Vol. 6| No. 2 | July 2016

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Global Analysis

The Role of Contesting Ideologies: Civil-Military Relations in Turkey By Assist. Prof. Dr. Rahman Dag*

Abstract

Civil-military relationship is generally examined through the use of an institutional approach or theories (concordance) that emphasise the salience of power struggles and social cohesion. These contributions are important but often exclude the role of contesting ideologies. To address this gap, this paper takes an ideological approach to address civil-military relations in Turkey. The analyses commence with the military reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century and the Republican period. The paper argues that modernization projects of the Empire paved the way for military superiority which turned into being saviour and founders of the Republic. It then moves to consider the ideological parameters that coloured the military establishment, arguing that the target of modernization was itself systemized and internalized into Kemalist ideology and the duty to preserve this remains inculcated in the contemporary military establishment.

Key Words: Civil-Military Relations, Turkey, Kemalism, Military Coup d’état

* He obtained his BA from Istanbul Yeditepe University and then MA degree from the SOAS (School of Orient and African Studies) in London. He was awarded with the Philosophy of doctorate degree from Exeter University, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. The core point of his thesis is the ideological roots of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamist political movements determining the perceptions between them. In addition, he is now acting as head of CESRAN International (Centre for Strategic and Research Analysis) Turkey Focus Programme and also working as assistant professor at Adıyaman University/ Turkey.

Journal of Global Analysis

Vol. 6 | No. 2

July 2016

www.cesran.org

Introduction

Civil-military relations have generated interest among researchers of authoritarianism and democratization throughout the 20th century due to the various power struggles between civil and military authorities in Latin American, African and various Middle Eastern states. The debates over this issue, from a theoretical perspective, have largely focused upon where states are located on the authoritarian-democratic continuum,1 and whether they are dictatorships or not. The range of views is broad, but largely has an institutional focus. While studying coups and military regimes in African countries, for example, Decalo argues that armies intervene into civil politics fundamentally because of decay amongst the military hierarchy rather than due to their organizational strength.2 From a society-centred approach, Finer3 and Huntington4 suggest that the political culture of society and the politicization in social forces and state agencies respectively are the driving force behind armies’ intrusions into civilian political life. From Nordlinger’s point of view5, the corporate interests of the armed forces and their advancement or possible threats stemming from civilian politics stand as the core motives directing where and when military power intervenes. He further argues that failures of incumbent civil governments in establishing economic stability or addressing social disorder and the concomitant polarization of society and corruption can consolidate a military’s coup initiative and even legitimize it in the eyes of society. Building upon this idea, Sakallıoğlu bases her theoretical framework on David Pion-Berlin’s institutional approach to South American civil-military relations for her examination of civil-military relations6 in Turkey with “index variables measuring the military’s political effectiveness vis-a-vis civilian institutions”7 in the period since the 1980 coup. Last but not least, Demirel’s analytical framework8 might also be categorized as an institutional approach as he analyses civil military relations in Turkey through power relations.

These institutional-type analyses are valuable contributions, yet none of the examples that address developments in Turkey have examined civil-military relations from an ideological perspective, despite the fact that in each military intervention, military rulers legitimized and justified their actions with arguments centred on the idea that they were doing so to protect and restore Kemalist principles. In this regard, the institutional approach to civil-military relations in Turkey fall short in fully comprehending the rationale behind coup d’états. This is in line with arguments made by prominent Turkish observers, in particular Metin Heper and Tanel Demirel, who argue that the military intervened in Turkey because it was afraid of losing power to a democratic system and of the possible social and political ‘disorder’ that democracy could cause. Such arguments have partial credibility but they fail to take into account the fact that the type of democratic regime the military sought and supports is not the one that the people necessarily demanded, but rather, the Kemalist-inspired system that is increasingly challenged by civilian political initiatives. It is surprising that despite repeated explicit announcements from the military establishment regarding its intent to protect the ideals of Kemalism, there have been very few studies addressing this, and especially the question of why the military considered this of greater significance than the other demands being made by political parties.

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Concordance theory might be exempted from the institutional approach as it recognizes cultural differences and gives importance to understanding of each political unit. The founder of this theory, Rebecca L. Schiff, argues that concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry is a fundamental determinant of not having a coup, regardless of which political regime is in use.9 Relying on this theory, each coup d’état must be examined to grasp which of the determinants discord the concordance. This is what Nilufer Gole did in her article taking each military intervention since the 1980 coup one by one under scrutiny.10 Despite the fact that she comprehensively uses the cover guardianship model including wide range of interventions forms11 it still fails to show from where the military in Turkey gained the guardianship position.

Before moving on, it is important to mention what this paper purposes, that is, a way of analysing the coups in Turkey away from the institutional approach and concordance theory to civil-military relations. As will become explicitly clearer later, the military in Turkey, which is one of the key institutions of state agency that has been driven by Kemalist ideology, almost always employed state institutions to maintain its dominancy over civilian politics. The striking point the paper indicates is that any institution (judiciary, legislation, special councillor groups consisted of experts, media) involved in coup d’états justified its stance by arguing that it was necessary to keep Kemalism alive because it was the only way of modernizing the state and catching up with the western world. The paper will argue that institutions here are just instruments, though the driving force has always been ideas which are considered to be the best way for modernization and which the military has spearheaded and guarded throughout its history. Therefore, the most striking point of the paper will be to examine thoroughly how the military obtained such a position historically and used this ideologically-oriented attitude to take ‘institutional’ precautions to justify its dominance over civilian politics.

In practical terms, based on recent developments within the last decade compare to a century-long military dominancy, civil-military relations in Turkey have dramatically evolved in favour of dominance of civil politics. Despite this, it seems impossible to determine to what degree military tutelage is still hovering above the state apparatus (judiciary, bureaucracy, media, and economy) as it depends on how deep military-driven Kemalism has been inserted into the institutions and the mind-sets constituting these. The most striking point of civil-military relations in Turkey is that the country seems to be more or less a democratic regime; however, civilian control decision-making processes has not generally occurred throughout its history unless the civilian politicians have come from a military background. For instance, relying on an unofficial arrangement, for a considerable period, there has been an understanding that the position of the presidency of Turkey should be occupied by an ex- high-ranking military officer. The paper, in this respect, would give a solid historical and practical explanation on the fundamental reason why the military interrupted democracy and only withdrew to its barracks once politics rearranged itself so that the military had remained the overseeing factor in the state politics.

This paper attempts to address these questions by firstly examining how, why, and when the modernizing role of the military in society emerged and was consolidated. In doing so, it will be argued that this process is actually almost two centuries old, as the military establishment firstly became a centre for modernization, before projecting agency as a modernizing force in its own right. The next section will argue that based on this history the military self-perceived, and has been perceived by the people of Turkey, as the ultimate guardian of the ideologically Kemalist-oriented state to such an extent that whenever they felt that this was threatened they intervened in civilian politics to restore the core principles of Kemalism. Lastly, whether this ‘guardian’ position of the military has been eliminated will also be discussed.

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Origins of the Position of the Military in Turkey’s History

The military’s position in the eyes of Ottoman society remained largely the same as it had been from the Republican era up to the present. Relying on Wittek’s work,12 Heper mentions that the “ruling institution in the Ottoman Empire was called Askeriye (the military).”13 The head of every institution, including the military, had become the Sultan, which lasted for as long as military expansion continued. However, from the late eighteenth century to the end of the Empire, the Sultan’s absolute power gradually decreased. As a result, components of Ottoman society emerged as separate interest groups, and a power struggle commenced. One of these groups was the army, which was also one of the first areas to be subjected to reformation and modernization in order to compete with its European counterparts. Although the reformation and modernization process was similarly applied to the administration of other structures of state, the military had always been the leading and most prominent modernized component of the Ottoman state structure.14 In other words, “the military emerged as the prime Westernizing force in modern Turkish history.”15 As a consequence of experiencing a century-long modernization process, the Ottoman Empire created its own modernized elites who distanced themselves from everyday people. Those elites, especially military officers, had become much more familiar with Western values and modernization and did not restrict themselves to military-related issues.16 In this sense, by considering themselves as the most developed modernizing force of society, military officers thus also committed themselves to be the leading advocates for modernization within society.

In regards to the first initiative of the process, by the early eighteenth century, the Nizami Cedid Ordusu (New Order Army), which was established by Sultan Selim III, was pursued but then abandoned due to the reaction of the embedded Janissary corps. The second initiative to form a modern army was then undertaken by Sultan Mahmud II with the establishment of the Asakir-i Manzume-i Muhammediyye (Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad) towards the end of the first quarter of 19th century, immediately after the abolishment of the Janissaries.17 These modernized military elites18 together with the modernized bureaucrats of the newly restructured administration initially constituted the “Young Ottomans” who were in favour of modernization and later became the “Young Turks”19 who felt that a constitutional monarchy was the only means of enabling the Ottoman Empire to overcome its inferiority when compared to European powers. Based on the common goal of being against Sultan Abdulhamid II’s regime, together with other modernized elites, military officers established a political party called İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress, henceforth CUP), which took power via a coup d’état in 1908.20 The CUP, at this time, believed that they were the only social power that could carry the Empire into the modern world.

After the demise of the Empire, Atatürk and his close associates who had been members of the CUP continued to believe that the only way to be free from European domination was to be like the European powers, not only in terms of military power but also in social, cultural, economic and political terms. Thanks to the use of Islamic rhetoric21 and their support for traditional values during the War of Independence during WW1, indispensable public support and legitimacy was gained by Atatürk and the military in the period following the end of the Empire. The (external) war to compel the Europeans to leave Anatolia and Istanbul ended in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne, but an internal civil war against ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘separatism’ continued until the end of 1930. Between the end of the external and the internal war, despite the fact that those involved with politics were required to resign from their positions in the military, Atatürk was still proclaimed to be the “Prime Commander” and his close military elites associates, such as İsmet İnönü, Rauf Orbay, and Fevzi Çakmak, among others, were still affiliated with the Turkish army.22

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The means of enhancing the military’s position to a higher level in terms of leading the modernization process was done through ‘Kemalism’, an ideology that was systematized by Atatürk from the inception of the Republic until his death in 1938 and was interpreted and applied by his party, the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party, the RPP afterwards).

Kemalism23 is a political ideology whose aim has been to eliminate what was inherited from the Ottoman state, including social structures based on multi-ethnic and religious principles and to replace them with an ethnically homogeneous and secular model based on Western style nation states. These ideas were to be fully implemented in the country, on the ashes of what has remained from the Empire as the best path for modernization. These doctrines gained ultimate significance to the extent that they represented alternative ideals in society that had to almost worshipped and followed without question. This process is described by Küçükcan24 as the “sacralisation of the state and secular nationalism.” Another factor which enhances the military’s supreme role within Kemalist ideology is that Atatürk himself employed former military officers within his newly established administration and the Assembly of Turkey. For example, approximately, 20 percent of the Assembly as well as 30 percent of the administrative posts were filled by former military officers in the early republican period.

Suna Kili suggests that Kemalism is a product of the evolution of the ideas which followed during the independence war and underpinned the reforms implemented by Atatürk following the war. Indeed, it may be true that a combination of these ideas created the core of Kemalism. However, the abandoning of traditional Islamic discourses and the multi-ethnic characteristics which were used to mobilize the people, but later superseded with secular and ethnically single-nation centric (Turkish) principles, do not seem to support her argument. Because, the contradictories between these ideologies, or lifestyles in society have provided distinctive and somewhat contradictory ideals concerning the target of modernization (westernization).

This Kemalist ideology consisted of six ‘arrows’ (republicanism, statism, populism, laicism, revolutionalism and nationalism) and was inserted firstly into the party program of the RPP and then into the 1924 constitution.25 These principles were considered the only means of achieving a European level of modernization in every aspect of life and, since then their protection has been undertaken by the military elite.26 In addition, the defining feature of Western democracy (multi-party system and free election), particularly after WW2, has also been inserted in the politics in Turkey which are strictly affiliated with the secular nation-state structure embedded into western style modernization.27 An almost identical process was experienced during the late Ottoman Empire in the case of the emergence of the CUP, which consisted mostly of modernized military elites and bureaucrats seeking to constrain the absolute power of the Sultan. After the collapse of the Empire, the Republican Party generated the new civil bureaucracy and politicians, while the military refrained from engaging in politics, but was given the duty of protecting the established republic ideals based on Kemalist principles. To illustrate this, Atatürk himself presented the duty of guarding the Republic to the army in 1931 by arguing that,

... the Turkish nation has ... always looked to the military... as the leader of movements to achieve lofty national ideals... When speaking of the true owners of this country... The Turkish nation... considers its army the guardian of its ideals.28

But this solidification of the role of the military did not come into existence following the demise of the Empire. Rather, the process by which the military gained a higher status in society actually began as early as the late eighteenth century with efforts to modernize the military made by the Empire. These efforts helped the military to consolidate its power and influence in the late Ottoman Empire and meant that by the time of the establishment of the new Republic, due to the military background of many prominent figures, especially Atatürk

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and his close associates, the military was in a preeminent position to take power. Thanks to the modern Turkish republic, emerging modern bureaucratic and political elites with pasts in the military, and the military itself formed foundational ideals which were labelled as Kemalism.29 In this regard, Kuru provides a crucial insight when explaining that,

Ideological allies, particularly in the judiciary, political parties, and media, in addition to some segments of society, provided the Turkish military with the necessary political power and encouragement. These influential civilians embraced assertive secularist, Turkish nationalist, and anti-communist ideologies, which made them worried about “Islamic reactionary,” “Kurdish separatist,” and communist threats.30

Amongst these ideological allies,31 the military institution has been perceived as being the most influential due to its task of protecting against external and internal enemies.32 The statements of Chief of General Staff and President of Turkey after the 1980 coup d’état, General Kenan Evren, in an interview conducted by Demirel, are significant in this regard. When he was asked about how people react toward a probable military intervention, he replied:

It was the military which established the Republic and brought democracy. Whatever new [development] came to Turkey after the abolition of (the Ottoman) dynasty, and even before it, was brought through the channels of the army... for that reason people placed trust in the military...33

This response from General Kenan Evren, one of the most prominent figures and leader of the most extensive military coup d’état in the history of modern Turkey, offers a brief summary of the main argument for this part of the paper. Specifically, the military has always been seen as a modernizing force/agent from the early 19th century and this process has thus facilitated the perception of the military as the guardian of the state.

In the meantime, the Turkish Armed Forces was able to train and educate its own cadets through its military schooling system. In these schools, cadets would be inculcated with the idea of protecting the state against internal and external enemies and indoctrinated with Kemalist ideals.34 Military elites therefore ensured the reproduction of future elites who shared an identical understanding of the world. Additionally, the recruitment policy of the Turkish military for high-ranking posts has been conducted with attention paid to whether the individuals are the sons of existing military personnel or not, in order to ensure the preservation of Kemalist commitments. Indeed, as Brown explains, “The glue that binds these officers to the previous groups and to other societal elites is Kemalism, the philosophy that is inculcated in cadets and officers throughout their careers.”35 In so doing, the Turkish military has never cut its ties to domestic affairs by focusing solely on external defence of the country. Kemalist understandings have been imposed by Kemalist elites not only in the military but also in civil politics, the judiciary, and the economy and have been used to counter distinctive ways of life demanded by minority social groups. Indeed, the military can be considered as tied to domestic political developments as much as it is to the defence of the country from external threats.36

In summary, the Turkish Armed Forces have been perceived to continue its modernizing functions by following the footsteps of Kemalism. In the single party era from 1923 to 1946, because there was a consistency in ideological concordance amongst most of the state elites, intellectuals and military leaders, any sort of intrusion from the military to the civil politics, had not been an issue. In other words, “The military might be the most distinctive defender of the secular state, but it is not the only one. Indeed, it derives much of its political effectiveness from the fact that it works within the larger framework of institutions and ideas that underpin the established order.”37 However, whenever a social group attempted to soften Kemalist ideal in society, or to offer an alternate set of ideas, as seen for instance in debates about Islamism, Kurdish nationalism, and the open market economy versus a state-

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centric economy,38 the Turkish Armed Forces felt that they had a duty to intervene in civil politics to restore Kemalist principles. A Kemalist ideology-dominated democracy is thus regarded as the best and only way to maintain a modernized state. What we argue here is that, despite the fact that the majority of people in Turkey do not entirely adhere to “Atatürk fetishism”,39 they have respect for him and his ideals. The military, as the guardian of the state and Kemalist ideology, has taken this responsibility to protect the Kemalist state on its shoulders.

The Kemalism-oriented Military as the Guardian of the State

The dilemmas posed by democratic norms to military elites in contemporary Turkey are very important to this topic. Within the context of modernization, or ‘westernization’, democracy occupies an elevated position as an indication of an achieved level of progress.40 Thus, it is contradictory if the military is understood as being against democracy and is regarded as being a means of establishing military dictatorship or supporting authoritarianism. The difficult part of democracy, for the military guardians of Kemalism, is that it is always open to the potential of non-Kemalist ideas passing into civil political life. This however constitutes a threat to the dominant ideology, to such an extent that the Turkish military forces believed that “a fully fledged democratic regime might jeopardize the existence of the secular and unitary Turkish republic.”41 Because a democratic regime was a vital requirement of achieving western-style modernization level (one of the core targets of the Kemalist modernization project), military elites never directly remained in power for more than three years. Yet, during those times, they have sought to ensure that alternative powers would not have the chance to challenge the official state ideology of Kemalism. This issue will be touched upon further, but it is important to note here that recent attempts to offer alternatives to Kemalism have proven more successful than ever before and there is a considerable amount of public support for such a change.

Whether coups have been direct interventions, or through the forced resignation of incumbent governments (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007), military elites have justified their interventions by invoking the potential degeneration of the Kemalist order together with the potential for social disorder caused by failures of civil governments.42 Throughout the single party era, there was no requirement for the military to become involved in civil politics as almost all elements of the state structure, especially the RPP, the judiciary, parliament, government and presidency were already pursuing Kemalism as their guiding principle.43 However, once the transition from the single party to the multi-party era was accomplished, those who did not internalize or unconditionally approve of the Kemalist ideology rushed to join alternative political parties, even though most of the founders of the opposition Democrat Party (DP) were from the RPP and owed their parliamentarian seats from their time at the RPP. Regardless, they eventually achieved their goals of entering into civilian party politics and became influential in various parties. However, when the military realized that their dominant position in the state was eroding and that none-Kemalist demands from both leftists (including Kurds) and conservatives were gaining currency in society, they took steps to explicitly remind the population of their ideological position and reinstall Kemalism into its dominant position in politics via a coup d’état in 1960. In line with the core argument of this paper, Demirel has also noted that “indeed, compromising the principles of Atatürk to garner votes has been singled out by commanders as the chief reason for both the 1960 and 1971 military intervention.”44 Taking such a measure overtly illustrated the ideological orientation of the military in Turkey as they chose to halt an ongoing democratic process to restore their privileged ideology.

The 1960 coup d’état should actually be regarded as a turning point in the history of civil-military relations in Turkey as the military ruling elites began to establish a method through which they could watch and control civil politics by being regarded as a crucial part of the

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democratic apparatus. The vital institution that the military formed to control civilian politics was the National Security Council45 (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu- NSC afterwards). This was constitutionalized by the National Union Committee in the 1961 constitution. This constitutional institution and its General Secretariat (formed with an amendment to the constitution) aimed to define the national security agenda which would then be presented to the civil government and specifically the Council of Ministers (Bakanlar Kurulu-CoM afterwards). Its decisions were firstly aimed at assisting the government as indicated in the constitutional article. In practical terms, it actually meant that the NSC served as a higher institution than the CoM. Furthermore, there were two assembly systems, one of which was the senate assembly to which the military was constitutionally given the right to appoint a certain number of people for perpetuity.46 Indeed, the list of legal institutions, including “the presidency, organization of defence, military budgets, arms production, procurement, military modernization, internal security and intelligence gathering and senior promotions”,47 with which the military is involved and thus maintains as non-accountable to civilian authorities can be extended almost indefinitely.48 Due to the time it would take to address all of these violations it is better to end this section of the paper by focusing specifically on the establishment of the military courts.49 These courts were run by military judges and inspectors in 1963 and their decisions were not allowed to be challenged by civilian courts.50 This has changed only recently. In addition to article 35 of the internal service act of Turkish Armed Forces, after the 1980 coup d’état, another act further legitimizing future interventions was enacted in the form of article 85 which stated that Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against internal and external threats, if necessary by force.51

From the above analysis, the most important fact to note is that when the military encountered the possibility of a replacement or even reinterpretation of Kemalism that differed from their own, they took swift action to halt the democratic processes. Their justification for doing so was established during the reign of the Democrat Party (DP) from 1950-1960, when article 34 of the Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces was regulated. It emphasises that “the military is responsible for defending both the Turkish Fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” The phrase of the constitution has intentionally being used as it refers to the six pillars of Kemalism favoured by the DP and so the military gained constitutional legitimacy.

The peak of this agenda can be observed in the so-called ‘soft coup’ done against the Islamist Welfare Party in the 1990s as the military increasingly became involved in domestic affairs via the creation of sub-working groups watching over civilian governments. These included the “Western Study Group” (Batı Çalışma Grubu)52 that provided briefings to journalists53 and intellectuals, aimed to influence universities and business associations and eventually and the constitutional court itself – a body which had the power to shut down political parties.54 This sort of conspicuous involvement into all aspects of the state and society can be traced back to the prerogatives the military took in the pre and post-28th February Process in 1997 (another name for the soft coup).55 The argument made by military commanders, that they “could not be in good terms with those who acted against the Atatürkist principles”56 in response to Necmettin Erbakan’s statements that his party did not seek any conflict with the military, can be regarded as reflecting the inherent opposition felt by Kemalists towards any Islamist ideology in Turkey.

The fundamental indication of these regulations concerning oversight of civilian governments is that the military ruling elites do not trust civilian politicians to protect the core premises of the State. Indeed, the intentions of high-ranking military officers can be explicitly proven by examining their statements. Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup d’état, head of the NSC and President of Turkey from 1983 to 1990 once stated that, “We were afraid that if, following the military interventions, a political party leader we would not approve of comes to power everything that we had worked so hard to achieve may be done away.” In addition,

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Turkey’s Chief of General Staff from 1987 to 1990, Necip Torumtay, also argued that “we came to the conclusion that our liberty, independence, and progress towards contemporary civilization were dependent upon our safeguarding the secular and democratic Turkish republic and the Atatürkian principles” while Doğan Güreş, Chief of General Staff from 1990 to 1994 stated his goals as being the safeguarding the “modern and secular features of the Turkish republic ... [and] defending the country against its internal and external enemies.”57

Considering the four previous intrusions of the military and the precautions they established afterwards, it can be argued convincingly that the military has committed itself, before withdrawing back to the barracks, to ensuring that there is no possibility of powerful alternative political groups emerging who could challenge the core promises of Kemalism and the military’s supremacy as its guardian.58 The measures taken have created convenient conditions in cases where the military feels the need for another intrusion so as to eliminate anti-Kemalist or semi-Kemalist political foci, which cannot be achieved through a democratic means.59 By taking lessons from the DP case and as a practical precaution to prevent a strongly supported political party gaining power that allows for anti-Kemalist ideas to develop, a proportional representation system was brought in by the 1961 constitution, which was championed as the most democratic and liberal constitution in Turkey’s political history. However, contrary to what the military expected, the new election system60 paved the way for more liberal, socialist, Islamist and separatist groups gain seats in parliament. For instance, the Turkish Worker Party61 a leftist group, the Islamist National Order Party (later National Salvation Party), and radical Turkish nationalists (later the Nationalist Action Party) with fewer votes but effective public support caused social disorder as they fought to alter the state’s ideology to be in line with their ideals.62

The precautions taken by military rulers generated excuses for another military intervention into civil politics. Nonetheless, the intention of the military ruling elites to employ the Islamic tradition in the 1980s as a countermeasure against communist or socialist groups entailed enlarging the relevant social and political arenas they could operate freely in. It seems evident that there is a clear relationship between the rise of the relatively conservative Motherland Party and later the Welfare Party and this official policy of the military ruling elites. Despite this, the military again decided that they had to intervene in politics to halt the degeneration of the Kemalist secular principle of the state against the revival of Islamist politics. As such, the military officers sought to eliminate conservative or Islamist political groups from the political scene via a softer coup d’état, which forced Necmettin Erbakan, the prime minister and the head of Welfare Party to resign from his post in 1997. Even though they had taken efforts to establish a considerable amount of legal and social precautions to prevent the revival of a non-Kemalist party, they could not anticipate the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, henceforth JDP) in the 2002 national election. In summary, from the analysis presented above, apart from the first coup in 1960, all future coups seem to have been carried out to try and alleviate the side effects or unintended results of precisely those precautions taken by the military to strengthen the Kemalist ideology in the country.

Has the guardianship position of the Turkish Military been eliminated?

The time when military tutelage over civilian politics was at its height can be said to have been during the February 28 process.63 This process ended with the replacement of the Welfare-True Path coalition government with another coalition government consisting of the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party, and National Action Party. That one tacitly approved the NSC decision.64 As has been repeatedly mentioned above, this process was driven by the central argument that Islamic political activities had threatened the core ideals of secularism, which form a vital part of Kemalism.65

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However, the situation in the post February 28 process period showed the contradiction between military tutelage and western style modernization ideals. This was especially the case since the EU accession process had officially started in 1999.66 As such, the European states suggested that Turkey should strive to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and eliminating military tutelage over civilian politics and acting with more sensitivity on human rights issues, especially with regards to the Kurdish question.67 Indeed, despite hesitation since the inception of the republic, Atatürk had repeatedly stated that Turkey’s ultimate target was “muasır medeniyetler seviyesine çıkmak” (rising up to the level of contemporary civilizations). As such, it is not possible for even the military to oppose the steps needed to reach the ultimate target that was inherited from Atatürk i.e., EU membership.68

Since the 1960 coup d’état, the military had reshaped the state institutions by always maintaining its presence in strategic parts points of the state. The establishment of two assemblies; one for parliamentarians and another for the Senate in which a number of retired military officers are directly appointed, an alternative military judicial system in line with the civil judicial system, the National Security Council whose decisions had to be followed by civil ministries, and the tendency to elect a president with a military background, can all be listed as significant points from which the military has been able to interfere with civil politics. Since 1999, however, the situation began to change for the sake of the EU accession process.69 The military officers in the State Security Courts were withdrawn in 1999 and this was followed by increases to the number of civilian members of the NSC. Moreover, its ‘recommendations’ slowly began to exert less influence over the ministries. The General Secretariat position of the NSC was also replaced by a civilian officer instead of a retired or ex-military officer. Furthermore, the financial budget of military spending was opened to the Court of Accounts for audit.70 Later, legal changes also meant that appeals were allowed against decisions taken by the “Yüksek Askeri Şura” (Military High Council ‘YAS’) in terms of promotions and the discharging of military officers.71 In addition, the JDP’s rise to power and its fear of a possible military coupe (due to the Islamist roots of the party) were also effective in softening the impact of the military’s tutelage. During the last decade, the military attempted to intervene in civil politics with the so-called ‘E-memorandum’72 in April 2007 but this was bypassed by the government due to the fact that it had formed a single party government, had wide popular public support and also the pressure of the EU accession process and its stipulations regarding military tutelage.

A balance between secularly sensitive military officers and the religiously sensitive single party government has always been sought when confronted with controversial issues, such as that concerning the headscarf (başörtüsü) and the Prayer and Preacher Vocational High Schools (İmam Hatip Liseleri), both of which were likely to generate ideological and practical conflicts between the government and the military. This is because such issues at least theoretically represent a key battle site between Kemalist ideals of modernism and religious modernism and they remain, in practical terms, quiet relevant for civil-military relations.

As Heper73 conceptualizes Turkey in the “post-2002 process” period, it seems that the JDP’s electoral victories, the regulation changes for full member of the EU, and the reinterpretation of Atatürkism by General Hilmi Özkök, can illustrate a relatively more democratic civil-military relationship within the last decade. For instance, General Hilmi Özkök does not appear to be obsessed with the supposed ultimate duty of the military to guard the republic against internal and external enemies. Rather, he suggested that military officers should develop a new understanding of modernism by re-interpreting Atatürkism as indicating an openness to change. He also raised the possibility of changes in the curriculum of military schools to prevent military officers from developing a narrow-minded understanding of Atatürkism.74 However, despite the fact that the JDP has enacted several crucial laws reducing the military’s preferential position within state institutions, the core legal doctrine from which the military obtains its right to intervene into civil politics in cases of threat to national security remains intact.

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Thus, in case of political stalemates among political parties which might be interpreted as an inadequateness of civil-politics to solve the fundamental issues, the understanding of the guardianship of military over the state might be triggered and direct the military to interrupt civil politics. For instance, the relatively more Islamic policies of the JDP government, or any initiative for a total resolution to the country’s ‘Kurdish question’ might potentially challenge the core Kemalist ideology that relied on secularism and Turkish nationalism. It is not likely, but there remains a small chance that the military involves itself with the political process even today. The fundamental legal doctrine for any such action would be related to article 35 of the “Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed Forces”75 which, as explained earlier, states that “the military is responsible for defending and guarding Turkish Republic as defined by the constitution”. Moreover, article 85 states that the “Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as external threats if necessary by force.”76

These legal grounds are removed from related official documents, which began with the law permitting military officers to be tried in civil courts in case of offences committed against civilians. This act was approved through a referendum, as the political powers of the JDP was not sufficient to change it alone. This change paved the way for the filing of charges against coup plotters in the military. Cases have concerned coup plots in 1997 but also the actual coup in 1980. One of the most important was the Ergenekon case, which was alleged to be a secret deep structure involving many people ranging from journalists to military officers. The verdict77 was announced in August 2013 and many of the accused were given long prison sentences. Moreover, many more alleged coup attempts are currently being investigated by the courts thanks to the new changed legal regulations.78

Conclusion

This paper has argued that all military initiatives to interfere into civilian politics have a common element, which is their goal of guarding the Turkish republic against internal and external enemies and to restore the Kemalist principles, which are supposed to lie at the core of the Republic. The miltiary argues that such principles can be damaged or can degenerate thanks to civilian politicians who vie for their power. Theoretically, civil-military relations can be explained as a power struggle between civil and military elites over who has the ultimate decision power,79 or by looking at whether the regime is autocratic, militaristic or even by adopting an institutional approach.80 The case of Turkey represents a significant variation from other countries’ civil-military relations. Indeed, the Turkish Armed Forces have been perceived by the military itself and the people of Turkey as the founder of the modern republic for decades, and is something heavily promoted through symbolism and ideas associated to Atatürk. At its core, Kemalism is conceived as a blend of Turkish nationalism and secularism working to establish a radically new order on the ashes of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state structure that characterised the Sunni Islamic Ottoman state.

As the paper indicates, the position of the military was elevated in the late Ottoman Empire as it was the first and foremost agent of modernization –something which created tremendous credibility for the military establishment. For those arguing that the Western style nation states system represents the height of modernisation and civilisation, then the military in Turkey has certainly brought about most of the radical reforms needed to bring Turkey to this level. Historical modernization developments beginning from the procurement of military equipment and changes to army structure in the last century of the Ottoman, together with the reforms in the republican single party era has consolidated the position of the military as a major force behind modernization in Turkey. Thus, the military has also come to regard itself as the sole guardian of any development coming via military. That is why, as is argued in the paper, Kemalism has prevailed in all state institutions as the only way for modernization to take place and as a necessary step to get rid of backwardness.

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At every point when anti-Kemalist social or political groups could potentially challenge these fundamental features of the state, the military felt an obligation to intervene and to reinstall fundamental Kemalist ideals through the appointment of Kemalist-minded elites, politicians or bureaucrats. On top of this, the placement of high-ranking military officers into state institutions as advisors or supervisors after every intervention has been another means through which the military has gained the ability to watch over state policies still mostly made up of civilians. Kemalist ideology has successfully proven itself of being able to reproduce its elites via officially sanctioned ideology-oriented education, administration and a set of norms. Yet, it could not stop people looking for alternate ideals and methods for modernization and development.

In every free election, comparably more conservative political parties have taken power and even via a single party, such as with the Democrat Party in 1950, the Motherland Party in 1983 and finally the Justice and Development Party in 2002. Despite the fact that all these parties have declared their respect for Atatürk or claimed that they are real ‘Atatürkists’, the military establishment continued to oppose them as they did not represent the type of modernity Kemalists believed in. Hence, the rise of leftist movements, which included communists and socialists, and rightist movements, which included conservatives and Islamists, has always been used as an excuse to legitimise military intervention. Therefore, even though the actual reasons for military interventions into civilian politics might have been different, ranging from economic failure, social disorder, political stalemate or the political polarization of society, the consistency and persistence of the ideological justification of these actions since the last century of the Ottoman Empire to the present reinforces the argument of the paper. Kemalist ideology has been the most significant driving forces of all intrusions by the military into civilian affairs.

In the last decade, however, the single-minded Atatürkism which excluded marginalized social groups has evolved into more pluralist version which is more tolerant towards different version of modernism. Therefore, the military, as the leading modernizing force of society (and its associated Kemalism) have been forced to soften their approach to many issues, due to the considerable amount of public support towards the JDP, which defines itself not as Islamist but ‘conservative democrats’.81 Moreover, the party’s record of financial and political successes, together with the requirements of the EU accession process subverted the single-minded modernism theory of Kemalism. As a consequence, the co-existence of Kemalist ideology (whose primary promoter is the Turkish Armed Forces) with conservative democracy (whose leading voice is the JDP82) is likely to continue in the future.

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Notes

1. Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relation”, 7-29.; Jacoby, “For the People, Of the People”, 669-85.; Jacoby, “Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation”, 641-65.

2. Decalo, Coups and Army Rule.

3. Finer, The Men on Horseback.

4. Huntington, The Soldier and the State.

5. Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics.

6. Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy”, 83-102.

7. Sakallioglu, “The Anatomy of The Turkish Military's”, 151-66.

8. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 127-50.

9. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations: A Theory of Concordance”, 7-24.

10. Narli, “Concordance and Discordance”, 215-225.

11. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology”, 5-35.

12. Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire.

13. Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy”, 63-82.; Varoglu, & Bicaksiz, 'Volunteering for Risk”, 538-98.

14. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding”, 513-52.; Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 128.

15. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security”, 199-216.

16. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary”, 130-51.

17. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire, 13-14.

18. Throughout the last century of the Empire, the military corps constituted the largest segment of the “modernization of knowledge and institutional innovations” Lerner, & Robinson, “Swords and Ploughshares”, 19-44.

19. Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics”, 67.; Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 10.; Arai, Turkish Nationalism. Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 13. See, Hanioglu, The Young Turks.

20. Turfan, Rise of the Young Turks.; Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military”, 25-42.

21. Mardin, “Ideology and Religion”, 197-211.

22. Karaosmanoglu, “The Evolution of the National Security”, 204.; Rustow, “The Army and the Founding”, 549; Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military”, 17-33.

23. For more details on Kemalism, see Dumont, “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology”, 25-44.; Okyar, “Ataturk's Quest for Modernism”, 45-53.; Tachau, “The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey”, 57-76.; Giritli, “Kemalism as an Ideology”, 251-253.; Webster, “The Turkey of Atatürk”,; Kazancigil & Ozbudun, “Ataturk: Founder of A Modern State”.

24. Kucukcan, “Sacralization of the State”, 963-83.

25. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 253-80.; Kili, “Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey”, 381-404.

26. Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military High Command”, 33.

27. It is generally argued that Atatürk’s fundamental achievement was to end the rule of the Ottoman dynasty and then restore the rule of the people. Thus, he was a promoter of

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democracy. This argument has been strengthened with Atatürk’s own speeches, such as when he argued “Hakimiyet bilâ kayd-u şart Milletindir,” which means “sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation” Roberts, and Şahin, “Construction of National Identities”, 507-31.; Atatürk, Atatürk'un Söylev ve Demeçleri.

28. Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 226 (Translation belongs to Tachau & Heper).

29. State elites of the time, such as those from the RPP, military officers and intellectuals, all believed that Turkish society was not totally ready for nationalist and secularist democracy; they thus thought that they needed further guidance, training and reforms. That is why I have called the reform movement a top-down one, which was not yet completely absorbed by society. This is highlighted by the fact that whenever an alternative political structure which was relatively conservative emerged in the political arena, the majority of people voted for that party, rather than the RPP.

30. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 38.

31. A composition of cultural identities which have emerged in modern Turkey has been analytically examined by Heper, Oncu, and Kramer, Turkey and the West.

32. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 33.

33. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 270.

34. Ibid, 255.; Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 81.

35. Brown, “The Military and Society”, 387-404.

36. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary Relations”, 139.

37. Cooper, “The Legacy of Ataturk”, 115-28.

38. Ibid, 117.

39. Kemal, “Military Rule”.

40. Demirel, “The Turkish Military's Decision”, 256.

41. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 128.

42. Harris, “The Causes of the 1960 Revolution”, 438-54.; Karpat, “The Military and Politics”, 1654-83.

43. Tachau and Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military”.; Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 312.

44. Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 129.; Nye, “Civil-Military Confrontation”, 209-28.

45. This consisted of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, Defence Minister, the ministers of Foreign and Internal Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Transportation, and Minister of Labour from the civilian governments and the General Chief of Staff and the commanding officers of the land, air, sea and gendarmerie forces. It was presided over by the President, and in the case of his absence, by the Prime Minister. The General Secretary of the NSC was also allowed to attend the meetings but did not have the right to vote on decisions though the agendas of the council was determined by him, who also tended to be an ex-military officer.

46. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 42.

47. Sakallioglu, “The Anatomy of The Turkish Military's”, 151-66.

48. Apart from formal observing institutions, as an informal financial guarantee of military power, Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu (the Army Mutual Assistance Association, OYAK) was established together with “Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Güçlendirme Vakfı (Foundation for

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Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces, TSKGV). OYAK was totally exempt from taxation and it became the third biggest holding agency within three years of the return to democracy in 1961. Once it comes to the 1971 memorandum forcing out the incumbent Justice Party government led by Süleyman Demirel, the function of the NSC to assist to the MoC was transformed to provide recommendations for the ministries. Finally, following the 1980 coup d’état, its function was elevated to make suggestions, which had to be given priority to implement into civil politics by ministries. Together with the consolidated power of the NSC, in which military attendants outweighed the civilian attendants, a high ranking military officer was appointed to “Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu” (Higher Education Council) which supervises universities and also “Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu” (Radio and Television High Council) so as to take media propaganda under military control. Observing the civilian institutions via official connections has been one of the ways through which the military has been able to interfere in state policies.

49. http://www.msb.gov.tr/asad/AskeriMevzuat/Kanunlar/as_mah_k.html. Thanks to constitutional change approved by a national referendum in 2010, the extreme autonomy of military courts from the civilian judicial system has been reduced during the JDP government era. This change paved the way for the trial of military staff in civilian courts. That is why the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases on alleged military intervention plots to take were administered by civilian inspectors. See for further details in Balci, “Foreign Policy as Politicking”, 157-170.

50. Sakallıoğlu, “The Anatomy”, 151.

51. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 635-57.

52. Ibid. 643.

53. Wuthrich, “Factors Influencing Military-Media”, 253-72.

54. Erdogan, “Kemalist Non-Governmental Organizations”, 251-81.

55. On the contrary, Michaud-Emin argues that there has always a way to reduce the supreme authority of military as the final decision has to be signed by the president or prime minister. He argues that, because of that, the passiveness of civilian politicians is the main reason why for the military’s power over civilian politics in Turkey. In legal terms, she is correct yet the informal tendencies and fear of politicians of a military memorandum or direct intervention which is considered as a duty in case of national security matters has to be considered.

56. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 645.

57. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, 241-52.

58. Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Miliary Relations”, 132.; Karabelias, “The Military Institution, Ataturk's Prnciples”, 57-69.

59. Aydinli, et al, “The Military's March toward Europe”, 77-90.

60. A proportional representation system was brought into force with the 1961 Constitution replacing a majority system. Its basic principle is that the proportion of seats a party would get is allocated according to the same proportion of the votes that a party receives in the national election.

61. It was outlawed by the Constitutional Court due to accusations of separatist activities as the party mentioned the existence of ethnically Kurdish people in Turkey, while official state ideology based on Kemalism officially denies their existence.

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http://www.msb.gov.tr/asad/AskeriMevzuat/Kanunlar/as_mah_k.htmlhttp://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe6tpNhYCiVyecgDBk_s2SA

62. Ahmad, “Military Intervention and the Crisis”, 5-24.; Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy.

63. It is generally used for defining the period from 1996 national election where the Islamist Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan obtained the highest votes and 1997 when the Welfare Party-True Path Party coalition government resigned due to military pressure. Since this process has been affiliated with the National Security Council decision made on the 28 February 1997, the process was named after that date.

64. Heper, “The Justice and Development Party”, 215-31.; Demirel, “Soldiers and Civilians”, 135.

65. Heper and Guney, “The Military and the Consolidation”, 636.

66. Aydinli et al., “The Military's March toward Europe”, 85.

67. Michaud-Emin, “The Restructuring of the Military”, 26.

68. Sarigil, “Europeanization as Institutional Change”, 40.

69. Karaosmanoglu, “Transformation of Turkey's Civil-Military Relations”, 253-64.; Satana, “Civil-Military Relations in Europe”, 279-92.; Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance”, 107-125.

70. The Court of Accounts is the one of the higher judicial institutions of Turkey responsible for controlling the accounts of state institutions.

71. Kuru, “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage”, 43.

72. The core reason behind this was the election to the presidency of JDP nominee Abdullah Gül who has an Islamist background dating back to the Welfare Party. The presidency office has always been affiliated with high-ranking ex-military officers because of the legacy of Atatürk and Inönü. Indeed, there has only been one civilian president since the inception of the republic to the election of Mr Turgut Özal in 1990, who was Celal Bayar. In addition, during the election process, the presidency was defined as “the last Castle” by Deniz Baykal, then-president of the RPP, which has regarded itself as Atatürk’s party. Moreover, Cumhuriyet meetings organized by the RPP all over Turkey against the election of Mr Gül made explicit invitations for the military to take over the civilian JDP government by accusing it of being the heart of “irticai faaliyetler” (religiously reactionary activities). Turkey’s politics has even witnessed a closure case in the constitution court against the JDP. These manoeuvres, in my opinion, can be regarded as reflections of embedded Kemalism-based state structure.

73. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”.

74. Heper, “The Justice and Development Party,” 217. ; Aydinli, “A Paradigmatic Shift”, 581-96.

75. The article was removed from the Act in July 2013 before the Ergenekon case verdicts were declared. Yet, article 85 of the internal regulations of the Military Forces is active on top of the constitutional right that the protection of state is the responsibility of the Turkish Armed Forces. http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/askerligin-tanimi-degisti-darbeye-dayanak-olan-35-madde-meclisten-gecti/haber-225443

76. Heper, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey”, 248.

77. http://www.iha.com.tr/gundem/iste-ergenekon-davasi-kararlari/290948

78. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/ergenekonda-karar-21-nisan-2016da

79. Sakallıoğlu, “Demythologyzing the National Security Concept”, 213-29.

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http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe6tpNhYCiVyecgDBk_s2SA

80. Stepan, Retihinking Military Politics; Sarigil, “Bargaining in Institutionalized Settings”, 463-83.

81. Tepe, “Turkey's AKP: A Model”, 69-82.

82. Öniş, “Political Islam at the Crossroads”, 281-98.

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