VIOLENT ISLAMISM IN SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 2006...Afghanistan, Bin Ladin decided to reopen a front in Saudi Arabia. His deputy Yusuf al‐Ayiri recruited hundreds of returnees from Afghanistan

Institut dʹEtudes Politiques de Paris

ECOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCES PO Programme Doctoral Monde Musulman

Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales

Doctorat de Sciences Politiques

VIOLENT ISLAMISM IN SAUDI ARABIA, 1979‐2006

THE POWER AND PERILS OF PAN‐ISLAMIC NATIONALISM

L’islamisme violent en Arabie Saoudite, 1979‐2006:

La puissance et les périls du nationalisme pan‐islamique

Thomas Hegghammer

Thèse dirigée par Professeur Gilles Kepel Soutenue à Paris, novembre 2007 Jury: Mme Donatella Della Porta, Professeur à l’Institut Universitaire Européen à Florence M. Gilles Kepel, Professeur à l’IEP de Paris M. James Piscatori, Professeur à l’Université d’Oxford M. Ghassan Salamé, Professeur à l’IEP de Paris M. Bjørn Olav Utvik, Professeur à l’Université d’Oslo

3

Résumé Ceci est une étude des dynamiques de la violence islamiste sunnite en Arabie Saoudite, et en particulier des causes de la violence qui éclate en 2003. La mouvance djihadiste saoudienne est analysée dans un cadre à trois niveaux emprunté à Donatella Della Porta, théoricienne des mouvements sociaux. La thèse s’appuie sur des sources primaires recueillies en Arabie Saoudite ainsi que sur l’Internet. L’analyse au niveau micro se base sur 787 biographies de militants saoudiens. L’analyse montre que lʹArabie Saoudite nʹa pas connu de mouvement islamiste socio‐revolutionnaire, et que le djihadisme saoudien s’inspire plutôt d’un nationalisme pan‐islamique. La violence en 2003 représente le résultat d’un mouvement qui s’est développé en trois phases. Dans les années 1980 émerge la mouvance djihadiste dite “classique” qui s’engage dans des conflits locaux contre des non‐Musulmans. Le djihadisme classique jouit du soutien de l’Etat, ainsi que de l’importance accordée au nationalisme pan‐islamique dans la politique intérieure du royaume. Le milieu des années 1990 voit l’émergence d’une branche plus extrême, celle du “djihadisme global” représenté par al‐Qaïda. Ben Laden s’oppose a la présence américaine dans la Péninsule, mais suspend les opérations en 1998. Après lʹinvasion de lʹAfghanistan en 2001, Ben Laden décide de rouvrir un front dans le royaume. Les vétérans d’Afghanistan mobilisent et lancent une campagne en mai 2003. Les militants échouent car ils sont perçus comme révolutionnaires et parce que les jeunes recrues préfèrent partir se battre en Irak. L’Arabie Saoudite se distingue ainsi des républiques arabes, où la violence islamiste tend à sʹorienter vers les régimes, et est alimentée par des problèmes socio‐économiques. Abstract This is a study of the dynamics of Sunni Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia which asks why unrest broke out in 2003 and not earlier. It analyses the Saudi jihadist movement using a three‐level framework borrowed from social movement theorist Donatella Della Porta. It uses new primary sources from jihadist Internet sites and fieldwork in Saudi Arabia. A collection of 787 biographies supports the micro‐level analysis. The main finding is that Saudi Arabia lacks a strong socio‐revolutionary Islamist movement, and that Saudi militancy is driven by pan‐Islamic nationalism. The 2003 violence marked the homecoming of a movement which had developed in three stages. In the 1980s emerged the “classical jihadist” movement which fought non‐Muslims in local territorial conflicts. It grew strong because it enjoyed initial state support and because pan‐Islamic nationalism played a special role in Saudi politics. In the mid‐1990s arose the more extreme “global jihadist” branch represented by al‐Qaida. Bin Ladin violently opposed the US presence in the Kingdom, but was first unable, and then unwilling to launch operations at home. After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Bin Ladin decided to reopen a front in Saudi Arabia. His deputy Yusuf al‐Ayiri recruited hundreds of returnees from Afghanistan and launched an anti‐Western guerrilla campaign in May 2003. The campaign failed because the militants were perceived as revolutionaries and lost recruits to Iraq. The dynamics of Saudi Islamist militancy thus differ from the Arab republics, where violence is more inward‐oriented and driven by socio‐economic grievances.

5

To Målfrid

7

Table of Contents List of Illustrations .......................................................................................................................13 Abbreviations................................................................................................................................15 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................17 Note on Conventions ....................................................................................................................19

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................21 Research Question and Focus .......................................................................................................21 Existing Literature........................................................................................................................23 Methodology and Sources .............................................................................................................27 Argument and Outline .................................................................................................................31

PART ONE: BACKGROUND..........................................................................................................35 1 ANALYSING ISLAMIST VIOLENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA ............................................37

1. EXPLAINING LOW‐LEVEL POLITICAL VIOLENCE....................................................................37 Definitions ....................................................................................................................................38 Epistemological Challenges...........................................................................................................40 Existing Literature on Islamist Violence and Terrorism ..............................................................42 A Social Movement Theory Approach ..........................................................................................49

2. TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF ISLAMIST SOCIAL MOVEMENTS....................................................53 The Limits of Essentialist Typologies ...........................................................................................55 A Rationale‐Based Typology.........................................................................................................69 Implications and Limitations ........................................................................................................77

3. SAUDI ARABIA AS A CONTEXT FOR ISLAMIST ACTIVISM........................................................80 The Idiosyncrasies of Saudi Arabia...............................................................................................80 The Composition of the Saudi Islamist Field ................................................................................90 Conclusions...................................................................................................................................98

2 PATTERNS OF ISLAMIST VIOLENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA .......................................101 1. JUHAYMAN AL‐UTAYBI’S MESSIANIC REVOLT (1979)..........................................................102 The Origin of Juhayman’s Ikhwan..............................................................................................102 Juhayman’s Ideology and Rationale for Violence........................................................................105 The Legacy of Juhayman .............................................................................................................108

2. FROM VIGILANTISM TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1990‐1994).................................................109 The Rejectionist Revival .............................................................................................................109 The 1991 Vigilantist Violence.....................................................................................................111 “Opening the Gates of Blood”: The al‐Hudhayf Incident ...........................................................114

3. TARGETING THE CRUSADERS (1995‐1996)............................................................................117 The Jihadists Attack: The 1995 Riyadh Bombing .......................................................................118 The 1996 Khobar Bombing: The Elusive al‐Qaida Fingerprints.................................................124

4. THE QUIET INSURGENCY (2000‐2003) ..................................................................................128 The “Alcohol Trade Bombings” ..................................................................................................128 Mysterious Explosions................................................................................................................131 The Sakaka Killings.....................................................................................................................132 Hunting Westerners ...................................................................................................................133

5. THE QAP CAMPAIGN (2003‐2006)........................................................................................135 Attack Patterns ...........................................................................................................................136 Declared Purpose ........................................................................................................................137 Fighting the Near or the Far Enemy?.........................................................................................143

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................144

8

PART TWO: THE JIHAD BEGINS ...............................................................................................147 3 THE POLITICS OF PAN‐ISLAMIC NATIONALISM.....................................................149

1. KING FAISAL AND THE ORIGINS OF PAN‐ISLAMIC NATIONALISM......................................150 Pan‐Islamism and King Faisal....................................................................................................150 Pan‐Islamic Cause no 1: Palestine..............................................................................................154 From Pan‐Islamism to Pan‐Islamic Nationalism .......................................................................156

2. THE AFGHAN WAR AND SAUDI STATE SUPPORT FOR CLASSICAL JIHADISM......................160 Unprecedented Involvement .......................................................................................................160 American Pressure......................................................................................................................161 Military Support.........................................................................................................................164 Hesitant Ulama...........................................................................................................................167

3. THE GULF CRISIS AND THE SAHWA’S CONTESTATION ........................................................169 Infidel Assistance........................................................................................................................170 Islamist Outrage .........................................................................................................................171

4. THE BOSNIAN WAR AND PAN‐ISLAMIC ONE‐UPMANSHIP .................................................175 The Constraints of Jihad in the New World Order.....................................................................175 Domestic and International Bidding Games ..............................................................................176 Disproportionate State Support..................................................................................................177 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................182

4 THE FORMATION OF THE SAUDI JIHADIST MOVEMENT....................................185 1. AFGHANISTAN: CRADLE OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT.......................................................186 The Pioneering Phase: A Muslim Brotherhood Enterprise.........................................................186 The Mobilization Phase: The Role of the Services Bureau ..........................................................193 The 1987 Tipping Point..............................................................................................................197 Legacy of the Afghan Jihad .........................................................................................................199

2. JIHAD IN BOSNIA: THE ANTICLIMAX ....................................................................................201 Early Arab Mobilisation to Bosnia: The Shaʹban‐Barbaros Alliance .........................................202 Bringing Saudis to Bosnia: Exploiting the State‐Sahwa Competition .......................................205 Disappointment ..........................................................................................................................208

3. IN SEARCH OF NEW JIHAD FRONTS ......................................................................................209 The Minor Jihad Fronts: Kashmir, Philippines, Eritrea, Algeria and Somalia...........................209 Tajikistan: Khattab’s Post‐Afghanistan Adventure ...................................................................211 Chechnya and the Preservation of Classical Jihadism ................................................................213 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................217

5 SAUDI RECRUITMENT TO THE EARLY JIHAD FRONTS .........................................221 Sources and Methods ..................................................................................................................223

1. PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS ...................................................................................................229 General Characteristics...............................................................................................................229 Geographical and Tribal Background .........................................................................................231 Social and Economic Status........................................................................................................236 Other Shared Characteristics......................................................................................................238

2. PERSONAL MOTIVATIONS .....................................................................................................240 Pan‐Islamic Nationalism ............................................................................................................240 Duty, Martyrdom and Purification............................................................................................243 Adventurism and Status.............................................................................................................245

3. PATTERNS OF JOINING...........................................................................................................247 Top‐Down Recruitment..............................................................................................................248 Bottom‐Up Initiatives.................................................................................................................251 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................254

9

PART THREE: GOING GLOBAL .................................................................................................257 6 THE IDEOLOGY OF GLOBAL JIHADISM ......................................................................259

1. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF GLOBAL JIHADISM.....................................................................260 The Ambiguities of Global Jihadism............................................................................................261 Anti‐Americanism, Pan‐Islamic Nationalism and Global Warfare............................................263 Instrumental Strategy or Ideology?............................................................................................265

2. THE ORIGINS OF GLOBAL JIHADIST THOUGHT.....................................................................268 Antecedents of Global Jihadism in Radical Islamist Thought.....................................................268 Macro‐ and Meso‐Level Factors Behind Global Jihadism ...........................................................274 The Political and Ideological Trajectory of Usama bin Ladin .....................................................276

3. CONSTRUCTION AND MAIN THEMES OF BIN LADIN’S DISCOURSE .....................................282 Diagnosis, Prognosis and Rationale ...........................................................................................282 Global Jihadism as a Discursive Frame.......................................................................................284 Saudi Arabia and the Al Saud in the Global Jihadist Worldview ...............................................287 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................293

7 CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR GLOBAL JIHAD, 1996‐2001 ............295 1. BETWEEN POLICE OPPRESSION AND COMPLACENCY ..........................................................296 Imprisoning the Sahwa ...............................................................................................................296 Torturing the Mujahidin ............................................................................................................298 Back to Non‐Confrontational Policing........................................................................................302

2. NEW CAUSES AND OPPORTUNITIES: THE 1999 TURNING POINT ........................................304 Internal Political Liberalisation ..................................................................................................305 New Pan‐Islamic Nationalist Causes .........................................................................................307 The Internet and the Growth of Online Jihadism .......................................................................311

3. THE RISE OF THE AL‐SHU‘AYBI SCHOOL...............................................................................314 Profiles of the Scholars ................................................................................................................315 Reacting to the Progressives .......................................................................................................324 Turning to Pan‐Islamic Nationalism..........................................................................................327 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................331

8 AL‐QAIDA AND SAUDI ARABIA, 1996‐2001..................................................................333 1. AL‐QAIDA IN AFGHANISTAN................................................................................................333 Al‐Qaida: The Definitional Debate .............................................................................................334 Organisational Structures ..........................................................................................................338 The Myth of Saudi Domination of al‐Qaida ...............................................................................342

2. AL‐QAIDA’S PRE‐9/11 OPERATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA........................................................343 Early Difficulties.........................................................................................................................343 Abd al‐Rahim al‐Nashiri and the 1998 Missile Plots .................................................................346 The 1998 Strategy Change: Indefinite Postponement of Operations..........................................349

3. RECRUITMENT AND FUNDRAISING .......................................................................................350 Early Recruitment Problems.......................................................................................................351 Yusuf al‐Ayiri: Bin Ladin’s Ideal Representative .......................................................................353 The Jihadist Fundraising Industry .............................................................................................360 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................366

9 SAUDI RECRUITMENT TO AL‐QAIDA ..........................................................................369 Sources and methods...................................................................................................................370

1. PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS ...................................................................................................373 General characteristics................................................................................................................373 Geographical and Tribal Background .........................................................................................374

10

Socio‐Economic Status................................................................................................................380 Other Shared Characteristics and Formative Experiences..........................................................385

2. MOTIVATIONS FOR GOING TO AFGHANISTAN .....................................................................387 Defending the Chechens and the Taliban....................................................................................388 Duty and Martyrdom.................................................................................................................392 Adventurism and Training.........................................................................................................393

3. PATTERNS OF JOINING...........................................................................................................395 Top‐Down Recruitment..............................................................................................................396 Bottom‐up Initiatives..................................................................................................................399 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................403

PART FOUR: THE HOMECOMING............................................................................................405 10 THE POST‐9/11 CONTEXT FOR GLOBAL JIHADIST ACTIVISM.............................407

1. NEW SYMBOLS OF MUSLIM SUFFERING ................................................................................408 Afghanistan, Guantanamo and the War on Terror ....................................................................408 Escalation in Palestine and Chechnya ........................................................................................410 The Invasion of Iraq ....................................................................................................................413

2. AL‐QAIDA’S SCHOLARS: THE RHETORICAL ESCALATION OF THE AL‐SHU’AYBI SCHOOL..414 Time for Loyalty and Dissociation: 9/11 and the War in Afghanistan.......................................415 No We Won’t Coexist: At War with the Sahwa .........................................................................417 Threatening the Regime over Iraq...............................................................................................419 From Radicals to Renegades .......................................................................................................420

3. FROM SOFT TO HARD POLICING OF THE JIHAD COMMUNITY..............................................424 The Persistence of Soft Policing..................................................................................................425 Autumn 2002: The First Bullet ..................................................................................................427 Early 2003: The Gloves are Off...................................................................................................430 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................433

11 THE FORMATION OF AL‐QAIDA ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA......................435 1. THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE DECENTRALISATION OF AL‐QAIDA ...............436 Underestimating the U.S. response ............................................................................................436 Withdrawing from Afghanistan .................................................................................................439 Aiming for the Arabian Peninsula .............................................................................................442

2. AL‐NASHIRI AND AL‐QAIDA’S FAILED 2002 OFFENSIVES ...................................................448 Independent Initiatives ...............................................................................................................449 The Abu Hudhayfa Missile Plot .................................................................................................450 The al‐Nashiri Network ..............................................................................................................452

3. AL‐AYIRI AND THE MUJAHIDIN ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA..........................................458 Al‐Ayiri the Organisation‐Builder.............................................................................................458 Internet Propaganda and Strategic Studies................................................................................460 Systematic Recruitment of Arab Afghans ..................................................................................463 Training Infrastructure ..............................................................................................................467 Safe Houses, Weapons and Equipment.......................................................................................471

4. LAUNCHING THE JIHAD ........................................................................................................475 A Contested Launch Order.........................................................................................................475 The East Riyadh Operation ........................................................................................................481 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................485

12 RECRUITMENT TO AL‐QAIDA ON THE ARABIAN PENINSULA ..........................487 Sources and methods...................................................................................................................488

1. PERSONAL BACKGROUNDS ...................................................................................................489 General Characteristics...............................................................................................................489

11

Geographical and Tribal Background .........................................................................................491 Social and Economic Status........................................................................................................494

2. THE AFGHANISTAN FACTOR.................................................................................................498 A Unique Radicalisation Process................................................................................................498 Jihad Experience and Internal QAP Organisation .....................................................................500 A Closed Universe ......................................................................................................................503

3. MOTIVATIONS........................................................................................................................504 Global Jihadist Ideology ..............................................................................................................505 Companionship and Loyalty .......................................................................................................506 Self‐Defence and Vengeance .......................................................................................................507

4. PATTERNS OF JOINING...........................................................................................................509 Persuasion...................................................................................................................................510 Incrimination ..............................................................................................................................511 Protection....................................................................................................................................512 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................512

13 THE FAILURE OF THE QAP EXPERIMENT ....................................................................515 1. EVOLUTION OF THE QAP CAMPAIGN ..................................................................................516 Setback and Reorganisation (May‐November 2003) ..................................................................517 Consolidation and Revenge (December 2003‐March 2004) .......................................................519 Spring Offensive and QAP Collapse (April‐July 2004) .............................................................521 Death Cramps of the Old QAP (August 2004‐May 2005) ........................................................526 The New Generation (June 2005‐December 2006) .....................................................................529

2. EXPLAINING THE FAILURE OF THE QAP CAMPAIGN ...........................................................533 Overwhelming State Power ........................................................................................................533 Legitimacy Deficit.......................................................................................................................537 Iraq and the Split between Classical and Global Jihadists ..........................................................540 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................545

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................549 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES ...............................................................................................565

OVERVIEW OF SOURCES ..................................................................................................................565 FULL REFERENCE LIST.....................................................................................................................573

APPENDIX 1: SECURITY INCIDENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA, 2000‐2006 ................................................613

APPENDIX 2: BIOGRAPHIES OF SAUDIS IN THE EARLY JIHAD FRONTS.....................................635

APPENDIX 3: BIOGRAPHIES OF SAUDIS IN POST‐1996 AFGHANISTAN.......................................649

APPENDIX 4: BIOGRAPHIES OF MILITANTS IN POST‐2001 SAUDI ARABIA ...............................667

APPENDIX 5: BIOGRAPHIES OF SAUDIS IN IRAQ................................................................................699

13

List of Illustrations

Tables

Table 1 A Rationale‐Based Typology of Islamist Activism..........................................................73

Table 2 Birth Year and Average Recruitment Age of Saudis in the Early Jihad Fronts .........230

Table 3 Geographical Origin (by Macro‐Region) of Early Saudi Jihadists ..............................233

Table 4 Administrative Region of Residence of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan.................375

Table 5 Geographical Origin (by Administrative Region of Residence) of QAP Militants ...491

Table 6 A Rationale‐Based Typology of Saudi Islamism ...........................................................558

Figures

Figure 1 Saudi Funding for Palestinian Resistance Compared With Oil Prices, 1967‐1990 ...157

Figure 2 Saudi Government Funding of Afghan Mujahidin Compared With Oil Prices, 1980‐

1990......................................................................................................................................................157

Figure 3 Departure Year of Saudi Militants in Pre‐1996 Afghanistan and Bosnia .................230

Figure 4 Map of Saudi Arabia with Administrative Regions ....................................................231

Figure 5 Geographical Origin (by Macro‐Region) of Early Saudi Jihadists.............................232

Figure 6 Home City of Early and Late Arrivals to the First Afghan Jihad ..............................233

Figure 7 Residence of Saudis in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Tajikistan and Chechnya ...................234

Figure 8 Tribal Origin of Early Saudi Jihadists............................................................................235

Figure 9 Occupational Status of Early Saudi Jihadists ...............................................................237

Figure 10 Education Level of Early Saudi Jihadists ....................................................................238

Figure 11 Education Level of Saudis in Early Jihad Fronts Compared with National Average

..............................................................................................................................................................238

Figure 12 Departure Dates of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan ...............................................374

Figure 13 Geographical Origin (by Macro‐Region of Residence) of Saudis in Post‐1996

Afghanistan ........................................................................................................................................375

Figure 14 Geographical Origin (by City of Residence) of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan.377

Figure 15 Geographical Distribution (By City) of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan and Early

Jihad Fronts ........................................................................................................................................377

Figure 16 Tribal Origin of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan .....................................................378

Figure 17 Education Level of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan................................................381

Figure 18 Education Level of Saudis in Early Jihad Fronts and in Post‐1996 Afghanistan ...382

Figure 19 Occupational Status of Saudis in Post‐1996 Afghanistan .........................................383

14

Figure 20 Geographical Origin (by City of Residence) of QAP Militants (Full Sample) .......492

Figure 21 Geographical Origin (by Macro‐Region) of Saudi Jihadists, 1980‐2006..................493

Figure 22 Tribal Origin of QAP Militants (Full Sample) ............................................................494

Figure 23 Education Level of QAP Militants ...............................................................................495

Figure 24 Evolution of Education Level of Saudi Jihadists........................................................496

Figure 25 Occupational Status of QAP Militants ........................................................................497

Figure 26 Date of QAP Militants’ First Departure for Military Training Abroad ..................501

Text Boxes

Text Box 1: Major Crackdowns and Shootouts, May‐November 2003…………………………517

Text Box 2: Major Shootouts, December 2003‐ March 2004…………………………………..…520

Text Box 3: Attacks on Security Services, December 2003……………………………………... 520

Text Box 4: Major Shootouts, April‐May 2004……………………………………………………522

Text Box 5: Main Attacks on Security Forces, April‐June 2004… ……………………………...522

Text Box 6: Assassinations of Westerners, May‐June 2004……………………………………...524

Text Box 7: Major Crackdowns, August‐November 2004……………………………………….527

Text Box 8: Major Gunbattles, July‐October 2005………………………………………………...531

15

Abbreviations

CDLR

CIA

CISR

CSRT

EIJ

ETA

FFI

FIS

GIA

GSPC

HT

IBC

IIRO

IRA

JSM

LeT

MB

MIRA

MWL

NATO

NSC

OIC

OPM/SANG

PAIC

PLO

QAP

SB

SMT

TWRA

UN

Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights

Central Intelligence Agency

Centre for Islamic Study and Research

Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Egyptian Islamic Jihad

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt

Front Islamique du Salut

Groupe Islamique Armé

Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat

Hizb al‐Tahrir

Islamic Benevolence Committee

International Islamic Relief Organisation

Irish Republican Army

al‐Jama’a al‐Salafiyya al‐Muhtasiba

Lashkar‐e‐Tayyiba

Muslim Brotherhood

Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia

Muslim World League

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

National Security Council

Organisation of the Islamic Conference

Office of the Programme Manager, Saudi National Guard

Popular Arab and Islamic Conference

Palestine Liberation Organisation

al‐Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula

Services Bureau

Social Movement Theory

Third World Relief Agency

United Nations

17

Acknowledgements

The only part of this study I did entirely on my own was the typing. For the rest, I

relied on the generosity of many remarkable people across Europe and the Middle

East.

Let me start by thanking my supervisor, Professor Gilles Kepel in Paris, who

accepted me as a doctoral student, opened the door to Saudi Arabia and offered

generous guidance and advice throughout the four years it took me to produce this

thesis. I also thank my other academic mentor and long‐time colleague, Dr Brynjar

Lia, whose day‐to‐day advice, feedback and support has been invaluable for my

work. His talent and integrity have been, and still are, a tremendous source of

inspiration.

This study would not have been possible without the PhD scholarship

generously awarded to me by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. I am also very

grateful to my employer, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt (FFI), for giving me the

resources and the time to carry out my project. I especially thank the always

supportive Jan Erik Torp and the phenomenally efficient FFI librarians.

I cannot overstate my gratitude to the King Faisal Foundation and the King

Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, for hosting me as a visiting

student on my four trips to Saudi Arabia. I am immensely grateful to the Director, Dr

Yahya Ibn Junayd, and his colleagues for their unconditional support and practical

assistance during my fieldwork. I will repay in the currency I know they value the

most: academic objectivity and sincerity.

I am also extremely grateful to the many people I met during my fieldwork in

Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. I am forever indebted to Saud al‐Sarhan, Mansur al‐

Nuqaydan and Yusuf al‐Dayni who unselfishly shared their vast knowledge of Saudi

Islamism and helped me in innumerable ways since I first arrived in the Kingdom. I

would never have been able to write this thesis without the help of these true

intellectuals. I also express special gratitude to Fahd al‐Shafi, Nasir al‐Huzaymi,

Nasir al‐Barrak, Hudhayfa Azzam, Abdallah Anas, and certain anonymous friends,

whose intellectual generosity seemed to have no limits. I thank Nawaf Obaid, whose

18

insights into the QAP investigation were crucial for my analysis. I interviewed many

other generous people who are unfortunately too numerous to be listed here.

In preparing this thesis, I have benefited from constant interaction with

colleagues in the field who generously shared documents, contacts, information and

ideas with me. My closest companion and sparring partner in this process has been

Stéphane Lacroix, with whom I have enjoyed an exceptionally fruitful and trustful

working relationship since we first enrolled in Sciences‐Po together in 2003. I also

thank Steffen Hertog and Will McCants, who kindly commented on parts of this

manuscript and with whom I had very stimulating discussions. I am very grateful to

my FFI colleague and excellent discussion partner Petter Nesser whose willingness to

take on extra duties in the last six months enabled me to finish this project in time. I

also thank my other current and former colleagues at FFI’s terrorism research project

– Laila Bokhari, Åshild Kjøk, Hanna Rogan, Anne Stenersen, Truls Tønnessen and

Samna Zia – for their help and encouragement. I have also benefited from

discussions with, and the travel companionship of, fellow doctoral students at

Sciences‐Po in Paris, especially Carine Abou Lahoud, Abd al‐Asiem al‐Difraoui,

Amelie Le Renard, Nabil Mouline, Thomas Pierret, Omar Saghi and Abdallah

Tourabi. Many other brilliant scholars and journalists have helped me in various

ways on this project, including Mariam Abou Zahab, Awadh al‐Badi, Faiza Ambah,

Peter Bergen, Faris Bin Huzzam, Christopher Boucek, James Buchan, Frank Gardner,

Bernard Haykel, Andrew Higgins, Sean Keeling, Michael Knights, Robert Lacey, Tim

Niblock, Reuven Paz, Bernard Rougier, Kjetil Selvik, Guido Steinberg, Camille Tawil,

Christoph Wilcke, and Lawrence Wright.

I am grateful to all the people who assisted me during my travels and

research visits abroad. I thank Bishoy Salah, Ashraf Ibrahim and Nicholas Stivang for

helping me around Cairo in 2003; I thank Ambassador Jan Bugge‐Mahrt and Trond

Rudi at the Norwegian Embassy in Riyadh for their assistance during my trips to

Saudi Arabia; I thank the librarians at the Arab World Documentation Unit in Exeter

University; and I thank Wyn Bowen, Michael Clarke, and Peter Neumann for

facilitating my research visit at King’s College London in 2005‐2006.

19

Last but not least I thank my family and close friends for their unrelenting

support and patience in this time‐consuming and laborious process. Above all and

everything else, I thank my wife Målfrid.

Oslo, July 2007

Note on Conventions

Transliteration

Words and titles in Arabic are transcribed using a simplified version of the

Encyclopaedia of Islam system. Diacritics are not included. Ayn and Hamza are

indicated but not distinguished. Transcribed Arabic words are never capitalised.

Arabic words in unabridged English dictionaries (Qur’an, hadith etc) are not

italicised.

Names

Arabic names are transcribed according to the abovementioned system (though

capitalised) unless a different transcription is dominant in English‐language texts

(e.g. Khobar not Khubar). Where different usages occur, I chose the one closest to the

abovementioned system (e.g. Usama bin Ladin). The article is dropped before

common place‐names (e.g. Riyadh, not al‐Riyadh). Ayn is not included at the

beginning of names (e.g. Abdallah)

Footnotes and Bibliography

Footnote numbering restarts in each chapter. Bibliographic references appear in

“Chicago 15th A” style. Full bibliographic details are provided only at first reference;

subsequent references appear in shortened form. Titles in foreign languages are only

translated on first reference. Page numbers are not preceded by “p.” References to

Internet sources usually do not include full URL address, but all cited documents are

stored electronically by the author. Some interviewees have been anonymized.

21

Introduction

It was a quiet Monday evening in Riyadh when the car bombs ripped through the

expatriate housing compounds. The triple suicide attack on 12 May 2003 was the

largest of its kind in Saudi history and marked the beginning of a protracted wave of

bombings, shooting sprees and clashes between security forces and militant

Islamists1 calling themselves “al‐Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula” (QAP). By the end

of 2006, the QAP campaign had left around 300 people dead and thousands

wounded. Never before in its modern history had Saudi Arabia experienced internal

violence of this scale and duration.

The QAP campaign is intriguing, because it put an end to a “Saudi exception”

as well as a “Saudi paradox” in the history of militant Sunni Islamism. The “Saudi

exception” refers to the fact that Saudi Arabia had experienced considerably less

Islamist violence than many other countries in the region. The “Saudi paradox” hints

at the curious discrepancy between, on the one hand, the high number of Saudis

involved in militancy abroad in the 1980s and 1990s and, on the other hand, the low

level of Islamist violence inside the Kingdom in the same period.

Research Question and Focus

Why was there an outbreak of Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia in 2003? The question may

seem straightforward at first sight, but in fact it encapsulates a number of intriguing

puzzles which require in‐depth analysis. It raises four particularly important sub‐

questions which I shall try to answer in this doctoral thesis: First, why and how did

the QAP emerge when it did? Second, why were so many Saudis engaged in

1 I define “Islamism” very broadly as ”Islamic activism.” A detailed discussion of this and other concepts will follow in Chapter 1.

22

militancy abroad in the 1980s and 1990s? Third, why was there relatively little

Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia prior to 2003? Fourth, to what extent do the

dynamics of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia differ from those in other countries?

These research questions are complex because they are rooted in at least three

semi‐independent fields of academic inquiry, namely the study of Saudi politics and

society, the study of Islamism and the study of political violence. The overall purpose of

this thesis is to make an intellectual contribution to these three academic fields

through an analysis of the jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia.2 For those studying

Saudi politics and society, the case of the QAP campaign presents conundrums such

as: How did this campaign relate to previous waves of political activism in recent

Saudi history? How strong is the Islamist opposition really in the Kingdom? From

which parts of Saudi society did the militants recruit? For scholars of political Islam,

our inquiry raises a number of issues, notably: What were the aims and the ideology

of the militants behind the campaign? How did the QAP relate to other Islamist

groups and currents, inside and outside of Saudi Arabia? How strong was al‐Qaida’s

foothold in the Kingdom? For the student of political violence and terrorism, the

Saudi case raises intriguing questions such as: How could there be a violent

campaign in a context with no visible political or socio‐economic crisis? How does

individual radicalisation occur in ultra‐conservative, tribal and wealthy societies?

How was the QAP able to grow so strong under a supposedly authoritarian regime?

While these questions will not be answered in full in this thesis, they do provide an

indication of the broader significance of this inquiry.

The focus of the study is on the dynamics of Sunni Islamist violence in

modern Saudi Arabia. While the analysis will hopefully shed some light on more

general issues relating to the history and politics of the Saudi Kingdom, the primary

criterion defining my research object is that of physical violence. Non‐violent Islamist

actors will be considered where relevant, but this is neither a study of Saudi

Islamism as such nor of the Saudi political system as a whole. I will also leave out

Shiite Islamist militancy, which represents a separate political phenomenon. 2 In this thesis, the term ”jihadism” used on its own is simply a synonym for ”militant Islamism.” However, as I shall explain below, ”Saudi jihadism” connotes a more specific political orientation, namely ”militant pan‐Islamic nationalism.”

23

Conversely, this study will include time periods and phenomena which may not

immediately seem relevant to our primary research question. The QAP campaign is

widely considered to have begun on 12 May 2003 and to be still ongoing – albeit at a

reduced rate – at the current time of writing (June 2007). However, my analysis will

delve as far back as the late 1970s, when the first significant Islamist violence

occurred and when the main Saudi Islamist currents began to crystallize. I will not,

however, consider historically more distant manifestations of Islamist militancy,

such as the so‐called Ikhwan revolts of the 1920s. At the other end, the chronological

focus ends on 31 December 2006, which concludes the last full calendar year before

the submission of this thesis. Similarly, the analysis will place considerable emphasis

on Saudi militancy outside the Kingdom, notably in foreign conflict zones such as

Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. This is because the QAP phenomenon, as we

shall see, was closely linked to the private participation of Saudis in foreign conflict

zones and in foreign‐based organisations such as Usama Bin Ladin’s al‐Qaida. A

major line of inquiry in this analysis will thus be the nature of the relationship

between the international and the domestic activities of militant Saudi Islamists. Put

simply, therefore, this thesis focuses on the history of the Saudi jihadist movement

from 1979 to 2006.

Existing Literature3

The main justification for this study is that violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia remains

notoriously understudied and that the existing literature fails to explain the outbreak

of the 2003 violence. In the academic literature on violent Islamism, Saudi Arabia

remains one of the least known parts of the Middle East, for two main reasons. First

3 In this review I exclude my own writings on Saudi Islamism, which include Thomas Hegghammer, ʺViolence politique en Arabie Saoudite: Montée et déclin dʹal‐Qaïda sur la péninsule arabiqueʺ in Quʹest‐ce que le salafisme?, ed. Bernard Rougier (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007); Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, ʺRejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al‐Utaybi Revisitedʺ, International Journal of Middle East Studies 39, no. 1 (2007); Thomas Hegghammer, ʺCombattants saoudiens en Irak: Modes de radicalisation et de recrutementʺ, Cultures et Conflits 64 (2007) Thomas Hegghammer, ʺReview of Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorismʺ, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (2007); Thomas Hegghammer, ʺTerrorist Recruitment and Radicalisation in Saudi Arabiaʺ, Middle East Policy 13, no. 4 (2006); Thomas Hegghammer, ʺSaudi Arabia: Terror threat reduced ‐ for time beingʺ, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief (2006); and Stéphane Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, ʺSaudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?ʺ (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 September 2004).

24

is that the Kingdom long remained out of reach to Western social scientists, and that

until recently, the Saudi government was very secretive on security issues. The

second reason is that scholars and analysts have long tended to exempt Saudi Arabia

from critical scientific inspection. Essentialist perspectives on Saudi Arabia have

come in two types – pro‐Saudi and anti‐Saudi – both of which are equally limiting.

Pro‐Saudi essentialism discourages academic inquiry into political contestation and

violence and because it is embarrassing to the regime. Anti‐Saudi essentialism skirts

basic scientific principles in its urge to highlight some fundamentally “wrong” aspect

with Saudi state and society.4 The result of this exemption from scientific inspection

is a deficit of both empirical knowledge and operational theories on the comings and

goings of militant Saudi Islamism.5 This deficit is reflected in the literature on the

violence that broke out in 2003.

The QAP campaign has been subject to a certain amount of analysis, but the

vast majority of articles are descriptive and more concerned with the policy

implications of the violence than its causes.6 In the few works that deal with the QAP

in some depth, we do not find adequate answers to the abovementioned research

questions. Broadly speaking, the literature contains three main types of causal

explanations.

First are organisational‐level analyses which attribute the 2003 violence to the

decision by Usama bin Ladin and al‐Qaida to open a battlefront in Saudi Arabia. This

is, simply put, the explanation found in the work of Nawaf Obaid and Anthony

Cordesman, who see the QAP campaign as the latest in a series of attempts by

4 See for example Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The House of Saud from Tradition to Terror (Doubleday, 2002); Dore Gold, Hatredʹs Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism (Washington: Regnery, 2004) or Mark Silverberg, The Quartermasters of Terror: Saudi Arabia and the Global Islamic Jihad (Lima, OH: Wyndham Hall Press, 2005). For a criticism of this perspective, see Thomas Hegghammer, ʺReview of Dore Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi Arabia Supports the New Global Terrorism,ʺ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (2007). 5 There are very few works that focus specifically on the issue of Saudi Islamist militancy – as opposed to Saudi Islamism more generally – in the 1980s and 1990s. A rare exception is Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabiaʹs Islamic Opposition, vol. 52, (Policy Papers) (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 2000). 6 For the best accounts and policy analyses of aspects of the QAP campaign, see the writings of Michael Knights (in the publications of Jane’s Information Group and the Olive Group) and Stephen Ulph (in the publications of the Jamestown Foundation). The Saudi journalist Faris Bin Huzzam has also published a number of good analyses on parts of the QAP campaign on the al‐Arabiya website and in al‐Riyadh newspaper.

25

Usama bin Ladin to topple the Saudi regime.7 Obaid and Cordesman provide very

valuable insights into the early history of the QAP organisation and show how the

QAP mobilisation was dependent on key entrepreneurs such as Yusuf al‐Ayiri. A

variant of this explanation has been presented by Dominique Thomas, who traced

the emergence of a Saudi jihadist current in the mid‐ and late 1990s which took to

arms in 2003 upon the order of Bin Ladin and the mobilisation of al‐Ayiri.8 Thomas

puts more emphasis on ideology than Obaid and Cordesman and sheds light on the

important role played by radical scholars such as Nasir al‐Fahd in the build‐up to the

2003 violence. However, these analyses do not adequately explain why Bin Ladin

suddenly decided to launch the campaign in 2003 and why there was a 7 ½‐year gap

between the 1995 Riyadh bombing and the QAP campaign. Moreover,

organisational‐level analyses tend to skirt the deeper causes of the violence. Obaid

and Cordesman’s paragraph on “Underlying causes of support for al‐Qaeda” only

lists a broad range of political and economic problems without explaining how they

relate to violence.9

A second and related type of explanation is based on social movement theory

and views the QAP campaign as the violent phase in a “cycle of contention” of the

Saudi Islamist movement. This is the approach used in Roel Meijer’s detailed and

balanced book chapter on the QAP campaign.10 Meijer argued that the violent phase,

which began in 1995, was brought about by the state repression of the non‐violent

Islamist opposition of the early 1990s. He explained the absence of violence before

2003 as the result of a tactical choice by Usama bin Ladin to focus his military

activities elsewhere. However, Meijer somewhat problematically assumes the

existence of a coherent “Saudi Islamist movement”, while in fact there are important

ideological differences and few organic links between the QAP and the Sahwist

7 Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, ʺAl‐Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamic Extremistsʺ (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 January 2005). The report is reproduced in Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf E. Obaid, National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats, Responses, and Challenges (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2005), 112‐121. 8 Dominique Thomas, Les hommes dʹAl‐Qaïda: Discours et stratégie (Paris: Michalon, 2005), 39‐58. 9 Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, ʺAl‐Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamic Extremistsʺ (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 January 2005), 21‐22. 10 Roel Meijer, ʺThe ʹCycle of Contentionʹ and the Limits of Terrorism in Saudi Arabiaʺ in Saudi Arabia in the Balance, ed. Paul Aarts and Gerd Nonneman (London: Hurst, 2005). See also Roel Meijer, ʺJihadi Opposition in Saudi Arabiaʺ, ISIM Newsletter 15 (2005).

26

opposition of the early 1990s. Moreover, Meijer does not adequately explain why

Usama bin Ladin changed his mind and refocused on Saudi Arabia in 2003.

Third are the structural explanations, which see the QAP‘s violence as the

natural result of deep socio‐economic problems or fundamental dysfunctions in the

Saudi state system. Some emphasise the economic dimension; Robert Looney, for

example, has argued that Saudi Arabia experiences violence because it is in a

terrorism‐prone stage of economic development.11 Others, such as Joshua

Teitelbaum, acknowledge the importance of socio‐economic factors, but suggest that

the real problem is the “ideology of religious extremism” which underlies the

legitimacy of the Saudi State.12 A related, but more sophisticated analysis is that

presented by Madawi al‐Rasheed, who sees Saudi jihadism as one of the many

permutations of Wahhabism after the authoritarian Saudi state lost the monopoly

over Wahhabi discourse under the pressures of globalisation.13 Al‐Rasheed’s book

Contesting the Saudi State is by far the best available study of radical Saudi Islamism,

not least because it is one of the few works to rely extensively on primary sources.

Al‐Rasheed rightly emphasises the indigenous nature of Saudi jihadism and

eloquently explains the fluid and complex relationship between jihadist, Sahwist and

official religious discourse. Unfortunately she does not articulate a clear explanation

to the outbreak of the 2003 violence, partly because this is not the focus of her book.

She does, however, strongly allude to the authoritarian nature of the state and its

instrumentalisation of Wahhabism as root causes of Saudi jihadism.14 Structural

explanations are no doubt important in identifying underlying causes of violence.

However, they require rigorous testing against empirical evidence, something which 11 Robert Looney, ʺCombating Terrorism Through Reforms: Implications of the Bremer‐Kasarda Model for Saudi Arabiaʺ, Strategic Insights 3, no. 4 (2004). 12 Teitelbaum noted that “Saudi Arabia is beset by many acute problems, such as the need for economic and political reform, corruption, unemployment, and a burgeoning population. […] they are close to insurmountable, since Saudi legitimacy is based on an ideology of religious extremism” ; Joshua Teitelbaum, ʺTerrorist Challenges to Saudi Arabian Internal Securityʺ, Middle East Review of International Affairs 9, no. 3 (2005). 13 Madawi al‐Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: University Press, 2007), 134‐174. See also Madawi al‐Rasheed, ʺDeux prédécesseurs saoudiens de Ben Ladenʺ, Critique Internationale, no. 17 (2002). 14 Al‐Rasheed notably stated that “it is essential to consider the role played by the Saudi regime in creating a context that allows it to grow. In many respects, the violence of the jihadis represents a mirror reflecting the violence of the state and its official ulama”; Madawi al‐Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: University Press, 2007), 137.

27

neither Teitelbaum nor al‐Rasheed really undertakes. Moreover, such explanations

very rarely account for variations in levels of violence over time and are not

sufficient to account for the timing of the QAP campaign. If authoritarianism or

Wahhabism is the problem, how do we explain the absence of a Saudi jihadist

movement prior to the mid‐1980s and the low levels of violence inside Saudi Arabia

prior to 2003?

This brief review shows that there is a significant gap in the academic

literature regarding the causes of the QAP campaign and on the general

phenomenon of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia. It also highlights a number of

methodological challenges, notably that organisational‐level analyses omit root

causes, structural explanations cannot explain timing, and social movement theory

does not work well on the “Saudi Islamist movement.” How, then, shall we analyse

the problem at hand?

Methodology and Sources

The basic analytical procedure followed in this thesis consists of viewing the QAP as

part of a Saudi jihadist movement – defined as an undercurrent of Saudi Islamism –

and to study the emergence and development of this movement using a three‐level

framework borrowed from social movement theorist Donatella Della Porta.15 The

justification and details of this approach will be further explained in Chapter 1, but to

put it simply, I posit that the nature of the violence in question requires an analytical

framework with several levels of analysis in order to capture both the underlying

causes and the tactical factors which determine the timing and form of violent

campaigns. Della Porta studied leftist extremism in Italy and Germany by

distinguishing between macro‐level variables such styles of protest policing, meso‐

level variables such as underground organisational dynamics, and micro‐level

variables such as recruitment and radicalisation processes. This is a powerful

framework which allows for conceptualising the effect of synchronic changes at

different levels of analysis. After all, political violence is rarely the product of a single

cause, but of constellations of factors at different levels. 15 Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9‐14.

28

My analysis also applies Della Porta’s concept of “social movement family” to

the Saudi context. Given that Saudi Islamism is politically too heterogeneous to be

analysed as a social movement, I view it instead as a family of social movements, one

of which is jihadism. I view Saudi jihadism as an extreme pan‐Islamic nationalist

movement whose rationale for the use of violence is the protection of the Muslim

nation and the liberation of its territories. The Saudi jihadist movement is distinct

from the non‐violent Saudi reformist movement (or Sahwa) and from the pietistic

“rejectionist movement.” Saudi jihadism can be considered a social movement

because it meets the four criteria in Della Porta’s definition of social movements,

namely that 1) they are informal interaction networks between a plurality of

individuals, groups and/or organisations; 2) they have shared beliefs and a sense of

belonging; 3) they are engaged in collective action focusing on political and/or cultural

conflicts 4) they use protest, i.e. unconventional styles of political participation.16 An

important assumption is that the Saudi jihadist movement has a long history which

must be analysed in stages. The analysis will therefore identify the most crucial

chronological periods and study each of them on the macro, meso and micro level.

The central concern at each stage is to understand and explain mobilisation, i.e.

how political entrepreneurs acted to mobilise the human, material and immaterial

resources available to them in given political contexts. The underlying theoretical

inquiry is therefore related to the agent‐structure problem in the study of collective

action.17 Having said this, the ambition of this work is not to develop political science

theory, but to use the most relevant analytical tools on a poorly known body of

empirical data to provide the best possible answer to the research question.

The process of collecting this body of empirical data was fraught with

numerous source‐related problems, as is always the case in the study of small violent

actors. Militant groups are clandestine by their very nature, and they are involved in

bitter struggles which solicit strong emotions and invite manipulation of information

by all parties to the conflict. This particular case study would seem even more

16 Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 14‐15. 17 See for example Jeffrey Berejikian, ʺRevolutionary Collective Action and the Agent‐Structure Problemʺ, American Political Science Review 86, no. 3 (1992).

29

problematic to study academically, because the QAP remained completely out of

reach to researchers and journalists, and because the campaign took place in the

hitherto inaccessible and secretive Saudi Arabia.18 It is fair to say that if the QAP

campaign had happened ten years ago, it would not have been possible to write this

doctoral thesis.

However, recent years have seen a number of important developments which

made it possible to collect a considerable amount of primary and secondary sources

on the Saudi jihadist movement. The first and most important factor is the Internet,

which has revolutionized the academic study of militant Islamism by making

primary sources much more widely accessible. Since the late 1990s, an international

community of radical Islamists has used the Internet as a distribution platform,

library and information exchange for texts, recordings and videos. Active groups

embraced the Internet as a means to publicise their agenda, document their activities

and hail their martyrs. The QAP in particular published an astonishing amount of

documentation about itself, making it one of the best documented militant Islamist

groups in history.19 Jihadist media entrepreneurs also used the Internet to document

the past, by scanning texts, digitalising old videos and tape recordings going back to

the 1970s, and posting them online. Documentation from jihadist websites must

obviously be used with caution, because its origin is difficult to verify and because it

nearly always has a propaganda purpose. However, while the question of

authenticity must be taken seriously, it is less of a problem than sceptics think. Most

long‐time observers of “jihadism online” agree that falsification is rare. Forgery is

difficult because individual documents can always be checked against other sources

for consistency of style and content. Moreover, the sheer quantity of documents in

circulation means the propaganda value of individual documents is limited.

18 Active QAP militants never gave a single face‐to‐face interview with outsiders in the 2002‐2006 period. Their hostility was evidenced by the tragic killing of BBC cameraman Simon Cumbers and the near‐fatal wounding of his colleague Frank Gardner in Riyadh in June 2004. 19 The remarkable textual production of the QAP included five different publication series: Sawt al‐Jihad [Voice of Jihad], published in 30 issues (30‐50 pages each); Mu’askar al‐Battar [Camp of the Sabre], 22 issues (30‐50 pages); al‐Khansa [named after a 7th century female poet], one issue; al‐Taqrir al‐Ikhbari [News Report], 23 issues; and the Bayan [Statement], at least three issues. The QAP also produced several 40‐90 minute films documenting their operations in remarkable detail; such as Wills of the Heroes, Martyrs of the Confrontations, Badr of Riyadh, the Quds Squadron and the Falluja Raid.

30

Authenticity issues arise mostly in the case of key documents that are exploited in

high‐level politics, such as the alleged letters between Ayman al‐Zawahiri and Abu

Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi, which were used by U.S. officials keen to delegitimise the Iraqi

insurgency. Accuracy, on the other hand, is a more serious concern, but this problem

can be addressed by relying on accumulated evidence. This study is based on

thousands of texts, recordings and videos systematically collected from the Internet

over a period of five years. The quantity and variety of this material is too large for

everything to be discussed here, so I will instead assess specific sources in the course

of the analysis.

The second factor which made this study possible was Saudi Arabia’s

opening to Western social scientists from around 2002 onward. Thanks to the King

Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, I was able to visit Saudi

Arabia on four occasions – each time for a period of 3‐4 weeks – in April 2004, April

2005, November 2005 and January 2007. Although the fieldwork was not without its

challenges of the practical and cultural kind, I was never at any point obstructed,

guided or “minded” in my travels and interview requests, at least to my knowledge.

The KFCRIS provided visas, office facilities and introductions without ever asking

for details about my research. I say this in all sincerity – if I wanted to be

sycophantic, I would not have judged Saudi prison torture or counterterrorism

inconsistencies as harshly as I do in Chapters 7 and 10. Although I was never able to

access active QAP members, I conducted numerous interviews with former radicals,

relatives of militants, moderate Islamists, journalists and expert commentators across

the country. I was also able to collect unique documentary evidence from Saudi

libraries and private collections. Interviews helped me develop a broader

understanding of Saudi Islamism which I could never have acquired from textual

sources alone. They also provided me with crucial factual details and insights. I have

anonymized a certain number of my sources upon their request or out of a concern

for their security. Information from interviews is of course not unproblematic and

must be treated with the same caution as other subjective documents. The credibility

of each source depends on his or her position and history, which must be evaluated

in the course of the analysis.

31

The third major development which facilitated data collection was the fact

that Saudi authorities were considerably more forthcoming with information about

security incidents from May 2003 onward than they had been in the past. The change

likely reflected a realisation that the Internet and Satellite TV had broken the state’s

monopoly on information, and that the government needed to use information

warfare to win the hearts and minds of the population. The Saudi Interior Ministry

published regular press releases and appointed official spokesmen, allowing for an

unprecedented level of detail about security incidents and investigations in the

media. Local Saudi media were also allowed to undertake a certain amount of

investigative reporting, which added depth and detail to the coverage. Given the

State’s influence over the Saudi press, local media sources must be used carefully.

However, when accumulated and combined with other sources, the vast media

coverage represents an important resource.

The material made available by these three developments is different enough

in kind to allow for a sound triangulation of sources. By triangulating jihadist

literature, local media reports and interviews, I can establish a historical narrative

which takes into account the perspectives of militants, the government and outside

observers. By complementing this narrative with secondary sources from the

academic literature and the international media, I hope to further reduce the risk of

error. Given the clandestine and politicised nature of my research object, the analysis

will inevitably contain inaccuracies and misinterpretations. Nevertheless, I argue that

the source data is rich enough to provide an empirically founded answer to the

research question.

Argument and Outline

The central argument in this thesis is that the QAP campaign represented the

homecoming of an extreme offshoot of a Saudi jihadist movement which had

emerged and developed abroad over two decades and in three stages.

The first stage lasted from the mid‐1980s to the mid‐1990s and saw the

formation of a “classical jihadist movement” which engaged in local struggles of

national liberation in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya in the name

of pan‐Islamic nationalism. The class

Documents

VIOLENT ISLAMISM IN SAUDI ARABIA, 1979 2006...Afghanistan, Bin Ladin decided to reopen a front in Saudi Arabia. His deputy Yusuf al‐Ayiri recruited hundreds of returnees from Afghanistan