Wahabi Ahle Hadith Deobandi and Saudi Connection

7/28/2019 Wahabi Ahle Hadith Deobandi and Saudi Connection

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Wahabi / Ahle Hadith ,Deobandi and

Saudi Connection

14APR

Ulema Rivalries and the Saudi Connection

Yoginder Sikand

Introduction

Its claim of representing Islamic orthodoxy is the Saudi regimes pri ncipal tool of seeking

ideological legitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only truly Islamic

state in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or

what is commonly referred to as Wahhabism by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led

by the eighteenth century puritan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with

Muhmmad ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi state. Exporting Wahhabi Islam to

Muslims elsewhere in the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major

preoccupation of the Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for

the Saudi Arabia monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the project of contemporary

global Wahhabism. Since Wahhabism is seen by its proponents as the single, authentic and

normative form of Islam, it has an inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on

or replace other ways of understanding and practising Islam.

As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has been an important target of Saudi

Wahhabi propaganda. Private as well as semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to

numerous Indian Muslim individuals and organisations. This paper examines the impact of official

and unofficial Saudi assistance to Sunni Muslim groups in India.

Intra-Sunni Rivalry and the Emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith

The establishment of British rule in India had momentous consequences for notions of Muslim and

Islamic identity. The widely shared perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling

of Muslim unity transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries. Yet, at the same time, British rule

opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that serious differences emerged

within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the development of neatly-defined, and, on

numerous issues, mutually opposed, sect-like groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis
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and the Ahl-i Hadith. Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the authentic Sunni

tradition, or the Ahl al- Sunnah wal Jamaah, branding rival claimants as aberrant and, in some

cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply fractured and fiercely contested nature

of Sunni orthodoxy.

The pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith saw themselves as struggling to promote what they believed to be

the true Islam of Muhammad and his companions. Like most other Sunni ulama, they co nsidered

the Shias to be outside the pale of Islam, and, therefore, kafirs. In addition, they believed that the

other Sunni groups, too, had strayed from the path of the pious predecessors (salaf). They argued,

through their writings and fatwas, that the Hanafis, the dominant section among the Indian Sunnis,

erred in blind conformity (taqlid) of the ulama of the Hanafi school even when their prescriptions

went against the express commandments of the Quran and the Hadith. They bitterly castigated this

as akin to shirk or the sin of associationism. They fiercely opposed popular customs and beliefs,

widely shared among the Indian Muslims, such as Sufism and the cults of the saints, insisting that

these had no sanction in the sunnah or the practice of the Prophet, and were, therefore, wrongful

innovations or bidaah. They decried certain customs widely practised by many Indian Muslims, such

as prostrating before graves or praying without uttering the word amin aloud or with the hands

folded on the belly instead of on the chest, which they saw as against the practice of the Prophet.

They insisted that Muslims must rely solely on the Quran and the Hadith for guidance, offering an

extremely literalist understanding of these two primary sources of Islamic law. Overall, they saw

their mission as rescuing Muslims from what they saw as the sin of shrik and guiding them to the

pure monotheism (khalis tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired

by the example of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly appreciating the

Wahhabis criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not identify themselves as such, refusing the

label of Wahhabi that their detractors used to dismiss them. Instead, they insisted that they alonerepresented the Islam of the Prophet, and that, far from setting up a new sect, they were simply

reviving what they believed to be true Islam. Hence, they claimed to be muwahhids, or true

monotheists, or Ahl-i Hadith or People of the Tradition of the Prophet.

Despite their differences with the Hanafis, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian

Ahl-i Hadith ulama did not go so far as to openly denounce them as infidels, although this seems to

have been implied in the writings of some of their scholars who accused their rivals of shirk. On the

face of it, they seem to have considered them, in a restricted sense, fellow Muslims, albeit having

been allegedly led astray and hence in urgent need of reform. Some Ahl-i Hadith pioneers, such as

Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari (1870-1943), even cooperated with the Deobandi ulama in theformation of the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Hind (The Union of the Ulama of India), while still bitterly

critiquing certain Hanafi practices and beliefs. While most early Ahl-i Hadith ulama admired the

efforts of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, not all of them agreed entirely with his views. Thus, not

all of them approved of his reported claim that Muslims who did not share his beliefs were kafirs and

fit to be killed. Some of them also appear to have held certain views commonly attributed to the

Ithna Ashari Shias, whom Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had, in no uncertain terms, branded as


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apostates. In marked opposition to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs position on Sufism as wholly

un-Islamic, some late nineteenth century pioneers among the Indian Ahl-i Hadith, such as Nazir

Ahmad Dehlvi, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali and Daud Ghaznavi, were Sufis in their own right. An

early Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Wahidduzaman Hyderabadi, is said to have believed in the intercession of

holy men, both living as well as dead, as well as in the capacity of dead saints to listen to peoples

requests. The doyen of the early Ahl-i Hadith, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali, is said to have been

convinced of a mystical light (nur) constantly emanating from his fathers grave.[1] He is even said to

have opposed Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab in some of his writings, a charge that later Ahl-i

Hadith scholars were quick to deny.[2] This, however, was an exception, for the majority of the early

Indian Ahl-i Hadith appear to have warmly supported Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, although this

did not mean that some of them did not have differences with him on certain contentious issues.

The crystallisation of the Ahl-i Hadith in India as a separate sect (maslak) was a gradual process,

given fillip by the setting up of separate mosques and madrasas from the late nineteenth century

onwards, which gave the movement the shape of a community separate from the Hanafi majority.

This owed, in part, to the fierce opposition that the Ahl-i Hadith encountered from the Hanafis.

Many Hanafi ulama saw the Ahl-i Hadith as a hidden front of the Wahhabis, whom they regarded

as enemies of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Proph et and the saints, their

opposition to popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the four generally

accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Further, they also saw the Ahl-i Hadith as directly

challenging their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi ulama issued

fatwas branding the Al-i Hadith as virtual heretics, contemptuously referring to them as ghair

muqallids for their opposition to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni

tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-i Hadith was fierce. In many places Hanafis refused them

admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards. Marital ties with them were forbidden, and insome places followers of the Ahl-i Hadith even faced physical assault.

The notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity was given a further boost with the establishment of the

All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference in 1906 which brought together ulama from different parts of

India who shared a common commitment to the Ahl-i Hadith vision. From then on much scholarly

effort was expended by Ahl-i Hadith ulama on seeking to prove rival Muslim groups, Sunni as well

as, of course, Shia, as aberrant, stressing points of differences between them and the Ahl-i Hadith in

order to argue their own claim of representing the single authentic Islamic tradition and to further

fortify the notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity. This was reciprocated by their rivals, who took

upon themselves the task of fiercely denouncing the Ahl- i Hadith. Yet, despite the bitter relationsbetween the Ahl-i Hadith and others the early Ahl-i Hadith ulama did not go so far as to explicitly

brand other Sunni groups as apostates. To have done so would have been dangerous, for the Ahl-i

Hadith, at that time, as now, formed only a miniscule minority among the Sunnis. The situation

began to change, however, from the 1970s onwards, after access to Saudi funds and links with

prestigious Saudi patrons gave numerous Ahl-i Hadith leaders a new aggressive confidence to take

on their Hanafi rivals despite their continued minority status among the regions Muslims. This


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period also saw a marked transformation in Ahl-i Hadith self-identity. While some pioneers among

the Ahl-i Hadith did not conceal their differences with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia on some

points, access to Saudi funds led to a gradual erasure of these differences, so much so that the Ahl-i

Hadith came to present itself as a carbon copy of Saudi-style Wahhabism, with nothing to

distinguish itself from it and upholding this form of Islam as normative. As their Muslim critics saw

it, this had only a single explanation: It was simply a clever means to win the favour of generous

Saudi benefactors.

The Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith Connection: Wahhabism as An External Policy Tool

Close links between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and Wahhabi ulama go back to the early

decades of the twentieth century. The early Ahl-i Hadith, although not a complete replica of the

Saudi Wahhabis, did not conceal its support for the Saudi state, which it saw as leading a crusade

for what it regarded as a truly Islamic polity. When, in the early 1920s, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul

Rahman ibn Faisal al-Saud, or Ibn Saud for short, conquered the Hijaz with British help and

declared the founding of the second Saudi state, many Muslims in India and elsewhere were

incensed, fearing that the fiercely iconoclastic Wahhabis would destroy the tomb of Muhammad

and other holy sites in Arabia. Predictably, the conquest of the Hijaz led to heightened acrimony

between the Ahl-i Hadith and other, including rival Sunni, Muslim groups in India. Indian Hanafi

leaders set up an organisation, the Hizb ul-Ahnaf (The Hanafi Army) to oppose the Saudi rulers and

the Ahl-i Hadith, who were seen as their agents. A Muslim Hijaz Conference was organised in

Lucknow by the Khuddam al-Haramayn (Servants of the Two Holy Cities) Society in 1926, which

passed a resolution calling for the liberation of the Hijaz from Saudi control and suggesting that

Muslims refrain from the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina till the Wahhabis had been overthrown.

Massive anti-Wahhabi demonstrations took place in different parts of India, denouncing the Saudi

rulers as anti-Muslim.

At this time, when the Saudi rulers were faced with stiff opposition from many Muslim quarters, the

Indian Ahl-i Hadith were quick to rush to their defence. They insisted that the Saudi rulers were

genuinely Islamic, and hence argued that they must be defended at all costs. In 1927 some Indian

Ahl-i Hadith scholars even travelled to Najd to meet Ibn Saud and to attend the Hijaz Conference

that he had organised to galvanise worldwide Muslim support for himself. The All -India Ahl-i Hadith

Conference organised a number of rallies to galvanise support for Ibn Saud and to oppose his

detractors among the Indian Muslims. Numerous leading Ahl-i Hadith scholars also penned tracts

and books defending the Saudi ruler and Wahhabism, claiming that Ibn Sauds destruction of tombs

over graves was fully in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. Echoing the views of many of his

fellow Ahl-i Hadith, the founder and president of the All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference, Muhammad

bin Ibrahim Junagadhi (d.1942), in a pamphlet defending Ibn Saud declared that From everyangle,

religious as well as political, Ibn Saud most well suited to be the servant [ruler] of the Hijaz. For his

part, Ibn Saud dispatched a number of letters to Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders acknowledging his

gratitude for their help and expressing his support for their mission. These letters were later

published in several Ahl-i Hadith newspapers.[1] The ties that were cemented between the Indian


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Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and its official Wahhabi ulama in the 1920s were to become even

closer in the decades that followed.

*

The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab states, institutions and private donors insponsoring a number of Islamic organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of

the boom in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members in the wake

of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian Muslim

organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant, although the Indian press routinely

exaggerated it, leading to a scare of petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand

conspiracy to convert poor, particularly low caste, Hindus to Islam. In actual fact, few Muslim

organisations actually engaged in missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead,

most Arab, including Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques,

madrasas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled to Muslim organisations

to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim localities and to provide scholarships to needy Muslim

students.

Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a range of sources, including the

Saudi state, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-Alami

al-Islami (World Muslim League) and the Dar ul-Ifta wal Dawat ul-Irshad, as well as private

donors, mostly rich shaikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several Indian Muslims

working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back money to fund Islamic institutions,

mostly based in towns and villages where their families live. In addition, the Saudi embassy in New

Delhi is said to be closely linked to a number of Islamic religious scholars, Muslim journalists and

managers of Muslim institutions in the country. Although this could not be verified, it is claimed that

requests for financial aid are often made to the Embassy from these individuals and institutions, and

the Embassy, in turn, forwards these requests to the appropriate authorities in Saudi Arabia itself. It

is also claimed that a number of newspapers, Muslim-owned as well as others, receive money from

Saudi sources to publish articles in support of the Saudi regime. Furthermore, the Saudi authorities

are said to pay the salaries of a number of teachers, known as mabuth, employed in various Indian

madrasas, almost all of these being graduates of Saudi universities and mostly associated with the

Ahl-i Hadith.

Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one method through which the Saudis

have sought to patronise and influence key Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms

of assistance include sponsored haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including ulama , patronising of

selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrasa students to study in Saudi Islamic universities

and jobs for such graduates in both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia. The

largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the Ahl-i Hadith, although the Jamaat-i Islami

and the Deobandis are also said to have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shias, both of

whom regard Wahhabism as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at all from


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Saudi sources.[2] This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim institutions in India is intended to

serve and promote a particular ideological vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the

Saudi regime and its official Wahhabi ulama.

Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic institutions internationally, including in

India, only in the 1970s. This was a period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab

socialism and pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baathists in Syria and Iraq and

various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the overthrow of monarchical

regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the United States and as helping the Zionist

occupation of Palestine. Within Saudi Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including

from those who had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region. Then came the

Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to fears of an export of revolutionary, anti-monarchical

Islam to the Arab world, including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the

Saudi kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also bitterly attacked the

Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly acquiescing in American support for Israel. In

his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime as anti-Islamic, claiming that it was in

league with Satanic powers. He argued that Wahhabism represented anti-Quranic ideas and a

baseless, superstitious cult, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within.[3] Radical appeals

emanating from Tehran, including anti-Wahhabi and anti-Saudi sentiments, soon caught the

imagination of Muslims all over the world.

The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which

the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti -monarchical

thrust of the Revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of Iran,

Americas closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as a result of the passionate

appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it was painfully realised, could well meet the same

fate. Consequently, the Saudis, backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting

Wahhabi Islam abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within Saudi

Arabia itself and abroad. Stressing the regimes Islamic credentials now came to be relied upon as

the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave of challenges from internal as well as external

opponents, from Muslims opposed to the regimes corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance

with the imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of Wahhabism was given a

further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis, supported by the Americans,

pumped in millions of dollars to fund Wahhabi-style schools and organisations in Pakistan in order

to train guerrillas to fight the Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, waspresented as a sign of Saudi Arabias professed commitment to true Islam, it also functioned as a

thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi regime. In exporting this brand of Islam

abroad, India, home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, received particular

importance.

The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the

aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely


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literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of correct

ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian,

branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as enemies of Islam; and,

finally, it was explicitly and fiercely critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that

were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as

ploys of the enemies of Islam.[4]

Saudi Patronage and the Indian Ahl-i Hadith

A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim groups in the decades after the

Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to institutions run by the Ahl-i Hadith. This is hardly

surprising, given the shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi

Wahhabis. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl -i Hadith has been that

there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the Saudi Wahhabi ulama so much so

that today there is hardly any difference between the two groups. A revealing indication of the effort

on the part of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith to identify themselves with their Saudi patrons, a Deobandi

critic writes, is the fact that the Ahl-i Hadith now prefer to refer to themselves as Salafis, a term that

the Saudi Wahhabis commonly use for themselves.[5] As pointed out earlier, most Indian Ahl -i

Hadith scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did hail Muhammad bin Abdul

Wahhab as a great reformer and as a pioneer in reviving true Islam and authentic monotheism,

but, despite this, some of them were critical of his extremism and that of his followers. Today, this

sort of criticism is completely absent in Indian Ahl-i Hadith circles, and Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama

now routinely hail the Wahhabi ulama of Najd as representing the only single saved sect (firqa al-

najiya), and the Saudi regime as the only genuinely Islamic regime in the world.

Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-i Hadith institutions has heavily influenced the contents of the vast

amount of literature that they produce and distribute. In the last two decades there has been a

mushroom growth in the number of Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are

said to receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced books, and, now,

audiotapes, videocassettes and compact disks, and some even operate their own websites. Most of

the authors whose works they publish are Indian, and to a lesser extent, Pakistani, Ahl-i Hadith

ulama whom have received higher education in various Saudi universities. Several of them are

presently working in various official as well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself.

Their vision and understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi

Arabia. They see the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and other forms of Islam as

deviant. In addition to the works of these writers, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses are now

churning out Urdu and, to a lesser extent, Hindi and English, translations of works, including fatwas,

by leading Saudi Wahhabi ulama, the most prominent of whom being the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz

bin Abdullah bin Baz (d. 1999), chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and the late Shaikh Nasiruddin Albani

(d. 1999) professor at the Islamic University of Medina. This clearly reflects the understanding that

local forms of Islam in India need to be stamped out and replaced by the puritanical, literalist Islam

of the Saudi Wahhabis.


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Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses focuses on the minutiae of

ritual practises and beliefs. This is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist

understanding of Saudi Wahhabi Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-i Hadith ulama are devoted

to intricate discussion of what they regard as the correct methods of praying, performing ablutions

and offering supplications, as well as rules and regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce

and so on. A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival Muslim, including Sunni,

groups, and to sternly condemn them as aberrant on account of differences in their methods of

performing rituals and their rules governing a range of issues related to normative personal and

collective behaviour. These elaborate discussions also serve to critique the Hanafi insistence on

taqlid, which several Ahl-i Hadith scholars condemn as akin to shirk or associationism, arguing that

it logically leads to setting up an authority that rivals God.[6] These and related debates are used to

reinforce the claim of the Ahl-i Hadith, as well as the Saudi Wahhabi ulama, being the only group

that faithfully abides by the sunnah of the Prophet and to declare all other Muslim groups as deviant.

Sometimes, this is taken to the extent of denouncing their rivals as being effectively outside the pale

of the Ahl al- Sunnah wal Jamaah, and, hence, for all practical purposes, non-Muslims.

Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India,

and one that is directly linked to the close association between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi

Wahhabis, is a fierce hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a

defining feature of the early Ahl-i Hadith, has been further exacerbated with the growing Saudi-Ahl-i

Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-i Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly

denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their

pre-Islamic past. These also includes customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the

cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural

context. As Ahl-i Hadith writers see it, these are all wrongful innovations, having no sanction in theProphets sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an adoption of a range

of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as genuinely Islamic. Th e publication of Urdu

translations of the compendia of fatwas of leading Saudi Wahhabi ulama by Indian Ahl -i Hadith

publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to provide to take the place

of what they see as un-Islamic practices widely prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has

added to the conflict with other Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are

associated with the cults of the Sufis. The Saudi Arabisation of Islam and Indian Muslim cultur e

that the Ahl-i Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the cultural chasm between

Muslims and Hindus. As many Ahl-i Hadith ulama see it, and this is reflected in their writings as

well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic jahiliya

period. Although most of them do not advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-i Hadith scholars

insist on the need for Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the

deleterious consequences this might have for the Muslims own commitment to and practice of

Islam.


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Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses have also paid particular attention

to combating their Muslim rivals. This, as shall be later argued, cannot be understood without taking

into account the Saudi connection. Scores of books have been penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama,

branding Sufis, Shias and Deobandis as heretical [7]. Sometimes, this charge is stated openly. On

other occasions it is articulated indirectly, but in a manner that the reader is driven to the conclusion

that other groups who claim to be Sunni are not genuinely so or might not be even Muslim at all.[8]

This concern to combat other Muslim groups has been particularly exacerbated as a result of links

established with Saudi patrons. This campaign is led by high profile Indian and Pakistani Ahl-i

Hadith scholars, who have generally trained in Saudi universities or are based in Islamic institutions

in Saudi Arabia itself. Heated polemical attacks on other Muslim groups are a means for them to

stress the separate identity of the Ahl-i Hadith and to press its claim of representing authentic

Islam. It also provides them with positions of authority as spokesmen of true Islam. Moderates

among the Ahl-i Hadith do exist, who seek to lessen tensions with other Muslim groups, but they

seem to be relatively powerless in the face of leaders who have access to Saudi funds and have a

vested interest in stressing and reinforcing differences with other Muslim communities. Tirelesslyclaiming in their writings to being the sole representatives of normative Islam and, in the process,

identifying themselves with the Saudi Wahhabi ulama, enables the Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama to

present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which, in turn, helps earn for them recognition as

well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In addition, such publications also serve the

purpose of presenting the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the

claim of the Saudi regime being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously committed to

genuine Islam.

Access to Saudi funds has, therefore, led to heightened conflict between various Muslim sectarian

groups in India, as Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses produce and distribute literature on a large scalebitterly attacking their rivals of being Muslim only in name. While earlier Ahl-i Hadith scholars did

critique other Muslim groups, this criticism was relatively mild and did not go to the extent of

denouncing fellow Sunnis as apostates. This was probably a tactical move, for the Ahl-i Hadith were

a small and beleaguered minority. Now, however, access to new patrons and sources of funds has

provided the Ahl-i Hadith with an aggressive confidence to denounce their Muslim rivals, going even

beyond the somewhat limited critique of their predecessors. According to Mohammed Zeyaul Haque,

an Indian Muslim journalist, while earlier Ahl-i Hadith criticism of Hanafi practices was limited

largely to matters of insignificant detail, such as proper ritual practices during prayers, the method

of divorce and so on, of late a vicious campaign of slander has been launched by mischief-makers

sitting in countries of the Middle East (by which he seems to refer to Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars

based in Saudi Arabia) carefully targeting Hanafis of all kinds, and going to the extent of denouncing

them as kafirs. Among their targets have been the widely respected and Hanafi-dominated All-India

Muslim Personal Law Board and the leaders of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat, the largest

Islamic movement in the world, which has its global headquarters in India. Haque claims that

recently a number of books, originating from South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholars based in the Middle


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East and fiercely denouncing the Hanafis (besides the Shias) as disbelievers, have flooded the

subcontinent.[9]

Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated to the interests of the Saudi

regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shia and anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various

Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves

the purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed to

Wahhabism and the Saudi state, these often being branded as enemies of Islam. In this way the

literature produced by several Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and

vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that

fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulama as well as the Saudi state. This function is

served more directly through forms of literature that raise political, as opposed to simply theological,

issues. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 appeared to the Saudi regime as

a major threat to its own survival as its claims for championing Islam were dismissed as hypocritical.

Consequently, some Indian Ahl-i Hadith (aswell as Deobandi) ulama penned tracts and bookspaid

for this by Saudi patrons, their critics allegeto brand the Revolution as a Shia, and, therefore, anti-

Islamic, insurrection, Khomeini as an enemy of Islam, and the Shia faith as a Jewish conspiracy to

destroy Islam from within. Predictably, the Revolution was painted in the lurid colours. It was

explained simply as an anti-Islamic conspiracy hatched by the Shia ulama in order to export

Shiism and establish Shia political rule over the Sunnis. In this way, the appeal of the Revolution, its

anti-monarchical thrust and its bitter critique of Western imperialism that had led to considerable

support for Khomeini among many Sunnis, including in India, was sought to be countered. The

attack on the Revolution was deliberately couched in an Islamic form in order to dismiss the

Khomeinis legitimacy. This also served as a means to defend the Saudi regime in Islamic terms, it

being routinely described in Ahl-i Hadith literature as the only truly Islamic regime in the world.

This claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole authentic Islamic regime in the world is

repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-i Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as

financial, between several Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders and the Saudi state and its official Wahhabi

ulama. Numerous books penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars discuss in detail the great

contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the Islamic cause, inevitably concluding with

the claim that Saudi Arabia under its present masters represents the only truly Islamic state in the

world today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray for his

continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious, fully committed Muslim,

whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the protection and promotion of authentic Islam.Support for this authentic Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible. Interestingly,

there is no reference at all in Ahl-i Hadith writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi

Arabia itself with the ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the

country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabias close links with the United States.

Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward by many Muslims, that monarchy is

un-Islamic, particularly one like the despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of


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the fact that Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its ruling

family.

A case in point is a book financed by a Saudi professor, published by the apex Ahl-i Hadith madrasa

in India and authored by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith writer based in Saudi Arabia, Abul Mukarram

Abdul Jalil. The author insists that because the message of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab is based

on true (sahih) Islamic beliefs, every Muslim must accept and follow it. At the same time, because

the present Saudi regime, allegedly, continues to follow faithfully in the footsteps of Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab, it is, the author writes, imperative on all Muslims to support the Saudi rulers.[10]

Similarly, a booklet penned by the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, chief mufti of Saudi

Arabia, and translated into Urdu and published in India by an Ahl-i Hadith publishing company,

hails the Saudi ruling family for allegedly working for the victory of true Islam. The pamphlet ends

with a prayer to God to keep the Saudi ruling family on the straight path.[11]

A particularly interesting text in this regard is a recent Urdu translation of a voluminous book,

running into almost 400 pages, penned by a Saudi scholar devoted to extolling the praises of the

Saudi regime for what its title refers to as its impressive Islamic missionary and educational

services. The author of the book, Saleh bin Ghanim al-Sadlan, is a professor at the Jamia Imam

Muhammad bin Saud University, Riyadh, and is associated with a number official Saudi Islamic

organisations and institutions. The book is an expanded version of a paper presented by the author

at a conference organised by the Department of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Riyadh. The

book has been translated into Urdu and published by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith student of his, Abdur

Rahman bin Abdul Jabbar Farewai, who runs an Islamic institution in New Delhi.[12]

The book provides details of various Islamic organisations set up and funded by the Saudi regime,

both inside as well as outside the Kingdom. These institutions, so its author claims, are engaged in

what he calls amazing contributions to the cause of Islam, providing peace and satisfaction to the

hearts and minds of the followers of Islam. All these efforts are said to be a reflection of the

commitment of the Saudi rulers to the Islamic cause. As al-Sadlan tells his readers, this shows that

In this period of the decline of the Muslims the existence of Saudi Arabia is a great blessing for the

Islamic world.[13] Expectedly, the book reads as a crude piece of undisguised propaganda for the

Saudi monarchy. The author claims that Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world that is governed

according to the Quran. The rulers and the ulama of Saudi Arabia, he writes, have created a model

Islamic government which has raised high the flag of Islam, worked for the spread of true Islam all

over the world, and has made immense contributions in the field of Islamic unity and service of

humanity. The Saudi government, he says, has always supported human and moral values and is a

model of justice, peace, security, love and unity.[14] All its revenue, trade and economic

institutions, he claims, are based on the shariah. He describes it newly established, but toothless,

consultative committee (nizam-i shura) as having been set up only in order that the country should

firmly and strictly follow the path of the shariah and Muhammad, peace be upon him.[15]

Predictably, there is no mention at all about Saudi Arabias key role in the Western-dominated global


12/24

capitalist economy, and of its close financial and political relations with the United States and other

Western imperialist powers.

For his part, the Saudi king is described by al-Sadlan as the Custodian of the Two Holy Cities

(khadim al-harimayn al-sharifayn), and is portrayed as having been appointed by God Himself to

serve the cause of Islam. He is described as performing this onerous responsibility with diligence and

fervour. He is said to have full faith in the fact that his government must work for the prosperity of

Islam. He is said to firmly believe in the supremacy of the Quran and the sunnah[16], and is quoted

as declaring that The Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Quran itself, which

falsehood cannot touch, from front or from behind.[17] Concluding his book, the author prays that

God should protect the Islamic Sultanate of Saudi Arabia in this age of terrorism so that it can

carry on in the service of Islam.[18]

Ahl-i Hadith-Deobandi Polemics and the Saudi Nexus

Central to Wahhabism is the understanding that it alone represents normative Islam, and thatother understandings of the faith are, by definition, false. One might argue that the Wahhabis are

not unique in this, and that, in fact, all Muslim sectarian groups do share this conviction. While that

may well be true, Wahhabi attitudes towards other Muslim groups have historically been

characterised by a fierce extremism quite unparalleled in the case of other contemporary Muslim

sects. This is another feature that Saudi-style Wahhabism shares with the Ahl-i Hadith.

As a claimant to Sunni orthodoxy, the Ahl-i Hadith is not alone in denouncing the Shias as heretics,

and, therefore, outside the pale ofIslam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi ulama share the same

opinion. Hence, the virulent opposition to the Shias on the part of the Ahl -i Hadith is hardly

surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as pure monotheism and its fierce opposition towrongful innovations, its denunciation of the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis,

is also understandable. What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that, of late, Ahl-i

Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular attention to denouncing the

Deobandis, who, while being muqallids as well as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the

Ahl-i Hadith a commitment to strict compliance with the shariah and the extirpation of what they

describe as bidaah. In that sense, the Ahl-i Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to the Deobandis

than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears that in recent years Indian Ahl-i

Hadith scholars have been focussing considerably more attention to combating the Deobandis than

to critiquing their Barelvi and Shia rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an explanation.

One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are far more organised and influential

than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a number of influential organisations, madrasas and

publishing houses all over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing

the Ahl-i Hadith than their other rivals, which, in turn, has forced the Ahl-i Hadith to pay particular

attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi front. In addition to this factor are other

developments, related to struggles over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp


13/24

intensification of rivalries between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The Saudi

connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts.

Relations between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in India have, since their inception, been

strained. Seeing the Ahl-i Hadith as a potent challenge to their own authority, early Deobandi ulama

bitterly critiqued and denounced them. Some even wrote boldly against Muhammad bin Abdul

Wahhab, arguing that his movement had nothing at all to do with Islam. Husain Ahmad Madani

(1879-1957), rector of the Deoband madrasa, penned a polemical tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqab, where

he claimed that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab preached patent falsehood (aqaid-i batila), killed

numerous Sunni Muslims and forced many others to accept his false creed (aqaid -i fasida). He

referred to him as a tyrant (zalim), traitor (baghi), and despicable (khabis), and labelled him and

his followers as the despicable Wahhabis (wahhabiya khabisia).[19] He wrote that Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab had declared the wealth of all Muslims, including Sunnis, who did not follow him as

property that could be rightfully looted (mal-i ghanimat), and their slaughter as a cause of merit

(sawab), considering all but his own followers as apostates. This is why, he claimed, the Arabs

detested Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers, their hatred for them exceeding their

hatred for Jews, Christians, Magians and Hindus. Undoubtedly, Madani asserted, Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab had committed such heinous crimes that such hatred for him is a must.[20]

Other Deobandis seem to have displayed similar views on the Saudi Wahhabis, although there were

exceptions. A leading Deobandi scholar, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, insisted that Muhammad bin Abdul

Wahhab was stupid (bewaquf) and had little knowledge (kam ilm), because of which he was quick

to declare other Muslims as kafirs. On the other hand, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, teacher and spiritual

master of Husain Ahmad Madani, issued a fatwa laying down that the Wahhabis beliefs were good

(umdah) and that they were good people, although he added that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs

views were extreme (shiddat) and that when his followers transcended the limits it lead to

considerable strife (fasad).[21] Gangohis views were contradicted by some of his own students.

Thus, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri considered the Wahhabis as deviant, and claimed, referring to

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, that neither he nor any of his followers and clan are among our

teachers in any of our chains of transmission in Islamic knowledge, whether in jurisprudence,

Hadith, Quranic commentary or Sufism.[22] Likewise, Husain Ahmad Madani, also a student of

Gangohi, dissented from his teachers opinion. Gangohi, he said, did not have a proper, complete and

first-hand knowledge of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs beliefs.[23]

The opposition of the early Deobandis to the Ahl-i Hadith and to the Saudi Wahhabis stemmed, in

part, from the Wahhabi critique of rigid taqlid and Sufism, which the Deobandis upheld but which

the Wahhabis branded as heretical. Deobandi opposition to the Wahhabi label might also have

been motivated, in large measure, by fear of British reprisal. Wahhabis, as the British Indian

authorities saw them, were Muslim groups who sought to challenge colonial rule, and who were,

therefore, regarded as deadly enemies of the Raj. Furthermore, it appears that Deobandi efforts to

clearly distance themselves from the Wahhabis had also to do with Deobandi-Barelvi rivalries.

Thus, for instance, Husain Ahmad Madani undertook to write his al-Shahab al-Shaqab against the


14/24

Wahhabis as a response to a book, Husam al-Harmayn, written by Ahmad Raza Khan, leader of the

Barelvis. In his book Khan culled out statements from the writings of numerous Deobandi elders

which proved, so he argued, that the Deobandis were Wahhabis and, therefore, kafirs, adding that

those who doubted their being kafirs were kafirs themselves. In order to gain support for his stand he

travelled to the Hijaz and had his claims against the Deobandis endorsed by several anti-Wahhabi

ulama of Mecca and Medina, whose statements he reproduced in his book. Alarmed that the book

would turn Indian Muslim opinion against the Deobandis, Madani, it is said, was forced to pen his

polemical tract, wherein he claimed that the Deobandis had nothing at all to do with the Wahhabis

at all, effectively declaring Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers as outside the Sunni

fold.[24]

Although several early Deobandi leaders sought to distance themselves from the Saudi Wahhabis,

on the whole a distinct ambiguity seems to have characterised their response to the charge of being

Wahhabis themselves. This owed to the ambiguity of the term Wahhabi as it was commonly

understood and used in India. While the Deobandis were careful to insist that they were not

Wahhabis in the sense of being followers of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, some Deobandis,

recognising the commitment that they shared with the Saudi Wahhabis to the extirpation of what

they regarded as bidaah, accepted the label Wahhabi in that limited sense. Thus, for instance,

Muhammad Zakariya, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat, is said to have

proudly announced before his followers, I am a more staunch Wahhabi than all of you. Likewise,

Yusuf Kandhalavi, son and successor of the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, Ilyas Kandhalavi,

declared, We are staunch Wahhabis. Given the shared vision, albeit limited in extent, of the Saudi

Wahhabis and the Deobandis, it was possible for the two groups to seek to work together for

common purposes. Thus, Ilyas Kandhalavi and a group of his followers met the Saudi ruler in 1938,

and discussed with him and the Saudi Wahhabi ulama plans for allowing the Tablighi Jamaat tofunction in the country.[25] Yet, although it is claimed that the Saudi monarch and several of his

ulama welcomed the prospect, the movement was not allowed to establish a presence in Saudi

Arabia. The situation remains the same today. It appears that the fact that the movements Deobandi

links were a major cause for concern on the part of numerous Saudi Wahhabi ulama, who regarded

the Deobandi tradition as bidaah and as promoting shirk. Further, it might also be that the Saudi

authorities viewed with concern the possibility of any independent, particularly foreign-based,

Islamic movement, such as the Tablighi Jamaat, being active in their own country, fearing that it

might work to undermine their own legitimacy.

The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the somewhat ambiguous attitude of theirelders towards the Ahl-i Hadith and the Wahhabis till at least the late 1970s, when the situation

began to change with new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the

Soviets the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and had a far larger

presence than the Ahl-i Hadith, in both Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi

funding began making its way to Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters

armed with a passion for jihad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a shariah -centric


15/24

Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties. The Pakistani Deobandis were, on the whole,

not reluctant to accept such assistance, despite the views of their own elders about the Wahhabis.

Over time, in India, too, several Deobandi ulama are said to have begun receiving Saudi aid, in some

form or the other, for their madrasas and other religious institutions. It is said that several Deobandi

leaders sort to court prospective Saudi patrons by claiming to be fellow defenders of authentic

monotheism, adducing their fierce and unremitting critiques of the Barelvis as evidence. Naturally,

the newly established links with Saudi patrons forced them to reconsider their own position on

Wahhabism and the Saudi state.

A clear indication of the flexibility that the Deobandis were willing to display in their relations with

the Saudi Wahhabis was the publication in 1978 of a book revealingly titled Shaikh Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab Ke Khilaf Propaganda Aur Hindustan Ke Ulama-i Haq Par Uske Asrat (The

Propaganda Against Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and Its Impact on the True

Ulama).[26] The timing of the publication was significant. It came at a time when the Deobandis, in

both India and Pakistan, were increasingly turning to Saudi patrons, following the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan. This necessitated a thorough revision of the Deobandi understanding and presentation

of Saudi Wahhabism and of its founder. As earlier pointed out, several Deobandi elders had bitterly

critiqued Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, going so far as to declare him, for all practical terms, as

anti-Muslim. Now, however, the increasingly close relations between certain Deobandis and Saudi

patrons called for both an apology and an explanation for the bitter critique of the founding-father of

Wahhabism by the elders of Deoband. This is precisely what this book set out to do.

The author of the book, the late Manzur Numani (d.1997), was one of the leading Indian Deobandi

ulama, having served as member of the governing council (majlis-i shura) of the Deoband madrasa

for many years. He had dozens of books to his credit and was the founder and editor of the widely

circulated Urdu magazine al-Furqan. A fiercely committed Deobandi, he wrote extensively against

the Barelvis and the Shias and in defence of Deobandi doctrines. His book in praise of Muhammad

bin Abdul Wahhab has gone into numerous editions, a sign of its considerable popularity in

Deobandi circles. He described the book as the outcome of a dream of the then rector of the Deoband

madrasa, the late Qari Muhammad Tayyeb, who, he wrote, had repeatedly requested him to write a

full-fledged bookto bridge the gulf and remove the misunderstandings between the Deobandis and

the followers of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, both of whom he is said to have regarded as

servants of the faith and as upholders of monotheism and the sunnah. The book appea rs to have

received the official approval of several leading Deobandi ulama, concerned as they were about

improving relations with the Saudis, including, probably, prospective Saudi patrons. In fact, in theconcluding section Numani explicitly stated that the book laid out the position of the ulama of

Deoband. He backed this claim by including the testimonies of two leading Deobandi ulama, the late

Muhammad Zakariya Kandhalavi, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat

movement, and Qari Muhammad Tayyeb. Zakariyas statement declared the book to be very

good.[27] For his part, Tayyeb heaped praises on the book, and claimed that it finally proved that

there is actually no difference of principle (usuli ikhtilaf) between the Deobandis and the


16/24

Wahhabis, and that to a very great extent they are united. He also advised that the book be

translated into Arabic as soon as possible.[28] The book was later rendered into Arabic in order to

convince Arab readers, including possible patrons, that the Deobandis were not opposed to

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers.

Numani begins his book by claiming that because of the wave of virulent propaganda unleashed by

the religious and political enemies of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, numerous true ulama

(ulama-i haq) (by which Numani probably means the ulama of Deoband) unwittingly opposed his

message. He stresses the point that the Deobandi elders were not alone in this. Numerous Indian

Ahl-i Hadith leaders, he points out, also shared the same opinion, and one of them, Siddiq Hasan

Khan, even penned a tract condemning him. He seeks to suggest that the initial opposition to

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab on the part of some Deobandi elders might have stemmed, in part,

from the influence of Khans writings. This point is crucial, for it enables him to counter the Ahl -i

Hadith claim of always and unanimously having being supportive of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab

and his mission, an argument which the Ahl-i Hadith generally use in order to gain Saudi support.

He then hastens to add that when the truth of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs mission and

message dawned on them the Deobandi elders did not hesitate to retract their statements against

him and to express support for him and his mission.[29]

Numani takes, as a case in point, the views of the rector of the Deoband madrasa, Husain Ahmad

Madani, who, as noted earlier, penned a book bitterly attacking Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. As

a child, Numani writes, Madani was brought up to understand that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab

and the Wahhabis generally were fierce enemies of Islam. This was, he says, a result of a massive

propaganda campaign conducted in India and elsewhere against the Wahhabis by their enemies,

who regarded the Wahhabi movement as a major challenge to their own authority and privileges as

custodians of Sufi shrines. Numani probably makes this point deliberately to stress the Barelvi

opposition to Wahhabism and to deny any Deobandi involvement in the matter. Because in his early

years Madani did not have access to the truth about the Wahhabis, and because of the influence of

the anti-Wahhabi campaign, Madani, Numani admits, did write against Muhammad bin Abdul

Wahhab. In 1910 he penned a tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqib, fiercely denouncing him and his followers.

However, later on, when he read the books of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for himself, he is said

to have realised that his message was actually one of pure monotheism and a bitter, and, therefore,

legitimate, critique of bidaah. After this apparent change of views, he is said to have heaped praises

on Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for launching a jihad against those who bow before graves, ask

the dead for help, construct domes over graves and engage in other such polytheistic practices.[30]The reference here is to groups like the Barelvi opponents of the Deobandis. The point is probably

deliberately made in order to stress the common commitment of both the Deobandis and the Saudi

Wahhabis to the extirpation of what they regard as bidaah. In order to argue the case for a radical

change in Madanis views about Wahhabism Numani argues that after recognising the reality and

alleged legitimacy of Wahhabism Madani worked closely with several Wahhabi ulama, particularly

in the governing council of the Saudi-based World Muslim League, of which he was appointed a


17/24

member in 1965. His involvement in the work of the League is said to have brought him in close

touch with two prominent Saudi Wahhabi scholars, Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, chief

mufti of Saudi Arabia, and Shaikh Abdullah bin Humid, a senior official Saudi religious leader.

Numani hastens to add that these two scholars were very pious Muslims and good models of

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs message and movement.[31]

The same radical change of views, Numani claims, occurred in the case of another leading Deobandi

scholar, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri. Under the influence of the anti-Wahhabi propaganda,

Saharanpuri declared the Wahhabis to be outside the Sunni fold. In his al-Tasdiqat he went so far as

to brand Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers as kafirs and traitors (baghi). However,

like Madani, after he read the books of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for himself he is said to have

realised the error of his earlier views. He then recanted from them and wrote in favour of the

Wahhabi movement, and even went to the extent of claiming that there was not even a grain of

difference between the Wahhabis and the other Sunnis. Further, he is said to have come out in

support of the Saudi government at a time when it was being fiercely criticised by the Barelvis and

Shias, by claiming that it was truly religious.[32]

After struggling to defend his Deobandi elders from the charge of being anti-Wahhabi, Numani

shifts to discussing the present Saudi regime and the question of its Islamic legitimacy. Since the

underlying aim of his book seems to be to prove the similarities between the Deobandism and

Wahhabism and to encourage greater cooperation between the Deobandis and the Saudis, it is

hardly surprising that Numani presents the Saudi regime in glowing terms. Thus, he proclaims that

the Saudi state is based on Islam, obedience of the shariah and the sunnah, and is the true heir of

the pure Islamic state established by Ibn Saud. He even goes so far as to declare that, as far as he is

aware, Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world that is governed strictly according to the

prescriptions of the Quran and the sunnah. In support of this claim he cites the fact that in Saudi

Arabia thieves are punished with their hands being chopped off, unmarried adulteresses are whipped

and male adulterers are stoned to death, all in accordance with Islamic law. Added evidence for this

assertion is the alleged piety of Saudi Arabias rulers. Numani describes the Saudi king as a model

Muslim monarch. The Saudi ruler is, he says, praise be to God, strictly observant of the fasts, prayers

and religious duties, and insists that his subjects follow in the same path. This, Numani says, is the

result of the great blessings of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs movement. Aware of the enormous

influence of the al-Shaikh family, descendants of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Numani also

refers to them in laudable terms. The family, he says, has produced numerous illustrious Islamic

scholars, and this, Numani claims, is undoubtedly an immense blessing from God. [33]

Numanis presentation of the Wahhabi doctrine and the Saudi state appears to have been carefully

calculated to minimise points of difference between Wahhabism and the Deobandi understanding

of Islam and to focus only on issues on which they are agreed, in order to argue that there were no

fundamental differences between the two, particularly on the question of pure monotheism and

opposition to bidaah. Thus, the fact that, in contrast to the Wahhabis, the Deobandis believe in the

legitimacy of Sufism, although of a shariah-minded sort, and that they insist on the need for taqlid of


18/24

one of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence, was conveniently ignored. This

can be said to be a reflection of a growing Wahhabisation of Deobandism under Arab influence. This

explanation is only partially valid, however. It appears that Numani was, in fact, deliberately seeking

to conceal the major differences between the Deobandis and the Saudi Wahhabis. Critics accused

Numani of doing so simply in order to win the favour of prospective Arab donors. This charge was

levelled by several Ahl-i Hadith scholars, probably angered at the prospect of growing links between

their Deobandi rivals and patrons in Saudi Arabia.

Numanis book was met with a swift rebuttal by numerous Ahl-i Hadith scholars, who accused him

of deliberately distorting the reality of Husain Ahmad Madanis views, and that of the Deobandis

generally, on Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab in order to win Saudi support. In 1986, the Jamia

Salafiya, Varanasi, the main Ahl-i Hadith madrasa in India, published a lengthy diatribe against

Numanis book penned by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Mahfuz ur-Rahman Faizi.[34] In his

preface to the book, Safi ur-Rahman Mubarakpuri, a leading Indian Ahl-i Hadith alim, quoted at

length from Madanis al-Shahab al-Shaqib, pointing out that Madani had fiercely condemned

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, reserving the choicest epithets for him. He claimed that Madani

had left no stone unturned to vilify the Sa udi rulers. He added that even at the present time the

Deobandis were secretly carrying on in that tradition, while cunningly seeking to brand the Saudi

governments true well-wishers (by which he meant the Ahl-i Hadith) as its enemies. Numanis

book, he claimed, was part of this sinister plot.[35]

Developing this argument further, Faizi claimed that Numani had unfairly accused certain pioneers

of the Ahl-i Hadith in India, most notably Siddiq Hasan Khan, of having been opposed to

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. He had gone so far as to wrongly claim that Madanis initial

opposition to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab owed to the influence of Khans alleged anti-Wahhabi

writings. Faizi stoutly defended Khan from the charge of having been opposed to Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab. He quoted profusely from Khans various writings to show that he considered

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab to have been a true Sunni and a staunch and passionate defender of

the Quran and the sunnah. He admitted that in some minor matters Khan and certain other earlier

Ahl-i Hadith had differences with the Wahhabis but this did not mean, he said, that, as Numani

had tried to argue, they were opposed to them. Numani had, he claimed, deliberately ignored the

praise that Khan and other early Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars had showered on Muhammad bin

Abdul Wahhab in order to prove that the early Deobandis were not alone in opposing him, and

that, like them, some Ahl-i Hadith ulama had also expressed their hostility towards his movement. If

Madani had been influenced by the alleged writings of Khan against the Wahhabis, how was it, Faiziasked, that he had completely ignored Khans other writings that portrayed them in glowing terms?

This itself proved, Faizi insisted, that Madanis opposition to the Wahhabis was not a result of the

influence of Khans writings.

Faizi also dismissed Numanis argument that Madani was simply an innocent victim of the massive

anti-Wahhabi propaganda that the enemies of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had u nleashed. He

pointed out that Madani had spent more than a dozen years in the Hijaz, where he could have gained


19/24

a true understanding of Wahhabism if he had cared to. Further, at the time of writing his book

against Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, a considerable deal of pro-Wahhabi literature, purporting

to present a true image of the movement, was available in India and Arabia, in both Urdu and

Arabic. Given this, how was it, Faizi asked, that Madani did not care to consult these authentic

sources while writing his book? The fact that Madani did not refer to these books itself showed that

he was not simply an innocent victim of anti-Wahhabi propaganda, contrary to what Numani had

claimed, Faizi insisted.

Numanis claim that Madani later retracted his anti-Wahhabi views was also dismissed by Faizi,

who argued that his note disclaiming his earlier stance was published in the columns of an anti-

Deobandi newspaper, and was not widely known among the Deobandis themselves. If Madani had

genuinely changed his position on Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers, Faizi asked,

how was it that this clarificatory note did not appear in subsequent editions of his al-Shahab al-

Shaqib, which, he claimed, continued to be published un-amended? As further evidence of his claim

that Madani had not actually changed his views on the Wahhabis, Faizi quoted from Madanis

autobiography, published almost three decades after he wrote al-Shahab al-Shaqib, where he is said

to have repeated the same charges against the Wahhabis that he made in his earlier work, branding

them as extremists (sakht ghali), and as having given immense trouble to their opponents, because

of which, Madani wrote, the people of Mecca and Medina hate them and the Hijazis detest

Wahhabism more than Christianity and Judaism. In his autobiography Madani also allegedly

charged the Wahhabis with blasphemy (gustakhana kalimat) against the Prophet, and claimed that

the Deobandis had not even the remotest relations with Wahhabi beliefs. As further confirmation

of the fact that Madani had never changed his anti -Wahhabi views, Faizi quoted Madani has

having written in an article published in the Deobandi journal al-Jamiat in 1952 that Muhammad

bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers had gone astray (gumrah) and, hence, were to be countedamong the Kharijites, implying, therefore, that they could not be considered part of the Sunni

fold.[36]

*

The controversy that erupted in the 1980s over Numanis book illustrated the fact that Saudi

assistance to selected Deobandi ulama and their schools in India and Pakistan was seen by Ahl -i

Hadith scholars and leaders as a major challenge, fearing, critics claim, that this would mean a

diminution in their own earnings from generous Arab patrons. This, at least, is how several

Deobandis explain the fierce diatribe mounted by some Ahl-i Hadith scholars against them in recent

years. In addition to this, Saudi pressure is said to have been behind the escalation of Ahl-i Hadithpolemical attacks on the Deobandis. Thus, a leading Indian Barelvi scholar, Yasin Akhtar Misbahi,

writes that although some early Deobandis were vehemently opposed to Muhammad bin Abdul

Wahhab and his movement, later, in order to ingratiate themselves with oil-rich Saudis, the

Deobandis sought to come closer to the Wahhabis and even to identify with them. This, he says,

continued till 1991, that is till the outbreak of the first Gulf War, when the Saudis, fearing an Iraqi

invasion, called in American troops and allowed them to be stationed in the country. Not a single


20/24

Muslim in India and Pakistan, Misbahi writes, approved of this step, not even the Deobandis who

had earlier received considerable financial assistance from the Saudis. This is why, he argues,

relations between the Deobandis and the Saudis began to sharply deteriorate, resulting in a massive

propaganda campaign conducted by the Najdis against the Deobandis of South Asia.[37]

A turning point in Ahl-i Hadith-Deobandi relations was the publication in the late 1990s of a book

titled ad-Deobandiyah, penned by a certain Sayyed Talib ur-Rahman, a Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith

scholar based in Saudi Arabia who is said to work for an official Saudi Islamic organisation. The book

was published by a Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith institution, the Dar ul-Kitab wal Sunnah in Karachi, and,

a critic alleges, was delivered, in a well planned manner, to the shaikhs of the Hijaz and Najd and to

[Saudi] government offices. Probably deliberately, the book was written in Arabic and widely

distributed in Saudi Arabia itself, in order to turn Saudi opinion, including that of the Saudi state and

rich Saudi patrons, against the Deobandis. The book is said to have openly declared the Deobandis as

apostates and mushriks (polytheists), and to have even argued th at many Deobandis had gone even

further [in their infidelity] than the polytheists of Mecca. It was alleged that the book claimed that

the Deobandi ulama were totally bereft of faith in monotheism, and that some leading Deobandis

attributed lies to God, tampered with the Quran and entertained stern hatred for the upholders of

monotheism and the sunnah of the Prophet.[38] Along with their fellow Barelvi Hanafis they were

described as quburin (grave worshippers) for their veneration of prophets and saints and for their

practice of offering fatiha (the opening verse of the Quran) at the graves of the dead.[39]

Shortly after the publication of ad-Deobandiyah, a series of similar books, making somewhat the

same sort of arguments, began to appear in Arabic and Urdu in India and Pakistan, as well as in

Saudi Arabia itself. Several of these, it is alleged, were sponsored, directly or otherwise, by rich Saudi

patrons. Most of them were authored by Indian and Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith scholars, although a few

were penned by Saudi shaikhs. One such book, published in both Arabic and Urdu by the Riyadh-

based Maktab al-Tawuni al-Dawah wal-Irshad, and distributed in large quantities to Muslim

pilgrims during the Haj season, allegedly declared the Deobandis to be effectively outside the Sunni

fold, and, hence, implicitly, outside the pale of Islam itself. A second book, written in Arabic by a

Saudi mufti, Shaikh Hamud bin Abdullah, referred to the Deobandis and the Tablighi Jamaat as

wrongful innovators (bidaati) and as having gone astray (gumrah) and even as being a Satanic

sect (shaitani jamaat). It claimed that the foremost effort of the Tablighis was to spread

innovations in Gods religion and to oppose the sunnah of the Prophet.[40] Another simi lar book,

penned by a certain Shamsuddin Salafi, a South Asian graduate of the Mecca-based Islamic

University, referred to the Deobandis as the sect of grave worshippers (firqa al-quburiya), andhence, for all practical purposes, as outside the pale of Islam.[41]Salafi is said to have described the

Hanafi ulama as polytheists and dwellers of hell.[42] A third book, published in 2001, bore the

provocative title of Are the Ulama of Deoband Sunnis?. Its cover flap proudly proclaimed that

thousands of copies of the book had been published in Saudi Arabia. The book consisted of a

virulent diatribe against the Deobandis, accusing them of all manner of un-Islamic beliefs and

practices. As evidence for this claim, the author argued that the Deobandis alleged insistence on


21/24

taqlid even if the prescriptions of the schools of fiqh violate the Quran and Hadith went against the

practice of Muhammads companions.[43] The Deobandis, he claimed, like their fellow Hanafi

Barelvis, follow various Sufi practices and enrol in different Sufi orders, whereas this was unknown

at the time of the Prophet. Unlike Muhammads companions, the Deobandis, as well as the Barelvis,

believe that the Prophet is still alive. Hence, the author concluded, many Deobandi ulama cannot be

considered to be Sunnis or Muslims at all.[44] The assumption, as well as conclusion, probably is

that the Ahl-i Hadith, who are presented as identical with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, alone can

claim to represent genuine Sunnism, the single saved sect. An even more hard-hitting attack on the

Deobandis, and on the Hanafis generally, was a book which appeared in 1999, authored by an Indian

Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Abu Iqbal Salafi. It bore the provocative title Mazhab-i Hanafi Ka Mazhab-i

Islam Se Ikhtliaf (The Opposition of the Hanafi Religion to the Religion of Islam), thus clearly

announcing the authors conviction that the Hanafis, including both Deobandis as well as Barelvis,

were not Muslims at all. The book went on to declare in no uncertain terms that the Hanafi religion

had no relation whatsoever with Islam, which, the author argued, was synonymous with the Ahl-i

Hadith. Thus, the author claimed that the Hanafis regarded Imam Abu Hanifa, and not Allah, astheir deity (rab), and that they worshipped him.[45] The Hanafi religion, he argued, was totally

opposed to Islam and fully against the Quran and the Hadith, and was, in fact, invented by Islams

enemies to undermine it. The Hanafis were, he said, identical to the Jews, who, he c laimed, were

inveterate enemies of Islam. Because of this, he went on, the Hanafis did not recognise the Quran

and the Hadith, and in fact, bore enmity against the Islamic scriptures. He also charged the Hanafis

with abusing the companions of the Prophet and for allegedly giving a higher status to their Imam

than to Muhammad.[46] He made no exceptions in this regard, effectively branding all Hanafis as

infidels. Thus, he insisted, All Hanafis follow the Hanafi religion (mazhab-i hanafi) and not the

religion of Islam (mazhab-i islam), claiming that the two were completely different.[47]

As part of their campaign against the Deobandis, South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholars appear to havepaid considerable attention to conveying to various Arab Wahhabi shaikhs, mostly resident in Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, information about the false and un-Islamic beliefs

of their Deobandi rivals. This is illustrated in the number of articles penned and fatwas delivered by

leading Arab Wahhabi ulama against the Deobandis in recent years, a fairly new development.

These writings and pronouncements have been given considerable publicity by Ahl-i Hadith websites

and publishing houses, aware as they are of the prestige and authority that the views and statements

of Arab ulama carry among many South Asian Muslims. An interesting case in point is an Ahl -i

Hadith website, probably based in India, www. allahuakbar.net. This site hosts numerous fatwas

against the Deobandis and the Tablighi Jamaat (in addition to groups like the Barelvis, Shias and

the Jamaat-i Islami) delivered by important Arab Wahhabi scholars. One of the fatwas, delivered by

Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, declares the Tablighi Jamaat as containing many

deviations, including aspects of bidaah and shirk. Accordingly, bin Baz argues that it is not

permissible for a Muslim to join the movement unless he has knowledge and accompanies the

Tablighis simply to disapprove of them and in order to teach them [the truth] so that they leave

their falsehood and embrace the way of the Ahl us-Sunnah wal-Jamaah.[48] The implicit message

contained in this statement is, therefore, that the Tablighis cannot be said to follow the Sunni way.


22/24

In a second fatwa hosted on the website bin Baz is quoted as having explicitly declared the Tablighis

outside the Sunni fold.[49] The website carries yet another fatwa, issued by the late Saudi-based

Wahhabi scholar Shaikh Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani, condemning the Tablighis for not

uphold[ing] the manjah (method) of the Book of Allah and the sunnah of His Messenger and for

being association with Sufism. al-Albani then go on to declare it impermissible for true Muslims to

join the movement.[50] The website hosts several similar articles and fatwas against the Tablighis by

other leading Arab Wahhabi scholars, including Shaikh Abu Abd ur-Rahman Muqbil bin Hadi al-

Wadi, Shaikh Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, Shaikh Salih bin Fouzan al-Fouzan, Shaikh Muhammad

bin Ibrahim al-Shaikh and Shaikh Abdur Razzaq Afifi.[51] The website also carries several articles by

both Arab and South Asian Wahhabi scholars against the Deobandis in general, accusing them of

shirk and bidaah, and, hence, implying that they cannot be considered to be genuine Sunnis or even

as proper Muslims at all.[52]

Efforts by the Ahl-i Hadith to win support among the Arab Wahhabi ulama for their campaign

against the Deobandis seem to have met with considerable success. A clear indication of this is the

fact that leading South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholars have managed to prevail upon the Saudi-managed Islamic University of Medina to ban the publication of the Tafsir-i Usmani, an Urdu

translation of the Quran by Mahmud ul-Hasan (d.1920), for many years the rector of the Deoband

madrasa, and a commentary on it by another leading Deobandi, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. This book

had reportedly been published for many years by an official Saudi publishing house, the Medina-

based King Fahd Complex for Printing the Holy Quran, for mass distribution. Its publication is said

to have been stopped after Ahl-i Hadith activists claimed that it propagated anti-Islamic beliefs such

as appealing to the people of the grave (ahl-i qubur) for help. By arguing that the Deobandis were

not true or full Muslims, the Ahl-i Hadith managed to convince the Saudi authorities to replace

Mahmud ul-Hasans translation of the Quran by one written by a leading Indian Ahl-i Hadith

scholar, Maulana Muhammad Junagadhi.[53]The success of the Ahl-i Hadith in their campaign against the Deobandis was not limited to winning

the support of key Saudi ulama. Some Deobandis themselves, so Ahl-i Hadith soures claim, are also

said to have been won over to the Ahl-i Hadith fold in the wake of the heated polemical exchanges

between the two groups. The most dramatic such conversion was that of Muhammad Anas,

proprietor of the Idara-i Ishaat-i Diniyat, a New Delhi-based Islamic publishing house associated

with the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat. This story was widely touted about by the Ahl-i Hadith

as proof of the falsity of Deobandi beliefs and of the claim of the Ahl -i Hadith as being the sole

genuine Sunni sect. The interview was reproduced in full, in Urdu and in English translation, in the

form of a booklet, on audio cassettes and on Ahl-i Hadith websites.[54] Muhammad Aqil, the Saudi-

based editor of the booklet, termed Anas decision to join the Ahl-i Hadith as repentance (tauba)

and claimed that by abandoning the Tablighi Jamaat Anas had turned his back on polytheism and

wrongful innovation and had entered the fold of monotheism, thereby suggesting that the

Deobandis and Tablighis were not monotheists or Muslims themselves.[55] He attacked the Tablighi

Jamaat, and the Deobandis in general, for allegedly being a group devoted to spreading polytheistic

beliefs and wrongful practices, for tampering with (tahrif) the Quran and Hadith, and for allegedly

stopping their followers from reading the Quran and Hadith and thus of wrongly claiming to be


23/24

genuine Sunnis.[56] The Tablighi message, he declared, was an open invitation to distortion in the

true religion. For his part, Anas announced that following his conversion he had decided to stop the

publishing and sale of several dozen books, mainly texts penned by revered Deobandi elders, which,

he claimed, contained numerous wrong beliefs that were clearly against the Quran and Hadith. He

also revealed that he was replacing numerous books by Deobandi scholars by texts prepared by Ahl-i

Hadith ulama.[57] It was urgent, Anas argued, that the truth of the Ahl-i Hadith position be put

forward against the claims of the Deobandis, because, he insisted, the Deobandis did not properly

follow the Quran and the Hadith. Referring to the Tablighis, he said, Very few of their practices are

in accordance with the Quran and sunnah. Even their prayers are not in conformity with the

Prophetic practice, he claimed, referring to the Deobandi method of praying that differs in some

ways from that of the Ahl-i Hadith.[58] Prayers are the most important thing, he stressed, probably

suggesting that if the Deobandi, or Hanafi more generally, method of worship was wrong, it was

hardly surprising that in other respects, too, they had gone far astray from the practice of the

Prophet.

*

The publication of ad-Deobandiyah and similar literature and the banning of Mahmud ul-Hasans

translation of the Quran came as a summons for battle for the Deobandis. Being branded as

polytheists, and, therefore, effectively as apostates, was taken as a major insult. It was also probably

feared that such virulent anti-Deobandi propaganda, particularly when conducted inside Saudi

Arabia itself, could lead to a complete loss of valuable Saudi as well as other Arab patronage, besides

greatly tarnishing the image of the Deobandis throughout the Muslim world. The Deobandis were,

therefore, not slow in reacting. They responded with a powerful counter-attack, churning out

massive quantities of literature to prove that the Ahl-i Hadith had, in actual fact, no liking at all for

the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia and that their profession of being followers of Muhammad bin AbdulWahhab was just a clever ruse to attract Saudi money, thus repeating the Ahl-i Hadith charges

against them. In addition to claiming to represent the Wahhabi tradition themselves and denying

the claims of the Ahl-i Hadith in this regard, some Deobandi scholars penned tracts branding the

Ahl-i Hadith as being fiercely anti-Islamic. Thus, for instance, a Deobandi alim from Ghazipur

prepared a set of five books to denounce the Ahl-i Hadith and even launched a new journal, Zam-

Zam, devoted solely to rebutting Ahl-i Hadith doctrines. In order probably to curry favour with the

Saudis, he published a book in Arabic, possibly meant for prospective Arab patrons, arguing that the

Ahl-i Hadith were actually enemies of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab but falsely claimed to be his

followers simply in order to attract Arab funds.[59] Numerous other Deobandis followed with their

own tracts and books fiercely opposing the Ahl-i Hadith. Many of these books were penned in Arabic,

Documents

Wahabi Ahle Hadith Deobandi and Saudi Connection