WAR on IRAQA Diagnostic Evaluation

Drake DaughdrillJared Silk

Ron Mahabir

• On February 5th, 2003 Secretary Colin L. Powell briefs the United Nations Security Council on the present status of Iraq at the time. (GlobalSecurity 2003)

• From evidence presented, his view was that enough was enough and that US and allied forces had no alternative but to go to war with Iraq.

• On March 20th, 2003 war began in Iraq.

• Was the war justified?

Briefing

• Help analysts identify key assumptions, uncertainties, and intelligence gaps, and potential changes that would alter key assessments and predictions.

• Help analysts discover “unknowns”

Introduction

Methods of AnalysisSource: IAFIE 2009

• Keys assumptions check

• Quality of Information check

• Indicators or signposts of change

• Analysis of Competing Hypotheses

• Conclusion

Overview

• “List and review the key working assumptions on which fundamental judgement rest” (US Gov’t 2009)

• Challenges mindsets by structured self-critique (Richards 2008)

Key Assumptions Check

• Major Key Assumption

• Iraq posses weapons of mass destruction and will do whatever it takes to deceive us from this.

Key Assumptions Check

Key Assumptions Check

Key Assumption AssessmentIraq is lying to us • They have done it in the past on many occasions and

will do it again in the future.

Iraq is hiding documents, hard drives and banned materials

• They have a track record of such activities.• Satellite photos before and after confirms this.

Iraq has biological weapons

• They have admitted to having them in the past.• We have first hand descriptions from persons in positions to know that they do have these weapons.

Iraq has chemical weapons

• We have found 122 mm chemical warheads and Saddam has used them in the past on his own people and on his neighbors.

Key Assumptions Check

Key Assumption AssessmentIraq has not abandoned its nuclear weapons program

• Saddam has nuclear scientists.• He has acquired equipment that enriches Uranium.• He is making attempts to get the remaining materials.

Iraq has missiles to deliver a mass of destruction

• We have obtained reports that Saddam has imported large rocket engines and satellite photos showing that he has built a large engine test stand.

Iraq is developing UAVs that can travel farther than the UN has allowed

• We have detected one travelling a distance of 500km non-stop (above 80km limit)

Saddam Hussein is funding terrorism

• Reports from defectors/captives• We have evidence of his ties to cells across the world.

• “Weighting the validity of sources is a key feature of any critical thinking.

• Moreover, establishing how much confidence one puts in analytic judgements should ultimately rest in how accurate and reliable the information base is.” (US Gov’t 2009)

• GIGO

Quality of Information Check

• Audio tapes

• Poor quality & does not explicitly state what is being hidden• Was the translation verified? (other meanings?)• Was the transmission analysed as a whole for more information?

• Inspectors

• Were the inspectors view of the situation truly taken into account? How much?

• Video

• 2000 liters of simulated anthrax? Maybe another used e.g. crop production...

Information sources

• Human sources (Defectors/Captives)

• Some evidence was corroborated e.g. Finding documents at scientists home.

• Some sources corroborated e.g. Mobile production program• How much was not corroborated?• Can we really trust these persons? How much?• Under what conditions was information extracted?

• Other countries

• Friend or foe? US and /or Iraq• Can we trust them?

Information sources

• Satellite photos

• Suggestive that something was moved.• However, we cannot see inside the buildings

• E.g. “...inside the facility there are special guards...”• Are the stated vehicles are as annotated?• Exhaust vent for long range missiles: Is it really?

• Interception of materials & Monitoring

• E.g. Fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion• Alternative and valid uses

Information sources

• “Periodically review a list of observable events or trends to track events, monitor targets, spot emerging trends, and warn of unanticipated change” (US Gov’t 2009)

• The human mind tends to see what it expects to see and to overlook the unexpected.

• Identification of indicators and signposts creates an awareness that prepares the mind to recognize change. (Richards 2008)

Indicators or Signposts of Change

Fact patterns

• Iraq had WMD capability in past

• Chem/Bio use demonstrated in Iran-Iraq War 1980• Uranium enrichment early stages before reactor destroyed by

Israel strike 1981

• Iraq consistently failed to transparently cooperate with UN weapons inspectors

• numerous breaches of UNSC resolutions since 1990• Suspicious behavior observed just prior to UN inspections

o trucks w/ cranes arrive and depart from missile & munitions siteso former scientists/lab techs hindered from UN interviews

• Concise accounting of WMDs and/or concrete evidence of disposal unavailable at time of UNSC 1441

• Shelf life of known WMD capabilities has expired if no new productiono Sarin & Tabun ~ 5 yrso VX slightly >5 yrso Botulinum toxin & Anthrax ~ 3yrs

• Saddam Hussein regime vilified by radical Islamists & terrorist groups

• Iraqi intell. & SFs cracked down on anti-regime elements since 1970s

Fact patterns

Competing Hypotheses

• Hypothesis A: Iraq continues WMD program in secret

• Hypothesis B: Iraq dismantles WMD program in secret

• Hypothesis b: Iraq unloads WMDs to terrorists in secret

• Hypothesis C: Iraq WMD programs defunct as of 1990-91 invasion

Indicators or signposts of change: Inspections reliability

Topic IndicatorHypothesis supported

(increases)

Inspections Reliability

Quantity of inspections B, C*Quality of inspections B, C*Frequency of inspections B, C*Prior notice of inspections A*Freedom of movement of inspectors B, C*Freedom of access of inspectors

to facilities B, C*to personnel B, C*

to documents/records b*, C

* Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

Indicators or signposts of change: National resources

Topic IndicatorHypothesis supported

(increases)

NationalResources

Unexpected changes in GDP

unaccounted gains bunaccounted losses A

Unexpected changes in inventories

WMD equipment/raw materials AWMD facilities A

WMD personnel A

* Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

Indicators or signposts of change: Intelligence

Topic IndicatorHypothesis supported

(increases)

Intelligence

Changes in “chatter”

specific to facilities Aspecific to equipment/materials A

terrorist groups in the region bChanges in movement

unloading at facilities AWMD personnel to facilities A

Fortification (fixed, mobile, troops, etc.) removal B, b*, C*

* Hypothesis supported via multiple simultaneous indicators

• Both the Key Assumptions Test and Indicators or Signposts of Change Test support the decision to go to war with Iraq, however, this was not the case with the Quality of Information Check.

• No one method is better and integration of methods is expected to bring about a more uncertain decision.

• Groups are preferable rather than individualistic view for a more global perspective.

• Therefore we find that the judgement to go to war with Iraq was premature.

• Present information suggest more in depth investigation and does warrant a war on Iraq.

Final Conclusion

• US Gov’t (2009) A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis. US Government.

• IAFIE (2009) Teaching Structured Analytic Techniques. Proceeding of the 5th Annual Conference for the International Association for Intelligence Education. Uni. Of Maryland, May 26-28, IAFIE.

• Richards, H.J. (2008) Taxonomy of Structured Analytic Techniques. Proceedings of the International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 26 – 29, San Francisco, CA, ISA.

• GlobalSecurity (2003) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Available online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm. (Last accessed on February 10, 2011)

References