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NEWS, ANALYSIS & DEBATEVOL. 2, NO. 3 – 2006

IN THIS ISSUEPromoting

Independent MediaBy Ross Howard

Voting for ThugsBy Kevin Deegan-Krause

Bonus section

Elections Today

IN THIS ISSUE

Latin America: Old Problems, New Agenda

By Gerardo Munck

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Vol. 2, No. 3 – 2006

Cover Story10 Latin america: oLd probLems, new agenda

If they are to consolidate democratic gains, Latin American countries must adopt an agenda that realistically confronts challenges such as weak institutions, corruption and economic inequality. by Gerardo Munck

Thinking Out Loud18 the right time for re-engagement

The fates of the United States and Latin America are economically and politically intertwined. Now is the time to work multilaterally with other democracies in the region to develop the potential of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter.by richard Soudriette & JaMeS VerMillion

20 party-society Linkage and the quaLity of democracy Trust in political parties is at an

all-time low in Latin America. The region’s social fragmentation—a product of its political and economic history—has been reinforced by weak links between political parties and civil society.by Paul W. PoSner

24 voting for thugsSometimes voters knowingly keep leaders with autocratic tendencies in power. Supporters of democracy should understand why.by keVin deeGan-krauSe

5 from the editor-in-chief

In Brief6 Letters to the editor

7 democracy watch

In the Trenches8 promoting independent media

After 15 years of international efforts to build independent media around the world, little has been written about the field’s objectives or accomplishments. Krishna Kumar’s new book reviews the successes and failures of USAID’s recent media programs.by roSS hoWard

Fieldwork14 afro-ecuadorians strive for poLiticaL rights

Politically silent for years, Afro-Ecuadorians are beginning to make their voices heard in the political arena.by laura inGallS

16 drug traffic as a roadbLock to democracy

The drug trade has long been a drain on Colombia’s human and economic resources. Containing it will take international cooperation, economic growth and improved rule of law.interVieW With andréS PaStrana

Beyond Democracy28 the other side of democratic transition

Are unsafe streets (and weak rule of law institutions) the price that aspiring democrats must pay for transition from authoritarianism?by Michael radu

VOL. 2, NO. 3 – 2006 NEWS, ANALYSIS & DEBATE

C o n t e n t s

Page 22

On the cover:

An unemployed demonstrator holds a card that reads “Minister Fernández, Where is the work?” during a protest in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 2004. The protesters were demanding increased government assistance for the poor and more subsidized job training programs. Aníbal Fernández is the Interior Minister of Argentina. (AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko)

Bonus Section eLections today

31 MexicoAdoptsinnovAtionsforthe2006federAlelections

byCarlosNavarro

34 AsteptowArdspeAce byBoazPaldi

36 electionresults

Special Thanks to IFES’ Americas department for their collaboration on this issue.

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democracy at large

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democracy at large (ISSN 1552-9606) is published by IFES (a nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)(3) founda-tion), and its content and choice of art do not nec-essarily reflect IFES’ views. Submissions on topics of democracy promotion, professional resources and letters to the editor should be sent to the Edi-tor-in-Chief, democracy at large, 1101 15th Street NW, Third Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005, USA, or sent to editor@democracyatlarge.org. Articles may only be reproduced with the Editor’s written per-mission.

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adViSory editorial board

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Pavol DemešSunanda DeshapriyaBronislaw Geremek

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Torquato JardimRafael López Pintor

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Marc F. PlattnerJean-François Revel

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FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

by Dorin TudoranMonsieur Revel

AP Photo/Alexis Duclos

CaraCas, august 1974. Jean-François Revel meets Carlos Rangel, with whom he will develop “a strong personal friendship and intellectual brotherhood.” The Venezuelan thinker asks Revel to take a look at “some pages.” Back in Paris, Revel realizes that what he has in his hands is the core of an extraordinary analysis. He signs Carlos Rangel to a major publishing house. This is how the now-famous Del buen salvaje al buen revolucionario (From the Nobel Savage to the Noble Revolutionary) was first published in 1976. Subtitled “Myths and Realities in Latin America,” Rangel’s book is still considered by many the paramount invitation to Latin Americans to break with their dependency on fabulous, yet per-nicious, mythologies surrounding their political, economic and social challenges and face reality.

Paris, June 1994. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, throws a dinner in honor of Octavio Paz, the 1990 Nobel laureate for literature. Revel is among the 15 academics, philosophers, diplomats, sociologists and journalists attending the dinner. To his stupefaction, all participants at the dinner talk “expertly” about Latin America and nobody seems interested in what the author of The Labyrinth of Solitude and The Philanthropic Ogre would have to say about his continent. Embarrassed by the collective arrogance, at the suggestion of the French historian and journalist, Alain-Gérard Slama, Revel asks Paz a question on some current Mexican events. Not so surprisingly, those attending don’t like Paz’s answer too much, for lucidity is rarely welcome among experts.

Paris, 1952. Under the nickname Jacques Séverin, Revel publishes a powerful réquisitoire of the Mexican nationalist system in Esprit magazine. Since Paz is the cultural attaché with the Mexican Embassy in Paris, his government is absolutely (and so wrongly) sure that he is the “traitor” who authored the article. It takes Paz a lot of effort to clear his name. Forty-two years later, his dear friend Revel tells Paz: “Since you made it, I can tell you that your confession gives me a lot of joy: what could be more flattering than having the Mexican government attributing one of my modest early writings to a future Nobel laureate?”

Ottawa, May 3, 2006. At breakfast, the president of IFES says, ”I don’t know if this is a good time for you to learn about it, but you should see this,” and hands me the Obituaries page of The Globe and Mail. Privileged to know Monsieur Revel for more than 20 years, I’m trembling. For some time, I knew that Revel wasn’t in fine health, but there is never a good time to learn about a giant’s disappearance.

I cannot remove Jean-François Revel’s name from the Editorial Board list of our magazine. He must be with us for this edition. His unparalleled love for, and deep knowledge of, Latin

America combined with his unflinching commitment to lucidity, constitute an invaluable legacy. Rest in peace, cher ami.

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democracy at large

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totheeditor:

I read Edward Joseph’s article, “A Decade After Dayton,” with great interest. Although he and I might disagree on some details, his core points are very important. Unlike most observers, Joseph makes the important distinction between the Dayton Agreement and its implementation. While Dayton was far from perfect—and I have frequently discussed what we could have done better—the real problems came in implementation, especially, as Joseph suggests, in 1996. I discussed this in Chapters 19 and 20 of To End a War (Modern Library, 1999) and wrote then, “On paper, Dayton was a good agreement; it ended the war and established a single, multi-ethnic country. But…. the results of the international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history. And the start was rocky.”

Joseph’s analysis is also sound on the terrible consequences of allowing the Bosnian Serbs to force their own people to leave Sarajevo in March 1996, as the city was unified as agreed to at Dayton. He might have also noted that this was the direct result of poor leadership by the NATO Com-mand in Bosnia at the time. The rapes, fires and other outrages that occurred could have been stopped by NATO had the IFOR Commander acted, as he should have, under the powers given to him at Dayton.

Joseph’s key point is that stronger, more assertive implementation of Dayton would have resulted in an even more successful post-Dayton story. How right he is! This is still true today in Bosnia (where the High Representative is going the other way, reducing his own role prematurely). The lesson is simple: if the international community is involved, they must be fully engaged; half-way measures are self-defeating. The same story is being played out right now in Afghanistan.

Still, it must be emphasized: The Dayton Agreement was a success. It ended the war in Bosnia forever and gave Bosnia a chance to more forward. If progress has been slower than it could have/should have been—and it was—it is, nonetheless, genuine progress. After four years of war in the Balkans, and 300,000 killed, this was a real achievement. Dayton stands as the most success-ful peace agreement in decades. The main lesson lies in the fact that it was worth the risks that the United States, belatedly, took to end a war.

Ambassador Holbrooke was the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Agreement. He is currently the vice chairman of Perseus, a private equity firm. Ambassador Holbrooke served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations from 1999 to 2001.

edwArdJosephreplies:

I very much appreciate Amb. Holbrooke’s thoughtful comments on my article. He and I are in agreement that more vigorous implementation of the Dayton Agreement could have trans-formed post-war Bosnia. While Bosnia is indeed vastly improved from a decade ago, the country remains crippled by polarization, in large part because of the rush to transfer Sarajevo to Bos-niak control in 1996.

While implementation always was the key, it is also true that the entity structure agreed at Dayton is part of Bosnia’s paralyzing zero-sum dynamics. Since emerging from war with their proto-state, Republika Srpska, Serb energies have been spent on preserving their quasi-sovereignty. Serb par-ties recently accepted some significant constitutional changes—but even these are of a limited nature and have yet to be formally approved. Ten years after Dayton, Bosnia remains—on paper and in reality—a state lacking vital central authority. Therefore, Amb. Holbrooke could not be more right that the current High Representative has ceded his own powers too soon to supply the political will that Serbs, Croats and Muslims cannot muster. Neither the shared (yet far off) dream of joining the EU nor the slow, protracted EU accession process will, alone, turn Bosnia into a country that no longer needs peacekeeping troops to keep from splitting apart.

Before succumbing to panglossian illusions, the current international leadership in Sarajevo should heed the wisdom of the man who brokered the Dayton Agreement and recognize the continuing need—not to decide matters for Bosnians—but to catalyze them into action.

sincerely,richArdholbrooke

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Vol. 2, No. 3 – 2006

I N B R I E F

(Clockwise from top left): A Kuwaiti woman casts her vote at a polling station in Salwa, Kuwait, in April 2006. (AP Photo/Gustavo Ferrari) Supported by the OSCE Mission in Serbia, work is underway to transform Radio Television Serbia (RTS) into a public broadcasting service. (OSCE) Workers load food supplies from USAID, the largest donor of food assistance to Darfur. (USAID)

Democracy Watch

dio and television stations (some privately owned and some state-owned). However, this overpopu-lation is a sign not of a free me-dia but of regulatory chaos, gen-erated in the early 1990s when broadcast licenses were granted as political favors.

In the past few years, the Ser-bian government has passed sev-eral media laws, including the Broadcasting Act (2002), most of which remain largely unimple-mented. The Broadcasting Act introduced a new licensing sys-tem, established an independent regulatory authority and set a deadline for the state broadcast-

er (RTS) to become a public ser-vice broadcaster. However, the appointment of regulators has been interrupted and delayed by a series of amendments to the Act, and the deadline for the re-form of RTS has been repeatedly extended (the latest deadline was April 2006). The European Union, which is considering Serbia’s membership, has noted that its media legislation is prob-lematic. OSI’s report—Television Across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence—is available at www.soros.org.

Researched and written by Miriam Dowd.

sudanUSAID has announced that it will reopen its offices in Sudan, 15 years after closing them due to government sanctions on development assistance. Since the 1992 closure, USAID has offered emergency aid, food as-sistance and logistical support to the country, while managing its programs from Washington and Kenya. USAID’s total budget for Sudan has increased from $72.7 million in 2004 to $109 million in 2006, and President Bush has named the country his top prior-ity in Africa. Money allocated to democracy and governance and support for the peace process is up by $6 million since 2004.

However, NGOs are facing in-creased operating challenges in the country. International orga-nizations, such as Amnesty Inter-national, have charged the Suda-nese government with obstruct-ing humanitarian aid, including failing to renew the contract of the Norwegian Refugee Council, which ran the largest refugee camp in the country, serving 100,000 refugees. Last Febru-ary, Sudan’s parliament created the Humanitarian Affairs Com-mission (HAC) with broad but vaguely defined powers to regu-late NGOs in country. The HAC has also acted against local NGOs, shutting down the operations of the Sudan Social Development Organization (which provided Sudanese with food and medical services) in March.

KuwaitNearly one year after women were granted full political rights

by the Kuwaiti Parliament, they voted—and ran—in a munici-pal by-election in April for the district of Salmiya. Though Ku-wait’s 1961 constitution grants equal rights to men and women, Islamist MPs have blocked wom-en’s suffrage movements for the past 40 years. The April election was won by Youssef al-Suweileh, while female candidate Jinan Boushehri came in second. Of the 28,000 voters registered in the district, 57 percent are wom-en, one third of whom turned out to vote (overall turnout was 38 percent).

Women and men voted in seg-regated polling places in ac-cordance with a provision in-troduced into electoral law by conservative legislators last year. While voting, women must cover themselves from head to toe and may show their faces only to verify identity. Women will vote in their first general election in Kuwait’s 2007 parliamentary elections, and already five Kuwaiti women have registered to run. Now that Kuwait has granted suffrage to women, Saudi Arabia is the only country in the Middle East that does not give women equal vot-ing rights.

serbiaAccording to a new report from the Open Society Institute, Ser-bia has struggled to reform its broadcast media since embrac-ing democracy in 2000. Because press circulation is extremely low in Serbia—at 100 copies sold per 1,000 citizens—most people get their news from television, and the country currently has 755 ra-

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democracy at largedemocracy at large

IN THE TRENCHES

Promoting Independent Media

by Ross Howard

After 15 years of international efforts to build independent media around the world, little has

been written about the field’s objectives or accomplishments. Krishna Kumar’s new book

reviews the successes and failures of USAID’s recent media programs.

W riting in democracy at large a year ago, journalist Yu-lia Savchenko described how independent media

had taken root in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, sprouting more than 300 non-state radio and television outlets and sowing free ex-pression in print and on the air. However, journalists’ democratic sentiments had not reached state officials or engendered wide-spread civil society activism. “Having tasted true freedom, these media professionals will not give it up easily,” she wrote, but added ominously that “neither will the gov-ernment concede without a fight.”

Ms. Savchenko’s prescience was confirmed in January 2006 when Kyrgyzstan’s state prosecutor announced that criminal libel charges would henceforth fall on any me-dia offending “the honor and dignity” of the president by naming beneficiaries of his corruption or citing critics’ accusations of his corruption. It was the latest in the abusive legal tactics and intimidation by state/local authorities against their coun-try’s independent media.

Kyrgyzstan’s two-steps-forward-one-step-back process echoes a recurrent pattern in the past 15 years of hope and support for free media development as an ele-ment of democratization. For example, the media liberalization of the former Soviet states could be considered worse today than five years ago. Such realities raise legitimate questions about what has been achieved by the estimated annual $100 million of media development activ-ities. For all of the assumptions about the connection between media development and democratization, surprisingly little has been written about specific objectives or real achievements.

Fortunately, Krishna Kumar has made a significant contribution to the media de-velopment story in his recent review of media-based strategies for democracy assis-tance, entitled Promoting Independent Media (Lynne Rienner, 2006). He has charted the evolution of media interventions since the late 1980s, including significant mistakes to avoid today, and provides an effective primer for any policy-maker or newcomer to the field.

A social scientist for the U.S. Agency for International Development (the leading funder of media interventions), Kumar tracks large-scale U.S. media development-for-democratization efforts from South America through Eastern Europe to the current frontiers of Asia and Africa, where entirely new approaches are required. He stops just short of the newest develop-ment—sophisticated evaluation—which is likely to bring qualitative confirmation of the importance of media development, notwithstanding the set-backs in Kyrgyzstan and other places.

By 1990, the technology-driven pervasive-ness of media and the preceding decade’s media-based humanitarian development drew international attention to media for peacebuilding and democratization. Within a decade, the spectrum of initia-tives included developing journalistic skills, promoting the economic viability of inde-pendent media, reforming the media’s regulatory environment, transforming state media and building alternative media. But USAID’s first large-scale, long-term effort came earlier.

Beginning in 1986, the Latin American Journalism Project (LAJP) sought to sub-stantially free Central American newspa-

pers from dependence on either govern-ment or opposition advertisers, which was reflected in the papers’ poor news judg-ment and low-quality partisan reporting. What saved the eight-year, $13.5 million program from being perceived as another CIA-funded anti-communist effort was im-plementer Florida International Universi-ty’s insistence on professional journalism standards of operation and hands-off su-pervision by USAID. Altogether, the LAJP trained more than 6,000 journalists and spawned a Panama-based independent training entity, which has reached another 1,200 since 1998.

USAID reported that the LAJP’s emphasis on conventional skills and ethics improved Central American print journalism, but Kumar acknowledges that pervasive cul-tures of corruption strongly tempered its initial effect. Regardless, reporting skills alone cannot overcome inadequate mar-kets, deficient media laws, weak judiciaries, oligarchic ownership and intimidating authoritarian rule. In addition, the print media was a poor choice of target sector, given that it was accessed by largely literate, urban citizens.

In contrast, USAID’s Russian initiative ($18 million over 10 years) targeted tele-vision reporters/managers and promoted stations’ commercial profitability, in the midst of dramatic political change. From 1992, the program’s focus on business ca-pacity development as a key to apolitical journalism (in a country unused to either) ultimately contributed to the emergence of more than 1,000 regional television sta-tions, most of them commercially viable. Nearly 12,000 people attended the train-ing programs, and thousands of hours of educational programming were produced

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Vol. 2, No. 3 – 2006

IN THE TRENCHES

for emerging independent networks. The project’s direct appeal to managers’/jour-nalists’ economic self-interest (and only indirect appeal to the idea of a free press) made it widely acceptable to Russians sus-picious of U.S.-sourced funds. But again, more recent oligarchic ownership, weak media laws and renewed authoritarianism have eroded the promise of independent Russian television. Nonetheless, the proj-ect established (among donors) commer-cial profit as a contributor to editorial in-dependence.

As Kumar describes, USAID initiatives in Yugoslavia and Bosnia were more clearly dedicated to immediate political objectives: regime change in Belgrade and creating a national pro-democracy network in Bos-nia. Both efforts made professionalism and commercial viability lesser priorities. For example, in Bosnia in 1996, international funds were hastily pooled for an indepen-dent television network (OBN) to profes-sionally report the post–Dayton Accord election campaign (and thus engender in-formed voting). However, the network was mismanaged, unprofessional, perceived by all sides as partisan and commercially un-sustainable; it died in 2000 as partners with-drew their subsidies. International bureau-crats’ top-down management was doomed due to its disregard for OBN’s economic vi-ability and its unrealistic expectations that OBN would quickly deliver political plural-ism and interethnic understanding.

As Kumar notes, the disarray in Bosnia re-flected divergences among American and European donors about the importance of commercial networks versus public-sector broadcasters. This question remains open.

In contrast, USAID’s Indonesia project was well-focused and well-funded, targeting local indepen-dent radio outlets emerging in post-Suharto 1998. By 2004, more than 2,000 Indonesians had participated in journalistic, technical and management training. How-ever, by design the $10 million program di-rectly reached only 7 percent of commercial radio stations (50 of 750). Here, the rising challenge for media interventions—measur-ing the improvements in both indigenous journalism and democratization—emerged clearly. Beyond cost and participation num-bers, the real outcomes in Indonesia can be only inferred. As Kumar acknowledges, “The program seems to have some positive, though indirect, effects…though causality is difficult to determine.”

USAID’s 2002 entry into Afghanistan re-mains a work in progress, as does that

country’s democratization. Promotion of stability is still a priority. At this frontier of democratization, more basic objectives are neces-sary. For USAID, Internews has established two dozen community-based radio sta-tions that provide unprece-dented, accurate informa-tion and gently stimulate conversations on previously unmentioned topics in dis-persed locations. However, local programming remains poor, self-censoring and largely incapable of sur-vival in impover-ished local econ-omies. In such a politically and ec-onomically frag-ile environment, commercializa-tion of the me-dia and democ-racy promotion through the news will take years of continued donor funding.

In Kumar’s last example, Sierra Leone, the conditions require even more innova-tion, including unconventional journal-ism that uses smart marketing to promote conflict resolution. The nongovernmen-tal organization, Search for Common Ground, has pioneered entertaining and informative programming—from soap

operas to storytelling to vox-pop shows—with the aim of promoting positive atti-tudes towards reconciliation. In conflict-stressed states, accustomed as they are to biased news and exhortations, such programming feeds a desperate hunger for entertainment that also presents al-ternatives to conflict and suggests com-mon ground. (Full disclosure: the author recently co-authored a Search for Com-mon Ground handbook about African radio hosts’ handling of conflict issues.) With USAID and other donors’ support exceeding $1 million annually, Search for Common Ground has also developed an evaluation methodology (lacking in many larger projects) to measure the impact of its programming.

What Kumar’s book makes clear is that narrow media interventions cannot func-tion effectively in isolation. Training in journalistic skills is only a beginning. In-stead, interventions must target different aspects of the media sector. For example, they must pay more attention to support-ive legal-legislative infrastructures and understand that exclusively commercial models are not the only solution. Finally, they need greater validation, especially among funders.

Fortunately, the media intervention com-munity is taking up the challenge itself. Last October, more than 400 practitio-ners launched a Global Forum for Media

Development to document the results of worldwide media interventions on gover-nance, conflict resolution, poverty alle-viation and markets. Without evaluations, mistakes will be repeated. According to the media task force of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe in 2003, there are “a high number of media outlets but far fewer sustainable and genuinely inde-pendent ones.” That pace—two steps for-ward, one back—needs to be changed.

Ross Howard is president of the journalism develop-ment consortium Media & Democracy Group, author of international media assistance: a review of donor activities and Lessons Learned, and teaches journal-ism at Langara College, Vancouver.

Kyrgyzstan’s two-steps-forward-one-step-back process echoes

a recurrent pattern in the past 15 years of hope and support for

free media development as an element of democratization.

A young Afghan boy poses with his father’s new radio.

Inte

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L atin America has made great strides toward democracy since 1978, the year a regional wave of transitions from authoritarian rule began. Never before have so many coun-

tries in the region been democratic and never be-fore has democracy lasted so long. Yet Latin America faces significant political challenges. The democrat-ic gains of the last 25 years are not guaranteed and need to be consolidated. Moreover, some enduring problems—such as rampant corruption and severe economic inequalities—must be tackled for the sake of Latin America’s future. Indeed, what is at stake is whether democracy will endure and whether fur-ther democratic changes will be pursued. Thus, it is imperative to understand these political challenges and, based on that understanding, to act in ways that secure democratic gains and promote further demo-cratic change in Latin America.

Consolidating Democratic Gains: Channeling Conflict through Institutions Latin America’s impressive process of democratiza-tion—which began in the late 1970s, well before any inklings of change in the communist East—starkly altered the region’s political landscape. While in 1977 only three countries merited the label “demo-cratic”—Costa Rica, Venezuela and, with some ca-veats, Colombia—in 2006, only Cuba is widely seen as authoritarian. For some countries—such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Mexico, Ni-caragua, Panama and Paraguay—the changes in the 1980s introduced their first serious experience with democracy. For other countries, which re-democra-tized, the changes inaugurated the longest period of democracy in their histories. Differences in progress

notwithstanding, democratic landmarks have been set in country after country.

Reservations about electoral processes in the region have also been dispelled. The spate of recent elector-al victories by leftist candidates, though a matter of concern in many circles, is actually proof of the vital-ity of electoral politics. In addition, the role of elec-tions as mechanisms to anoint new leaders has been demonstrated by the election to the presidential of-fice of a trade unionist (Brazil, 2002), an Aymara In-dian (Bolivia, 2005) and a woman (Chile, 2006). Yet the institutionalization of democratic politics is not assured. The tendency of popular leaders to re-form constitutions so as to allow for their immediate reelection (Ricardo Lagos, of Chile, is the only ex-ception in recent times) and the numerous “failed presidencies” (during 2000-05, eight elected presi-dents did not reach the end of their legal mandate) are only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, many actors have refused to abide by the principle that, in a de-mocracy, all political conflicts must be channeled through democratic institutions.

Latin Americans have resorted to various non-demo-cratic actions. The military-plotted coups or rumors of coups were credible in Haiti in 1991, Paraguay in 1996 and 2000, Ecuador in 2000, Venezuela in 2002 and Bolivia in 2005. Elected leaders seeking to perpetuate their grip on power or to ensure the election of allies oversaw outright fraudulent elections in Panama in 1989, the Dominican Republic in 1994, and Haiti and Peru in 2000. Moreover, elected presidents launched autogolpes (self-coups) aimed at closing down con-gress in Peru in 1992 and Guatemala in 1993; and elected congresses instigated “impeachment coups,”

Latin America: Old Problems, New Agenda

A bird’s eye view of La Caval slum, top, and a gated community, bottom, in the Buenos Aires suburbs in 2003 underscores the glaring divide between rich and poor in Argentina. (AP Photo/Natacha Pisarenko)

by Gerardo Munck

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the last 25

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guaranteed

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most clearly in Nicaragua in 2005. Finally, the people took to the streets—pushing for the displacement of elected presidents in ac-tions that resemble “popular coups” more than the recent “civil society revolutions” in post-communist countries—in Ecuador in 2000 and 2005, Argentina in 2001, Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2003 and Haiti in 2004. Politics in Latin America has hardly been tranquil.

These threats to democracy have been largely contained. The clas-sic military coup d’état—so common in the region in the 1960s and 1970s—has become an atypical event. The only successful post-1978 military coup occurred in Haiti in 1991, and it was reversed three years later when Aristide was restored to power. The coup against Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 was turned back after two days, and the military junta set up in Ecuador in 2000 lasted a day and a half before relinquishing power to the elected vice president. Attempted, threatened or rumored coups in Paraguay in 1996 and 2000, and in Bolivia in 2005, were altogether prevented.

The undemocratic actions of elected leaders, likewise, have been largely controlled. Fraudulent elections were strongly resisted or otherwise corrected. Hence, the winner of the 1989 election in Panama was installed in office following a U.S. invasion. A ne-

gotiated outcome, involv-ing the shortening of the presidential term, was the response to the Dominican Republic’s disputed 1994 election. Peru’s fraudulent 2000 election was washed out within six months, when the president resigned. In sum, only the results of the questionable 2000 elec-tions in Haiti were allowed to stand. The self-coup in

Peru in 1992 was also successful, but elections for congress were held seven months later; and the copycat act in Guatemala in 1993 failed from the outset. Finally, the political crisis in Nicaragua in 2005 was mostly resolved through diplomatic intermediation.

The popular mobilization against elected presidents has been the hardest to diffuse and has left some significant lingering effects. None of these situations evolved into military-led governments or triggered, as a reaction, military coups. But the targeted presidents were brought down in all instances, except Venezuela in 2002. As analysts have noted, in all cases civilians eventually assumed the presidency; to a large extent, these civilians were constitutionally in the presidential line of succession; and these selected presidencies concluded with the installation of elected presidents.1 Nevertheless, these popular actions were launched in defiance of the will of the citizenry as expressed institutionally through the ballot box, in free and fair elections. In addition, the protest instigators sometimes operated in alliance with leaders of political parties who had lost the previous election for president and in two cases (Ecuador in 2000 and Venezuela in 2002) acted in concert with the military.

The popular actions also involved the use of violence on the part of demonstrators (as well as state repression) in Argentina in 2001, Venezuela in 2002, Bolivia in 2003 and Haiti in 2004.

Overall, Latin America offers a democratic success story. Dictators have been removed and authoritarian regimes ended. Unambigu-ous violations of democracy have been rare and brief. Most of the time, elections are held regularly, winners take office, and losers and new players prepare for the next election. But political con-flicts are not always channeled through democratic institutions and hence democratic politics is partially institutionalized. Latin Ameri-ca still faces the challenge of consolidating its democratic gains.2

Confronting Enduring Problems: Corruption and Economic Inequality as Democratic ChallengesAnother challenge faced by Latin America concerns the preva-lence of corruption, understood as the use of public office for pri-vate gain. Though notoriously difficult to measure systematically, quantitative assessments and other evidence suggest that corrupt practices are widespread in Latin American states. High profile cas-es, such as the accusations against three former presidents of Costa Rica in 2004, and the corruption scandal that broke out in Brazil in 2005, only add fuel to the suspicions that it is endemic.

The political costs of corruption are high. Corruption breaks the link between citizens and their elected representatives, though the specific practices may vary. Candidates running for office may re-ceive money under the table and later return the favor through government decisions. Officials in the executive or the legisla-ture may get kickbacks in exchange for decisions regarding th-e privatization of state enterprises, the regulation of business or government procurement. Legislators may sell their vote to offi-cials from the executive branch. In each scenario, state actions are driven by considerations other than the connection between voters and elected officials.

In addition, by breaking the link between elected representatives and policy administrators, corruption hinders the ability of elected officials who do not betray the public trust to make the state work in the interest of the citizenry. Again, a range of specific practices might bring about this split. Laws are not applied when, in return for a bribe, a policeman looks the other way and does not give a driver a traffic ticket; or a bureaucrat waives some requirement to open a business or does not close down a nightclub that has violated safety codes. Laws are interpreted in a biased manner when a judge who has been paid off sets free a wealthy landowner who has hired a hit man to kill a squatter or environmental ac-tivist. More ominously, laws are not applied or are interpreted in a biased manner when the police on the take create a “liberated zone” for kidnappers; when a judge makes a ruling while weigh-ing the choice between plata o plomo (money or a bullet); or when the military—bought off by mafias—provide for the safe passage of drugs through the territory they control. Corruption taints de-mocracy by directly degrading the democratic process.

Indeed, many actors have refused to abide by the principle that, in a democracy, all political conflicts must be channeled through democratic institutions.

Latin America: Old Problems, New Agenda

If they are to consolidate democratic gains, Latin American countries

must adopt an agenda that realistically confronts challenges

such as weak institutions, corruption and economic inequality.

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Still another political challenge faced by Latin America is its glaring levels of eco-nomic inequality. Various measures of economic inequality show that, in terms of national averages, Latin America ranks lower than any other major region of the world. Moreover, disaggregate fig-ures show that the poverty rate among indigenous and Afro-descendant people is higher than among whites (Perry et al. 2004; Busso et al. 2005). Northern-ers traveling through this overwhelm-ingly urban region are commonly struck by the stark juxtaposition of, on the one hand, luxury high-rise apartments and gated communities and, on the other hand, squalid slums—the villas miseria of Buenos Aires, the barrios of Caracas, the conventillos of Quito, the colonias popula-res of Mexico City, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and the callam-pas or poblaciones of Santiago de Chile. Numbers and images offer converging evidence that material resources and ba-sic life opportunities are spread very un-evenly among Latin Americans.

Economic inequality and democracy are not necessarily incompatible. Indeed, economic inequality is a problem for de-mocracy only when economic power is translated into political power, weaken-ing the principle of political equality. Yet when economic inequality reaches high levels, as in many Latin American coun-tries, there is reason to worry about the impact of economic power on democracy.

The democratic principle of political equality can be abridged in different

ways. Political equality can be weakened by the excessive weight given to the pref-erences of the wealthy, as manifested in their greater ability to run successfully for office, to set the agenda via media owner-ship, and to influence legislation through lobbying. Decreased political equality can also be the effect of election results that filter out the preferences of the poor, who may face legal hurdles that make it harder to register to vote; who may have to travel long distances to designated poll-ing stations (because they work far from home); who may face significant induce-ments to sell their votes; and who are gen-erally less prepared to speak the language of political power. Competitive elections and alternation in power notwithstand-ing, if the rich have undue influence on the political process or the poor are shut out, the claim that all citizens have equal standing and an equal opportunity to af-fect government policy loses some of its meaning. And the evidence suggests that these are widespread problems in Latin America.3

In sum, corruption and economic in-equality both impact democracy. As a result, Latin America not only faces the challenge of consolidating its democratic gains, it also faces the challenge of pursu-ing further democratic change.

Transforming Democracy: The What, How and Who of Democratic ChangeTo respond to its democratic challeng-es, Latin America needs a new political

agenda. Indeed, innovative analysis and bold action is required to transform Latin American democracies. Any such agenda will necessarily have to be tailored to the specifics of each country. Nonetheless, as a way to begin constructing a road map that could be used to enter this unchart-ed territory, I would make the following suggestions regarding questions to be ad-dressed, leads to be followed and pitfalls to be avoided.

A first question to be addressed is what is the agenda? Answering this question is harder than might first appear. There is a strong temptation to think the answer hinges on identifying the “right institu-tions.” Even worse, some pin their political hopes on one institution within the overall structure of the state. The shortcomings of such approaches are clear. To be sure, institutional change is one of the tools re-formers can use. But proposed solutions must go beyond institutional fixes.4 After all, part of the problem is that institutions are weak, and that many actors are quite adept at working around (or gaining pro-tection from) the laws. Thus, framing an agenda requires, most fundamentally, understanding the nature of problems such as corruption and economic inequal-ity and coming to terms with the fact that they are rooted in entrenched practices and the interests of powerful actors (some operating legally and others illegally). In other words, a proposal for change must not lose sight of the big picture and must account for the strategic and adaptive be-havior of actors.

A second question is how should this agen-da be fostered? In this regard, it bears em-phasizing that democratic change requires a reversal of the recent trend toward the privatization of public affairs and a recov-ery of the sense of politics as a noble en-deavor. That is, the procedures through which change is sought, even though the agenda for change is decidedly radical, must be consistent with the overall goal of strengthening democracy. The new politi-cal agenda requires a renunciation of any sort of violence and a commitment to re-solve differences within the framework of democracy.

Finally, a third question is who is capable of promoting such an agenda? This is, ul-timately, the key question, because it gets at the central problem: the fact that those actors who have an interest in change do not have the power to bring about change, while those actors who have the power to introduce change do not have an interest in doing so. As a result, this question in-vites pessimism. But this uphill battle can

Protesters burn a police uniform in April 2005 during a demonstration demanding the resignation of Ecuadorean President Lucio Gutiérrez.

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be won. At its core, getting change going is a matter for small, cohesive and committed groups of people. The first task of these change teams is to show, largely by exam-ple, that it is possible to alter entrenched practices; their larger task is to modify, through the exercise of political power, the incentives for others. In a nutshell, the prospects of democratic change hinge on the emergence of such change teams and the formation of a broad coalition for change—one that includes political par-ties, NGOs and other civil society groups, and international democracy promoters.

Lessons from Regional ModelsRecent discussions about the direction of Latin American politics have focused on the rising electoral fortunes of leftist par-ties and the distinction between two lefts: one represented by Chávez, who became president of Venezuela in 1998 and still holds that office, the other by Lagos, who was president of Chile from 2000 to 2006. There is much to this distinction. Chávez came to the presidency as an outsider, is close to Castro and favors strong state in-tervention in the economy. Lagos assumed the presidency as the leader of a coalition of parties with a long history, was not close to Castro and emphasized how the state can assist the global competitiveness of private business. Moreover, these regional models exercise a powerful influence. Lat-in American politicians learn from each other, and the viability of reforms and policies are gauged in part by considering the experience of neighboring countries. Yet the lessons to be drawn from Venezu-ela and Chile are not, as is frequently por-trayed, that leaders should pick one route or the other. Rather, these two cases offer complementary lessons.

Venezuela illustrates that the cause of so-cial justice remains a potent one in Latin America and that, when the established political elites ignore it, anti-oligarchic po-litical movements in the populist tradition of Perón are formed. Such movements can be successful in the electoral arena, as is shown by the victories of Chávez and then Evo Morales (in Bolivia in 2005) and the strong, first-round showing by Ollanta Humala in Peru in 2006. Yet Chávez’s re-cord in office suggests that the rise to pow-er of such an outside leader has negative consequences for the institutionalization of democratic politics, does not reduce corruption and does not bring growth and equity. Thus, probably the key lesson of Venezuela is that politicians cannot af-ford to ignore the situation of the grupos postergados (neglected groups) who have been waiting to participate fully in politics

and to claim a larger share of the wealth of their societies.

Chile, in turn, is rightfully held up as an example to emulate. It has enacted re-forms that removed the authoritarian leg-acies of the Pinochet-led military regime, and it has strong democratic institutions. It has shown, probably better than any other country in the region, how corrup-tion can be dealt with effectively when government and opposition parties work together on the problem. Moreover, it has shown that a Latin American coun-try can manage its relationship with the globalized economy in a way that leads to increased general welfare. Yet Chile’s democracy has failed to reduce the high levels of economic inequality it inherited from Pinochet in 1990. Thus, the lesson of Chile is that even in the best of politi-cal circumstances, some of the democratic challenges faced in Latin America are likely to stubbornly persist.

To conclude, Latin American political leaders confront huge pressures to address urgent social demands yet have few rea-sons to believe that solutions to these de-mands will be found. Such circumstances are not propitious for the strengthening of democratic politics. But this is where Latin Americans stand today, and, as the saying goes, histo-ry is not made in the circumstances of one’s choosing. The hope is that Latin Americans will craft new op-tions and forge alternative paths, as they have done before, so that the lives of Latin American citizens will be better to-morrow than they are today.

Gerardo Munck, Ar-gentinian by birth, teaches in the School of International Rela-tions at the University of Southern California. He worked on democ-racy in Latin america (2004), a report of the United Nations Devel-opment Programme, and is active in vari-ous initiatives to pro-mote and monitor de-mocracy.

Notes1 There is one exception: Mesa, who succeeded the

elected president of Bolivia in 2003, was himself displaced from office in 2005 and hence did not oversee the elections of his successor. There is also one pending case, Ecuador, where elections are scheduled for late 2006.

2 A fuller assessment of the state of democracy in Latin America is provided in United Nations Devel-opment Programme 2004.

3 For a keen analysis of the role of money in politics, see Griner and Zovatto 2004.

4 For an effort to move the discussion of the agenda in this direction, see United Nations Development Programme 2004.

References

Busso, Matías, Martín Cicowiez and Leonardo Gasparini. 2005. Ethnicity and the Millennium De-velopment Goals. New York: UNDP, World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Griner, Steven and Daniel Zovatto (eds.). 2004. From Norms to Best Practices. The Challenge of Political Finance in Latin America. San José, Costa Rica: The Organization of American States and International IDEA.

Perry, Guillermo, Francisco H. G. Ferreira, Michael Walton et al. 2004. Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History? Washington, DC: World Bank. United Nations Development Programme. 2004. Democracy in Latin America. Toward a Citizens’ Democ-racy. New York: UNDP.

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Afro-Ecuadorians Strive for Political Rights

by Laura Ingalls

Politically silent for years, Afro-Ecuadorians are beginning to make

their voices heard in the political arena.

W hen Mae Montaño ran for mayor of Esmeraldas, a remote provincial capi-tal in northwest Ecuador,

the country’s political parties refused to support her candidacy for three reasons: she was black, she was a woman and she was poor.

Ten years later in 2005, Ecuador’s acting president nominated Montaño for vice president, the first time that an Afro-de-scendant woman was considered for the post. During her candidacy, people on the street told her that she had everything she needed to win: she was black, she was a woman and she was poor.

“It’s very interesting because 10 years ago these were negative factors in my candidacy and now they are strengths,” said Montaño.

Montaño eventually lost both political races, but she now works to increase the national profile of Afro-descendants and remove the governmental and societal con-straints that perpetuate their economic and political isolation. As executive director of Alianza Equidad, she leads a coalition of community leaders who lobby Ecuador’s government to address inefficiency and corruption. Montaño believes those prob-lems directly affect the Afro-Ecuadorian community by wasting up to $2.5 billion annually that could go toward improving education, combating unemployment and strengthening social services in Afro-de-scendant areas.

Barriers to Political ParticipationThe Inter-Agency Consultation on Race in Latin America (IAC), a program of the In-ter-American Dialogue, estimates that Afro-descendants represent 10 percent of Ecua-

dor’s population. Government statistics put the number somewhat lower, but IAC Ex-ecutive Director Judith Morrison said that is because Afro-Ecuadorians are concen-trated in the remote Costa region where they are unlikely to obtain national iden-tity papers—documents that are required to vote or run for office. Another factor is that Ecuador’s census classified people by language up until 2001, when the govern-ment added a question that allowed peo-ple to self-identify by ethnicity. Afro-Ecua-dorians often speak Spanish, masking their true heritage.

Morrison said Afro-descendants have had some national influence. The Ecuadorian constitution specifically recognizes Afro-de-scendants and guarantees their civil rights and entitlement to ancestral lands. There is also a national Afro-Ecuadorian Day and Council for Afro-Ecuadorian Development. However, despite these achievements, Afro-descendants remain vastly underrepresent-ed in the country’s power circles.

Their economic situation plays a key role in this marginalization. According to a 2004 World Bank report, Ecuador’s con-sumption-based poverty rate was 45 per-cent in 2001, a 5 percent increase over a 1990 study (World Bank 2004). In contrast, poverty rates in urban areas of the Costa region rose more than 80 percent in the same period.

The study also found that Afro-Ecuador-ians make about 20 percent less than other workers in terms of real income, even after controlling for demographic differences and employment type. Afro-Ecuadorians also tend to be employed in the lower-paying informal sector, mostly because of their low education levels. On average, the 2001 census found that Afro-Ecuadorians

complete 5.6 years of education, two years more than members of the indigenous community, but a year less than whites.

Active discrimination also blocks Afro-Ec-uadorians from obtaining higher-paying jobs and political office. Afro-Ecuadorians say newspaper advertisements that call for buena apparencia (or “good appearance”) are veiled calls for white-only candidates. The country’s mainstream media rarely show Afro-descendants and when they do, they often perpetuate tired stereotypes of blacks as less intelligent than other ethnic groups.

Rare Rise to ProminenceThe multiple barriers Afro-descendants face make Montaño’s rise to national prominence all the more exceptional. She was raised by a single mother and aunt who supported five children by washing clothes in Esmeraldas. Montaño said her mother’s highest aspiration was that her children would receive an education.

“From my childhood, I worked hard to study more and more because my only de-sire was to work to make the money neces-sary for my mother and aunt to not have to work so hard.”

Montaño originally wanted to study medi-cine, but that avenue was too expensive. She eventually worked her way through college, earning degrees in education and commercial engineering. After graduating, she worked in the public sector on youth and women’s issues, which inspired her to enter politics to address the problems faced by poor women in her community.

“As a student, I had opportunities to get in-volved with different political causes, but I never wanted to because politics seemed so

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dirty,” she said. “But through my involve-ment in women’s organizations, I became a feminist and realized that without getting involved in politics, I could never bring about real change.”

Her failed bid for mayor earned her new respect in her community, and she was ap-pointed manager of Esmeraldas’ port, the first time a woman has ever managed a port in Ecuador. Her success in improving the port’s efficiency led to her appointment as counselor for Afro-descendant affairs in the Ecuador Embassy in Washington. Polit-ical upheaval in Ecuador cut short her stint in the United States, but months later she was nominated for vice president.

“The [Afro-Ecuadorian] people felt that yes, it is possible that we were just about to reach the vice-presidency and that we’re now more visible in the country’s history,” she said.

Montaño said Afro-Ecuadorians should build upon that momentum to create their own “political spaces” and increase their le-verage with the country’s political parties. Such goals require preparing leaders for the rigors of electoral politics and devel-oping mechanisms for financing political campaigns.

“Political campaigns are like electoral busi-nesses, and we need to learn how to raise funds to participate in a political cam-paign,” she said.

Building Tomorrow’s LeadersIFES, an international democracy-building organization, is partnering with three Afro-Ecuadorian organizations—AfroAmérica XXI, CONAMUNECE and FECONIC—to remove some of the barriers to Afro-Ecua-dorian political participation. A year ago, they launched a project in the provinces of Esmeraldas, Guayas, Imbabura and Carchi to increase political participation, strength-en Afro-descendant community groups and increase their visibility.

The project established a political leadership school, which provides training in project management, ethno-education and political participation. It also works with Ecuador’s political parties to encourage them to run Afro-descendant candidates and to partici-pate in debates that examine Afro-descen-dant issues. A third component showcases Afro-Ecuadorian history, culture and nation-al contributions on a weekly radio program, in publications and in special events. Ibsen Someford Hernandez Valencia, Af-roAmérica XXI’s program director, said the project addresses the “organizational

weakness” of the Afro-Ecuadorian commu-nity, which prevents them from taking an active national role. One way the project does this is by training civil society organi-zations to meet international monitoring

and evaluation standards, thus preparing them to receive program funds directly rather than as sub-grantees to internation-al organizations. Hernandez said he hopes funding for his project continues past the current 18-month term.

“We believe that although the time for the project is short, results are being seen in the communities and that, in a more gen-eral sense, the project is helping to make our community more visible,” he said.

Morrison said her organization finds it challenging to convince donors to support democratic participation programs such as the Black Legislator’s Network, a coalition of Afro-descendant lawmakers in Latin America. Rafael Erazo, a prominent Afro-Ecuadorian congressman, is part of the organization that grew out of the IAC but has since become an independent network promoting black development and human rights by increasing Afro-descendant repre-sentation in legislative and governmental positions.

“I think there’s a concern that as blacks in places like Ecuador [gain] a greater politi-cal consciousness about their identity and about their political strength that if you gear them toward processes that may in-

crease their representation, you may end up mixing that in with what may become partisan politics,” said Morrison, adding that she believes such fears are unfounded.

Despite the challenges, Montaño said she is inspired by recent political gains that the indigenous community has made in Ecuador and in the region. She hopes that the Afro-descendant community can make similar progress by participating as a com-munity in the major political debates and building the capacity of its future leaders.

“There is no strong, continued Afro-Ecua-dorian presence as actors in national poli-tics,” she said. “There is so much to do.”

Laura Ingalls is a contributing editor for democracy at large.

…Afro-Ecuadorians make about 20 percent less than other

workers in terms of real income, even after controlling for

demographic differences and employment type.

References

World Bank. Ecuador Poverty Assessment. Report No. 27061-EC. Washington, DC: World Bank, April 2004.

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Afro-Ecuadorians in Guayaquil participate in a training session on project design and implementation led by Danasio Santos (AfroAmérica XXI) in March 2006.

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Drug Traffic as a Roadblock to Democracy

Interview with Andrés Pastrana

The drug trade has long been a drain on Colombia’s human and economic resources.

Containing it will take international cooperation, economic growth and improved rule of law.

: You have mentioned in the past that Colombia cannot eradicate its drug trade without international cooperation (for example, convincing the European companies that are providing the chemicals used to process some of the drugs to join the eradication effort). Have your efforts in trying to address this issue been successful? What more could be done?

Andrés Pastrana: Without international cooperation, it is impos-sible to fight transnational crimes like drug production and traf-ficking. Fortunately, we have made progress in the control of pre-cursor chemicals and money laundering. However, while cocaine consumption appears to have decreased in the United States, the latest figures point to increased consumption in Europe, where the price of cocaine is about 25 percent higher than in America. With-out a serious effort to reduce consumption, all of our efforts to control the supply of drugs will have been in vain. As I see it, if the production gets out of control in Colombia, then Europe and the United States will be flooded with cheap illegal drugs that cause an increase in consumption. But the reverse is also true: as consump-tion continues to climb in Europe and other places, traffickers will have more incentives to take bigger risks to produce more.

DAL: While Latin American democracies face major challenges due to corruption, poverty, social inequity and drugs, Colombia appears to face all of these challenges simultaneously. How is Colombia dealing with these issues, and what advice can it give its neighbors?

AP: There is no doubt in my mind that drugs are Colombia’s big-gest challenge. In fact, the immense illegal resources they provide prevented the peaceful resolution of our internal conflicts in the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Even though in the last 15 years our country has made impressive progress in both educa-tion and health as well as in creating a safety net for the poorest people, violence has spread in the coca-producing areas and in the corridors used by the drug traffickers. With Plan Colombia—the government’s multi-year, comprehensive strategy to bring about lasting peace by reducing the production of illegal drugs, revitaliz-ing the economy and strengthening government institutions—we have been able to regain security and put the traffickers on the

defensive. However, we see that the drug problem has moved into other countries of Latin America. Just as it started in Peru and Bolivia and moved to Colombia in the 90s, it is possible that the next decade will see both production and trafficking move into Central America and Mexico. Many have thought of this problem as Colombia-specific, but it isn’t so. It is transnational organized crime that feeds on huge profits derived from consumption in the United States and Europe.

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DAL: How strong are NGOs in Colombia, and what role do you think they can play in solving some of these problems?

AP: NGOs in Colombia are very strong, and this is due to the open democracy that our country enjoys. I took advantage of their strength when in 1999 we had to rebuild the coffee region after a dev-astating earthquake. All the reconstruc-tion effort, including taking care of the people who had lost everything to the earthquake, was done through NGOs. The result was outstanding: no corrup-tion, quick action and, most importantly, the preservation of the social fabric of the neighborhoods, enabling families and friends to resume their lives with few scars. NGOs are also taking a great part in alternative development projects and in caring for displaced populations. I truly believe that wherever there is a strong group of NGOs, the government should work closely with them.

Andrés Pastrana served as Colombia’s 37 th president between 1998 and 2002. He is currently Colombia’s ambassador to the United States

In 2000, then-President Andrés Pastrana met with Colombian naval officers after they discovered packages containing cocaine (five tons in total) in a farm north of Bogotá.

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The Right Time for Re-engagement

by Richard Soudriette &

James Vermillion

The fates of the United States and Latin America are economically and politically intertwined.

Now is the time to work multilaterally with other democracies in the region to develop the

potential of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter.

O n September 11, 2001, two historic events occurred. First was the heinous attacks in New York and Washington,

which triggered the war on terror that has become a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Second was the signing of the In-ter-American Democratic Charter by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and his counterparts from across the Americas at a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), formally embracing democ-racy as the preferred system of governance.

Unfortunately, the war on terror has over-shadowed the significance and the promise of the Charter. In addition, the U.S. gov-ernment’s focus on combating terror has siphoned financial resources and attention away from Latin America and towards re-gions such as the Middle East, particularly with respect to democracy and governance assistance. While there have been a few no-

table exceptions—such as the eligibility of Honduras and Nicaragua for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding—the pri-mary focus of these new programs is on economic growth. In the past five years, funding from USAID or the U.S. Depart-ment of State for strengthening democracy in Latin America has been scarce.

At a March 2006 meeting of IFES’ board of directors, U.S. Ambassador to the OAS John Maisto argued for a new focus on the Americas. He expressed a genuine concern that, at a time when democracy has been universally embraced by the leaders of the

Americas, the institutions of democracy are under fire in many countries as they have not fulfilled people’s expectations. In a 2005 United Nations survey of Latin Americans, 87 percent of the respondents in Peru said they were not satisfied with democracy. In countries like Bolivia, Ecua-dor and Haiti, recent civil unrest and mass demonstrations have forced democratically elected governments from office. Ambas-sador Maisto advocated stepping up multi-lateral efforts to reinforce democracy. The United States cannot do the work alone; rather, we need to work with the OAS and other democracies in the region to bolster democratic values.

In May 2005, Secretary of State Condoleez-za Rice demonstrated the importance of such diplomacy by reaching out to the gov-ernment of Chile—which had officially op-posed the U.S. intervention in Iraq—when U.S. support was needed to elect a new

secretary general of the OAS. Under Sec-retary Rice’s leadership, the United States supported the candidacy of José Miguel Insulza (Chile’s Interior Minister). This move signaled an important shift in U.S. policy in working multilaterally with other democracies in the Americas.

It is important that the United States con-tinue to use similar diplomatic efforts to reinforce its multidimensional interests in the western hemisphere. The response of the U.S. government to the newly elected president of Haiti, René Préval, is very en-couraging in this respect. Despite the fact

that President Préval is a longtime protégé of the controversial former President Aris-tide, the United States has been willing to give his government critical support. The stakes are high for both Haiti and the United States, which faces the possibility of thousands of Haitians escaping misery for the shores of Florida. To succeed, Préval’s government and Haiti need technical as-sistance and training that can help build a functioning government and energized economy. It is important that the United States join with international donors to provide assistance that can raise the coun-try’s standard of living and fulfill the hopes of Haitians.

Indeed, Haiti is but one example of a country where significant investment has been made to support democracy, but where the results have been disappoint-ing for the country’s citizens. While cred-ible elections are an essential element of democracy, the donor community needs to deepen democracy assistance to ensure that democratic institutions function well and are equally accessible to all citizens. Only when citizens believe that democracy serves them and builds a functioning sys-tem of government that is accountable to all citizens (not just the wealthy and pow-erful) can democracy succeed.

As the United States engages in the im-portant work of promoting democracy in Latin America, we should keep in mind that there is no blueprint for this work. Democracy must be home grown, and its promotion must always be undertaken in a manner that respects local history and cul-ture as well as the realities on the ground. Assistance is most effective if it is offered transparently and in a spirit of sharing best practices while not pushing defined insti-

While challenges to democracy are increasing, U.S. government

funding for democracy work in the hemisphere is declining.

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tutional models. In addition, the United States must always be willing to respect any election results (regardless of who wins) as long as the election process is democratic, free and fair.

Given the importance of being open to any and all options that can strengthen Latin American institutions of democracy, it is vital to embrace a truly multilateral approach. We need to begin engaging the member countries of the OAS to ensure that democracy promotion is not dismissed by Hugo Chávez and his populist friends as a “tool of Yankee imperialism.” Indeed, the United States must work with OAS mem-bers to safeguard the Inter-American Dem-ocratic Charter and to deflect President Chávez’ current efforts to replace it with a watered-down version.

In terms of electoral infrastructure, the United States should encourage the involve-ment of electoral management bodies from such countries as Argentina, Canada, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay in helping countries, such as Haiti, that are struggling. This can be done by working through tech-nically competent and nonpartisan NGOs such as CAPEL in San José, Costa Rica, and IFES. Through the OAS and initiatives such as the Summit of the Americas and the Community of Democracies, we should work together to strengthen civil society, enhance the rule of law and reinforce ac-cessible and accountable democratic gover-nance throughout the Americas.

It is important that policy-makers in Wash-ington not view Latin America’s turn to the

left as an automatic threat to U.S. interests or to democracy. As Jorge Castañeda dis-cussed recently in Foreign Affairs, there are two schools of Latin America’s left: prag-matic and populist. The pragmatic left un-derstands the importance and challenge of providing effective governance as the best means of winning the struggle against pov-erty. This school of thought is represented by President Lula in Brazil and Pres-ident Bachelet in Chile. The Unit-ed States must reach out to these countries for help in advancing de-mocracy in the Americas.

O n t h e o t h e r hand, the popu-list left, according t o C a s t a ñ e d a , seeks to br ing about change through confrontation and appeal to the masses. In the past, its mem-bers have used policy differences with the United States to divert their constituents’ attention from the economic problems that plague so many Latin American countries (as did Perón in Argentina and Castro in Cuba). As countries have embraced more transparent and professional electoral processes, the conditions have been cre-ated enabling the populist left to win at the ballot box.

It is imperative that the United States re-main fully engaged with Latin America and

that we work in concert with the leaders of the pragmatic left to encourage a transfor-mation of the populist left. The economic successes of Brazil and Chile underscore Castañeda’s point that a “makeover for the radical left is exactly what is needed for good governance in the region.” Brazil’s Lula and Chile’s Bachelet should be en-listed as interlocutors and role models for

newly elected leaders such as Morales in Bolivia. They also can help moderate the difficult relationship between the United States and Venezuela, which continues to deteriorate.

On July 2, 2006, the voters of Mexico will go to the polls to elect a president to succeed President Vicente Fox. The current mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Ob-rador, is the leftist Democratic Revolution-ary Party (PRD) candidate and has been running a strong campaign (though his poll numbers have dipped recently). Re-gardless of who wins in July, it is imperative that the United States and the pragmatic left of the Americas develop a working rela-tionship with the next government.

Latin America is vital to the long-term in-terests of the United States. Therefore, the United States must remain engaged in the region to encourage economic develop-ment and trade. At the same time, we must also continue to send the message that the region is a priority by providing foreign assistance in such important areas as rule of law, civil society, good governance and elections. The United States must not be afraid to enlist like-minded partners in the region in our efforts to realize the goals of the Inter-American Charter: 1) the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it, and 2) democ-racy is essential for the social, political and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.

Richard Soudriette is the president and James Vermil-lion the executive vice president of IFES.

Chilean President Michelle Bachelet (left) talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during a welcome ceremony in Brazil in April 2006.

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Party-Society Linkage and the Quality of Democracy

by Paul W. Posner

Trust in political parties is at an all-time low in Latin America. The region’s social

fragmentation—a product of its political and economic history—has been reinforced by weak

links between political parties and civil society.

O ver the past several decades, as countries in Latin America have made the arduous transi-tion from authoritarianism to

democracy, the preoccupation of scholars and policy-makers has shifted—from how to establish or restore democratic regimes to how to make them more democratic. One of the key elements of this current focus is the relationship between political parties and civil society. Its importance to either improving or degrading the quality of democracy across the region cannot be overemphasized. In democratic regimes, political parties play an essential role in facilitating meaningful political participa-tion and aggregating, articulating and rep-resenting the interests of groups and indi-viduals throughout society. They organize political campaigns and elections, hold public officials accountable and help devel-op and implement public policy. Moreover, in societies marked by extreme poverty

and inequality, and in which protections of social and civil rights are woefully inad-equate, parties have a unique role to play in strengthening democratic practices and empowering citizens to improve their lives.

How well are parties across Latin America performing these vital functions? In par-ticular, what kinds of linkages have they formed with civil society, and what impact do these linkages have on the quality of representation in Latin America’s fledg-ling democratic regimes? Unfortunately,

a general assessment of conditions across the region suggests negative answers to these questions. With rare exceptions, parties in Latin America are failing to ef-fectively articulate societal interests, to provide clear programmatic alternatives to the voting public and to maintain a high level of accountability and integrity in government.

Two general patterns have emerged. On the one hand, in countries such as Argenti-na, Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia—wracked by economic crisis, political corruption or both—traditional parties have severely declined or even imploded. In their place have emerged resurgent populist move-ments, ultra-nationalist and anti-neolib-eral in nature but generally lacking clear programmatic or ideological orientations. On the other hand, in countries that have experienced more economic and political stability, Chile being the most prominent

example, the political landscape has been dominated by parties that have pursued electoral linkage. Such parties have tended to avoid traditional organizational activi-ties for modern electoral practices—such as polling, focus groups and mass media advertising—that do not rely on or facili-tate the organization of civil society. Both of these forms of linkage (charismatic and electoralist, as discussed below) emerge where civil society is fragmented and poor-ly organized. Thus, they perpetuate cir-cumstances in which citizens have limited

capacity to hold parties or politicians ac-countable or to compel them to represent their interests. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that less than 20 per-cent of Latin Americans have confidence in political parties, and only one in three is satisfied with democracy in their country.

To understand the causes underlying these conditions, we must first identify the various ways in which parties in Latin America have formed linkages with civil society. With this taxonomy in mind, we can better understand how economic and social changes that have occurred during the transition from state-led to market-ori-ented development have reshaped party-society linkages and affected the quality of democratic representation across the region. Parties in Latin America have pursued essentially five modes of linkage with society. The first, clientelist linkage, is the oldest and perhaps most prevalent.

This form of linkage, prac-t i c e d m o s t a r t f u l l y b y Mexico’s PRI during its 71 years of un-interrupted

rule, involves party distribution of material resources to clients in exchange for politi-cal support. Closely associated with clien-telism is linkage based on personalistic or charismatic bonds. In this type of linkage, parties become vehicles for the fulfillment of the ambitions of individual politicians. Parties that pursue charismatic linkage, such as Alberto Fujimori’s Cambio 90 in Peru, attract support on the basis of their leaders’ personal appeal. As a result, these parties typically do not offer clear ideologi-cal or programmatic options and tend not

With rare exceptions, parties in Latin America are failing to effectively articulate

societal interests, to provide clear programmatic alternatives to the voting

public and to maintain a high level of accountability and integrity in government.

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to be well institutionalized or deeply root-ed in civil society. Leaders of such parties engage in clientelism in order to attract supporters and cultivate their loyalty.

Both clientelist and charismatic linkage reinforce social fragmentation and do not promote responsible party government. Rather than encourage voters to make political choices on the basis of informed understanding of clear ideological or programmatic alternatives, these types of linkage encourage electoral participation on the basis of narrowly defined material interests or affective attachments to charis-matic leaders, each of which may have per-nicious repercussions for democracy. For example, when leaders (such as Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Ál-varo Uribe in Colombia) gain office and wield power primarily on the basis of their charismatic appeal, democracy becomes delegative in nature. In other words, such leaders view their electoral victory as li-cense to rule in extra-constitutional fash-ion with little, if any, respect for judicial or legislative oversight. Moreover, charismatic leaders often try to enhance their appeal through the promise or actual distribution of material benefits to targeted constituen-cies, a practice that tends to inflame class conflict and undermine economic stabili-ty. Such problems are evident in Venezuela under Chávez’ Fifth Republic Movement and may emerge in Bolivia under the lead-ership of Evo Morales and his Movement for Socialism. Clearly, then, clientelist and charismatic forms of linkage have negative repercussions for responsible party govern-ment and the quality of democracy.

Programmatic and participatory forms of linkage have more beneficial conse-quences for the quality of democracy. For example, parties that adopt a participa-tory form of linkage attempt to serve as an agency through which citizens can them-selves participate in government and tend to be closely linked with organizations in civil society, such as labor unions, peasant associations and urban neighborhood or-ganizations. They have strong grassroots organizations and are internally democrat-ic. Parties that adopt this form of linkage often have programmatic identities—they develop coherent, ideologically consistent positions that clearly differentiate them from their competitors. Citizens who ally with such parties tend to have relatively well-developed ideological and program-matic preferences. Party-society linkages of this sort have been rare in Latin America: they were practiced by the Christian Dem-ocratic and leftist parties in Chile before the 1973 coup and more recently by the Workers’ Party in Brazil.

In contrast, parties that pursue electoral-ist linkages are primarily concerned with mobilizing an electoral constituency rather than organizing and mobilizing groups in civil society. Their primary objective is to develop the broadest possible base of elec-toral support, which requires attracting unorganized and often independent vot-ers and developing a multi-class electoral constituency. To the extent that grassroots party structures exist, party leaders typical-ly control them and mobilize party activists only for electoral purposes (e.g., register-

ing new voters, canvassing, getting out the vote, etc.). Without high levels of autono-mous organization in civil society, this form of linkage will not be an effective means for grassroots constituents to promote their interests.

Recent economic reforms, and the social changes that have accompanied them, have tended to erode or impede forms of link-age that encourage mass organization and participation and have reinforced modes of linkage that exacerbate social fragmen-tation. Social fragmentation is problematic for Latin American democracy because it undermines citizens’ ability to organize collectively and thus compromises their ability to make public officials and politi-cians responsive and accountable. Indeed, social fragmentation makes citizens more susceptible to clientelist and charismatic manipulation.

The recent increase of social fragmenta-tion across the region can be traced to two aspects of the 20th century efforts to trans-form Latin America’s economies: the col-lapse of import substitution industrializa-

tion (ISI) and the manner in which Latin American nations adopted market-oriented reforms. There were many problems asso-ciated with ISI (measures intended to sub-stitute imported products with homegrown versions) that made it unsustainable as a development model, including economic inefficiency, severe fiscal deficits and infla-tion, and significant corruption. However, despite its many shortcomings, ISI led to a diversification of Latin American class structures and the emergence of parties that appealed to these newly incorporated

segments of the population. Thus, under ISI, parties emerged that helped facilitate the organization of civil servants and mid-dle class professionals, workers, peasants and urban shantytown dwellers. Where these parties emerged and the organiza-tion of civil society increased, party compe-tition and political contestation—elements essential to democracy—also increased.

This dynamic was radically altered with the usurpation of power by military regimes in the 1960s and ‘70s and the eruption of the debt crisis in the ‘80s. Both of these factors had a devastating impact on the organiza-tion of society and the functioning of po-litical parties throughout Latin America. Severe military repression in country after country decimated civil society, thwarted democratic political activity and under-mined the normal functioning of politi-cal parties. For different reasons, the debt crisis had similar consequences. Countries that faced balance-of-payments crises were compelled to adopt structural adjustment policies in order to satisfy foreign creditors and to jumpstart their depressed econo-mies. Fiscal austerity and economic liberal-

In Caracas in 2003, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez arrives at a rally of his supporters commemorating the fifth anniversary of his first presidential election.

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ization hit the poor and the working class particularly hard. Real wages declined and unemployment increased substantially. La-bor unions and other interest associations, already weakened by military repression in many countries, were further weakened by the rise in unemployment and attendant expansion of the informal sector.

Given the heterogeneous nature of work-ers in the informal sector, both in terms of their spatial dispersion and diverse eco-nomic activity, they are exceedingly difficult to organize. Their individualistic pursuit of economic survival is symptomatic of the kind of social fragmentation that has oc-curred in Latin America as a result of both military repression and economic liberal-ization. This fragmentation is compounded by the persistence of widespread poverty, the ongoing absence of the rule of law and the perpetuation of authoritarian enclaves in many countries. Citizens fearful of vio-lent retribution by political opponents or the state itself are disinclined to engage in the organizational activity essential for the recuperation and autonomy of civil society. The daily struggle for economic survival for many compounds this problem.

The failure of market-oriented reform to produce the increased economic growth and prosperity anticipated across the region has produced widespread disenchantment with neoliberalism and with the politicians and parties responsible for its adoption. An-ger over government corruption and eco-nomic malaise (if not crisis) has led to the collapse or decline of traditional parties, such as the Radical Civic Union in Argen-tina, Democratic Action and Copei in Vene-zuela, APRA in Peru, the PRI in Mexico and the ADN in Bolivia. It is within this context that we must understand the emergence of a new brand of populism across the region.

In many cases, popular protesters exercised violent means to compel leaders from these

traditional parties to leave office. In all cas-es, the public held the parties represented by these leaders responsible for unfulfilled promises of economic growth and pros-perity, increasing poverty and widespread corruption. The newly ascendant populist leaders—Chávez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia, Ollanta Humala in Peru, and to a lesser extent Andrés Manuel López Ob-rador in Mexico and Néstor Kirchner in Argentina—represent in many respects a throwback to the populist politics preva-lent during ISI’s heyday between 1930 and 1970. As with previous populist move-ments, these are charismatic leaders, high-ly nationalistic and dismissive of economic policy prescriptions offered by the United States, the IMF and other international financial institutions. However, their new brand of populism differs from its prior incarnation in that it is founded on a high-er degree of social fragmentation, and a much lower level of mass organization of traditional institutions of interest media-tion, such as labor unions. Thus, we would expect all of the problems associated with previous populist regimes—economic mismanagement, corruption, low levels of political accountability and denigration of the rule of law—to reemerge under these leaders and the parties they control.

Despite these worrisome trends, more promising (if still imperfect) examples of party-society linkage are evident in the region. In Brazil, the Workers’ Party (PT) has effectively pursued programmatic and participatory linkages at the municipal level of government and to some extent at the national level. However, the par-ty’s reputation for good government has been severely damaged by recent corrup-tion scandals that have rocked President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s administration. Moreover, while Lula’s government has done a good job of maintaining macro-economic stability, hewing close to the neoliberal policies adopted by President

Cardoso, it has made limited progress in addressing the mas-sive social needs and inequities that per-vade Brazilian soci-ety. This has alienat-ed many of the social sectors that support-ed his election and threatens to erase many of the PT’s po-litical gains from the past two decades.

A similar pattern of successful manage-ment coupled with

political alienation is evident in Chile. De-spite the center-left Concertación’s success-ful macroeconomic management since the 1990 transition, high rates of poverty and inequality persist and public trust of politi-cal parties remains below 10 percent. Opin-ion surveys indicate that the public’s dissat-isfaction with political parties stems both from their failure to distribute the benefits of economic growth more equitably and their pursuit of an electoralist form of link-age, which leaves them largely detached from civil society.

The degree of political dissatisfaction in Chile, despite enviable rates of growth and poverty reduction, suggests the importance of closer linkage between parties and civil society. Citizens want to feel that parties and politicians listen to and are responsive to their concerns. More concretely, citizens in contemporary Latin America want their leaders to address the issue of social and economic inequity.

In the final analysis, the character of politi-cal parties and the manner in which they choose to link with civil society are deeply rooted in the institutional and cultural fab-ric of individual nations and thus not read-ily amenable to reform. Nonetheless, there are steps that those striving to strengthen the quality of democracy in Latin America can take to promote the development of positive linkages between parties and soci-ety. For those working with NGOs, it is es-sential that they encourage the creation of fruitful networks among different social or-ganizations. In other words, organizations working on women’s issues, human rights, labor issues, environmental protection and so forth should find common ground. Pa-rochialism among NGOs reinforces the already high levels of social fragmentation that exist in the region and thwarts the kind of collective action necessary to hold parties and public officials accountable.

Social division and fragmentation can be fur-ther minimized when aid agencies support policies that help reduce economic and so-cial inequality and promote respect for the rule of law. To the extent that citizens over-come material deprivation and do not fear reprisals in the exercise of their democratic rights and freedoms, the more empowered they will be to demand accountability and responsiveness from political parties. Ulti-mately, this sense of empowerment is cru-cial. Because in the struggle to strengthen democracy, what matters is not simply how parties link to society but also how citizens choose to relate to parties.

Paul W. Posner is an assistant professor of government at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.

Members of the Bolivian Federation for Unemployed People (Federación de Desocupados de Bolivia) protest in La Paz to demand jobs from then-President Carlos Mesa in 2004.

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democracy at large

Voting for Thugs

by Kevin Deegan-Krause

Sometimes voters knowingly keep leaders with autocratic tendencies in power.

Supporters of democracy should understand why.

W hen Alyaksandr Lukash-enka, president of Belar-us, claimed 86 percent of the ballots in his country’s

recent presidential election, observers not only criticized him for cheating but also for doing so unnecessarily. As the Economist com-plained, “It is hard to beat a dictator who would probably win even if he didn’t rig the vote.” In trying to understand Lukash-enka’s reasons for excess, observers tended to overlook another, more fundamental question of motivation: why would citi-zens support a leader with so little regard for the voters that he would rig his own re-election? Nor are Lukashenka’s voters par-ticularly unusual. A long list of post-com-munist leaders—including Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, Slobodan Milošević in Serbia, Vladimír Mečiar in Slovakia, Leonid Kuch-ma and Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin in Russia—have achieved substantial popular support despite a clear distaste for any electoral rules except those that worked to their own advantage.

For those who seek the spread of democ-racy, these leaders are a constant reminder that voters may freely elect dictators—a phenomenon that Karl Popper referred to as “the paradox of democracy”—and it is more important than ever to understand why. A degree of genuine popularity has always helped strongmen stay in power, but in recent decades, even leaders of ex-tremely repressive states allowed at least the illusion of electoral competition. The rise of such “competitive authoritarian-ism” opens opportunities and dangers for both strongmen and democrats. In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, perceptions of elec-toral fraud were instrumental in mobiliz-ing large-scale public protest and ousting autocratic leaders. In contrast, when large

numbers of voters genuinely support the regime, it is easier for a government to conceal fraud and to prevent the kind of public protest that can spark a restoration of political balance.

While this problem is not unique to post-communism, the close similarities among would-be authoritarian leaders in Central and Eastern Europe provide a convenient laboratory for understanding why voters prefer leaders who do not themselves pre-fer democracy. Although political analysts and scholars offer a variety of different per-spectives, it is possible to identify four use-ful reasons that together explain why voters choose authoritarian leaders.

Some Like StrongmenSince the end of World War II, social sci-entists and policy-makers have debated the existence of an “authoritarian personality type” among citizens. Such a type—if suf-ficiently widespread—might explain the phenomenon of “voting for thugs.” Bojan Todosijević’s exhaustive analysis of politi-cal attitudes in Serbia identifies support for authoritarianism not as a personality type but as a worldview—an enduring but not unchangeable “perspective on how the world is and ought to be organized, about the individual’s place in it and about the relationships between the individuals and groups” (Todosijević 2005). In Serbia, Todosijević finds a widespread worldview involving “resistance to change, preference for order, obedience to rules and estab-lished authorities.” Public opinion surveys spanning 12 years—1990, 1996 and 2002—show this worldview to be stronger among Milošević supporters than among those of other candidates. The same dynamic appears to be true for Slovakia’s Mečiar,

Croatia’s Tuđman, Belarus’ Lukashenka and Ukraine’s Kuchma and Yanukovych (though survey evidence in the latter two cases is rather limited).

At the same time, the surveys suggest that the number of voters with authoritarian worldviews is not always sufficient to elect strongmen. New Democracies Barometer surveys conducted between 1991 and 1998 asked respondents in post-communist Eu-rope whether it would be “better to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything.” (Such multinational surveys are notoriously dif-ficult to interpret given different domestic contexts, but the results are still useful.) Average support for a strong post-com-munist leader ranged from 7 percent to 60 percent, but not all countries with au-thoritarian leaders appeared at the top of the range. Indeed, while more than half the populations in Belarus and Ukraine were willing to accept the dismissal of par-liament, the rates of support for this pros-pect in Slovakia and Croatia were among the lowest, with authoritarian-sympathetic populations that were far too small to elect a strongman on their own.

However, to rely only on the explanation of an authoritarian personality assumes that all strongman supporters think alike. In fact, the segment of the population supporting most of these leaders overlaps only imperfectly with the population that prefers order, obedience and authority. For example, Mečiar’s partisans were twice as likely to agree that (1) a firm hand was more important than patient negotiation, (2) political opposition was unnecessary, (3) political leaders could justifiably break the law in the public interest and (4) all power should be placed in the hands of

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the winner of elections. Yet between one-third and one-half of those who supported these authoritarian opinions chose some party other than Mečiar’s (including a small but significant share who opted for Mečiar’s archrivals). Although most au-thoritarian voters opted for the strongmen, not all of them did, which would seem to weaken their chances for political success. Even more significant, how-ever, is the evidence that not all strongman voters shared authoritarian values. In Croa-tia and Slovakia, evidence sug-gests that fewer than half of the strongman voters held values that were consistent with strongman rule. In Serbia, Belarus and Ukraine, the ratio appears to have been somewhat higher, but still not enough. To win, these leaders must attract the votes of non-authoritarians.

Some Have No ChoiceOne advantage of political authority is that it can promote political success by suppressing alternatives. State power may magnify the vote totals of those in power by making it impossible for opposition supporters to cast ballots in secret (or to cast ballots at all). Where governments have a high degree of control over employ-ment, entire communities may be aware of the economic penalties that await them should votes for government candidates fall too low.

In other cases, votes for those in power are supplemented by “Chicago-style” repeat voting among government supporters. In many eastern Ukraine towns in 2004, vot-ers with ample supplies of “out-of-district” voting permissions were bussed from vil-lage to village, contributing to a turnout well above 100 percent in many polling places. Votes for those in power can also be works of pure fiction, originating in the process of counting and reporting. More subtle is the use of (1) false or “paper” candidates to confuse and divide opposi-tion forces, (2) heavy administrative bur-dens imposed on opposition candidates and (3) limited access to state-owned mass media. These methods, too, undercut the ability of voters to choose anyone other than the government candidate.

While these methods are extremely impor-tant for the success of many power-abus-ing political leaders, they are also the most expensive and potentially the most fragile. Systematic vote fraud, candidate harass-ment and censorship require an extremely high degree of state control, including control over economic activity, a large and disciplined security apparatus and a simi-larly tight hold over mass media (includ-

ing often overlooked mechanisms such as controlling the supply of newsprint). Leaders have indeed managed to achieve this degree of control in some regions of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, but such successes are much more sporadic in Central Europe and the Bal-kans. Furthermore, elections are the point at which foreign and domestic observers

are most likely to become involved. In re-cent years, election observers have become more sophisticated in the degree to which they evaluate the political environment leading up to elections.

Some Do Not SeeSome of the mechanisms for magnify-ing government support are designed to elude even careful electoral observers. Those who abuse power often do so in such a way as to hide the abuses them-selves. This, too, requires a firm grip on power, but in this case power is used not to interfere with voters’ choices but to shape their impres-sions and prevent bad news from reaching their ears.

The methods post-communist strong-men use to hide abuses are striking-ly similar. Their first and most important priority is to prevent the detection of abuse. For example, they might exclude opposition from key parliamentary com-mittees and over-sight bodies, par-ticularly those con-cerning sensitive ar-eas such as privati-zation, police/intel-ligence services and state-owned media. Since independent-minded state offi-cials might never-theless seek to pur-sue criminal investi-gations, leaders find it necessary also to control police and prosecutorial servic-es down to the low-est level.

Leaders must also muzzle any media re-ports that suggest the abuse of political power. A coordinated message from a va-riety of state-owned sources may create an atmosphere of plausibility that can under-cut other conflicting messages from frag-mented private media. Through its use of unsigned but obligatory talking points, Kuchma’s state apparatus in Ukraine

managed to convey a common message through a variety of superficially unrelated media. When such control proves insuffi-cient, governments may need to resort to other means; it is no surprise that report-ers have been among the main victims of political violence in competitive authoritar-ian regimes.

But can abuse of power succeed in obscur-ing the abuse itself? The record seems mixed. Some recent scholarship suggests that it can within certain narrow limits. A 1997 survey of Slovak voters revealed that frequent viewers of state television were

…those inclined toward democracy must figure out how to compete

against authoritarians on at least some portion of their home ground.

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A poster from the 2004 Ukrainian Electoral Commission warns voters against manipulating the votes of others.

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more likely than others to believe that “the government obeys the law.” Exposure to state media even had a small but signifi-cant persuasive effect on those who other-wise distrusted Slovakia’s government. The main impact of media control was its ability to tranquilize the population by offering reassurance that despite rumors and alle-gations emerging from unofficial sources, things were not that bad. A recent analysis of media in Ukraine by Marta Dyczok of the University of Western Ontario argues that state control of media did help limit “large-scale public protests” (Dyczok 2006), but it did not actually increase support for the Kuchma government and did little to protect that government once obvious elec-toral fraud (and careful political organiza-tion) sparked large-scale protest. In fact, the concealment (once publicly known) may have helped make protests even more vehement. Thus, in the post-communist region, as elsewhere, a government’s cov-er-ups may prove more damaging than its crimes.

Some Choose Other Goals While revealing a government’s abuse of power may push some to protest, there seem to be many others who already know about it or who would support the gov-ernment even if they did know. For these voters, a leader’s abuse of power is simply a price that must be paid for some other good, the nature of which can vary widely. Martine van Woerkens notes that in colo-nial India members of the sect of alleged assassins from which we derive our word “thug” often disguised themselves as trad-ers, soldiers and men of God. Support for many post-communist strongmen relies

on strikingly similar appeals: voters toler-ate their thuggery as a regrettable necessity essential for achieving economic prosper-ity, attaining group security or following a moral imperative.

In their recent study, “Feeding the Hand That Bit You,” Amber Seligson and Josh Tucker find that authoritarian inclina-tions are not enough to explain why people in Bolivia and Russia vote for members of their countries’ previous au-thoritarian governments (Seligson and Tucker 2005). In this work and Seligson’s analysis of Argentina’s regional elections, economic incentives play a strong role, and leaders of previously nondemocratic regimes benefit from perceptions that those regimes offered more financial security. Evidence from Serbia, Belarus and Ukraine show a similarly important role for economic questions. Milošević, Lukashenka and Yanukovych successfully presented themselves to voters as guaran-tors of economic stability and guardians against the uncertainties of the free mar-ket. However, such appeals do not appear essential: Slovakia’s Mečiar and Croatia’s Tuđman did not tend to rely heavily on economic appeals to the disadvantaged.An even more pervasive explanation for these leaders’ support lies in their appeals to ethnic or national insecurity. In Croatia, Tuđman’s support began not primarily with authoritarianism but with nationalism. As a strong advocate for Croatia’s indepen-dence, he attracted the support of those who had come to see themselves in terms of their Croatian national identity. Fur-thermore, since Croatian identity within Yugoslavia was tightly bound to Catholi-

cism, he was also able to make successful appeals to religious conservatives on moral issues. Todosijević’s study of Serbia shows that although Milošević’s early political ap-peal depended largely on his supporters’ desire for socialism and authority, nation-alism played an increasingly strong role. In Slovakia, Mečiar’s initial appeals rested primarily on his defense of Slovak sover-eignty, first against the Czech majority in Czechoslovakia and later against the Hun-garian minority and Western interference in independent Slovakia.

In Ukraine, the voting for Kuchma showed less distinct patterns, but support for his prime minister, Yanukovych in 2004, showed a strong pattern of support in the country’s East, particularly among its Rus-sian-speaking population (though domi-nance of state-owned industry in the same region makes it difficult to disentangle national and economic appeals). Initially, Belarus appears to offer an even stronger exception to the nationalist-authoritarian linkage, but closer examination shows an underlying similarity to the other cases. Unlike Tuđman, Milošević or Mečiar, Lu-kashenka failed to find common cause with those who embraced the symbols and language of his country’s 19th century na-tional movement. But his Soviet-style anti-nationalism actually involved an emphasis on group solidarity in the face of over-whelming external and internal threats that made it almost indistinguishable from the nationalisms employed by other strong-men in the region.

Nearly all post-communist strongmen thus relied on national appeals to some de-gree, and memories of 20th century fascist movements lead us to expect that nation-alism is inseparable from the demand for order and stability. But it is important to note that the affinity is neither automatic nor inevitable. Public opinion surveys from the early post-communist period show that nationalism bore only a weak connection to the authoritarian worldview. This sepa-ration was actually extremely useful for would-be authoritarian leaders. As long as they were careful, they could focus on identity questions with nationalist audienc-es, emphasize order with authoritarian au-diences and thereby attract large segments of both. Over time, however, the leaders intertwined the two audiences as they justi-fied political abuses in “defense of the na-tion.” Many voters accepted the link, and authoritarian attitudes became increasing-ly tied to nationalism. Those who did not drifted away to other parties, and strong-men found themselves with electorates that were more devoted but ever smaller. It is ironic that the stronger the bond be-

A group of Slovakian grandmothers demonstrate their support for Vladimír Mečiar.

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tween nationalism and authoritarianism, the more dangerous political life became for national-authoritarian leaders: Mečiar lost a 1998 election, Milošević was deposed after covering up his loss in 2000 and Tuđman appears to have been headed for one or the other of these fates when death intervened.

Stopping StrongmenIt would be nice if we could categorize people who vote for strongmen neatly into these four groups, but even though schol-arly research on these questions is still limit-ed, we do know enough to say a few things.

First, as the international community has realized, leaders who abuse power tend to abuse electoral processes. Cleaner elections generally mean fewer votes for thugs. But election monitors are not enough. Abuses of power begin to affect voters long before election day by limiting voters’ options and concealing crucial information. There is probably little that outsiders can do about this directly, but they can provide resources and support (moral and financial) for lo-cal journalists and community leaders who seek to expose abuses of state power.

Second, although there will always be vot-ers who prefer thugs, they will not usu-

ally constitute a majority. Unless would-be strongmen have another source of political appeal to draw upon, they will usually lose (and in most countries of post-communist Europe, they usually did). This means that those inclined toward democracy must fig-ure out how to compete against authoritar-ians on at least some portion of their home ground. The authoritarian nationalists who took power in Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia faced relatively weak competition on na-tionalist and economic issues because many democratically inclined candidates rejected nationalist, socialist or religious appeals. It is perhaps dangerous to encourage demo-crats to take up nationalism or its like, but democratic candidates must weigh the relative danger of ceding such issues to the other side. If a candidate’s goal is not only to curb abuse of power but also to achieve other aims—ethnic tolerance, free markets, secularization—then his/her task becomes more difficult, and the thugs have greater freedom in their campaigns. In nearly ev-ery country studied here, the successful ouster of a strongman required a broad coalition of those who, regardless of their other deeply held opinions, believed that they could not achieve their goals without first ending the monopolization and abuse of power. Of course, the example of Belar-us demonstrates even a broad, committed

coalition may not succeed if it faces a suffi-ciently entrenched regime. Furthermore, as the Ukrainian example shows (and Belaru-sians may yet learn), the victory of a broad coalition may result in such chaotic infight-ing that voters find themselves nostalgic for the thugs they just voted out. Even in Slova-kia, the most hopeful of examples, it took the greater part of a decade for fractious post-Mečiar coalitions to settle down into something more reassuringly dull.

Kevin Deegan-Krause is assistant professor of po-litical science at Wayne State University. His book, elected affinities: democracy and party competition in slovakia and the czech republic (Stanford Univer-sity Press, 2006), analyzes why Slovaks supported Vladimír Mečiar.

References

Dyczok, Marta. 2006. “Was Kuchma’s Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine before 2004.” Europe-Asia Studies 58:2.

Seligson, Amber and Josh Tucker. 2005. “Feeding the Hand That Bit You.” Demokratizatsiya 13:1.

Todosijević, Bojan. 2005. “Structure, Determinants and Political Consequences of Political Attitudes: Evidence from Serbia.” Doctoral Dissertation, Central European University, Department of Po-litical Science.

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democracy at large

BEYOND DEMOCRACY

The Other Side of Democratic Transition

by Michael Radu

Are unsafe streets (and weak rule of law institutions) the price that aspiring

democrats must pay for transition from authoritarianism?

O ver the past two decades, many countries have passed through the transition from authoritarian or totalitarian

regimes to various degrees of democracy. Latin America’s transitions in the 1980s were from military governments; Central and Eastern Europe’s transitions in the late ‘80s were from communism. Sub-Saharan Africa had a number of less easily catego-rized transitions to democracy, most nota-bly that of South Africa.

While there is no question that leaving be-hind undemocratic regimes was a great gain for the peoples involved, nonetheless, political transition brought new problems as well. In young democracies as different as Romania, South Africa, El Salvador and Guatemala, the main problem cited by citizens has been the explosion in crime. Quite often that fact alone leads some to nostalgia for the former regime, regardless of its undemocratic nature. Political justice may have been absent then, but at least the government was more effective in control-ling crime.

One of the main problems facing transi-tional societies is a widespread perception that democratization is associated with high levels of crime. Under democracy, many transitional governments have grappled with several challenges (including how to build strong rule of law institutions) that can both explain the increase in crime and inhibit their ability to cope with it.

Latin America’s Crime WaveHigh rates of violent crime are a signifi-cant social problem in Latin America. In a Latinobarómetro survey, undertaken in 17 of the region’s countries in 2001, some 80 percent of respondents said that crime and

drug addiction had significantly increased over the three previous years in their coun-tries. More than half (65 percent) had said the same thing in a similar survey undertak-en in 1995 (Kliksberg 2002).

Today, the region has one of the highest murder rates in the world, with 25.1 homi-cides per 100,000 people—up from 8 per 100,000 in the 1970s (Otis 2006 and Mes-quita Neto 2002). Within the region, there is wide variation between countries as well as between urban and rural areas. In the 1990s, the homicide rates of Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala numbered in the 150s per 100,000 (when two of these three countries were embroiled in civil wars), but today El Salvador claims the highest rate at 54, followed by Honduras at 40 and Guate-mala at 37 (Buvinić, Morrison and Shifter 1999 and Henríquez 2006). Crime is particu-larly high in large cit-ies, where murder rates have reached 55 per 100,000 in São Paulo, Brazil; 101 in Guate-mala City and 248 in Medellín, Colombia (Mesquita Neto 2002). Rampant crime plagues much of the region, but the violence is particu-larly serious in Central America.

While there are mul-tiple causes for this in-crease in violence—in-cluding economic poli-cies that increased un-employment, inequality and urbanization; the legacies of past conflicts

(a culture of violence, stores of weapons and thousands of ex-combatants); and the growth of transnational networks of orga-nized crime throughout the region—there is a perception that democracy, under the guise of ineffective governmental institu-tions like the police and criminal justice system, is to blame. Citizens are increasing-ly forcing politicians to face this last issue, which is part of the challenge of successful democratization.

Weak InstitutionsA society making the transition from an un-democratic to a democratic system tends to have weak institutions, particularly those that are inherently repressive—the police, military and intelligence services. At least initially, funding and personnel for such

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law-and-order institutions are cut, and new legal restrictions are imposed on them.

For example, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the peace agreements reached in the 1990s separated police forces from military forces and placed strong restraints on the number and composition of each (both countries’ peace agreements are available at www.usip.org). Newly constituted local police forces took charge of public order, but they were often understaffed, untrained and inexperi-enced. They had little knowledge of how to investigate crime, and any education offered to them through police reform too often fo-cused on issues of professionalism and ap-propriate interaction with the public rather than effectiveness in solving and preventing crime (Call 2000). In addition, police forces, which have only recently begun to be better paid, were plagued with corruption, with po-lice officers drawing additional salaries from local criminals. To further complicate the situation, Central American governments had historically seen crime as something to respond to rather than prevent, and the new police forces inherited this perspective.

Under these circumstances, it is not surpris-ing that the police found themselves over-whelmed by their countries’ soaring crime rates and unable to do their jobs effec-tively. For example, a Mexican study found that, between 1996 and 2003, 96 percent of crimes went unpunished while in Brazil only about 8 percent of the murders com-mitted annually are successfully prosecuted (Franco 2005). In Guatemala and El Salva-dor, a public that originally welcomed the new scaled-down police force after the end of the wars soon said it would like a role for the military in fighting crime, a testament to their lack of faith in the national police (Pérez 2003-04).

The job of the police, particularly those in Central America, was made significantly more difficult by the rise of the marabun-tas or maras (international criminal gangs named after a deadly species of Central American ant), which coincided with Gua-temala’s and El Salvador’s transitions to de-mocracy and their launch of reorganized police forces. Originating in the street gangs of Los Angeles, the maras have now spread throughout Central America where they have brought their violent gang rivalries along with heightened crime and an invigo-rated drug trade. In the case of El Salvador, the local police were both outnumbered and outgunned by the maras, virtually pow-erless to stop them (author interviews with police in 2003). Today, 15 municipalities in El Salvador are believed to be effectively un-der the control of the maras, creating areas where rival gangs battle over turf and fami-

lies flee their homes in search of security (Arana 2005). In 2004 in Honduras, one of the gangs attacked a civilian bus (killing 23) as a warning to the government of what they would do if it continued to pursue harsh penalties against criminals. Central Ameri-can police forces have, as yet, been unable to overcome the grave challenge presented by the maras.

Declining Public Confidence in DemocracyAs Table 1 shows, confidence in democracy among Central Americans has recently been declining, and this trend reflects that of Lat-in America in general. Polls indicate that be-hind this trend is Latin Americans’ concern about public insecurity, which is second only to their worries about the economy (“The Americas...” 2004).

The relationship between the perception of security and support for the democratic political system is direct and clear—the less secure the citizenry, the less support for de-mocracy—as is demonstrated in the cases of Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Hon-duras (Orozco 2005). Hence, not surprising-ly, a United Nations report in 2004 revealed that only 43 percent of Latin Americans are fully supportive of democracy. Another survey, conducted in El Salvador in 1999, found that 55 percent of respondents would support a military coup under conditions of high crime (Pérez 2003-04). (In compari-son, only 28 percent said they would sup-port a coup under conditions of high unem-ployment.)

Massive street marches in 2004 in Buenos Aires and Mexico City have made it clear to politicians that voters want issues of public security addressed. In Argentina, Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Colombia, politicians have made tackling crime a central theme in their political party platforms. Most offer to use an “iron hand” (mano dura) against criminals. For example, the democratic parliaments of Honduras and El Salvador have passed tough (and popular) anti-maras legislation.Here, poli-ticians have run into conflict with local hu-man rights groups.

The Need for NGOs to Adapt Local human rights NGOs—as well as inter-national groups such as Amnesty Interna-tional or Human Rights Watch—have at the core of their identity the idea of aiding vic-tims of political violence. Historically, such violence has been perpetrated by the state through its military or police force, and hu-man rights NGOs have viewed their role as trying to hold the government accountable for its abuse of human rights.

However, these days—unlike 30 years ago—Latin Americans are more likely to complain about the inability of local police to create public security than about po-lice abuse. As a result, these human rights NGOs have fallen out of sync with the pub-lic and are no longer articulating its great-est concerns. For human rights organiza-tions to focus solely on police accountabil-ity for abuse without considering what the police need in order to fight crime more effectively is to risk alienating the public.

For example, under some of the “iron-hand” policies of Central American govern-ments, citizens can be arrested and impris-oned for wearing a tattoo that is required for membership in MS-13, one of the violent maras. Amnesty International pro-tested this law on the basis that it illegally punishes simple membership in the gang. Amnesty also attacked then-Salvadoran President Francisco Flores’ 2003 Anti-Maras Act (AMA) as:

. . . problematic in many respects, since it is based on mistaken, untenable premises such as the need to penalize people on the basis of their appearance and social background. . . . The inter-national treaties and instruments which the AMA infringes in general include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Ameri-can Convention on Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Amnesty International 2003).

As a result of statements like these, human rights groups have been accused of car-ing more for the rights of criminals than the right of ordinary citizens to live under basic public security. NGOs cannot afford to ignore such sentiments, which have al-ready begun to erode popular support for their cause, and the democratic process in general. Their statements only reinforce Latin Americans’ already troubling habit of “look[ing] back with nostalgia to the mili-tary regimes when there was order and sta-bility, albeit authoritarian order enforced by state-directed violence, as ‘the good old days’” (Bruneau 2005).

Rachel Neild of the Washington Office on Latin America has suggested that human rights organizations, who are already ex-perts on what the police should not be do-ing, may need to learn more about alterna-tive models of policing that can improve crime prevention, law enforcement and respect for rights (Neild 2003). For unless Latin America’s crime rates can be brought under control, democracy (and its atten-

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BEYOND DEMOCRACY

dant human rights) is under threat in the region. Political scientist Nancy Bermeo has found that what distinguished success-ful and failed democracies in the interwar years in Europe was their crime rates. In countries where democracy collapsed, such as Italy and Germany, crime rates were on average three times what they were in countries where democracy survived (Pérez 2003-04).

ConclusionNo matter how positive the transition to democracy of formerly authoritarian or totalitarian countries, ultimately the le-gitimacy of a government lies in its ability to protect its citizens from crime and the state from assaults against its institutions. If democratization is seen to come at the cost of increased lawlessness, its founda-tions can only be shaky. Many transition countries have weak institutions and need help discovering innovative ways to fight crime more effectively so their populations can feel secure.

Michael Radu is senior fellow and co-chairman of the Center on Terrorism, Counterterrorism and Homeland Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

References

“The Americas: The battle for safer streets; Crime and policing in Latin America.” 2004. The Economist. October 2.

Amnesty International. 2003. “El Salvador: Open Letter on the Anti-Maras Act.” Available at www.amnesty.org.

Arana, Ana. 2005. “How the Street Gangs Took Central America.” Foreign Affairs 84:3.

Bruneau, Thomas. 2005. “The Maras and National Security in Central America.” Strategic Insights 4:5.

Buvinić, Marya and Andrew Morrison. 1999. “How is violence measured?” Available at www.iadb.org.

Buvinić, Marya, Andrew Morrison and Michael Shifter. 1999. “Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Framework for Action.” Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

Call, Charles. 2000. “Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Inse-curity.” Hamburg : Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde.

Corporación Latinobarómetro. 2004. “Latinobarómetro 2004: A Decade of Measurements.” August 13. Available at www.latinobarometro.org.

Franco, Adolfo A. 2005. “Gangs and Crimes in Latin America.” Testimony submitted to the International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. House of Representatives. April 20.

Henríquez, Alexis. 2006. “Los 20,000 km más letales.” La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador). January 15.

Kliksberg, Bernardo. 2002. “Crime is on the Rise in our Lands.” Revista Envío 250.

Mesquita Neto, Paulo de. 2002. “Crime, Violence and Democracy in Latin America.” Presented at Integration in the Americas Conference. April. Available at www.laii.unm.edu.

Neild, Rachel. 2003. “Human Rights NGOs, police and citizen security in transitional democracies.” Journal of Hu-man Rights 2:3.

Orozco, Manuel. 2005. “Perception of Insecurity and Support for the Political System.” Testimony submitted to the International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. House of Representatives. April 20.

Otis, John. 2006. “Latin American Politics: For many, democracy has been disappointing.” Houston Chronicle. March 10. Available at www.chron.com.

Pérez, Orlando J. 2003-04. “Democratic Legitimacy and Public Insecurity: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala.” Political Science Quarterly 118:4.

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31 MexicoAdoptsinnovAtionsforthe2006federAlelections

byCarlosNavarro

34 AsteptowArdspeAce byBoazPaldi

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Vol. 14, No. 1 – 2006

eleCtiOn Calendar

PresidentialColombia (1st Round) – May 28, 2006Peru (2nd Round) – June 4, 2006Colombia (2nd Round) – June 18, 2006Mexico – July 2, 2006DR Congo – July 30, 2006Sao Tome and Principe – July 30, 2006Yemen – September 23, 2006Bosnia and Herzegovina – October 1, 2006Brazil (1st Round) – October 1, 2006Ecuador (1st Round) – October 15, 2006Brazil (2nd Round) – October 29, 2006

ParliaMentary/legislativeFiji – May 6-13, 2006Singapore – May 6, 2006Azerbaijan – May 13, 2006Dominican Republic – May 16, 2006Cyprus – May 21, 2006Montserrat – May 31, 2006Czech Republic – June 2-3, 2006Slovakia – June 17, 2006Mexico – July 2, 2006Macedonia – July 5, 2006DR Congo – July 30, 2006Tuvalu – August 3, 2006Sweden – September 17, 2006Bosnia and Herzegovina – October 1, 2006Brazil – October 1, 2006Ecuador (1st Round) – October 15, 2006Cote d’Ivoire – October 31, 2006

referenduMsMontenegro – May 21, 2006Mauritania – June 25, 2006Bolivia – July 2, 2006

On July 2, Mexico will hold its next federal elections. More than 71.5 million Mexican citizens are registered to vote, and they will elect a new president, 128 senators and 500 deputies (the latter two make

up the National Congress). This election will be the sixth organized at the national level by Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) since its creation as an independent, public organization in 1990. However, it is the first federal elections to follow the historic 2000 elections, which saw the PRI party cede the presidency to another party for the first time in 70 years. In addition, it will be the first election since nine new members took the reigns of the IFE’s governing body, the General Council, after being appointed by Congress in October 2003.

The three federally elected offices—president, senator and deputy—are gov-erned by different electoral rules. Mexico’s president is elected by simple ma-jority for a period of six years. Presidents serve only one term as re-election is not allowed by the constitution.

The 128 members of Mexico’s Senate are elected for six years using a mixed electoral system. Each of the 32 federal states elects three senators: two seats are assigned to the party or coalition with the most votes and the third seat is assigned to the party or coalition with the second largest number of votes. The remaining 32 seats are assigned according to the principle of proportional rep-resentation using a national list of candidates from each party or coalition.

Congress’ 500 deputies are also elected using a mixed electoral system, though their terms of office are only three years. Three hundred deputies are elected in 300 single-member districts (each state is assigned a certain number of dis-tricts according to its population) using the principle of plurality (the candi-date who receives the most votes wins). The other 200 deputies are elected using proportional representation: candidates on party lists compete for 40 seats in five multimember districts.

Mexico Adopts Innovations for the

2006 Federal Electionsby Carlos Navarro

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Mexico’s July elections are expected to be highly competitive. Only registered national political parties are allowed to present candidates, and currently, there are eight registered political parties. Six of them already have parliamentary representation: PAN, PRI, PRD, PVEM, PT, and PC (see box for party descrip-tions). The other two parties—PASDC and PANAL—obtained their registry for the next elections only last year.

PAN (National Action Party): center-right party of current Presi-dent Vicente Fox and historically the leading opposition force to the PRI. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 151PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party): left-of-center party, which won all presidential elections between 1929 and 2000. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 224PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution): left-of-center party, founded in 1988 by a wide array of leftist parties and organizations, and former members of the PRI. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 97 PT (Labor Party): formed in 1990, its roots are in a network of community organizations. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 6PVEM (Green Ecological Party of Mexico): first registered as a party in 1991, this party has allied alternately with PRI and PAN over the past 15 years. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 17PC (Convergence Party): describes itself as a “social democratic party”; first registered for party status in 1999. Seats won in 2003 Chamber of Deputies election: 5PANAL (New Alliance Party): registered in 2005. PASDC (Social Democratic and Peasants Alternative Party): regis-tered in 2005.

While PAN is fielding its own presidential candidate, the PRI and the PVEM have chosen to form an alliance—the “Coalition for Mexico.” Likewise, the PRD, the PT and the PC have formed the “Coalition for Common Wellbeing,” and each of these co-alitions is offering voters a single candidate or list. Newly regis-tered parties are not allowed to form coalitions to present com-mon candidates. As a result, the PASDC and the PANAL are running their own candidates. To maintain their party registry and the right to participate in the allocation of seats by propor-tional representation, a party must receive at least 2 percent of the votes in any federal election.

The 2006 elections include significant innovations and present some important challenges for election administrators. First, between 2004 and 2005, the IFE conducted a redistricting pro-cess, redrawing the country’s 300 electoral districts. The review and adjustment of electoral boundaries was designed to ensure that each district had equal populations and therefore granted Mexican voters equal political representation and equal power at the ballot box. This new electoral geography corrected dis-parities created by significant social and demographic mobility; now, all districts vary no more than 10 percent from a pre-estab-lished average. In addition, 29 districts have been created—for the first time—with a predominantly indigenous profile. This redistricting will impact all races, but particularly those of the 300 deputies.

Second, voting by Mexicans living abroad will be allowed for the first time. As approved by Congress in June 2005, expatri-

The ACE Electoral Knowledge Network provides comprehensive and authoritative information on elections,

facilitates networking among election-related professionals and offers capacity-development services.

For more information, please visit

www.aceproject.org.

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ate Mexicans will have the opportunity to exercise their right to vote in the 2006 presidential elections. In addition, they will do so by mail, and the postal vote has never been used before in Mexico. To prepare for these new voters, registration was conducted abroad between October 2005 and February 2006. During this time, more than 40,000 Mexicans registered to vote abroad in the next elections.

Third, because there had been concern about going further in establishing a level playing field among candidates, creating eq-uitable campaign finance rules and disclosing political accounts, the IFE’s General Council recently approved a group of political finance regulations that represent an important step forward in this matter. These new regulations set more detailed guidelines for the oversight of national political parties’ financial resources and, for the first time, made clear political parties’ obligation to report on their campaign expenses before the election. For the 2006 elections, presidential candidates are required to report three times (March 30, May 30 and July 31), while candidates for deputy and senator must report twice (June 15 and July 31). The IFE will make all reports available to the public. These new political finance regulations were approved in November 2005 and were met by unanimous approval and supported by the po-litical parties.

In addition, the political parties are required to authorize the National Bank and Securities Commission to deliver information about their bank balances to the IFE—should it be necessary—in order to ease the exercise of its oversight responsibilities.

In another step to increase political finance transparency in the upcoming elections, the IFE signed an agreement with the Na-tional Chamber of the Radio and Television Industry (CIRT) and the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Offenses (FEPADE) in January 2006. This agreement stipulates that all stations af-filiated with the CIRT will provide the IFE with a copy of all service contracts signed with political parties between January and July 2006 as part of a campaign for federal office. This infor-mation—as well as the account information and party reports

mentioned above—will give the IFE more tools for conducting oversight of campaign expenses, and consequently, will guaran-tee greater integrity and certainty in the electoral process.

Carlos Navarro is the director of electoral studies of the International Affairs Unit (Director de Estudios Electorales de la Coordinación de Asuntos Internacionales) of Mexico’s Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

The three top Mexican presidential candidates as of May 2006: Felipe Calderón (PAN), left, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD), center, and Roberto Madrazo (PRI), right, are seen in this composite of file photos taken in December 2005 in Mexico City, Mexico.

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A Step Towards Peace

by Boaz Paldi

Voters in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) go to the polls on July 30, 2006, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United

Nations Mission to Congo (MONUC) are contributing to the international effort to ensure those elections will be fair and transparent. For the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, UNDP and MONUC are ramping up civic education, security and media-development efforts in what should be the climactic stage of the largest and most complex electoral-assistance mission ever.

An Important Step Towards PeaceThe US$422.9 million initiative is of historic importance, according to William Swing, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Special Representative in the DRC. “This is the closest that the Congolese people have been to a credible election since independence in 1960,” he said. “They have the largest and most sustained international support since independence, including the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the history of UN peacekeeping. We are encouraged simply because of the sheer

enthusiasm of the people, who are determined to get back to conditions of stability and legitimacy of institutions.” The elections are a crucial step in a peace process aimed at ending the DRC’s five-year civil war, which has affected six adjacent countries and killed four million people. To this day, fierce fighting continues in some of the country’s 11 provinces, but a peacekeeping force 17,000 strong stands ready to help maintain order and stability in a nation whose location and size make it a bellwether for Africa as a whole.

The DRC has been riven by conflict throughout its history. The country’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated just four months after the country achieved independence from Belgium in 1959. A series of coups in its first years of existence led to the three-decade reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, which was notorious for pervasive corruption.

In 1997, rebels took the capital and installed Laurent Kabila as president. Shortly afterward, the nation plunged again into civil war, with factions supported by neighboring countries facing off

against Kabila’s forces. Joseph Kabila, the current president, took the reins of power when his father was assassinated in 2001.

UNDP/MONUC’s Technical Assistance to the ElectionsIn the past year, UNDP and MONUC have been a major force in registering 25.7 million Congolese to vote in a country the size of Western Europe with few passable roads and minimal infrastructure. The task required ingenuity, technology and hard work. Eighty-kilogram (176-pound) registration kits—each containing a laptop computer, fingerprinting materials and a digital camera—were distributed throughout the DRC by means ranging from light aircraft and trucks to dugout canoes and litters hand-carried through dense rainforest. The mobile kits made possible the immediate issuing of photo identity cards, an important tool for safeguarding citizens’ rights and access to public services.

However, most Congolese have never participated in a democratic process before. So UNDP, in collaboration with local partners, is ramping up its efforts in civic education, a crucial component

Votes collected to be tallied in the DRC’s December referendum on the constitution.

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in preparing citizens for the nation’s first free election. For example, the Bam Bam group, supported by UNDP and a local NGO, Francophone D’appui au Développement, performs civic-education plays for local communities in Kinshasa.

One play tells the story of a candidate—nicknamed Drunkard—who says he will legalize drugs and send everyone to Europe and America if they simply give him money. The performers then talk with the audience about democratic choice and politicians’ responsibilities to their constituencies. Other performances take on issues like women’s roles in the election, the importance of youth participation and how one goes about voting on polling day.

UNDP Civic-Education Officer Renzo Hettinger said UNDP has programs like this in all 11 provinces of the DRC. “It is very important for UNDP and for the electoral process to reach the population at the grassroots level, with activities that are simple, short and have a sure hook for the population.” Setting the elections in motion has brought its share of challenges, particularly in logistics. Shortly before the December referendum on the DRC’s new constitution, the company bidding to provide salaries to the country’s electoral workers pulled out of the process, putting the referendum at risk. In a matter of days, UNDP arranged to pay 240,000 election workers and police in 10,000 locations.

“It was not easy, but we succeeded in doing it on time,” said Simone-Pierre Nanitelamio, head of operations for UNDP in the DRC. “It’s a payment mechanism that we’re going to improve for the next phases of the electoral process, namely for future voting, but that’s the greatest challenge, to try to dispatch the material across a territory that is as vast as the European Union.”

Another aspect of UNDP electoral assistance is fostering independent media. UNDP and the UN Department of Public Information jointly fund and run a radio station based in the capital. In addition to music and pop-culture broadcasts, the station invites representatives from all political persuasions to hold public debates on the airwaves. UNDP also holds seminars on the media’s place in the elections, and the role and contributions of women in journalism.

Malu Malu, president of the Independent Electoral Committee, says he is optimistic about the future of Congo after the elections but says much work remains in building public confidence in the institutions of government and law. “It is essential to consolidate democracy on the basis of respect for the wording

of the constitution and the laws, and to ensure that the latter are applied totally impartially. The system of oversight has to be a system binding on everybody, not just a certain category of people, because very often we have experienced a system that covered the lower ranks while the higher ones, the ones that ought to have been subject to oversight, escaped,” he said.

Building Legitimate Institutions for a Better FutureUNDP support for democratic elections has grown rapidly in recent years. The organization supports, on average, one election every two weeks, in 46 countries around the world. By far the largest demand comes from Africa, where in 2005 UNDP worked with 20 different countries on elections, including the critical post-conflict election processes of Liberia, DRC and Sierra Leone.

However, UNDP’s work goes far beyond election day in building the foundations of sustainable democracy. Indeed, what happens before—and long after—the event is just as important as the vote itself. Increasingly, UNDP works to help countries build capacity and stable institutions over a longer term. This includes establishing independent electoral-management bodies, strengthening or revising electoral laws and supporting long-term election planning, monitoring and budgeting.

As UNDP Administrator Kemal Derviş stated recently, human development cannot take place without an electoral process. Building legitimate institutions, he maintains, is the basis for any country’s development—and that is the crux of any democracy-building mission. “There is increasing agreement among economic historians and analysts that institutions that …are supportive of development, [and that] are legitimate vis-à-vis the people of the country, are … factor[s]. Without these institutions, without governance, nothing works…. Electoral legitimacy is a very important part of governance and that is why supporting that kind of legitimacy is so important…for development,” Derviş said.

To be sure, challenges remain before the DRC goes to the polls in July. And it is far from certain that these elections will succeed in bringing change to this troubled land. Still, the hope of the international community and the UN is that the democratic process will gain a foothold. And although this may not cure all of the troubles facing the nation, it will be a first step on the path to recovery.

Boaz Paldi is a broadcast specialist with UNDP.

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ELECTION RESULTS

The Election Calendar (p. 31) and Results are

providedbyIFES’F.CliftonWhiteAppliedResearch

CenterforDemocracy&Elections,whichmaintains

timely,worldwideelectionresultsavailableonlineat

www.ElectionGuide.org.

Uganda

Presidential February 23, 2006 Registered Voters: 10,450,788

Votes Cast: 7,230,456 69.19% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 6,934,931 95.91% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 295,525 4.09% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI National Resistance Movement (NRM) 4,109,449 59.26%

Kizza Kifeefe BESIGYA Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) 2,592,954 37.39%

John Ssebaana KIZITO Democratic Party (DP) 109,583 1.58%

Abed BWANIKA Independent Candidate 65,874 0.95%

Miria Kalule OBOTE Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) 57,071 0.82%

PortUgal

Presidential January 22, 2006 Registered Voters: 9,085,339

Votes Cast: 5,590,132 61.53% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 5,487,347 98.16% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 43,149 0.77% of votes cast

Blank Votes: 59,636 1.07% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Aníbal António Cavaco SILVA Independent Candidate 2,773,431 50.54%

Manuel ALEGRE de Melo Duarte Independent Candidate 1,138,297 20.74%

Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes SOARES Independent Candidate 785,355 14.31%

Jerónimo Carvalho de SOUSA Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) 474,083 8.64%

Francisco Anacleto LOUÇÃ Left Block (BE) 292,198 5.32%

António Pestana Garcia PEREIRA Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers - Reorganizative Movement of the Party of the Proletariat (PCPT/MRPP)

23,983 0.44%

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Israel

Parliamentary March 28, 2006 Registered Voters: 5,014,622

Votes Cast: 3,186,739 63.55% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 3,137,064 98.44% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 49,675 1.56% of votes cast

Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes Seats

Kadima 690,901 22.02% 29

Labor-Meimad 472,366 15.06% 19

Shas 299,054 9.53% 12

Likud 281,996 8.99% 12

Israel Our Home (Yisrael Beitenu) 281,880 8.99% 11

National Union–National Religious Party (Ichud Leumi–Mafadal) 224,083 7.14% 9

Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset (Gimla’ey Yisrael LaKneset, GIL) 185,759 5.92% 7

Torah and Shabbat Judaism 147,091 4.69% 6

Meretz–Democratic Israel 118,302 3.77% 5

United Arab List–Arab Renewal 94,786 3.02% 4

Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hadash) 86,092 2.74% 3

National Democratic Assembly 72,066 2.30% 3

Others 182,688 5.82% 0

PerU

Presidential (1st Round) April 9, 2006 Registered Voters: 16,494,906

Votes Cast: 14,632,003 88.71% of registered voters

Valid Votes: 12,275,385 83.89% of votes cast

Invalid Votes: 619,573 4.23% of votes cast

Blank Votes: 1,737,045 11.87% of votes cast

Candidate Party ValidVotes %ValidVotes

Ollanta HUMALA Tasso Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú) 3,758,258 30.62%

Alan GARCIA Pérez Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano, PAP) 2,985,858 24.32%

Lourdes FLORES Nano National Unity (Unidad Nacional, UN) 2,923,280 23.81%

Martha CHAVEZ Alliance for the Future (Alianza por el Futuro, AF 2006) 912,420 7.43%

Valentín PANIAGUA Center Front (Frente de Centro, AFC) 706,156 5.75%

Other candidates N/A 989,413 8.06%

Note: Results based on 99.957% votes counted as of May 1, 2006 (Source: Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales)