MASARYK UNIVERSITY BRNO

Faculty of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations and European Studies

The Visegrad Co-operation Since EU Accession –

Successes and Failures 2004-2014

EUP401 International/Transnational Organizations and European Politics

Author: Dániel Péter (432433)

M.A. in European Politics

Professors: JUDr. Mgr. Ivo Pospísil, Ph.D. (lecturer)PhDr. Petr Suchy, Ph.D. (lecturer)Mgr. et Mgr. Petr Vilímek, Ph.D. (lecturer)

Brno, 14 December, 2014

Introduction

During the past 23 years of its existence, the Visegrad co-operation has received a great

variety of remarks concerning its roles and activities. It was proclaimed dead, dysfunctional,

redundant and ineffective just as often as it was praised for its constant ability to renew itself

and participate in a growing number of fields, thereby earning the respect of the EU and its

close neighbours. In a range of articles and studies written about the Visegrad Group in the

last two decades, both viewpoints have been vindicated by relevant arguments. Based on my

research about the topic, I have come to the conclusion that the evaluation and the final

verdict over any Visegrad policies or actions is highly dependent on how we define “success”

and how we perceive the purpose and the functioning of the Visegrad Group.

Right from the moment of its creation, the Visegrad co-operation was designed to be a forum

for coordination with the explicit aim of full involvement in the European political and

economic system. (Visegrad Declaration, 1991) Although this target has been reached and the

fields of co-operation were largely extended over the years, the basic logic of the group is still

the same: consultation instead of regular harmonization, flexibility instead of permanent

institutions, unanimous decision-making instead of the supremacy of majority interests and

exclusive membership instead of further expansion. If we accept the existing framework of

the Visegrad as it is and disregard the recurring critics about the lack of institutionalization

and openness1, we can perceive the results of the V4 in a different, and maybe more realistic

way.

Taking this into consideration, the purpose of this paper is to provide a short, but realistic

description about certain aspects of the Visegrad co-operation and to draw a conclusion about

its (in)effectiveness in a number of policy areas. Based on the aforementioned reasons, this

particular work does not question the current structure of the V4 and its mechanisms, and

does not concentrate on bilateral relations inter alia, or on the EU’s relations with the

individual member states, but tries, instead, to reveal the strength and the weaknesses of the

co-operation within its current limits.

In order to be able to answer the main question of whether the V4 can be considered

successful in a particular area, it is necessary to define, how “success” can be measured.

Therefore, the methodology and the structure of this paper is, as follows. Based on the

available literature, I have chosen four areas2 of co-operation that the majority of the authors 1 Not addressing the questions of institutionalization and the expansion of the V4 does not mean that the author would not consider such issues relevant. However, the current paper attempts to address the topic from a different perspective.2 The reason for such a low number of areas is attributed to the limited scope of this paper

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consider the most visible examples of the V4’s joint work. The choice was made within the

time span of 2004-2014, thus covering only the post-accession period. The analysed areas are

the following:

1. Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs: The Schengen Case

2. Co-operation within the Eastern Partnership: The Case of Ukraine

3. Co-operation in the field of transportation policy

4. Co-operation in the field of energy security

The different characters and scope of these issues make it possible to compare them in

multiple dimensions. While the first and partially the second cases are connected to the initial

years of EU membership, the remaining two originate from the second half of the covered

period. In this sense, the time dimension is covered. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership and

the common energy security policy indicate a much deeper and long-term engagement,

whereas the Schengen Case and the transportation policy were based on short-term ad-hoc

interests3. Thus, the dimension of policy engagement is covered.

During the description of the individual cases, I will mainly use the official documents –

statements, declarations of the Visegrad Group as primary sources. To understand the context

and to compare the viewpoints of different experts, I have accessed a rich variety of articles

found mainly on the websites of Visegrad-related online journals, namely the Visegrad Insight

and the Visegrad Revue.

Based on the flexible framework of the Visegrad co-operation and presuming that joint

initiatives are implemented only on those fields which are equally important to every partner,

my hypothesis is, that the V4 is more successful in less-engaging and short-term issues,

whereas keeping up a common interest and group solidarity is more difficult in the long run.

Thus, I expect that the current analysis will show that the Schengen Case and the co-operation

in the field of transportation were more successful than the other two cases. The success of the

each policy area will be determined on the condition, whether the Visegrad Group was able to

take actions according to its declarations and statements and whether a joint group spirit could

be maintained throughout coordination and implementation.

3 Clearly, the area of transport infrastructure is not a short-term issue, but the particular issue covered in this case did not require repeated negotiations.

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1. Co-operation in Justice and Home Affairs: The Schengen Case

Several authors agree that the joint lobbying and coordination for a quick entry into the

Schengen zone was one of the Visegrad’s earliest examples of effective results. (Druláková,

2007; Fawn, 2013; Strážay, 2014; Zelenická, 2009) Thus, already before the accession to the

EU, the V4 Interior Ministers decided to establish a common working group to examine the

conditions of a joint application to the Schengen system. (Druláková, 2007: 11) When parallel

screenings were already underway in all four countries, they agreed to set October 2007 as a

deadline for full integration. However, due to technical difficulties connected to the

modernization of the Schengen Information System, some of the old member states indicated

that there might be a delay in accession, postponing the original date to 2009. (Fawn, 2013:

345; Zelenická, 2009: 57) As a reaction, the V4 issued a declaration during their annual

meeting, in which they expressed concerns that any delay in Schengen entry would lead to “a

serious crisis of confidence for the populations in the new EU Member States”. (Visegrad

Statement, 2006a) On behalf of the V4, the Czech President emphasised that “all four

presidents see entry into the Schengen zone as an absolute priority and would view it as

discrimination if it were delayed.” (EurActiv, 2006) A month later their standpoint was

repeated, but this time the Baltic-3 Foreign Ministers were also involved in a joint statement,

reaffirming their commitment to the original date. (Visegrad Statement, 2006b)

Although the joint efforts of the V4 were eventually successful and the postponement of entry

was revised in Brussels, Austria still insisted on a delay. In December 2006, the Austrian

Interior Minister pointed out that Slovakia “bought the wrong systems” and they were needed

to be tested for a few more months. (Novinky.cz, 2006) Some days later the Czech

Ambassador to the EU stated that in case Slovakia was unable to meet the entry requirements

(the disputed issue was mainly the Slovak-Ukrainian border), the Czech Republic would still

proceed with accession and would be ready to impose tough border controls on Slovakia

together with Poland and Hungary (Druláková, 2007: 11-12; Grohová, 2006) Fortunately,

Slovakia was able to overcome the difficulties and the V4 could assert its position against

Austria one more time in June 2007. In a press statement, the Prime Ministers “confirmed

their strong commitment” towards the planned entry and “consider[ed] unhelpful any

statements and intentions from any third party going against this objective”. (Visegrad

Statement, 2007)

Based on the eventual success of the V4 in keeping the original date, Fawn (2013) and

Strážay (2014) considers the case of Schengen a great example of fruitful co-operation. On

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the other hand, we cannot help noticing that the group spirit of the Four was quickly

abandoned when one of them had temporarily failed to comply with the regulations.

Consequently, regardless of the positive outcome of joint lobbying, the supremacy of the

individual approach over group solidarity can be traced in this early phase of group co-

operation, therefore it can be deemed only as a partial success.

2. Co-operation within the Eastern Partnership: The Case of Ukraine

Having incorporated 10 new member states in 2004, the EU no longer had to concentrate the

bulk of its resources on expansion and could finally look for new foreign policy goals. Instead

of searching for more candidate states, Brussels decided to put emphasis on the neighbouring

countries, who either didn’t seek membership or their orientation was not sure yet. Aiming at

these states, the EU started to create a security and a democracy belt around itself by building

up closer economic and political relations with them. (Gerasymchuk, 2014: 43) This new

Neighbourhood Policy was targeted at the Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the three

remaining Eastern European states without membership candidacy: Belarus and Ukraine and

Moldova.

The turn in the EU’s foreign policy was in accordance with the goals of the Visegrad Group.

Already in the Kroměříž declaration4, the Four has declared that they are “ready to use their

unique regional and historical experience and to contribute to shaping and implementing the

European Union's policies towards the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe.”

(Visegrad Declaration, 2004) It was clear that the Eastern dimension of the Neighbourhood

Policy meant a huge opportunity for the Visegrad to become an active player and gain

influence through their geographic proximity and historical experience with Ukraine and

Belarus. On the other hand, the bilateral principle of the Neighbourhood Policy towards these

countries was perceived as inefficient, especially compared to the emerging Mediterranean

Union. Therefore, in 2008 Poland and Sweden made a joint proposal to initiate a multilateral

scheme of co-operation on the fields of migration, visa-free travel, free-trade and the

environment, and to create a forum where the EU and the six members of the Eastern

Partnership could discuss these issues. (Rahimov, 2010: 24) The initiative was endorsed by

the Czech EU Presidency and it became a core element in the programme of subsequent

Visegrad Presidencies as well. (Fawn, 2013: 346)

4 The Kroměříž Declaration was a milestone in the history of the Visegrad, as it proposed new areas for co-operation after EU accession, thus giving a clear signal that the V4 will not disintegrate.

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The success of the V4’s collective involvement in the Eastern Partnership is, on the other

hand, ambiguous. While Fawn (2014) or Strážay (2011) consider the group as a successful

mediator to promote democratisation in the participating countries mainly because of their

better understanding and experience of communist past, others emphasise the lack of tangible

results in the fields of visa policy and democratic achievements, not to mention inconsistent

reactions in the case of Ukraine and Georgia. (Kobzová, 2012; Sobják, 2012; Zelenická,

2009)

Indeed, it was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that first tested the limits of common

Visegrad approach. Being the biggest Eastern European state and lying in the conflict zone of

EU and Russian interests, Ukraine and its “swinging” foreign policy orientation can easily

lead to security problems for the Visegrad countries, of whom Poland, Slovakia and Hungary

share a border with Ukraine. Yet, it was Poland alone and not the V4 that tried to settle the

crisis in Ukraine with the help of Javier Solana and the Lithuanian president. (Gerasymchuk,

2014: 46) A common statement from the Four came only afterwards, in which the parties

expressed support for democratization and willingness to share their “unique experience

gained within the consistent processes of transition”. (Visegrad Statement, 2004) It was

followed months later by another statement that promised co-operation in implementing the

EU-Ukraine Action Plan, which was devised to enhance democratic principles in Ukrainian

public life. (Visegrad Statement, 2005) However, as Zelenická points out, common statements

did not result in well-coordinated actions. She mentions the lack of any official support for the

pro-EU presidential candidate Yuschenko and the controversial issue of visa introduction

towards Ukrainian citizens as examples. In the latter case, the V4 became divided over the

time frame of visa application: while the Czechs and the Slovaks wanted visas to be

introduced immediately, Poland and Hungary strived for the latest possible application.

(Zelenická, 2009: 65) All in all, we can say that the Visegrad Group was rather reluctant to act

quickly and actively during the political changes in Ukraine in 2004-2005. Meanwhile,

Poland undoubtedly made itself visible as a strong advocate of a pro-Western Ukraine.

Stability and pro-EU orientation after the Orange Revolution didn’t last long. Visegrad’s

biggest neighbour became once again the centre of attention in late 2013, when Yuschenko’s

successor, the pro-Russian Yanukovich decided not to sign the Association Agreement with

the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. His move provoked angry protests,

which soon transformed into mass demonstrations in Kyiv and lasted until February 2014,

when Yanukovich was effectively forced to leave the country. (Gerasymchuk, 2014: 49) The

first reaction from the side of the Visegrad came already in December 2013 in the form of a

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joint statement issued by the four Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It called on all parties to stop

violence and urged the Ukrainian government to start peaceful negotiations with the civil

society. In another statement from February 2014, more specific actions were proposed: co-

ordinated humanitarian aid, the maintenance of reverse gas flow to Ukraine, the speeding-up

of visa liberalization and an increase in the International Visegrad Fund’s budget allocation to

support Ukrainian mobility. (Jarábik, 2014; Visegrad Statement, 2014a)

Despite the joint rhetoric, the level of individual participation of the V4 countries showed

diverging trends. While the Czech and the Polish government expressed their support for the

opposition parties and the EU-friendly demonstrators, Slovakia and Hungary remained silent.

As for the latter, Orbán’s government made it quite clear from the beginning that its utmost

priority is the well-being of the Hungarian minority living in Ukraine. (Gerasymchuk, 2014:

50) Still, the annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was an issue that temporarily

united the Visegrad again, resulting in a series of declarations both on group level and

together with the Nordic-Baltic 8 regional format. In these documents the countries strongly

condemned Russia’s unauthorized action as an act against international law and called for

immediate withdrawal of armed forces from the occupied areas. (Visegrad Statement, 2014b)

When tensions did not ease in connection with Crimea and the situation was further

exacerbated by the rise of separatist militias in the Southern and Eastern part of the country,

the direct involvement of Russia in both cases could not be left without adequate reaction any

more. To put pressure on Putin, the EU decided to impose economic sanctions against the

country. (EU Newsroom, 2014)

During the negotiations, three out of V4 states expressed concerns regarding the sanctions and

only reluctantly agreed on them while positioning themselves against any further measures of

economic nature. (Markovic, 2014) The opposing stances of the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian

government indicated that the Visegrad spirit is valid only so far as the individual interests of

the parties are not endangered. As an important trading partner and almost exclusive gas

supplier for the Visegrad states, Russia was and certainly will be able to undermine the V4’s

common goals in connection with the Eastern Partnership. Its influence is the clearest in the

case of Hungary and to a lesser extent in Slovakia.

Already at the 2008 NATO Summit, Hungary’s maverick character became apparent, when it

alone opposed the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the alliance, while the remaining three

Visegrad states supported expansion. Moreover, the Hungarian government was much more

moderate in condemning the Russian aggression in Georgia5 than the others. (Rácz, 2012: 40)

5 what happened in Georgia

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Slovakia’s rather reserved behaviour in case of the two Ukrainian crises also raises questions.

According to Markovic (2014), the pragmatic and sometimes neutral approach towards

Russian actions derives from the similarity of the Orbán and Fico governments’ interest-based

politics, and a certain level of distrust towards the “West” and “Western values”.

Based on the examples presented above, we can draw at least two conclusions regarding the

reactions and common position of the V4 in the Eastern Partnership. First of all, it has become

clear that beyond common declarations and encouraging words, the countries of the Visegrad

Four failed to act unilaterally. Poland – the biggest and the most influential of the V4 – often

engaged in mediation and diplomatic actions alone or with other European partners

(especially with Germany or the Baltic states) in the region. In several cases, the Poles were

supported by the Czechs, who try to uphold democratic values and human rights and view the

Eastern European countries through the prism of common European values. As for Slovakia

and Hungary, their pragmatic attitude and the pursuit of self-interest restrain them from more

active participation. It is worth mentioning here that for these two states, the Western Balkans

represent a more relevant region than Eastern Europe – a factor that might also influence their

behaviour. (Sobják, 2012: 125)

The second conclusion is centred on the role of Russia. My point here is that the bilateral

relations of the Visegrad countries with Russia greatly determine how the V4 perceive their

possible scope of actions within the Eastern Partnership. In this sense, I do not personally see

any possibilities for a stronger and more united Visegrad approach towards either Ukraine or

the other participating states in the near future. Thus, the V4’s common participation in the

Eastern Partnership so far can not be considered successful.

3. Co-operation in the field of transportation policy

To commemorate the 20th anniversary of Visegrad’s existence, the Prime Ministers of the

Four met in Bratislava in February 2011, where they issued the third Visegrad Declaration.6

Compared to the previous one in Kroměříž, the document emphasised further co-operation in

additional policy fields, including among others the development of transport infrastructure.

(Visegrad Declaration, 2011)

According to Fawn (2013: 345), Visegrad has been lobbying on transportation already since

2009, making clear that “financing and planning had to take into consideration the overall

balance of Europe, and not simply, for example, population density”. The main concern of the

V4 was that some of the important transport corridors in the region had been degraded and put

6 The first was issued in 1991 as the founding declaration, the second in 2004, in Kroměříž

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into a lower classification, resulting in less cohesion support from the EU budget for

infrastructure. Consequently, the Czech EU Presidency in 2011-2012 declared that it would

enforce common Visegrad interests during the negotiations of the new Trans European

Transport Network guidelines. Thereafter, the EU Commissioner responsible for transport

was invited to a V4+ meeting in Prague, together with other interested member states. In a

subsequent press statement, the Hungarian State Secretary for Infrastructure commented

positively on the meeting, praising the consistent co-operation of the V4 and the flexibility of

the Commission that contributed to relevant policy changes in sensitive areas. (IHO, 2012) As

one of the results, a freight railway between Prague and Slovakia was agreed as part of the

European transport network. (Fawn, 2013: 345)

Lately, in an annual International Transport Conference held in Ostrava in November 2014,

three Visegrad states also agreed to support the Baltic-Adriatic corridor – a transnational

network of multidimensional transport routes linking the Baltic countries with Italy through

Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. (Janowska, 2014) Considering that

transport connections between the V4 states are still relatively scarce and cover mainly the

West-East routes, this area should - and probably will - remain among the priorities of the

Four in the future. More successful lobbying is needed, because the lack of coordinated

approach may lead to a disproportionate transport policy which would only favour the

Western part of the EU. (Fawn, 2013: 345; Manga, 2014)

As we can see, co-operation in the case of transportation was rather easy and no particular

problems occurred among the V4 states, thus this ad-hoc coordination could be described as a

success.

4. Co-operation in the field of energy security

Whereas the idea of a common transportation lobby emerged as a natural interest, a joint V4

policy for energy security was triggered by an unexpected crisis. When a dispute between

Russia and Ukraine broke out about gas prices in January 2009, Russia stopped gas flow to

Ukraine completely, resulting in a halt to all gas supplies towards the countries of Central and

South Eastern Europe. The crisis revealed the vulnerability of the Visegrad in terms of energy

dependency and forced them to start elaborating a strategy to diversify their energy portfolio.

The main focus, of course, has been put on the search for different gas sources, given that

90% to 100% of the imported gas in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and

around 70% in case of Hungary is covered from Russian import. (Pavol, 2012) Thus, the first

step of the Visegrad after the crisis was to create a permanent High Level Group on Energy

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Security already in 2009. Then, it was followed by a V4 Extended Energy Security Summit,

organized by the Hungarian Presidency in February 2010. In the declaration following the

summit, the represented parties7 endorsed the proposal of a “new supply triangle” in Central

and Eastern Europe, consisting of the Nabucco pipline as an Eastern, and the LNG8 terminals

in Poland, Croatia and Romania as a Northern and a Southern source of gas input, while also

initiating the North-South corridor - an interconnected pipeline network that links the whole

region together. (Fawn, 2013: 345, Rácz, 2012: 41, Visegrad Statement, 2010) The

importance of the initiative is marked by the fact that it has reached EU level and became a

priority of the Commission’s Energy Infrastructure Package, which was created to realise the

EU’s energy and climate targets. (European Commission, 2011) The participating countries

signed the final agreement in Brussels in the beginning of 2011, thus the preparation for

constructions of grids connecting the national pipelines could begin. (EurActiv, 2011)

As far as the Visegrad countries are concerned, the grid linking the Slovak and the Hungarian

lines has already been finished, though it is currently non-functional. Considering that the

Polish-Slovak interconnection is yet in its preparation phase, the Slovak-Hungarian link could

only be used at the moment for reversing the gas that still comes from Russia to both

countries. (OrientPress, 2014; The Slovak Spectator, 2014) Let us not forget, however, that

even if all the links are established between the V4 and the other states, the North-South

corridor could only be effective if the proposed alternative gas routes and sources become

available. With the failure of the Nabucco project, one element of the “triangle” is already

out, giving the planned LNG terminals an even higher priority. The Polish terminal is still

under construction but plans have already been revealed to further expand its capacity.

(Koper, 2014) Once it’s finished, the Visegrad countries and their partners will become one

step closer to be more independent from Russian gas import.

Bearing this in mind, the common energy policy of the V4 regarding a united gas market -

even if it’s only in the initial phase - could be considered an undoubted success, which is

proven by the fact that the EU and several other member states play an active part in it.

Conclusion

7 including the V4 + Austria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Romania8 Liquid Natural Gas

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Throughout the previous pages I attempted to give a short insight into the functioning of the

Visegrad co-operation by roughly describing four areas of joint interest. My intent was to find

out, whether the V4 is able to effectively coordinate its moves on different policy areas as far

as we consider consistency between proposals and their implementation on one hand, and the

maintenance of group solidarity on the other. It can be noticed that the results are rather

ambiguous. If we summarize the conclusions of the individual cases, the following trends

could be observed:

1. The first two cases were less successful in terms of maintaining group solidarity, than

the other ones.

2. Co-operation in the field of energy security was much more successful than within the

Eastern Partnership, both in terms of realised steps and the prevalence of group

interest.

What can we draw from these observations? First of all, it became visible that those initiatives

that belong to the second part of the analysed period (2008/9-2014) can be considered more

effective than the ones from around 2004-2005. The only exception can be found in the V4’s

activity in relation to Ukraine during the recent crisis. The failure of proper coordination in

this case can be attributed to the different relationships of the four countries with Russia.

From this last example we can draw one more conclusion: it is not the level of required

engagement that determines the outcome of a long-term policy goal, but rather the nature of

the issue itself. Namely, when the foreign policy goals of the V4 states are much divergent in

a question, there is little chance that they will successfully embark on a common platform.

Thus, it is evident that my original hypothesis was not proven: the success of a particular

policy area within the Visegrad is not dependant on the time scope or the level of engagement.

Both ad-hoc and long-term co-operation can be fruitful if the foreign policy goals and

external relations of the V4 countries are not substantially divergent.

Of course, this final conclusion cannot be accepted as a universal principle valid for all

Visegrad actions. Although the four cases that have been described in this paper could be used

as indicators, they nonetheless cover only a very limited area and time span of the Visegrad

co-operation. More research on the field is needed, analysing joint proposals on the area of

security policy (with a special emphasis on the planned Visegrad Battle Group), or the co-

operation in connection with the EU’s financial framework. Moreover, the V4’s relations with

Russia and the USA must also be studied in order to determine the reasons behind different

reactions from the side of the individual states.

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Regardless of the results and conclusions described above, I think that the Visegrad co-

operation has made huge progress since its foundation and keeping it alive and active after

obtaining EU membership was one of the biggest achievements of Poland, the Czech

Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Although problems and differences exist among the

members, one thing is for sure: without the Visegrad and its open format, the Visegrad Plus,

Central Europe would be much more divided and would certainly lack any real chances to

actively participate in the EU’s decision-making and foreign policy. It has great potential if

the states are ready to recognise the opportunities it offers and use it even more wisely in the

future.

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