Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: 'We don't know how to do this

Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘Wedon’t know how to do this’

GARY E. WEIR

Contemporary History Branch U.S. Naval History Center

ABSTRACT The Cold War at sea expanded in many realms, including thefrigid and treacherous waters of the Arctic Ocean. The US Navy pioneered theseefforts with the visit of USS Nautilus to the North Pole in 1958. During the latterstages of the Cold War, however, Soviet naval strategists began to conceptualizethe polar ice cap as a strategic asset for cloaking the operations of its nuclearmissile submarines. As under-ice operations afforded the Soviet submarine fleetadvantages of stealth, proximity to target and tighter lines of communications,both navies were forced to try to develop tactics for combat under theseextremely complex and arduous conditions.

KEY WORDS: ASW, Submarine Warfare, Artic, Climate change, underseawarfare, submarine tactics

Reflecting on his work in the 1970s, the father of naval Arctic appliedscience, Dr Waldo Lyon, recalled the value of placing acoustic arrays inthe ice cover, providing scientific and operational intelligence regularlyvia satellite. Building on that observation he noted that:

. . . we finally demonstrated with the arrays [that] the Russianswere using the Arctic . . . one of these arrays tracked [a contact]right across, from Franz Josef Land, came across to the top ofGreenland, went back at 14 knots, just the right speed,disappeared on the other side. That’s what this array caught.That caught attention. It was from that point on, then, which wasin about the middle seventies, okay, everybody believed then thatwe’d better be watching the Arctic Ocean, so that was thebeginning of I guess what you’d call the Arctic Cold War era.

During that time, particularly in ‘73, I had Hawkbill andSeadragon in the Bering Sea, and we played a war game, with

Correspondence Address: Gary E. Weir, 805 Kidder Breese St., SE Washington, NavyYard, Washington D.C. 20374 USA. Email: [email protected]

The Journal of Strategic StudiesVol. 28, No. 2, 411 – 427, April 2005

ISSN 0140-2390 Print/ISSN 1743-937X Online/05/020411-17 # 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/01402390500088635

. . .practice torpedoes. The game was on, two of us in the shallowwater under the ice, and that’s when we learned . . . no way . . . wedon’t know how to do this.1

The Arctic Environment

During the Cold War, the naval conflict at the top of the worldbelonged primarily to the submariners. With the advent of nuclearpower in both the US and Soviet fleets, the ice cover in the Arcticbecame what one Soviet Victor 2 driver called the armor above his headthat offered both protection and a challenge to his survival.2 For the USsubmarine force, exercising under-ice capability by voyages to the Poleor deep penetrations into the Norwegian and Barents seas on specialoperations changed roughly 30 years ago into the far more aggressiveposture of the Maritime Strategy.Frequent exercises demonstrated that US submarines could success-

fully and regularly venture under the ice and into protected Russianwaters, deliberately refining their ability to bring any conflict home tothe Soviet Navy. The Maritime Strategy conceptually transformed theArctic environment from a natural scientific laboratory and a region ofoccasional and exceptional operational activity into a possible battlespace on par with the northern Pacific or the GIUK gap. In this battlespace the incomparable environment reigned supreme, strictly limitingthe options available to opposing submarines, limiting strategic choicesand dictating the only tactics possible.In recent years the post-Cold War Arctic environment has once

again redefined the possible. During the confrontation betweenNATO and the Warsaw Pact the ice ‘armor’ limited both access tothe region and its geographic promise for commerce and defense. Inrecent years the dramatic recession of the Arctic ice cap during thesummer months has opened new commercial possibilities anddramatic new strategic questions. Data gathered in large part by USsubmarines in cooperation with the National Oceanic and Atmo-spheric Administration (NOAA) has enabled scientists to suggest witha great degree of certainty that the Arctic ice will begin to disappearcompletely each summer by the end of this century. The process hasalready begun. The summer season recession is already dramatic andobvious. For countries in Asia, the summer Arctic would provide avery valuable short route to the eastern coasts of North America andSouth America, as well as the commercial opportunities of Scandi-navia and Western Europe. Economic possibilities exist which makesit almost certain that their naval forces will follow. Can seriousreflection on the Cold War experience provide a productive basis foran Arctic naval strategy over the next century?

412 Gary E. Weir

In response to the success of regular US deep submerged penetrationsinto their protected northern waters, during the Cold War the SovietNorthern Fleet looked forways to secure the very limited routes availableto their SSBNs transiting from theKola Peninsula to their launch stations.Employing locations in the Norwegian or Barents seas protected byseasonal ice and Soviet SSNs, as well as sending their SSBNs into theArctic Ocean for natural protection within range of their Americantargets made strategic sense. As the Maritime Strategy pushed Americanforces forward, the Soviets looked to the Arctic tomaintain their internallines of communication, to achieve effective deployment and to ensurethe safety and potency of their submerged deterrent.3

Initial Arctic Operations

Both adversaries had already taken their first steps in the Arctic. The USNavy reached the North Pole with USSNautilus (SSN 571) in 1958 andcontinued to engage in scientific and operational projects in the far northwith both the 571 boat and USS Skate (SSN 528) in order to understandboth the capabilities of the vessels and one of the most demandingsubmarine environments in the world ocean. By 1962, the SovietNovember-class nuclear submarine K-21 made the first Russian Arcticvoyage, surfacing in a man-made polinya opened by a four-torpedovolley. On 17 July 1962 the first Soviet nuclear submarine,K-3, took theRussians on their initial trip to the North Pole under the command ofCaptain First Rank L. Zhiltsov, who became a Hero of the Soviet Union.In September 1963 the Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-178 cruisedfrom the Pacific Ocean across the Arctic to the Northern Fleet, traveling617 miles submerged,4 emulating a feat already accomplished by anumber of American nuclear submarines, includingNautilus and Skate.5

These activities simply marked a beginning. From 1949 onward,addressing the Soviet challenge successfully, in the Arctic andelsewhere, occupied a very high place on the US Navy’s list of strategicpriorities.6 For nearly a half century after each superpower beganmaking regular trips to the North Pole, US and Soviet submarinersengaged in an intense and regular virtual war on many fronts far belowthe surface of the world’s oceans during a period referred to by AdmiralJames Watkins as an era of violent peace.7

The Virtual War

In the early twenty-first century, employing the phrase ‘virtual war’ todescribe this conflict immediately feels false and conjures unwelcomeimages of video games, computer graphics and child’s play. The morenatural view, very prevalent in the current historical literature, suggests

Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘We don’t know how to do this’ 413

that these two Cold War superpowers engaged for a third time in abattle for the Atlantic, naturally following the path paved by the majornaval powers of the two world wars. This view goes on to suggest thatafter 1945 the hunt simply occurred at greater depth, at greater speed,with more powerful and innovative weapons and techniques, andeventually on board nuclear submarines. All of this took place with theconstant threat of nuclear Armageddon lurking in the background viamissile or nuclear torpedo.8

Actually, the Cold War’s constant and dangerous submarine joustbarely resembles past undersea confrontations, if at all. With theconstant threat of mutually assured destruction placing tenuous butstrict limits both on the use of weaponry and the traditionalexpectations of battle, Cold War submariners formulated strategyand tactics, and calculated victory and defeat in a very different way.Since using even conventional offensive weapons could easily pre-cipitate horrible and nearly uncontrollable geopolitical consequences,undersea warriors measured victory in terms of surveillance, detectionand constant monitoring. If you knew the enemy, his vehicle or ship, hislocation and capability, and could follow or ‘shadow’ him withoutbetraying yourself, you claimed victory by Cold War standards. Theobject of this dangerous and difficult exercise had little to do withdestroying the target in an encounter that might escalate to jeopardizethe race, but rather with redefining that conflict in terms of surveillance,detection, submerged capability and destructive potential. With thisvictory achieved, a national leader might anticipate any threat withsufficient time to destroy an adversary’s ability to act. Control over theopponent became the operational objective and precise knowledge ofhim the means to that end. Underwater acoustics, early and reliabledetection and capable submarines would provide the keys to a moreeasily recognized victory if the nuclear nightmare began to unfold.Absent that terminal event, surveillance, detection and control providedthe desired advantage, and for nearly 50 years became synonymouswith success.The undersea conflict also provided the only stage on which the two

major players regularly met in face-to-face armed confrontation. Whiletheir soldiers glared at one another across the checkpoints between eastand west in Europe, in the occasional combat episode during the airwar in Korea, in various capacities during the VietnamWar, only underthe surface of the world’s oceans did the two leviathans risk dailyencounters and possibly deadly confrontation in their mutual effort toachieve the desired control. Thus the submarine Cold War evolved intoa high-tech, high-risk venture, that involved the best and brightestpractitioners on both sides, each seeking to control the other viaseamanship, technology, enhanced listening and stealth.

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When asked about the pursuit of these goals, Vice Admiral AnatoliShevchenko recalled with his larger-than-life enthusiasm a particularlywild, high-speed chase he conducted with his Victor 2 boat, K-513, inDecember 1978. He encountered an ‘American colleague’ commandinga Sturgeon-class attack boat in the North Atlantic. The contest lastedfor over six hours at submerged speeds approaching 26 knots.In this case, Shevchenko decided to fall in behind the American

without trying to disguise his presence, feeling sure that his oppositenumber had already detected him. He decided to deprive the Americanof any stealthy illusions while driving him away from the contact pointto ensure the relative privacy of ongoing Soviet fleet exercises. Suddenly,Shevchenko’s opponent decided to lose his pursuer and resume hispatrol, so he accelerated away at high speed, doubtless hoping to doubleback more quietly at some future point without benefit of a Victor-classtail. Characteristically, Shevchenko found the prospect of a chaseinteresting. Listening for the sound of the Sturgeon’s screws loudlydeparting at over 24 knots, Shevchenko waited for the burst of speed toend without accelerating himself. While he waited, his sonar plotted theAmerican’s course and speed. When the acoustic signal seemingly wentquiet, 513 took its turn at high speed, along the same bearing andcourse, for the same amount of time. The boat would then slow down topermit the sonar to re-acquire the American, who would then attempt toelude at high speed once again. While accelerating, neither submarinecould detect the other due to the turbulence generated by their high-speed screws, internal machinery sounds and increased flow noisesalong the hull. Some of the high speed bursts would last as long as 20 to30 minutes. After a burst, Shevchenko would then slow down to fiveknots to give the sonar a chance to work. Once the American realizedthe effort to elude had failed, the chase began again.Since the sonar cannot ‘hear’ anything with the boat moving at high

speed, the officers in the control room took some time to relax. Thischase stood out in Shevchenko’s memory not only for its challenge, itsspeed and near recklessness, but also for a tradition initiated by theboat’s political officer. After two hours of chasing had passed, he hadthe cook reward each hard-working rating in the sonar room for theirintense devotion to the chase. While their boat sped after the Americanand attention to the momentarily deaf passive sonar could relax for afew moments, the galley provided each with a bowl of cream cheese,topped with sour cream, and crowned by a magnificent strawberry! Sowhile the submarine rushed after its adversary, the acoustics team satback and enjoyed this decadent treat laced with color and vitamin C. Assoon as their boat slowed, they went back to work.During this bizarre episode, a well-known quieting and acoustics

expert, Captain First Rank Anatoli Kolmakov, came into the sonar


room. He joined Shevchenko’s crew for this deployment on board 513to complete an on-board submarine sonar qualification course. Uponentering, he saw everyone enjoying their strawberry-topped delicacy.He smiled and commented that everything seemed well in hand.Shevchenko’s navigator Sergey Efremenko responded very seriously bysaying , ‘We are chasing an American submarine!’. Kolmakov laughed,never took him seriously, and left the compartment.Many years later, Shevchenko recalled with characteristically

energetic gestures and a broad smile that:

Two hours later he came into the sonar room again and saw useating the cream cheese and he was told the same thing. When heleft the post the men laughed! Kolmakov went to the navigators’room, made sure that it was true that we were chasing the U.S.submarine and said ‘An amazing tradition! I would never believethat the symbol of surveillance aboard a submarine is a strawberrywith sour-cream!’9

The final patrol of the ill-fated Soviet Mike-class nuclear submarineKomsomolets, K-278, in 1989 provides a more sobering case in point.Captain First Rank Boris Kolyada received orders to join Komsomoletsas senior supervisor to the boat’s commanding officer Captain SecondRank Evgeni Vanin. Kolyada, a veteran Alfa-class submarine driver,would instruct Vanin just as Captain First Rank Baranov had taken himin hand years earlier. The 278 boat sortied on 28 February 1989,expecting to return on 30 May.Komsomolets’s orders took her to sea for three months to hunt for

US surface ships and submarines. Ignoring none of the targets detectedby his sonar, Vanin ran torpedo training drills on every detected vessel.A fishing ship became the first object to provide training for the crew onthis outing. During any of these practice sessions, the crew would plotthe target’s course and the speed, choose the weapons and the bestattack solution, and then the computer would feed the properinformation to the fire control system. These practice drills wouldnot require the captain or crew to arm the weapons or perform anyelaborate technical preparations. Running drills with the fishing boat astarget, 278 lingered in the vicinity of Bear Island, not far from NorthCape. Norwegian submarines and ASW aircraft roamed the entire area.Its deployment orders sent Komsomolets into the middle of a NATO

exercise in the Norwegian Sea called ‘Northern Wedding’. TheRussians did not appreciate the presence of US carrier battle groupsthat far north, so 278 became part of a group tasked with interceptingthe carrier USS America as she carefully approached West-Fjord on theNorwegian coast at 68 degrees north latitude.

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Given the roles assigned to US submarines providing ASW protectionduring the exercise, the encounter quickly became rather complex andthreatening. As Komsomolets approached the Americans, everythingaccelerated. Taking up position on the perimeter of the American forces,it did not take Vanin’s sonar very long to turn up a submerged Americantarget. He quietly slid in behind the contact, hoping to trail the Americanas long as possible. Unfortunately, the effort quickly backfired. TheAmerican skipperquickly detected278and each commander tried to takeup station behind the other both to hide in the noise of his opponent’sscrews and to assume the best torpedo firing position. Kolyada recalledthat the encounter, ‘becameadog-fight lasting someminutes, reminiscentof three dimensional aerial combat during the Great War’.Vanin reported the detection as well as the deep dog-fight to

Northern Fleet headquarters. He included sonar confirmation of thetarget as an American Los Angeles-class submarine. Vanin ordered thecrew to battle stations and initiated preparation for torpedo attack. Allof this, including the frantic submerged maneuvering, took too muchtime. The American’s proximity and aggressiveness did not permit aneasy or safe firing solution and the possibility of an accident or anincident grew with every minute. After 90 minutes of submergeddancing, Vanin chose to break off the contact and resume his progresssouth. The American won the tactical exchange.The very next day the game grew far more dangerous. Proceeding at

high speed, another Los Angeles-class boat showed itself. Evidentlylaying in wait for the approaching Mike, this American accelerated anddeliberately moved into a position that permitted detection by 278.Each submarine maneuvered to assume the required trailing position,with the American moving, by increments, precariously close toKomsomolets. Captain Vanin did not care for the dangerous joustingand on Kolyada’s advice, went deep. While K-278 could stand thecrushing ocean pressure at 2,100 feet, the American could not. Heremained directly above Vanin for a time, keeping track of theMike viasonar. Wanting to keep to the schedule and tasks in his orders, Kolyadaremembered that Vanin ‘kissed the American goodbye with a torpedodrill simulating an attack’ and then went on his way south, remainingat depth as he left the scene.10

Kolyada concluded that the occasional high-speed bursts employedby Vanin to evade provided potentially hostile sonar with too much tohear. The surface groups involved in ‘Northern Wedding’ brought withthem a full complement of ASW forces armed with the best detectionand attack technology available. The Russian boat even picked up aBritish Swiftsure-class submarine, but did not retain the contact longdue to its high speed. Vanin proceeded to follow his orders, which tookhim away from the site of his dog-fight to a region just north of the


Shetland Islands. His superiors wanted him to linger in that location toconfirm the presence of an American aircraft carrier. With the densityof opposing forces and the sheer numbers of submarines in that portionof the GIUK gap the situation grew more dangerous by the hour.Only days later, on 7 April 1989, fire raged through the internal

spaces of 278 and she went to the bottom of the Norwegian Sea, 180kilometers southwest of Medevyezhiy Island with 42 of her crew.Kolyada was spared, Vanin was not.11

The New Nature of Undersea Warfare

The new nature of undersea warfare, its object and tactics, placedcontrol of the Soviet Union’s growing submarine fleet at the top of theUS Navy’s priorities and the control sought by each dependedcompletely on knowledge of the environment as well as a mastery ofsubmarine technology. Combining the latter with an intimate knowl-edge of the ocean made detection and identification possible, and withthat, control over the Soviet submarine force.12 Nowhere on Earth wasthis more important or more difficult than under the Arctic ice.As a result, regular, early and accurate detection of Soviet

submarines became every bit as important as developing the capabilityto guide a ballistic missile to its target. Oceanographic research duringWorld War II began to reveal the physical nature of the ocean in waysnever before imagined, enabling underwater acoustics to emerge as thevital eye of a victorious American submarine force and the key toidentifying an approaching or lurking threat. During the two decadesfollowing the war, ocean research sponsored largely by the Bureau ofShips, the submarine force and the Office of Naval Research (ONR)improved passive sonar and signals analysis, conceived the deep oceansurveillance system called SOSUS and installed its first generationarrays, initiated the operationally-oriented LRAPP, and laid thefoundation for SURTASS.13

These projects and systems eventually provided a striking advantagefor the US Navy. For example, by the time SURTASS went to sea infinal form in 1984, the Soviet Northern Fleet already understood itsimportance to the battle for control. After his encounter with the twoAmerican Los Angeles-class boats in 1989 described earlier, CaptainVanin’s evasion provided him with brief relief, only to have anotherthreat emerge. His sonar supervisor had reported intense active sonarsignals from surface vessels close aboard. In the control room, Vaninconsulted first with his executive officer Oleg Avanesov and then hisnavigator Michael Smirnoff. Studying the charts, they chose a newcourse for the boat just in time. The active sonar ‘pings’ grew evenstronger, requiring Komsomolets to evade. When the signals again

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began to increase in strength once again three hours later, Vaninestimated the distance to the surface vessels and, satisfied with themargin of safety, decided to take a look. He came shallow and brokethe surface with his periscope to more precisely determine his locationand to record the radio signals of the pursuing ship. His crew went tobattle stations in response to the general alarm as Vanin placed hispursuer in the periscope crosshairs. Increased magnification revealedthe persistent American as one of the US Navy’s Stalwart-class. Vaninrealized that this specialized vessel carried the SURTASS system. AsCaptain Boris Kolyada recalled:

Vanin commented openly that ‘If the SURTASS system vessels arehere, it’s difficult for us to stay undetected’.

He turned to his diving officer and issued a quick order.‘Emelyanov, estimate the best depth for evasion. If it goes onlike this an [American P-3] Orion [aircraft] will be here soon. Wedefinitely need to maneuver away from the region’.

‘The course and depth have been confirmed,’ snapped navigatorSmirnoff.

‘Our radio transmission to base was received,’ reported commu-nication officer Alexander Volodin.

Vanin turned back to Emelyanov and simply said, ‘Dive’.14

Feeling strongly that USSAmericawould showherself further to the east,Vanin took 278 in that direction, only to find the British ASW aircraftcarrier Illustrious performing searches along the Norwegian coast andthe eastern part of the 278’s patrol sector. He escaped before the RoyalNavy could detect him andmoved to thewest, learning shortly thereafterthat other submarines from the Northern Fleet had encountered theAmerican carrier and performed the necessary torpedo attack drills.Even further north, in the Arctic, operations under the ice would

depend absolutely on environmental knowledge, the detection possibi-lities it provided and the ability to use it to best advantage. As early ashis 1973 makeshift war game with USS Hawkbill and Seadragon underthe winter ice covering a portion of Bering Sea, Waldo Lyon hadalready come to a disturbing conclusion regarding the uniqueconfluence between tactics and the environment under the Arctic ice:

We learned then that whatever submarine was stopped in the icecover, he had such an enormous advantage over the one that was


[searching], there was no chance for the [latter]. He was going tobe hit. [The attacker in the ice cover is] listening . . . all around. Allhe has to do is drop his weapon in the water, and the one that’scoming, is in the open water underneath. [The searcher] trying tofind [possible threats] up in the ice cover. If [the attacker] shoots,[the searcher] has a long time before he even gets close enough toshoot his weapon . . . and not much water to maneuver in to avoid[an incoming] weapon. The advantage is enormous for the onethat’s stopped in the ice. It’s unfair.15

In February 1992, within the context of the late Cold War MaritimeStrategy, Lyon commented in the United States Naval InstituteProceedings that:

Warfare in the ice is like jungle warfare. The sea ice canopybecomes the jungle in which the submarine must live, work, andfight – not just transit. The sea ice canopy is highly variable.Viewed from below it is upside down, rolling hills of ice: a‘badlands of ice buttes and blocks, scattered or piled on oneanother; canyons between massive ridges; flat ice planes and opencracks and lakes. It is dynamic, changing under thermal stress, andis always in motion under stress of wind and current’.16

Discussing submarine encounters under the Arctic ice as if theyresembled open ocean patrols struck Lyon as absurd. Naval officersand scientists with Arctic experience reacted strongly to the notionthat this region would ever become the site of regular submarineoperations on a large scale. In his career-long struggle to keep hisArctic Submarine Laboratory in San Diego open and working, on thisissue Lyon had encountered every reaction from professional interestand concern to complete incredulity. Submariners either treated thenotion of Cold War operations under the ice as fantasy or a terriblydeadly business akin to walking into a confined space with your vitalsalready in a sniper’s crosshairs. Very few had given serious thought tothe Arctic as a battle space until submerged navigation improvementsopened debate on the tactics of under ice naval operations in the faceof a capable enemy. 17 As Lyon observed, looking back over 20 yearsof debate:

. . .okay, in the late seventies, we started bringing this point up. Ifyou’ve got warfare coming up in the Arctic Ocean, we don’t knowanything about how to fight. [In] these 637s we can’t evade. To gointo the ice cover to evade, you’ve got to come to a complete stop,and I mean stop, be sure that you’re zero speed, and then you must

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go up vertically against the ice at twenty to thirty feet a minute?Let’s just start thinking time. You’re going to avoid a weapon? Noway. It’s going to take you twenty or thirty minutes to make thatmaneuver. Otherwise you’re going to wreck the submarine . . . Sothe point was, ‘All right, we’d better start doing something aboutlearning about how to do warfare in the ice’. So Rickover thenproposed, ‘Well, let’s build an experimental submarine, one thathas a little sail and hardened, so that we can go ramming into theice cover to evade the weapon, or let’s modify a Skate and try it’.18

Lyon and Rickover understood both the importance of the problem andthe peculiar nature of the Arctic environment. The latter would imposeits own discipline on any tactical and technical solution underconsideration, in much the same way as the physics of nuclear powerinflicted its uncompromising standards on naval reactors and Americansubmariners.

The Soviet Experience

The Soviet submarine force simultaneously found itself going throughthe very same growing pains. While accustomed to demanding anddangerous transits with both diesel and nuclear boats across thenorthern rim of the Russian landmass, operating under the Arctic icefell into a completely different category. One of the Russian Navy’scurrent experts on Arctic operations, Vice Admiral Anatoli Shevchen-ko, first experienced the far north at the same time the Americans beganto realize the strategic alternatives presented by the Arctic in a world oflonger-range ballistic missiles and aggressive naval strategies. Shev-chenko qualified for command in 1974, less than a year after the trialwar game by Hawkbill and Seadragon in the Bering Sea, and after astaff assignment he took command of K-513, a Victor 2-class fastattack submarine. Shortly after a first deployment took his boat to theMediterranean, the deputy commander of the Northern Fleet sub-marine flotilla, Rear Admiral Eugene Chernov presented him with anunwelcome surprise immediately upon his return. Impressed with the513’s crew, the admiral intended to send them north to explore theArctic, their boat’s capabilities and themselves. It had become plain toChernov that the Arctic would soon assume an importance far beyondthe symbolic achievement of reaching the Pole or the inspiration of afascinating natural laboratory. His orders spoke to a future of navalwarfare under the ice against the Americans and NATO:

. Primary Mission: to cruise under the arctic ice and surface at theNorth Pole.


. Ancillary Tasks: to continue the process of Arctic exploration toenable nuclear submarines to operate in this region.

. Specifically: to practice cruising under the ice solo and in a group; torefine under-ice navigation, to study the bathymetric conditions inthe Arctic Ocean, to gather data on the features of the ice, topractice ways of establishing the submarine’s exact location at anytime and that of a patrolling partner; to take regular fathometerreadings; and to lose no opportunity to observe NATO naval forcescarefully.19

Left with little choice by a man he respected, Shevchenko thanked theadmiral for the honor and the trust placed in the 513 crew, all the whilethinking to himself that extended leave and time with their familieswould have made this ‘honor’ feel much better! He returned to thebarracks and told the officers the admiral’s news. The once bustling,noisy room went completely silent. He knew all to well what wentthrough their minds. He recalled an exchange with his navigatorCaptain-Lieutenant Sergey Efremenko who spoke up and asked:

‘Comrade commander, when are we going back to the boat?’

‘Today at 1500.’

Efremenko then said, ‘That’s it then. That was close! For a terriblemoment I was worried that our men might get sun stroke in thesouth during their vacations!’20

When asked how he prepared for the assignment, Shevchenkoimmediately recalled reading George Steele’s book Seadragon: North-west Under the Ice in 1966 four years after its publication in the US . Atthat point he began to appreciate the demands of the Arctic through theeyes of this American submarine commander. He now went back tothat book, and with good reason and renewed purpose looked for thespoken and unspoken detail that might emerge from Steele’s prose.21

Weeks later, when his K-513 arrived at the Pole after a successfultransit marred only by a slightly bent forward dive plane, Shevchenkoannounced to his crew that as of 1832 hours on 31 August 1979 theyhad arrived in ‘the land of Nautilus and Seadragon’.

The Arctic Balance

In the later stages of his long career, Waldo Lyon argued that neitherthe US nor the Soviet Union ever completely developed under-icecapability. American 688I fast attack submarines with their low and

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forward-mounted control surfaces as well as the latest Sierra- andAkula-class Soviet/Russian boats can operate with considerable agilityin the various basins of the Arctic Ocean and have little trouble findingpolinyas for surfacing. Even with this achievement, they have neverthoroughly addressed the deadly endgame predicted by Lyon in hisanalysis of the Arctic operational environment and the realities of theice cover. Both sides quickly discovered Lyon’s meaning when hestressed the importance of a regular presence and being there first. A1989 RAND report noted the growing habit of the Soviets to adapt:

. . .Their submarine design for just this type of environment. All ofthe large Soviet Typhoon-class SSBNs are based in the Kola regionand are thought to be the first submarines designed particularly forunder-ice operation. These submarines exploit their design byusing a technique called ‘ice picking’ [by the US Navy] in whichthey quietly drift for months while resting immediately below thesurface of the ice.22

The name ‘ice picking’, used by the RAND analyst, comes from aDARPA, [spell out first mention] through-the-ice surveillance deviceunder development in the mid-1980s called ‘Ice Pick’, which firstappeared in an airdropped version late in the Cold War.23

The ice cover provided the stealth the Soviet-Russian Navy alwayssought to make their SSBNs, perhaps some of the quietest submarinesin the world, virtually undetectable on station. They also still carriedtorpedoes designed for breaking through the ice in case they could notimmediately emerge through the cover in the event of a quick launchorder.24 While its submarine force did not miss the advantages of thispractice, the US Navy did not have the same geographic disadvantagesthat obliged the Soviets to look to the Arctic for solutions. Thanks toadvanced surveillance capability and a much friendlier geography, theAmericans had a wider variety of answers to their tactical needs. Forthe Russians, the ice cover offered greater safety, proximity to targetand tighter internal lines of operation and communication.However, the Arctic provided neither side with a complete advantage

or disadvantage. Like the dense Vietnamese jungle that proved soformidable in the 1960s and 1970s, the natural Arctic environmentseverely limited the tactical options available in the region of closestphysical proximity between the Cold War adversaries. Neither sidecould exercise the desired control with certainty in the Arctic and bothhad to accept the limits imposed by nature. The Arctic became a battlespace both too dangerous to ignore and too terrible for combatoperations save under the most dire circumstances; a perfect metaphorfor the Cold War standoff ensured by MAD or mutually assured


destruction in which both navies found themselves trapped for thebetter part of a half century. For the submariner, without the greatestcare, this environment could be every bit as demanding and tyrannicalas the technology that drove their amazing boats.The environmental tyranny of the far north that shaped the Cold

War in that region has confirmed in recent years that the only constantin earthly experience is change. Given what scientists now predictabout the Arctic, the Soviet and American confrontation in that areaduring the Cold War may become far more important than eitherpower expected. Bringing to the attention of the general public widely-held scientific conclusions already familiar to the US Navy, journalistDaniel Glick recently reported in National Geographic Magazine that:

The annual breakup of sea ice off the coast of Alaska happensweeks earlier than it once did. Since 1978 the area of perennialArctic sea ice has decreased by 9 percent per decade, but the degreeto which the ice has thinned has been harder to assess. Scientistsusing submarine sonar data documented a 40 percent thinning inthe past 30 years. Others put the estimate at about 15 percent.Some predict that the sea ice could be absent in summer by 2100.25

Thanks to the unclassified SCICEX submarine exercises in the Arctic inthe 1990s as well as research conducted from satellites, fromicebreakers and via the SCAMP acoustic ocean floor mapping projectat Columbia University, scientists have concluded that the configura-tion of the Arctic ice and the region’s general climate will soon poseamazing possibilities as well as fresh potential threats. According to onescientific publication:

. . .In 10 years’ time, if melting patterns change as predicted, theNorth-West Passage could be open to ordinary shipping for amonth each summer. And the Northern Sea Route across the topof Russia could allow shipping for at least two months a year in aslittle as five years. The new routes will slash the distances forvoyages between Europe and east Asia by a third, and open upnew fisheries. The resulting boom in shipping could lead toconflicts, as nations try to enforce fisheries rules, preventsmuggling and piracy, and protect the Arctic environment fromoil spills. To complicate matters, Russia and Canada considertheir northern sea routes as national territory, while the U.S.regards them as international waters.26

As these changes take place, geologic time suddenly surrenders to thespan of a single human life. The environmental lessons as well as the

424 Gary E. Weir

limited capabilities in the Arctic and in the regions of seasonal icedeveloped during the Cold War will soon become the foundation uponwhich the US Navy’s strategists build their operational reaction to thesedevelopments. Powers like Japan, Russia and China will naturally lookclosely at the possibilities presented by these dramatic new circum-stances and their evolving plans will naturally involve their defenseforces. Thus, within the next few years the increased appearance ofRussian, Chinese and European forces at the top of the world seemsvery likely. In the near term, they can only do so by following in thefootsteps of Nautilus, Skate and K-21. However, a 2001 ONR-sponsored symposium examining the operational challenges posed bythese developments initiated the conference discussion by assuming thatthe navy would have to expand its operations in the Arctic by 2050 andthat over the next 20 years the volume of sea ice in that area woulddecrease by 40 per cent. They also understood that within five to tenyears the strong possibility existed that the Okhotsk and Japan seaswould remain ice-free year around.27

For a time their shared Cold War experience and under icecapability will give the US and the Soviet Union an advantage in theregion. That will not last for long. As the ice recedes further theacoustic detection equation will change dramatically. Wind will driveup the ambient noise levels in an open sea while mixing the surfacelayer with warmer air, affecting the acoustic ducting near the oceansurface. As the surveillance problem becomes more complex, thepopulation of possibly hostile forces will likely increase given theattractiveness of the region as a route and a center of virtuallyuntapped natural resources. As the US Arctic Research Commissionput it:

In summary, melting of sea ice in the Arctic will turn it into aconventional open-ocean ASW environment, with none of theadvantages it now affords to an adversary strategic submarine.28

There is every reason to suspect that a full-fledged pursuit of controlmay very well resume once again, only now in the far north, driven bythe natural strategic advantages presented by the Arctic’s location aswell as the economic promise of easier access to valuable worldmarkets.

Disclaimer

The views expressed here are the author’s personal opinions, andshould not be taken to reflect the official position of the Department ofDefense or any U.S. government agency.


Notes

1 Oral History with Dr Waldo Lyon, by Gary E. Weir, US Naval Historical Center, 16 April

1994, US Navy Operational Archive, Washington DC [OA]. USS Hawkbill [SSN 666] was a

Sturgeon-class nuclear boat and USS Seadragon [SSN 584] belonged to the Skate-class.

2 Oral History with Vice Adm. Anatoli I. Shevchenko by Gary E. Weir, Moscow, 10 and 13 Feb.

2002: personal collection of the author.

3 Willy Østreng, ‘The Geostrategic Conditions of Deterrence on the Barents Sea’, in Lawson W.

Brigham (ed.), The Soviet Maritime Arctic (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1991)

pp.201–14.4The Soviet nuclear submarine K-21 had the first Soviet Arctic cruise in 1962. The K-3

Commander, Capt. First Rank L. Zhiltsov, his on-board supervising officer Rear Adm. A.

Petelin and the propulsion officer R. Timofeev were elevated to Heroes of the Soviet Union. In

1963 the nuclear submarine K-115 (Commander I. Dubyaga) made the first cruise from the

Barents Sea to the Pacific Ocean under the Arctic ice, the submarine also surfaced at the

drifting base ‘North Pole – 12’. In Sept. the same year the ballistic missile submarine K-178

(Commander A. Mikhailovsky) had cruised from the Pacific Ocean to the Northern Fleet. On

29 Sept. 1963 the nuclear submarine K-181 (Commander Y. Sysoev and the cruise supervisor

Admiral V. Kasatonov) surfaced at the North Pole. Oral History with Rear Adm. Oleg

Chefonov and Capt. First Rank Igor Chefonov by Gary E. Weir, Moscow, 12 Feb. 2002. The

author also consulted an essay prepared for him by the brothers Chefonov entitled, The Missile

Firing Submarines. This essay and the oral history are in the author’s possession.

5 Oral History with Rear Adm. Oleg Chefonov and Capt. First Rank Igor Chefonov by Gary E.

Weir, Moscow, 12 Feb. 2002: personal collection of the author; George P. Steele, Seadragon:

Northwest Under the Ice (New York: Dutton 1962). Other works consulted relative to the

under ice experience include: William M. Leary, Under Ice: Waldo Lyon and the Development

of the Arctic Submarine (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press 1999); Gary E.

Weir, An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean

Environment (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press 2001); William Anderson

with Clay Blair Jr., Nautilus 90 North (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Books 1989).

6 ‘Study of Undersea Warfare’ (The Low Report), 22 April 1950, Post 1 Jan. 1946 Command

File, US Navy Operational Archive, Washington, DC. [OA]

7 Adm. James D. Watkins, USN. ‘The Maritime Strategy’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 112

(Supplement to Jan. 1986) pp.3–17. See particularly p.5ff.

8 Owen R. Cote Jr., ‘The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle

with Soviet Submarines’, Newport Paper No. 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College 2003);

Nuclear torpedoes made the Cuban missile crisis much more dangerous than President John F.

Kennedy thought at the time. He was unaware of their presence on board the four Soviet

Foxtrot submarines on their way to Mariel during the crisis. Oral History with Capt. First

Rank Nikolai Shumkov by Gary E. Weir, Moscow, 14 Feb. 2002: personal collection of the

author. Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian

Submarines that Fought the Cold War (New York: Basic Books 2003).

9 OralHistorywithViceAdm.AnatoliI.ShevchenkobyGaryE.Weir,Moscow,10and13Feb.2002;

Shevchenko,TheArctic Cruises. Both the essay and the oral history are in the author’s possesion.

10 Oral History with Capt. First Rank Boris Kolyada by Gary E. Weir, St Petersburg, 17 Feb.

2002. Kolyada, ‘The Last Cruise of the K-278 (the Komsomolets)’. Both the essay and the oral

history are in the author’s possession.

426 Gary E. Weir

11 Ibid.

12 Gary E. Weir, An Ocean in Common: American Naval Officers, Scientists, and the Ocean

Environment (College Station, TX: A&M University Press 2001); Gary E. Weir, Forged in

War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940–1961

(Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1998).

13 The Long Range Acoustic Propagation Program (or LRAPP) complemented SOSUS by

addressing with scientific and engineering solutions the immediate at-sea acoustic detection

requirements of the American surface operating forces. SURTASS became operational in 1984

as the surface towed-array sonar system, using in an at-sea, very mobile configuration on board

dedicated surface ships many of the same detection technologies developed for SOSUS.

14 Oral History with Capt. First Rank Boris Kolyada by Gary E. Weir, St Petersburg, 17 Feb.

2002; Kolyada, ‘The Last Cruise of the K-278 (the Komsomolets)’. Both the essay and the oral

history are in the author’s possession.

15 Oral History with Dr Waldo Lyon, by Gary E. Weir, US Naval Historical Center, 16 April

1994, OA.

16 Waldo K. Lyon, ‘Submarine Combat in the Ice’, US Naval Institute Proceedings 118 (Feb.

1992) p.38.

17 One of the best sources for unclassified details on open basin navigation in the Arctic is Tom

Stefanik, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy, (Lexington, MA: Lexington

Books 1987).

18 Oral History with Dr. Waldo Lyon, ‘Submarine Combat in the Ice’, U.S. Naval Institute.

Proceeding 118 (Feb. 1992), p. 38.

19 Oral History with Vice Adm. Anatoli I. Shevchenko by Gary E. Weir, Moscow, 10 and 13 Feb.

2002. The author also consulted an essay prepared for him by Vice Adm. Shevchenko entitled,

The Arctic Cruises. The oral history and the essay are in the possession of the author. See also,

Weir and Boyne, Rising Tide (note 8).

20 Oral History with ADM Anatoli I. Shevchenko by Gary E. Weir, Moscow, 10 and 13 Feb.

2002.

21 Steele, Seadragon: Northwest Under the Ice (note 5).

22 Suzanne Holroyd, ‘Canadian and U.S. Defense Planning Toward the Arctic’, RAND

Corporation, 8. Defense Technical Information Service.

23 Tom Stefanik, Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare and Naval Strategy (Lexington, MA:

Lexington Books 1987) p.45.

24 Oral History with Rear Adm. Oleg Chefonov and Capt. First Rank Igor Chefonov by Gary E.

Weir, Moscow, 12 Feb. 2002; Oral History with Capt. First Rank Igor Kurdin by Gary E.

Weir, St Petersburg, 19 Feb. 2002, personal collection of the author. The possession and use of

ice-breaking torpedoes was discussed during these interviews.

25 Daniel Glick, ‘The Great Thaw’, National Geographic Magazine 206/3 (Sept. 2004) p.16.

Note also the graphic images of the Arctic ice retreat on p.20f.

26 Debora MacKenzie, ‘Arctic Meltdown’, New Scientist, 3 March 2002, available at 5 http://

www.newscientist.com4 .

27 ‘Naval Operations in an Ice Free Arctic Symposium, Handbook’, 17–18 April 2001, sponsored

by the Office of Naval Research, Oceanographer of the Navy and the Arctic Research

Commission, 3. Contemporary History Branch, US Naval Historical Center.

28 US Arctic Research Commission, ‘The Arctic Ocean and Climate Change: A Scenario for the

U.S. Navy’, 15. Contemporary History Branch, US Naval Historical Center.


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