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8

WAR IN THE CAUCASUSBYZOLTAN GROSSMAN,

WHILE world attention has focussedon the Balkans, another center of geopo-litical rivalry has erupted into war: theCaucasus.TheCaucasusregionlaysalongthe 'fault line' between Christianity andboth the Sunni and Shiite branches ofIslam. More importantly, the area hashistorically been foughtover by the threemain regional powers - the Russians,the Ottomans (Turks) and the Persians(Iranians). New fighting within and be-tween Caucasian states eerily recalls theproxy wars of long ago, including theCrimean War (1853-56) and the twoworld wars. Yetthe newwarfare isbeingwaged with the modern ferocity of MiGjets, tanks, and "ethnic cleansing."

The breakup of the Soviet Union inDecember 1991 brought independenceto the three Transcaucasian republics ofGeorgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Theyhad briefly achieved independence fromRussia after World War I, only to beincorporated into the new Soviet state.Soviet dictator Josef Stalin artificiallydrewboundaries between these republicsin a way to guarantee strife among anyfuture independence movements. Today,many of Stalin's ethnic 'booby traps' aregoingoff, and Moscow's divide-and-con-quer strategy is bearing fruit.

In Georgia and Armenia, Moscowstill has thousands ofbordertroops guard-ing the former Soviet frontier. On Octo-ber 6, only days after the Russian Armycrushed the Moscowrebellion, PresidentBoris Yeltsin asked for ~ revision in theTreaty on Conventional Forces in Eu-rope to allow for a greater Russian mili-

Zoltan Grossman a professional cartographerin JI,{adison, Wisconsin, is active in NativeAmerican support grOllpS. He writes OIl issues

of geopolitics and indigenOlls peoples. Author's

permission required before reprinting.

tary presence in the Caucasus.In addition, autonomous ethnic re-

publics within' the newly independentstates - aswellas in neighboringsouth-ern Russia - are pressing for their sov-ereign rights (see dark shaded areas onmap). Most of the current fighting iscentered in these autonomous regions,but the seemingly random flare-upsshould not be seen as isolated from oneanother. Any secessions or boundarychanges could easily lead to a maelstromof violence, and more direct involvementby Russia, Turkey, Iran and other pow-ers. Nonviolence International's repre-sentative for the ex-USSR, AndreiKamenshikov, recently returned from thewar in Georgia. He comments, "TheCaucasus are very unpredictable. Issuescannot be simplified and there are manydifferent players. Anyone who says they-- - - -

,Ii'. \

\\

have a clear picture of what is happeningdoesn't know what they are talkingabout."

GEORGIAGeorgia is an ancient Christian na-

tion, with its own distinct alphabet andOrthodox' patriarch. Ethnic Georgianswere aided by fellow Orthodox Russiansagainst the Ottoman Empire, which con-trolled the Black Sea coast until 1829.After Moscowannexed their lands, Geor-gians became among the most indepen-dence-minded of all the peoples in the "Russian Empire. However, it was anethnic Georgian, Josef Dzhugashvili(later Stalin), who blocked any movestoward sovereignty.

When Georgia's independence move-ment won its longtime goal in 1991, itbecame the first ex-SOvietrepublic out-

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" ~Tens of thousands of people forced from their Azeri villages by advancing Armeniantroops now live ill refugee camps. Iran provides tents and rice. Photo ({;)1993JasonEskenazi, Impact Visuals

8 THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY.FEBRUARY 1994

.sid~the Baltics not tojoin the new Com-monwealth ofIndependent States (CIS).But the newgovernment fractured withinweeks, andPres~dentZviad Gamsakhur-dia fled Thilisi after the national Capitalwas damaged by fierce infighting. Hiseventual successor, former Soviet for-:eign minister (and Geowan Communistchief) Eduard Shevardnadze, droveGamsakhurdia from his stronghold inwestern Georgia to Chechnia, a seces-sionist republic in neighboring Russia.

At the same time, Georgia' sown threeautonomous ethnic regions pressed forautonomy or secession. First, SouthOssetian nationalists fought for mergerwith Russia's North Ossetia.Second, ethnic Abkhaz - whoactually make up only one-fifthof Abkhazia 's population - be-gan their fight for an indepen-dent Abkhazia that would joinRussia. (Ossetians and Abkhazin Georgia are both OrthodoxChristian peoples, though someMuslim Abkhaz live in the adja-cent North Caucasus region ofRussia.) Third, some MuslimAjars began to more peacefullyagitate rorAjaria 's independenceor its merger with Turkey (asbrieflyoccurredin 1920-21).

The Georgian governmentaccused the South Ossetians andAbkhaz of merely serving as afront for Moscow, which it saidwanted to dismember Georgia inrevenge for its refusal tojoin the

CIS. Soine Russian. troops did The Callcaslls.Map by ZoltanGrossman.protect South OsseUan fightersagainst the Georgian army, though Rus-sian troops have more recently served aspeacekeeping Jorces jointly. with Geor-gian forces. Russian officers and bomberpilots were captured while aidingAbkhazian fighters, but it remains un-clear whether or not they represent arogue Russian nationalist element in thearmed forces..The Abkhazians were alsoaided by Russian Cossack .mercenariesand the Confederation of MountainPeoples, a. group of ethnic minoritieswho back independence from both Geor-gia and Russia, and who object to whatthey call Georgian forced acculturation.The Georgian military (which has beenimplicated inserious human rights abusesin Abkhazia) has in turn received directaid and training from the United States.One CIA agent training Georgian forceswas killed elsewhere in the country,though it remains unclear .whether the

killers were tied to a rebel group.The year-long War in Abkhazia left.

over 3000 Clead.On September 27, 1993,Abkhazian forces captured the republiccapital ofS~humi. They droveoutPresi-dent Shevardnadze, who had desperately'issued appeals for military help ~obothhis. rival Gamsakhurdia and Russian

. President Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin sentevacuation ships and warned Abkhazianrebels to lift their siege of Sukhumi, buthis defense minister Pavel Grachev saidthat any Russian interventionary forcewould have to disarm both sides, an offerShevardnadze refused. During the 11-.day siege, a peace march of Sukhumi

soon captured Gamsakhurdia's strong-hold of Zugdidi. Shevardnadze wasquoted in the Christian ScienceMonitoras saying, "We now face the threat offamine, not only in Georgia but Armeniaas well. Azerbaijan is also sufferinggreatly."

Later in 1993,Shevardnadzeagreedto giveRussia free basing rightsat theport of Poti, raising fierce objectionsfromGeorgiannationalists.

ARMENIAArmenia is another ex-Soviet repub-

lic, with a long history of independenceand association With. Christianity. Its

history has been dominated by astruggle with neighboring Turksand Turkic Azerbaijanis. BeforeWorld War I, the region of Arme-

; nia was split between the OttomanEmpire (in w~t is today most ofnortheastern Turkey) and the Rus-sian Empire (in what is today thecountry of Armenia). During thewar, many Armenians foughtwiththe Russian Allies against Otto-man rule. Towards the end of thewar and in the period that foIlowed,the Young Turk nationalist move-ment took genocidal revengeagainst Armenian civilians, kiIl-ing at least 600,000 and deportingtwo million more. An Armeniandiaspora was created in Syria, Leba- .

non, Palestine, Iraq, France, theUS and many other countries. The

... successful "ethnic cleansing" of Ar-menians from Turkey was later citedby Adolf Hitler as a precedent for

his actions. There was little internationaloutcry, though US President WoodrowWilson proposed that all of Ottoman andRussian Armenia become a US postwarmandate. Wilson's proposal shows anhistoric US interest in the region, thoughthe Congress did not support it. Instead,the Russian part of Armenia joined aTranscaucasian federation that was soonincorporated into the new Soviet Union, .

and the restbecamepart ofTurkey. .

In 1923, Stalin broke the Trans-caucasian republic into Georgia, Arme-nia, and Azerbaijan. In the process, hepurposely separated off a large partof theethnic Armenian population intoAzerbaijan in order to ensure that anyfuture attempt at secession wouldbe dif-ficult. Most of these Armenians becamepart of the Nagorno-Karabakh autono-mous republic within Azerbaijan, whileothers ended up in the Nakhichevan en-

'-

women called for unity among ethnicAbkhaz, Georgians and Russians, say-ing that the men on all sidesbore respon-sibility for the war.

After the fall of Sukhumi,Shevardnadze aIleged that rebels hadexecuted Georgian government officials,and that Russian forceshad overpoweredgovernment troops. Gamsakhurdia thenreturned from exile, announcing that hewas the nationalist leader who couldhold Georgia together, and vowing totopple Shevardnadze. The changing ofGeorgia's borders has led to more fight-ing among ethnic Georgians. Over250,000 ethnic Georgians have fledAbkhazia. On October 8, Shevardnadzetold Yeltsin that Georgia would acqui-esce to joining the CIS, and within 12days Russian forces were deployed inWestern Georgia to protect vital supplylines from Gamsakhurdia forces. They

THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY.FEBRUARY 1994 9

-..--

- - - -

..

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-During a demonstration for their president in the Central Square in Grozny, Chechen Republic, in Southern Russia, people take a momentfor prayer.Photo~1993 by JasonEskenazi,Impact Visuals. - .

clave of western Azerbaijan, and otherswithin Azerbaijan proper. Some ethnicAzens also ended up within Armenia.

In 1988, while still part of the SovietUnion, an ethnic Armenian parliamentin Karabakh called for unification withAnnenia. The move quickly turned intoan ethnic Armenian rebellion, whichwas backed by Anneniannationalists inAnnenia and its diaspora. Other ethnicArmenians fled pogroms in Azerbaijanicities such as Sumqayit, while ethnicAzeris left Armenia and Karabakh infear of the same. With the Soviet break-up in 1991, Karabakh declared itself anindependent state determined to rejoinAnnenia. The move was supported byAnnenia, which joined the CIS and se-cured someRussian military aid forKara-bakh Armenians (a number of Afghanmujahadeen mercenaries have fought forAzerbaijan).

. Azerbaijan retaliated by blockadingArmenia, including shutting offvital oilpipelines and rail lines. Another oil pipe-line through Georgia was blown up byAzeri commandos, though another pipe-line through Turkey strangely remained

open throughout much of the conflict.The transport andenergycutoffhascausedsevere deprivation within Armenia, in-cludingblackouts inthe capitalofYerevanthat have led officials to reopena nuclearreactor closed after a severe 1988earth-quake. According to the United Nations,10,000 people have been killed in thewar, while one million Azeris and half-a-million Armenians have been displaced.

The conflict in Karabakh - the Rus-sian term Nagorno ('Highland') is rarelyused now - has mostlybeen centered inKarabakh itself. The tide ofbattle, whichhas shifted dramatically, rarely led todirect confrontation between the armedforces of Armenia and Azerbaijan them-selves. In 1993, however, not only haveethnic Armenians secured control overKarabakh, but they and some fightersfrom Armenia are now occupying one-fifth of Azerbaijan, driving away thou-sands of Azeri refugees. Karabakh hadbeen territorially separated from Arme-nia, but the new conquests join themtogether. Karabakh Armenian leaderRobertKocharianseeshis enclavesas a"second Israel" needing to occupyneigh-

boring territory for "self defense." It isthis. development that threatens to in-volve outside military forcessuchas thoseof Turkey and Iran.

AZERBAIJANAzerbaijan is the real geopoliticalprize

in the Caucasus. The massive oil fieldsaround thecapitalofBaki (formerlyBaku)for years supplied the Soviet military-industrial complex.Azeris share a Turkicethnic background with Turkey, and in-dependent Azerbaijan is the cornerstoneof Turkish plans for influence in ex-Soviet states. However, Azeris also sharetheir Shiite Muslim religion with neigh-boring Iran, which also has historicallycompeted for the region. Azerbaijan alsoclaims chunks of Armenia and Georgia,which both in turn claim sections ofAzerbaijan. .

The interests of Russia, Turkey andIran can be seen clearly in recent devel-opments in Azerbaijan. Moscow hasplayed its historical role in curbing thecountry's independence. Soon after its1991 independence, Azerbaijan joinedthe CIS, but in 1992 nationalist Presi-

10 THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1994

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dent Albufaz Elchibey pulled the countryout of the alliance. This year, a violentmilitary revolt ousted Elchibey, ostensi-bly due to the defeats he presided over inKarabakh. The parliament then restoredto power the pre-independence Commu-nist Party chief Heydar Aliyev, who re-.joined the CIS. (Turkey and the US con-tinue to recognize Elchibey as Azerbai-jani president.) Aliyev is from Naxc;ivan(formerly Nakhichevan), an enclave ofAzerbaijan.

Turkish leaders have often threatenedto militarily support Azerbaijan in itswar with Armenians. Turkey shares atwo-mile border with Naxc;ivan, whichis separated from the rest of Azerbaijanby a strip of southern Armenia. (Azerbai-jan wants this strip as a corridor toNaxc;ivan,while Armeniaclaimsmuch

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of Naxc;ivan.)The boundary with Naxc;ivan is the

sole territorial link that Turkey has withthe five new ethnic Turkic states of theex-USSR - Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki-

.stan. Adherents ofpan-Turkism (the ide-ology that all Turkic peoples should beunited) would like a stronger link be-tween Turkey and its new "sphere ofinfluence." (This fact partly explains theferocityofTurkish armyattacks onKurd-ish separatists in southeastern Turkey,who want to create an independent statethat would cut Turkey off entirely fromAzerbaijan.) With the fall of Karabakhand Armenian occupation of new Azeriterritories, Turkish troops are poisedalong the frontier to protect Naxc;ivan.Inthe October 14New York Times, a Turk-

ish official denounced "a grand Russiandesign, a hidden hand in the Caucasus."

To make matters more complicated,Naxc;ivan has historically been part ofPersia, joining Russia only in 1828.Though Azeris are fellow Shiites, Iran isno friend of Azeri nationalism. Most ofNorthwestern Iran, in the region aroundTabriz, is inhabited by ethnic Azeris. Itwasoccupiedby SoviettroopsafterWorld'War II, who withdrew only after Presi-dent Truman issued a nuclear threat.Iranian leaders fear that the example ofan independent Azerbaijan could leadtorebellion among Iranian Azeris and thecreationofa "Greater Azerbaijan"(whichwould also create a larger Azeri borderwith Turkey). While Tehran angeredmany Azeris by maintaining neutralitythroughout much of the Karabakh war, it

THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY.FEBRUARY1994 11

has recently moved Iranian troops intoAzerbaijan to set up refugee camps forAzerisfleeing Armenianadvances. Whilea humanitarian .gesture, the move alsoprevents thousands of nationalist refu-gees from entering Iranian Azerbaijan.At least 30,000 refugees have alreadycrossed the border fleeing Armenianforces, who have been burning villageswithin sight of Iran. .

The rivalry between Turkey and Iranover influence in the e.x-SovietMuslimstates has pitted secularism against Is-lamic fundamentalism, the Roman al-phabet against the Arabic alphabet, andpro-US Turkish policies against (untilrecently) anti-US Iranian policies. Iranhas lost the political battle for influencein Azerbaijan to Turkey, and more re-cently to Russia. But the potential still

remains for the rivalry between Turkey.and Iran to grow violent where they mostfeel their security is' at stake. Here, theethnic crises in the ex-USSR have a realdanger of spilling outside the formerSoviet frontier.

. Thereis alsoa distinctpossibilityofadirect United Nations military role in thecontext of a peace settlement - involve-ment that given recent trends could in-volve US forces. In March 1992, thenSecretary of State James Baker raised thepossibility of a NATO military role in theKarabakh crisis. There are a number ofUS bases nearby in the Kurdish region ofsoutheasternTurkey. .

SOUTHERN RUSSIARussia itself sees the Caucasus as

amongits mostvulnerableflanks,where

PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPSWORKING ON THI; CAUCASUS

Amnesty International (Moscow) Con- SEII .5HT,;Conta<;t:J~.!1athanCohen T~I~tact: Tanya SmlthTel. 7-095-291-29o.t <4<4~071...793-8383(Fax: 793-7975)1, Longtimehuman rights trackingin.the Conflict resolution training in

region.Py~tigors~~~bar~in-~I~ia,~nd else!· ~~~~~'

JArmenia-Azerbaijan Initiative (Stanford. .. . .",CA) Co~t3:F~:.Steve,Kadivar.J:el. .. t?- 1j.Memogai~t1o~ow) TeI.7+99~~.923-4~J.32S~7756 (Fax: 32S-7785) .. (fax: 973..209..) .......

"Buildinga Common Future" media- Human rights monitor:ing. I

~Ionproiect. '.. '" ." w .JI-'~?; Nonviolence~nternationaJ;282 Fllow ~i.~Caucasian Institute for Peace. Democ- Norwalk,..CT..06850. Contact:'Andreliacyand Devel~pment (Tbiljsi)f7ax:8832- yKamen$bikovT el" 20J-866-'1s:4. ...;1....1950-855 .Obse rvingconflictsinAbkbazia,NortH,"

.

No.

~gov~r:nmentalan.

d. nonpartisan OS$etia.lngus?~~tla, elsewhere. ~instit;uteln .Georgian capital. d l1 tJ Pax Christi' International. Oude

iHelsln'9 Ci~izen$ Ass~mbly,Panska?,G~Tar~ 2.'1'1OOO..£ku.~sels,Bel~~m~;prague+', Czech Republic. Contact Radha T et 322..502..5550 (Fax:S02--462~) '. I

Kumar,Tel. <422-220ISI(Fax:2209"8) Human rights fact-findinginCaucasus.-WinnersofOlofPalmePeacePrizeIn; 0 . i

conlund:ionwith Karabakh peace work. . Quaker Peace' andServlce,Fri~ridsHouse. EustonRd.. London NWI ~BJ.Con.tact: Alan~.leydeIiTe.l,..tf-07J-3~7-i360I (Fax:38S: 1977).Also:AkademikanKroleva..d9/2,Kv.2"3, 129515,Moscow,Russia...TeI.7~09S.;282..73"2. ~.

<'"'... ' , ,-<

, Work on Karabakhcrisis;Bridgebuild-

Ing in N~rth Ossetla and Karach~YiCherkessla. .. !!

~e;lslnki Wat<;.h (Moscow) Contac~:Rachel DanberT el. 7-095-241-0369

Human rights contacts in region.>.

Institute of Ethnologyand Anthropology(Moscow) Contact: Valery Tishkov Tel.7-09~-938- IH7 (Fax: 938-0600)

Part of RussianAcademy of Sciences;works with Bruce Allyn In Boston (F~~17-354-8467).

International Alert. I Glyn St., London

,StanleyFoundation (Muscatine, IA)Con-.tact: Dan Clark Tel. 319-263,.;3021

. Recently hosted conference on the'Caucasus. .

ethnic secession could start a virtual re-peat of the Soviet breakup. Mostly Mus-lim autonomous republics -~th a totalof about 20 ethnic groups- formthesouthern border of the newRussia, in thearea known as the North Caucasus. Manyof these mountain peoples fi,ercely re-sisted the imposition of Russian rule inthe 18th and 19th centuries, taking in-spiration from the Chechen Sufi leaderSheikh Mansur (1732-94). In World WarII, after German invaders lost the war forthe oil-rich region, Stalin accuSedsomeof the ethnic groups of collaboration. Heexiledmany- the Chechen,Ingush,Balkars, Karachay, and Kalmyks - toCentral Asia, thoughtheyhad their home-lands restored after his death.

When Russia replaced the SovietUnion in 1991, some of the autonomous !republics saw an opportunity for sover- I

· eignty. In March 1992.President YeItsin lsigned the Federation Treaty. with 20ethnic republics, promising them more

~. autonomy. In southern Russia, the treaty ,was signed by. Adygea, Karachay- +Cherkessia,Kabardino-Balkaria,North IOssetia, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and tKalmykia. The oI)ly two of the twenty- .two republics that refused to sign wererich in oil - Tatarstan (in central Rus-sia), and Chechnia (in the Caucasus).'

In November 1991, the republic ofChecheno-Ingushetia had seceded fromRussia. When YeItsin sent Russian com-mandos to the republic's capital ofGrozny, they were surrounded at theairport and YeItsin backed down. WhenChechen general JokharDudaevdeclaredindependence, however, it was not nec-essarilya universallypopularmove. First,like elsewhere in Russia, the assertion ofautonomy has been carried out largelybyregional leaders in order to preserve theprivileges they enjoyed in the Sovietera.Sovereignty has not always been used topass power to an oppressed minority, butironically to keep power in the hands ofa minority elite, or eveI}a local Russianelite. (One ofYeltsin ' s mainchallengersin the Moscow October revolt, RuslanKhasbulatov, isan ethnic Chechen.) Sec-ond, the Ingush did not want indepen-dence without first reclaiming territoriesin North Ossetia, and 'seceded from thesecessionists' to form Ingushetia. Third,serious power struggles have split eventhe Chechen leadership.

The Confederation of MountainPeoples(CMP)wants to unite the region'sautonomous republics in an independentNorth Caucasian Fed~ration.CMP fight-

. I

12 THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1994

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ers aided Abkhazian forcesagainst Geor-gia, and have been active in defendingChechnia from Russian forces. Ironi-cally, if Russian soldiers have aided tlieAbkhazians in Georgia, they could findtheir strategybackfIreas Caucasian fight-ers fight for secession from Russia. Mos-cow has mediated Georgian- ~Abkhazian talks, partly out of fear thatsession could spread into Russia~r the.North Caucuses) One ofthe reasonsMos-cow did not meet Georgia's request to

, sealAbkhazia's borderwithRussiawasthat it feared creating instability amongthe mountain peoples who have alwaysfreely crossed the region's borders. Butthe Russians have little to worry about.The dream of a united North Caucasushas been severely tested by infIghtingamong the ethnic republics. Over 500were killed in late 1992as ethnic Ingushfought NOI1hOssetia over the disputedterritory ofPrigorodny, creating an exo-dus of 60,000 refugees. '

NO SOLUTIONS IN SIGHTFacing pressure from Russian na-

tionalists, Yeltsin may not back downfromhis nextskirmishwithsecessionistforces, or with any ex-Soviet states.

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Soon after the October putsch failed,police used Yeltsin' s state of emergencyto evict thousands of Azeri and Chechensmall merchants from Moscow. Non-violence International's. Kamenshikovsays that "what happens in Moscowaffects the regions, but what happens inthe regional conflict zones also directlyimpacts what happens in Moscow."While saying that the military does notwant a full-blown Caucasian war,Kamenshikov says that "Yeltsin nowdepends on the military more than the.military depends on him. The regionswere frightened byYeltsin's use offorceand may be more willing to cooperate,but he s,hould expect more silent resis-tance and sabotage." ,

Whether in.Georgia, Armenia, Az-erbaijan, or southern Russia, the newethnic and political conflicts are clearlyrelated. New leaders use violent ethnicstrife to divert their own citizens' at-tention from worsening economic con-ditions. Foreign regional powersjockeyfor position, using local military forcesas easily as they dispose of them. Otherforeign powers, such as the UnitedStates, turn a blind eye to abuses ofhuman and sovereign rights as they

I'

covet the strategic position and resourcesof the Caucasus. Like elseWherein the

, former Soviet bloc, economic 'shocktherapy'.~nsures repayment of foreign.bank loans more than it serves to im-prove living standards. .Kainenshikovsays that he ,does not see "too manypositive signs," whether in solving cur-rent conflicts or in defusing "time bombsready to explode."

The position of ,the US will mostlikely be to back its NATO ally Turkeyagainst Iran"back the Georgian.govern-ment, use'the Karabakh crisis to extractconcessions from Armenia and oil fromAzerbaijan, and to support Yeltsin'scrackdowns to preserve Russia's 'terri-torial integrity. ' In other wor4s, the self-determination ofpeopleswhohavefoughtfor centuries against foreign rule will bedeemed as less critical than regional"stability." The only real solution is forthe ex-Soviet countries to turn into genu~ine confederations, with equal sovereignrights for each nationality. The blockingof the inevitable drive toward sovereigntywill ensure that the present regional powerplays degenerate into an ethnic free-for-all. In fact, that may be what has alreadyhappened. .

The sister of a 27-year-old soldier killed in the ongoing conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia is comforted duringfuneral serivices.Photo~1993 by Jason Eskenazi, Impact Visuals.

THE NONVIOLENT ACTIVIST/JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1990413