Voting in Australia · In 1901, when the Commonwealth of Australia was formed, the voting system used for the election of governments was not the Preferential voting system we use

The Democracy Solution Page 1 Copyright © Peter Wallace 2014 28/10/2014 All Rights Reserved 10:04 pm

Voting in Australia

Introduction The vote of the Australian people on election day is obviously of profound importance to our democracy. But probably far more so than many of us realise. Because, our vote, is the only participation we have in our democracy to the extent that politicians are compelled to abide by our will. Beyond our vote, politicians can, and for the most part do, completely ignore our will, with little or no consequence. So if a problem exists with our vote that diminishes or cancels out its democratic nature, Australia can very quickly be rendered democratically void — all but for the ‘goodwill’ of politicians. Yet voting is a fundamentally simple concept, so we should have no problem whatsoever holding a vote that is perfectly democratic. And even though political science deals with significant complexities in voting theory — it is inescapable, that a vote in a single winner contest, involves nothing more complicated than choosing one candidate over all others — and to be democratic, only has to comply with two very basic principles, which are:

1. To decide a winner based on democracy’s majority rule; and 2. To provide a fair and equal contest for all candidates.

So given the obvious importance of our vote to our Australian democracy, as well as the relative simplicity of voting, it would be reasonable to presume that an advanced first world nation such as Australia, would have a voting system that would be particularly democratically robust. After all, the Australian Electoral Commission is dedicated to that end.

In this context, it is therefore extraordinarily difficult to comprehend, how a nation such as Australia could get voting so profoundly wrong, that we fail to meet even the two very basic principles set out above — and consequently, suffer an outcome from our vote that is completely democratically valueless. Yet that is the truth of voting in Australia. The problem is our use of the Preferential voting system — and the key problem with Preferential voting is that it is not primarily a system of voting, but primarily a system of corruption. And as a system of corruption, the genius of preferential voting is that the corruption is hidden behind its mild complexity, which only takes a few minutes to work through and understand, but which most Australians never learn. Therefore, all that most of us ever see of voting in Australia, is that (1) we hold regular general elections, and (2) we decide a winner apparently based on the party that receives the most votes from the Australian people. Which all seems suitably democratic. However, it’s all a lie of truly horrendous proportions and consequences for our Australian democracy. To summarise the problem with Preferential voting as briefly as possible — it enables politicians to easily hijack a vote and divert it from being an instrument used by the people to elect a government, to being a powerful tactical tool of political corruption — whereby candidates of any ideology, even multiple candidates all of different ideologies, can easily collude and form contrived political partnerships to engage in tactical preferencing — which in the counting of votes, effectively enables the colluding partners to combine their separate sets of votes as one, giving them the significant electoral advantage of being able to compete against mutual rivals collectively, rather than individually, which is patently unfair and undemocratic.


The effect this corruption of Preferential voting has on our Australian democracy is catastrophic. It literally overrides the majority rule, the imperative central structural pillar of democracy — because it changes the basis for winning a vote, from being the party that receives the most votes from the Australian people, to being the party that most successfully colludes, manipulates, and corrupts the Preferential voting system for their own political advantage. In this section, we will show that the extraordinary truth of our so called Australian democracy — is that on election day, Preferential voting subjects all Australians to such an astonishing level of political corruption, that we are instantaneously relegated from being the joint owners of a democracy, to being merely spectators of a shared political dictatorship — which renders Australia utterly democratically void.


Preferential voting.

In 1901, when the Commonwealth of Australia was formed, the voting system used for the election of governments was not the Preferential voting system we use today, but the First Past the Post voting system. First Past the Post is currently the most widely used voting system in the world. It is used for the election of governments in the USA, UK, Canada, New Zealand, and numerous other democratic nations. First Past the Post is also the most basic form of vote – it is the type of vote most people instantly think of when the subject of democratic voting is raised. With a First Past the Post vote, the ballot paper lists all the candidates who have nominated for election. The people cast their votes for one candidate only, then the votes are counted, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins — nice and simple. However, First Past the Post does have significant problems. In 1918, Billy Hughes was Prime Minister of Australia, as leader of the Labor Party. He had led a referendum in support of military conscription, which was defeated, and was so divisive it split the Labor party. Hughes left Labor, along with a number of his Labor colleagues, and joined with the Liberal opposition to form a new party, the Nationalist party. Hughes led the Nationalist party with sufficient numbers to continue as Prime Minister. However, Hughes’ Labor background eventually became a problem for some Nationalist party members, especially the country members. They distrusted his Labor roots, and split from the Nationalist party to form their own party, the Country party. This created the political problem for Hughes, that as the Nationalist and Country parties shared a similar conservative ideology, the conservative vote had become split. This made it much easier for Labor, now Hughes’ non conservative rival, to win otherwise safe conservative seats. This split vote problem is commonly referred to as the ‘spoiler effect’. Because when the vote of an ideology is split, naturally, it spoils the total vote of the ideology, which inadvertently benefits its rivals. As a hypothetical example of the spoiler effect — if we assume the people of an electorate are ideologically split say 60% conservative to 40% non-conservative, then according to democracy’s majority rule, the conservative vote would win with its superior 60% majority. However, with two conservative parties competing in the same election, some conservative voters would inevitably vote for one conservative party, and some for the other. And if we assume an even split of the conservative vote, then each conservative party would only receive 30%. That would mean the non-conservative side would then win the vote with their superior 40% majority. Despite 60% of the people in the electorate being conservative voters. Such a profound structural flaw in a voting system necessarily renders it unfit for use in democracy. So a solution for the First Past the Post spoiler effect was warranted.


For Hughes, the solution was the introduction of Preferential voting — which solved the First Past the Post spoiler effect by allowing the Nationalist and Country parties to go into an election as competitors, yet by tactically preferencing one-another, they could effectively combine their separate sets of votes as one in the counting of votes, and therefore collectively achieve the majority they needed to defeat Labor. Then when Labor had been successfully knocked out of the contest, the winner of the vote would simply be whichever one of the Country and Nationalist parties, received more votes than the other. Problem solved for Hughes, but literally at the expense of democracy for all Australians, for the best part of the last one hundred years since Preferential voting has been in use. We know that for a vote to be democratic, it must provide a fair and equal contest for all candidates. Therefore, any solution to the unfair disadvantage of the First Past the Post spoiler effect, must necessarily correct that unfair disadvantage to the point of neutrality — so that no candidates are unfairly disadvantaged. For abundant clarity, that means the unfair disadvantage can’t simply be reversed, or shifted to other candidates. Because that would still leave us with an unfair, and therefore, undemocratic vote. However, shift the unfair disadvantage to other candidates is precisely what Preferential voting does. Because by allowing candidates of a shared ideology to simply preference one-another, and therefore, effectively combine their separate sets of votes as one, all other candidates are forced to compete against the candidates of the shared ideology collectively, rather than individually. While on face value, there may seem to be some level of fairness in allowing the votes for candidates of a shared ideology to be combined as one, therefore avoiding the spoiler effect, there are multiple problems with this solution that render it unfair and undemocratic. However, before we look at those problems, it is worth reminding ourselves of the context of our vote. Which, after all, is a contest to establish Australia’s democracy. It warrants that we are highly prudent in deciding and applying the rules of the contest. And if we are going to be a democracy, then we are compelled to abide by the very basic principle, that for a vote to be democratic, it must provide a fair and equal contest for all candidates. In this context, the only circumstances in which we could feasibly allow the votes for candidates of a shared ideology to be combined as one, would be if their ideologies were truly identical in every way. Otherwise, how is it possibly fair to all other candidates, that the votes for some loosely similar ideologies, or even potentially, ideologies feigning similarity, are able to be combined as one, and compete collectively, while all other candidates have to compete individually? Yet logically, it is not feasible that two separate and distinct political candidates, or parties, could share an ideology that is truly identical in every way. In particular, in circumstances where they are competing against one-another in a vote. Plainly, they do not see eye to eye on ideology to the extent that they can’t work together, or choose not to work together. Moreover, an ideology is not something that can be quantified, so there is no potential to assess and prove that two or more ideologies are truly identical. Notwithstanding that, even if we could satisfy the above conditions, and deem that it is fair to allow the separate sets of votes for some miraculously proven identical ideologies to be combined as one — Preferential voting has no facility whatsoever to limit the combining of votes only to candidates of identical ideologies, or even loosely similar ideologies.


Ideology is simply not a consideration — any basis will do. And the blatant corruption of democracy of colluding partners tactically preferencing one-another, to achieve the significant electoral advantage of competing against mutual rivals collectively, rather than individually, is perfectly allowable. Therefore, we have to conclude, that any extent of theoretical fairness of preferential voting allowing the candidates of a shared ideology to combine their separate sets of votes as one, is necessarily defeated on grounds that we can summarise as: 1. The significant unlikelihood that multiple ideologies are truly identical;

2. The impossibility of quantifying and proving that multiple ideologies are truly identical; and

3. The much greater unfairness of Preferential voting’s flawed structure, of allowing any candidates, regardless of ideology, to combine their separate sets of votes as one to achieve a corrupt political advantage.

However, all that was academic for Hughes. Because as the architect of Preferential voting in Australia, Hughes never intended for fairness nor democracy to be part of the Preferential voting equation. Hughes was a formidable political operator — He spent a total of 58 years in Australian parliaments. He was Prime Minister as leader of both the Labor party and the Nationalist party, two parties with opposing ideologies. He changed parties a total of five times. He was a qualified barrister, a political survivor, and he was not stupid. There is no potential that when Hughes introduced Preferential voting in Australia, he was not fully aware of its inherent corruption of the vote. He knew perfectly well, and that’s why he introduced it. To use Preferential voting to corrupt the vote for his own political advantage. And the truth of that statement is proven by the numbers locked in every preferential vote in which Hughes participated, as well as every preferential vote that has taken place in Australia for the best part of the last 100 years since Preferential voting was introduced. Because from even the most basic analysis, the numbers show the combining of votes for candidates who have no logical right nor democratic reason to be combined — other than, to take up the corrupt electoral advantage that Preferential voting so effortlessly delivers. Preferential voting is nothing more than an example of the age old enemy of democracy raising its ugly head. A cunning politician’s corruption of democracy to serve his political self-interest. All the evidence of Australia’s historical votes, right down to the exact number of votes each candidate received, is available online for anyone to see and analyse at the Australian Electoral Commission’s website www.aec.gov.au. ____


How preferential voting works

To be able to see beyond the mild complexity of Preferential voting and grasp its inherent corruption, it is necessary to understand how Preferential voting works. So we’ll spend the few minutes necessary for a brief explanation, and include a comparison of Preferential voting with First Past the Post. The key structural difference between a Preferential vote and a First Past the Post vote, is the standard of democratic majority required by each voting system to decide a winner — a concept that goes to the very core of democracy. To win a First Past the Post vote, a candidate only needs to achieve a simple majority. That is, more votes than any other candidate. Therefore, a candidate who receives say only 25% of the vote can win, providing all other candidates receive less votes, say only 10% each. However, Preferential voting requires a much higher democratic majority. To win a Preferential vote, a candidate must achieve an absolute majority. That is, a minimum of 50% + 1 vote. Literally an unbeatable majority. So with Preferential voting, it’s not good enough for a candidate to receive say 25% of the vote, or even exactly 50%, even if all other candidates have much lower percentages, say only 10% each. 50% + 1 vote is the minimum requirement to win. However, in any voting contest with three or more candidates, the potential obviously exists that no candidate will achieve an absolute majority. For example, in a three way contest, each candidate could receive an even split of just 33%. To overcome this problem, Preferential voting uses a markedly different method of casting and counting votes compared with First Past the Post. And this is where all the problems begin with Preferential voting. In the casting of votes, Preferential voting requires the people to cast a vote for every candidate on the ballot paper, in order of numerical preference. So a correctly completed Preferential voting ballot paper, would show each candidate ranked in order of preference, from 1, 2, 3, 4 etc, up to the total number of candidates in the contest, with 1 being the most preferred candidate, then 2, 3 etc being consecutively less preferred.


First Past the Post Preferential Voting Then in the counting of votes, both systems begin with a simple count of the total votes received by each candidate. For Preferential voting, this simple count is called the primary vote. At this initial stage, the counting process for each voting system is identical, and if both systems were run simultaneously in the same election, they would each produce identical results. For First Past the Post, this simple count is the end of the counting process, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins. However, with Preferential voting, if a candidate achieves an absolute majority in the primary vote, they win. Yet, if no candidate achieves an absolute majority, then Preferential voting progresses to a relatively complex process of elimination of candidates, and distribution of preference votes, which ultimately forces an absolute majority – at least numerically, if not democratically.


Following is a hypothetical example of how First Past the Post and Preferential voting would each handle an identical vote. From the initial count, First Past the Post would instantly elect Chris as the winner, because Chris achieved a simple majority. However, Preferential voting would not elect Chris, nor any other candidate, because no candidate achieved an absolute majority. Therefore, Preferential voting would commence its process of elimination of candidates, and distribution of preference votes, to force an absolute majority. This is done by eliminating the candidate with the least votes, then distributing that candidate’s votes to the remaining candidates, according to the order of preferences listed by voters on each ballot paper, then completing a new count. The preference votes that are distributed to the remaining candidates, then hold the same full value as the remaining candidates’ own primary votes. So in our hypothetical example, Anne has the least votes, therefore Anne is eliminated. Anne’s preference votes are then distributed to the remaining candidates, according to the order of preferences listed by voters on each ballot paper, that Anne received in the primary vote. Therefore, hypothetically, of Anne’s 18 primary votes; 4 votes are distributed to Ben, 10 to Chris, and 4 to Debbie. After the distribution of Anne’s preference vote, a second count is completed, which results in the increased percentage share of votes between the remaining candidates, with Chris still in the lead.


However, still no candidate has achieved an absolute majority, so the process of elimination of candidates, and the distribution of preference votes, continues. Ben now has the least votes, therefore Ben is eliminated. Ben’s preference votes are then distributed to the remaining candidates, according to the order of preferences listed by voters on each ballot paper, that Ben had received — which includes Ben’s own primary votes, and the preference votes he received from Anne, when she was eliminated. Therefore, hypothetically, of Ben’s 28 votes; 8 votes are distributed to Chris, and 20 to Debbie. After the distribution of Ben’s preference votes, a third count is completed, which finally results in Debbie achieving an absolute majority and winning. So while First Past the Post would have instantly elected Chris as the winner, Preferential voting would elect Debbie, despite Chris having won the primary vote, and therefore, being the first choice candidate of most voters. This simple hypothetical comparison of First Past the Post and Preferential voting, raises a profound dilemma for democracy. That is, how can these two voting systems start with identical candidates, and identical voter intentions, yet result in the election of different candidates, with both voting systems supposedly being perfectly democratic? The truth is — First Past the Post and Preferential voting are both structurally flawed and unfit for use in democracy. ____


Tactical preferencing partnerships

On face value, Preferential voting’s requirement of an absolute majority, may appear to produce a superior standard of democratic voting than other voting systems that only require a simple majority. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Ironically, it is Preferential voting’s requirement of an absolute majority, and its method of ensuring one is achieved, that facilitates its corruption. For any candidate competing in a preferential voting contest, in a field of multiple candidates, achieving an absolute majority in the primary vote — that is 50% + 1 vote — is a very high hurdle to jump indeed. And in many seats, an absolute majority is not achieved at the primary vote, which means a winner can only be decided by distributing and counting preference votes. The table below shows that in recent elections, on average, around as many seats are won by absolute majority in the primary vote, as are won by preference votes. This means in the many seats where an absolute majority is not achieved in the primary vote, the opportunity remains wide open for any candidate to still win, based on preference votes, (except for the lowest placed candidate, who will be eliminated first). This opportunity creates a powerful incentive for politicians to control the flow of preference votes. That is, to influence how voters list their order of preferences for candidates on their ballot papers, so politicians can steer preference votes towards themselves. And the most efficient way for politicians to control the flow of preference votes, is to collude with other politicians, and form tactical preferencing partnerships, where each colluding partner agrees to preference one-another; that is, steer their supporters’ preference votes to one-another, in priority over their mutual rivals. The benefit for the colluding partners in preferencing one-another, is that when one of the colluding partners is eliminated, the preference votes of the eliminated colluding partner, will automatically be distributed to the remaining colluding partner, in priority over their mutual rivals. So in short, well before a vote even takes place, the colluding partners are literally able to pre-program their separate sets of votes to automatically combine as one, when one of the colluding partners is eliminated. Which obviously provides a significant numerical advantage to the remaining colluding partner, over all rivals. And the logistics of this political corruption are remarkably simple. Each colluding partner simply prints their respective How-to-Vote-Cards, reflecting the partnership. Then on election day, they hand out their respective How-to-Vote-Cards to their supporters, as their supporters enter the polling booths to vote — and that’s it.


Each of the colluding partner’s How-to-Vote-Cards, instruct their supporters on how to list their order of preferences for candidates on their ballot paper. Which enables the colluding partners to steer their supporters preference votes to one another. While there is no obligation for anyone to follow the instructions on a How-to-Vote-Card — politicians know that for many people, when standing in the polling booth with their chosen candidate’s How-to-Vote-Card in hand, the task of voting is reduced to simply transcribing the order of preferences from the How-to-Vote-Card, directly onto their ballot paper. And that gives politicians enormous control over the flow of preference votes. It is self evident — otherwise, why would politicians hand out How-to-Vote-Cards? Each of the colluding partners’ respective How-to-Vote-Cards, would show themselves preferenced 1st, with their colluding partner preferenced 2nd, or at least higher than their mutual rivals; who would be preferenced last, or at least lower.

Greens

Labor

LNP


The ability of colluding partners to tactically preference one-another, represents a double kick in the head for their mutual rivals. Because, not only does it deprive their mutual rivals of preference votes, and therefore of total votes in the final count —it also forces their mutual rivals to compete against both colluding partners collectively, rather than individually. In a competitive sense, this means any mutual rival competing in their own right, that is, without the benefit of a tactical preferencing partnership of their own, is forced into the unfair position of having to jump the very high hurdle of achieving an absolute majority at the primary vote — that is 50% + 1 vote. Otherwise, if they have to rely on preference votes to win, their position is either significantly weakened, or hopeless from the outset. In contrast, the colluding partners, individually, don’t have to jump nearly as high a hurdle. In fact, the colluding partners have the luxury of having to receive an average of just 25% each + 1 vote, to guarantee that all mutual rivals will eventually be eliminated, and one of the colluding partners will win. Even if a very popular mutual rival receives far more of the primary vote than each of the colluding partners individually, say even as much as 49%, they can still lose to the colluding partners. Because, if the colluding partners two sets of votes are equal to 25% each + 1 vote, they achieve a combined absolute majority, which defeats even the much more popular mutual rival’s 49%. And tactical preferencing partnerships are not limited to just two politicians. So for colluding partners to guarantee they will always win over all mutual rivals — a tactical preferencing partnership with three colluding partners would require each partner to secure just 16.6% of the vote, or with four partners just 12.5%, or with five partners just 10%, and so on. And the only logical basis for candidates to form such tactical preferencing partnerships is perfectly obvious. Two or more candidates who each share mutual rivals they fear or hate more than one another, attempting to improve their electoral chances by combining their separate sets of votes as one, to compete against their mutual rivals collectively, rather than individually. Then assuming the tactical preferencing partnership is successful, and forces all mutual rivals out of the contest; the winner of the vote will simply be the colluding partner that receives more votes than the other. Which, of course, will include the preference votes distributed to them from the eliminated mutual rivals they corruptly forced out of the contest. It is unfair, corrupt, and undemocratic. From the perspective of Preferential voting’s structural flaws only, that is, excluding political corruption —when a Preferential vote results in a simple majority, the only mechanism Preferential voting provides to convert a simple majority, into an absolute majority, is to add back the votes of failed candidates the people democratically rejected, and use those votes to defeat the candidate the people democratically elected.


Then when we include political corruption — Preferential voting is transformed from being a positive contest only, where candidates can only benefit by putting their best foot forward — to being a negative contest, where candidates can benefit and win, by manipulating the vote to limit the ability of their rivals to compete. In a sporting contest, Preferential voting would be the moral equivalent of knee capping the competition. To demonstrate how effortlessly Preferential voting overrides the democratic will of the people, we will look at two case studies of actual preferential votes.


Case study 1: The McMillan vote

The McMillan vote is a Preferential vote that took place in the seat of McMillan (Victoria) at the 1972 federal election. First, look at the numbers of the primary vote, the peoples’ vote for their first choice candidate. In the primary vote, Labor received a very substantial 46%, almost twice as much as the second placed Liberals on only 24%, and almost 3 times as much as the third placed Country Party on only 17%. However, no candidate achieved an absolute majority, so Preferential voting’s process of elimination of candidates and distribution of preference votes began. At the second and third counts, the fringe-dwellers were eliminated; that is, the Independent and the Democratic Labor Party. But still no candidate achieved an absolute majority. Then at the fourth and final count, the Liberals were eliminated and almost all of their preference votes, a full 96% split, were distributed to the Country party. Therefore, the Country Party achieved an absolute majority and won. However, look at the enormous difference between the percentages of the Country Party’s primary vote, and its final vote, with which it achieved an absolute majority and won. The low-performing Country Party, which in the primary vote only managed to receive 17%; that wasn’t even ranked 2nd, but 3rd; and that was out-voted by Labor by a ratio of around 3 Labor votes to 1 Country party vote; improved its primary vote by more than three times to go from guaranteed loser on 17%, to guaranteed winner on 52% in the final count.


To achieve this enormous increase, Preferential voting effectively gifted the Country Party the electoral power of four candidates combined. That is (1) the Country Party’s own votes, (2) most of the Independent’s votes, (3) most of the Democratic Labor Party’s votes, and (4) most of the Liberal Party’s votes – all of which were combined with and counted as Country Party votes in the final count, even though all these candidates went into the vote as competitors. Further, the Country Party actually won with more preference votes than primary votes. In fact, the Country party’s final count was comprised of only 32% of primary votes, and a huge 68% of preference votes. And of that 68% of preference votes, around half were not even distributed to the Country Party until the 4th count. Yet all these votes were counted as having the same full value as the Country party’s own primary votes, just as though 52% of the people had voted for the Country Party, instead of the truth of a lowly 17%. For the McMillan vote to be democratically valid, we have to somehow believe that Labor’s 46% of the primary vote, that is, the people’s vote for their first choice candidate; is inferior to the Country party’s 52% concoction of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th count preference votes, distributed to them from failed candidates, whom the majority of the people democratically rejected. Plainly, it is impossible to reconcile how the outcome of this vote has any connection whatsoever to the democratic will of the people, as determined by democracy’s majority rule. The McMillan vote also provides an outstanding opportunity to see how Preferential voting handles the spoiler effect. Because, the Country and Liberal parties do share a conservative ideology, and they were competing against one-another in this vote. So is it valid that the Country party’s primary vote was only low due to the conservative vote being split with their close friends the Liberals? And therefore, the significant increase in the Country party’s final vote, when combined with the Liberal’s vote, is fair and democratic, because it represents the people’s true support for their shared conservative ideology? We have previously discussed three problems with that proposition, and when we apply those problems to the McMillan vote, we have to conclude that any extent of fairness of the Country and Liberal parties votes being allowed to be combined as one, on the basis of their shared ideology, is necessarily defeated. First, by the significant unlikelihood that they meet the required standard of their ideologies being identical. Second, by the impossibility of assessing and proving that their ideologies are identical. And third, by the much greater unfairness of Preferential voting’s flawed structure of allowing any candidates, regardless of ideology, to combine their separate sets of votes as one, simply to achieve an unfair political advantage. Notwithstanding that, when we look at the composition of the Country parties 52% with which it won; the combined primary votes of the Country and Liberal parties only comprise 41%, which is less than Labor’s 46% primary vote. So the shared conservative ideology of the Country and Liberal parties actually lost this vote. The remaining votes that lifted their combined votes from 41% to 52%, came from the fringe-dwellers; the Independent and the Democratic Labor party. So are we now to presume that the fringe dwellers also share an identical ideology with the presumed identical ideology of the Country and Liberal parties? Because if they don’t, how can we possibly justify the fringe dwellers’ votes being combined with the Country and Liberal parties’ votes, to achieve the winning 52%? It is plainly unfair to all other candidates, and in fact so unfair, that it caused Labor, the obvious democratic winner of the vote, to be corruptly and undemocratically defeated.


This is the consequence of Preferential voting’s flawed structure, of combining the votes of failed candidates, who were democratically rejected by the people, to achieve a forced absolute majority. Moreover, we know that when politicians engage in tactical preferencing, they preference key rivals in last place on their How-To-Vote-Cards. Which means, any other candidate can be incidentally preferenced higher, simply so that last place can be reserved for a more feared, hated, or stronger political rival. Yet as the counting of a Preferential vote unfolds, we may well then find ourselves in the circumstances, where preference votes that were only incidentally distributed to a candidate, are enough to decide the winner of a seat — and therefore decide the rise or fall of a government — and therefore decide the course of Australia’s future for years to come — all down to just one candidate, whom for all we know, without being incidentally preferenced, may only have been capable of securing a handful of votes from family and friends. ____


Case study 2: The Blair vote.

The degree to which political parties are able to benefit by forming tactical preferencing partnerships, is directly linked to their relative size, or the share of the primary vote they command. Which means, the major parties benefit most. While this may seem obvious, it has particular significance that is perhaps not so obvious. That is, when the major parties tactically preference one-another, the sheer size of their combined primary votes can instantly reduce the contest to a two horse race between them only. All other candidates might as well not bother nominating. In particular, when the combined primary votes of the major parties comprise an absolute majority, no other party can possibly win. Yet we know the major parties have a great mutual hatred, so why would they want to tactically preference one-another? The major parties each have a strong vested interest in ensuring that a third political party doesn’t establish a foothold in Australian politics, for two practical reasons:

1. Because the existence of a third significant party would take votes away from each of the major parties, and

2. Because a third significant party would mean, each of the major parties would then have to worry about whether the other major party, was colluding with the newcomer, to tactically preference one-another, and together deliver the non preferenced major party the preferential kick of death at the next election.

A far more sensible approach would be for each of the major parties to use the power they share between their respectively large primary votes, to tactically preference one-another, and quickly knock any promising newcomers on the head before they become a problem. Which also means, each of the major parties would then enjoy the significant luxury of knowing they will always be around — either in government or opposition. So despite their mutual hatred, and opposing political ideologies, the major parties can achieve a significant mutual benefit, by tactically preferencing one-another, and combining their separate sets of votes as one. And the electoral experiences of Pauline Hanson provides a text book example of just such political corruption by the major parties. At the 1998 federal election, Pauline Hanson contested the seat of Blair (Queensland) as the One Nation candidate, in a field of nine. Before the election, the Labor and Liberal candidates each made public statements that they would preference Pauline Hanson last on their respective How-to-Vote-Cards. Then in an astonishing show of unity in political corruption, every other candidate in the field also preferenced Pauline Hanson last on their How-to-vote cards.


So from the moment each of Pauline Hanson’s eight rivals preferenced her last, they had collectively forced her into the unfair position of having to jump the very high hurdle of having to achieve an absolute majority at the primary vote to win — that is 50% + 1 vote. Otherwise, if she had to rely on preference votes to win, her position was either significantly weakened, or hopeless from the outset. Yet in contrast, each of Pauline Hanson’s eight rivals, individually, didn’t have to jump nearly as high a hurdle. In fact, they had the significant luxury of having to receive an average of just 6.25% +1 vote, to guarantee that Pauline Hanson would lose, and one of the colluding partners would win. Here are the numbers of the contest.

How to vote Labor. 1 Clarke

Australian Labor Party

2 ……….. 3 ……….. 4 ……….. 5 ……….. 6 ……….. 7 ……….. 8 ………..

9 Hanson One Nation Party

How to vote Liberal. 1 Thompson

Liberal Party of Australia

2 ……….. 3 ……….. 4 ……….. 5 ……….. 6 ……….. 7 ……….. 8 ………..

9 Hanson One Nation Party


With marked similarities to the McMillan vote, Pauline Hanson easily won the primary vote with 36%, which was far more than the eventual winner, the 3rd placed Liberal, on only 22%. However, as no candidate achieved an absolute majority of the primary vote, Preferential voting’s process of the elimination of candidates and distribution of preference votes began. When the fringe dwellers were eliminated, almost all of their preference votes, a full 90% split, were distributed away from Pauline Hanson, and towards Labor and Liberal. Which eventually resulted in a three way contest, with Labor on 29%, Liberal on 32%, and Pauline Hanson on 39%. Then in the 8th and final count, Labor had the least votes and was eliminated, but most of Labor’s preference votes, a full 74% split, were distributed to their much hated rival with an opposing political ideology, the Liberals in priority over Pauline Hanson. And therefore, the Liberal candidate won. So with the logistical simplicity of printing How-To-Vote-Cards, and handing them out to supporters on election day, Pauline Hanson’s eight rivals were easily able to limit the flow of preference votes to her, which limited the increase of her primary vote from 36%, to a final count of just 39%. However, in contrast, the Liberal candidate enjoyed a huge unfair advantage from their tactical preferencing partnership. Their primary vote more than doubled, from just 22%, to a final count of 53%. And just like the McMillan vote, the Liberals actually won with more preference votes than primary votes. What the Blair vote powerfully demonstrates, is that when a contest is to be decided on preference votes, colluding partners are able to go far beyond manipulating the vote simply to steer preference votes towards one another — but are actually able to very accurately target a key mutual rival to be deprived of preference votes, and therefore, very likely force that key mutual rival out of the contest. Even when that key mutual rival is by far the strongest performer in the field, and the obvious democratic winner. Which was the case with both Pauline Hanson in Blair, and the Labor candidate in McMillan. Such a simple process, to achieve such powerful corruption, and with such profound damage caused to our Australian democracy. The demolition of Pauline Hanson in the Blair vote tells the true disgusting story of the corruption of democracy that is inherent to Preferential voting. And all Australian politicians participate in this corruption, by engaging in preference deals, with no regard whatsoever for the destruction of Australia’s democracy they full well know it causes. ____


The duopoly effect

If we look at the damage Preferential voting has caused to our Australian democracy over time, it is perfectly apparent that a powerful duopoly of major political parties has been created. And in the context of Preferential voting, a political duopoly is effectively a shared dictatorship. Because it intentionally blocks the participation in the political process of alternative candidates and parties. The table below shows the percentages of seats won in the lower house of the Australian federal parliament by the major parties combined, compared with seats won by all other parties and independents at every election since 1949. For clarity, the major parties include:

1. The Labor Party (and all its previous incarnations), and 2. The Liberal and National Coalition (and all their previous incarnations)

Remarkably, over the last 50 years of regular general elections in Australia using Preferential voting, the major parties combined have won a staggering 99.2% of all seats in the lower house of federal parliament, with other parties and independents only winning a miniscule 0.8% of seats. So do we have a love-fest with the major parties to the extent of 99.2% of our electoral vote, or must there be something else going on here? What is going on — is that between them, the two major parties are able to manipulate the Preferential voting system for their own advantage, just as effectively as a more honest dictator uses a gun.


On election day, we have no choice whatsoever, but to elect one of the major parties of the shared dictatorship. Because the power they hold between them, through the size of their combined primary votes, along with the ease of corruption of the Preferential voting system, means that a third party stands all but no chance of ever securing sufficient seats in parliament to form a government. And the numbers prove that. When threatened, the major parties simply knock any promising newcomers on the head, just as they did with Pauline Hanson in the Blair vote. The reality is, that for any third party to break the major parties’ duopoly and win government, they would have to perform the political miracle of achieving an absolute majority in the primary vote, of an absolute majority of seats Australia wide. And its not as though the major parties have never been challenged. The Australian Democrats were active in Australian federal politics for 31 years from 1977 to 2008. However, they never managed to win a single seat in the lower house of federal parliament. All their members occupied seats in the senate. The One Nation Party has been active in Australian federal politics since 1992. However, to date they have never managed to win a single seat in the lower house of federal parliament. All their members have occupied seats in the senate. The Australian Greens have been active in Australian federal politics since 1997. However, to date, they have only managed to win two seats in the lower house of federal parliament. That is, the same seat twice. (Excluding a lower house seat won via by-election, then lost at the following general election). All their other members have occupied seats in the senate. Australia, of course, is not the only nation to experience a duopoly of major political parties. For example, the United States has a duopoly with the Republicans and Democrats. However, the cause of the duopolies in our two nations are very different. In Australia, the duopoly effect is a function of Preferential voting’s structural flaws, combined with intentional political corruption to achieve an electoral advantage. However, in the United States, the duopoly effect is a function of First Past the Post’s structural flaws only. That is, political corruption is not required as a driver, (although it may be present). The cause of the duopoly effect in the United States is twofold:

1. The spoiler effect, and 2. Voluntary voting.

In the United States, the First Past the Post spoiler effect, causes the duopoly effect, by strongly steering peoples’ votes towards the major parties. For example, in the 2000 Presidential election contested between Bush, Gore, and Nader — Al Gore and Ralph Nader shared a similar ideology. But for people who liked Nader, they largely knew that if they voted for him, they would weaken Gore, and therefore, inadvertently strengthen Bush. And as Nader was an independent, and not representing one of the major parties, he was less likely to win. Which provided a strong incentive for Nader’s supporters to not waste their vote on him, and instead vote for Gore, thus reinforcing the duopoly effect.


Voluntary voting in the United States also reinforces the duopoly effect. Where as in Australia, we have compulsory voting, which provides insulation from the duopoly effect. In Australia, compulsory voting means we experience the highest voter turnout in the world, which is consistently around 95% of all eligible voters. However, in every other major democracy in the world, voting is voluntary. So if the people in these other democracies don’t want to vote, they just don’t vote — and they just don’t vote in their hundreds of millions. For example, in the United States, voter turnout is commonly only around 50% of all eligible voters. Even at its historical peak in the most dire of political circumstances, during and shortly after the Civil War (1861-1865), United States voter turnout only reached 81%. So in Australia, as a proportion of population eligible to vote, almost 100% more Australians vote than Americans. The table below shows the voter turnout figures for our most culturally similar English speaking nations. So in these other nations, where voting is voluntary, and hundreds of millions of people choose not to vote, some obvious questions arise, such as:

1. Who is not voting, 2. Why are they not voting, and 3. How would the outcome of elections change if they did vote?

Good and logical reasons for people not to vote, if given the choice, would be if they had some level of angst, dissent, disinterest, disgust, confusion, or other similar feelings at the prospect of voting. So what kind of people would have these feelings? Undecided voters, who can’t choose between the candidates on offer. Disenchanted voters, who feel no party represents them. Disenfranchised voters, who once supported a party but no longer feel they can. Disempowered voters, who don’t believe their vote can make a difference. Protest voters, who want to make a statement by boycotting the vote. Assorted nutters, who would rather harm democracy than participate in it. As well as all those people who choose apathy over democracy, and just couldn’t care less about voting. And given all these people have some good and logical reason not to vote, at least in their minds, hundreds of millions of these people in other nations all around the world, just don’t vote. However, these are precisely the people most likely to express a view contrary to the major parties, and therefore, contribute most to breaking down the duopoly effect — if they voted.


The consequence of these people not voting, is that the vote is then dominated by people who are not undecided, disenchanted, disenfranchised, disempowered, protest voters etc, and therefore are more likely to have polarised support for the major parties, which serves to reinforce the duopoly effect. However, in Australia, because of compulsory voting and our 95% voter turnout, almost all of these people vote, all bar just 5%. So our very high voter turnout in Australia, and the participation of all these people most likely to express a view contrary to the major parties, logically should produce a more vibrant mix of political parties in our parliaments, and therefore, naturally provide insulation from the duopoly effect. Yet that doesn’t eventuate. Because with Preferential voting, when a promising newcomer throws their hat into the political ring, their rivals simply agree on the terms of their tactical preferencing partnerships, print their How to Vote Cards, then sit back on election day and watch the numbers fall their way. And thus, the duopoly effect is achieved. It is palpably ironic — that in Australia on election day, we head to the polling booths to vote in the highest proportion of population of any nation in the world, generally believing we are the people of an advanced first world democracy, and fully intending to participate in our democracy with our vote. Yet being largely oblivious to the truth, that due to our use of Preferential voting, we will be instantaneously depriving ourselves of our democracy — with the very act of voting. As the first order of business in the modernisation of our Australian democracy, we must end our use of the preferential voting system, and replace it with a new voting system that is truly democratic.

There is more to this section. This is intended to be an excerpt only.


Documents

Voting in Australia · In 1901, when the Commonwealth of Australia was formed, the voting system used for the election of governments was not the Preferential voting system we use