UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORDSCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

DIVISION OF PEACE STUDIES

VOTING FOR DISORDER:

POST-CONFLICT ELECTIONS AS A CHALLENGE IN PEACE PROCESSES IN AFRICA

THE CASE OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

AFRICAN PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

UB NO: 10022357

2011

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort and that it has not been sub-

mitted anywhere for any award. I warrant that I have mentioned all used sources and

that I have cited them correctly according to established academic citation rules.

Abstract

The post-conflict election in Côte d'Ivoire in November 2010 was meant to conclude the

country's transition from war-to-peace, to mark the beginning of a new era of peace

and promote democratisation. Instead, the election triggered a military stand-off

between the two major presidential candidates and and plunged the country back into

civil war. The case of Côte d'Ivoire is not an isolated one; the ambiguous effect of post-

conflict elections is an issue of debate for scholars and practitioners since the 1990s.

Whereas some post-conflict elections indeed consolidate peace in a post-conflict coun-

try, others, like in Côte d'Ivoire, lead to the resurgence of violence and civil war.

This dissertation analyses the factors which allowed for the post-conflict election in

Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 to ruin the country's peace process. The analysis is based on the

conceptual framework of Höglund et al., which brings together most of the major find-

ings about post-conflict elections that have emerged in academic literature so far. The

dissertation argues that a whole range of conflict-generating factors, including the con-

tinuity of the major political actors, unfavourable institutional circumstances and the

particularly high stakes of the election, were present. These factors influenced and re-

inforced each other and ultimately created an unstable, high-explosive environment for

the elections.

Keywords: Civil War, Côte d'Ivoire, Peace Building, Peace Process, Post-conflict Elec-

tions

Acknowledgements

I want to thank my supervisor, Christopher Cushing, for supporting me throughout the

dissertation writing process; my parents, for making my studies in Bradford possible;

and Peter, for always cheering me up whenever I was on the verge of losing my self-

confidence.

Abbreviations

AU African Union

BAE Brigade Anti-Émeute, Anti-Riot Brigade

CECOS Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité, Command Center

for Security Operations

CEI Commission Électorale Indépendante, Independent Electoral

Commission

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FESCI Fédération Estudiantine et Scholaire de Côte d'Ivoire, Ivorian Federation

of Students and Pupils

FPI Front Populaire Ivoirien, Political Party of Laurent Gbagbo

LMP La Majorité Présidentielle, Presidential Majority, coalition supporting

Gbagbo

PDCI Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire, Political Party of Konan Bédié

RDR Rassemblement des Républicains, Political Party of Alassane Ouattara

RHDP Rassemblement des Houphouétistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix,

Coalition between Ouattara's RDR and Bédié's PDCI

RTI Radio Télévision Ivorienne, Ivorian State Television and Radio

UEMOA Union Èconomique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine, West African

Economic and Monetary Union

UN United Nations

UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Voting for Disorder

Contents

Declaration......................................................................................................................ii

Abstract.......................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements........................................................................................................ iv

Abbreviations.................................................................................................................. v

1. Introduction................................................................................................................. 11.1 Research Questions................................................................................................ 21.2 Structure................................................................................................................. 31.3 Methodology ..........................................................................................................5

2. Literature Review........................................................................................................72.1 The International Community's Rationale to Promote Post-conflict Elections......72.2 Post-conflict Elections in the Academic Literature.............................................. 102.3 The Conceptual Framework of Höglund, Jarstad and Kovacs.............................122.4 A Short History of Côte d'Ivoire's Civil War and Peace Process..........................15

3. Actors in the Electoral Process.................................................................................183.1 Continuity of Major Political Actors.................................................................... 193.2 Other Actors..........................................................................................................24

4. Institutional Framework of the Elections............................................................... 284.1 Electoral System................................................................................................... 284.2 Weak and Politicised Electoral Management Bodies........................................... 324.3 Flawed DDR Process and Security Sector Reform.............................................. 354.4 The Role of the International Community ...........................................................394.5 Timing of the Election.......................................................................................... 42

5. Stakes of the Elections...............................................................................................445.1 High Concentration of Political and Economic Power.........................................445.2 Lack of Security Guarantees for the Defeated Party............................................ 475.3 The End of the 'Neither War Nor Peace Economy'...............................................49

6. Conclusion..................................................................................................................52

Bibliography................................................................................................................. 59

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1. Introduction“When two elephants fight, it is the grass which suffers.”

- Ancient African Proverb1

Since the 1990s, civil wars and internal conflicts are increasingly ended not by military

victories of one party, but by negotiated settlements. This trend continues in the new

millennium, and reflects the increased efforts of international peacemaking.2 The nego-

tiated settlements typically provide guidelines for a war-to-peace transition of a country

and outline the tasks for the transitional government in order to create stable peace. At

the end of the transitional phase, the peace agreements usually envision democratic

elections as the last step of the peace process.

Côte d'Ivoire is a prime example for this trend. The country's civil war was ended by a

negotiated settlement in 2007. The peace agreement outlined the transition from war-to-

peace and stipulated the holding of elections. The Ivorian presidential elections in

November 2010 were meant to be the last crucial step in the peace process and should

have marked the beginning of a new era of peace in the country. But instead of consol-

idating the peace, the elections triggered a resurgence of violence and armed conflict

that caused more deaths than the original conflict which the elections intended to end. 3

The case of Côte d'Ivoire is all but unique. There are many other examples of post-con-

flict elections in all parts of the world which ruined peace processes and plunged coun-

tries back into civil war. In Africa, examples include Angola's post-conflict election in

1 Ali A. Mazrui and Ade Ajayi J.F., “Trends in Philosophy and Science in Africa,” in General History of Africa, vol. 8 (Berkeley: UNESCO / University of California Press, 1993), 677.

2 Human Security Report Project, Human Security Brief 2007 (Vancouver: Human Security Report Project, 2008), 35.

3 Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 2011), 209 f.

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1992, which spoiled the country's peace process and triggered a new phase of the civil

war that was even more devastating than the conflict prior to the elections. In sharp con-

trast, there are other cases where the post-conflict elections managed to transform a vi-

olent conflict successfully into a political dispute and strengthened the democratic sys-

tem of the country. Examples include the post-conflict election in Mozambique in 1994

and the 2005 election in Liberia.4

This discrepancy is intriguing and has increasingly motivated academics to inquire into

the reasons for this ambiguous effect of post-conflict elections. The case of Côte

d'Ivoire is a new, very recent example that has so far not been studied in detail. This dis -

sertations attempts to fill this gap.

1.1 Research Questions

In order to assess why the Ivorian post-conflict election had such a devastating effect,

the primary research question will be as follows:

Which factors allowed for the presidential election in 2010 to ruin the

peace process in Côte d'Ivoire?

To answer this question, several secondary questions will be used. The questions are

formulated in accordance with the conceptual framework of Höglund, Jarstad and Ko-

vacs, which is used as a theoretical basis in this dissertation and will be discussed in

more detail in chapter 2.3. Based on the framework, the secondary questions will be the

following:

4 J. Michael Turner, Sue Nelson, and Kimberly Mahling-Clark, “Mozambique’s Vote for Democratic Governance,” in Postconflict Elections, Democratisation & International Assistance (Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 153-175; David Harris, “Liberia 2005: An Unusual African Post-conflict Election,” Journal of Modern African Studies 44 (2006): 375-395.

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1. Which specific actors were responsible for the electoral violence

and what was their motivation?

2. Which institutions/institutional frameworks had a conflict-

generating effect in the election and why?

3. Are there any factors which made the stakes in the election

particularly high?

In addition to these questions which are derived from the conceptual framework, the

dissertation will try to integrate the case of Côte d'Ivoire in the overall theoretical de-

bate and ask:

What does the example of Côte d'Ivoire tell us about post-conflict

elections in Africa in general?

1.2 Structure

As a first step, the dissertation will give an overview of the international community's

rational to promote post-conflict elections and introduce different explanations of the

ambiguous effect of post-conflict elections that have emerged in academic literature.

Subsequently, a more detailed discussion of the conceptual framework by Höglund et

al. will follow, which will be used as the theoretical basis in the dissertation. To famili-

arise the reader with the context in which the Ivorian post-conflict elections took place,

the dissertation will then provide a short history of Côte d'Ivoire's civil war and peace

process.

After this introductory part, the dissertation will present the conflict-generating factors

in the Ivorian post-conflict elections according to the three clusters proposed by the

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conceptual framework, that is, actors, institutions and stakes of the elections.5 Concern-

ing the actors, it will be argued that the major political actors in the elections were not

only belligerents during the civil war, but also part of a fierce power struggle that pred-

ated and even partly triggered the civil war. The elections, thus, were not a new begin-

ning in Ivorian politics, but the continuation of a power struggle that already proved to

be tremendously harmful for the country.

Regarding the institutions / the institutional framework of the elections, several poten-

tial conflict-generating factors will be discussed. This dissertation argues that contra-

dictory to the statement of some academics, the design of the electoral system in Côte

d'Ivoire was not a conflict-generating factor. More relevant for the devastating effect of

the elections were, for example, the weakness and politicisation of electoral manage-

ment bodies, which allowed the parties to easily manipulate and utilise them in their fa-

vour. The flawed Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process and

security sector reform furthermore provided the two main parties in the elections with

fully operational militias and armed forces, which were loyal only to political objectives

and not the constitution or peace agreement. The potential conflict-mitigating effect of

the international community's presence and involvement in the peace process was

spoiled by the poor reputation of international involvement in Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover,

the elections were ill-timed, as the surrounding conditions in the country were not yet

ready for elections.

The last part of the analysis concentrates on the stakes of the elections. These were par-

ticularly high for the candidates and their closest allies as well as for many middle- and

5 Kristine Höglund, Anna K. Jarstad, and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” Democratization 16, no. 3 (2009): 531.

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low-level actors. The high centralisation of political and economic power transformed

the elections into a 'winner takes all election'. The lack of security guarantees put the

defeated party at risk to be impeached for war crimes. In addition, the end of the 'neither

war nor peace economy' that flourished during the transitional phase signified for many

middle- and low-level actors that they had to support one candidate and to make sure

that he wins if they wanted to secure their economic privileges.

The conclusion will summarise the findings of the dissertation and explain how the in-

dividual conflict-generating factors interacted, influenced and reinforced each other. It

will also assess if the electoral disaster in Côte d'Ivoire could have been prevented and

evaluate the lessons the case study of Côte d'Ivoire provides for the overall debate.

1.3 Methodology

The dissertation at hand is primarily based on secondary literature. This includes books,

academic papers and newspaper articles as well as reports by NGOs and governmental

organisations in English, French and German. I have been fully aware that some sources

are prone to be influenced by the agendas of the respective organisations and are thus

not always neutral in their analysis.

To guarantee a balanced and objective perspective, multiple resources have been used

wherever it was possible. Unfortunately, Côte d'Ivoire is a 'neglected country' in aca-

demic literature and a few aspects discussed in the dissertation thus have to rely on a

single source. In this case, I paid particular attention to the credibility of the source. No

untrustworthy sources like Wikipedia have been used.

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Due to the scope of the dissertation, I have focused only on the national, overall conflict

dynamics that were influenced by the post-conflict elections. Local conflict dynamics,

which are needed to fully explain singular, local outbreaks of extreme violence, were

deliberately excluded. The massacre of Duékoué, for example, where the electoral de-

bacle served as pretext for the killing of approximately 800 people, cannot be explained

by the negative impact of the post-conflict elections alone but has to take into account

the social, ethnic and generational tensions specific for the western region of Côte

d'Ivoire.6

As this dissertation is based on literature and no fieldwork has been undertaken, there

are no major ethical issues regarding the research. Furthermore, although the post-con-

flict election in Côte d'Ivoire took place only recently and I have been following the

situation in Côte d'Ivoire very closely since two years, I have no personal connections

to the conflict. My interest in the country and its conflict is purely academic, and thus I

am confident that the analysis in this dissertation was made with an appropriate critical

distance.

6 For more on local conflict dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire, see McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire.

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2. Literature ReviewSince the 1980s-90s, post-conflict elections have become more and more common and

their ambiguous effects soon attracted the attention of academics. The following chapter

will explain the rationale of post-conflict elections, introduce the theoretical debates re-

garding their mixed outcome and present the theoretical framework of the dissertation.

To familiarise the reader with the case study of Côte d'Ivoire, a short overview of the

country's history and the course of the events during and after the post-conflict election

in 2010 will follow.

2.1 The International Community's Rationale to Promote Post-conflict Elections

According to Kumar, 'post-conflict elections' are the first national or regional elections

held in a country following the end of a civil war or internal conflict.7 In most cases,

post-conflict elections are part of a peace agreement of the warring parties, and are re-

garded as the final step to complete the transition from war to peace. The international

community heavily supports the conduct of these elections, among other things through

financing, logistical support, training and monitoring, often in connection with peace-

keeping missions. For the international community – primarily the UN but also bilateral

donors as well as NGOs – post-conflict elections seem to be the best solution to achieve

a whole range of goals.

According to the rationale of the international community, post-conflict elections can

end the civil war sustainably by transforming the violent conflict into a non-violent

7 Krishna Kumar, “Postconflict Elections and International Assistance,” in Postconflict Elections, Democratisation & International Assistance (Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 5.

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political debate. Disputes are no longer settled by weapons but by arguments and polit-

ical discussion: “ballots take the place of bullets.”8 Second, they transfer power to a le-

gitimate government. A recognised, accountable government will ensure inclusive polit-

ics and thus reduce grievances and the possibility of renewed conflict.9 An elected gov-

ernment, moreover, does not only bring stability to the political situation of the country,

but it also provides a legitimate partner for international financial institutions and

donors. While international institutions and donors are often reluctant to transfer money

for post-conflict reconstruction to transitional governments which are in place after the

signing of a peace agreement but have no legitimacy, after a post-conflict election they

hope to find trustworthy partners in the country. This enables the country to recover

economically and thus again increases stability.10 Furthermore, the elections will stimu-

late further democratisation in the country. During the election process, important

democratic infrastructure will be created, for example, through the establishment of

electoral commissions and political parties. It also stimulates the development of a civil

society and a diversification of the national news media estate. These institutions are

likely to remain in place even after the elections and strengthen the democratic process

of the country.11 Therefore, even if the elections result in violence, they help to consol-

idate the democratisation process and pave the way for more successful elections in the

future.12 Theoretically, all these arguments of the international community are compre-

8 Ibid., 6.9 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes. Democracy in Dangerous Places (London: The Bodley Head,

2009), 79 f.10 Terrence Lyons, “The Role of Postsettlement Elections,” in Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation

of Peace Agreements (Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 218.11 Krishna Kumar, “After the Elections: Consequences for Democratisation,” in Postconflict Elections,

Democratisation & International Assistance (Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 218 ff.

12 Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder, “Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict Stability” (Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Political Science and Columbia

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hensible and make post-conflict elections an important tool in international peace build-

ing. In reality, however, it is questionable in how far elections can meet these expecta-

tions. Does an elected government really pursue more inclusive politics, even if they are

not dependent on votes from a minority? Is an elected government really more trust-

worthy than a transitional government, especially if the main actors remain the same?

Another point highlighted amongst others by Lyon is that post-conflict elections present

an exit strategy for international peacekeeping missions. As the elections signal the end

of the transition period from war-to-peace, they are a valid justification to end the de-

ployment of these costly missions. The existence of such an exit strategy is an important

argument to convince the international community to send troops in the first place, as

they would hardly agree to a mission without a foreseeable end date. 13 On the downside,

post-conflict elections can easily become a 'quick fix' solution, an excuse for the inter-

national community to end its engagement even though a more long-term engagement

would be needed.14

These numerous arguments explain why the international community is very supportive

of post-conflict elections, which are now a standard component of brokered peace

agreements after civil wars. Some cases seem to confirm the success of post-conflict

elections by living up to the expectations and meeting some or all of these goals. The

probably most impressive example in Africa for this case is the election in Mozambique

in 1994, which ended decades of civil war and marked the beginning of a successful

University, War and Peace Institute, 2011), 3, http://brancati.wustl.edu/T2K_Feb62011.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).

13 Lyons, “The Role of Postsettlement Elections,” 217.14 Bengt Säve-Söderbergh and Izumi Nakamitsu Lennartsson, “Electoral Assistance and

Democratization,” in From Reaction to Conflict Prevention. Opportunities for the UN System (Boulder, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 364.

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democratisation process.15 On the other hand, as already indicated in the introduction,

the cases of Angola and now, Côte d'Ivoire, show that post-conflict elections can also

dramatically fail and lead to a resumption of violence.

2.2 Post-conflict Elections in the Academic Literature

Since the 1990s, post-conflict elections increasingly attracted the attention of practition-

ers and academics, who started to analyse the reasons for their mixed results. This led to

lively discussions as to why some post-conflict elections provide the basis for lasting

peace and democratisation, while others have a devastating effect and plunge a country

back into conflict. A whole range of corresponding suggestions has emerged on how to

mitigate the conflict-generating factors in post-conflict elections.

An edited volume by Kumar was one of the first publications to examine post-conflict

elections in more detail.16 Kumar stated that elections in a post-conflict environment are

fundamentally different than elections in other circumstances because of their complex-

ity, sensitivity and the expectations attached to them. Post-conflict elections fulfil more

and different functions than normal elections as they take place in circumstances which

are characterised by weak institutions, a fragmented and polarised society and deep

political cleavages. Although Kumar acknowledges that post-conflict elections can fail

to end a conflict due to the unfavourable circumstances, he mainly emphasised the pos-

itive effects elections can have on democratisation in a post-conflict society.17 He also

notes that countries in post-conflict situations often lack capacity to organise free and

15 Turner, Nelson, and Mahling-Clark, “Mozambique’s Vote for Democratic Governance.”16 Krishna Kumar, ed., Postconflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance (Boulder,

Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).17 Ibid.

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fair elections and thus international assistance is crucial to make post-conflict elections

successful.

Reilly, another pioneer in this field, highlights that the electoral system is key to suc-

cessful elections not only in post-conflict situations, but in divided societies in general.

He argues that certain electoral systems can promote extremist and polarising politics,

whereas others are able to stimulate a moderate and cooperative political environment.

Electoral systems should therefore be consciously 'engineered' to meet the needs of a

post-conflict society. Reilly especially advocates preferential vote-pooling systems.18

According to his findings, this kind of system stimulates politicians to form broad coali-

tions instead of, for example, campaigning solely along ethnic lines, an effect he terms

'centripetalism'.19 Reilly's arguments are supported by Sisk and Reynolds, who also pro-

mote the adjustment of electoral systems to manage conflict in divided societies. 20

Lyons, in contrast, dismisses the importance of electoral systems and other technical ar-

rangements for post-conflict elections. Based on his extensive research on the post-con-

flict elections in Liberia, Lyons draws the conclusion that the most important aspect for

post-conflict elections is the 'demobilisation of politics'.21 With this term, he describes

the need to transform structures which developed during war and are based on violence

18 In a preferential vote-pooling system, voters do not vote for a single candidate, but rather list the candidates in order of personal preference. The candidate with the fewest top placements is eliminated and his votes are transferred to those candidates the voters opted for as second choice. This procedure is repeated until one candidate has an absolute majority of votes. See Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18 f.

19 Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management.20 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 533 f.21 See for example Terrence Lyons, Voting for Peace: Postconflict Elections in Liberia (Washington

D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

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and fear, like militias and black markets, into structures which are based on security and

trust, for example political parties and open economies.22

Brancati and Snyder, moreover, stress the significance of the timing of post-conflict

elections. Their quantitative analysis of civil wars shows that if post-conflict elections

are held too soon after the end of the civil war, the failure of the elections and the resur-

gence of war are much more likely. They argue that shortly after a civil war, the parties

to the conflict are still powerful and legitimate political institutions are generally weak.

However, by creating the right environment through the strengthening of political insti-

tutions, the demobilisation of armed forces and power sharing agreements, the risks as-

sociated with an early post-conflict election can be mitigated.23

2.3 The Conceptual Framework of Höglund, Jarstad and Kovacs

In 2009, Höglund, Jarstad and Kovacs published an analytical framework which tried to

combine the findings of previous research on post-conflict elections.24 This framework

will be used as the basis for the analysis in this dissertation and therefore, be presented

in more detail in the following section. The framework examines two kinds of elections,

elections during civil wars as well as post-war elections. For the purpose of this disser-

tation, only the part concerning post-war elections of the framework is of relevance and

will be considered here.

22 Terrence Lyons, “Post-conflict elections and the process of demilitarizing politics: the role of electoral administration,” Democratization 11, no. 3 (2004): 38.

23 Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Post-Conflict Stability”; Dawn Brancati and Jack Snyder, “Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Post-Conflict Elections” (Washington University in St. Louis, Department of Political Science and Columbia University, War and Peace Institute, 2010), http://brancati.wustl.edu/Rush2Polls.pdf (accessed May 19, 2011).

24 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies.”

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To systematically analyse the conflict-generating factors of post-conflict elections, Hö-

glund et al. propose to examine three clusters of possible factors: a) the key actors in the

electoral process; b) the institutions of the elections; and c) the stakes of the elections.25

These clusters include most of the possible conflict-generating factors of post-conflict

elections brought forward by the academics cited above. But instead of picking one

factor as the most significant, the framework rather focuses on the interconnection of

different issues, as the factors can influence and reinforce each other. Correspondingly,

there are many different ways and mechanisms which lead to electoral violence.26 Over-

all, the framework is similar to the Strategic Conflict Assessment Frameworks used for

example by the British Department for International Development (DFID).27 As with

these Strategic Conflict Assessments, the Höglund et el. Framework has the benefit that

it helps to strategically structure a complex situation in order to understand the ongoing

dynamics.

Concerning the actors of the electoral process, the framework of Höglund et al. suggests

that the “... political experience, agenda, support base, links to society and perceived le-

gitimacy ...” of the actors can be a determining factor if the elections are successful or

spread further violence.28 Often, the key actors in the elections were also the key actors

of the previous conflict. Former rebel groups might turn into political parties, trying to

fight for their cause with different means but resorting to violence if they are not able to

gain power and reach their goals legitimately through the elections, as was the case in

the 1992 Angola elections. Other actors might be excluded from the electoral process

25 Ibid., 531.26 Ibid., 547 ff.27 DFID, Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes (London: DFID, 2002).28 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 537.

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and for this reason turn to violence.29 But 'actors' as defined by Höglund et al. do not

only include key actors like political parties or candidates who participate directly in the

elections. It also includes stakeholders who are outside the electoral process itself but

actively influence it. Höglund et al. do not specifically mention the media and civil so-

ciety organisations, but they too, can accordingly be important actors. There are many

ways in which a whole variety of actors might cause election-related violence, therefore

a thorough actor-analyses is essential.

Höglund et al. subdivide their second cluster of factors, the institutional framework,

into two types of institutions. First, “... electoral systems as one of the institutions regu-

lating the electoral process itself ...”; and secondly “... institutions that are relevant for

regulating and managing violence during electoral process, including the electoral man-

agement bodies, the police and the military.”30 Electoral systems can influence the dy-

namics of campaigning according to the local conflict dynamics. Weak or politically

biased electoral management bodies might create tensions due to real or perceived fa-

vouritism. Similarly, armed forces might be politicised and support one side, using

force to intimidate the opposition.31 However, the term 'institutions' can be misleading,

given that in the social sciences, the term has a specific connotation.32 Sometimes one

entity can be an actor and institution at the same time, therefore, it is important to dis-

tinguish between the different roles that they can play. For example, the armed forces

can be an institution because they provide a structure to manage violence during elec-

tions. On the other hand, in post-conflict settings armed forces and rebel groups are of-

29 Ibid., 539 f.30 Ibid., 540.31 Ibid., 542 f.32 see for example K. Sänge, “Zum Begriff der Institution im Neo-Institutionalismus,” in Einführung in

den Neo-Institutionalismus (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 35.

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ten politicised and participate actively in the election campaigns, and are thus also act-

ors. The object of reference in the analysis is not the entity itself but the specific role as

an actor or institution.

The last cluster of factors proposed by the framework deals with what is at stake in the

elections. The stakes highly influence the probability of whether or not the losing

parties are likely to accept the election results. Do the losers have some kind of guaran-

tee that they will not be suppressed by the winners, or does a defeat mean that they lose

every capacity to engage in politics after the elections? Constitutional pacts or power-

sharing agreements can reduce the risk for the loser to be marginalised in the further

political process and to turn violent to seek a victory by force.33

Höglund et al. emphasise that although the identification of the different factors – act-

ors, institutions and stakes – is necessary to understand why post-conflict elections can

lead to violence, it is even more important to look at the relationship and interaction

between them. Only then will the mechanisms of how elections affect the conflict-dy-

namics in a society, and either promote peace or violence, become visible. This step of

the analysis will be made in the conclusion of this dissertation.

2.4 A Short History of Côte d'Ivoire's Civil War and Peace Process

To understand the context in which the post-conflict election took place, it is necessary

to give a brief overview of Côte d'Ivoire's civil war and peace process. Côte d'Ivoire's

political situation first began to deteriorate after the death of the 'father of the nation',

president Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. The power was first transferred to Henri

33 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 543 ff.

15

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Konan Bédié, the speaker of the parliament and protégé of Houphouët-Boigny. Bédié

promoted the concept of 'Ivorité', a debate about who is indigenous Ivorian and who has

immigrant roots. The concept aimed at the immigrants who came to Côte d'Ivoire dur-

ing the rule of Houphouët-Boigny when the cocoa industry was thriving and the Côte

d'Ivoire was the economic powerhouse in the region. Bédié promoted the concept

mainly to exclude his rivals from the elections in 1995, most importantly, Alassane Ou-

attara, another former protégé of Houphouët-Boigny. Bédié was overthrown in a milit-

ary coup in 1999 by Robert Guéï, who allowed elections a year later.34 Ouattara and

several other candidates were again barred from running for president because of al-

legedly being immigrants, and the elections were boycotted by many opposition parties

and characterised by irregularities. The winner of these dubious elections was Laurent

Gbagbo, the historic adversary of Houphouët-Boigny. He adopted the concept of Ivor-

ité, which had already heavily polarised the country and deprived especially Muslim

residents from the north of the country of their citizen rights because they were al-

legedly immigrants. Tension continued to rise between the Muslim North and the Chris-

tian South, and in 2002, the Forces Nouvelles rebels, originating from a mutiny of parts

of the army, tried to overthrow the government to end the marginalisation of the North-

erners. The attempt failed, but the country was effectively split in two, with the Forces

Nouvelles controlling the Northern 60% of the country and the Government controlling

the South.35

34 Richard Banégas, “Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other African Modes of Self-Writing,” African Affaires 105, no. 4121 (2006): 538 ff.

35 Abu Bakarr Bah, “Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire,” African Affairs 109, no. 437 (2010): 603 ff.

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A ceasefire was agreed in 2003, and a UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations

Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was deployed in 2004.36 However, several peace

negotiations failed and the country remained divided. Finally in 2007, the Ouagadougou

Peace Agreement was signed between Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, the political head

of the Forces Nouvelles, and officially ended the civil war. In reality, it was more a state

of 'neither war nor peace' or 'armed peace', as some authors described the transition

period.37 The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement provided for the identification of the pop-

ulation, disarmament and the integration of the rebel forces into the national army, the

reunification of administration in the North and the South and the holding of elections.

Gbagbo's mandate had already officially ended in 2005, and so the agreement asked for

a presidential election as soon as possible.38

Nevertheless, this election was postponed five times. In the beginning, the delicate

identification and registration of the population, which decided if a resident is a real

Ivorian and thus had the right to vote etc., delayed the holding of the elections. But

soon, this seemed to become a pretext for Gbagbo and Soro to play for time in order to

cling to power in the transitional government of national unity. Under enormous inter-

national pressure, the election finally took place in November 2010, with Ouattara be-

ing able to participate for the first time. The first round was peaceful and had a high

voter turnout, with Gbagbo and Ouattara emerging as the strongest candidates. The run-

off election between the two saw massive tensions between the supporters of the can-

didates. Bédié, who placed third in the first round, now supported Ouattara.

36 United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, “United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)”, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/ (accessed May 23, 2011).

37 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 171.38 ECOWAS, Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, 2007.

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The Electoral Commission declared Ouattara as the winner of the second round (54,9%;

Gbagbo 45,9%) and this decision was reaffirmed by the international community who

certified the election as being free and fair. Yet, the Institutional Court annulated parts

of the results, claiming fraud in several provinces in the North, and declared Gbagbo

winner (51,45%; Ouattara 48,55%).39 Although the international community rallied be-

hind Ouattara and asked Gbagbo to step down, both were sworn in as president and

named their governments. Several mediation attempts of the AU and ECOWAS as well

as international sanctions failed to convince Gbagbo to step down. In March, the Forces

Nouvelles took up arms again and started an offensive, taking over most of the towns

held by Gbagbo supporters within three days. The fighting then concentrated mainly on

Abidjan. UNOCI as well as the French troops present in the country started to support

the rebels with air strikes against Gbagbo's military bases and the presidential palace.

The deadlock ended eventually, when Gbagbo, his family and closest allies were arres-

ted by Ouattara's forces.40 To sum it up, the post-conflict election, meant to be the final

step of the peace process and to unite the country, resulted in violence and divided the

county more than ever before.

39 Caroline Wells, “Côte d’Ivoire: the need to reach beyond the theatre of elections,” openDemocracy, 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/caroline-wells/c%C3%B4te-divoire-need-to-reach-beyond-theatre-of-elections (accessed March 2, 2011).

40 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: Cote d’Ivoire,” Al Jazeera English, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/12/2010121971745317811.html (accessed April 9, 2011).

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3. Actors in the Electoral ProcessAs the theoretical basis and the country-specific context have now been introduced, the

dissertation will continue to analyse the conflict-generating factors in Côte d'Ivoire's

2010 post-conflict election. Following Höglund et al.'s framework, the fist focus of the

analysis will be the actors in the electoral process.

3.1 Continuity of Major Political Actors

In many other cases of post-conflict elections, the former parties to the conflict trans-

form into political parties and continue to fight each other by different, non-violent,

means. Höglund et al. propose that this bears the risk that the parties return to violence

as soon as it becomes clear that they will not achieve their goals politically, thus making

rebel-party transformation a severe conflict-generating factor in post-conflict elec-

tions.41

In Côte d'Ivoire, the situation was more complex than that. The former rebel movement,

the Forces Nouvelles, never formed a political party after the end of the hostilities.

Their political figurehead, Guillaume Soro, became prime minister in the government

of national unity under his former enemy, President Laurent Gbagbo, after the signing

of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.42 But Soro was not able to participate in the

post-conflict presidential elections due to his young age, therefore the only viable Force

Nouvelles candidate to run for president was excluded from the outset. Yet, this was

never of real importance. Part of the reason why the Forces Nouvelles never created

41 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 539.42 Patrick Meehan, “The ‘problem’ with Côte d’Ivoire: how the media misrepresent the causes of

conflict,” openDemocracy, 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/patrick-meehan/problem-with-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-how-media-misrepresent-causes-of-conflict#ednref4 (accessed June 8, 2011).

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their own party and introduced their own presidential candidate was the fact that there

already was a party with a strong candidate which represented their constituency, the

population of the northern part of the country: Alassane Ouattara and his party Rass-

amblement des Républicains (RDR).43 For the Northerners, as well as the numerous im-

migrants and their descendants, Ouattara became the hero and figurehead of their

struggle against the 'second-class citizenship'. He was personally affected by the xeno-

phobic Ivorité movement in the country, barred from the presidential office only be-

cause one of his parents came from Burkina Faso. The symbolism of Ouattara's fate let

this constituency even overlook the fact that it was during Ouattara's mandate as Prime

Minister from1990-to-1993 that the hated cartes de séjour, the manifestation of the ex-

clusion of 'non-indigenous Ivorians', were introduced.44 And, despite the fact that there

was never evidence that Ouattara actively supported the rebellion of the Forces Nou-

velles in 2002, for his enemies, his participation was beyond question.45 Although the

former rebels did not transform into a party and neither brought forward a presidential

candidate, their agenda and constituency were clearly represented by Ouattara in the

post-conflict presidential elections.

The second party of the civil war, the then government and its main constituency, the

'Christian Southerners', is also clearly represented in the post-conflict elections. Their

figurehead, the incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo, was actively involved in the civil

43 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis, Africa Briefing (Dakar; Nairobi; Brussels, 2009), 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/B062-cote-divoire-whats-needed-to-end-the-crisis.aspx (accessed March 1, 2011).

44 Mike McGovern, “The Ivorian Endgame,” Foreign Affairs (2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67728/mike-mcgovern/the-ivorian-endgame (accessed June 3, 2011).

45 Tobias von Lossow, Côte d’Ivoire: Neuanfang mit Altlasten, SWP-Aktuell (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011), 4.

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war. The Forces Nouvelles tried to overthrow Gbagbo and his government with their re-

bellion in 2002.46 Gbagbo was the main person responsible for the exclusion and sup-

pression of Northerners and immigrants – through the disenfranchisement of these

groups he sought to strengthen his own power base in the South of the country.

Both sides of the civil war thus participated in the post-conflict elections, represented

by actors who were already engaged in the civil war – if not directly, as in the case of

Gbagbo, then indirectly, by being a symbolic figure in the war, as was the case with Ou-

attara. The political fronts in the post-conflict elections as well as the actors remained

the same as in the civil war.

But the problem lies even deeper than this continuation of the civil war by different

means. The rivalries between the major players in Ivorian politics, Gbagbo and Ouat-

tara, and also former president Konan Bédié, can be traced back long before the start of

the civil war. All three “... came out of the machinery of Houphouët-Boigny's one-party

state,”47 and their rivalry began with the struggle about the succession of Houph-

ouët-Boigny after his death in 1993. Bédié and Ouattara, both protégés of the founding

president, fought for the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny's Parti Democratique de la

Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), splitting the party effectively in two with Ouattara founding his

own party, the RDR.48 Ouattara's professional experience in international financial insti-

tutions made him the perfect candidate to tackle Côte d'Ivoire's economic crisis, a huge

advantage that could have made him the front-runner in the presidential elections. But

46 Bah, “Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire,” 604.47 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight, Africa Report (Dakar; Brussels, 2004),

4, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/082-cote-divoire-no-peace-in-sight.aspx (accessed February 24, 2011).

48 Meehan, “The ‘problem’ with Côte d’Ivoire: how the media misrepresent the causes of conflict.”

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Bédié managed to exclude Ouattara from the two presidential elections in the 1990s by

embracing the concept of Ivorité. The concept resonated with the real socio-economic

tensions in the country, denounced immigrants as being responsible for the economic

crisis and gave Bédié a valuable tool to get rid of his major opponent, the alleged 'for-

eigner' Ouattara.

Laurent Gbagbo, the historical opposition leader, was the main opponent of Houphouët-

Boigny's rule and became the most important political counterbalance to Bédié and Ou-

attara. As opposition leader, he was jailed several times by Houphouët-Boigny's govern-

ment, by command of Ouattara.49 This deepened animosity between these two even

more. Gbagbo came to political power only late in his life after decades of political op-

position, and became known as being able to avoid giving up his hard won power by

engaging in discussions without making concessions, but rather playing for time.50 His

determination to stay in power is the main reason why he spoiled several peace agree-

ments with the rebels. He only eventually accepted the Ouagadougou Agreement be-

cause it prolonged his mandate as President and in contrast to previous agreements did

not envision him to delegate extensive powers to the Prime Minister.51 Moreover,

Gbagbo is a highly religious person and a follower of a charismatic pentecostal

church.52 In his perception, it was his godly mission to rule Côte d'Ivoire.53 Gbagbo ad-

49 Joseph Hellweg, Hunting the Ethical State. The Benkadi Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 38 f.

50 Camilla Elowson, Minor Conflict, Major Consequences? Facing an Unresolved Identity Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire (Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2011), 26.

51 For a more detailed argumentation on this point, see Arnim Langer, Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace, IBIS Discussion Paper 4 (Dublin: Institute for British-Irish Studies, 2011), 22 f.

52 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 96.53 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, Africa Report (Dakar; Brussels:

International Crisis Group, 2011), 15, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/cote-divoire/171-cote-divoire-is-war-the-only-option.aspx (accessed June 28, 2011).

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opted the concept of Ivorité and the xenophobic rhetoric from Bédié to strengthen his

own position by further excluding Ouattara from the Presidential race in 2000.

With the endorsement of Ivorité as a means to fight an elite power struggle, Bédié and

Gbagbo fuelled real existing tensions in the country that ultimately led to the civil war.54

This shows how deep the personal rivalries of these three major actors run and how

harmful the craving for power and the “outsized egos”55 of these major players were for

the country. In the 2010 post-conflict elections, all three of these historic belligerents

were running for president, continuing their power struggle. Gbagbo's campaign slogan

“we win or we win” already indicated that he intended to remain in power at any cost.56

Gbagbo's self-assuredness was boosted amongst others by his personal priest, who fore-

casted that Gbagbo would win the election because he was destined to rule over Côte

d'Ivoire.57 Bédié's PDCI and Ouattara's RDR, this time, were in an uncomfortable alli-

ance, ensuring each other support in case of a second round of the elections against

Gbagbo, but nonetheless competing against each other in the first round.58

All in all, the post-conflict presidential elections marked not a new beginning in Ivorian

politics, but were the continuation of a power struggle between the three main actors, as

well as a continuation of the civil war itself. All of the actors have shown in the past

54 Daniel Ozoukou, “Post election conflict in Ivory Coast: Reasons of a predictable failure,” Oye! Times, January 28, 2011, http://www.oyetimes.com/news/africa/9101-post-election-conflict-in-ivory-coast-reasons-of-a-predictable-failure (accessed April 3, 2011).

55 Mahmood Mamdani, “UN-enforced regime change in Ivory Coast an avoidable disaster,” The East African, 2011, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/UN+enforced+regime+change+in+Ivory+Coast+an+avoidable+disaster/-/2558/1158264/-/w7k9gm/-/index.html (accessed May 10, 2011).

56 The Carter Center, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions (The Carter Center, November 2, 2010), 5, http://cartercenter.org/countries/cote-divoire-peace.html.

57 AlertNet, “Arrest warrant out for pro-Gbagbo Ivory Coast pastor,” AlertNet, August 5, 2011, http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/arrest-warrant-out-for-pro-gbagbo-ivory-coast-pastor (accessed August 10, 2011).

58 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis, 8.

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that they were ready to plunge the country into chaos if it benefited their personal in-

terests. Their personal rivalries made the victory in the post-conflict election a matter of

pride. Gbagbo's refusal to accept the election results and therefore his defeat was hardly

surprising.

The Ivorian post-conflict election was a sharp contrast to the successful post-conflict

elections in Liberia, which were characterised by the absence of all major actors in-

volved in the civil war and thus guaranteed a new beginning in politics.59 In Côte

d'Ivoire, however, the continuity of actors proved to be a major conflict-generating (or

rather conflict-prolonging) factor.

3.2 Other Actors

In addition to the three main political actors described above, a range of secondary or

minor individual actors had a certain influence on the post-conflict elections. Due to the

scope of this dissertation and the limited availability of reliable and detailed sources,

only two examples of these actors will be briefly outlined in the following section. Sub-

sequently, there will be a brief discussion as to why neither the 'international com-

munity' nor 'the media' are classified as actors in this dissertation.

One of the secondary individual actors was Guillaume Soro, political head of the Forces

Nouvelles and Prime Minister in the unity government of Gbagbo. He was not able to

run for the presidency himself, because he was too young according to the constitution.

Soro would have had the power to change the election dynamics by, for example, expli-

citly taking sides for one candidate from the beginning of the campaign. However, due

59 Harris, “Liberia 2005: An Unusual African Post-conflict Election,” 392.

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to his own political aspirations, he presented himself as “neutral referee”60, in order to

keep good relationships with all sides and not jeopardise his own career. His signific-

ance thus lies rather in the fact that he did not actively involve himself in the post-con-

flict elections instead of acting as the major player that he could have been.

Another secondary actor was Charles Blé Goudé, leader of the Jeunes Patriotes militia.

Blé Goudé is one example of the many middle- and low-level actors that profited

massively from the 'neither war nor peace economy' and had much to lose if his candid-

ate, Gbagbo, lost the elections (see chapter 5.3 for a more detailed argumentation on the

stakes of middle- and low-level actors and its consequences).Very popular among the

youth in the south, he again mobilised and radicalised the masses in order to support

Gbagbo after his refusal to give up power, as Goudé already did during the civil war.61

His unbroken support for Gbagbo can be attributed not only to his ideological loyalty,

but primarily to his attempt to secure his own political and economic interests.

International actors, notably, the UN, France and Burkina Faso, did not seem to be act-

ively involved in the electoral process and are thus not treated as actors. Their role was

limited to the provision of an institutional framework, as will be demonstrated in

Chapter 4.4. Without denying the active involvement of several international actors, es-

pecially France and Burkina Faso, in Ivorian politics, economy and the civil war in the

past, there are no indications that they were actively engaged in the electoral process, at

least not to actively pursue their own interests. In fact, France disengaged massively

from Côte d'Ivoire in the previous years, its position towards the former colony being

60 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: The Contenders,” Africa Confidential 50, no. 11 (2009): 7.61 Banégas, “Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other African Modes of Self-Writing,”

544.

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almost indifferent especially since the beginning of President Sarkozy's mandate.62 Ar-

guably it would also not be surprising if France meddled covertly by, for example, fin-

ancing Ouattara's election campaign, given the history of France's involvement in the

past and the lack of transparency of the campaign financing.63 But up to now, no such

allegations were made, and even less proof of such manoeuvres has been given. Be-

cause of this, France is not treated as an actor in this dissertation, and neither is Burkina

Faso, for similar reasons.

The UN as well is not classified as an actor. Although the UN was heavily involved in

the ultimate ousting of Gbagbo after the post-conflict elections,64 it did not pursue iden-

tifiable self-interests besides that free and fair elections were held. The UN played a

passive role by providing an institutional framework for elections, which will be dis-

cussed in Chapter 4.4. Indeed, it only became an active protagonist when the electoral

violence had already become a full-scale armed conflict.

Some observers might also perceive the national media, print as well as radio and TV to

be an actor in the electoral process. It in fact played a role in distributing hate speech

and partisan messages. But looking closer, it becomes evident that the media is rather an

extended arm of the main candidates than an actor with an own agenda. Most of the

newspapers are affiliated with one particular political party. As Reporters Without Bor-

ders describes it, the press in Côte d'Ivoire generally can be subdivided in a 'blue press',

which means newspapers supporting Gbagbo and his FPI, and a 'green press', newspa-

62 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 201.63 Mission d’Observation Electorale de l’Union Européenne, Côte d’Ivoire: Rapport Final. Election

Présidentielle 31 octobre - 28 novembre 2010 (EU, 2010), 16.64 Mamdani, “UN-enforced regime change in Ivory Coast an avoidable disaster.”

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pers backing Bédié and his PDCI.65 The daily newspaper 'Nord-Sud' is owned by allies

of Guillaume Soro and the Forces Nouvelles, whereas the newspaper 'Le Patriote' sup-

ports Ouattara and his party RDR.66 Private radio stations in Côte d'Ivoire are not al-

lowed to broadcast information about politics. The State Television and Radio (RTI),

composed of two television channels and two national radio stations, were under the

control of the Gbagbo government. Although the Ivorian law demands that the RTI

gives equal airtime to of all candidates, the coverage became more and more biased to-

wards Gbagbo during the two round of the elections – clearly a result of the influence of

the Gbagbo government.67 Given these affiliations of the media and the major actors,

the media is treated in this dissertation as a tool of the candidates and not an actor in

and of itself.

65 Reporters Without Borders, “‘The press is already in full election campaign’: Reporters Without Borders alerts President Gbagbo,” Reporters Without Borders, December 9, 2009, http://en.rsf.org/cote-d-ivoire-reporters-without-borders-alerts-09-12-2009,37445.html (accessed August 8, 2011).

66 Ibid.67 Mission d’Observation Electorale de l’Union Européenne, Côte d’Ivoire: Rapport Final. Election

Présidentielle 31 octobre - 28 novembre 2010, 22 f.

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4. Institutional Framework of the ElectionsThe actors would not be able to spoil the post-conflict election, no matter how strong

their determination to win, if the institutional framework of the election would act as a

neutral force to moderate the power struggle of the candidates. In this chapter, it will be

shown that none of the institutions and institutional frameworks in Côte d'Ivoire was

effectively able to do so.

4.1 Electoral System

Many scholars have emphasised that the choice of the electoral system is crucial to limit

electoral violence in divided, post-conflict societies.68 However, as this chapter will

show, the change of the electoral system within the limited options provided by the

presidential system in Côte d'Ivoire would not have made a significant difference in the

presidential election. In fact, only a change of the overall political system from a presid-

ential into a parliamentarian system could have offered the possibility to choose a con-

flict-mitigating electoral system. The problem in Côte d'Ivoire was thus not predomin-

antly the choice of the electoral system, but the choice of the overall system of gov-

ernance.

Côte d'Ivoire's electoral system in a presidential election is a two-round (or run-off) ma-

jority system conducted by single ballot. To be elected president, one candidate must

reach the absolute majority. If no candidate is able to achieve an absolute majority in

the first round, the two candidates with the most votes have to stand in a run-off.69

68 see for example Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies. Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management.

69 IFES Election Guide, “Election Profile for Cote d’Ivoire,” IFES Election Guide, 2011, http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=1912 (accessed June 24, 2011).

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Many scholars attach little value to this system and argue that is can be even harmful in

a divided society. Instead, they propose to use preferential voting systems. According to

them, preferential voting requires candidates to not only attract their own constituency,

but also to reach out to other ethnic, regional and religious groups by moderate political

positions, temperate rhetoric and inter-party alliances.70

However, in Côte d'Ivoire, it is questionable if a preferential voting system would have

brought advantages. The alliance between Bédié's PDCI and Ouattara's RDR is a re-

markable example that inter-party cooperation was also possible in a two-round system.

Their alliance was a successful interregional and interethnic coalition.71 As most of

Bédié's constituency voted for Ouattara in the second round, it would have been likely

that most of them would have voted for Ouattara as a second choice in a preferential

system – thus ensuring Ouattara's victory. It is unlikely that under a preferential elector-

al system Gbagbo would have sought Bédié to join his alliance of the Presidential Ma-

jority (La Majorité Présidentielle, LMP), or rather that Bédié would have accepted such

a coalition.

Could the preferential voting system have made a difference in the campaigning? While

the election campaigns started relatively docile in the first round of the elections, the

tone of the campaigns hardened before the run-off. The rhetoric of the candidates be-

came increasingly aggressive and they accused each other of being responsible for the

civil war and especially Gbagbo's supporters distributed messages which incited ethnic

70 Benjamin Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, Electoral System and Conflict in Divided Societies, Papers on International Conflict Resolution 2 (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999).

71 Thomas J. Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 469.

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and nationalist violence.72 Would a preferential system have prevented that and eased

the election-related tensions in the country? This, too, seems rather improbable. In the

first round, Gbagbo was sure of his victory because of the split of the opposition, with

Ouattara and Bédié both running for presidential office. His aggressive rhetoric prior to

the second round of the elections can be interpreted as an act of defiance when it be-

came clear that the alliance between Ouattara and Bédié would sustain – a course of

events many observers did not expect.73 Gbagbo felt forced onto the defensive. In a

preferential system, the same would have happened, with the small difference that as

there is only one round of elections, which means that the campaign would already have

been hostile from the beginning. The alliance between the two main opposition forces

was decisive in the elections, and as long as the alliance did not fall apart, Gbagbo was

under pressure, no matter which electoral system would be applied. His aggressiveness

is a reaction to this pressure, and can, perhaps, even be seen as a deliberate attempt to

mobilise and radicalise his own constituency to fight for him if the election results were

not in his favour.

Other authors suggest that electoral systems that require a presidential candidate not

only to win the overall majority, but also a certain percentage of votes in a large number

of disperse regions, will mitigate conflict.74 This is especially effective when the parties

to the conflict are divided geographically, as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire, where one

party dominates the South and the other the North. If a candidate has to appeal to voters

throughout the country, the argument goes, regionalism and votes along ethnic lines are

72 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, 1.73 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 472.74 Timothy D Sisk, “Pathways of the Political. Electoral processes after civil war,” in The Dilemmas of

Statebuilding. Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 202.

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prevented and the winner is seen as representative of the whole country. The candidates

have to search for political consensus instead of polarising the country through extrem-

ist positions to win.75 However, such a rule would hardly have changed the situation in

Côte d'Ivoire. Looking at the results of the second round of the election, it becomes ob-

vious that Ouattara actually has won not only the overall majority, but also gained a sig-

nificant proportion of votes in the southern districts won by Gbagbo (whereas Gbagbo

gained almost no votes in the northern districts won by Ouattara), even if that was not

required by the Ivorian electoral system.76 Theoretically, he should thus have been ac-

cepted easily as the country's legitimate representative. But in spite of this outcome,

Gbagbo and a relative small number of militant supporters were not willing to accept

their defeat and spoiled the whole process. A change in the electoral system would not

have been able to prevent such behaviour either.

What are the reasons that other electoral systems could not have improved the

situation? As Höglund et al. put it, “[t]he key concern with electoral systems in war torn

societies … is to what extent they permanently exclude certain groups from power.”77 In

Côte d'Ivoire, the strong presidential system and the insignificant role of the parliament

transform the presidential election into a winner-takes-all election that leads to the ex-

clusion of the defeated parties from any real political power in the next five years (this

topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.1).78 No electoral system can change

this fact. The only way to ensure the participation of different political parties in the

75 Ibid.76 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 475.77 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 540.78 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral, Rapport Afrique

(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2010), 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/regions/afrique/afrique-de-louest/cote-divoire/158-cote-d-ivoire-securing-the-electoral-proces.aspx (accessed June 17, 2011).

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political process is to strengthen the legislative branch. A parliamentarian system, com-

bined with a proportional electoral systems that gives minorities a chance to participate,

would be more suited to accommodate different political fractions and reduce the risk

for them to be permanently excluded. The question of the electoral system is thus of

secondary importance in Côte d'Ivoire – it is primarily a matter of the overall system of

governance.

4.2 Weak and Politicised Electoral Management Bodies

After the run-off election, the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI, Commission

Électorale Indépendante) tried to announce the preliminary results. However, two

Gbagbo-nominated members of the CEI prevented the spokesperson to do so by seizing

the results and tearing them up in front of the international press and television cameras,

shouting that the results had not been approved by the commission.79 The incident

caused the CEI to miss the legally set deadline of announcing the results within three

days.80 The CEI spokesperson was only able to publish the results several days later,

guarded by UN peacekeepers. These results, which proclaimed Ouattara's victory, were

immediately rejected by Gbagbo, who appealed the Constitutional Council. The Consti-

tutional Council, in turn, annulled parts of the results because of alleged fraud in several

northern regions (Ouattara's electoral base). However, the alleged irregularities were

fictional. Although there were some local incidents on election day, most of them were

rather in the government controlled South than in the North, and none of them affected

the overall outcome.81 Nonetheless, the Constitutional Council went on to suspend the

79 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 473.80 Nicholas Cook, Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 3 f.81 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, 8.

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results of seven northern districts, subtracted the votes from the overall results and pro-

claimed Gbagbo the overall winner.

How was such a charade possible? The CEI is assigned by the Ivorian constitution to

organise and conduct all phases of elections. In theory, it should have the authority and

capacity to announce credible and independent results. However, the CEI was

weakened by several factors. The CEI “consists of a national commission, 19 regional

commissions and 415 local commissions.”82 According to the Pretoria Agreement,83 it

should furthermore consist of two representatives from each political party signatory to

the treaty as well as members from governmental, judicial and presidential bodies.84

Overall, the composition led to a dominance of the opposition in the CEI. This was an

anathema to Gbagbo, as it impeded his control over an important electoral institution.

To undermine the CEI's credibility, he dissolved the CEI in February 2010, nine months

before the election, claiming that it was biased and accusing its leader of having manip-

ulated the electoral list in favour of the opposition.85 Gbagbo was able to do because of

Article 48 of the constitution, which allows the President to “... take exceptional meas-

ures when the state’s institutions are threatened.”86 Gbagbo's move prompted the oppos-

ition parties to leave the transitional Government of National Unity in protest. Only

when Gbagbo reconstituted the CEI and appointed an opposition member as the new

82 Elowson, Minor Conflict, Major Consequences? Facing an Unresolved Identity Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, 23.

83 One of the precursor peace agreements of the Ouagadougou Agreement; the Ouagadougou Agreement refers to the Pretoria Agreement at several points.

84 The Carter Center, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 4.85 Mission d’Observation Electorale de l’Union Européenne, Côte d’Ivoire: Rapport Final. Election

Présidentielle 31 octobre - 28 novembre 2010, 10.86 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Another Temporary Fix,” African Confidential 51, no. 5 (2010):

7.

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president of the CEI, the opposition parties returned to the government.87 These events

increasingly politicised the CEI and undermined its independence and credibility.

Similar to the CEI, the Constitutional Council, too, was severely politicised. The Con-

stitutional Council, composed of seven members which are appointed by the presid-

ency, is assigned by the Ivorian constitution to judge the legality of the election and to

approve or annul the results.88 However, there are no specific guidelines “... on the

nature of irregularities or how the Council may consider them in the event that it annuls

an election result.”89 According to Ivorian law, the Constitutional Council is not able to

change the results – if it annuls them because of irregularities, a new election must be

held within 45 days.90 The Constitutional Council, therefore, exceeded its mandate by

declaring Gbagbo the winner, in fact, it conducted a constitutional coup d'état. How-

ever, the decisions of the Constitutional Council are legally binding, and they are not

subject to appeal, which enabled Gbagbo to present himself as a man respecting the

Ivorian law by accepting the results presented by the Constitutional Council.

To ensure an objective and credible election outcome that is accepted by all parties, it is

vital to guarantee the independence of the Council. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

Most of its members had been nominated by Gbagbo or his close allies and were known

to be loyal to the incumbent president.91 The president of the Council, Paul Yao-N’Dré,

was for example a close friend of Gbagbo and member of his party FPI.92 Another

87 Langer, Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace, 20.88 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 474.89 The Carter Center, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 9.90 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 474.91 Cook, Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crisis, 3.92 David Robert and Anja Casper, “Stürzt die Côte d’Ivoire Erneut in eine Politische Krise? Nach der

Auflösung der Regierung” (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010), http://www.kas.de/westafrika/de/publications/18838/ (accessed June 16, 2011).

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member of the Council was Gbagbo's former lawyer, and yet another, was a founding

member of Gbagbo's former political party.93 The Constitutional Council's bias towards

the presidential camp severely damaged its independence and acceptance by the other

parties. Its partisanship led eventually to the abuse of its position to support Gbagbo by

changing the results of the election.

Recapitulatory, the two major institutions responsible to ensure a fair, independent and

credible election were politicised and prone to partisanship. This created mistrust in the

electoral process and made it easy for all parties to contest the validity of the election

results and even change them in their favour. Due to this, the charade described above

was made possible. The weakness and politicisation of these two major electoral man-

agement bodies, caused notably by their dependence on the presidency, has thus clearly

been a conflict-generating factor in the post-conflict election.

4.3 Flawed DDR Process and Security Sector Reform

Gbagbo's refusal to accept the election result, the politicisation of the electoral manage-

ment bodies, etc. suggest that the conflict that was triggered by the presidential elec-

tions was mainly a political contention. But this does not fully explain the escalating

military violence and the outbreak of what some term a renewed full-scale civil war.

This violence can be attributed to the flawed demobilisation and security sector reform

programmes that led to an ongoing fragile security situation in the country. The Ou-

agadougou Peace Agreement of 2007 envisaged the creation of a reunified national

army, formed by the former government forces and the Forces Nouvelles rebels, the de-

mobilisation of parts of the rebels, and the dismantling of militias and militant youth

93 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: An then, there were two,” Africa Confidential 51, no. 22 (2010): 3.

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leagues.94 Yet, the implementation of this agenda was never seen as a precondition for

the elections and neither the camp supporting Gbagbo nor the rebels showed much in-

terest in a quick implementation as they were not ready to trust the other side.95 Only a

few weapons had been collected, and shortly before the election only 17,601 of 23,777

Forces Nouvelles combatants were demobilised.96 In summary, the DDR process was

slow and remained largely incomplete.97 In addition, both the Forces Nouvelles and the

national Defence and Security Forces continued to import arms and military material, in

violation of the UN arms embargo.98 Overall, both sides had still significant military re-

sources at their disposal prior to the election.

Gbagbo, as the incumbent president, was in command of the approximately a 60,000-

man strong national Defence and Security Forces, including the army and the militar-

ised gendarmerie and police forces.99 The Ivorian army is considered relatively poorly

trained and equipped, and generally described as divided. Parts of the army were said to

be fiercely loyal to Gbagbo, while other parts rather opposed him – a division that can

be explained by the partial integration of the Forces Nouvelles.100 On the contrary, the

militarised gendarmerie, often seen as a counterweight to the army, is known as a

staunch partisan force, supporting Gbagbo.101 Moreover, Gbagbo created special units

94 ECOWAS, Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.95 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis, 9.96 United Nations Security Council, Twenty-sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, November 23, 2010, 8.97 Ibid., 8 f.98 Grégoire Bafouatika et al., Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph

12 of Security Council resolution 1893 (2009) (United Nations Security Council, 2010).99 Arthur Boutellis, The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace (New

York: International Peace Institute, 2011), 9.100 Elowson, Minor Conflict, Major Consequences? Facing an Unresolved Identity Crisis in Côte

d’Ivoire, 27.101 Raphaël Outtara, “Côte d’Ivoire,” in Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa

(Zurich, Berlin: LIT Verlag; Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2008), 78.

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loyal to him that were responsible for maintaining order in Abidjan, like the Anti-Riot

Brigade (Brigade Anti-Émeute, BAE) and the Command Center for Security Operations

(Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité, CECOS).102 Overall, the highest

ranks in the hierarchy of the Defence and Security Forces were all loyal supporters of

Gbagbo. Gbagbo used the power of his presidency in the previous years to staff the key

positions with close allies. The most popular example for this is the Gbagbo confidant

General Philip Mangou, who was appointed chief of staff, the highest authority within

the military, in 2004.103 This strategy of Gbagbo lead to an increasing politicisation of

the national armed forces and it gave him the capacity to stay in power by force of

arms.

The former Forces Nouvelles rebels have maintained their own, separated chains of

command due to the incomplete reintegration into the national armed forces and were

able to revert to a well-trained force of allegedly 45,000 soldiers prior to the elections.

Although many rebels of the lower ranks opted to be disarmed, demobilised and rein-

tegrated into civilian working life or a 'civic service', the incomplete implementation of

the DDR process disposed them to re-mobilisation.104 The willingness of the Forces

Nouvelles to fight for ideological reasons waned during the last years, but was likely to

have been revived if the Northerners would be disenfranchised again. Perhaps even

more important, many middle-level actors of the Forces Nouvelles used their position

increasingly to gain economic benefits and it was very likely that they would go to

102 Richard Banégas, “Post-Election Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire: The Gbonhi War,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 461.

103 Outtara, “Côte d’Ivoire,” 84.104 Elowson, Minor Conflict, Major Consequences? Facing an Unresolved Identity Crisis in Côte

d’Ivoire, 29 f.

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some lengths to secure their power and privileges by bringing Ouattara to power, as will

be demonstrated in more detail in Chapter 5.3.

Beside the regular fighting forces, there were many militias and youth leagues fighting

on both sides which had not been dismantled. Militias were not disarmed and still active

especially in the west of the country,105 with Gbagbo remaining in close contact with at

least two of them.106 In Abidjan, the Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) and the student

organisation Fédération Éstudiantine et Scholaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), both well

trained youth-leagues devoted to Gbagbo and the FPI, had their structures to mobilise

and radicalise the youth still in place.107 These militias had proved valuable for Gbagbo

before, creating chaos in the streets of Abidjan and intimidating opponents and support-

ers of his enemies.108 In recent years, similar youth movements loyal to the RDR and

PDCI developed as well. All of them were known for their tendency to resort to partisan

violence.

In summary, the continuing split of the Defence and Security Forces and the failure of

dismantling partisan militias led to a situation where two of the major presidential can-

didates effectively controlled their own fully equipped and operational armed forces.

Because of this constellation, the political conflict degenerated into an armed conflict.

The Defence and Security Forces were the main factor as to why Gbagbo was able to

hold onto power, despite international sanctions and frozen assets.109 Instead of enfor-

cing the internationally accepted election results, the armed forces to some extent con-

105 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral, ii.106 Elowson, Minor Conflict, Major Consequences? Facing an Unresolved Identity Crisis in Côte

d’Ivoire, 27.107 Human Rights Watch, “The Best School.” Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire

(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008), 33.108 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Is War the Only Option?, 10.109 Boutellis, The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace, 1.

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ducted a coup d'état against the elected president Ouattara. Ouattara, on the other hand,

had his own fighting force to confront the security forces and fight for enforcement of

his electoral victory. The flawed DDR process and security sector reform was therefore

another major escalating factor in the post-conflict election.

4.4 The Role of the International Community

In many post-conflict elections, the international community has played a conflict-mit-

igating role by providing security, technical and logistical support and monitoring the

elections.110 Peacekeeping forces, election monitors and others can provide an important

institutional framework to strengthen the electoral process. An absence of the interna-

tional community in contrast can be considered as a preventable risk in post-conflict

elections.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the international community showed a strong presence and was act-

ively engaged in supporting the electoral process. Most importantly, the UN peacekeep-

ing force, UNOCI, with approximately 9,000 troops was mandated to provide security

and support the organisation of the elections.111 It was supported by French troops of the

Forces Licornes, which had been deployed in the country since the crisis in 2002.

Moreover, the head of UNOCI, Young-Jin Choi, was instructed by the UN Security

Council to certify the election results, which was accepted by the Ivorian government

and signed by Gbagbo himself.112 The Ivorian elections “were to be the first elections to

110 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 543.111 United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, “UNOCI Mandate,” United Nations Operation in Côte

d’Ivoire, 2011, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/mandate.shtml (accessed June 22, 2011).

112 United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, “Statement on the Certification of the Result of the Second Round of the Presidential Elections Held on 28 November 2010”, December 3, 2010, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml (accessed June 21, 2011).

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be certified by the UN in Africa”.113 In theory, independent external certification of the

results would increase the chances for the election outcome being respected by all

parties.

However, the standing of the international community in Côte d'Ivoire was ambivalent

and it was difficult for UNOCI to fulfil its mandate. This is due to a discourse in the

Ivorian society that prevails alongside the paradigm of Ivorité. It is a discourse about a

'second independence' from the former colonial power France, about 'patriotism' and

state sovereignty.114 This discourse evolved closely connected to concept of Ivorité, dur-

ing the dramatic economic decline of Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s. Painful liberal reforms

prescribed by international financial institutions as well as deteriorating relations with

the former colonial power France, which had still a heavy presence in the country,

quickly led to a situation where foreign actors made convenient scapegoats for the crisis

in the country.115

Strong ultra-nationalist tendencies evolved, and 'patriotic' groups, often aligned with the

FPI and the Gbagbo government, radicalised large parts of the youth especially in the

South. Agitators like Charles Blé Goudé, the leader of the Jeunes Patriots, spread their

xenophobic propaganda through massive demonstrations in Abidjan as well as through

state media.116 The anti-French and anti-UN sentiments turned violent several times in

the previous years, for example in 2004, when French institutions as well as houses and

113 Thomas J. Bassett and Scott Straus, “Defending Democracy in Côte d’Ivoire. Africa Takes a Stand,” Foreign Affairs (2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67907/thomas-j-bassett-and-scott-straus/defending-democracy-in-cote-divoire (accessed July 18, 2011).

114 Banégas, “Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other African Modes of Self-Writing,” 536.

115 Ibid., 546.116Human Rights Watch, “The Best School.” Student Violence, Impunity, and the Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, 31.

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businesses of French nationals living in Côte d'Ivoire were looted,117 or in 2006, when

Jeunes Patriots militias attacked several UN bases throughout the country.118 On the

more political level, too, the international community has been repeatedly sidelined in

the peace process, especially by Gbagbo's FPI government.119 Most striking was the ex-

clusion of the international community from the negotiation of the Ouagadougou Peace

Agreement, which was negotiated solely by the conflict parties themselves and the

president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, as a mediator.

Therefore, it was hardly possible for UNOCI to be accepted as a neutral and honest

broker in the post-conflict election. The fact that Ouattara was portrayed as the 'candid-

ate of the West' by his enemies made things even worse, as the suspicions implied that

the international community would be biased and deliberately support Ouattara if it

came to a close run. It was therefore no surprise that UNOCI's verification of the results

presented by the CEI was dismissed as partisan and had no influence on the behaviour

of the Constitutional Council. In fact, Gbagbo and his supporters started a renewed ul-

tranationalist campaign to disqualify the UN-verified CEI results, denouncing UNOCI

as a foreign occupation force and Choi as a puppet of France.120 Due to this campaign,

UNOCI was deliberately attacked by loyalist patriotic militias, which significantly di-

minished UNOCI's capacity to provide security. UNOCI's decision to protect the tem-

porary residence of the UN-certified president Ouattara was again a sign for the nation-

117 Ibid., 19.118 Human Rights Watch, “Because they have guns...I’m left with nothing.” The Price of Continuing

Impunity in Côte d’Ivoire (Human Rights Watch, 2006), 9 f.119 David Zounmenou, “Côte d’Ivoire: Finally a Light at the End of the Tunnel?,” Institute for Security

Studies, 2010, http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1051 (accessed June 24, 2011).120 Bassett, “Winning Coalition, Sore Loser: Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 Presidential Elections,” 470.

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alists that the international community was 'taking sides', and this triggered renewed at-

tacks on UNOCI patrols121 and even shooting at one of its helicopters.122

It would go too far to say that the involvement of the international community in the

electoral process was a conflict-generating risk in Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict election.

However, it was shown that the nationalist tendencies restrained the international com-

munity from providing a stabilising and conflict-mitigating framework, as it usually

does in post-conflict elections.

4.5 Timing of the Election

Given that the post-conflict election had been postponed six times since 2005, it seems

to be absurd to claim that the election was hurried and ill-timed. But the timing of post-

conflict elections should not only be understood as the time elapsed since the end of the

war or the signing of a peace agreement. Timing is also about the environment in which

the elections take place, about how strong the relevant institutions are and about the real

and perceived security situation in the country.123

As already discussed above, in Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict election, the important insti-

tutions like the CEI and the Constitutional Council were weak and the security situation

was still fragile because of the flawed and incomplete DDR process and security sector

reform. Moreover, many important actors were not interested in holding elections. Es-

pecially Gbagbo and Soro seemed to be comfortable with the status quo as both had

121 United Nations Secretary General, “Le Secrétaire Général Déclare que l’ONUCI s’Acquittera de son Mandat et Prévient des Conséquences de Toute Attaque Contre le Personnel de l’ONU”, December 20, 2010, http://www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2010/SGSM13325.doc.htm (accessed June 24, 2011).

122 United Nations News Service Section, “Côte d’Ivoire: UN condemns firing at helicopter and killing of civilians,” UN News Centre, March 29, 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37925&Cr=ivoire&Cr1= (accessed June 24, 2011).

123 Brancati and Snyder, “Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Post-Conflict Elections.”

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their share in the government and thus were able to satisfy their respective constituen-

cies. This also explains the various postponements of the election, which can be seen as

a tactic to gain time in office.

The reason why the election finally took place in November 2010 was mainly due to the

pressure of the international community. The bi- and multi-lateral donors who funded

the election became increasingly impatient and threatened to suspend their financial aid.

The financial crisis in 2008 especially amplified the desire of the UN and France to get

out of Côte d'Ivoire as soon as possible and to end the costly peacekeeping mission.124

The election was an important benchmark to justify a retreat of the Forces Licornes and

the UNOCI troops. The importance of the election as an exit-point for international en-

gagement prompted the UN to focus their efforts on organising the elections, whereas

other areas like the DDR process and the strengthening of institutions became subordin-

ate. In this sense, the election was in fact hurried and ill timed, as the international com-

munity treated the election as an end in and of itself, without considering if the political,

social and security environment were 'ready' for the election. Hence, although the elec-

tion was postponed six times, the time was not ripe for a post-conflict election in Côte

d'Ivoire.

124 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 211.

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5. Stakes of the ElectionsHöglund et al. argue that the stakes, or in other terms, what the election is about, are of-

ten decisive for the dynamics of the election. The more that is at stake, the harsher the

campaign will be, and the more likely it is that parties try to rig the election or that the

defeated parties will not accept the results.125 In the post-conflict election in Côte

d'Ivoire the stakes were particularly high.

5.1 High Concentration of Political and Economic Power

As in many former French colonies, Côte d'Ivoire's political system is a presidential re-

public, whereby the President is head of state and head of government.126 The power is

heavily centralised at the national level, with almost no powers at the local and regional

level like in federal or decentralised states.127 The political system is characterised by an

extremely strong executive. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who in turn ap-

points the cabinet.128 The President controls the military and the police and, as already

described above, is able to staff the key positions within these defence and security

forces. He has a significant influence on most of the political institutions, as seen in the

example of the CEI and Constitutional Council.

Moreover, the legislative branch, represented by the National Assembly, is weak and ill-

equipped. It consists of 225 members and has “only six standing committees, which do

125 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 543 ff.

126 International Business Publications, Côte d’Ivoire. Foreign Policy and Government Guide Volume 1. Strategic Information and Developments (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications, 2007), 86.

127 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral, 17.128 International Business Publications, Côte d’Ivoire. Foreign Policy and Government Guide Volume 1.

Strategic Information and Developments, 87.

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not even have meeting rooms.”129 Small member parties use to sell their votes to the rul-

ing party if the latter had no majority, thus trying to gain advantage for themselves.130

As a consequence, parliamentary oversight of the executive is almost non-existent. The

civil society, as well, is very weak and is no real counterbalance to the strong execut-

ive.131 The winner of the presidential election has, therefore, a quasi-monopoly on polit-

ical power. In turn, the defeated party is excluded from all state affairs for the next five

years of the winner's mandate. In addition, one must not to forget that by winning polit-

ical power, the winner of the election in a way also gains a late victory in the civil war.

This symbolism should not be underestimated; it again fuelled the determination of

each party to win the election.

However, as McGovern puts it, “[p]olitical power [is] a relatively small portion of the

prize for which the elite [fights]” in Côte d'Ivoire.132 At least as important as the politic-

al power are the economic benefits which the presidency offers. Although economic

growth has slowed down during the last two decades and the per capita income has de-

clined 15% since 1999, Côte d'Ivoire remains the largest economy in the UEMOA.133

Côte d'Ivoire's wealth can be primarily attributed to the cocoa sector, which produces

approximately 40% of the world's cocoa. Since independence, this sector has been the

biggest source of revenue and the 'slush fund' of Ivorian politics.134 Non-transparent net-

works of parastatal controlling authorities, commercial intermediaries and obscure com-

panies are long known to serve the Ivorian government as a means for personal enrich-

129 Outtara, “Côte d’Ivoire,” 84.130 Ibid.131 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral, 17.132 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 139.133 CIA World Factbook, “Côte d’Ivoire,” CIA World Factbook, 2011,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iv.html (accessed July 5, 2011).134 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 137.

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ment and as a tool to accommodate political allies. In the 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire privatised

the cocoa sector under the pressure of IMF and World Bank to make it more transpar-

ent. However, this made the illicit activities only more sophisticated and better hidden,

so that it is almost impossible to trace the mechanisms in detail.135 It is not even possible

to trace the use of the taxes generated by the cocoa sector, as there is no court of audit in

the country.136 Similar patterns can be observed in other economic branches, such as the

coffee sector and the increasingly important oil sector, which surpassed cocoa and cof-

fee as the most important export commodity in 2007.137 Regardless, it is beyond dispute

that the government is the most important beneficiary of this system. The winner of the

presidential elections has access to enormous economic assets. These, in turn, can be

transferred into even more political power through patronage systems and “handing out

largesse.”138

Overall, the winner of the post-conflict elections of Côte d'Ivoire gains enormous polit-

ical and economic advantages that enables him and his entourage to govern the country

according to their liking, with virtually no restrictions through checks and balances.

Furthermore, the accumulated political and economic power provide strong advantages

for the ruling party in the next election. This includes not only the appointment of allies

to key positions in electoral management bodies, but also enormous resources to fin-

ance the electoral campaign. A change of government is therefore less likely, and for the

135 Ibid., 158.136 dradio, “Am Abgrund - Der Konflikt in der Elfenbeinküste spitzt sich zu,” dradio, 2011,

http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/hintergrundpolitik/1432158/ (accessed April 9, 2011).137 Langer, Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace, 22.138 Richard Atwood and Richard Moncrieff, “West African Elections: There’s too Much at Stake,”

International Crisis Group, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/op-eds/west-african-elections-theres-too-much-at-stake.aspx (accessed July 6, 2011).

46

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losing party of the preceding election it will be even more difficult to win the next elec-

tion.

To reduce the stakes in a post-conflict election, some authors propose elite-negotiated

pacts that ensure inclusive politics regardless of the election results.139 However, no

such pacts have been signed in Côte d'Ivoire prior to the elections. All parties of the

election, therefore, had much to win and much to lose. All in all, the high centralisation

of political and economic power transformed the post-conflict election in Côte d'Ivoire

into a 'winner-takes-all' election and was therefore an important conflict-generating

factor.

5.2 Lack of Security Guarantees for the Defeated Party

Another factor that was at stake in the election was the fate of the defeated party. With

its newly acquired power, the winner would be able not only to marginalise its oppon-

ents politically and economically, but even to impeach its former enemies in the civil

war for war crimes or other offences.140

In Côte d'Ivoire, no party has ensured the other to refrain from such measures, which

would have diminished the stakes of the election. On the contrary, insinuations by the

candidates indicated that criminal prosecution was a real threat. Ouattara, for example,

announced during a TV debate with Gbagbo shortly before the run-off election that he

intended to create a truth and reconciliation commission as well as several investigative

commissions if he won the election.141 It was very likely that if there were to be legal

139 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 546.140 Ibid., 545.141 Andreas Mehler, Côte d’Ivoire: Kein Ausweg durch Machtteilung, GIGA Focus Africa (Hamburg:

GIGA - German Institute for Global and Area Studies, 2010), 3.

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prosecutions concerning crimes committed during the civil war after the election, it

would be a politicised, one-sided prosecution, a victor's justice to get rid of opponents.

Whereas it would be hard to prove that Gbagbo himself has committed war crimes,

many of his close allies were more vulnerable to prosecution. Blé Goudé, for example,

was already on the UN Sanctions list since 2006 because of inciting violence against

UN troops and foreigners and directing and participating “in acts of violence by street

militias, including beatings, rapes and extrajudicial killings.”142 Regarding Gbagbo,

however, it would be relatively easy for Ouattara to find other offences committed dur-

ing his presidency, like racketeering in the cocoa sector or the misappropriation of tax

revenues.

There are no reports that Gbagbo ever explicitly announced investigations of war

crimes committed by his antagonists after his re-election, but he as well did not expli-

citly ensure Ouattara and the Forces Nouvelles that he will refrain from such measures.

A secret blacklist by the UN that listed 95 key persons who committed human right ab-

uses during the civil war allegedly included, according to reports by Radio France Inter-

nationale, amongst others, Guillaume Soro.143 Gbagbo's party could have used such al-

legations anytime to get rid of Soro and others in the future. No party could be truly

sure of its security in the case its opponent would carry the day.

This again is a striking contrast to the successful post-conflict elections in Liberia in

2005. In that case, the stakes of the election were explicitly diminished by not threaten-

ing former rebel leaders with war tribunals, but instead they were 'bought off' by offer-

142 United Nations Security Council, “List of Individuals Subject to Paragraphs 9 and 11 of Resolution 1572 (2004) and Paragraph 4 of the Resolution 1643 (2005)”, 2006, http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1572/listtable.html (accessed June 11, 2011).

143 Langer, Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace, 23.

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ing them political participation in the new government without even having to stand in

the election.144 It is debatable if it was right to offer the rebel leaders impunity. How-

ever, the fact remains that it diminished the stakes in the election. The successful elec-

tion in turn consolidated the peace and democratisation process in the county. In Côte

d'Ivoire, the threat of legal prosecutions raised the stakes of the election even more.

5.3 The End of the 'Neither War Nor Peace Economy'

In their framework, Höglund et al. primarily focus on what is at stake for the major

political actors. However, the stakes in post-conflict elections can also be considerably

high for middle- and low-level actors.145 As this chapter will show, this fact can also be

a conflict-generating/conflict escalating factor.

The free and fair post-conflict election in Côte d'Ivoire was meant to end the state of

'neither war nor peace', which had characterised the country since 2003. It was to be the

event that signified the end of the state of emergency and marked the beginning of 'real

peace' in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the prospect of stable peace was not desirable for

everybody in the country. The state of 'neither war no peace', as well as the division of

the country which resulted in the limitation of state control in most parts of the country,

served as excuse for a variety of middle and low ranking actors to enrich themselves.

In the North as well as the South of the country, national security forces (or respective

Forces Nouvelles troops) as well as militias justified the erection of hundreds of roadb-

locks with the need to provide security for the population in these 'times of war'. In real-

ity, these roadblocks were mainly a tool for economic enrichment. The security forces

144 Harris, “Liberia 2005: An Unusual African Post-conflict Election,” 394.145 Höglund, Jarstad, and Söderberg Kovacs, “The predicament of elections in war-torn societies,” 543

ff.

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demanded a 'toll' for every vehicle passing, mostly on the basis of problems with the

documentation of the travellers.146 In the North, the zone commanders147 collected taxes

and customs from the population, large parts of which ended up in their personal coffers

or were used to pay their troops.148 The state of 'war' gave these actors the pretext to de-

mand fees, whereas the stability provided by the relative peace in the country enabled

them to consolidate and extend their mechanisms of enrichment.

A free and fair post-conflict election signified for many actors the end of their illegal

privileges. The country would finally be at peace, and roadblocks would no longer be

justified. A legitimate government could re-establish state control throughout the coun-

try and end the reign of the zone commanders. Furthermore, all pretexts not to demobil-

ise and unite the armed forces would be lost.149 The only chance to protect their priv-

ileges or secure their power was either to delay the elections or, if they were unavoid-

able, to pledge allegiance to one candidate, in the hope for profit from the large state re-

sources through patronage networks once their candidate would be elected president.

Côte d'Ivoire's politics have massively relied on patronage networks since the reign of

Houphouët-Boigny, and today it is almost impossible to gain power at the national level

without the support of allies at the middle and lower levels.150 Conversely, the actors at

the middle and lower levels could be sure to profit when their candidate is in power.

However, the support for one candidate also bore the risk of losing all privileges if that

146 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 172.147 The north of Côte d'Ivoire that is controlled by the Forces Nouvelles is divided in ten administrative

zones of command with a zone commander (or com'zone) acting as military governor148 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis, 12.149 United Nations, Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 12 of

Security Council resolution 1893 (2009), 2010, 6.150 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 168.

50

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candidate was defeated. It was therefore certain that all actors would do to everything in

their power to ensure the victory of their candidate.

This context explains at least partly the escalation of the situation after Gbagbo refused

to accept the election results. It explains the motivation of the national security forces

and dozens of militias to support Gbagbo after his defeat, even if their action was un-

constitutional. It explains the motivation of the Forces Nouvelles to take up arms again

and fight for Ouattara, instead of waiting for a political solution. It may even be an ex-

planation for Gbagbo's intransigence to accept the election results. Even if he were will-

ing to admit his defeat at some point of the stand-off to prevent further bloodshed, the

pressure and continued support of his allies was likely to keep him clinging to power.

The end of the 'neither war nor peace economy' and the associated struggle to secure

their privileges made the elections a high-stakes, zero-sum game for many middle and

low level actors in Côte d'Ivoire. This circumstance fuelled the escalation of the conflict

and can therefore be seen as another conflict-generating factor in Côte d'Ivoire's post-

conflict election.

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6. ConclusionThe overall research question posed in the introduction asked 'which factors allowed for

the presidential election in 2010 to spoil the peace process in Côte d'Ivoire?' As it has

been shown in the course of this dissertation, a whole variety of conflict-generating

factors were present in Côte d'Ivoire's post-conflict election. The election was character-

ised by actors who were irreconcilably opposed and were likely to go to lengths to en-

sure their own victory. The personal power-struggle of the major candidates, which has

already lasted several decades, escalated as a result of the high stakes. The high central-

ity of political and economic power and the lack of security guarantees for the defeated

parties transformed the post-conflict elections to a 'winner-takes-all' election. On a dif-

ferent level, the high stakes for secondary and minor actors contributed to the escalation

of the situation. The institutional framework, notably the weak electoral management

bodies and a flawed DDR process and security sector reform served as additional cata-

lysts for this power struggle. Moreover, the timing of the election was unfavourable and

the international community was not able to act as a neutral arbitrator. The electoral sys-

tem, in contrast, seems not to have been decisive in the elections. The reason for this is

the overall political system of Côte d'Ivoire: no matter how skilfully an electoral system

is designed, the strong presidential system will always transform the election into a

'winner-takes-all' election.

It has to be emphasised that the three clusters, which were presented separately above,

were interconnected and reinforced each other. Most important, the centralisation of

power seems to be the pivotal point for all other factors. First, the high centralisation of

power is the reason why changing the institutional framework of the election by intro-

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ducing a different electoral system would not have had a conflict-mitigating effect in

the Ivorian election. The strong centralisation of power, caused by a strong presidential

political system, makes electoral engineering irrelevant because the election will always

remain a zero-sum game.

Secondly, the high stakes of the election, which resulted from the centralisation of

power, fuelled the already fierce power-struggle between the three main actors. The

amplified power-struggle, in turn, motivated Gbagbo to deliberately weaken and manip-

ulate the institutional framework provided by the electoral management bodies and the

international community, in order to provide loopholes in case the results were not in

his favour. The reason why Gbagbo was able to do so is again the high centralisation of

power invested in the office of the President.

Thirdly, the centralisation of power also raised the stakes for the middle- and low-level

actors. They had to ensure that their candidate wins because only then, through his un-

restricted power, this candidate could secure the privileges of the low-and middle-level

actors who supported him. That is why both the Ivorian army and the Forces Nouvelles

as well as the militias resisted disarmament. They intended that the DDR process and

the security sector reform remained flawed and incomplete, because it was not in their

interest to have unified, constitutional armed forces which would act as an independent,

neutral institution in case the election results were contested. The low- and middle-

level actors had much to lose if their candidate was defeated, so they wanted to remain

capable to bring their presidential candidate to power by force, if the election results

were unfavourable for them.

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Given these interlinkages, it can be argued, on a more theoretical level, that the high

stakes of the elections encouraged the actors to weaken the institutions which con-

strained their room for manoeuvre. The weakened institutions, in turn, fortified the cent-

ralisation of power, as they were not able to act as neutral counterbalance to the candid-

ates any more. This again increased the stakes and consequently also fuelled the power-

struggle of the actors.

Looking at these findings of the dissertation, the question that comes immediately to

one's mind is if it would have been possible to mitigate the conflict-generating factors

beforehand and, if yes, who would have been able to do so. For the anthropologist and

political scientist, Mahmood Mamdani, as well as, the Ghanaian analyst, Akyaaba Ad-

dai-Sebo, it is clear: the Ivorian electoral crisis was an “avoidable disaster”151 for which

the UN was responsible. The UN knew that “each of the three protagonists felt it to be

their manifest destiny to rule Côte d’Ivoire at the expense of the other”152 and should

have prevented them from contesting the elections by “a transitional arrangement that

embraced all three egos but with a caveat preventing each one of them from participat-

ing in future elections.”153 It would have undoubtedly been an pivotal advantage if the

three major actors would not have been allowed to run for office in these elections as a

major conflict-generating factor would have been eliminated. But is it realistic to blame

the UN that this was not the case? As mentioned several times in the dissertation, the

UN and the international community as a whole were constantly and deliberately side-

151 Addai-Sebo, cited in Mahmood Mamdani, “Ivory Coast: A UN failure,” Al Jazeera English, April 27, 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/04/20114258205629868.html (accessed May 3, 2011).

152 Akyaaba Addai-Sebo, “Has the UN failed Côte d’Ivoire?,” Pambazuka News 512 (2011), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/70054 (accessed June 3, 2011).

153 Addai-Sebo, cited in Mamdani, “Ivory Coast: A UN failure.”

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lined in Côte d'Ivoire's peace process. Most importantly, they were excluded from the

negotiations of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement.154 The exclusion of the UN could

be seen as a result of the Ivorian actor's genuine wish to solve their own problems and

to emancipate themselves from neo-colonial paternalism. But looking back on how

Ivorian actors and especially, Laurent Gbagbo, have instrumentalised paradigms like

'Ivorité' and the 'second war of independence' masterly to pursue their own political

ends, it is more likely that it was more of a successful attempt by Gbagbo to keep things

firmly in his hands. If the UN would have been involved in the peace negotiations, the

peace agreement would have looked profoundly different and perhaps the UN would

even have managed to insert a paragraph that excluded the main actors from running in

the elections. The only allegation that can be made is that the UN pushed for the hold-

ing of elections even though the timing was not right. Then again, 'right timing' would

have involved the Ivorian actors to complete the DDR process and strengthen the insti-

tutions. However, this was not to be expected as these projects as well as the holding of

elections were not in the interest of the main actors who preferred to play for time in or-

der to cling illegitimately on to power. A vicious circle. But rather than evidence of a

UN failure, the case of Côte d'Ivoire can be seen as a vivid example for the importance

of UN involvement in peace processes from the beginning.

What does the case study of Ivory Coast tell us about post-conflict elections in general?

First of all, it confirmed the assessment that post-conflict elections are different than

conventional elections. The legacy of the civil war was present throughout the elections,

and many things that proved to be conflict-generating factors can be attributed to the

154 International Crisis Group, Côte d’Ivoire: What’s Needed to End the Crisis, 1.

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previous internal conflict: the existence of two armed forces as well as numerous mili-

tias in the country; the existence of a war economy or rather a 'neither war nor peace

economy' and the possibility to threaten a party with impeachment for war crimes

which raised the stakes in the elections. The case study also seems to support Lyons ar-

gument about the 'demobilisation of politics'. The failure to transform armed fractions

and militias into political parties or other types of civil organisations and the continu-

ation of the war economy that fostered the emergence of powerful middle- and low-

level actors proved to be fatal for the Ivorian post-conflict elections.

Concerning the timing of the elections, it has been shown that what was important was

not primarily the time that elapsed since the signing of the peace agreement, but that the

circumstances in which the elections took place were not yet 'ready' for elections. Simil-

ar to Lyon's argumentation, Brancati and Snyder's findings that political institutions

have to be strengthened and the DDR process completed before successful elections can

take place have been affirmed. Regarding the choice of the electoral system, this seems

not to have been of importance in Côte d'Ivoire, as the presidential system curtails the

possibilities of electoral engineering. What would have been needed is a change in the

overall government system of the country. A limitation of powers of the presidency and

a strengthened legislative could have prevented the situation whereby one party wins

everything and all others are excluded from all state affairs for at least the next five

years. The design of the electoral system would probably be more significant in a sys-

tem where the parliament is of more importance.

Höglund et al.'s framework proved very valuable, because it did not only include the

predominantly institutional factors that other academics have also focused on, but ac-

56

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knowledges the significance of certain actors. It was apparent in Côte d'Ivoire's post-

conflict elections that the behaviour of the country's elites was at least as harmful to the

elections as institutional shortcomings. If the contestants in the elections are primarily

motivated by and interested in retaining power whereas peace is only of secondary im-

portance, this is likely to have a devastating effect on all other factors related to the

elections. Political institutions are deliberately weakened, the DDR process purposely

delayed and stakes are raised by their personal rivalries. A weakness of the conceptual

framework is that it focuses only on the high-level actors. As this dissertation has

shown, it is also worth to include middle and low level actors in order to explain the

conflict dynamics in post-conflict elections.

What also became clear in the case study of Côte d'Ivoire is that international peace-

keeping forces and international involvement in general are no panacea that guarantees

successful post-conflict elections. It depends highly on the context of the country if and

how the international community can play a conflict-mitigating role. However, its pres-

ence in the country alone is not enough.

It remains to be seen if the post-conflict elections in Côte d'Ivoire, in spite of their viol-

ent outcome, had a positive effect on the consolidation of democracy in the country. It is

too soon to make a concluding statement concerning this point. However, democratic

institutions like the CEI and the Constitutional Council have been weakened rather than

strengthened during the flawed post-conflict elections. The fact that the results had to be

enforced by armed groups is likely to leave the impression that military strength is more

important than success in the polls. One positive aspect could be the absence of major

technical problems in the preparation and implementation of the elections, made pos-

57

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sible through capacity building and assistance of the UN. This could provide a valuable

asset in future elections. Nevertheless, at the time of writing of this dissertation in Au-

gust 2011, nine months after the elections and three months after Gbagbo's ousting, the

government has not yet made any attempt to draw the right conclusions from the post-

conflict election debacle and does not seem to have any plans to ensure the independ-

ence of electoral management in the foreseeable future – even though legislative elec-

tions are already due at the end of this year.

There is no alternative to post-conflict elections in order to successfully consolidate a

country's transition from violent internal conflict to sustainable peace. Scholars already

seem to have developed a good theoretical understanding of what needs to be done in

order to ensure that the post-conflict elections fulfil the hopes attributed to them and not

fuel the conflict anew. However, as the case of Côte d'Ivoire has shown, the mistakes

made in previous post-conflict are still repeated in practice. The implementation of the

knowledge provided by researchers will remain the biggest challenge for practitioners,

politicians and constituencies alike.

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