W. Załuski - On (Un)Happiness From the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Theory and Neuroscience

8/11/2019 W. Zauski - On (Un)Happiness From the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Theory and Neuroscience

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Wojciech Zauski Jagiellonian University

Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies

On (Un)Happiness from the Viewpoint ofEvolutionary Theory and Neuroscience 1

Introduction

In this essay we shall present the main insights into the problemof happiness that have been provided by evolutionary theory andneuroscience and re ect on the limits of the scienti c approach tothis problem. We shall start by distinguishing arguably the three mainquestions about happiness, namely the conceptual : what is happi-ness; the empirical : what are the conditions of happiness; and the ax -iological : can happiness be an ethical ideal. As it transpires, ratherunsurprisingly, evolutionary theory and neuroscience can be help-ful in tackling the empirical question and unhelpful in tackling theremaining two questions. We shall also see that evolutionary theoryinspires some interesting, though rather speculative, hypotheses re-garding a more general problem (which can be viewed as connectedwith the empirical question) of whether human beings are destinedto be happy.

1 This paper was written within the research grant The Limits of Scienti c Explana -tion sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation.


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1. The Conceptual Question

In the history of philosophical thought two main concepts of happi -ness were developed: the eudaimonic and the hedonic (psychologi-cal). Both concepts can be treated as explications of a general accountof happiness as a high quality of life.

Hedonic happiness is psychological welfare. This concept of happiness implies, rst, that in order to determine whether an agent ishappy or not, one must draw up a balance of her personal pleasant and

painful experiences, and, second, that each person is the best judgeof her own happiness. Brie y: hedonic happiness is feeling good . Tomake this concept of happiness more determinate one must specifyhow such a balance is supposed to be made. Two problems must beresolved in this context: (a) whether hedonic happiness should be as-sessed on the basis of the agents experiences over her lifetime or onthe basis of her experiences at some particular moment (period) ormoments (periods) of her life; (b) how psychological welfare is to bede ned. Ref. (a). One can hardly call a person happy who has experi -enced only one happy moment in her life. Thus, it seems plausible tomaintain that each persons happiness can be assessed only by takinginto account this persons experiences over her lifetime. Two addi -tional options are open here: one can assess happiness on the basis oftotal pleasure (or net pleasure see point (b) below) or average pleas -ure (total pleasure divided by the number of years lived). The rst op -tion seems more plausible, for, arguably, one cannot discount, whilede ning a persons life to be happy or not, this persons length of life.Ref. (b). There are two main ways of striking a hedonic balance. The

rst consists in taking into account only the pleasant moments experi -enced over a lifetime. Thus, a happy life would be a long life abound-ing with pleasant moments. The second one consists in taking into ac-count both pleasant and painful moments and thereby making a net

balance of pleasure. Thus, a happy life would be a long life in whichthere is a surplus of pleasure over pain, and a life would be happier,the larger this surplus is. The second way seems more plausible, for,


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333On (Un)Happiness from the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Theory

arguably, a persons amount of negative experiences cannot be dis -counted in the overall hedonic evaluation of her life. This way may

also be supplemented by taking into account the fact that the surplusmay be generated by pleasures of different intensity. Now, it seemsthat among the pleasures of a happy person one must nd intenseones, because it may be rather dubious to call a person happy if theyhave lived a monotonous, dull life, consisting of small pleasures butdeprived of much pain and thereby producing a high surplus of pleas-ures. In sum: it seems that in order to decide whether a given persons

life was happy, one should make a balance of this persons pleasuresand pains over her lifetime, and know this persons total number of pleasures and the number of her intense pleasures. Thus, one can gen-erally say that a given person can be called hedonically happy if herlifespan was long, the hedonic balance was positive, she experiencedmany pleasures, and many of these pleasures were intense. But thisaccount is, of course, very sketchy. To esh it out one would have toenrich it by taking into account such subtle relationships as, for ex-ample, the fact the presence of strongly negative experiences in oneslife may have positive effects for the overall balance of our happiness(because such experiences are likely to increase our satisfaction witheven small pleasures), or the shape of the distribution of pains and

pleasures over a lifetime (arguably a life is more happy if its pleas-ure curve is increasing rather than decreasing, i.e., painful momentsare concentrated in the earlier stages of life, and pleasant ones in itslater stages).

Eudaimonic happiness is the realization of some normative ideaof a good life, e.g., a life which consists in the possibly extensive de-velopment of human potentialities, or in living in accordance with na-ture. Brie y: eudaimonic happiness is being good . According to themost famous Aristotelian conception of eudaimonic happiness,human beings can be called happy if they pursue a life in accordance

with reason, because reason is a differentia speci ca of the humanspecies. This concept of happiness implies the existence of a connec-tion between happiness and virtue. This connection can be construed


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in at least three different ways: happiness is virtue; virtue is a neces -sary and suf cient condition of happiness; virtue is a suf cient condi -

tion of happiness. The rst way seems most plausible: the remainingtwo are equivocal because they seem to assume the hedonic under -standing of happiness and tacitly identify eudaimonic happiness withvirtue. The concept of eudaimonic happiness implies that human be-ings may not know what is good for them, as they may not know theirown potentialities (or, more generally, they may ignore a normativeconception of a good life): there are pleasures which hinder the de-

velopment of human potential and pains which promote this develop-ment. Consequently, one may feel hedonically happy without beingeudaimonically happy and one may be eudaimonically happy with-out feeling hedonically happy (and even without knowing that one iseudaimonically happy).

There exist no conceptual relations between these two conceptsof happiness, but these concepts may remain in empirical relations,e.g., eudaimonic happiness may conduce to hedonic happiness (theexistence of such a relation was posited especially in classical an -cient and medieval philosophy). 2

2. The Empirical Question

In asking the question about the conditions of happiness, we shallmean by happiness its hedonic variety, because it is clear that theconditions of eudaimonic happiness are determined by an assumedconception of a good life. The question about the conditions of he -donic happiness can be posed in two different, though interrelated,ways: (1) is an individuals level of happiness constant or changea -

ble?; (2) does the level of our happiness depend on us?

2 More on the conceptual question can be found, for example, in R. Nozick, The Exa -mined Life: Philosophical Meditations , Simon & Schuster, New York 1990, pp. 99117and W. Tatarkiewicz, O szczciu , PWN, Warszawa 1979, pp. 1529.


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Ref. (1): one can formulate three main hypotheses in response tothis question.

(a) Hypothesis of a constant level of happiness .According to this hypothesis, happiness is entirely determined by

inner factors: our biological constitution (fate). This constitutiondecides how we deal with stress, whether we have an easygoing per-sonality, what our personal level of anxiety and stress is, etc.

(b) Hypothesis of a radically changeable level of happiness .According to this hypothesis, happiness is entirely determined by

events beyond our control (chance), or is entirely determined byour conscious efforts, or is entirely determined both by our consciousefforts and events beyond our control. This hypothesis has thereforethree variants.

(c) Hypothesis of a moderately changeable level of happiness .According to this hypothesis, happiness is entirely determined

by our biological constitution as well as by our conscious efforts and/or by events beyond our control. This hypothesis therefore also hasthree variants.

Ref. (2): one can formulate three main hypotheses in response tothis question.

(d) Hypothesis of a total independence of happiness of our conscious efforts.

According to this hypothesis, happiness depends solely on our biological constitution and/or events beyond our control. This hypo-thesis has therefore three variants.

(e) Hypothesis of full dependence of happiness on our consciousefforts.

According to this hypothesis, happiness depends solely on ourconscious efforts.

(f) Hypothesis of a partial dependence of happiness on our conscious efforts.

According to this hypothesis, happiness depends on our con-scious efforts and on our biological constitution and/or events be-yond our control. This hypothesis has therefore three variants.


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Different philosophers have assumed different hypotheses. Forinstance, the Stoics believed in hypotheses (b) and (e): they therefore

believed that fate and chance play no role in determining the levelof our happiness. 3 The hypotheses (c) and (f) (in their variants say-ing that human happiness depends on fate, chance, and our con-scious efforts) seem to be in accordance with the commonsense ac-count of the conditions of happiness. It should be noted, though, thatthere are at least two interesting arguments for the prima facie ratherstrongly paradoxical hypotheses (a) and (d). The rst argument relies

on the assumption of the existence of the so called happiness attrac-tor (the natural biological level of our happiness to which we areattracted), which is supposed to explain the fact that even impor-tant changes in our life do not, in the long run, seem to change thelevel of our happiness, that is, regardless of what we experience in ourlife our level of happiness appears to remain more or less the same. 4 The second argument appeals to research on identical twins, whichis purported to show that our level of happiness is determined by ourgenetic makeup. 5 Interestingly, the hypothesis (b) (in its version say -ing that happiness is entirely determined by events beyond our con-

3 McMahon makes an interesting remark regarding luck (chance) and fate as fac-McMahon makes an interesting remark regarding luck (chance) and fate as fac-tors in uencing human happiness: Strictly speaking, luck and fate are opposed, in thatone implies randomness and the other pre-established order. When considered fromthe standpoint of human happiness, however, the two are closely related, in that eachdenies the role of human agency in determining the course of human events. Whetherthe universe is predetermined or unfolds chaotically, what happens to us our happi -ness is out of our hands , D.M. McMahon, The Pursuit of Happiness. A History fromthe Greeks to the Present , Penguin, London 2007, p. 10. 4 Cf. J. Czapiski, Szczcie zudzenie czy konieczno? Cebulowa teoria szcz -

cia w wietle nowych danych empirycznych , [in:] Zudzenia, ktre pozwalaj y , eds.M. Kofta, T. Szustrowa, PWN, Warszawa 2001, pp. 266306. 5 Cf. D. Lykken, Happiness: The Nature and Nurture of Joy and Contentment , St.Martins Press, London 2000. In this book, Lykken, drawing on his study of the lifehistories of some three thousand identical and fraternal twins, argues for the existenceof a happiness set point largely determined by our genetic makeup (as Lykken writes,

Nearly 100 percent of the variation across people in the happiness set point seems to be due to individual differences in genetic makeup (p. 58). He has conceded, though,that our efforts and events beyond our control play an important role in whether wesucceed in achieving our happiness set point.


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trol) and the related hypothesis (d) (in its version saying that happi-ness depends solely on events beyond our control) can be ascribed

to the ancient Greeks as their natural, pre-philosophical attitude to -wards happiness. This attitude is re ected in the Greek term for hap -

piness eutychia , which means good luck; thus, according to an -cient Greeks, happiness is a matter of luck. 6

In the remainder of this section we shall evaluate the extent towhich biological sciences especially evolutionary theory and neu -roscience can contribute to answering the empirical question, that

is, can help decide between the competing hypotheses about the con-ditions of happiness.( Evolutionary theory ) Evolutionary theory does not say anything

about individual personality-based differences in the levels ofhappiness, i.e., it suggests that our biological constitution is more orless the same, but it seems to lead to three general hypotheses abouthappiness in general , i.e., about what this uniform biological consti-tution is like. First , from the standpoint of evolutionary theory, hap-

piness is not an ultimate goal of human actions but a means to realiz-ing a fundamental evolutionary goal: survival and reproduction (andtherefore spreading our genes). Humans are therefore not destinedto be happy but, rather, are destined to effectively pass on their

6 Cf. D.M. McMahon, The Pursuit , op. cit. , p. 68. In point of fact, happiness waslinked with luck and fate for the larger part of human history; the above-mentioned pre- -philosophical attitude of ancient Greeks was therefore also a pre-philosophical attitudeof other peoples. As Darrin McMahon wrote: It is striking that in virtually every Indo-European language, the modern word for happiness is cognate with luck, fortune, orfate. The root of happiness, for example, is the Middle English and Old Norse happ ,meaning chance, fortune, what happens in the world, giving us such words as hap-

penstance, haphazard, hapless, and perhaps. The French Bonheur , similarly,derives from bon (good) and the Old French heur (fortune or luck), an etymology thatis perfectly consistent with the Middle German Glck , still the German word for hap -

piness and luck. In Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, felicit , felicidad , and felicidade all stem from the Latin felix (luck, sometimes fate), and the Greek eudaimonia brings

together good fortune and good god. () In the Indo-European language families, hap - piness has deep roots in the soil of chance (pp.1011). Thus, the primitive meaning ofeudaimonia had a similar meaning to the eutychia; only later philosophers gave ita new meaning of a good life.


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genes to subsequent generations. They are designed to experiencehappiness only so long as it serves the evolutionary goals. Happiness

accompanies activities which promote these evolutionary goals (e.g.,eating, sex, pursuing social esteem) and thereby encourages human

beings to undertake these activities. Such activities trigger off neu-robiological mechanisms which give rise to the feelings of pleasure(i.e., trigger off the reward mechanisms) and the expectation of thesefeelings moves us to undertake these activities. Thus, evolutionarytheory points at the same time at the main types of the sources of our

happiness: these sources are activities promoting fundamental evo-lutionary goals. It should be stressed, though, that according to theadaptive lag-hypothesis (saying that our biological adaptations whichwere adaptive in ancestral environments in which our biological and

psychological dispositions had been shaped may fail to be adaptivein modern environments) our biological system of reward (dopamin-ergic system) may mis re, i.e., pleasure (hedonic happiness) mayaccompany non-adaptive activities. In other words, the axis pleasu-re-pain may diverge from the axis of biological tness the lackof biological tness. Second , in order for happiness to play its evo-lutionary role (i.e., to motivate to undertake tness-enhancing activi -ties), it must be ephemeral and transitory (because durable happinesswould amount to the lack of evolutionary progress) as well as not ex-cessively euphoric ( because durable happiness would probably hinderthe proper performance of our daily activities, which are a constantand self-propelling oscillation between satisfaction and dissatisfac-tion ). But evolutionary theory suggests also that even though happi-ness is transitory and non-euphoric human beings should be expectedto retain hope that they will reach a durable and euphoric happiness,since such hope is a powerful protection against their falling into de-spair and, consequently, against what may be called an evolutionaryimpasse. Thus, human beings can be expected to cherish an illusion-

ary hope that they can achieve durable happiness, since without sucha hope they would not so readily engage in activities leading to a tran-sitory variety of happiness necessary for the realization of the evolu -


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tionary goals. The phenomenon which consists in that human beingsare designed to become involved in a rather hopeless and painful

pursuit of durable happiness is referred to as hedonic treadmill;Darrin McMahon describes this phenomenon in the following way:

human beings display an undeniable tendency to quickly accom -modate themselves to their pleasures to grow bored and then

become anxious or uneasy in their satisfaction. Like junkies inneed of a x, we need a variety in our pleasures or greater doses of

the same when initial rush wears off. It is this longing a formof pain that sends un in renewed pursuit. () the hedonic tread -mill () has been adapted by natural selection to sustain us inlife. () although natural selection has conditioned us to experi -ence pleasure in activities that contribute tour survival, it disposesus to quickly adapt to them and then to strive for a little more. Inthis view, enduring satisfaction or permanent contentment wouldnot be conducive to survival. It is in our interest and so in ourgenes always to be slightly wanting, restlessly searching for fur -ther satisfaction. A bit if anxiety keeps us on guard against danger,and a bit of unful lled desire keeps us on the chase, ever eager toensure our survival and that of our kin. 7

It should be noted that this phenomenon was well known to manythinkers and religious reformers (e.g. Schopenhauer and Buddha) andconstituted one, perhaps especially important, grounds of their pessi-mistic evaluation of the human condition. The merit of evolutionarytheory lies, therefore, not in discovering this phenomenon but in ex-

plaining its origins. Third , evolutionary theory suggests that, in gen-eral, human beings are rather unhappy in the deepest layer of their per-sonality, although hopeful of attaining happiness; they are unhappy inthe following sense: since their ancestors lived in a hostile world in

which things that posed a danger to them were more numerous than

7 D.M. McMahon, The Pursuit , op. cit. , pp. 422423.


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those which favoured them (or perhaps more precisely: in which non--avoiding dangerous things was much more costly than overlooking

favourable things) they must have developed acute vigilance in or-der to avoid those dangerous things. Thus, a mental climate which

prevails in human lives is the climate of anxiety, of worry arising outof an awareness of present and future dangers. In other words, forthe larger part of their life human beings experience dejection andworry, because their brains reached their nal form at the time whenfear and alertness were adaptive emotions. One can therefore say that

evolutionary theory supports Heideggers claim that the fundamentalcategory of human existence is Sorge (care). This claim is consistentwith a well-justi ed hypothesis according to which human beings ex -hibit the negativity bias: their brains are constructed above all witha view to noticing and reacting against dangers and obstacles; accord -ingly, their reactions and feelings towards dangerous things are fasterand more intense than reactions and feelings towards positive things. 8 The assertion that, from the standpoint of evolutionary theory, human

beings are in the deepest layer of their personality rather unhappy, isof course also fully consonant with and supported by the aforemen-tioned claim about the existence of the hedonic treadmill. Fourth ,evolutionary thinking is an inspiration of the following, assuredlyapt, remark of Bertrand Russell about unhappiness arising from theeasy satisfaction of natural needs: The human animal, like others, isadapted to a certain amount of struggle for life, and when by meansof great wealth homo sapiens can gratify all his whims without ef-fort, the mere absence of effort from his life removes an essential in-gredient of happiness. 9 The aforementioned evolutionary hypothesesabout human happiness seem very plausible, with the possible excep-

8 On negativity bias see, e.g., J. Haidt, Szczcie. Od mdroci staroytnych po kon -cepcje wspczesne , translated by A. Nowak, GWP, Gdask 2006, pp. 6267. On the

adaptive value of low moods see, e.g., R.M. Nesse, Is Depression an Adaptation? ,Arch Gen Psychiatry 2000; vol. 57, pp. 1420. 9 B. Russell, The Conquest of Happiness , W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York London 1996 (First published in 1930).


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tion of the hypothesis that human beings are, at the deepest layer oftheir personality, rather unhappy: this last hypothesis is likely to be

at odds with some or perhaps even many peoples intuitive sentimentthat the natural state of human beings is that of hedonic indifferenceor even moderate happiness rather than Sorge .

( Neuroscience ) Neuroscience provides some insights not onlyinto human happiness in general but also into the causes of individ-ual differences in the levels of happiness: it sheds some light on what

biological factors decide that some human beings are, over their life-

time, happier than others. Let us make a short survey of this research. First , as is well known, research on the brain has shown that the hu-man brain is composed of various parts ful lling different, hetero -genic functions. There are two main divisions of the human brain.The rst one is between the old (emotional) brain (the limbic sys -tem: hypothalamus, hippocampus, and amygdala) and the new (in-tellectual) brain; the other is between left hemisphere and right hem -isphere. Jonathan Haidt plausibly argues that it is doubtful that agentsequipped with such a brain with a divided self may ever attainhappiness. 10 This insight harmonizes with the above mentioned evo-lutionary insight that, to use the Heideggerian jargon, the central cate -gory characterizing human existence is the category of Sorge . Clearly,such a structure of the brain is fully understandable from the stand-

point of evolutionary theory: the human brain has been built step bystep over an enormously long period of time in the process of naturalselection rather than having been planned from the start by some in-telligent designer. Second , the neurobiological research has demon-strated that when human beings experience hedonic happiness theirleft prefrontal lobe becomes activated. This brain structure comprisesmany neurotransmitters (dopamine, serotonin, GABA) which are re -sponsible for the transport of positive signals to the limbic system.Research on one-year children has shown that those of them who have

more active left prefrontal lobe do not cry when left alone as opposed

10 Cf. J. Haidt , Szczcie , op. cit. , pp. 1752.


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to children with a less active left prefrontal lobe. Accordingly, it has been hypothesized that this brain structure is responsible for our af-

fective style and thereby for our (un)happiness potential; if onesright prefrontal lobe is more active than the left one then one exhibitsthe style which consists in distancing, worrying that one may makea mistake, preoccupation with potential criticism in short: one isthen predestined to be more unhappy. One can therefore say that,to a certain extent, some human beings are genetically predestined to

be more happy than others (or less unhappy than others) to a cer -

tain extent because the human brain is plastic, especially before the period of maturity, and various factors (e.g., intense stress) may makea child less happy than would result from her genetic makeup. 11 Thisstyle is therefore not unchangeable: one may change to a certain de-gree by, for example, meditation, cognitive therapy, or various medi-cines. As for the last way of changing our affective style, it should bementioned that research conducted within psychopharmacology andneuroscience has shown that and how (i.e., through the medium ofwhat biological mechanisms) certain medicines may in uence ourhedonic happiness (e.g. Prozac may change our affective style bymaking us worry less by making us perceive the world as full of

positive possibilities rather than as a source of potential dangers). 12 Third , Hans Eysenck distinguished three dimensions of human per -sonality (introversion-extraversion; neuroticism; psychoticism andargued ( inter alia ) that these three dimensions have neurobiologi-cal bases. 13 Now, it has been hypothesized that our individual levelof happiness is determined by a combination of these dimensions insuch a way that happy people are most frequently extrovert, non-neu -rotic, and non-psychotic.

11 But one may, of course, ask whether this brain structure creates or re ects the stateof happiness.12 Cf. P.D. Kramer, Listening to Prozac , Penguin Books, Toronto 1994.13 Cf. H.J. Eysenck, Dimensions of Personality , Transaction Publishers, London 1997(First published in 1947); H.J. Eysenck, S.B.G. Eysenck, Psychoticism as a Dimensionof Personality , Hodder and Stoughton, London 1976.


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Let us summarize. The research pursued within the biologicalscien ces has led to two main conclusions related to the hypotheses

about the conditions of human happiness. The rst conclusion (sup - ported especially by neuroscience) says that much of variance in thelevels of happiness experienced by human beings can be accountedfor by variance in our biological constitutions. Consequently, thisconclusion undermines those hypotheses about the conditions of hu-man happiness which neglect the role of fate of our biologicalconstitution in determining the levels of our happiness (i.e., those

hypotheses which explain individual differences in human happinessonly by events beyond our control and/or our conscious efforts). Thesecond (more controversial) conclusion concerns not so much theconditions of human happiness, as human happiness in general: it as-serts that whatever conditions may determine our level of happiness,we shall always be, in the deepest layer of our personality, rather un-happy than happy. To reconcile these two conclusions one can simplyreformulate the former by saying that those with a favourable bio-logical constitution will experience over their lifetime less unhappi-ness than those with an unfavourable biological constitution.

3. The Axiological Question

The axiological question will be answered differently depending onthe assumed concept of happiness. Clearly, eudaimonic happiness(being good) can be an ethical ideal and as such was assumedwithin classical philosophy. What is controversial is whether hedonichappiness (feeling good) can be regarded as an ethical ideal. He-donistic ethics assumes that hedonic happiness is the highest value,the highest good, or an intrinsic value. Anti-hedonistic ethics as-sumes that hedonic happiness cannot be an ethical ideal. Anti-hedon-

istic ethics may take a more or less negative attitude towards hedonichappiness. According to asceticism, hedonic happiness is inherentlywrong. According to other anti-hedonic ethics (e.g. Platonic) hedonic


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happiness is not inherently wrong but it is wrong when it is given pri-ority over other higher values (as was memorably put by Kant,

one of the most famous representatives of the anti-hedonistic ethics,we should not aim at being happy but at becoming worthy of hap-

piness). There are several plausible ethical arguments in favour ofanti-hedonistic ethics, i.e., arguments against treating hedonic hap-

piness as an intrinsic value: we have qualms of conscience when inthe case of con ict between hedonic happiness and other goods wehave given priority to the former; we give a higher valuation to he -

donic happiness if it is generated by realization of some praisewor-thy deeds; hedonic happiness owing from evil acts is not regardedas good. 14 These arguments show that hedonistic ethics is at oddswith our deeply embedded ethical intuitions. One can also formu-late non-ethical arguments against treating hedonic happiness as anethical idea. For instance, it has been maintained that hedonic happi-ness would be a self-defeating ideal: it is not attained by those whoconsciously pursue it; it can only be attained as a side-effect ofour pursuing other valuable ends. 15 Another non-ethical or perhapsquasi-ethi cal argument against treating hedonic happiness as an in -trinsic value (an argument advanced by many thinkers, especially by

Nietzsche), says that hedonic happiness, unlike physical and mentalsuffering, makes us uncreative, hinders us from discovering our po-tentialities. As we can see, in answering the axiological question it isredundant to appeal to neuroscience and evolutionary theory: sciencecannot help in any interesting way to tackle the fundamental ethical

problem of the value of hedonic happiness.

14 Cf. W. Tatarkiewicz, O szczciu , op. cit. , pp. 522523.15 Cf. V.E. Frankl, Paradoxien des Glcks. Am Modell der Sexualneurose , [in:] Was istGlck? Ein Symposion, Dtv-Taschenbcher 1134, Dtv-Verlag, Mnchen 1976.


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Conclusion

The above considerations show that the biological sciences (evolu-tionary theory and neuroscience) can provide some non-trivial in-sights into the empirical question about human happiness. Especiallyinteresting contributions seem to be the evolutionary claim about thenecessarily transient nature of happiness and the generally unhappynature of human beings and the neuroscienti c insight regarding theindividual happiness-relevant differences in our biological consti -

tution. But, undoubtedly, there is still much work be done within the biological research on happiness. In particular, the challenge for thisresearch is to test some more subtle empirical hypotheses about hap-

piness. Let us, at the end of this essay, provide some examples of suchhypotheses: only hedonically happy persons are good persons, i.e.,only hedonically happy persons can exhibit disinterested concern withthe well-being of other persons; the fewer contradictory desires onehas, the more one is likely to attain hedonic happiness; hedonic happi -ness eludes us if we intentionally pursue it; 16 what human beings reallyaim at is not experiencing hedonic happiness, but attaining the basisof hedonic happiness; 17 only a person who is unhappy in her inner-most core desires hedonic happiness; 18 eudaimonic happiness is a nec-essary (in the empirical sense) condition of hedonic happiness, i.e.,only good people can really feel good; human beings do not always

pursue hedonic happiness (this last hypothesis is especially interest-ing, because con rming it would amount to undermining psycholog -ical hedonism a theory of human motivation which says that pleas -ure seeking and pain avoidance are the only motives of our actions).

16 Victor Frankl ( Paradoxien , op. cit. ) calls it the rst paradox of happiness (thesecond paradox of happiness analysed by Frankl consists in that even in the midst ofthe most terrible events, even in extreme suffering (e.g., in a concentration camp) one

may nd happiness if one is capable of giving sense to these events).17 Cf. V.E. Frankl, Paradoxien , op. cit.18 This claim was defended by Max Scheler (cf. M. Scheler, Cierpienie, mier, dalsze

ycie, translated by A. Wgrzecki, PWN, Warszawa 1994).

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W. Załuski - On (Un)Happiness From the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Theory and Neuroscience