),

AMUN (as a delegate at SpecPol, 2004), Harvard World Model United Nations (as assistant-director in theMiddle East Summit, 2002), among others. My expectations for TEMAS are significantly high and I am really honoured to take part on this event, sharing the chair with my esteemed colleagues. I hope we perform a good

job and have a great time together”.Guilherme Marques: “In 2005 I will be attending my second year in International Relations at PUC

Minas. I have not had yet much experience in MUN such as my esteemed directors, what does not mean I amnot fully engaged with the Warsaw Pact Organisation – it is quite the contrary! My main objective in this projectis to learn and improve my skills on this area. I believe we will have a nice simulation in March.”

Igor Vidal : “I am in the third semester of International Relations at PUC and at the second semester of Law at UFMG. I have always participated in models but this is my first time as an assistant director. I amextremely happy to participate at this first TEMAS, not only because of the high quality of all the TEMAS staff, of the opportunity to assist my former Security Council director and assistant-director, Lucas and Shênia,respectively, of the Cold War theme that I find very interesting, but also because my good friend Guilherme will

be the other assistant director. I am sure that we, directors, assistant-directors and delegates of the Warsaw Pact, will do a great job.”

As your directors in this great opportunity, it is important to remind you of some facts. As citizens of the

West, we are already used to think from the Western point of view. Here, nevertheless, we must change ourmindsets and ratiocinate as an Eastern politician in the Cold War, over the strong influence of the Soviet Union.It is difficult, but not impossible. To do so, therefore, it is essential that you prepare yourselves hardly to thismeeting, studying not only the Polish situation but also your own positions and also the Eastern position duringthe Cold War. We are very much sure you are all capable to do that, as we trusted upon you the greatresponsibility of your roles. We will be constantly open to help you whenever you may need. Good luck and

welcome to our Cold War World!

Lucas Rezende and Shênia Kellen – Directors of the Warsaw Pact

Guilherme Marques and Igor Vidal - Assistant Directors of the Warsaw Pact


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consisted of an operation on Western Europe - more specifically south-eastern France – brought

up by the Czechoslovak People’s Army (!SLA 5) using conventional and nuclear arsenal.

There are also three important events whose description here is essential: the Polish

October and the Hungarian Revolution - also known as the Hungarian Uprising - in 1956 and the

Prague Spring in 1968.

The Polish October was one of the first attempts to reform the structure of a Soviet Bloc

country after Stalin’s death. Anti-Stalinist workers started a 15,000 men strike in June 1956, in

Poznan, to protest against the structure of the Polish state. The movement was suppressed and

many casualties were counted, shocking the entire country. There was a need for a new

leadership, which was fulfilled when Wladyslaw Gomulka became the First Secretary of the

Polish Communist Party (PUWP6) on 19 October. On that very day Nikita Khrushchev arrived in

Warsaw with Soviet Generals and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces Commanders. Khrushchev did not

want any changes in Communist Poland and threatened an invasion if the country left the

Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The PUWP First Secretary guaranteed that he would not try to

move Poland away from communism. From that point on there were changes on “Polish - Soviet

accords on trade and military cooperation […], a significant reduction of political terror, an end

to forced collectivization, the release of Cardinal Wyszynski (followed by some concessions in the

religious field), and [new] contacts with the West, including freer travel” 7.

The Hungarian Revolution happened almost simultaneously with the Polish October.

Having its basis on Stalin’s death, it was a march led by students and workers against the

Communist government. The revolutionary movement was crushed down by the Soviet Union

after the announcement of the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, stating Hungarian

willingness to become a neutral country and to declare its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.

Soviet troops under the Warsaw Pact rule were headed the counter-movement.

In 1968 the Czechoslovak Communist Party, through his leader Alexander Dub"ek, tried to

liberalise the country’s economy and made a deep reform on its political and administrative

structures. Dub"ek wanted “Socialism with human face” without any authoritarian Stalinist

influence that still remained there. This period came to be known as the Prague Spring and

represents the peak of the Warsaw Pact military interventions up to the time. Almost 200,000

Pact Troops of all allies except Romania entered into the country in August and crushed down

any resistance, putting an end to the conflict.

5 Original name “!eskoslovenská lidova armáda”.6 Original name “Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza” (PZPR). In English, Polish United Workers´ Party.7 http://www.britannica.com/eb/print?tocId=9108559&fullArticle=true


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STRUCTURE OF THE WARSAW PACT

The highest governing body of the Warsaw Pact is the Political Consultative Committee

(PCC). Its creation is determined in the text of the treaty, which gives it the power to set up

auxiliary bodies if it deems necessary. The permanent members of the PCC are the Communist

Party first secretaries, the premiers and the foreign ministers of the member-states. The PCC co-

ordinates all activities that are not purely military and assesses whether specific international

developments pose a risk to the security of the member-states, besides requiring that self-

defence provisions are properly taken by the Warsaw Pact with respect to the military obligations

of the alliance.

In January 1956, two auxiliary bodies were created: the Permanent Commission and the

Joint Secretariat. The Permanent Commission is responsible for providing recommendations tothe PCC and the Joint Secretariat works on a common foreign policy to member-states. The Joint

Secretariat has command over the logistics, armaments and arms research of the Warsaw Pact

and records, and spreads the decisions of the PCC.

The highest military body of the Warsaw Pact is the Committee of Defence Ministers

(CDM). It was created in the 1969 PCC session in Budapest, which brought many reforms to the

structure of the Warsaw Pact. The CDM is composed by the ministers of defence of each member

state which was a permanent member of the PCC before 1969, and is subordinate to the latter.

The main function of the CDM is to co-ordinate the defence policies of the member states andstrengthen the defence capacity of the alliance.

Directly below in the hierarchy is the Command and Staff of the Warsaw Combined

Forces. The Staff of the Warsaw Pact Combined Armed Forces is subordinated to the Warsaw

Pact Commander-in-Chief and works continuously throughout the year. Because of this, it

handles most of the Warsaw Pact actions in the military area, such as large-scale manoeuvres,

joint exercises and multilateral meetings and contacts among military personnel at all levels. The

Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff monitors the activities of the Staff and the First Deputy Chief of Staff

is part of the additional personnel of the Staff and is appointed by the government of the country in which the city of Moscow is located.

The Military Council was created in 1969 and sends reports to the CDM regarding the

work of the Staff. The chairman of the Military Council is the Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief.

Subordinated to the Military Council there is the Technical Committee of the Warsaw

Pact. Also created in 1969, this committee supervises matters related to military technology and

standardisation of armaments used by Warsaw Pact troops and member states.


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The Committee of Foreign Ministers (CFM) was established in the 1976 PCC meeting and

came to regularise the previous informal meetings among representatives of the member states

of the Warsaw Pact. It had the official task of preparing recommendations and executing the

decisions of the PCC.

PROCEDURES OF THE WARSAW PACT

The procedures of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Pact differ

from those of many other international organisations. The basic rules to be used within the

discussion are attached to this Guide. It is essential that the delegates have a thorough knowledge

of them. The following lines are for the presentation of the specific procedures that will guide the

meeting of December 8, 1981.

The first aspect regards the unmoderated and moderated caucus. The purpose of the

latter is to promote a more dynamic and focused debate, stimulating the participation of all

member states and staff members. The unmoderated caucus, in turn, is normally used to write

documents and to discuss the topic in a more informal, flexible manner.

Unmoderated caucus: On this Warsaw Pact meeting, larger time limits for the caucus will

be accepted so as to give the delegates the opportunity to work on specific matters. The delegates

and members of the WP Staff are supposed to remain in the chamber during the unmoderated

caucus and it is important that documents and negotiations have the participation of all of them.

After half of the stipulated time limit, delegates can, if they feel that they have achieved their

previously set objectives for the caucus, move for the closure of the latter. This is the only motion

accepted during the unmoderated caucus and must have a two-thirds majority of session quorum

to pass.

Moderated Caucus: Delegates that move the motion for a moderated caucus will have the

opportunity to moderate that caucus. The delegate has to declare if he is willing to assume this

duty or not and, if not, moderation automatically goes to the chair. It is worth emphasising thatmoderating requires a satisfactory knowledge of the rules.

The second aspect refers to the different voting procedures. Only the seven (7) member

states of the Warsaw Treaty (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,

Romania and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics) may vote on substantive matters. The

three (3) staff members of the Warsaw Treaty (Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff


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and the First Deputy Chief of Staff) and the PUW First Secretary shall be allowed to vote on

procedural matters only.

The Political Consultative Committee is based on the principle of consensus. A

substantive matter (e.g., amendments or resolutions) can only be approved if there is no vote

against it. Besides that, at least four (4) affirmative votes are needed. More than three (3)

abstentions will lead to the non-approval of the matter.

CONTEXT AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

As a first step towards a wide, reasonable comprehension of the Polish crisis some

elements and events that make up the context in which it evolved shall be properly addressed.

The situation in Poland in 1981 is the expression of a deep internal crisis heading for a social

chaos insofar as state and society do not concur on the direction of both domestic political

economy and, to some extent, the external affairs established with the two world superpowers.

Additionally, the matter undeniably reaches international dimensions and, therefore, scrutiny

over the broader environment in which it encompasses, namely Eastern Europe and even the

bipolar world, are paramount for its full understanding. Thus, this section aims to draw up the

international context in which the Polish crisis emerged and unfolded, outlining important

aspects regarding the implementation and development of socialism in Eastern Europe. A glance

will be taken at how this process occurred in a few representative countries. The objective here is

to provide important general information that may contribute to the comprehension of the roots

of the conflict in the Polish state as well as its implications for the international system, especially

the Communist world. Next, the situation in Poland in 1981 will be briefly addressed.

The expansion of the Soviet influence in East Europe began in the late years of the World

War II and the consolidation of such influence ensued in the early years of the Cold War. Two

important initiatives contributed to that end: the first was the sending of Soviet troops to

countries such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, and

Romania after the War; the second refers to the USSR ever-increasing control over the East

European party leaderships. By taking the first initiative, the Soviet Union managed to assert its

“physical” presence in those countries, enhancing its capacity of military intervention and,

consequently, of bolstering the Communist regime. The deterrent aspect of that undertaking is

remarkable once in many countries loyal to the Soviet power where the Communist

governments were often unpopular and lacked enough legitimacy to assert its leading role in the


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society the very fear of a Soviet military action has in some cases dissuaded the population

from taking extreme measures against their governments.

Equally significant, the control over the party elites has been steadily pursued since the

early 1920s when, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution, Communist parties were created

in every East European country. Notably, among the conditions for joining the Communist

International (Comintern) was the subordination of the national party to the leadership of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In effect, it was necessary to bind all the parties

together in their loyalty to the Central Communist Committee of the Soviet Union, for the

independence of one of them might threaten the whole Communist system. The Soviet influence

over national parties intensified in the 1930s, as the CPSU appointed and dismissed members of

the parties in the region and outlined the basic policies they should adopt domestically. In

addition, in the late 1940s Communist parties were installed in power in Poland, Czechoslovakia,

Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Such governments were supposed to carry out reforms such as

collectivisation of agriculture and rapid development of heavy industry.

The years that coincided with Stalin’s leadership of the CPSU witnessed a relative,

apparent success of the Party in exporting the Soviet model of Communism to East European

nations and in keeping the party elites in the region under the Soviet control, despite the existing

internal contradictions in the regional countries. Stalin’s death, in 1953, and the subsequent

accession of Khrushchev to the top of the CPSU, marked a turning point in the history of

socialism. Violent manifestations8 erupted among workers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia

in the same year and the party leadership was led to propose, for the sake of stability and the

maintenance of the Communist governments in power, a “new course” to be adopted by the

nations composing the socialist confederation. The “new course” required that the East European

Communist leaders adapt their domestic policies to fit local conditions with a view to satisfying

as much as possible the popular demands for consumer goods, and to appear as sovereign as

possible (JONES, 1981). The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU appeared to outline a new,

reformist environment in the Communist world9 which was both a reaction to anti-Communist

uprisings in socialist countries, and an event that encouraged attempts at pursuing alternative

paths in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The First-Secretary Khrushchev,

8 It is worth mentioning that in the Khrushchev years the contestation by the intelligentsia and the students’ movementsintensified in some East European nations, backing the worker’s on their requests for change and expressing a wider socialdiscontent with the regime.9 Signing a change in the Soviet police to East Europe, Khrushchev resumed relations with Tito’s Yugoslavia in 1955. The twocountries had experienced tense relations in the spring of 1948 when the Soviets accused the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) of several failings: hostility to Soviet military and economic advisors; favouritism to rich peasantsand the urban bourgeoisie; adoption of an overly ambitious industrialisation program; premature plans to collectiviseagriculture; merging the YCP into the People’s Front, a union of political, economic, and cultural organisation; manifestationsof bourgeois nationalism; plans to align Yugoslavia with the West; and failure to attend a meeting with the other members of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) (JONES, p. 24).


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who criticised the dictatorial administration of his antecessor, highlighting its repressive, illegal

character and blaming Stalin for committing several mistakes, then officially inaugurated the

process that he and his allies would name de-Stalinisation or democratisation. Additionally, the

Twentieth Congress proclaimed the renunciation of the leading role of the CPSU in relation to

the other Communist parties and, consonant with the Marxist-Leninist ideas, the Party leadership admitted the existence of separate roads to socialism. The Soviet leadership indicated

that from then on Moscow would respect the independence of each “Socialist country”, which

would enjoy a greater deal of freedom.

Such striking news were promptly welcomed by the countries under the Soviet umbrella

and fueled radical changes in some nations, in particular in Poland and Hungary.

Notwithstanding, the Soviet reaction to those transformative movements was not that

welcoming. The Soviet army was ready to undertake a military intervention in Poland in 1956,

after the national party had been converted into a stage for internal struggles betweenMoscovites associated with Stalin, on the one hand, and reformers compromised with

Khrushchev’s words, on the other. The takeover by the leader of the reformers, Wladyslaw

Gomulka, halted the conflict temporarily and avoided the confrontation. Almost at the same

time, showing that the critical events in Poland were not merely isolated facts, a revolution broke

out in Hungary as two pillars of the Soviet socialism # namely the unique party and the

subordination to Moscow # were extinguished, giving room for democratic principles as political

pluralism10. An intraparty battle followed. In the face of that adverse situation about 20,000

Soviet troops were sent in to counter the “counterrevolutionary putsch” in Budapest. The military action was not sufficient to put an end to the internal conflict, though. Counting on the consent

of both the Hungarian population and the Soviet Union, Imre Nagy, an exponent of the reformist

faction, acceded to the party leadership, cooling down the national effervescence. Moscow also

took measures with respect to Yugoslavia. The 1957 Moscow Declaration condemned the country

for its ideological deviations and proclaimed USSR as the leader of the Socialist camp. In 1961

another important event composed the set of crises faced by Khrushchev. It was the Albanian

crisis, which was stirred up by the Soviet attempt at overthrowing the leaders of the Albanian

party and installing a pro-Soviet leadership in the country 11

. In the Romanian case12

, also in theearly 1960s, the crisis was triggered by a public declaration by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the

10 The events in Hungary, as well as the relations that Nagy pursued with the USSR, were influenced to a certain extent by theprinciples endorsed by the 1955 Bandung Conference such as national independence, sovereignty, equality, nointerference ininternal affairs, and self-determination. In the same year, the Soviet-Yugoslav declaration also asserted that each socialistcountry is free to determine its own methods of socialist development.11 On October 27th one of the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labour (APL), Enver Hoxha, made a speech in which heemphatically rejected the right of the Soviet party congress to pass judgment on other parties.12 The Romanian case is a special one # particularly its relative independence from the Soviet Union and its adoption of astrategy of territorial defence (which was inspired in Yugoslavia), entailing support from socialist countries and also the West.It is also important to mention that the Soviet withdrew their troops from the country in 1958.


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head of the party, who asserted the country’s complete independence from the Soviet Union,

following accusations of past interference of the Soviets in matters of policy and personnel in the

national party.

The Brezhnev years witnessed a partial restoration of Stalinism. However, the new

context of growing nationalism and the acute social conflicts in East European countries could

not be dismissed. Although the crises which have emanated in this era are not as numerous as in

the precedent years, the General Secretary of the CPSU was not immune from the vigour of

national upheavals. This was notable when the Prague Spring “flourished” in 1968. The

progressives in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia enhanced its influence in the party and

had a program encompassing the decentralisation of the economy, the government and even the

party. They were provided with strong support by the press, what favoured the attainment of

their objectives, namely to purge the conservatives of the party as well as enact the reforms they

regarded as necessary. In August the Soviet Union, claiming that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia had given up its leading role and lost control of political developments in the

country 13, crunched the national movement by resorting to Soviet tanks. Such episode had a

world repercussion and stirred demonstrations of fraternity and sympathy with the Czechs in

some neighbouring countries14. It also showed the Soviet willingness to act when it deemed

necessary. Later on, Polish upheavals erupted in 1970, and again in 1976 (these events will be

properly addressed in the following section).

In this sense the General Secretary of the CPUS declared in the Twenty-Fourth Congress

in 1971 that a condition for the construction of socialism in the socialist confederation was a

“correct combination of general and the national particular”15, reinforcing a tendency that had

been delineated by the former CPSU leader16. Referring to “a gradual drawing together of the

socialist countries” in 1976 he also claimed that: “Of course, much depends on the policy of the

ruling parties and their ability to safeguard unity, combat isolation and national exclusiveness,

honour their common international tasks, and act jointly in performing them”17. Yet, the

beginning of the 1980s was again tumultuous. In January 1980 another crisis broke out in

Poland and, despite beliefs that the conflict had been solved by the approval of the Gdansk

accord in that year’s October, strikes were resumed as an expression of lingering dissatisfaction.

13 JONES, p. 40.14 After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviets in 1968, Albania left the Warsaw Pact.15 The 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Novosty Publishing House, 1971), p. 9.16 A fragment of the 1957 Moscow Declaration states: “Disregard of national peculiarities by a proletarian party inevitably leads to its divorce from reality, from masses, and is bound to prejudice the cause of socialism… and, conversely, exaggerationof the role of these peculiarities… is just as harmful to the socialist cause” (Declaration of the Conference of theRepresentatives of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries”, Pravda, December 2, 1960, p.1).17 XXV S’’ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, [The 25th Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union],(Politizdat, 1976), p. 29.


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This year (1981) the situation has reached astonishing dimensions. In the following lines special

attention will be attached to the current state of affairs in the country.

Once more: the situation in Poland is definitely alarming. For the latest months the Poles

have witnessed a deep, relentless crisis for which there is no precedent even in the Communist

world. Tensions between state and society are more intense than ever. There is a widespread,

enduring fear that the Polish party, internally fragmented and lacking enough legitimacy to hold

national power in the model inherited from the Soviet Union, resort to harsh mechanisms (the

martial law, for instance) to restore its leading role and prevent the Polish nation from pursuing

a liberalising trend. Another # some would qualify it as a remote, albeit real # possibility,

namely an eventual Soviet military intervention in the country, has also been raised. To make

matters worse, the Polish state has accumulated a debt of almost US$ 30 billion to Western

banks, having been, therefore, under external pressure for changes # such as wider

decentralisation and privatisation # in its financial and economic systems. The economicconstrains imposed by the payment of the debt service as well as a significant reduction of the

national industrial production (about 15%) and exports, set the scene for a very unfavourable

economic situation which seems to deteriorate progressively. Equally important, it may be added

that the unfolding critical events in Poland pose an extra source of potential conflict between

East and West and may, alongside with similar movements in other socialist countries, be a sign

of deterioration of or a threat to the whole Communist system.

It is widely known that the crisis in Poland is a cyclical one. However, besides the adverse

economic setting in the country, some features of the current situation confer it a somewhat new,

diversified face. At this time the social effervescence, following a movement which started in the

late 1960s, is not only the expression of an unsatisfied working class searching for improvement

in life conditions. In fact, there is a nationwide discontent, comprising active members of the

intelligentsia, concerning both economic andpolitical elements. A broader range of issues

composes the agenda of the critics to the regime. In addition, the very establishment and

subsequent recognition of the labour union Solidarity by the state last year represented a striking

departure from the history of socialism in other countries. Solidarity has reached a historical

unparalleled power and organisational self-discipline to defend the demands of the workers,

leading some of its contenders into affirming that its role approximates more and more to the

role undertaken by political organisations. Notwithstanding the character of the union has not

been clearly defined yet, Solidarity’s aims include the formulation of social and economic policies

as well as a far greater participation in the management of the Polish economy. This latter point

gravely concerns both the Polish Communist party and the Soviet Union once it might cause the


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weakening of the PUWP, whose maintenance of its central power domestically figures among the

core tenets of the Soviet socialism.

In effect, the Polish Communist party has faced a serious challenge, which was

particularly worsened by two important elements. First of all, the outbreak of a wave of strikes

last October, as well as Walesa’s refusal to sign the Front of National Accord proposed by

Jaruzelski, displayed the strong willingness and capacity of the members of Solidarity to

coordinate their actions and to resist. Particularly the latest news referring to the Solidarity’s

presidium in Radom last week (on the 3rd and 4th of December) put the party leadership in

serious alert and under strong pressure from other socialist countries. In the party’s view the

need to restore its authority in the country, averting a complete social chaos, and its

responsibility to keep Poland on the path of socialism are imperative. The second element, in

turn, relates to the situation in the PUWP. The divisions within the party have reached

meaningful proportions, and marked disagreement on how to act in the face of the criticalsituation does exist.

Bearing in mind the complexity of the situation at hand this is, in general terms, the

political, economic and social setting in Poland.


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HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM

Poland is a country that has fought against invasions for several times across its history.

Recalling recent history, only in early 20th century Poland was invaded by the Russians, the

Germans and the Soviets. It was Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939 that started World War II.

After the end of the war, Poland was considered a Soviet sphere of influence. From that time on,

People’s Poland was ruled by Communist order. To understand the situation that led Poland to

the 1980-1981 Solidarity crisis, it is necessary to comprehend the social movements of the

country when under the Soviet influence. During the Stalin years, Poland was controlled by

Boleslaw Bierut. After the Soviet leader’s death in 1953, Poland faced a slight liberalisation. In

1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, showed great concern about the situation in

Poland, especially after Bierut’s death. It was necessary a new leadership, and, despite

Khrushchev’s threats to invade Poland if the radical leader Wladyslaw Gomulka were elected the

First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, he became the new Polish leader, promising

a way to socialism closer to Polish traditions. Only after Gomulka assured Khrushchev he would

keep the basic foundations of Polish communism the Soviet leader abandoned the threat of

invading Poland. This was called the Polish October.

Soon after the Polish October, Gomulka started being severe on the population control

again, in a clear contrast to his prior promises. It was when the labour restlessness got started. In

1957, he imposed censorship on the press and curtailed the power of Workers’ Councils in

factories. In 1959, Gomulka started the cleric persecution by prohibiting religious teaching at

schools and also closed many schools led by the Church doctrines. It was frequent during his

government the refusals for Church building, and disagreements were constant with the Church.

In 1966, the Polish Government refused to concede a visa to Pope Pius VI, when the country was

celebrating its Christianity millennium. In this same year, the government celebrated Poland’s

statehood millennium.

A group of intellectuals started a movement against the country’s political status. In early

1964, an open letter written by 34 intellectuals to the government was widely spread. On anotherletter, two graduate History students from Warsaw University, Jacek Kuron and Karol

Modzelewski, invoked for a “Workers’ Revolution”, in which workers would take control of the

country and would rule through workers’ councils. Among their requests were also free trade

unions, the right to organise strikes, freedom of the press and free cultural and scientific activity.

The PUWP was accused of being an exploiting worker’s bureaucracy, and both of them were

arrested. In 1967, repression over the intellectuals was increased when many of them praised

Israeli’s victory over Egypt, what led some twenty thousand Polish-Jewish scholars, journalists


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and bureaucrats to go in forced or even voluntary exile. In 1968, there was the “Polish March”.

After the prohibition of a play for being an anti-Russian work much applauded by the students,

on March 8 University students staged sit-ins calling upon for the end of the censorship. Spies

were sent into the University dressed as workers and beat up the students. Many of them went

into exile or were expelled. After this episode, things laid down. In August 1968 there was the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and in early 1970, the government gained some support

when achieved an agreement with West Germany on the Oder-Neisse Line as Poland’s western

frontier, what was under discussion since many years ago.

The First Workers’ Strike: 1970

The revolt happened mainly because of Poland’s economic stagnation. Gomulka decidedto cease the subsidies on food and basic products because they were embezzling about one-third

of the country’s budget, and he refused to carry out economic reforms. On December 12, a rise on

the price of food and other supplies, some up to 60% (CIENCIALA, 2003), was announced by the

Warsaw radio, as well as the cancellation of the 13th salary and Christmas bonus. On 15

December, 3,000 workers from Gdansk went to the Party Headquarters to protest. A policeman

shot one of the workers, leading the rebels to shoot against the installations, and the staff was

forced to evacuate the building by chopper. The workers began sit-ins at the Gdansk and Gdynia

shipyards, but were persuaded by Party local representatives to quit it, and to support and to taketheir demands to Warsaw. On December 16, Gomulka sent troops to defeat what he called the

“counterrevolution” in Gdansk. Many workers were shot when arriving at the Paris Commune

shipyard railway station nearby Gdynia. In Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin, strike committees were

organised; in the latter, an Interfactory Strike Committee was formed, and made many requests

to the Party. One of the requests was taken from the open letter written some years before by

Kuron and Modzelewski, and was the establishment of a non-party Trade Union leadership. The

strikes were repressed by force, and some 3 thousand were dead or injured. The fighting

persisted through December 18 and was extended to other parts of Poland. At this time, anotherleadership was necessary to restore calm, and USSR advised upon Gomulka’s replacement. On

December 19, Gomulka resigned alleging health problems and Edward Gierek was offered the

leadership by the Polish Politburo. Gierek appeared on TV on that day asking for calm and

regretting the bloodshed, and peace was restored.

On early January 1971, using old images Polish TV showed Gierek joking with workers of

the Szczecin shipyard, what unpleased them. To get things worse, a newspaper published


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workers had signed a special production commitment, what did not happen, so they got on strike

again. At this time, they demanded Party representatives to talk to them, what happened on the

24th. Gierek asked for the workers’ help, and they answered positively to him. There were still

some other strikes, but they were soon controlled by Gierek. On March 1971, old prices were

restored and peace was established.

To keep peace, Gierek started granting relative autonomy to the press, as well as some

moves to please the intellectuals, such as the reform of the Warsaw Castle and autonomy to

academic publications and university studies. Making use of the Brezhnev-Nixon "detente" of the

1970s, Gierek wanted to modernise Polish industrial camp. At this time he started getting

massive credits from the West. This improved Poland’s economic condition. In 1974, however,

the economic situation worsened partly because of the raise of international oil prices.

Nevertheless, reforms were necessary since previous times, but Gierek was not willing to carry

them on. As the purchasing capacity of the Polish people decreased, the Party leaders enjoyed aprofuse life style (CIENCIALA, 2003).

The Second Workers’ Strike: 1976

In June 1976, the government announced a raise in prices for the critical situation in the

budget because of the subsidised prices. Although the government announced the workers had

agreed upon the hike, only the workers members of the Party did so. New strikes begun to

happen and were abruptly put off. The strikes at the Ursus Tractor Factory, near Warsaw, and in

Radom were violently repressed. With the support of the Catholic Church, which had already

helped civic and human rights during 1970, a new movement emerged, this time joining the

intelligentsia and the workers. Among the proposals of Cardinal Wyszynski, one of the Church’s

exponents in Poland, were freedom of conscience, freedom of religious belief, free cultural

activity, the right to truth and freedom of speech, free trade unions, an independent judiciary and

civil service, free elections to parliament, economic rights of private farmers, respect for the

indispensable civil rights of all Poles, and said the Constitution should not contain anything thatcould limit the sovereignty of the Polish state (CIENCIALA, 2003). In 1976, the draft

Constitution established the subordination of Poland to the USSR and the conditionality of the

respect of human rights to the obedience of the Party. The government, to avoid other

insurgencies, cancelled the rise.


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In late summer - early autumn 1976, a group of intellectuals created the KOR 18, the

Committee for the Defence of Polish Workers, aimed at helping Polish workers. The Committee

published an underground bulletin, with the first being published in September. KOR adopted a

policy of open activism, what means that KOR members signed the bulletins with their demands,

based on the Polish Constitution and other international documents signed by the government, with regard especially to human rights. In little time, other organisations emerged in the country,

such as the ROPCIO19, the Movement for the Defence of the Rights of Man and Citizen, formed

by right-wing intellectuals demanding moderated reforms and the KPN20, the Confederation For

and Independent Poland, also a right-wing movement. In 1978 it was created the TKN21, the

Association for Scholarly Courses, an underground educational organisation that organised

seminars to teach what was not taught or was distorted at official universities22. The government

response came through fines, threat of loosing jobs and salaries. However, with the help of the

Church, the movement persisted. In February 1978, Mloda Polska - Young Poland, another right- wing organisation - in cooperation with the KOR, established the Free Baltic Trade Union in

Gdansk, an institution where future workers’ leaders were taught. KOR also published

Robotnik 23, an underground paper made for the workers. These organisations joined together to

celebrate national symbols and dates, such as annual celebrations for the Polish Constitution of

1791 on May 3, on September 17 in memory of the Soviet invasion or Easter Poland in 1939, and

on November 11 to celebrate the Independence Day in the pre-war period. The demonstrations

were also to protest against the government, and were frequently repressed by the police.

Samizdat, the Polish underground press, developed significantly from 1976 to 1980, in spite of

the government’s attempt to persecute the dissident movements. The PUWP had to act very

carefully, in order to avoid causing mass unrest and the opposition of the U.S. government and

of the Church. During the 1970’s, Poland received the visit of 3 U.S. presidents: Richard Nixon in

1972, Gerald Ford in1975 and Jimmy Carter in 1977.

Karol Wojtyla, the Archbishop of Krakow, was elected Pope on 16 October, 1978,

therefore aggravating the government’s concerns. Soon after his election, Wojtyla, now John Paul

II, announced his will to visit Poland, which happened in June 1979. The impact on the country

was enormous. 200,000 people went to hear him in Warsaw; 1,000,000 visited the monastery of Jasna Gora at Czestochowa; and more than a million attended in and around Krakow, everything

carefully being secured by the police. The Pope’s speeches dealt on right of freedom and the

18 Original name “Komitet Obrony Robotnikow”.19 Original name “Ruch Obrony Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela”.20 Original name “Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej”.21 Original name “Towarzystwo Kursow Naukowych”.22 The seminars were done in private flats, in the model of the underground education that happened in Poland during theRussian occupation of 1890-1914 and German occupation during World War II.23 The name of the paper is the same used in a publication made before World War I by Jozef Pilsudski and means The Worker.


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importance of God’s presence in one’s life. The visit was certainly a turning point for the Polish

social movements.

1979 saw a strong decreasing of the Polish standard of life with the economic crisis.

Investments on power supply were lacking. The transport system, including roads and railroad

tracks, were in bad condition; food production declined due to poor harvests and the

government’s policies of discrimination of private farmers24; the health system was in shambles;

great disparities could be noted between the elites, those who were part of the PUWP, and the

lower classes. Party and government officials, high police and military officers and industrial

managers enjoyed a pompous lifestyle while the mass was in hardship. In February 1980, the

government allowed a fairly open coverage of public opinion during the elections to the Eighth

Party Congress, which were to take place later that month. Mass complaints about authority

abuses were aired on national TV and led to the dismissal of premier Piotr Jaroszewicz. Gierek

appointed as his substitute his friend Edward Babiuch. By May-June 1980, unrest was widespread and the population was considering strikes and sit-ins.

The Solidarity Movement

Premier Babiuch announced a raise on prices on 1 July 1980, which ensued strikes all

over the country. The strikes were nonetheless uncoordinated and the government could put

them off by negotiation. In late July, however, there was a city-wide strike at Lublin. All factories

stopped working and Polish consumer goods were distributed to the local population instead of

being sent to the USSR. Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw Jagielski could control the strikes,

Nevertheless other strikes in Gdansk and other coastal cities became coordinated. In August

there was a strike at the Lenin Shipyard, Gdansk, where some workers were killed on the

December 1970 insurrection, because of the prices raise and the dismissal of Anna

Walentynowicz, a member of the Free Baltic Trade Union. The shipyard manager could reach an

agreement with the employees and the strike came to an end. None the less, an electrician who

was a worker leader in December 1970 and member of the Baltic Trade Union tried in vain topersuade workers not to go back to work. His name: Lech Walesa.

In coordination with Walentynowicz, a nurse named Alina Pienkowska and Henryka

Krzywonos, a street car driver, Walesa persuaded 400 out of 10,000 workers to coordinate the

movement joining them, and they not just accepted but also brought some 600 more. On 16


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August, the MKS (Interfactory Strike Committee) was formed, which gathered enterprises from

all parts of Poland. It soon became the Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK), aimed to

coordinate the movement all over the country. A group of advisors was formed under

coordination of Tadeusz Mazowieck, with local and KOR intellectuals coming from Warsaw. The

government cut off all communications from Gdansk and the rest of Poland and proposednegotiations - the rebels, however, said no negotiation would take place unless all

communications were restored. Tadeusz Pyka, a Deputy Premier, was unsuccessful on the

negotiations and the Lublin strike negotiator Jagielski replaced him. The meetings between the

government and the MKS representatives were recorded and later widely broadcast, what was

known as the “cassette revolution”. The main negotiation, nevertheless, was carried out by the

workers’ advisory group. The Gdansk Agreement put an end to the strike. The agreement,

commonly known as the 21 Points, was signed on August 31, and is similar to another agreement

signed on the 30th

in Szczecin, and the main results achieved were25

:(a)

establishing a Free Trade Union and safeguarding the right to strike,

(b)

demanding self-management, that is, Workers’ Councils to run state enterprises;

(c)

a sliding pay scale to guard against price hikes without increasing wages;

(d)

the state was to consult Solidarity and society in general on economic policy,restricting exports, improving food supplies, abolishing foreign currency shops[where people with foreign currency could buy goods unavailable in other shops];

(e) improving work conditions, health services, medication supplies, free Saturdays,and vacations, also increasing the amount of housing available;

(f)

defining censorship;

(g)

safeguarding Solidarity and Church access to the media;

(h) and release of all political prisoners and reinstatement of workers fired afterstrikes and university students expelled for their opinions.

Solidarity demanded a law to quit censorship, but it had also to recognise the Polish

United Workers’ Party as the government authority and the existence of international alliances,

in a reference to the Warsaw Pact. The government postponed the recognition of Solidarity at

most, having recognised it only in November 1980 and the Rural Solidarity only in April 1981. On

September 1980, following instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Gierek

resigned, pleading health problems and was replaced by Stanislaw Kania. The the ensueing

months saw a great joy in the nation, with free speech and elections of leaders in every type of

civil and institutional organisations. Some 1,000,000 people, one third of the Party members,

joined Solidarity during late 1980 and mid 1981. On 8 December 1980, right one year ago, a

24 Private farmers owned 78% of the land at that time, but could only buy fertilisers and machineries from the West and in USdollars. The government purchased prices too low to cover their costs and imposed high taxes on extra production to avoidprivate wealth (CIENCIALA 2003).25 Passage taken from CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003.


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crucial decision for the future of Poland and of Solidarity was taken: the Warsaw Pact hosted a

meeting to discuss the Polish situation and decided, at that moment, not to intervene and let

Polish government take care of Solidarity. The situation in one year was about to be drastically

changed.

General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was the Polish Minister of Defense, became the Prime

Minister of Poland in February. In March, a general strike in reaction to the economic situation

in Poland was avoided due to negotiations between Walesa and Deputy Premier Mieczyslaw F.

Rakowski. At this time, the Warsaw Pact exercised manoeuvres in Poland and there were

rumours of a military intervention in the country. On May 13 1981, there was an attempt to kill

Pope John Paul II in Rome. The Pope survived the attempt, although he was seriously injured. At

the time, it was raised a Bulgarian connection, but nothing was proved by the Italian authorities.

A few days later, Cardinal Wyszynski passed out because of a cancer. Both religious were great

supporters of Solidarity. The changes in the Party, however, continued. The pressure from theSoviet leaders for the total suppression of Solidarity was increasing. On June 5, the Soviet

Central Committee sent a letter to the Polish Committee mentioning the threat to the

revolutionary achievements of the Polish people26. Soviets openly gave support to the hardliners,

and demanded the Solidarity suppression by force.

In July 1981 there was the Extraordinary Party Congress, where were elected, by secret

ballot, delegates and the Central Committee. However, no reforms such as economic or political

were done, which earned but a negative response from the population. At this time, food

shortage was vastly growing in Poland. Marshall Kulikov, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact,

spent the month of August in Poland, making pressure on Kania to crush Solidarity. In this same

month, Brezhnev sent Kania a telegram asking for a plan to defeat the movement. On the 14 th,

the Soviet leader met with Kania and Jaruzelski and insisted on the use of force. On the 20th, the

Soviet government announced a drastic cut of supplies to Poland in the following year. On 20

September , Brezhnev called the PUWP leader and asked him to immediately implement martial

law in Poland, saying that there would be a reaction by member-states should Warsaw Pact lines

be threatened. These were clear economic and military pressions on Kania. In September –

October 1981, there was a Solidarity Congress in Gdansk, where Walesa was re-elected and theSolidarity Program was developed, fully adopted in October. Right in this month, Jaruzelski

replaced Kania as the Head of State. In November, a Solidarity-Church-Party meeting took place.

At this meeting, Jaruzelski proposed a National Front, led by the Party. Walesa and Cardinal

Jozef Glemp, the Church representative, saw it as an attempt of the state to have full control of

26 CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003.


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Poland and rejected it, just as Jaruzelski rejected Walesa’s plans to strengthen relations between

the state and Solidarity.

On 27 and 28 November, there was the 6th PUWP Plenum27, which decided that the Party

had to take an emergency action to protect Polish citizens and state. Cardinal Glem opposed the

decision but tried unsuccessfully to appease Solidarity’s members. At that time, front

confrontation seemed very close. Also in late November Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski was extracted

from Poland to the United States - there are rumours he could have been a Western spy in

Poland. On 3 and 4 December, Solidarity Presidium met in Radom and agreed to have a Front of

National Understanding under some conditions28, and voted for a 24 hour strike if the

parliament voted for total power to the government. At the meantime, tapes of Solidarity leaders

rumouring a takeover of the governments came up and the political situation deeply worsened.

On 5 and 6 December, Solidarity delegates from the Mazowsze region met and called for a

protest in the centre of Warsaw on 17 December. On 7 December, Jaruzelski had a telephone talk with Brezhnev, in which the Soviet conductor said: “The counterrevolution is sitting on the back

of your neck. If you don’t take necessary measures it will be too late. And now this concerns us

all. (…) This is not just your affair!” (CIENCIALA, 2003). The Polish leader said he still believed a

peaceful settlement was possible and asked to see the Deputy Chairman of the Council of

Ministers, Chief of Soviet Economic Planning, Nikolai K. Baibakov, what was conceded by

Brezhnev.

27 A kind of conference in which very important decisions were taken, including the Party’s policies.28 The conditions were: (i) a decree on Trade Unions which would include Solidarity proposals; (ii) the government wouldgive up the so-called provisional economic regulations; (iii) Solidarity would be guaranteed access to radio and TV.(CIENCIALA, Anna. 2003)


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POSITIONS

Bulgaria

Expressing great concern in regard to the mounting instability in Poland, Bulgaria once

again confirms itself as one of the most reliable allies in the socialist bloc. Fearing that any delay

in action against the anti-socialist forces could lead the Polish Communist Party to the brink of

ruin, the Bulgarian leadership has, even thought publicly not as actively as some other member

states of the Warsaw Pact, emphasised that the socialist bloc must assist Poland in this moment

of crisis and fulfil its obligations to the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria is following closely the

development and the effects of the Polish crisis.

East Germany

It is clear that Solidarity is a threat to the stability of socialist Poland. The suppression of

the counterrevolutionary forces by Polish authorities has been claimed for a long time - without

any apparent success. The East-German government believes it is time to consider the possibility

of a military intervention before loosing control over the situation. It is the duty of the Warsaw

Pact members to help the Polish comrades to overcome the crisis.

Hungary

As it is generally believed by the state members of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary concurs that

overcoming the extraordinary events in Poland is a complex, pressing task to be fulfilled mostly

by the leadership of the PUWP. Such an end requires the elaboration of a precise, consistent plan

with a view to securing the restoration of the authority of the Polish Communist Party. Only with

the implementation of a set of effective measures to curb the counterrevolution will the friendly

relations in the Communist world, as well as multilateral cooperation and the system of socialist

alliance, be revitalised and reinforced. Needless to say, to grasp the Hungarian stance on the

issue one should take a proper account of the nation’s past experience # particular as it may be.


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Poland

Jaruzelki’s representatives, albeit deeply weakened because of its lack of legitimacy upon

its population, are looking forward for a quick solution to the Solidarity case. It has been pressed

by the other Warsaw Pact countries to put an end to the internal conflict as soon as possible.

Strongly opposing ifluence from the West and from the Church, the Polish government has do

deal very carefully with the matter because it fears an even wider revolt. Its compromises are to

keep socialism in the country as well as its commitment to the Warsaw Pact. The government

also fears a Soviet invasion to the country, but considers it is a possibility, just as the

establishment of a Martial Law, as the Brezhnev government has been attempting to force.

Jaruzelski and the government know a fast and effective solution has to be taken in the next days

or they may be either invaded by the USSR or totally lose the control of the country. The Polish

head of state also knows he is in a very delicate situation: either he finds a definite solution to the

Solidarity question or he is replaced, just as his predecessors that failed in controlling the

country’s situation.

Romania

The Rumanian People's Republic is extremely concerned about the situation in Poland

and believes that the problem must be solved from the inside. It is essential that the state-

members of the Warsaw Pact keep that in mind and act through diplomatic channels to keep the

crisis under control. An invasion from outside would bring more instability not only to the

situation in Poland, but also to the international scenario. Romania affirms that it is important

for the Polish Communist Party to focus its attentions on the working class - which is not fully

represented by the “Solidarity” movement.

The People’s Republic of Czechoslovakia

Since the beginning of the counterrevolutionary movement in Poland, Czechoslovakia has

kept a day-by-day watch on the situation. It is the Czech government’s view that the crisis is a

clear attempt of the international imperialism to wither away socialism in Poland by exploiting

the dire situation that this country encounters itself in. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia

sees in the 1968-1969 Czechoslovak crisis an incredibly insightful parallel to the ongoing “anti-


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socialist movement” in Poland. The latter has to regain control over society and its allies have the

duty to assist it at all costs. Czechoslovakia is willing to take every possible measure to buttress

Poland.

Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

Regarding the situation in Poland as deeply alarming and posing a great danger for the

Communist system, it is the Soviet Union stand that it must be handled in an effective, decisive

manner. Hence, in the face of the advanced stage of the crisis, the leadership of the PCSU has

reiterated its requests that the Polish authorities undertake a decisive action against

counterrevolution, making use of all the necessary mechanisms to hinder “increasing anarchy” in

the country as well as the undermining of governmental authority. The USSR’s primary allegedaims encompass the saving socialism in the Polish state, the avoidance of an escalation of the

conflict to other nations in the region, and the preservation of Poland as an ally as well as a loyal

party to the Warsaw Pact. The enduring Western influence in the Polish case is also an issue of

grave concern to the Soviets. At the same time, however, a certain deal of caution is in order in

this regard, given the current international policy of détente and the potential of the matter to

cause a wider, bipolar confrontation.

First Deputy Chief of the Warsaw Pact Staff Lieutenant General K. K. Pashuk

General Pashuk is the responsible for the military operations of the Warsaw Pact. He is

the one that, in the case of a military intervention, will coordinate the operation. His position at

the meeting is to present tactics for a possible military intervention in Poland and also to assist

the PCC in any matter regarding military operations.

Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief Marshall Viktor G. Kulikov

Concerned with the crisis in Poland and the possible consequences that it might have in

other member-states of the Warsaw Pact, Viktor G. Kulikov reiterates that the Polish Communist

Party must regain its once uncontested position in the country. The demise of socialism in

Poland would lead to the inevitable withdraw of the latter from the Warsaw Pact and would


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weaken the socialist alliance. The Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief insists that a firm and

decisive action must be taken to deter the counterrevolutionary movement that has plagued the

country and that Poland has the means to “resolve the problem on its own”. As the Deputy

Defence Minister of the USSR, Marshall Kulikov also supports Brezhnev’s demands to crush

Solidarity.

Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff General Anatoli Gribkov

General Anatoli Gribkov is the responsible for the political coordination of the Warsaw

Pact. His position is, at the meeting, to measure the political results of the possible solutions to

be taken upon the Polish situation and to advise the PCC on the political results, both Eastern

and Western, of the Warsaw Pact actions.


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TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AND QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHALL ADDRESS

A productive debate on the Polish crisis demands sufficient knowledge of the matter as

well as strong will to handle it in appropriate manner. To that end, important questions shall be

carefully considered while the discussion is held. A few of them are presented below and they

may be especially useful at the time of drawing up a resolution of the Warsaw Pact meeting.

Bearing continuously in mind the complexity of the current situation in Poland:

! What measures should be taken to handle the critical events in Poland? Who should be

the agent(s) in charge of transforming this situation?

! Do the latest events in Poland pose a threat to Communism? If so, how to preserve the

Communist system?

! Should the socialist model adopted by the Polish state remain untouched or measures

should be devised to fit such model to the demands of the Poles?

! Should the leading role of the PUWP be restored? If so, how could this aim be attained?

! What should be done in relation to Solidarity and its actions and demands?

! What should the participation of the Warsaw Pact and its members be in this case?

! How to deal with the influence of the West in Poland?

!

Should any measures be taken in order to relief the suffering of the population due to the

deteriorating economic situation in the country?

A couple of final remarks is in order at this time. Nowadays, the international system has

experienced a delicate moment in which stability is arduously desired and pursued by most

countries. The critical events in Poland must be coped with as soon and wisely as possible so as

to prevent a disaster for the Poles and, eventually, for the world. Therefore, it is your utmost

duty, representatives to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, to devise

effective measures to handle the Polish situation and restore stability in Poland. We shall also

remind you that all of you invited for the meeting of 8 December, 1981, may write a one page

document stating your positions regarding the topic at hand for the other members of the

meeting appreciation.


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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

BAEV, Jordan. The organizational and doctrinal evolution of the Warsaw Pact (1955-

1969) A CD Documentary Volume, Sofia. Available at:

http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/publications/organizational.html

BYRNE, Malcolm. New Evidence on the Polish Crisis: 1980-1982. Cold War International

History Project Bulletin II, 1997. Available at: http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACFC43.pdf

CASTILHO, Carlos.; WAACK, William. Polônia: A crise de 500 dias que abalou o

socialismo (Poland: The 500 day crisis that shook socialism). Rio de Janeiro. Codecri, 1982.

211p.

CIENCIALA, Anna M. Poland 1957-1980/81. Czechoslovakia and Hungary 1956/68 -

1980. Lecture Notes 18. Hist.557. (revised Nov. 2003). Available at:

http://raven.cc.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect18a.htm

CLAUDÍN, Fernando. A Oposição no “Socialismo Real”: União Soviética, Hungria,

Polônia, Tcheco-Eslováquia. Ed. Marco Zero, Rio de Janeiro, 1981.

FALLENBUCHL, Zbigniew M. Poland: Command Planning in Crisis. Challenge, July-

August 1981.

GATI, Charles. Polish Futures, Westerns Options. Foreign Affairs, s/d.

IRVING, David. Uprising! One nation’s nightmare: Hungary 1956. Parforce UK, 2001.

Available at: http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Uprising/

JORDAN, Alexander T. One Year Later - Poland Under the Cannon. National Review,

October 2, 1981.

JONES, Christopher D. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and

the Warsaw Pact. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1981.

LEWIS, William. The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine and Strategy. New York: McGraw-Hill

Publications, 1982. 471p.

MACEACHIN, Douglas J. US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis: 1980-1981. United States

Central Intelligence: Agency’s Center for the Study of Intelligence. 2001. Available at:

http://wings.buffalo.edu/info-poland/web/history/socialism/1980/link.shtml

MICGIEL, John S.Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions. 8-10

November 1997. East Central European Center, Columbia University.


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SHAPIRO, Ian. Fiscal crisis of the Polish state. Genesis of the 1980 strikes. In: Theory and

society. Renewal and critique in social theory, Volume 10, 1981, ss. 469-502

WINSTON. The Current Wisdom - The Polish Conundrum. National Review, August 7,

1981.

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http://countrystudies.us/poland/17.htm

http://library.thinkquest.org/C001155/

http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/soviet_union/su_appnc.html

http://nhs.needham.k12.ma.us/cur/Baker_00/2001_p6/baker_jl_al_sh_p6/solidarity.htm

http://wings.buffalo.edu/info-poland/classroom/shorthist.html

http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is_v39/ai_5041576

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/HOM.htm

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/

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http://www.wikipedia.com

Documents

Warsaw_Pact_-_Study_Guide.pdf