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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

VOLUME II

Based on the outline of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza

May 1996 Revised Edition

_______________

Compiled by Jose Salvador Y. Mirasol

Updated by UP Law Batch 1995

Updated and Enlarged by Rodell A. Molina

UP Law Batch 1996

This work is dedicated to the members of UP Law Batch 1996, to which I

belong, especially to the members of Prof. Barlongay's class in Political Law

Review, without whose encouragement and support, this work would not have been

accomplished.

Special thanks to Lianne Tan for lending me her diskette in Political Law

Review as updated by UP Law Batch 1995, Shirley Alinea and Raquel Ruiz for

lending me their notes, Non Lerrer, Buddy Carale, TJ Matta and Irene Isidoro for

patiently printing this work.

To the Lord Almighty, this work is lovingly dedicated

-- RAM

_______________

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS


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Independent Constitutional Commissions

Art. IX, A, Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil

Service Commission (CSC). the Commission on Elections and (COMELEC), and the Commission on

Audit (COA).

A. Civil Service Commission

1. Composition and qualifications of Commissioners

Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission

composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines

and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public

administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediatelypreceding their appointment.

Art. VII, sec. 13. xxx

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the

President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the

Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,

including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

2. Appointment and term of Office

Art. IX, B, Sec. 1. xxx

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of

the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first

appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another

Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the

unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.

Transitional terms

Of the first appointment, the Chairman shall serve for 7 years, without reappointment. Of the

Commissioners, the following periods apply:

1 Commissioner for 5 years; another for 3 years without reappointment


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3. Appointment of personnel of CSC

Art. IX, A, Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in

accordance with law.

4. Salary

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise xxx the Chairmen of the

Constitutional Commissions (shall receive an annual salary of) two hundred four thousand pesos each;

and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law andshall not be decreased during their tenure.

The salary, of course, can be increased and the increase can take effect at once, since, like the Judiciary,

the Constitutional Commissions have not part in the passage of such a law.

5. Disqualifications

Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any

other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active

management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office,

nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or

privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including

government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure" :

a. Hold any other office or employment.

This is similar to the prohibition against executive officers. It applies to both public and private offices

and employment.

b. Engage in the practice of any profession.

c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the


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functions of his office.

d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege

granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their

subsidiaries.

6. Impeachment

Art. XI, Sec. 2. xxx [T]he members of the Constitutional Commissions xxx may be removed from

office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,

graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. xxx

7. Functions of the CSC

Art. IX, B, Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the

Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,

responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and

rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and

institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President

and the Congress an annual report on its personnel program.

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or

matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A

case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or

memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise

provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought

to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy

thereof.

Id., Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

8. Scope of the Civil Service

Art. IX, B, Sec. 2 (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and

agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original chart-

ers.


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Art. XII, Sec. 16. xxx. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or

established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic

viability.

National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government

owned or controlled corporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general

corporation law.

F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed.

NLRC ruled ordering her reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement.

NASECO as a government corporation by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil.

National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the

Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.

ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law.

HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before

its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly

situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the

applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in GOCC's,

among them NASECO.

In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973

consti where NHC v Juco was based. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporation with

original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service does not include GOCC which are organized

as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. Adapted.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) VS. NHA, 173 SCRA 33

F: Respondent NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 under the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations. Its

shares of stock have been 100% owned by the Government from its incorporation. Petitioner TUPAS is a legitimate labor

organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied.

Adapted.

HELD: The civil service now covers only govt owned or controlled corporations w/ original or legislative

charters, that is those created by an act of Congress of by special law, and not those incorporated under and

pursuant to a general legislation.

xxx

There is, therefore, no impediment to the holding of a certification election among the workers of NHC

for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, the NHC being a govt owned and/ or controlled corp. w/o


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an original charter. RAM.

Alliance of Government Workers v Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

F: Petitioner is a federation of unions in govt-owned corps. and in govt schools. It petitioned the SC for a ruling that

PD 851, requiring "all employers... to pay their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month... a

13th month pay," applies to govt employees. VV.

HELD: NO. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts w/c impose burdens on

the public treasury or w/c diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do not embrace the

Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the Phil. as a sovereign cannot be

covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

ISSUE 2: May government employees act through a labor federation which uses the collective bargaining power

to secure increased compensation for its members?

HELD: NO. The terms and conditions of employment in the Government including any political subdivision or

instrumentality thereof are governed by law. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars,

rules and regulations and not through Collective Bargaining agreements.

Under the present constitution, (1973), GOCC's are now part of the civil service, thus, not allowed to use

concerted activities to get other benefits or higher salaries different from that provided by law and regulation.

Adapted.

OVERRULED:

Government-owned or controlled Corporations, Considered and Defined.

National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was

dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is

vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further

proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC. VV.

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the

Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch,

agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled

corporation.

The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers

to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All


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offices and firms of the government are covered.

This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC

belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements.

"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover

cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. Adapted.

xxx

For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether

created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and

the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that

such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.

xxx

The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1,

Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create

a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could

create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and

employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec.

and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open

market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled

corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The

Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have

application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed. VV.

Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 -- Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned Firms

Regardless of How Organized.

F: F. Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager and analyst of

Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB dismissed the complaint,

however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps. organized under a special law. Petrophil is

a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs.

Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgment. VV.

ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall within the

jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally

"created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It is now

funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to governmental

programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential

government related functions. Adapted.

xxx

The meaning thus given to "govt-owned or controlled corps." for purposes of the civil service provision


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[Art. IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] should likewise apply for purposes of the TB and SB provisions [Art. XI, Secs. 4 and

12], otherwise, incongruity would result; and a govt-owned corp. could create as many subsidiary corps. under

the Corp. Code it wishes, w/c would then be free from strict accountability and could escape the liabilities and

responsibilities provided by law. xxx

a. Terms, conditions of employment in the Civil Service

(1) Oath of allegiance to the Constitution

Art. IX, B, Sec. 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold

and defend the Constitution.

Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all

times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an

immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

(2) Merit System

(a) Appointment of lame ducks

Art. IX, B, Sec. 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such

election, be appointed to any office in the Government, or any government-owned or controlledcorporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

(b) Ban on holding multiple positions

Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official

shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or

instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies

or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment

during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other

profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any


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franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality

thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly

avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.



Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under-secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other

office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including

government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his

seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof

increased during the term for which he was elected.

Art. VIII, Secs. 8 (1) (3) and 12

Art. VIII, Sec. 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the

Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice, as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a

representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor

of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

xxx

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep

a record of its proceedings.

Sec. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be

designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

CLU v Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

F: The petitioner challenged Ex. Order No. 284 which in effect allowed Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and

asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold other positions in the govt., albeit,

subject of the limitations imposed therein. The respondents, in refuting the petitioners' argument that the measure was

violative of Art. VIII, Sec. 13, invoked Art. IX-B, Sec. 7, allowing the holding of multiple positions by the appointive

official if allowed by law or by the pressing functions of his positions.

HELD: By ostensibly restricting the no. of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or asst. secretaries

may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the govt. and GOCCs, EO 284

actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of


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Art. VIII, Sec. 13 prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. If

maximum benefits are to be derived from a dept. head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to

his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other govt. offices or employment.

xxx

The stricter prohibition applied to the Pres. and his official family under Sec. 13, Art. VII as compared

to the prohibition applicable to appointive officials in general under Art. IX, B, Sec. 7, par. 2 are proof of the

intent of the 1987 Consti. to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or

employment in the govt during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their

positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by

the Consti. itself. xxx

However, the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Art. VII, Sec. 13

must not be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein w/o addition

compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said

official's office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" w/in the contemplation of the

constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and function on said officials.

Adapted.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568 (1993)

F: Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay

Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) under Sec. 13, par (d) of RA 7227 "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.

ISSUE: W/N proviso in Sec 13 par (d) of RA 7227 which states, "Provided, however that for the first year of its

operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman

and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment

or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

HELD: YES. Sec 7 of Art IX-B of the Consti provides:

"No elective official shall be legible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office

or position during his tenure."

In the case at bar, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e. Mayor of

Olongapo City, to other governmental post. Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to

prevent, it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, 1st par of Art

IX-B. While the second par. authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive position, there is no

exception to the first paragraph except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself.

Futhermore, the proviso is a legislative encroachment on appointing authority to only one eligible i.e.

the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. The conferment of the appointing power is a perfectly valid legislative

act but the proviso limiting his choice to one is an encroachment to his prerogative.

Thus, Mayor Gordon is ineligible for appointment throughout his tenure but may resign first from his

elective office before he may be considered for appointment. He has a choice.


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Sec. 13 par (d) is declared unconstitutional and the appointment of Mayor Gordon is invalid but his

previous acts as Chairman of SBMA shall be considered that of a de facto officer. Adapted.

(3) Standardization of pay and ban double compensation

Standardization of pay

Art. IX, B, Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of

government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with

original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the

qualifications required for their positions.

Ban on double compensation

Art. IX, B, Sec. 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,

double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of

the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.

Sec. 56. Additional or Double Compensation.-- No elective or appointive public officer or employee

shall receive additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law nor accept without

the consent of the President, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign state.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.

(Book V, Title I, Chapter 8, Administrative Code of 1987.)

(4) Ban on partisan political activities


(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any

electioneering or partisan political campaign.

Compare with

Art. XVI, Sec. 5. xxx

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members

shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity

except to vote.


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Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938)

F: This is a quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial Governor of Laguna. It

is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office, respondent was a Captain in the

Philippine Army and for this reason, is ineligible to that office.

HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of the Armed

Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any election except to vote, but

it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section 431 of the Election Law, as

amended disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the Philippine Army and no claim is

made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the respondent, being in the reserve

force, is not disqualified from voting. The respondent being a qualified elector and the possession by him of the

other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the

office of provincial governor to which he has been elected.

The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would

lead to widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve corps of

the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon.

Raison d' etre for the disqualification: Members of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the

agents of any political group. Adapted.

Santos v. Yatco, 59 0G 548 (1959)

F: This is petition for prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the order of Judge Yatco disallowing then

Secretary of Defense Alejo Santos from campaigning personally for Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan.

The petition was granted for the ff. reasons:

The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and

employees in the Civil Service;

When Santos, a Nacionalista campaigned for Gov. Martin, a candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he was

acting as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of

the Administration to which he belongs;

The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious

influence upon the members of the armed forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of

National Defense and who are often called upon by the COMELEC to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial

elections, is not justiciable by the court. Adapted.


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(5) Removal or suspension only for cause

Art. IX, B, 2. xx

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause

provided by law.

De los Santos v Mallare, 87 Phil 289

F: Eduardo de los Santos, petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on 7/16/46 by the Pres. He then began

the exercise of the duties and functions of the position. On 6/1/50, Gil Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by

the Pres. to the same position, after w/c, on 6/3, the Undersec. of the DPW & Communications directed Santos to report to

the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the

other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he

commenced these proceedings.

HELD: The provision of Sec. 2545 of the Rev. Admin. Code that the Pres. may remove at pleasure any of the

said appointive officers is incompatible w/ the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the CivilService shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." We therefore declare Sec. 2545 of

the RAC as repealed by the Consti. and ceased to be operative from the time that instrument came into effect.

For cause as provided by law.-- The phrase "for cause" in connection w/ removals of public officers has

acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons w/c the law and sound public policy recognized as

sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes w/c the appointing power in the

exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of

those vested w/ the power of removal, or w/o any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the

administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the

rights and interests of the public."

Three specified classes of positions-- policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical--

are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is

allowed by the Consti. xxx

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

Primarily confidential.-- The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee

for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy w/c insures freedom of intercourse without

embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

Policy-determining.-- Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not

formulate a method of action for the govt or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it.

Highly technical.-- Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer

is not required nor is he supposed to posses a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, w/c is

the sense in w/c "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the Consti. RAM.

Corpus v. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591 (1965)


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F: Mariano Corpus was the Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department of the Central

Bank, a position declared by the President of the Philippines as highly technical in nature. He was administratively charged

by several co-employees in the export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of internal

regulations of the Central Bank. He was suspended from office while an investigation was being conducted over his

complaint. The investigating committee found no basis upon which to recommend him for disciplinary action, hence,

recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such recommendation, the Monetary Board

approved a resolution dismissing Corpus from Office on the ground that the latter's continuance in office is prejudicial tothe best interests of Central Bank. Corpus moved to reconsider said resolution but the same was denied. He filed an action

with the RTC which declared the resolution null and void.

Central Bank appeals and alleges that officers holding technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of

confidence by the appointing power and that such removal is implicit in Sec. 1 Art. XII of the Constitution which provide

that : "x x x Appointments in the Civil Service, EXCEPT as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential

or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness. " CB also argues that for the three classes

of positions referred to in the Constitution, lack of confidence of the one making the appointment constitutes sufficient and

legitimate cause of removal.

ISSUE: W/N the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss of

confidence was valid despite the fact that the committee which investigated the charges against him found nobasis for his removal

HELD: NO. The removal of respondent on the ground of loss of confidence is a clear and evident afterthought

resorted to when the charges subject matter of the investigation were not proved or substantiated. It was a mere

pretext to cure the inability to substantiate the charges upon which the investigation proceeded. The court

therefore dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the

constitutional mandate that No officer in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as

provided by law must be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly technical in nature must be

afforded the Constitutional safeguard requiring removal to be for cause as provided by law, and if the dismissal

for "loss of confidence" be allowed, it must have basis in fact, which does not exist in the case at bar.The exemption of the three positions adverted to earlier from the rule requiring APPOINTMENTS to be

made on the basis of Merit and fitness DOES NOT EXEMPT such positions from the operation of the rule that

no officer in the Civil Service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law. This rule is absolute, in

fact, the CB Charter provided for the same absolute rule.

Furthermore, the Civil Service Law which classified Corpus' position as non-competitive provides that

such positions are protected by the Civil Service Law and that his removal must only be for cause recognized by

law (Garcia v Exec. Secretary.)

While the tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, the

tenure of officials holding highly technical posts does not end upon mere loss of confidence. The Consti. clearly

distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule to the

latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental charter. Officers

holding highly-technical positions hold office on the basis of their special skills and qualifications. The court

also said that if mechanics and engineers enjoy security of tenure with more reason should a highly technical

officer, as Respondent Corpus, be protected by the Constitutional provision on security of tenure. RAM.

Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)


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F: Plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions under the Office of the President. About the second

week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication from Executive Sec. Mutuc advising them that their services in

the government were terminated. They appealed to the President but said appeal was denied. They filed an action against

the Exec. Sec. alleging that they had been removed from office without just cause and without due process. Defendant, on

the other hand, averred that the positions which plaintiffs were then occupying were primarily confidential in nature and

therefore, their appointments were subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power.

ISSUE: W/N plaintiffs are occupying positions which are primarily confidential and therefore are subject to

removal at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

HELD: NO. The fact that the plaintiffs held office for the "president's Private Office" under subdivision entitled

"private secretaries" and that they handled "confidential Matters" even if they only performed clerical work do

not make them officers and employees occupying highly confidential offices. There is nothing in the items of the

plaintiffs (who were clerks and secretaries) to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential"

in nature. The fact that they handled at times "confidential matters" does not suffice to characterize their

positions as primarily confidential. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspendedexcept for cause as provided for by law and since plaintiffs positions were protected by this provision, their

removal without cause was therefore illegal. Adapted.

xxx

Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v. Mallare

declared as mere obiter.-- The assumption that an officer holding a position w/c is primarily confidential in

nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is

evidently based upon a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare to the effect that "three specified classes of

positions-- policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical-- are excluded from the merit

system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Consti . xxx.

This was, however, a mere obiter, bec., the office involved in said case -- that of City Engineer of Baguio -- did

not belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine whether its incumbents

were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more, said obiter, if detached from the

context of the decision of w/c it forms part, would be inconsistent w/ the constitutional command to the effect

that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by

law" and it is conceded that one holding in the Govt a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service."

Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal."-- When an

incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that

pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not"removed" or "dismissed" from office-- his term merely

"expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed term for

w/c he had been appointed or elected, is notand can notbe deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon

the expiration of said term. The main difference bet. the former-- primarily confidential officer-- and the latter

is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time

of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its

decision to put an end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not"removed"

or "dismissed" from office-- his term merely "expired." RAM.


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[NOTE: The Court in this case ruled that the one holding in the government a primarily confidential

position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service"

are protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer shall be removed from office without cause as

provided by law". While incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the

appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed or dismissed" but that

his term, merely expires.]

Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 -- A Civil Service Employee is Not Barred by Laches if before Bringing Suit

He Continuously Pressed His Claim for Reinstatement.

F: Cristobal, a third-grade civil service eligible, was employed as a private Secretary in the Office of the President of

the Philippines. In January 1962, he and some others were given notice of termination of their services effective January 1,

1962. On March 24, 1962, five of the employees concerned filed an action with the CFI, which culminated in an SC ruling

ordering their reinstatement (Ingles v Mutuc). Cristobal, however, was not a party to the case because during the pendency

of such case, he sought reinstatement and in fact, the Exec. Secretary and several other Exec. secretaries promised to lookfor placement for him. After the Supreme Court rendered the decision in the Mutuc case, Cristobal wrote the President

requesting reinstatement. This request was denied in five successive letters from the Office of the President, the last letter

declared the matter "definitely closed". Cristobal filed an action in the CFI (now RTC) of Manila. The dismissal was

based on Rule 66 of the Rules of Court (Quo Warranto) which provides that an action for quo warranto may not be filed

unless commenced within one year after the cause of the ouster. Since Cristobal did not bring the action until after the

lapse of nine years, his case was barred by laches.

HELD: Cristobal is not guilty of laches. He sought reconsideration of his separation from the service and

although he did not join in the Ingles court action, he continued to press his request for reinstatement during the

pendency of the case. In fact Secretary Mutuc assured him that he would work for his reinstatement. The

continued promise not only of Mutuc but of the subsequent Secretaries led Cristobal to wait but depite waiting

for such a long time, his reinstatement never came about. It would be the height of inequity if after Cristobal

relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former Exec. Secretaries, the court would

rule that he had lost his right to seek relief because of the lapse of time.

Cristobal, just like the Plaintiffs in the Ingles v Mutuc case, was not holding an office characterized as

"highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters"

occasionally. He is therefore protected in his tenure and may not be therefore removed without just cause. He is

entitled to backwages for five years although he had been dismissed for nine years, applying by analogy the

award of backwages in cases of unfair labor practice. Adapted.

(6) Right of Self-Organization

Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private

sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.



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(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

(not in VV's outline)

Sec. 38. Coverage.-- (1) All government employees, including those in government-owned or

controlled corporations with original charters, can form, join or assist employees' organizations of their

own choosing for the furtherance and protection of their interests. They can also form, in conjunction

with appropriate government authorities, labor-management committees, work councils and other forms

of workers' participation schemes to achieve the same objectives.

(2) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to the members of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, including police officers, policemen, firemen and jail guards. (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,

Chapter 6, Administrative Code of 1987.)

Alliance of Government Workers v Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

F: supra.

HELD: The dismissal of this petition should not, by any means, be interpreted to imply that workers in govt-

owned or controlled corporations or in state colleges and universities may not enjoy freedom of association.

These workers whom the petitioners purport to represent have the right to form associations or societies for

purposes not contrary to law. But they may not join associations w/c impose the obligation to engage in

concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different from

those provided by law and regulation.

National Service Corp. v NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 (1988), supra.

TUPAS v NHA, 173 SCRA 33 (1989), supra.

ISSUE: W/N employees of NHC have undoubtedly the right to form unions.

HELD: The right to unionize is now explicitly recognized and granted to both employees in both governmental

and the private sectors. There is no impediment to the holding of a certificate of election among the workers of

NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the Labor Code, for NHC is a GOCC without an original charter.

Statutory implementation of the Consti (par 5 sec 2 art IX-B) is found in Art 244 of the Labor Code. Adapted.

(7) Right to strike

SSS Employees Association v CA, 175 SCRA 690 [Public Sector Labor-Management has jurisdiction of


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dispute concerning terms and conditions (of employment) but not damages arising from acts of a union.]

F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners SSSEA, alleging

that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building

preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. The Public

Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The SSSEA

went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the union's demands.Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was denied. The restraining

order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the

case to the CA. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to strike.

HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages,

like workers in the private sector, in order to pressure the Govt. to accede to their demands. As now provided

under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. EEs to Self-

Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of employment in the

Govt, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. owned and controlled corporations

with original charters, are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securingchanges thereof.

The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment (124

SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector and govt

employees w/ regard to the right to strike?

Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt. workers cannot use

the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.

The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through

compulsion of law. Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary

basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the

terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of

collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given

delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. And

this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's.

EO 180, w/c provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of govt employees, while

clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and

conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law.

Govt employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the

betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are w/in the ambit of legislation or negotiate w/ theappropriate govt agencies for the improvement of those w/ are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved

grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.

RAM.

Issue: W/N the RTC can enjoin the SSSEA from striking.

Held: Yes. EO 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor


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disputes involving government employees. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. The RTC

was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming

jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the

NLRC, the PSLM Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes

within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council and the NLRC that has jurisdiction over the instant labor

dispute, resort to general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

Adapted.

Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 323 (1991)

F: On September 17,1990, Monday, at least 800 public school teachers proceeded to the national office of the DECS

and aired their grievances. The mass action continued into the week despite the DECS Secretary's RETURN TO WORK

order. The Secretary filed administrative charges against the protesting teachers. The Secretary rendered the questioned

decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two

separate petitions were filed to assail the validity of the return to work order and his decisions in the administrative

proceeding.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MASS ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED AS STRIKES?

HELD: Yes. The mass actions constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from work,

which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS CAN STRIKE?

HELD: No. Employees of the public service do not have the right to strike although they have the right to self

organization and negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the improvement of working conditions.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEEDINGS?

HELD: This court is a court of last resort. It resolves questions of law where there is no dispute of the facts or

that the facts have been already determined by the lower tribunals. It is not a trier of facts. It can not resolve the

issue which requires the establishment of some facts. The remedy is for the petitioners to participate in the

administrative proceedings. If they lost, they may appeal to the Civil Service Commission. If pending said

administrative proceedings, immediate recourse to judicial authority was believed necessary, recourse is with the

RTC where there would be opportunity to prove relevant facts. Adapted.

9. Review of the decisions of the CSC

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or

matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A

case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or


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memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise

provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought

to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy

thereof.

BARLONGAY CASES:

Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989)

Manalansang v. CSC, , 203 SCRA 797 (1991)

F: This is a resolution of the Court en banc denying petitioner's second motion for reconsideration. The Court

wishes, however, to devote a few words to one issue raised by the petitioner w/c appears of sufficient importance to merit

separate treatment and disposition: that concerning the effect of the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, or

final order or resolution of the CSC on the 30-day period prescribed for taking an appeal therefrom. Adapted.

HELD: The Court holds that the thirty day periodprescribed by Sec. 7, Part A, Art. IX of the Consti. shall be

interrupted from the time a motion for reconsideration is timely and properly filed until notice of the order

overruling the motion shall have been served upon the accused or his counsel. In other words, in computing the

period of appeal from the CSC, the time during w/c a motion for reconsider or set aside its judgment, order or

resolution has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails the requirements set therefor. RAM.

Mancita v. Barcinas, 216 SCRA 772 (1992)

F: On 10/15/90, Mayor Divinigracia, Jr., who had succeeded Mayor Prila, informed pvt. resp. Nacario that her

services as MPDC would be terminated effective 11/16/90 to pave the way for the reinstatement of petitioner (w/c CSC

ordered.)

xxx

Meanwhile, on 11/8/90, pvt. resp. Nacario filed w/ the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, a petition for declaratory relief

and prohibition w/ prel. inj. against CSC xxx

As prayed for by the petitioner (now pvt. resp. Nacario), the resp. Judge issued on the same day a temporary

restraining order and set the hearing of the application for a writ of prel. inj. on 11/22/90. Petitioner filed a motion to

dismiss the petition on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to rule, pass upon or review a final judgment,

order or decision of the CSC. On 2/25/91, resp. Judge issued an order denying the motion. MFR was also denied Hence,

this petition for certiorari.

HELD: The CSC, under the Consti., is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service and as such,

its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this Court's certiorari jurisdiction. (Lopez v. CSC, et. al, 195

SCRA 777.)

Since the decision, order, or ruling of the CSC is subject to review only by this Court on certiorari under

Rule 65, ROC, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the civil case, an action w/c seeks a review of a decision of the

CSC. RAM.


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10. Fiscal Autonomy

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual

appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Approval of appointments by the CSC

BARLONGAY CASES:

Barrozo v. CSC, 198 SCRA 487

F: On 11/10/88, David Borja retired as City Engineer of Baguio. At that time, petitioner Teodoro Barrozo was a

Senior Civil Engineer of DPWH assigned to the office of the City Engineer of Baguio and resp. V. Julian was the Asst.

City Engineer of Baguio. On 12/27/88, Mayor Labo extended to B arrozo a permanent appointment as City Engineer of

Baguio. On 2/16/89, after his protest was rejected by Mayor Labo, pvt. resp. Julian appealed to the MSPB of the CSC,

claiming that as a qualified next-in-rank officer, he had a pre-emptive right over Barrozo. The CSC Cordillera Admin.

Region, to w/c the appeal was referred, declared Barrozo's appointment void for being violative of Civil Service promotion

rules. MFR was denied. CSC, on appeal, affirmed the decision. Adapted.

HELD: The CSC has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the authority

to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the

required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications

should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the CSC. It cannot disallow an appointment bec.

it believes another person is better qualified and mush less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.xxx

The law does not absolutely require that the person who is next in rank shall be promoted to fill a

vacancy. In fact, the vacancy may be filled not only by promotion but "by transfer of present employees in the

govt service, by reinstatement, by re-employment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by

appointment of persons w/ the civil service eligibility appropriate to the position. What the Civil Service Act

provides is that if a vacancy is filled by promotion, the person holding that position next-in-rank thereto "shall be

consideredfor promotion."

xxx

One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but

it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right

to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next

higher position. RAM.

B. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

1. Composition and qualifications of Commissioners


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Art. IX, C, Sec. 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their

appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been

candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,

including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice oflaw for at least ten years.

Art. VII, Sec. 13. xxx



Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices,

including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

F: Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on Appointments

confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the required qualification of

10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: W/N MONSOD HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR 1O YEARS?

HELD: YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the

preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such

actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the determination of

the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.)

The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of

law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law

provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work.

The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays

have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their

specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most

corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation.

Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970,

then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a

member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as

lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

ISSUE: W/N THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

IN CONFIRMING MONSOD'S APPOINTMENT?

HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the


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president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom

it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law.

From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the CA. Adapted.

2. Appointment and term of office of Commissioners; Rule against reappointment

Art. IX, C, Sec. 1. xxx

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of

the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first

appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last

Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the

unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.

Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 PHIL 103 (1949)

F: President Quirino designated the Solicitor-General as Acting member of the Comelec in November, 1949. The

Nacionalista Party filed this prohibition on the following grounds: (1) the SG did not resign from the office of the Solicitor-

General; (2) there is no vacancy in the Comelec because the retirement of the Comelec member causing the vacancy, was

accepted by the President in bad faith; and (3) the functions of a Solicitor-General are incompatible with those of aComelec member.

ISSUE: W/N THE DESIGNATION WAS VALID?

HELD: NO, it was not. By the nature of the Comelec's functions, the Comelec must be independent. Members

are not allowed to perform other functions, powers and duties to preserve its impartiality. The Solicitor-General's

duties also require an undivided time and attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy,

appointment is preferred to designation.

ISSUE: W/N PROHIBITION WOULD LIE?

HELD: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the

respondent's designation or his right to office. The proceeding is instituted by the other party claiming the

position occupied and/or the Solicitor-General. Prohibition however, has a different purpose, which is to prevent

the usurpation of jurisdiction by a subordinate court.

Although there is no other party who claims a right over the position occupied nor will the SG file a

case against himself, the court must grant the remedy of a quo warranto proceeding because the SG's continued


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occupancy as member of the Comelec is illegal. Adapted.

Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (DEC. 18, 1990)

F: Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac was appointed by Pres. Aquino as Acting Chairman of the Commission

on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to

investigate the Dec. 1989 coup d'tatattempt.

ISSUE: WON the appointment is unconstitutional

HELD: NO. Art. IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as

"independent". Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the

Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own

proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,

orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the SC as provided by the Constitution in Art. IX-

A, Section 7.

The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.

That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. Adapted.

NP v. Vera, 85 Phil 149

F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as

Chairman of the COMELEC is a violation of the Constitution particularly Art. X, Sec. 1 of the 1935 Constitution which

provides that the members of the COMELEC shall hold office for nine years without reappointment.

Held: The prohibition against reappointment comes as a continuation of the requirement that the Commission

shall hold office for a term of nine years. Reappointment is not prohibited provided his term will not exceed

nine years in all.

In July 1945, three Commissioners were appointed. De Vera was appointed for three years. If he were

to succeed himself, he cannot be reappointed to do so because that would preclude the appointment of a new

member after 3 years and would furthermore increase his term to 12 years since upon the expiration of his term,

his successor must be appointed for nine years.

But in this case, de Vera's appointment was by virtue of the death of the Chairman in 1947 and he was

promoted to occupy the chairmanship of the Commission for the unexpired term only. Thus, this is not offensive

to the Constitution because it does not increase de Vera's term of office to more than nine years nor does it

preclude the appointment of a new member upon the expiration of the first term of three years. Adapted.

Republic v. Imperial, 96 Phil 770

F: This is a quo warranto proceeding to test the legality of the continuance in office of Imperial as Chairman and

Perez as member of COMELEC.

When Chairman de Vera died in August 1951, before the expiration of the maximum term of nine years of the


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Chairman of the Commission, Imperial was appointed Chairman to succeed de Vera. His appointment provided for a term

expiring July 12, 1960. The SG contended that the term for which he will legally serve as Chairman legally expired on July

12, 1954, the expiration of the 9 year term for which the first Chairman was appointed.

Comelec member Perez on the other hand, was appointed for a term of 9 years expiring on 24 November 1958.

The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which

Commissioner Enage, his predecessor was appointed.

Held: The terms cannot begin from the first appointments made in July 12, 1945 but from the date of the

organization of the COMELEC under CA 657 on June 21, 1941. Thus, the term of office of the first Chairman,

Lopez Vito began on June 21, 1941 and ended June 20, 1950. That of member Enage began on June 21, 1941 to

June 20, 1944 (but this was not filled). Since the first 3 year term had already expired in 1944, the appointment

of De Vera on June 12, 1945 must be for the full term of nine years (June 1944 to June 1953). The first vacancy

occurred by the expiration of the term of Enage. His successor, Perez, was named for a full 9 year term which

shall have started on June 1947 to June 1956.

The second vacancy happened upon the death of Lopez Vito on May 1947. To succeed him, de Vera

appointed and lasted only up to June 1950, the unexpired period of Lopez Vito's term. Thus, on June 1950, a

vacancy occurred which De Vera could no longer fill because his appointment was expressly prohibited by theConstitution. Thus, the next Chairman was respondent Imperial whose term of 9 years must be deemed to have

began on June 21, 1990 to expire on June 20, 1959. Adapted.

3. Appointment of personnel

Art. IX, A, Sec. 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in

accordance with law.

4. Salary

Art. IX, A, Sec. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and

shall not be decreased during their tenure.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x the Chairmen of the

Constitutional Commissions (shall receive), two hundred four thousand pesos each; and the Members of

the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred eighty thousand pesos each.

The salary, of course, can be increased and the increase can take effect at once, since, like the Judiciary,

the Constitutional Commissions have not part in the passage of such a law.

5. Disqualifications


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Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any

other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active

management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the functions of his office,

nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or

privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

No members of a Constitutional Commission shall during his "tenure" : (IX, V, 2)

a. Hold any other office or employment.

This is similar to the prohibition against executive officers. It applies to both public and private offices

and employment.

b. Engage in the practice of any profession.

c. Engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be affected by the

functions of his office.

d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege

granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their

subsidiaries.

6. Impeachment

Art. XI, Sec. 2. The members of the Constitutional Commissions may be removed from office, on

impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and cor-

ruption and other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.

7. Powers and functions of the COMELEC

The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

a. Enforce election laws

Art. IX, C, Sec. 2. (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of

an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.


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Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454

F: Sanchez, a mayoralty candidate, who lost in the 1980 San Fernando, Pampanga elections, filed with the Comelec a

petition to nullify the said elections due to large scale terrorism, which took place after the people had cast their votes. The

Comelec, after hearing, issued the resolution which ordered the nullification of the elections and the certification of the

failure of elections to the president or prime minister for remedial legislation and the appointment of municipal officials.

The winning mayoralty candidate questioned the validity of the resolution.

ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC HAS THE POWER TO NULLIFY ELECTIONS ON THE GROUND OF

POST ELECTION TERRORISM?

HELD: YES, it has. The Comelec is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and

qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective provincial and city officials. In line with its

duty to protect and preserve the integrity of the elections, the Comelec must be deemed possessed of the

authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. The

fact that the failure of elections was due to terrorism after the votes were cast is not material.

ISSUE: W/N THE COMELEC HAS THE POWER TO CALL SPECIAL ELECTIONS?

HELD: YES. The Comelec, being the sole judge of elections, returns and qualifications, has the power to call

special elections. During the time the Comelec was not the sole judge, the president, upon certification to him by

the Comelec of a failure of elections, had the power to call special elections. The Comelec has the duty to take

necessary steps to complete the elections, that is, to see to it that the real winners are proclaimed. But when the

winners cannot be determined from the elections, which was marred by massive and pervasive terrorism, the

Comelec must call for a special election in order to proclaim the real winners. Adapted.

b. Decide administrative questions pertaining to election except the right to vote


(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including

determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and

inspectors, and registration of voters.

c. Petition for inclusion or exclusion of voters


(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or

exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,

including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.

Omnibus Election Code


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Right to Vote

The right to vote may be challenged in the MTC by:

a) a proceeding challenging the right of a voter to be registered;

b) an action instituted by a voter for reinstatement;

c) proceeding filed by an individual to exclude any voter whose name appears in the list of voters.

There are dates which the law allots for the registration of voters. Any person, under 136, during this

period may challenge the registration of voters on the grounds of the qualifications and disqualifications in the

exercise of the right of suffrage.

Qualifications (Articles 5, 117)

a) Filipino citizen

b) 18 years old

c) Resident of the Phils., for one year and of the municipality where he proposes to vote for 6 months.

Disqualifications (Art. 118)

a) Those convicted by final judgment and have been sentenced to imprisonment for at least one year and such

disqualifications has not been removed by absolute pardon or amnesty. This disqualification lasts for 5 years

unless restored by absolute pardon or amnesty. (Cristobal v Labrador)

b) Those convicted of crimes involving the national security, or disloyalty to the government, rebellion, sedition,

subversion, etc.

c) Insanity or incompetency

Inclusion Proceedings

If the Board of Registration cancels the name of a voter, he can file in the MTC a petition for an order to

include his name in the list of voters or to reinstate him. Action must be filed within 20 days form the last day of

registration. Appeal can be made to the RTC within 5 days, and the decision shall be final and unappealable and

no motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

Exclusion Proceedings (Articles 138, 139, 142)

A petition for exclusion must be filed with the MTC within 20 days from the last day of registration.

d. Prosecute election law violators


(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or


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exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,

including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices.

BP Blg. 881, Sec. 265

Sec. 265. Prosecution.-- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive

power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the

same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however,

That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing the

complaint, he may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper

investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

EO 134, Sec. 11, February 27, 1987

Sec. 11. Prosecution.-- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have exclusive

power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as provided for in the preceding

section, and to prosecute the same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint

within two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of the Fiscal or with the

Department of Justice for proper investigations and prosecution, if warranted.

The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.

De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760

In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a government official (COMELEC

Registrar) who violated the election law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more

registered voters) must be prosecuted by the COMELEC, before the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan. The 1978

Election Code is clear that the COMELEC shall have the power to conduct preliminary investigations of all

election offenses, and that the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide such cases. It is not the

character or personality of the offender (public official) but the crime committed (violation of election law) that

determines jurisdiction. This provision of the 1978 Election Code has been integrated in the 1987 Constitution.

Adapted.

Corpuz v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281

F: The complaint for electioneering against the Director of Trade et. al., filed before the Comelec was withdrawn and

later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelec Legal Assistance Office moved to enter its appearance for the

complainants. The Tanodbayan denied the motion on the ground that it has exclusive authority to prosecute the election

offenses of public officials.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TANODBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE

ELECTION OFFENSES?


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HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either explicitly or implicitly,

authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. Instead the constitution granted such power

exclusively to the Comelec in order to insure a free, orderly and honest elections. It is the nature of the offense

that determines the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comelec regardless of who the offender is, whether a private

individual or a public officer. Adapted.

People v. Basilia, 179 SCRA 87

F: Three complaints were filed with the provincial fiscal alleging violations of the Omnibus Election Code. After

conducting preliminary investigation, the fiscal filed the information with the RTC. The judge, motu proprio, dismissed the

information on the ground that the Comelec has the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute

election offenses. Hence this review.

ISSUE: W/N FISCALS MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTE

ELECTION OFFENSES?

HELD: YES, they may. Although the Comelec is granted the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary

investigation and prosecute election offenses, it is also authorized by the Omnibus Election Code to avail itself

of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of government. To ensure credible elections, the Comelec may

deputize law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities, whether before or after elections. Pursuant to such

authority granted by law, the Comelec issued Resolution no 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct

preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses. Adapted.

People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788(1990)

*EN BANC

F: In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC- Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Or. with the

COMELEC, for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, in the office of the Mayor to a very remote

barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC as required by law.

The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete City (Atty. Lituanas) to, among others,

conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. Said directive was pursuant to a COMELEC resolution which in turn, is

based on the constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws

relative to the conduct of elections.

After a preliminary investigation, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed with the respondentRTC of Dumaguete City a criminal case against the OIC-Mayor. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against the accused

which was later cancelled on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Sec.

2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed if the same has the

written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control

of the latter."

Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. Hence the RTC quashed the information. A motion for

reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.


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ISSUE: W/N a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election

offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the RTC may take cognizance of the

investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists.

HELD: NO. The Court emphasizes the important features of the constitutional mandate that "xxx no search

warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge

xxx." (Art. III, Sec. 2, Constitution)

First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Prov'l Fiscal nor for

the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.

Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him to

make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to

him. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other suppporting documents

behind the Prosecutor's certification w/c are material in assisting the judge to make his determination.

Third, judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry w/c determines probable

cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether

the offender should b

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