War games and national security with a grain of SALT

7/29/2019 War games and national security with a grain of SALT

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G A R R Y . B R E W E Rn d B R U C E . B L A I R

a . . . t h i s en t i r e s c i ence o j l ong -range tnciss ive ciestruction-of CUI-culcitcd cidvcintcige or disadvcintcigei n t n 2 ~ c l e r nveeipori r y -h a s g o t t e nserioirsly out of hcind; . . . the vari-cibles it involv es [ire rapidly gro wingbeyond the power of ei ther hutnantn ind or compu ter . -Geor ge K en -ncin (December 1977)It is difficult to de term ine how muchinfluence models, simulations andgam es exe r t on defense programsand Toreign policy. Clearly, how-ever, their impact is substantial andgrowing, to the chagrin of Kennanand others who not only doubt theefficz.cy of quantitative analysis toinform decision-making and sharp endebaie, but also fear that analyticrigor may become a substi tute forsound judgment and comm on sense.Because of its rigor and applica-bility to a variety of scientific pur-suits, quanti tat ive methodology en-joys a certain prestige in defense cir-cles. Yet most defense studies thatre ly heavi ly on mathemat ica l andstatistical techniques are vulnerableon at. least two counts :Dai:a inputs have obscure, un-known, or unknowable empirica lfoundations, and t h e relevance ofmuch data , even if valid, to the ef-fecti ,(eness of weapon systems isunkr own [11.The models, and the behavioral as-sumptions and proposit ions onwhich they are based, are not oftenreliable, and are usually not vali-dated at al l [2].Consequently, many analyses con-ceal spurious conten t behind protec-t i v e l a y e r s o f m a t h e m a t i c s a n dstati:jtics.D e s p i t e t h e h i g h p o t e n t i a lcostis-in mis place d em ph as is, un-wauanted confidence, and unwise

res our ce allocation-that may be in-curred, technical analyses are usedincreasingly for advocacy . In a 1977speech at Mississippi State Univer-si ty, Secretary of Defense HaroldBrown outl ined the dangers of ex-pert advocacy: I f , in the guise of analysis and ex-position, [an expert] becomes an ad-vocate for a part icular decision, hesometimes may h ave the satisfactionof getting his own way, but only bysubstitut ing his own judgment forthat of people who have the respon-sibility for decisions and who mightweigh values differently if given allthe facts, and who se judgment maybe better.More recently, in a speech at theNaval War College, Navy SecretaryG r a h a m C l a y t o r c o m p l a i n e d t h a tO ne of the m ost frustrat ing things Ihave encoun te red in t h i s j o b hasbeen a tendency on the p art of somestaff people to use systems analysisa s a cover for what is really subjec-t ive judgment [3]. As examples ofsuch m isuse, consider the followinga l l ega t ions f rom a recen t p ro fes -sional military publication:The Air Force rigged a model ofSoviet air defenses to favor the B-1bomber and suppressed several in-dependent studies demonstrat ingthat a new bomber did not needsupersonic speed.The Navys Sea P lan 2000, a com-prehensive in-house study of futurenaval requiremen ts, lacks analyticsubstantiat ion and is probably asblatant a political ploy and lobbyingeffort as any s tudy in recent mem-ory . The Navy has released only theconclusions of i ts studies and nottheir detai ls, exerted t ight censor-

ship and suppressed dissent , andwithheld potentially disruptives tudies from i ts own Navy Sec-retaries while they were reworkedand edited to ensure that theyreached the proper conclusions 4] .Given the a t tent ion wi th whichdefense analysts pronouncements

are received, the t ime has co me for acri tical look at ou r growing rel ianceo n c o m p u t e r - b a s e d a n d h i g h lya b s t r a c t t e c h n i q u e s t o d i s c o v e rfacts about war and the mili taryb a l a n ce . T o t h is e n d , w e s h a lle x a m i n e h i s t o r i c a l e v i d e n c e o fa n a l y s i s m i s u s e a n d i t s c o n s e -quen ces; briefly ap praise the generalquali ty of studies sponsored or con-ducted by the Department of De-fense; and assess strategic analysis.This assessment wil l be i l lustratedby a c r i t i que of t h e w e l l - k n o w ns t ra t eg i c war m ode l advanced byPaul Nitze, an exercise undertakenbecause i t exempl i f ies the genera lproblem of analysjs}being used forbo th rhe to r i ca l and po l i t i ca l pu r -poses.

It is admittedly dangerous to relyon historical analogies, but relatedp a s t e v e n t s m u s t a t l e a s t b eexamined, since failure to learn fromp a s t m i s t a k e s r i s k s i n c a l c u l a b l ecosts. In a provocative essay, PaulBracken exposes the unintendedconsequences of strategic gamingby the British in analyzing threats ofGerman s t ra tegic a i r a t tack , 1922-by the French in constructingdefenses between the world wars;and by the Russians in preparing fora German assault on their westernborderIn the British case, a small groupof statistical specialists in the AirStaff prepared asse ssm ents of thel i ke ly Germ an s t ra t eg i c t h rea t t o18


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Great Britain. Only their summaryfindings-no documentation-werep r e s e n t e d t o t h e t o p d e c i s i o n -makers, nor .were the findings evers u b j e c t e d t o d e t a i l e d , e x t e r n a le v a l u a t i o n . H i g hl y s e l e c t i v e ,mythical numbers were used inplanning, leading to the constructionof day bombers and the virtual ex-clusion of night bombers, fighters,and other necessary com ponents of atotal defense system. Extrapolationfrom those numbers in f i f th- ands ix th -o rde r s tud i e s gene ra t ed fea rand m istt i st in the public: Lloyds ofLondon refused to issue any kind ofwar insurance; the Home Office de-termined that civil ian losses fromGerman bombing would be greaterthan the country s capacity to buildcoffins, so orders w ere issued for theconstruction of mass grav es; and theHealth Ministry judged it necessaryto print ov er one mill ion extra d eathcertificates [6].Bracken [5 ] ci tes the fo l lowingmistakes and lessons to be learnedfrom the experience:0 No one questioned the assump-

, t ions on which the studies and deci-sions were based; assumptions mustbe questioned constantly.0 N o one reviewed the basic data ;such, a review would have shownthat the numbers had been carefullyselected to support the worst possi-ble case.NO, one exam ined the st i-uctureof the mode ls. gener ated by the AirStaff analysts to d etermine just whatkinds of outputs they were capableof generating; someone should have.Al l theory , data , and methodsused to support politically charged

and cost ly proposals for weaponsmust be subjected to thorough, inde-pendent review.T h e t e c h n i q u e o f s e l e c t i v eomission can be use d to prove nearlyanything.0 One must quest ion pol i t ica lstrategists who use highly quan-titative analyses produced by othersbut do not cut through the detai l to

. u n d e r s t a n d p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h eana lyses i nc lude and om i t , wha ttheir limitations are, and where the

basic data came from.The F rench case points up anotherlesson. After the strategic decisionwas m ade to build the M aginot Line,most analyses focused on the techni-cal details of that fortification sys-tem. Calculations of range, thicknessof concrete, firing angle qnd the likebecame .a substi tute for more com-preh ensive thought, and an ane sthe-t ic for decision-makers who refusedto confront the real problems posedby a mobile, flexible enemy. Thoseanalyses diverted attention from thereal problems facing French militarys t r a t e g i s t s . T h e l e s s o n is t h a tanalyses can be used to keep certainf a c t s a n d c o n t i n g e n c i e s fr o mscrut iny .The Soviets learned the same les-son the hard way in their prepara-t ions for World War 11. During the1930s a s e r i e s o f r e m a r k a b l estrategic games was conducted thatmight have afforded insight into thec o m i n g c o n f l i c t . H o w e v e r , a n ygaming that deviated even sl ightlyfrom Stalins strategic doctrine wasquickly suppressed. In fact , bri l-l i a n t S o v i e t g e n e r a l w a s p u r g e dp a r tl y f o r h i s h e t e r o d o x w a y , o fplaying the gam es [7]. In t ime, otherSoviet military thinkers learned thatit was personally hazardous to dis-pute the basic strategic assumptions,no matter how fatal they see med, sodissent ended and the gam es, wereincreasingly played by foreordainedrules Incidentally, the Japanesef e l l p r e y t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s e l f -delusion in their prewar gaming ofthe Pearl Harbor at tack [9] and theBattle of Midway [ l o ] .The skeptical reader may be in -clined to dismiss these hoary illus-trat ions by assert ing that the lessonshave indeed been learned and thattodays analyses are t ruly scientific.Current practice, we arg ue, does notwarrant such confidence.Although we do not at tempt a fullappraisal of the qrrnlity of defensestudies here, several key findings ofa recent survey and assessment arerelevant [ l , pp. 7-11].Militaty ancrly.ws are ojten k df o r a d v o c a cy . Most military models,

simulations, and gam es are producedby in-house analytic staffs and arenot ,wel l documented . If model buil-ders do not question the environ-m en t se t by t hose so l i c i t i ng t hew o r k , t h e y m ay b e p e r p e t u a ti n gerror in their models, for practicallyany point of view can be supportedby seiecting appropriate guessti-m a t e s a b o u t t h e e n v i r o n m e n tstudied [113 .Modeling is one-sicled. Competinggroups of experts hardly coinmuni-cate , and countervail ing technicalexpertise is seldom called upon tostrengthen a technical analysis byplaying devils advocate.Qual i t y con t r o l i s v i r tucr l l ynonexis ten t . ,Mo st work is not sub-jected to thorough, independent re-view. If documentation is providedat all, it is of highly uneven quality orcomprehensib le only to the modelbuilders. Standards of scientific vali-dation .are similarly lacking. In fact ,the rubric Validation is a happycustom er appea rs to be as typical acri terion as any [12].I n s l i f j c i e n t b a s i c r e s e a r c h h a sd o n e on top ics thcr t shouldroutinely be treated in militarye l s . D a t a v a l i d a t i o n , s e n s i t i v i t yanalysis, and othe r technical tests ofmodel validation ar e not don e, nor isthere much evidence of interest indoing them. The existing basic re-search on softer topics, such aspanic behavior, threat and confron-tat ion, and other aspects of humanb e h a v i o r a n d m o t i v a t io n i s in -adequate as a base for constructing,testing and using these models. In -stea d, the emphasis is on m echanis-tic, engineering-like weapon studiesthat omi t far more of importancethan they treat .The tenuousness of much of theda ta, ttie un deve loped, state of valizdation and the neglect of such im -por t an t p rocedures a s sens i t i v i t yanalysis, and scrutiny of the w ork fo rits relevance to realistic conditionslead to the conclusion that advocacyrather than sc ient i f ic inqui ry i s aprime motive.Perhaps senior officials responsi-ble for the billions of dollars wo rth of1979 19


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Garry D. Brewer is professor of organization and management andpolitical science at Yale University. He is th e former editor of& (1977-1979), and th e author of(1 973) and co-author of

of (1979).war-fighting machinery. and m anymillions of lives cannot be expectedto care too much about technicalmatters. The l ink between those whobuild m odels and those who eve ntu-ally use their result; is tenuous atb e s t . E v e n t h e m o r e t e c h n i c a l l ysophisticated genera! or high civilservant has little time to learn thefine points of strategic analyses. T heproblem of communication betweenanalytic staff and policy-maker isfurther compl icated ,by desi res . tokeep the boss happy and no t t oopen u p a can of worms, desireswhich ensure that the few chunks ofinformat ion presented to .a senioroffici.4 are car efu ll i selected andpredigested [13]. the results of a nanalysis move into the stratosphereo f ,comm and and d ecision ,. througtisuccessive layers of iritermediates,the message-whether from a quicka n d d i r t y m o d e l o r a c o m p e t e n tone-tends to becom e.mo re conciseand less equivocal . Only so .muchpredigest ion can occur before a l lnu.tri tive content has been extracted .Our ca lcula t ions are remarkablyprecise in matters in which we havehad IO exper i ence , .such as nuclearwar, and remarkably guarded andqualilied in matters I brimming withaccumulated data, such as conven-tional war. The at t i tude of strategiccalculators in the last decade has re-sembled that of the freshman algebrastudent who tailors ,his problems tothe few tools at his disposal and pre-sumes that problems are therebysolved. In both cases the wisdom isdubicus.T h e p r e c i s e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o fstratcgic pari ty, for example, pre-sents a difficult technical problemb e c a u s e m o d e r n s t r a t e g ic f o r c e shave quite different environmental,t e c h : ~ o l o g i c a l , n s t it u ti o n al a n dhuman constraints. The analyst re-sorts quickly-almost autom atical-ly-to the use of highly aggregatedand 2bstract indices; however, theexpression quanti tat ive methodol-ogy i s fundamental ly m isleadingbecause the requis i te quant i ta t ivefoundation is simply lacking or ish i g h l y u n c e r t a i n , s e l e c t i v e o r20

judgmental [13, 141.During the A B M debate a decadeago , bo th c r i t i c s and p roponen t sv i ewed the ro l e o f quan t i t a t i vemethods in the proper perspective:They did not argue about technicalfacts, sin ce in this comp lex are a weare dealing at most with technicaljudg .m en t s , and m ore o f t en w i thpolitical opinion [15]. The debatewas intelligent.A focal issue in the debate aboutS A L T has been the vulnerability ofA m e r i c a s f o r c e o f l a n d - b a s e dMinuteman missiles. That vulnera-b i l i t y , once p ro j ec t ed , becam e apolitical fac t; it may become techni-cal reality as well. But it is impossi-ble to determine the true picture,given the many conflict ing assess-ments. The strong. policy assert ionsmade without qualification and onthe basis of closely guarded data,and the claims of validity for projec-tions five, ten, and more years in thefuture, leave little doubt that we areagain dealing at most with technicalj u d g m e n t s a n d m o r e o f t e n w i t hemotions and political opinion.There are as many se ts : fac tsthere are advocates. Early in i977the Joint Chiefs of Staff set the up-w a r d s a f e l i m i t fo r Minu te rnansurvivabi li ty-an analy t ica l ly de-termined threshold-a t 55 0 l and -based and MIRVed Soviet missiles. InMarch o f t ha t y ea r a , cons t ra in tl imi t ing each s ide to 550 MIRVedwas proposed as part of Presi-dent Carters comprehensive SALTplan. After the Soviets rejected thisproposal , the United States agreedto a higher ceiling of 820 such mis-s i l e s . Pau l N i t ze ca l cu l a t ed t ha tu n d e r t h e p r o p o s e d c e i l i n g t t i eSoviet Union couid destroy 90 per-cent of the Minuteman force usingless than half of its own warheads,whi le the Uni ted S ta tes c ould , notpose a comparable ihreat by 1985[16, p . 131. Appearing before the Se-nate Commit tee on Foreign Rela-t i o n s , S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e C y r u sVance offered to submit a completecounter analysis to Nitzes asser-tion [16]. The latest Pentagon posi-tion is that Minutema n could beco me

vulnerable by the early to middlewi th o r w i thou t SALT I iagreement [17, p. 1061. study, re-ported in the Washington .Post ofD e c e m b e r 9 , 1977 , d e m o n s t r a t e st h d t Minuteman could have becomevulnerable even if the March 1977proposal had been accepted . Finally,the Secre tary of Defense doub ts thatthe projected vulnerability of bothU.S. and Sovie t s i lo-based I C B M Scan be reversed by negotiated ac-cords [17, p. 1061.Mpst analysts agree that the tech-nical trend runs against silo-basedforees , but many differ o n the prob-able timing and de gree of vulnerabil-i ty . Important policy choices, for in-stance the ratification of SALT anddecis ions on the development anddeployment of new land-, air-, andsea-based systems, turn on such de-tai ls. Regrettably, advocacy seemsto have prevented the developmentof a clear statement of the problemsand their possible solutions.For the more abstract , ambitious,and uncertain task of projecting theoutcome of a nuclear war involvingthe full contingent of strategic forceson both sides, advocacys perniciouseffects become even more apparent.Not only do the analyses becomemore simplified, but the issues theyconsider appear to be fewer, under-standab le, and resolvable. Paradoxi-c a l l y , h o w e v e r , t h e c o n c l u s i o n sr e a c h e d b y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s tgroups-including at tendan t policyprescriptions-also become sharplypolarized and contradictory.One conclusion , summarized byDefense Secretary Brown in th e D e -1979, relies on the results ofan assessment of the strategic bal-ance after a Soviet counterforce at-tack to which the United States re-tal iates ,with a counterforce strike.F o r t h e p . e r i o d a n a l y z e d , 1978through 1987, and for all scenariosconside red, the post-at tack advan-tage lies with the United States [17,p. 1041.Nitze reaches the opposi te con-clusion [18]. The United States fel lbehind strategically in 1973 and has


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Bruce G . Blair, a former Minuteman launch control officerand former Brookings Institution Research iscurrently completing a doctoral dissertation a t Yale.

s i n c e g r o w n w e a k e r . I n f e r r i n g aSoviet grab for nuclear w ar-winningsuperiori ty, his strategic war modeland ana lys i s dep i c t a rapid ly de-teriorating si tuation:B y 1977, fter a Soviet-initiatedcounterforce strike against the Uni-ted State s to which the United Statesresponded with a counterforcestrike, the Soviet Union would haveremaining forces sufficient to de-s t roy Chinese and Europeannuclear capabil i ty, at tack U.S.population and conventional mili tarytargets, and st il l have a remainingthrow-weight in excess of that of theUnited States [18, . 2261.The claim is as mysterious as it isprovocative. The author hardly in -f o r m $ t h e r e a d e r a b o u t w h a t h issimulations include, what they om it ,or even what they mean. We mustturn to other writ ings and analyseson which Nitze relies [19].But be-fore doing so, it is important to pointout that the official and contradic-tory conclusion is probably as ques-t i onab le a s N i t ze s . In s i t ua t i onsd o m i n a t e d b y g r a v e u n c e r t a i n t y ,h i g h s t a k e s a n d s t r o n g e m o t i o n ,r e a s o n e d d i s c o u r s e a n d c l e a rthought a re often the first casualt ies.basic Nitze positsthree ways in which throw-weight,or any other me asure, can be used asan index of relative strategic capa-bility [20, p. 198-991:0 that which each side has beforea s t r ike;0 t ha t su rv iv ing to t he Un i t edS ta t e s and tha t rem a in ing to t heSoviet side after an initial counter-force strike by the Soviets; and0 that remaining to each side afteran exchange in which the Sovietsattack U.S. forces and the UnitedStates responds by reducing Sovietreserv e forces to the greatest extent .Nitze bases his computations onthe third method, believing that itclearly reveals the stability or po -tential instability of the strategic ba-lance between the United S tates andthe Soviet Union. The relevance ofp o s t - e x c h a n g e r e s i d u a l s c a n b esummarized as follows: [Ilf each

limited exchange placed the UnitedStates in a progressively weaker re-l a t i ve pos i t i on , [ t hen the Un i t edStates] would concede to the SovietUnion the potential for military vic-tory [18, . 2271.Does the United Statesn e e d s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s f o rt e r c e -e i m i n a t on of mi 1 t a r ytargets in the Soviet Union , includingits strategic offensive force s-o r for-of the indus-trial capacity and m uch of the civilianpopulation of the Soviet Union-orfor both? The question is partiallyanswered by the fac t t ha t ac tua lstrategic war plans have always in-cluded war-fighting and counterforcetargeting as prominent features [21,p. 5541.But the question deserves tobe raised anew. In oneart icle, as we have seen, Nitze con-tended that U.S. superiority beganto be reve rsed in 1973, with theSoviets gaining the military capabil-ity to end an exchange with an ad-vantage in their favor [18, . 2261.By 1977 he si tuation looked grave.He supported that conclusion usingt h r o w - w e i g h t c o m p u t a t i o n s . I nanother art icle, Nitze claimed thatother indices, including warheads,p roduced rough ly s im i l a r a f t e r -exchange results [22, t. 1, p. 8201.Yet in a third article he shows theUnited States holding post-exchangewarhead advan tage in eve ry yea rfrom 1973 hrough 1978, nd projectsparity in 1979 [20, . 2031.If warheads are given the weightthat some defense experts bel ievethey deserve [23],Nitzes own logicsupports a contrary explanation ofSoviet in tent ions: Sovie t deploy-ments to date have been aimed at

d im in i sh ing U .S . supe r io r i t y ( innumber of warheads) , not a t con-so l ida t ing or e x t e n d i n g S o v i e tsuperiori ty. Regardless oft h e i n d e x s e l e c t e d , r e s u l t s o fanalysis based on the third methoddepe nd on the intermediate results ofthe second method. In two art icles,o n e in

[24] nd one inPolicy [20, . 2021, Nitze providessuch results, calculating the forcesr e m a i n i n g o n b o t h s i d e s a f t e r aSovie t a t tack but before counter-fo rce re t a l i a t i on by the Un i t edStates. The calculations in each arti-cle should be identical for the year1976. Jn later years the data are notcomparable be cause of different as-sumpt ions about const ra in tsand procurem ent decisions.) In fact ,they differ markedly (see table). Theresults of the third method are t husdemonstrably unreliable.

Nstrategy. L et us consider the resultsof Nitzes analysis for a future year,specifically 1984. or that year N itzeshows tha t a Sov ie t coun te r fo rceattack leaves the Soviets with a 4:3advantage in the number of remain-i n g w a r h e a d s . A f t e r t h e U n i t e dStates strikes back against Sovietstrategic weapons held in reserve ,t h e S o v i e t a d v a n t a g e g r o w s t o3.5:l.O [20, p. 202-31. t can be de-d u c e d t h a t t h o u s a n d s o f U . S .warheads destroy the equivalent of

Ni tze conveys an erroneous im -pression of the effectiveness of theU.S. bomber force, which accountsf o r o v e r 50 p e r c e n t o f &he o ta lmegatonnage avai lable in the na-t ions strategic force [25, t. 1 1 , pp.

60 o 150 Soviet MIRVed

ofStrategicNuclearEquivalent DeliveryThrow-weight Megatons Weapons Warheads Vehicles

2.0: 1 o 4.0: 1 O 1.5:l.O 1.0:2.3 1.3:l.OForeignPolicy 3.5:l.O 12.0: 1.0 1.9:l.O 1.0

June 1979 The Bulletin 21


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...6046, 61631. In the analysis , U.S .alert bombers are used in strikingS o v i e t c o u n t e r f o r c e t a r g et s a n d[constitute] a significant componentof the effectiveness of that at tack[22, p. 8211. Actually, Nitze makesnumerous l imiting assumptions thatminimize the role and effectivenesso f b o m b e r s ; t h e s e m a y b e s u m -marized: Soviet are assumedto be too heavily defended for U.S.bombers to at tack them withor gravi ty bombs. These weaponsa re t he re fo re t a rge t ed aga ins t alarge number of runways from whicha Backfire [bomber] can reach U.S .targets (recovering in Cuba). Thetargeted runways are assum ed to beunoccupied a t the moment of de-s t rucl ion . When the runways arestruck, the majori ty (60 percent) ofthe Backfire bombers ar e assumed tobe on airborne alert . The remainder(40 percent) had already been de-s t r o y e d b y U.S. a n d / o r

B o m b e r p e n e t r a t i o n r a t e s d e -crease: each year [19, pp. 147-511.Today B-52 strategic bombers areintended for use against a variety of

Soviet targets , including silos[21, pt. 5, p. 30271. Nit ze s exclusionof t ha t u se on t h e g r o u n d s t h a tSovie t terminal defenses-mainlysu rface-to-ai r mis si les (s s)-precliide bomber attack ignores thevulnerability of the defenses them-selves;. sites are vulnerable tod e f e n s e s u p p r e s s i o n b yor (short-range at tackm i s s i l e s ) , c l e a r i n g t h e w a y f o rb o m b e r s t o u s e g r a v i t y b o m b sagainst silos. Gra vity bombsare generally thought to be very ef-fective against hard targets [26]. Al-though a new Soviet is beingdeveoped [17, p . 511, to t lay theSovi t have no effect ive defenseaga ind a at tack [21, pt . 11 , p .61111, much less against o rsuppressors .T h e m o d e l a l l o c a t e s a l l U . S .and gravity bombs (no bomb-ers ale held in reserve) to runwaysvoid D f Soviet aircraft, in order tod e s t r o y t h e g ro u n d s u p p o r t o f a22

weapon system that carries a smallpayload and has a minor interconti-n e n t a l s t r a t e g i c c a p a b i l i t y . T h eweapon system in question is theSoviet Backfire bomber. Althoughthe strategic role of the Backfire isstill disputed, it is being delivered tothe Soviet Navy and Air Force inroughly equal numbers, and i t ap-pears designed for dse in peripheralat tack, theater, and naval missions.The strategic role of the B ackfire andthe massive bomber assault againstits logistic support should have beenmade explicit in the analysis.Another l imi t ing assumpt ion i sconcealed in the statem eht tHat m ostof the Backfire is eliminated after thebomber assault on Soviet runways[19, p. 1511. Since 40 percent of thebomber force is assumed already de-stroyed in the at tack , thebombers implied contribution couldbe negligible.Not concealed is the limiting as-s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e U . S . b o m b e rpenetrat ion rate decreases annually.However, neither the base rate northe rate of decrease is specified. Theassum ed base ra t e shou ld endowU.S. bombers wi th an impressivepenetrat ion capabil i ty because theSoviet Union lacks an interceptorsystem that would e nable fighter air-craft to detect and destroy low-flyingU . S . bombers [27, 281, and currentS o v i e t ( S A - 1 , S A - 2 , S A - 3 ,SA-4, SA-5) at fixed locations caneasily be avaidtd [29, p. 1191. Fur-thermore, the assumed rate of de-crease could not be very large. Al-t h o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t o f a t r u elook-down, shoot-down capabil-i ty fo r fighters is expec ted [17, p. 151,the achievem ent of an effective, op-erational defensive capabil i ty is alodg way off. Although the da ta usedin the analysis are claimed to be rep-resentative of those i n penetrat ionstudies [19, p. 1491, one major s tudy ,at least, has concluded that throughthe late 1980s the Sovie ts can deployno s igni f icant a i r defense againstpenetrating bom bers [16, p. 301.

0 While air-launched cruise mis-si les are considered in th eanaly sis, the results of the simulation

indicate tha t they d o not inflict heavylosses on Soviet forces . Th emodel, by unstated assumption, ap-pears to defy the Defense Depart-ment claim that with surviving alertbombers armed with the Un-ited States would have a very sub-s t an t i a l capab i l i t y t o des t roy re -maining Soviet silos [17, p. 631.

0 At, any one t ime, the Sovie tsno rm a l ly have th ree S S B N S ( s u b -marines carrying ballistic missiles)patrolling the Atlantic and one pa-trolling the Pacific [30], while about85 percent of the i r force i s port -bound [31, pt . 1 , pp. 423-241. With sofew Soviet S S B N S deployed off U.S.coas ts , very h igh percentage ofalert bombers should survive a sud-den (submarine-launched bal-listic missile) attack [25, pt. 5 ,30291. To thre aten seriously the alertb o m b e r f o r c e in p e a c e t i m e , t h eSovie ts would ha ve to keep on patrolm any m or t S S B N S than at present. Itcould take months to place as manyas 20 S S B N S (33 percent of the fleet)o n p a t r o i w i t h i n r a n g e o f U . S .bomber bases [29, p. 1181. If insteadof a gradual peac etime buildup theSoviets chose to surge their sub-marines, it would take days to posi-tion them within firing range for ashort-warning a t tack .In response to ei ther readily de-t ec t ab l e deve lopm en t t he Un i t edStates could increase bomber alertrates, disperse aircraft to additionalinland bases , or both [21, pt. p.5551. Given the S S B N alert rate of 80percent assumed in the analysis, andthe l ikely corresponding changes inpatrol patterns, it is implausible that30 percent of the alert B-52 forcewould be destroyed or that off-alertbombers would not be put on combata ler t . Yet , again according to theanalysis, no off-alert bombers arebrought to alert , and they are de-stroyed [19, pp . 147, 1501. In reality,the vas t m ajority of all U . S . strategicbom bers wou ld p robab ly su rv ive[25, p t. 5 , 30291. This would rep-r e s e n t a t h r e e f o l d i n c r e a s e o v e rN i t z e s w o r s t - c a s e e s t i m a t e o fbomber survivabil i ty.The Sovie ts have not increased


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. . .their day-to-day S S B N alert rate; theyh a v e n o t d e v e l o p e d a d e p r e s s e d(sho rt time-of-flight) trajec tory[21, p t . 1, p. and they havenever surged their S S B N force , as wedid in th e 1973 Yom K ippur War [21,pt. IO, pp . 6625-261. Another trendfavors the bombers survivalpects. To counter the considerableantisubmarine warfare forcesdeployed by the United States andits allies, the Soviets have deployedlarge ships, at tack submarinesand a i rc ra f t fo r t he p ro t ec t i on o fthei r own S S B N S in areas c lose toSoviet ports, especially Murmansk[32] . N e w l a u n c h e d f r o mthese defended waters have a longtime-of-flight and therefore do notthreaten alert bombers.The d eployment of protectiveforces suggests that the Soviets be-l ieve their own S S B N S ra ther thanU.S. bombers to be the threatenedfo rces . A balanced assessment ofU.S.-Soviet strategic vulnerabilitiesmust take U . S . advantages intoacsount. In the analysis, however,S S B N S are assum ed to survive for anunlimited period [22, p. 8211. Thisassumption agrees with the Depart-ment of Defense judgment that theSoviets have no effective capa-bility pt. 10 , p. but it con-tradicts the Departments judgmentthat the United States has a goodcapability to destroy enemy [SSBNS]in a protracted war at se a [33].

0 Nitzes simulation is structuredso that U.S. bombers 1711rst be usedagainst Soviet strategic reserves. H eassumes tha t , because of a shortageof long runwaysin the United States,the Soviets could destroy the avail-able runways at the cost of verym o d e s t a m o u n t o f t h e i r t h r o w -weight. TheS oviets would thereforegain in net residual advantage if th eUnited States holds bombers in re -se rve , s i nce t hese , l i ke non-a l e r tbombers , are assumed to be subjectto destruction [22, p. 8211.A big loss in net residual advan-tage however, is suffered if bombersare no t held in reserve , s ince ac-cording to the analysis they are usedso ineff ic ient ly . Thus the deck i s

s tacked. Furthermore , though thenumber of long runways in the Uni-ted States is not large, neither is i tsmall, and many of them are locatedwithin large metropolitan areas.at tack against primary bomberbases and complexes could kill20 million civilians [34]. The UnitedStates would suffer an incaleulablenumber of additional casualties if th eS o v i e t s a l s o a t t a c k e d s e c o n d a r yrunways. If the U nited States cannotwithhold any of its bombers becausesecondary runways have been de-stroyed, then it is inappropriate tocharacterize the scenario as coun-.terforce.

Ano the r a ssum pt ion i s equa l lyf a l l a c i o u s . F o l l o w i n g t h e i n i t i a lSoviet at tack, Nitzes analysis hasthe surviving bomber force d irectedsolely against Soviet strategic re-serves . He argues that a counter-f o r c e a t ta c k is b e t t e r t h a n t h ea l t e rn a t i v e -t h e d e v a s t q t i o n o fSoviet cities [22, p. 8221. B ut he failst o c o n s i d e r t h a t i n c o u n t e r f o r c estrategy, targets other than strategicreserve forces have equally high orhigher priority.Ni tze worries about thepolitical leverage that an apparentcounterforce advantage confers. Heexpec ts the Soviets to exploit fullyt he i r s t ra t eg i c advan tage t h roughpoli t ical or l imited [conventional]means [18, 2171. In a crisis, ap-parent nuclear superiori ty wouldbe an important factor in determin-ing who prevailed [18, p. 2161. Theana lys i s se t s fo r th t he fo l l owingscenario:

Continuation of the decline inNorthern Hemisphere mean temper-ature could lead to serious starvationin the Soviet Union. Never in historyhas a militarjly stro ng nation per-mitted itself to starve. To a strongnation facipg starvation, a threat ofpopulation fatalities from nuclearwar could be an incentive rather thana deterrent . More importantly, themost probable scenario would beone of nuclear blackmail to coerceshipment of food, rather than to at-

tack the other sides forces [19, p.1461.The po l i t i ca l scena r io t hus i n -volves nuclear blackmail, backed upby the threat of imminent attack andmade credible by aggressive prep-a r a t i o n s fo r w a r . H o w e v e r , t hemilitary model and results are basedon a nuclear surprise at tack that de-s t roys seve ra l t housand s t ra t eg i cweapons on non-aler t submarinesand bombers; there is only a briefperiod of warning preceding the at-t ack , in which one or two U.S .

S S B N S are moved safely out of port[19, p. 1471. The assumption here ist ha t t he S ov ie t s no t pn ly cou ld .mobilize their strategic forces with-out our aw arenes s, but also thatb lackmai l episode would be overbefore the U nited Statesc ould takesteps to reduce the vulnerability ofits forces. The analysis implies thatan ultimatum is delivered and resol-ved within perhaps three hours-about the length of time it would takefor the first few S S B N S to get safelyout of port , according to a Depart-ment of Defense official interviewedin April 1978. T he t iming seems cal-culated to make the poli t ical andmil i tary scenarios consis tent , b u tthey are not reconcilable. Putt ingcris i s and coerc ion a longside sur-p r i se a t t a c k j u s t d o e s n o t m a k esense .N i t ze s t heo ry o f s t ra t eg i c i n -teraction has nothing to say aboute v e n t s t h a t c o u l d t r a n s f o r m t h estar t ing condi t ions that dr ive themodel and analysis. For exam ple, hedoes not consider the effects of warin Europe on strategic force levels.I n such a war thousands strategicweapqns cou ld be again sttargets i n Europe and surroundingoceans before or during a strategiccounterforce exchange between theUnited States and the Soviet Union

of scierltijic procedure.Nitze bypasses the important sci-en t i f i c p rocedure o f sens i t i v i t yanalysis. The assumptions, such asSoviet targeting doctrine and est i-mates used to assign inp ut-value s to1979 The 23

P51.

~ -~


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a aaa

missile accuracy and reliability, arejudgmental , and many are outrightg u e s s e s . T h e s e l e c t i o n o f g a m estrategies is also largely a matter ofsubjective udgm ent. The question ofw h e t h e r t h e s i n g l e p l a y o f t h emodel--one run for any given indexsuch throw-w eight-is indica-tive of anything more than a uniqueconf luence o f change and chosene v e n t s r e m a i n s u n a n s w e r e d . R e -course to simple indices to describethe aggregate outcomes of thousandsof indiv idual in teract ions g lossesover the neglect of a basic scientifics tep .The threat to Minuteman missi lesis a m a t t e r i n w h i c h s e n s i t i v i t yanalysis is needed for crucial infor-mation. In the hypothetical case of afu ture Sovie t threat consis t ing ofh igh ly acc u r a t e , h igh ly re l i ab l e ,medium-yield even rathermodest sh i f t s in the pert inent as-sumptions are sufficient to changethe apparent advantage from the at-tacker to the defender if a full firststrike on land-based missiles is at-tempted [36].

of posi t ive T hemodel contains an implausible as-sum pt ion abou t con f l i c t m anage-ment: strategic forces on both sidesremair under posit ive com mand andcontrol before, during, and after oneo r m o r e c o u n t e r f o r c e e x c h a n g e s .Such battle manag ement capabilitysimply does not exist .A computer can easi ly be pro-grammed to s imulate one or morec o u n t e r f o r c e e x c h a n g e s . T h edi ff icul ty l ies in coordinat ing thelarge, complex, and human institu-tions tha t would execute a war. Asthe 1970 Report to the President byt h e B l u e R i b b o n D e f e n s e P a n e lfound: Without except ion , everycrisis within the last decade tha t hasinvolved the m ovement of forces has,required both an ad hoc organiza-tional arrangement and ad hoc plan-ning. The panel concludes that th eexis t ing command s t ructure pro-vides little flexibility and a co nside r-able potential for confusion in crisissituations [37].Tod ay, the Office of M anagement24

and B udget echoes the plaint: Se ri-ou s questions persist about the ef-fectiveness of the command struc-t u r e f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f w a r , f o rpeacetime activit ies, and for crisismanagement [38]. There is a la-mentable tendency among strategicexperts to dismiss institutional mat-ters. For instance, former Secretaryof Defense James Schlesinger se tforth some precondit ions for succe ssin carrying out a strategy of flexibler e s p o n s e : M a i n t a i n c o n t i n u e dc o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i th t h e S o v i e tleaders during the war [and] indoc-trinate and plan in anticipation of thedifficulties involved [39]. But theinsti tutional suppo rts for those c on-dit ions were sketchy, superficial lyanalyzed, and subsequently treatedas givens, implying that large andc o m p l e x o r g a n i z a t i o n s c o u l d b emanaged simply during nuclear war.Ni tzes s imulat ion omits humanfrailties and human error in controlsystem s, and they are not taken intoaccount in the later analysis. For realsystems, the slightest mistake couldbe fatal . In the execution phase ofre t a l i a t i on , t he en t ry o f a s ing l ewrong dig i t in to a computer a t aMinuteman launch cen ter could hurlmissiles against S oviet cities insteadof military targets . The S oviets couldmake s imi lar mistakes in a f i rs t -strike at tempt. The cost of such er-rors defies calculation; their possi-bility is seldom even acknowledged.The s imulat ion a lso neglects toc o n s i d e r c o m m a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,identified in a recent Congressionalinquiry as the fore mo st deficiency int h e N a t i o n a l M i l i t a r y C o m m a n dSystem [40]. In 1972, outgoing De-puty Se cre ta ry of Defense DavidPacka rd vo i ced conce rn t ha t t heUnited States might not be able torespond at all to a surprise at tack be-cause of weaknesses in control overstrategic nuclear forces [41]. Tod ay,in a surprise at tack on the commands t r u c t u r e , l a r ge s e g m e n t s o f t h est ra tegic force-even i f modernizedalong the l ines Nitze advocates-could be isolated and in effect in-capacitated. Steinbruner highlightsthe consequences of our fai lure to

treat command problems:There are s t rong reasons to be-l ieve, or better to fear . . . thatrealis tic flexibility-the ava ilabilityunder com bat condit ions of morethan a single plan-is shar ply limitedby the vulnerability of commandchannels, and that the dangers oflosing central command overstrategic operations shortly after theinitiation of even very moderatelevels of warfare are very great in-deed.Given that command considera-t ions have not been fully integratedinto strategic logic and given thelevel of strategic forces which havebeen deployed, the parameters usedheretofore to define stability cannotby themselves give a valid assess-ment ei ther of the stat ic strategicbalance o r of the effect of marginalchanges [42].

Would rational behavior in a nu-clear war have any of the at tributesof Nitzes (or anyone elses) com-puter program? S oviet and Am ericanleaders al ike would be under pow-erfu l pressure to be sensib le . Butwould sensibil i ty be wound up insome highly abst rac ted not ion ofpost -exchange counterfo rce capa-bility?In sum , the discrepancies betweenNitzes model and our mili tary in -s t i tu t ions create doubt that post -exchange throw-weight residual , orany othe r similarly derived m easure ,has much relevance to the strategicbalance. I n fairness to Nitze, how-ever, one needs to be reminded thathis part icular analysis is basicallyrepresentative of a much larger classof military studies and an alyses . It isby no means atypical .Because a war game, model, orsimulation is an abstraction and sim-plification of a complex reality, theuse of results must be augm ented byj u d g m e n t a n d c o m m o n s e n s e . I nstrategic studies i t is inappropriate tode f ine b road na t iona l secu r i t ygoa ls - fo r i n s t an ce s t ra t eg i cparity-in term s acce ssible only toquanti tat ive methods. Highly aggre-gated and abstract indices such as


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"post-exchange counterforce equi -valence" only creat e an illusion ofunderstanding, which in turn misin-fo rm s po l i cy -m akers and com pl i -cates the problem. The use of suchindices detracts from the potentialcontribution that analytic techniquesand scientific applications can maket o m i l it a r y f o r c e p l a n n i n g a n dweapon system evaluation.Other practices detract from thatcontribution. One is an emphasis onn a r r o w , a l l -c o m p u t e r ' m o d e ls d e ls i g n e d t o a n a l y z e a p a r t i c u l a rweapon system or group of system s.Such m odels are not submitted to in -depe nden t scru tiny of the driving as:sumptions, theories; and data; theyare not compared wi th a l ternat ivemodels of re la ted s i tuat ions; andana lys t s do no t acknowledge thelimitations of their results.R e g a r d i n g i s s u e s , m o s tstrategic analyses focus exclusivelyon the "damage expectancy" andsurvivability of nuclear weap ons andtheir delivery systems.' The re are toomany "missi le-duel" games and toofew studies of command, cqnt ro l ,and comm unications. Current' n u -clear doctrine calls .for a strategy offlexible response and war-fighting,yet the analytic community adherest o a n a r r o w l y f o c u s e d s t r a t e g i cparadigm that stresses conveotionalcalculations of weapons vulnerabil-it y and neglects the'study of opgani-z a t i o n a l w e a k n e ' s s e s a n d h u m a nlimitations. Alternative theories andtechniques must be created if we areto unde rs t and o rgan iza t iona l andhuman performance better than wedo [43]. All-computer models suchas 'N i t z e ' s m js l'e :ad and l eavepolicy-makers without an adequateapprecia t ion of the ' rea l problemsand witho'ut the set of realistic solu-t ions they need.The use of war gam es is extens ive,the s takes are high, and th e potentialvalue of the work is'great. It is timeto elevate 'professional standards andp r a c t i c e s , i m p r o v e m a n a g e r i a lstewardship, and raise the perfor-mance of the entire system responsi-b le f o r . m i l i t a r y s t u d i e s a n dana lyses .0

. .

1. Carry D. Brewer and Mart in Shubik.Gtrrrre: qf P ro-(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1079).2. Martin Shubik and Carry D. Brewer,

(Santa Monica, Calif . : The Rand Corp., R-3. Quoted in Bernard Weinrdub, "ClaytorCriticizes Pentagon Aides on Plans to Reducethe Navy's Role," New York Times, Mar. 28,1978, Section A .4. Bridget Gail, "Debating the Real Issuesabout the Future of the U.S. Navy,"115:9 ( M a y1978). 30.5 . P a u l B r a c k e n , " U n i n t e n d e d C o n s e -quences of Strategic Gaming." &8:3 (Sep t . 1977), 283-318.6 . Richard Titmuss. P;d?/errl.s ofPolicy (London: HMSO, 1950).7. John Erickson, to(Lon don: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1975).8. Waller Goerlitz,(London: Methuen , 1963), pp . 97-120.9. R o b e r t a W o h l s t e t t e r , Pectr-1(Stanford UniversityPress. 1962). pp . 371-73,'38!.10 . Franc i s McHugh, vf(Newport . , R.I . : U.S. Naval WarCollege? 1966), chap . 2 , p. 19.11 . Bracken points o u t t h a t m a n y ' l a n dcombat mode ls used to ana lyze Europeanwarfare omit most of the urban areas, whichleads to the erroneous finding that collateraldamage would be minimal. See Paul Bracken,"Urban Sprawl and Defense ," .Sr r r~~i~~cr /18:6 (Sep t . 1976): see also U.S. General Ac-

counting Oftice, tov jhiotlels (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976).12 . John Mayberry, "Principles forsessment of Simulation Model Validity," invu ( I S

t o ern$edited by A. I . Siege1 (Wash ington, D.C.:Navy Personnel Research and DevelopmentLaboratory, 1971), pp . 157-65.13. Glenn Kent, "Decision Making,"Urriwrsit? 22:4 (May/June 1971).14. Ralph E. Strauch, Critictrlof Metllot1olvg.v (I S Policy(San ta Monica , Ca l i f . : TheRand Corp., P-5282> 1974). John Honig has

com men ted that :'framing the problem andposing the question is probably 90 percent ofthe business," which points up the selectiveand judgmental aspects of the problem. SeeJohn Honig , "Rkmarks ," Opera t ions Re-search Society ?f America, Annual Meeting,San Francisco, May 9, 1977.15. Cortrrd: (San Francisco, Calif . :Freeman, 1974);p. 75.16 . U.S. Congress , Sena te , 01 2(Washington, D.C.: GPO ,1978).17. v f1979, Feb. 1978.

1060-ARPA/RC, 1972). .

62-65.

18. Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stabil-i ty in an Era of Detente.' ' 54:2( Jan . 1976), 207-232.19. Nitze relies on a technical analysis byT.K. Jones, who with L.R. White wrote "TheStrategic Nuclear Balance Measured in'Termsof Relative Post-War Strength," inrlreedited by A.B. Cordesman (London: Re-port A031369, June 24, 1976), pp . 128-153.'The Jones and White study contains all thegraphs that appear i n Nitze [I81 and much thesame discussion of results . Sin ce 'Nitz e doesnot spell out all his own assumptions. we baseour criticism of his analysis partly on the as-sumptions i n Jones arid White. The assump-tions Nitze does specify are identical to thosein Jones and White.20. Paul Nitze, "Deterring our Deterrent."Fvreigtr Policy 25 (Winter 1976-77), 195-210.

21 . Secretary of Defense Brown describesthe role of "damage limitation" in' currentnuclear doctrine as follows: "U .S. strategicforces are not procured for a damige limitingmission. They are procured for their con-tr ibution to deterrence. Howe ver, ' should anuclear war occur, our forces may be utilizedto limit damage to the United States to theextent practicable in addition to being used todestroy resources which contr ibute to thepostwar power, inf luence, and recovery capa-bility of the enem y." U. S . Congiess, Senate,1978 hii/ it(rryrrre11t (Washington. D.C.: GPO, 1977). pt . 1.22 . Paul Nitze, "Comment and Correspon-dence: Strategic Stability,"

23 . Enthoven and Smith are representa-tive: "I f a single ipdex is needed, the n!mberof separately targetable warheaqs is the leastunsatisfactory one." Alain Enth oven andWayne Smith,i r l g . Progrtrrrr, 196/-1969 ( N e wYork: Harper and Row, 1971), p . 183.24 . Paul Nitze. "Carter Warned on SovietNuc lea r Advantage ,"Sptrce 107:19 ( N o v . 7, 1977), 20 .25. U. S . Congress. Senate, F Y 1977

f o r(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976).26 . U.S. Congress, House. />ODFY I 979 (Wash ing ton . D .C. :21 . Robert P. Berman, Sovier in

(Washington, D.C.: T he BrookingsInstitution, 1978), pp. 18-19.28 . Alton H. Quanbe ck and Arch ie L .Wood,(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings In-stitution, 1976), pp. 64-65. .29 . U.S. Congress, Senate. 1978(Washing!on, D.C.: GPO, 1977).30. Richard T . Ackley. "The Wartime Roleof Soviet 104:904 (1978), 36.31 . U.S. Congress, Senate, DOD?,crtiorr fo r 15179

54:4 ( July 1976), 820-823.

GPO, 1978), pt . 2, pp . 803-804.

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978).June 1979 The Bulletin 25


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32 . Office of the Chief of Naval Op erations,Utirlerstcrtiditig Ncnd(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy,1978), p. 8 .33 . U. S . Congress, Senate, D O D1975 (Washington, D.C.: GPQ ,1974), pt. p. 45.34 . Sidney D. Drell and Frank von Hippel,Limited Nuclear War,2 3 5 5 ( N o v . 1976), 35.35 . Soviet weapons that are usually consi-dered strategic but that may have a non-strategic primary mission include the entirebomber force ( theater and antixa rr ier) , SS-11in fields, and most of th e

S S B N force (anti-shipping). U . S . systems in-clude 40 0 Poseidon available toIn addit ion, events may call a t tacks onSSB N S as part of an campaign of attrition,even during a conventional war. Ackley [30]discusses the an t i - sh ipp ing ro le o f Sov ie tthe use of Poseidon is considered inD O D for 1979 pp .U . S . plans for are discussedbriefly in 1978 for[21, pt. p. and 1977[25 ,pt . 4, p . 19721.36 . John Steinbruner and Thomas M. Gar-win, Strategic Vulnerabil i ty: The Balancebet ween Prudence and Paranoia.(Summer 1976). 168.37 . Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, to

a t i d of onqf Defense (Wash ing ton ,D.C. : GPO, Ju ly 1970), 53.38. Off ice o f Management and Bu dge t ,Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense:D e f e n s e R e o r g a n i z a t i o n ,

(Washington, D.C.: Sept .20, 19771,39 . U . S . Congress, Senate,Policies (Washington, D.C.: GPO,40 . U. S . Congress, House, of D e-prrrttiietit qf Cotnninnd,S y s t e i n s(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977).41 . Washington Evening Star-Ne ws, Feb.28, 1973), p . A I .42 . John Steinbruner, National Securi tyand the C oncept of S trategic Stabil i ty,ofConflict Resolurion 2 2 3 (Sept . 1978),43 . Among the strategic exchange m odels,simulations and games employed by the De-fense Department, these subjects are ei thertreated outside of the models or not at all. Form o d e l s . s i m u l a t i o n a n d g a m e s u s e d toevaluate information-processing capabil i t iesand requ i rements the f indings are equallydismal. In rare in-house appraisal of suchmodels it was determined that documentat ionis uneven, no t available, or non -existent; val i-dat ion is deficient; and review is not open,regular or r igorous. See Kerr and H.J .Z w e i g , Tools f o r

C~r??t~irrtiicrrtiotis Engineering M o d -e l s . N I I ~ (SanDiego, Calif.: Naval Electronics LaboratoryCente r , 1974).26

1974). pp . 9-13.

411-428.

S T E P H E NM . M E Y E RNIXMembers of the American defensecommunity have argued that by them i d - l 9 8 0 s , t h e U . S . M i n u t e m a nI C B M force will be vulnerable to aSoviet preemptive nuclear strike. Itis argued that the Soviet I C B M forcec a n b e e x p e c t e d t o a c q u i r e t h ep rop e r com bina tion o f nuc l ea rexplosive power, delivery accuracy,fractionation, throw-weight, and op-erational reliability required to de-stroy upwards of 90 percent of theU. S. Minuteman force in a surprisefirst at tack. Whether anyone couldcarry off such a feat is questionablebut independent of the M inutemanstrue vulnerab ility, it is this perceivedv u l n e r a bi l it y t h a t h a s c r e a t e d apolit ical issue. Th e search has begunfor a solution to the perceived vul-nerability problem.

Among the opt ions being consi -dered is a passive defense programknown as the Multiple Aim PointSys t em (MAPS) .The program callsf o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a l a r g enum ber of surplus-but comp letelyoperational-ICBM silos. T he I C B M Sin their cannister-launchers would behauled around the M A P S fields ont rans porte rs and randomly loadedinto the M A P S silos. Since the totaln u m b e r o f s i l o s w o u l d b esignificantly gre ater than the num berof MAPS ICBMS and assuming that thee m p t y s i l o s c o u l d n o t b e d i s t i n -guished from the loaded si los, thesystem would force the Soviets towaste a large portion of their nuclearwarheads targeting empty holes.At first glance it would seem tha tcons t ruc t ion o f t he m u l t i p l e a impoint system would have little im-pact on strategic arms control . It is,after all, passive defen se systemwhose purpose i s to increase thesurvivability of the U.S. land-basedmissile force. Yet the history of thepast 30 years demonstrates that be-cause there are a limited number oftechnological responses to strategicdeman ds and threa ts the Soviets even-

tually deploy strategic systems thatare quite similar to U . S . systems. Canwe assume that the Soviets will notbuild a multiple aim point systemof their own in response to a per-ceived MX -threat to their force?And if they do, how would twomultiple aim point systems-one inthe United States and one in theSoviet Union-affect the relative se-curity of the two superpowers and thef u t u r e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r s t r a te g i carms control?T h e r e c a n b e n o d o u b t t h a t aSovie t mul t ip le a im point systemwould cause U.S . defense p lannersto fear that the Soviets would cheaton in-force and/or future I C B M limi-t a t i o n a g r e e m e n t s b y p l a c i n g e x t r a m i s s i l es i n s o m e o f t h eempty M A P S si los. The Soviet capa-bility for breako ut (deploying a largenum ber o f unexpec t ed add i t i ona ls t ra t eg i c weapons w i th in a sho r tperiod) then would be radically im-proved. Certainly, the ready availa-bility of fully operational but empty

silos provides an unequalled oppor-tunity to have all ones I C B M S (per-m i t t e d a n d e x t r a ) p r e p a r e d f o rlaunch at the same instant .2 Thu s thequestion: Is it possible to verify thatt h e S o v i e t s a r e c o m p l y i n g w i t hagreed limitations of the deploymentof I C B M S and not placing extra ICBMSin empty MAPS silos?If all the M A P S silos were simul-taneously opened fo r inspection, theloaded and em pty s i l o s cou ld becounted . But not only would openingall the silos confirm that the propernumber were empty but the t rue lo-cations of th e I C B M S would be re-vealed. Even if the relocation of theI C B M S w e r e t o c o m m e n c e i m -mediately following the verificationi n s p e c t i o n , i t w o u ld b e d a y s o rweeks or possibly months before asafe number of the missiles could bemoved. As a result , there would be acritical period following the all silosopen inspection when the inspect-ing count ry would have complete


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Documents

War games and national security with a grain of SALT