documents.worldbank.orgdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/338511510321829472/... · Web viewCURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Effective Exchange Rate: ) Currency Unit=Haitian Gourdes (HTG) US$

Document ofThe World Bank

Report No: ICR00004162

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT(TF-99644)

ON A

GRANT

FROM THE HAITI RECONSTRUCTION FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$65 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF HAITI

FOR A

PORT-AU-PRINCE NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT (PREKAD)

October 31, 2017

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global PracticeLatin America and the Caribbean Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Effective Exchange Rate: www.oanda.com)

Currency Unit=Haitian Gourdes (HTG)US$ 1.00 = HTG 39.47 (December 31, 2011)US$ 1.00 = HTG 65.72 (December 31, 2016)HTG 1.00 = US$ 0.015 (December 31, 2016)

FISCAL YEAROctober 1 – September 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AF Additional FinancingAGETIP Agence d’Exécution de Travaux d’Intérêt PublicBMPAD Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (Bureau de Monétisation

des Programmes d’Aide au Développement) BSA Structural Building AssessmentCASEC Communal Section Boards (Conseils d’Administration de la Section Communale) CDD Community-driven developmentCECI Centre d’Etude et de Coopération Internationale - MDODCHF Cooperative Housing Foundation currently GC - MDOD CIAT Inter-Ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning CIH Housing Commission COI Cost of IllnessCOPRODEP Project Development Council (Conseil de Projet de Développement Participatif) CRC Community Reconstruction Center (Centre d’Appui à la Reconstruction – CAR) DAE Directorate of Analysis and Evaluation of the BMPADDRM Disaster Risk ManagementEPPLS Public Enterprise for Social Housing – Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor

(Entreprise Publique pour le Logement Social)ERL Emergency Recovery LoanERR Economic Rate of ReturnESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework GC Global Communities previously CHF - MDODGFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and RecoveryGOH Government of HaitiHAPNRD Haiti Action Plan for National Recovery and DevelopmentHH Habitat for Humanity - MDODHNIS Housing and Neighborhoods Information SystemsHRF Haiti Reconstruction FundIHRC Interim Haiti Recovery CommissionIIERP Institution and Infrastructure Emergency Reconstruction ProjectIOM International Organization for Migration - MDODJ/P HRO Jenkins/Penn Haiti Relief Organization- MDODJSDF Japan Social Development FundMAST Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du

Travail) MDE Ministry of Environment (Ministère de l’Environnement)MDOD Service Providers or Project Management Contractor (Maître d’Ouvrage Délégué)MEF Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances)

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MICT Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities (Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales)

MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission for HaitiMIS Management Information SystemMPCE Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (Ministère du Plan et de la

Coopération Externe) MTPTC Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (Ministère des Travaux

Publics Transports et Communication)NDC Neighborhood Development Council NPV Net Present ValueNRHRF Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction FrameworkOFDA Office of US Foreign Disaster AssistanceOM Operational manual OPM Office of the Prime MinisterORAF Operation risk assessment frameworkPADF Pan American Development Foundation - MDODPCU Project Coordination Unit of the BMPADPDNA Post-Disaster Needs AssessmentPMC Project Management Contractor or MDOD in FrenchPREKAD Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (Projet de

reconstruction des quartiers défavorisés de l’aire métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince)PRODEP Rural Community Driven Development ProjectPRODEPUR Urban Community Driven Development Project with three declinations: Initial;

Habitat; and AFRAP Resettlement Action PlansRPF Resettlement Policy FrameworkRSCG Rental Support Cash Grant programsSA Special AccountSBA Structural Building AssessmentSS Single SourceUCLBP Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings - Office of the Prime Minister

(Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics) UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Program US United StatesUSAID United States Agency for International Development VSL Value of Statistical LifeWAVES Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem ServicesYLD Year-Lived with Disability (part of the global burden of disease metric)

RatingMS Moderately SatisfactoryMU Moderately UnsatisfactoryNR Not ReportedS SatisfactoryU Unsatisfactory

Senior Global Practice Director: Ede Ijjasz-VasquezPractice Manager: Ming ZhangTask Team Leader at ICR: Jonas Ingemann ParbyICR Team Leader: Roland Alexander Bradshaw

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HAITIPort-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project

CONTENTS

ContentData Sheet

A. Basic Information…………………………………………………………………………..viB. Key Dates................................................................................................................................. iC. Ratings Summary.....................................................................................................................iD. Sector and Theme Codes.........................................................................................................iiE. Bank Staff...............................................................................................................................iiiF. Results Framework Analysis..................................................................................................iiiG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs.................................................................................viH. Restructuring (if any).............................................................................................................viI. Disbursement Profile.............................................................................................................vii

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design.............................................................12. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes............................................................63. Assessment of Outcomes........................................................................................................104. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................................145. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance...................................................................156. Lessons Learned.....................................................................................................................177. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors............................19Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.......................................................................................20Annex 2. Outputs by Component...............................................................................................21Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis..............................................................................27Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes....................30Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results.........................................................................................32Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................................33Annex 7. Summary of Recipient's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................................34Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents....................................................................................40Annex 9: Exogenous and Endogenous Factors that Affected PREKAD Implementation.........41Annex 10 Implementation Arrangements..................................................................................44MAP...........................................................................................................................................49

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A. Basic Information

Country: Haiti Project Name:Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction

Project ID: P125805 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-99644ICR Date: 03/21/2017 ICR Type: Core ICRLending Instrument: ERL Grantee: Government of HaitiOriginal Total Commitment:

US$ 65.00M Disbursed Amount: US$ 64.87M

Revised Amount: US$ 65.00MEnvironmental Category: BImplementing Agencies: BMPADCofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual Date(s)

Concept Review: Effectiveness: 07/28/2011

Appraisal: 04/04/2011 Restructuring(s):10/11/201202/12/201505/20/2016

Approval: 04/04/2011 Mid-term Review: 07/15/2013 06/30/2014Closing: 06/30/2015 12/31/2016

C. Ratings SummaryC.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Moderately SatisfactoryGrantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

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C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance IndicatorsImplementation

Performance Indicators QAG Assessments (if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

YesQuality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

YesQuality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme CodesOriginal Actual

Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Other Public Administration 11 11 Social Protection Social Protection 24 24 Transportation Roads and highways 10 10 Water, Sanitation and Waste Management Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management

10 10

Industry, Trade and Services Housing Construction 45 45

Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Finance Finance for Development 4 4 Disaster Risk Finance 4 4 Urban and Rural Development Disaster Risk Management 4 4 Disaster Preparedness 4 4 Disaster Response and Recovery 4 4 Disaster Risk Reduction 4 4 Rural Development 2 2 Land Administration and Management 2 2 Urban Development 60 60

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Services and Housing for the Poor 60 60 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 23 23

E. Bank StaffPositions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Anabela Abreu Alexandre Abrantes Practice Manager: Ming Zhang Guang Zhe ChenTask Team Leader: Jonas Ingemann Parby Sylvie DebomyCo-Task Team Leader: Ali Alwahti ICR Team Leader: Roland Alexander BradshawICR Primary Author: Fadi M. Doumani

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator

Baseline Value

Original Target Values

(from approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

1st

Restructuring


2nd

Restructuring

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1: Number of displaced households who have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing repair and reconstruction works and/or receiving return support

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

0 12,000 16,000 16,000 16,099

Date achieved 31-Jul-2011 30-Jun-2015 11-Oct-2012 12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)

Exceeded target by 1%The result of this indicator is the sum of intermediate indicators 1, 2 and 8 (see below)

Indicator 2: Number of households benefitting from community-wide upgradingValue quantitative or Qualitative)

0 42,000 42,000 42,000 75,035


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Indicator

Baseline Value


(from approval documents)


1st

Restructuring


2nd

Restructuring




Exceeded target by 79%

Indicator 3: Direct project beneficiariesValue quantitative or Qualitative)

0 210,000 210,000 210,000 348,163



Core Supplemental Indicator. Exceeded target by 66%

Indicator 4: Direct project Female beneficiariesValue quantitative or Qualitative)

0 105,000 105,000 105,000 182,089



Core Supplemental Indicator. Exceeded target by 73%

Note: Indicator targets were not changed during the 3rd Restructuring.

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value


(approval documents)


1st

Restructuring


2nd

Restructuring



Indicator 1: Percentage volume (m3) of debris cleared in neighborhoodsValue (quantitative/ qualitative)

0 TBD TBD 1,154 2,405

Date achieved 31-Jul-2011 30-Jun-2015 11-Oct-2012 12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

Target exceeded by 108%Target to be determined as a % of contracted agreement of volume removed from total volume. However, only the volume removed by contractors is reported.

Indicator 2: Number of housing units repaired compliant with standardsValue (quantitative/ qualitative)

0 8,300 3,000 1,162 1,134


Achieved 98% of target.

Indicator 3: Number of houses rebuilt compliant with standardsValue (quantitative/

0 3,700 1,000 938 944

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Indicator Baseline Value


(approval documents)


1st

Restructuring


2nd

Restructuring



qualitative)Date achieved 31-Jul-2011 30-Jun-2015 11-Oct-2012 12-Feb-2015 31-Dec-2016Comments (incl. % achievement)

Exceeded target.

Indicator 4: CRCs are established, fully staffed and effectiveValue (quantitative/ qualitative)

0 4 4 4 4


Achieved target.

Indicator 5: Number of community infrastructure repair and rehabilitation contracts completedValue (quantitative/ qualitative)

0 TBD TBD 277 288


Exceeded target by 4%

Indicator 6: Community urban development plan completed and approved by the Communities

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

0 TBD TBD 4 4


Target achieved.

Indicator 7: Baseline established no later than 6 months after project launch and M&E reports available annually

Value (quantitative/ qualitative)

0 1 1 1 1


Target achieved.

Indicator 8: Number of households provided Return Cash GrantsValue (quantitative/ qualitative)

Not Applicable

Not Applicable 12,000 13,900 14,021


Target exceeded.

Note: Indicator targets were not changed during 3rd Restructuring.

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G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived DO IP

Actual Disbursements(US$ millions)

1 08/13/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 03/19/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.00

3 04/18/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 2.00

4 11/04/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 5.00 5 05/17/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 9.15

6 12/22/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 25.99

7 07/21/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 41.20 8 11/07/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 47.42 9 03/16/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 50.65

10 07/30/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 53.68 11 03/11/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 62.13 12 10/21/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.4613 05/17/2017 Satisfactory Satisfactory 64.79

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$ millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

10/11/2012 Yes MS MU 4.98

The project was restructured to: (i) accelerate the return of camp dwellers to safer housing conditions in neighborhoods after hurricane Isaac, in particular through the introduction of Return Cash Grants for one year; and (ii) increase the volume of financing for infrastructure versus in situ house reconstruction. US$2.6 million from Components 3 (Institutional Support and Studies) and 4 (Project Management) and the US$2 million contingencies were transferred to Component 2 (Repair and Improvement of Community Infrastructure). The PDO was amended, some key PDO level and intermediate indicator targets were updated; a new Return Cash Grants Intermediate Indicator was introduced.

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Restructuring Date(s)

Board Approved PDO

Change

ISR Ratings at Restructuring

Amount Disbursed at

Restructuring in US$ millions

Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made

DO IP

2/12/2015 No MS MS 49.04

The restructuring included: (i) a reallocation of grant proceeds between categories to support the prioritization of investments towards more infrastructure and less housing reconstruction sub-projects; and (ii) a 12-month extension of the closing date from June 30, 2015 to June 30, 2016. Intermediary indicator target values were updated to reflect the prioritization of investments in the housing subcomponent.

5/20/2016 No MS MS 62.86

The restructuring extended the project closing date by six months to accommodate delays caused by the political situation related to the postponed presidential run-off of December 27, 2015.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. At the end of 2009, Haiti was a fragile state trying to emerge from a stop-and-go economic dynamic interspersed by political turmoil, social unrest, high poverty levels, natural disasters and weather shocks. Haiti was one of the most disadvantaged countries in the Western Hemisphere with: (i) a GDP per capita of US$668; (ii) high levels of absolute poverty and extreme poverty (60 and 31 percent respectively in 2009); (iii) a low human development index of 0.4 ; (iv) large income inequalities, with an almost constant GINI coefficient of 0.6 between 2001 and early 2010; (v) a poor stewardship of environmental assets, illustrated by a low Environmental Performance Indicator of 40 in 20091; and (vi) a very high vulnerability to catastrophic events, e.g., flash floods and landslides, which claimed more than 5,000 lives and affected more than 1.5 million people between 2004 and 2009 (see Annex 9 for more details).

2. On January 12, 2010, Haiti was struck by a magnitude 7.3 earthquake (with the epicenter 16 kilometers away from Port-au-Prince). The disaster killed more than 220,000 people, injured 300,000 and directly affected the lives of over 2 million. This event was recorded as the worst natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere in 50 years. In addition to the staggering loss of life, the March 2010 Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) recorded severe damage in and around the capital Port-au-Prince where 65% of the country’s GDP was estimated to be generated: over 400,000 buildings were damaged, of which 115,000 entirely destroyed and 145,000 severely damaged. The total damages and losses were estimated at US$7.8 billion, equivalent to 120 percent of Haiti GDP in 2009. This catastrophic situation forced up to 1.5 million people to seek shelter in temporary and densely populated tent camps that increased the risk of epidemiological diseases. In October 2010, a cholera epidemic broke out in Port-au-Prince, killing at least 3,600 people and sickening over 170,000 by the end of 2010. Nineteen out of twenty Ministries had collapsed and the lives of 16,000 staff of various Ministries were lost. The situation was dire when Bank post-earthquake missions arrived in Haiti. Counterparts were quasi non-existent, and homeless people were roaming the rubble in very unsafe and unhygienic environments.

3. Faced with this situation, the Haitian Government, development partners and international NGOs struggled to devise an effective course of action and to sequence priorities to tackle massive response and reconstruction challenges. Some previous disasters were similarly large in scale, such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which ravaged Banda Aceh, Indonesia in particular in December 2004, which caused 227,000 deaths in 9 countries, and the large earthquake, which ravaged the region of Kashmir in Pakistan and northern India in 2005, which caused 87,000 deaths and massive destruction in the mountain city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan. However, reconstruction solutions used in these cases were of limited application. The greenfield solutions proposed in Aceh where the land had been wiped clean of structures could not be applied in Haiti due to the interspersion of collapsed and standing housing in dense urban areas. Similarly, the reconstruction mechanisms used in the city of Muzaffarabad Pakistan, relied on strong Government capacity, clear cadaster registries, and a financial architecture, which were not present in Haiti. Though many lessons pertaining to the link between response and reconstruction, aid architecture and coordination could be drawn from international experience, applicable models for reconstruction in Haiti’s environment simply did not exist and had to be developed during the response and reconstruction effort.

1 Yale university website: <http://epi.yale.edu/country/haiti>.

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1.2 Sector Context

4. The recurrent catastrophic events pre-2010 had already revealed the weaknesses of the housing sector in Haiti, especially in Port-au-Prince; these weaknesses were brought to the fore by the 2010 earthquake. Uncontrolled development driven by rural migration, as well as the lack of appropriate urban planning tools, housing policy and building codes, and suitable mechanisms for enforcement, were the main reasons for the pervasive structural vulnerability of constructions that led to the devastating effects of the earthquake. Moreover, the institutional framework governing the housing sector in Haiti was extremely fragmented and included numerous public agencies that had some sort of jurisdiction over housing and urban development: Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities (MICT); Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE); Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC); and Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST).

5. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) - which was created at the “Towards a New Future for Haiti” international donor conference on March 31, 2010 in Santo Domingo - became the development partners’ sole official interlocutor after the earthquake. MAST was designated as the coordination agency on housing reconstruction, although it lacked the capacity and technical expertise to assume the necessary management and coordination role. MTPTC carried out the Structural Building Assessment (SBA) program, funded by the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Office of the United States (US) Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The objective of the SBA was to: (i) inform the population about dangerous buildings; (ii) promote the reoccupation of safe buildings and in doing so contribute to the decongestion of temporary shelter camps; and (iii) develop a platform for economic recovery. By March 16, 2011, the program had assessed structural conditions of and color-coded about 400,000 single and multi-unit residential buildings: 54 percent were assessed as green-tagged or safe to inhabit; 26 percent yellow-tagged, as repairs were needed; and 20 percent red-tagged, as the houses needed to be destroyed and rebuilt.

1.3 Recovery Strategy

6. Following the earthquake, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) was set up as a partnership between the GOH and the international community with a view to finance post-earthquake reconstruction projects approved by the GOH/IHRC. The GOH/IHRC oversaw the implementation of GOH strategies to inform the reconstruction process. It was also tasked with making sure that international assistance was aligned with the priorities of the Haitian people and the GOH, while ensuring accountability and transparency. It was a new challenge for GOH to absorb the large aid flows and to broker political consensus to endorse these new critical policies and strategies. In October 2010, the GOH agreed to in principle but never officially endorsed the GOH/IHRC Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework (NRHRF). The framework explicitly identified the preferred option for the displaced people: to return to their original neighborhoods and restore, to the extent feasible, their previous livelihoods. Still, development partners and other stakeholders found in difficult to align their housing reconstruction programs with the provisions of the framework, which led partners to use their own reconstruction standards (see below).

1.4 Rationale for World Bank Involvement

7. The World Bank Group’s post-earthquake response was comprehensive. In total US$479 million were mobilized by the World Bank Group to support response and

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reconstruction from existing and new sources of funding during FY10. In the short term, the Bank placed the entire Haiti portfolio under the emergency procedures of BP/OP 8.00 to provide maximum flexibility to respond to the urgent, medium, and long-term needs resulting from the disaster. While many development partners focused on securing temporary and transitional shelters and providing essential relief services (e.g., water, food, medicine), the Bank’s comparative advantage laid in supporting the reconstruction with a long- term view to “build back better”, integrating risk data and diagnostics, capacity building for safer construction, as well as a pragmatic approach to repairing and reconstructing neighborhoods, including public spaces and permanent housing.

8. With Funds from IDA and from various Trust Funds, working through Haitian institutions and in collaboration with partners and NGOs, the Bank financed the Structural Assessment of 400,000 buildings, developed detailed and state of the art multi-hazard mapping of the city of Port- au- Prince, carried out a full LiDAR assessment of the affected area, supported the Government in developing building codes for schools and health centers and a building guide for private housing construction, trained a core group of 80 engineers at the Ministry of Public Works who in turn trained masons, building professionals and community workers in earthquake resilient retrofitting and construction, and supported community-based neighborhood reconstruction for US$95 million to benefit over 200,000 people in neighborhoods most affected by the earthquake.

9. The Bank’s urban reconstruction stance was anchored in the urban-focused IDA Urban Community Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR), which was under implementation and invested in community level infrastructure. After the earthquake, PRODEPUR received an immediate US$30 million Additional Financing (AF), known as PRODEPUR Habitat. PRODEPUR Habitat aimed to finance housing repair and to reconstruct and improve community infrastructure in areas affected by the disaster. A number of initiatives to help the reconstruction drive were supported in parallel: (i) a Japan Social Development Fund financed cash-for-work under PRODEPUR; (ii) GFDRR funded the SBA and the mapping of national and local disaster-prone areas; (iii) an Institutional Development Grant built IHRC capacity to make the NRHRF operational and to coordinate corresponding interactions with public and private stakeholders; (iv) a Spanish grant supported the IHRC in the preparation of a housing policy and housing subsidy framework; (v) IDA approved the US$65 million Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project in March 2010, which would collect and treat debris and provide temporary housing to the Ministry of Finance and relaunch basic financial functions; and (vi) IFC provided support to define a housing finance framework.

10. In 2010 the US Government provided support for urban upgrading and housing reconstruction programs to Haiti through the HRF. The World Bank agreed to serve as a partner entity for the implementation of these funds which would fund reconstruction of Port-au-Prince neighborhoods severely affected by the earthquake. The HRF funded PREKAD following a US$65 million grant (TF-99644) from OFDA and was considered PRODEPUR Habitat’s “twin.” PREKAD was prepared during February - April 2011, was approved on schedule on May 4, 2011 and became effective on July 28, 2011. PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD aimed to : (i) facilitate and speed up the return of the displaced residents of the targeted districts to their communities by helping them repair and/or rebuild their homes in compliance with earthquake/hurricane-proof standards; (ii) facilitate the return of displaced people to safe rental housing; and (iii) improve the basic infrastructure and services of neighborhoods by financing the construction of roads, corridors, bridges, drainage systems, street lighting, commercial spaces, and amphitheater. The twin projects operated in the Port-au-Prince neighborhoods of Delmas, Cité-Soleil, and Carrefour-Feuilles, as well as Nazon and Martissant.

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The twin projects were prepared and managed by the same Bank core team, used the same in-country implementation arrangements (detailed in Annex 10) and were managed by the same project coordination, the Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (BMPAD) and operated under the aegis of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF).

11. At the time of PREKAD’s first years of implementation, capacity remained critically low in the country and it was paramount to utilize existing implementation arrangements and mechanisms to deliver activities and channel funds. Also, as the extreme emergency and complete chaos of the aftermath of the earthquake began to fade, it became urgent to find rapid solutions to the massive challenge of providing and caring for the 1.5 million people living in camps. Providing temporary shelter, food, water and sanitation, health and education services, new livelihoods, and protection from violence to these internally displaced persons, many of whom were traumatized, was an essential but monumental task. International solidarity was high and emergency funding was substantial, but the authorities and the international community rapidly began to understand that such a situation could not be sustained for long without unacceptable human consequences and a potential instability. A sense of strong urgency emerged to help people leave the camps to safer housing and better livelihoods.

1.5 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Original Key Indicators

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12. The PREKAD Project Development Objectives (PDO) were: to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure. PREKAD had three key indicators, including a core indicator: (i) number of displaced households who have returned to neighborhoods upon completion of housing repair and reconstruction works and/or receiving return support; (ii) number of households benefitting from community-wide upgrading; and (iii) number of households benefitting from community-wide upgrading with a breakdown by gender (core indicator).

13. The main beneficiaries of PREKAD were the people affected by the earthquake in some neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité-Soleil, and Carrefour and were initially estimated at 210,000 people.

14. The project consisted of the four inter-related components as follows: Component 1: Debris Removal and Housing Repair and Reconstruction (US$38

million). Carrying out of: (i) the removal of debris; and (ii) the safe demolition of Red-tagged Houses and Buildings, and houses considered unfit for repair. Supporting residents to: (i) the repair and/or retrofit of Yellow-tagged houses and buildings, through the hiring of local contractors under the supervision of the Project Management Contractor (MDOD); or (ii) the on-site reconstruction of Red-tagged Houses and Buildings, and houses unfit for efficient repair, through the provision of Cash Grants to Beneficiaries. Providing technical assistance to support neighborhood communities, including Neighborhood Development Councils (NDCs), in the preparation and implementation of Project activities and other associated activities.

Component 2: Community Service Infrastructure Repair, Improvement and Extension (US$20 million). Carrying out of: (i) repairs, improvement and extension of basic community infrastructure, including, inter alia, roads, walkways, drainage ditches and channels, solid waste management facilities, water supply systems and sanitation facilities; and (ii) construction of Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs) that will be established as a permanent one-stop shop for consultations and training to serve the targeted Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods.

Component 3: Institutional Capacity Support and Studies (US$5 million). Provision of technical assistance to support the GOH and the Municipalities of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

Component 4: Project Management (US$2 million). Supporting BMPAD in the coordination of the administrative, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, financial management and procurement aspects of the Project, through the financing of incremental operating costs, goods, and consultants’ services.

1.6 Strategic Fit

15. The PREKAD fitted the Bank and the GOH strategies as it: Was in line with the Bank Group FY09-12 Haiti Country Assistance Strategy

(CAS --48284-HT, discussed by the Board on June 2, 2009) for which promoting growth and local development through CDD was a central theme.

Was processed under the Bank OP/BP 8.0 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies and was aligned with the guiding principles for emergency operations.

Provided support for key objectives under the GOH HAPNRD, adopted in March 2010, which identified housing as a major priority under social rebuilding. This

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priority included repairs as well as reconstruction of permanent homes to encourage internally displaced persons to return home.

1.7 Implementation Arrangements

16. Implementation arrangements involved several stakeholders : (i) the BMPAD was the executing agency, and was responsible for the Program administration and management, and directly managed Components 3 and 4; (ii) seven MDODs (PADF, IOM, GC, HFH, CECI, J/P HRO and DAMA Construction) implemented Components 1 and 2; (iii) the Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings (UCLBP) under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), which replaced the GOH/IHRC, coordinated and guided reconstruction policy, and created norms and guidelines for implementing agencies; (iv) the MTPTC provided the mandate for the components, i.e., repair and reconstruction of houses and infrastructure, approved planning and town planning plans and coordinated with the BMPAD communication officer on all aspects of the Habitat communication strategy; (v) the Port-au-Prince and Delmas Municipalities approved planning and town planning plans; (vi) the CIAT drafted terms of reference and the follow-up of studies on the Operational Planning Plans and other procedures involving urban planning and urban development issues in the Port-au-Prince urban area; and (vii) the Public Enterprise for Social Housing (EPPLS) under the MAST was involved in the management of rental stock/home ownership of social housing. In addition, a series of coordination efforts in the sectors were made, including the Round Table of the Housing group, chaired by UCLBP, and composed by several government agencies and various international organizations and donors, with the objective of coordinating and harmonizing intervention in the urban and housing sector.

1.8 Revised Project Development Objectives

17. The PREKAD PDO was revised during the 1st Restructuring (level 1) in October 2012 as follows: to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure. As stated above, by end 2012, the urgency of returning people from camps to neighborhoods had sharpened, considering diminishing resources, political volatility, and increasingly difficult conditions in the camps. This urgency was compounded by the impacts of Hurricane Isaac (August 25, 2012) which further deteriorated conditions for IDPs. The sub-objective added to the original PDO aimed to speed up the return of internally displaced people to to temporarily safe houses at the request of the GOH. The PREKAD key indicators were unchanged; one intermediary indicator was replaced by another to monitor the new one-year rent grant.

1.9 Restructuring and Revised Components

18. The project was restructured three times as discussed in Section H of the Data Sheet. The targeted beneficiaries increased, while the component scope remained unchanged; however, more weight was put on the Return Cash Grants to accelerate the return of displaced people to secure homes.

1.10 Other significant changes (Not Applicable)

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

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2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

19. Soundness of background analysis. The project built on the achievements and lessons learnt at the global level from earlier Bank post-earthquake operations, as well as Urban Development and Emergency Recovery Projects and in Haiti, notably PRODEP, ERDMOP and PRODEPUR. PREKAD was developed by drawing extensively on the PRODEPUR Habitat AF. The Emergency Recovery Loan (ERL) instrument was the most appropriate, as it allowed the needed flexibility to fine tune the design based on rapid developments and changes in the aftermath of the earthquake. However, despite the reconstruction coordination efforts and technical support led by UN Habitat and actively supported by World Bank Staff and experts during project preparation and beyond, the GOH at the technical and political levels did not succeed in adopting national reconstruction policy containing standards with regard to eligibility for reconstruction support, the standard size of reconstructed houses, or a unified mechanism for the delivery of subsidies to home owners for reconstruction. In this context, each development partner (e.g., USAID) and international NGOs (e.g., Habitat for Humanity) used its own reconstruction standards.

20. The PDOs responded to the country’s emergency and development priorities and focused on attainable outcomes, while the indicators were SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and time-bound). They were scaled up during the 1st Restructuring. Due to a shift in strategy (see project design below) the project evolved to place more emphasis on community infrastructure and rental grants, reducing the volume of housing repairs and reconstructions. Thus, two intermediate indicators associated with house reconstruction and repair were scaled down twice and a new indicator was introduced for cash grants to monitor the movement of displaced people from camps to safer houses.

21. The institutional and implementation arrangements were similar to PRODEPUR. The PRODEPUR institutional set up proved its efficiency given it previous experience in managing World-Bank financed projects. 22. Assessment of project design. The project design took into account key lessons from earlier projects including international experience in Indonesia and Pakistan among others, though many of the solutions applicable in other settings were not appropriate or implementable in Haiti, due to both the terrain and physical conditions, as well as the lack of institutions as these were already challenged and had themselves been victims of the Earthquake on a large scale. Synergies between PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD proved instrumental in defining the PREKAD modus operandi, oversight, monitoring, safeguards, financial management, procurement, and management information systems (MIS). the original project design was appropriately ambitious in terms of housing reconstruction and repair based on what was known at the time.

23. Restructuring. However, housing reconstruction and repair was scaled down during the restructurings, first in 2012. This change reflected an evolving situation on the ground: (i) a much sharper focus on and greater urgency of moving displaced persons out of camps into safer neighborhoods starting in mid-2012 by government and partners; and (ii) the realization that a key assumption of the original government approach and project design – namely that displaced persons mostly owned property in neighborhoods to which they wished to return – was incorrect. It had become clear by 2012 that 80 percent of people who had lived in collapsed neighborhoods were renters meaning that reconstruction and rehabilitation support (a form of support that would go to the owners of the properties they rented) would not necessarily benefit them. Polling also demonstrated that their attachment to the neighborhoods where they lived at the time of the

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Earthquake was limited, and that their willingness/desire to move elsewhere if given the opportunity was much greater than expected. Also, experience had shown that private investment in reconstruction could be incentivized and leveraged very effectively by investing in public neighborhood infrastructure first and that the existing rental market could generate economic activity existed in pockets of the city that had not been destroyed. In response to this learning and to the objective accelerating return out of camps, the restructurings scaled down housing reconstruction targets (Intermediate indicator) and reoriented resources toward rental cash grants and enhancing community infrastructure.

24. Support by the Project to the return of camp dwellers to neighborhoods consisted of a (i) one year rental cash equivalent to US$500, and (ii) US$150 for transport and family support (transport at time of leaving the camp and support after 8 weeks of checking that the family still lived in the same house as agreed with the recipient), and support to beneficiary families provided by the NGOs/MDODs, including psychological assistance, vocational training and livelihood programs. Where possible, returnees were also connected to services financed under other Bank projects, such as the Education for All Project (P124134), which financed tuitions waivers for primary school and school feeding.

25. Government commitment. The GOH’s commitment was clearly re-emphasized with the creation of the OPM/UCLBP in November 2011, which showed strong leadership and became the driver of the reconstruction process. GOH chose BMPAD as the primary agency to implement PREKAD as an emergency and fast disbursement project, as it was already managing other Bank projects with similar delivery mechanisms, e.g., PRODEP and PRODEPUR.

26. Assessment of risks. Project risk was correctly rated as high due to the exogenous and endogenous factors (see below and Annex 9).

2.2 Implementation

27. Positive factors helped implement PREKAD such as the dedication of the OPM/UCLPB and BMPAD staff, the experience of MDODs in working in very harsh conditions, and the resilience of NGOs working in insecure areas of Port-au-Prince, coupled with the various public stakeholders that saw value-addition in collaborating towards the realization of the project outputs and outcomes. The preliminary beneficiary engagement in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan area under PRODEPUR prior to the earthquake paid off, as community structures were quickly set up (CRCs and NDCs)

28. Exogenous and endogenous factors affected PREKAD implementation during 2011-2016 (see details in Annex 9) although corrective measures were devised for the endogenous factors. The exogenous and endogenous factors include: (i) the chaotic aftermath of the earthquake prevented the emergence of any reconstruction leadership and the formulation of a consensus reconstruction strategy, and affected the progress of reconstruction; (ii) the political turmoil and social unrest that occurred on and off during PREKAD implementation; (iii) the catastrophic hurricane punctuated the implementation period; (iv) inflationary pressures that started in 2013 increased equipment prices and delayed MDOD operations until their contracts were adjusted for inflation by BMPAD; (v) unclear urban planning policy, housing policy and land tenure that hindered reconstruction, and provided mixed signals to entities dealing with

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reconstruction; (vi) changing factors on the ground that underpinned the first two restructurings, notably the urgency brought by deteriorating conditions and the unsustainability of camps and a better understanding of the composition of the displaced and their status as renters and homeowners; (vii) improved BMPAD implementation capacity after the 1st Restructuring ; (viii) significantly improved the institutional set up after the creation of OPM/UCLBP in November 2011 and the adoption of the first national housing policy; (ix) work in unsafe areas, e.g., Cité-Soleil and Carrefour-Feuilles; (x) lack of technical and financial capacity of municipalities hampered the drainage construction; and (xi) unsecured and un-hygienic camps, compounded by NGOs having to leave the country after their funding dried up.

29. The Mid-term review (MTR) of April 2014 was timely and identified actions to address issues affecting the implementation of PREKAD. BMPAD addressed the findings of the MTR and improved operational management with guidance from the Bank.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

30. M&E design. As discussed in Section 2.1 above, indicators in the Results Framework were SMART and were revised during the restructurings to reflect changes in project objectives and scope. The monitoring arrangements as described in the PAD (establishment and operation of a Management Information System (MIS), semi-annual technical audits, a mid-term review, and regular monitoring and evaluation reports) were in accordance with generally accepted practices. The M&E design could have included indicators to capture achievements in: (i) the quality and sustainability of infrastructure works; (ii) capacity building of municipalities and line ministries in implementation/supervision of works, and institutional strengthening at the national level.

31. M&E Implementation. BMPAD submitted biannual and annual reports to the Bank in a timely manner. These reports included progress achieved on all indicators and identified key areas for action. Information on key project outputs and indicators was regularly collected and reported in ISRs as part of the Bank’s supervision visits.

32. M&E utilization. The conclusions and the recommendations of the MTR and technical audits were integrated in project implementation and restructurings. Technical audits to evaluate the technical quality of works guided BMPAD in following up with MDODs and executing firms.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 33. Safeguards. The project was correctly classified as an environmental Category B project at appraisal and triggered OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources, and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement (triggered for dwellers living in areas that needed to be reconstructed but not applicable to IDPs per World Bank Policy). The project was processed under OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies, and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were developed, consulted and disclosed within the first year of project implementation.

Safeguards implementation is assessed below: Environmental Safeguards are rated Moderately Satisfactory. Positive environmental

aspects of the project include: (i) improved urban space, including the creation of green space; (ii) improved sanitation; and (iii) communities contributing to the upkeep of their neighborhoods. Areas for improvement include: (i) greater attention to the health and safety (H&S) of workers and communities during works; including use of personal

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protective gear; (ii) cleanup after completion of works; and (iii) and removal of construction debris and waste from destroyed houses under housing repair and retrofitting activities (this did not apply to earthquake debris removal).

Social Safeguards are rated Satisfactory. PREKAD funded neighborhood reconstruction activities (which led to some impacts under OP 4.12), as a result of which a number of project affected people (PAPs) were relocated (a vast majority of them temporarily) until their houses and neighborhoods were rehabilitated. PAPs received compensation according to OP 4.12, which covered loss of assets, moving expenses, and economic losses.

A resettlement audit at the end of the project confirmed that all PAPs were compensated before the start of works. The resettlement audit noted that MDODs could have handled resettlement aspects better, including (i) keeping the geographical advantages of PAPs prior to their resettlement and (ii) paying compensation for moving expenses based on the size of the household, rather than on a standard basis.

OP4.12 only applies to displacement/resettlement that is the direct result of a Bank-funded project. As such it did does not apply to this disaster induced movement of IDPs as the rental subsidy is not a compensation mechanism. Therefore, these camp dwellers are not counted under the PAP, as defined by OP 4.12.

34. The Fiduciary Compliance is assessed as follows: Financial management is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The FM issues during

project implementation were: (i) delays in submitting IFRs and audit reports to the Bank, which was due to MDODs’ delays in sending the financial requirements; (ii) delays in submitting disbursement reports by the MDODs, while advances were made to MDODs without documentation; and (iii) delays in submitting withdrawal applications to document advances made to the designated accounts. Throughout the life of the project, delays between the provision of advances and the full accounting of spending both by MDODs and by BMPAD prevented accurate readings of project financial status. The quality of the audits was acceptable and most of the audit observations were carried forward in the following year. BMPAD made progress in implementing the action plan agreed with Bank supervision missions and the hands-on support provided by the Bank resulted in all suppliers being paid by April 30, 2017 for services provided. All advances to the designated accounts were fully documented by mid-May 2017.

Procurement is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Procurement performance by BMPAD was guided by intense hands-on implementation support from the Bank. Throughout project implementation, procurement management remained weak due to: (i) high staff turn-over and lack of qualified procurement staff; (ii) long delays in the procurement of works, goods and services; and (iii) contract management characterized by multiple contract amendments and cost overruns. The Bank guided the BMPAD PCU to proactively manage these procurement challenges with appropriate solutions and good practices.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

35. Operations and maintenance and sustaining reforms and institutional capacity. BMPAD has prepared: maintenance plans for the communal infrastructures with the municipalities, Electricité de Haiti and communities; management plans for the houses with

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MAST/EPPLS (Guide produced in 2015); and plans for transition/closing of the CRCs. An initial agreement was reached with EDH to assume the responsibility for the upkeep of the electricity network extension. Specific agreements have been reached with the municipalities of Port-au-Prince, so that the newly built assets under PREKAD (roads, corridors, bridges, drainage systems, street lighting, commercial spaces, and amphitheater) would be maintained by the municipalities’ force account, while daily street sweeping and minor upkeep operations were to be assumed by the communities. The upkeep of coops or social housing projects’ communal space and the management of communal services will be assumed by MAST/EPPLS; financial sustainability will be ensured by the repayment of the homeowner lease to MAST/EPPLS. At the policy level, the OPM/UCLBP could help implement the Housing Policy in the future by promoting integrated buildings (such as coops) as a corner stone of earthquake and hurricane-proof construction.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

36. Relevance of Objectives is rated High. As discussed in Section 1.3, the PDO was aligned with the goals of the GOH. The PDO remains in line with Bank priorities as identified in: (i) the 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic to eliminate poverty and boost shared prosperity (both the original and revised PREKAD PDOs address issues faced by residents of Port-au-Prince neighborhoods who were severely affected by the earthquake, most of whom are poor); and (ii) the Bank Group’s FY16-19 Country Partnership Framework for Haiti, which is aligned with the IDA 17 special themes of Inclusive Growth, Fragility, Gender and Climate Change. The PREKAD PDO is in line with two of the four CPF pillars, i.e., inclusive growth in terms of contributing to enhance economic opportunities, and resilience in term of strengthening natural disaster preparedness by building earthquake-hurricane proof houses. The PDO was amended during the restructuring in October 2012 to cover the expanded scope of supporting the return to improved housing conditions through rental cash grants.

37. Relevance of Design and Implementation is rated Substantial. PREKAD’s four components were designed to directly support the achievement of the PDO to move displaced people from camps to houses through house rebuilding, house repairing or facilitating their transition to rented houses. Component 1 aimed at removing debris, and repairing and reconstructing houses, while Component 2 aimed at building communal infrastructure. Component 3 aimed at building institutional capacity and carry out studies, while Component 4 aimed at managing the project. As discussed in Section 2.3 under M&E Design, the Results Framework was appropriate to measure the achievement of the PDO and was updated during implementation to measure the achievement of the expanded PDO. Project implementation, overall, was satisfactory as the project achieved its expected outputs and outcomes, despite the initial delays caused largely by the emergency nature of the project, the difficult country conditions, and the collapse of the institutions responsible for setting policy for reconstruction.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development ObjectivesEfficacy is rated Substantial

38. As indicated in Section 1.8, the original PDO was amended at the time of the first restructuring in October 2012 to include the phrase “and/or return to improved housing conditions”. As the final PDO is merely an elaboration of the original PDO to take account of additional activities, the achievement of the PDO is being evaluated with respect to the final PDO and a split evaluation has not been carried out.

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39. PDO Element 1: Residents of Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods Severely Affected by the Earthquake Return to Their Neighborhoods is rated Substantial. The Project contributed directly to the expected outcome of PREKAD to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities. The target of 16,000 households moving out from camps to reconstructed, repaired and rented safe houses was exceeded. As indicated in Section F. Results Framework Analysis of the Data Sheet, the remaining PDO level indicator targets for Indicators 2, 3, and 4 (households benefiting from community-wide upgrading, direct project beneficiaries, and direct female project beneficiaries) were all exceeded by a significant margin. In addition, the target for the provision of one-year Rental Support Cash Grants was met (Intermediate Outcome Indicator 8). After one year: (i) none of the grantee households returned to camps; and (ii) 100% of the grantees had autonomously found an accommodation solution. The Rental Support Cash Grants Operations Manual reports that 25% of grantees remained in the same rental accommodation for a second year.

40. PDO Element 2: Improving Basic Community Service Infrastructure is rated Substantial. Component 1.1 Debris Removal and Component 2: Communal Infrastructure Repair and Improvement contributed to achieving this element of the PDO. The target for the former was exceeded by over a 100% (see Section F of the Data Sheet). The targets set for establishing fully staffed and effective CRCs (Intermediate Outcome Indicator 4) and Community Approval of Community Urban Development Plans (Intermediate Outcome Indicator 5) were fully met. In addition, project financing of demand driven activities (roads and corridors, drainage ditches and channels, small bridges, electric panels, sanitation) exceeded targets (Intermediate Outcome Indicator 6).

3.3 EfficiencyEfficiency is rated Substantial

41. Sub-project investments were efficiently implemented. Economic analysis in the PREKAD Emergency Project Paper focused on cholera cases being averted in camps. However, cost/benefit analysis was not carried out, as PREKAD was a demand-driven project. An economic analysis was also not carried out at the restructurings. An ex-post economic analysis was performed and covers the 2011-2026 period, i.e., 10 years after the closing date of the project (see Annex 3). Five layers of benefits were considered, as summarized below:

Benefit 1: Cholera avoided due to the reinsertion of over 16,000 displaced households (equivalent to over 75,000 people) in decent houses.

Benefit 2: Land value appreciation associated with the 20,600 linear meters of road and corridor construction, as well as the construction of small bridges.

Benefit 3: Drainage and other improvements for up to12,000 beneficiaries. Benefit 4: Houses repaired, retrofitted and constructed as additional “economic” rent

collected and considered proxies for renters and homeowners living in their houses. Benefit 5: Construction of 367 latrines.

42. The project is economically viable with a net present value (NPV) of US$7.3 million, with an economic rate of return (ERR) of 19%, and a Present Value of benefit over cost ratio of 1.1.

43. Administrative Efficiency. Although, the project had a slow start and implementation was affected by exogenous and endogenous factors (see also Annex 9), administrative processes were as efficient as possible in the challenging post-earthquake environment, due to extremely

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limited capacity of all actors. The extension of the Grant closing date by 18 months is therefore understandable. Implementation ratings for environmental safeguards, social safeguards, and procurement were either satisfactory or moderately satisfactory. Although by the end of the project, the ISR rated Financial Management Moderately Satisfactory, the overall rating FM is Moderately Unsatisfactory, due to delays in financial reporting.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome RatingRating: Satisfactory

44. The overall project outcome is rated Satisfactory based on the ratings for relevance of objectives (high), relevance of design and implementation (substantial), achievement of the two elements of the PDO (substantial), and efficiency (substantial).

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

45. PREKAD directly benefited about 16% of the total 2015 population of 2.26 million living in Port-au-Prince, Delmas, Cité-Soleil, and Carrefour;2 female beneficiaries accounted for 182,000. Based on the 39.1% poverty incidence in Port-au-Prince in 2012, it is estimated that at least two fifths of the beneficiary population in the targeted neighborhoods is urban poor, i.e., at least 135,000 people. PREKAD investments resulted in the following health, environmental, economic and social benefits:

Return of internally displaced people to repaired, constructed or existing safe housing, thus increasing their quality of life and livelihoods.

Increased opportunities (commerce, services and street vendors), social cohesion (basketball fields, amphitheater, murals with recreational spaces, night gathering of communities and especially students under street lighting poles, and improved safety in neighborhoods) and improved living environment.

Time savings through increased vehicular and pedestrian mobility, and access to work, markets, schools, health centers, churches and amenities.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

46. The Project led to sustained institutional capacity improvements at the national, sectoral and local levels. Despite some issues of ensuring sustainability of activities, first-hand evidence demonstrates that institutions or local governments are taking over O&M and are successfully applying the project management and technical skills acquired through the project in their day-to-day activities.

47. Institutional capacity in the housing sector was successfully internalized by the GoH. PREKAD (and PRODEPUR) were instrumental in strengthening government’s housing capacity after the earthquake. Both projects supported the creation of UCLBP Housing and Public Building Construction Unit in the office of the Prime Minister, which quickly developed Haiti’s first-ever housing policy. The Rental Support Cash Grant Program (RSCG) implemented by UCLBP became the national reference for all donors engaged in the movement of IDPs to safer housing efforts. This model served as a national reference for the development of rental subsidies for all donors engaged in movement of IDPs and has become a national norm. The 2014 Operational Manual on RSCG programs provided a logistical and ethical framework around the rental cash grant for displaced people living in camps to recover their dignity by moving to safer

2 Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique website:<http://ihsi.ht/>.

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houses. A standardized methodology has been developed and staff from mayors’ offices, the Civil Protection Department (DPC), and the UCLBP have been trained to deliver RSCG programs. The RSCG experience in Haiti also served as a reference for the development of rental subsidies in other environments internationally and a summary of all findings and lessons was co-written and published by the Bank and other donors as a guide for such development. The Housing Public Enterprise (EPPLS) within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST) has developed, in collaboration with UCLBP and BMPAD, the operations manual for the management of new social housing built under the Project.

48. Before the implementation of PREKAD, BMPAD, was responsible for the management of community projects. With PREKAD going into implementation, BMPAD streamlined its organizational structure and strengthened its leadership role on operations including: hiring of new staff; migration to an updated MIS; and improved compliance on safeguards and fiduciary matters. BMPAD has also set up offices in the intervention districts, headed by an engineer working with the designated NGO team mobilized for the neighborhood, a Town Council agent, and a MTPTC agent to support CRCs. The functions of MDODs are gradually evolving into result-oriented service delivery.

49. Other institutions. The coordination across institutional partners between BMPAD, OPM/UCLBP, MAST/EPPLS, the MTPTC, CIAT and the municipalities proved difficult at the onset but was addressed by reemphasizing their roles and responsibilities toward achieving a common goal in terms of result-oriented activities after the 1st restructuring. Moreover, the creation of the OPM/UCLBP improved the dialogue with GOH and was instrumental in facilitating PREKAD implementation. The project effectively supported the institutional collaboration between OPM/UCLBP and MAST/EPPLS for the management of public housing developed under the project, including the handling of beneficiaries’ contributions, the process of prioritizing and allocation of its occupancy, and the subsequent operations and maintenance responsibilities and modalities.

50. Institutional and technical capacities in construction and disaster risk management have been successfully internalized and streamlined by the GoH. The Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications (MTPTC) became the de facto lead agency for many reconstruction and disaster risk management activities after the earthquake, and carried out: (i) the building safety (habitability) assessment; (ii) debris clearance, and (iii) public infrastructure reconstruction. MTPTC implemented programs that created standard practices and de facto policies, which laid the ground for the consolidation of the 2012 national building code.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative): N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

51. Although no separate beneficiary survey was carried out for PREKAD, the beneficiary assessment carried out for PRODEPUR Habitat reliably assesses the impacts of identical activities and impacts. The key outcomes of this assessment are: (i) 93 percent of beneficiaries of improved housing (recipients of grants for reconstruction of homes, or access to new social housing) report that PRODEPUR Habitat had a positive impact on their quality of life; and (ii) about 90 percent consider that reconstruction infrastructure works under PRODEPUR Habitat to be sustainable. A stakeholder workshop was organized in Saint Marc during December 14-16, 2016 to present the results of the components of each project and difficulties encountered by the providers and the lessons learned from each partner were reviewed. The positive outcomes of the projects were highlighted and institutions and development partners stressed the

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importance of consolidating the results through a strong leadership of the government. Consolidation of results would necessitate the (i) establishment of reconstruction guidelines and coordination mechanisms for post-disaster contexts; and (ii) improved pro-active urban planning and disaster risk management.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development OutcomeRating: Moderate

52. Overall sustainability. The project was strongly supported by beneficiaries, GOH and municipalities. In light of the fact that the project was aimed at emergency reconstruction of neighborhoods after a disaster, sustainability pertains in particular to (i) the functioning of institutions supported and the availability of knowledge generated by the Project and (ii) the permanence/persistence of the improved situation of beneficiaries under the project. The overall institutional framework for repairing, improving and constructing new houses and communal infrastructure is in place. This model can now be used for future reconstruction needs, should these arise in Haiti’s highly seismic environment.

53. Sustainability of repaired, reconstructed and social houses. The housing repaired or rebuilt on private land, as well as latrines installed in houses, are the responsibility of homeowners and have been maintained appropriately. Additionally, great efforts were made by the GoH to ensure that the social housing program built under the project continues to be sustainable in the long term. The replenishment of the MAST/EPPLS through the refinancing scheme set up during PREKAD will not only help maintain the social housing stock built under PREKAD, but also leverage the financing of new social housing.

54. Sustainability of the one-year rent scheme. Rental grants targeted the most vulnerable (renters struck by the earthquake) and were complemented with measures to strengthen the resilience of families. They presented a temporary solution to an untenable situation but evidence is lacking that they led to livelihood or housing solutions for beneficiaries once grants expired. Rental subsidies supported the reintegration of households into neighborhoods and treated affected households as agents of their own recovery, putting them in the driver’s seat to make their choice of location and housing (within minimum standards assessed by MDODs). The injected cash into local rental markets, stimulating private investment in construction and rehabilitation in affected neighborhoods. To help avoid that families returning to a “normal” life (including access to economic opportunities and safety from violence and promiscuity) lost access to services (water, education and health services which were variably available in camps), the Project financed psychosocial support, vocational training and livelihood development programs as well as some clinic access through the MDOD contracts. Beneficiaries were also connected, where possible with services provided under other World Bank program such as the Education for all program (P124134), which provided tuition waivers to schools in poor neighborhoods.

55. There has been on comprehensive evaluation of the impacts of the rental grant program financed by this Project. Also, the Rental Support Cash Grant Evaluation monitored all on-going rental grant programs in Haiti under the GoH’s Return Strategy in 2014 and preliminary Red Cross evaluation found that one year’s rental support did not necessarily lead families to finding solutions in the future, once rental grants expired. Although in the former, none of the household grantees returned to camps after one year.3 only 25 percent of the displaced household grantees remained in their initial rented houses after one year. Those that chose to move continued to

3 World Bank. 2014. Rental Support Cash Grant Programs: Operational Manual. Washington, D.C.

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exercise their free choice to find accommodation solutions that reflect their financial means and personal priorities. Of the 75 percent that moved, 49 percent reported being unable to pay the rent, while 26 percent attributed their move to problems with the landlord. More research is required on the rental program to identify interventions to improve resilience and sustainability under these types of programs.

56. Sustainability of communal infrastructure. The commitment of the community to carry out routine, low cost maintenance and cleanup is likely to be sustained as communities have taken ownership of the small assets. Street lighting upkeep will be assumed by the communities, while the electric network maintenance will be assumed by Electricité d’Haiti. However, the stock of municipal and other institutional assets need to be duly assessed and funds need to be adequately and regularly allocated for their sustained maintenance. MTPTC and municipalities have small budgets to perform routine, periodic and urgent maintenance for roads, corridors, bridges, drainage systems, etc; their budgets have been increasing, but remain relatively limited in relation to their responsibilities.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at EntryRating: Moderately Satisfactory

57. The Bank responded quickly to the country’s emergency needs as PREKAD was prepared in a short period in the face of changing and extremely challenging circumstances with a weakened government counterpart. Although all project basics were sound, the components well targeted, and the delivery mechanisms used had proven effective in the past, some key design elements had to be rethought. In particular, the assumption that reconstructing private houses for owners would be the shortest route to rehousing large numbers of displaced persons who were renters was revealed to be incorrect. The project therefore needed to be restructured and equipped with tools to return renters to neighborhoods, while increasing rental stock in the city. The goal and the means to ensure the return of displaced people to safer houses was emphasized by the fine tuning of the PDO during the 1st Restructuring of the project. Component 1 and Component 2 were interlinked and were essential to the achievement of the PDO. Component 3’s institutional capacity support and studies helped prepare for the return renters from camps to neighborhoods and the preeminence of rebuilding of community infrastructure. These design adjustments showed the Bank and the Government’s ability to adjust to changing conditions and to evolving priorities as the massive aftermath of the disaster became clearer. Repeated restructurings were used to ensure that the project kept pace with these changing conditions and evolving awareness and analysis by the Government, the Bank and other development partners and stakeholders.

58. As discussed in Sections 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4, the Bank ensured that the project was well-prepared and met the Bank’s strategic, technical, economic, institutional, financial, safeguard and fiduciary requirements; the risk assessment was comprehensive, and appropriate risk management measures were included in project design and in the implementation support plan. The results framework was sound, with three outcome indicators as well as eight intermediate outcome indicators.

(b) Quality of SupervisionRating: Moderately Satisfactory

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59. Regular and sustained engagement with BMPAD. The Bank team in headquarters and the in-country Task Team Leader regularly visited BMPAD and project sites (often weekly or bi-weekly) to ensure that project implementation progressed satisfactorily in line with the legal agreements. A dedicated full-time Bank staff based in Port-au-Prince supported the supervision of both PREKAD and PRODEPUR throughout project implementation. Close implementation support to BMPAD by the Bank’s team, including just in time advice, problem solving, and daily interactions as well as close engagement with the MDODs as needed were usual., Implementation issues were identified at an early stage and the project was restructured when it became necessary. The MTR was carried out on schedule and the findings were used to speed up project implementation.

60. Monitoring and reporting. The Bank team undertook 13 implementation support missions, which included site visits. Sufficient budget and staff resources were allocated and the project was adequately supervised and closely monitored. The ISR ratings reflect the challenges encountered candidly. The project had three TTLs who provided strong leadership to the Bank team in supporting project implementation.

61. Compliance with safeguard and fiduciary policies. The Bank team worked closely with BMPAD and the MDODs to ensure that mitigation measures were developed to minimize the environmental and social impacts triggered by the project. However, the location of the debris transfer remained poorly documented and safeguarded. Although the Bank provided extra support to address the weaknesses in project FM and appropriately accounted for by the end the project, the delays encountered in reporting on advances by the MDODs and by BMPAD could not be entirely resolved. Difficulties encountered in FM supervision prevents the Bank from proving a Satisfactory rating for Quality of Supervision.

62. Asset and knowledge transfer arrangements. The Bank supported the BMPAD to ensure that: (i) ownership of all infrastructure assets built under PREKAD were transferred in to the MTPTC and the municipalities; (ii) electrification and lighting poles to Electricité d’Haiti’; and (iii) housing constructed, reconstructed and repaired to their owners. The Bank discussed arrangements to ensure adequate funding for maintenance with the Government and the agencies concerned and, as indicated in Section 2.5, this dialogue with municipalities on maintenance aspects will continue under Bank-funded Municipal Development and Urban Resilience Project (P155201).

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

63. Based on the ratings for Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry and Quality of Supervision, overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

64. The GOH actively drove project preparation and ensured the satisfactory implementation of PREKAD. Despite, their weakened capacity after the earthquake, GoH institutions involved in PREKAD worked closely with the Bank and other development partners, including USAID and the Spanish Government, to ensure proper coordination of donor efforts. They also provided strong guidance to BMPAD and the MDODs to address coordination issues

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with government agencies and resolved problems by involving all stakeholders, including beneficiaries, PAPs, municipalities, NGOs, and civil society.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

65. BMPAD –– Moderately Satisfactory. Despite the capacity constraints at the time of the project and the overall FCV and post-disaster context, BPMPAD was an effective entity that was mission-critical in the day-to-day management of PREKAD. A qualified team was recruited to manage PREKAD; additional staff were recruited after the 1 st Restructuring. BMPAD’s strong commitment helped deliver all sub-projects, albeit with an understandable 1.5-year delay, and improve the quality and regularity of reporting over time. Although BMPAD was familiar with Bank procedures, it took until the 2014 MTR for BMPAD to resolve procurement and safeguard issues in a timely manner and to reduce accumulated implementation delays. BMPAD substantially improved its coordination with partner institutions, MDODs, contractors, NGOs and communities after the 1st Restructuring.

66. MDODs –– Moderately Satisfactory. MDODs made tremendous efforts in internalizing Bank and Government requirements for PREKAD implementation. MDODs: (i) reduced their overhead and management costs; (ii) adhered to financial management and reporting practices; and (iii) streamlined costs to the request of BMPAD. Despite working in challenging areas (e.g., Cité Soleil and Carrefour) and under very harsh conditions, they were inclusive, transparent, and involved communities in sub-project preparation and execution. MDODs contracting and reporting initially faced challenges, but improved over time. Nevertheless, certain delays in technical and financial reporting remained, which impacted overall M&E and Financial Management as discussed above. Some MDODs have internalized Bank safeguards requirements in their own regular work. Most sub-projects were technically sound; however, the last batch of sub-projects were time constrained and could have been implemented to better quality. Together with BMPAD, MDODs carried out a successful communication campaign to showcase the achievements of PREKAD and PRODEPUR. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower PerformanceRating: Moderately Satisfactory

67. Based on the ratings of Government performance and implementing agency performance, overall Borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

6. Lessons Learned

General Application

68. Community engagement can play an important role in post-disaster reconstruction. The experience of PREKAD at community level provided the basis for a quick launch of reconstruction efforts in a post disaster situation. Although not anticipated, the community engagement and dialogue initiated under the CDD PRODEPUR before the earthquake proved instrumental in identifying interlocutors at the community level after the disaster, thus having targeted the population at appropriate level to commence reconstruction efforts. In this project, communities were very quick to organize themselves in NDCs to help government identify the needs and sequence priorities. Therefore, engaging at community level from a resilience perspective, might provide an avenue for future engagements to manage disaster risks appropriately.

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69. Infrastructure projects can support Governments to take leadership of overall reconstruction efforts and strengthen institutional coordination. PREKAD helped re-positioning the GOH and especially the OPM/UCLBP as authority and direct all the resources towards one common goal by redefining the roles and responsibilities of development partners and international NGOs, e.g., MDODs.

70. Countries that are highly vulnerable to disasters would benefit from preventively establishing or strengthening housing policies, building standards, land planning tools, and land tenure mechanisms. This would ensure the best institutional environment for effective housing and infrastructure reconstruction. More specifically: (i) a housing policy needs to be formulated or regularly updated, especially in terms of building codes and standards; (ii) a multi-sectoral cadaster could be gradually set up as a land information system that is essential for land management and that would help manage the aftermath of a disaster; and (iii) records of household status (owner or renters) should be maintained by municipalities and possibly integrated in the multi-sectoral cadaster. The lack of a housing policy, urban planning tools and clear land tenure were exogenous factors that delayed emergency reconstruction. Not knowing whether the displaced people were owner and renters was an endogenous factor that also necessitated the restructuring of the project thus delaying the implementation by one more year.

71. The GOH successfully implemented standard approaches for assessing post-disaster damages to infrastructure and housing. The use of a defined methodology to assess structural vulnerability after a natural disaster proved an effectively instrument to define and prioritize reconstruction efforts. The color-coded tagging of houses (red for demolition and reconstruction, yellow for repair or retrofitting; and green for safe to move in) performed under the SBA was a very effective mechanism to guide the reconstruction decision making processes. The immediate deployment of this method after a natural disaster as part of a needs assessment was further augmented through the analysis of drone acquired imagery that was further validated with rapid visual inspections to obtain early planning data for reconstruction operations.

72. PREKAD supported the development of institutional tools for future disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts, in particular to address the displacement of affected people. The RSCG Operational Manual helped develop a modus operandi that could be used globally to support shelter solutions for displaced persons other than camps. As an instrument to transit out of camps to better housing and more normal conditions or as an alternative to shelter in camps, rental grants can provide eligible households with support in a form other than camp lodging with all its downsides. Whether this instrument can facilitate more rapid integration of displaced persons or refugees into receiving communities would have to be tested. Although this scheme provides an instrument that could prove timely in the aftermath of a disaster or in a refugee crisis, its phasing out presents a challenge. Regular monitoring and follow up on the renters and clear alternative plans for the renters, who could not afford to stay after one year, need to complement this instrument.

73. Implementation of social housing projects with community management of shared spaces are possible in the Haitian context, despite the lower social cohesion in urban areas, mistrust of state actors and weak land-tenure systems. Pilot social housing activities introduced through the construction of multifamily complexes in Delmas 32 demonstrate that these types of housing projects are possible in the Haitian context.

Project Management-Specific

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74. On-going institutional strengthening and capacity building will be necessary in fragile contexts such as Haiti to ensure sustainability of project outcomes. While the Project managed to achieve important results, on-going institutional strengthening and capacity building in DRM, Housing and Infrastructure management will be necessary. Areas to be strengthen globally include, among others: (i) reviewing and updating architectural and construction standards and building the capacity (architects, engineers, masons, etc.) for resilient infrastructure and thermal-hurricane-seismic-prone housing construction; and (ii) enforcing building codes and construction supervision for the entire formal and informal construction drive.

75. In disaster-prone and fragile countries, allow for a flexible project design and make use of existing mechanisms. The ERL proved flexible as a Bank lending instruments in an emergency context and given the evolving situation after the earthquake or any disaster, a project design requires fine tuning or even changes in focus and scope. In addition, projects in FCV and disaster-prone countries should make more use of targeted operation instruments to respond to post-disaster needs; additional flexibilities in the design and implementation would further support a timely response with targeted activities in environments where needs may have dramatically changed.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Donors

(a) Grantee/Implementing agencies

76. The GOH recognized the positive outcomes of the project and agreed with the findings and ratings of the ICR, including the “Satisfactory” overall outcome rating. The Government’s evaluation found that the project objectives were successfully met and the overall project performance to be moderately satisfactory. Government underlines the MDOD model of delivery as a key cause for delays and for the moderately unsatisfactory financial management rating. Annex 7 contains (ii) a summary of the Government’s evaluation report, including important lessons learned identified by the GOH, some of which are integrated in the ICR’s lessons learned; and (ii) a summary and the complete comments to ICR provided by the GOH.

(b) Co-financiers/Donors

77. PREKAD was funded out of HRF resources tagged as USAID/OFDA contribution. Therefore, there was no evaluation of the PREKAD per se from the USAID/OFDA. However, an External Evaluation of HRF was carried out in April 2015 which mentions the housing and rental grant projects and specifically PREKAD in various instances as the most relevant and successful operations supported by HRF.

(c) Other partners and stakeholders: N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ Million equivalent)Components Appraisal

Estimate (US$ millions)

1st

Restructuring(US$ million)

2nd

Restructuring(US$ million)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(US$ millions) **

Percentage of

Appraisal(%)

(%)

Component 1 37.00 37.00 24.891 59.88 98.4%

Component 2 20.00 24.60 35.986Component 3 4.00 2.00 1.439

4.58 111.2%Component 4 2.00 1.40 2.684Total Baseline Cost 63.00Physical and Price Contingencies 2.00 0.00 0.000 0.00

Errors and Omissions* 0.33

Total Project Costs 65.00 65.00 65.000 64.79 99.7%Note: *This line was entered pending the release of the final audit. ** Costs by component are presented in this format in the final report received from the governmentSource: PREKAD Emergency Project Paper, 2011 page 27; PREKAD Restructuring Paper, 2012 page7; and PREKAD Restructuring Paper, 2015 page 6.

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component AchievementsComponent/Sub-Component

Output Unit Original Target

RestructuringTarget

Actual

Component 1: Debris Removal and Housing Repair and ReconstructionDebris Removal Building debris was removed by specialized enterprises from public spaces (and

subject to the consent of the owner, private lots). Constructions marked as unsafe and beyond repair (i.e., red-tagged houses by MTPCT) or considered unfit for repair were safely demolished.

m3 TBD 1,154 2,405

Housing Repair and Retrofitting

Support was provided to residents of the selected Port-au-Prince neighborhoods to carry out repairs and/or retrofit yellow-tagged houses and buildings under the owners’ own initiative (hiring contractors, labor, etc.,) in compliance with standards (many standards existed) and endorsed by MTPTC and the municipality. The target was scaled down during the restructurings due to a missing baseline. The amounts allocated (US$1,350 for repairs and US$3,500 for retrofitting that could also serve as a down payment to get a bank loan), the area determined by UN-Habitat design (18 m2) and the standards to be used remained contentious during project implementation, although efforts were made to increase the area to 22 m2 and allow for a modular construction in the multi-family housing that allowed for expansion by the owner in the future and included the structural reinforcement of houses to enable them to withstand the effects of possible future earthquakes with likely different seismic parameters. All technical assessments and grant agreements were prepared by CRCs and agreements were signed between BMPAD and the owners, while CRCs were responsible for work supervision; the grant was paid in four equal tranches. Housing repair and retrofitting reached 98% of the target.

# 8,300 1,162 1,134

Housing Construction Cash Grants were provided to Beneficiaries for the on-site reconstruction of red-tagged houses and buildings, and houses unfit for repair. The amounts allocated (US$3,600), the house sizes (18m2, 25 m2, 36 m2 and 46 m2 depending on whether it was a single family or a multi-family house) and the standards to be

# 3,700 938 944

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Component/Sub-Component


RestructuringTarget

Actual

used remained contentious during project implementation and the Bank suggested a review to consider some of the US, UK and French housing standards. The selection of beneficiaries was based on defined criteria and a lottery, as demand exceeded supply. The program was more subsidized than anticipated as GOH increased the level of subsidies after construction. Monthly payments were to be made by beneficiaries until cost of the house was covered; Beneficiaries paid about 20% of costs.

Technical Assistance to neighborhood communities

The provision of technical assistance helped support neighborhood communities, including NDCs, in the preparation and implementation of Project activities. The TA was satisfactorily implemented and included: (i) coordination of community-based mapping exercises; (ii) preparation of Cash Grant selection criteria and procedures; (iii) provision of advice on resettlement policies and procedures (in accordance with the Resettlement Action Plans); (iv) provision of training on gender awareness; (v) establishment and operation of CRCs; (vi) creation and implementation of conflict-resolution mechanisms related to Project activities; (vii) supervision of housing construction activities; and (viii) provision of training on the use of new building codes and techniques (see below).

Component 2: Communal Infrastructure repair and improvementEstablishing the CRCs CRCs were established on time and were fully staffed and effective. They

operated satisfactorily over the project period. Although the CRCs were meant to be converted into branch offices of the municipal administration for the project area (similar to the COPRODEPs under PRODEPUR), they were however dismantled at the end of the project.

# 4 4 4

Establishing the NDCs As the principal entity representing the community, NDCs played an instrumental role in project implementation by: (i) providing a link between the communities and the municipal authorities on the one hand, and with PMCs and BMPAD on the other hand; (ii) informing the communities of implementation progress and possible problems; and (iii) explaining project features and benefits, and taking part in the administration of the cash grant allocation for housing reconstruction. NDC operations varied slightly depending on the type and structure of the existing organization and the physical and social context of the area.

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Component/Sub-Component


RestructuringTarget

Actual

Demand-driven activities There was a menu of interventions and a few were picked out by the beneficiaries: roads and corridors; drainage ditches and channels; small bridges; electric panels; and sanitation. Most sub-projects were properly executed, however, there was no quantitative criteria for sub-project selection, which led to over or under-engineer sub-projects, i.e., some main roads were constructed using cobblestones that are cheaper, but are less resistant to heavy traffic, and some corridors were made with cement (more expensive and very resistant).

# TBD 277 288

Component 3: Institutional Capacity Support and StudiesCommunity urban development plan completed and approved by the Communities

The urban restructuring plan methodology has been successfully tested in Delmas 32 as part of the preparation of PRODEPUR. Similarly, the community-based mapping exercises to determine property tenure status will be based on on-going work by GOH entities, IOM, and UN-Habitat. The community urban plans were completed and approved by the communities in a timely manner.

# TBD 4 4

Advisory Services for Communities and Municipalities

Implementation of the housing repair and reconstruction program and the community infrastructure repair and improvement program required close assistance by teams of adequately skilled local and international specialists. Although this output did not have indicators, it was achieved.

Other activities were cancelled

Sector institutions were already receiving substantial institutional support from other donors and did not have the capacity to absorb additional activities at the same time.

Component 4: Project ManagementBaseline established no later than 6 months after project launch and M&E reports available annually

Some delays were encountered in setting up the baseline. # 1 1 1

24

25

26

.

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

At appraisal, cost benefit analysis was not carried out as PREKAD is a demand driven project. An ex-post quantitative economic analysis has been carried for this ICRR, the main elements of which are summarized below.

Conversion Factors for Economic AnalysisThe conversion factors used for converting financial costs to economic costs are summarized in Table A3.1.

Table A3.1: Conversion Factors for Economic AnalysisCategory Factor

Energy 0.8Services 1

Equipment, Goods and Infrastructure 1 for Bank funded equipmentLabor 1 and social cost is not used

Salaries 1 and social allocations are not usedSource: adapted from IMF Haiti Article IV (2016).

A number of additional key assumptions were considered in the economic analysis: A real discount rate of 6% per annum. The right-of-way, including the price of land and any structures on the land, was not

included in the analysis. Benefits are assumed to accrue over and after project implementation (see Table A3.4) at

various periods.

The disbursed economic and financial costs during the 2011-2016 period are shown in Table A3.2.

Table A3.2: Economic and Financial Costs during 2011 - 2016,(US$ million)

Cost 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Financial 0.0 5.0 18.0 24.4 17.6 4.8 64.8 Economic 0.0 4.5 16.2 22.0 15.8 4.6 62.8

Source: ISRs and Table A3.1

Quantification of Benefits

As many of the benefits of housing for the displaced are difficult to quantify, the economic analysis is limited to:

reduced incidence of cholera; increase in land value in community infrastructure interventions; reduced opportunity losses from flooding in flood prone neighborhoods; rental value of new houses repaired and reconstructed; and benefits of latrines in houses.

Results of Economic Analysis

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Costs associated with the four components are considered in the economic analysis and are assumed to be disbursed as illustrated in Table A3.3. Benefits are assumed to start accruing in 2012.

Table A3.3: Economic Flows Truncated at 2017(US$ million)

Category 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Total CAPEX 0.0 4.5 16.2 22.0 15.8 4.3

Total OMEX 0.3 0.3

Ben 1 Cholera avoided 1.2 3.9 1.3 0.8 0.2Ben 2 Land appreciation 12.4 12.4 12.4 12.4Ben 3 Drainage and better access 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4Ben 4 House repaired and reconstructed 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0Ben 5 Latrines 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

The project is economically viable with a net present value (NPV) of US$7.3 million (using a discount rate of 6%) with an economic rate of return (ERR) of 19% and a PV B/C ratio of 1.1 (Table A3.4). The project remains viable even at discount rates of 4% and 8%. Further details of the economic analysis are in the Project Files.

Table A3.4: Economic Analysis of the Entire ProjectKey Economic Indicator Viability Criteria

(6% Discount rateOver a6-year investment)

Entire Project discounted

at 4%

Entire Project

discounted at 6%

Entire Project discounted

at 8%

Economic AnalysisNPV (US$ million) >0 9.8 7.3 5.3ERR (±%) ≥discount rate 19% 19% 19%PV Benefit/Cost Ratio >1 1.2 1.1 1.1Viability Yes Yes Yes

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ReferencesBassi, S. (IEEP), P. ten Brink (IEEP), A. Farmer (IEEP), G. Tucker (IEEP), S. Gardner (IEEP), L. Mazza (IEEP), W. Van Breusegem (Arcadis), A. Hunt (Metroeconomica), M. Lago (Ecologic), J. Spurgeon (ERM), M. Van Acoleyen (Arcadis), B. Larsen and, F. Doumani. 2011. Benefit Assessment Manual for Policy Makers: Assessment of Social and Economic Benefits of Enhanced Environmental Protection in the ENPI countries. A guiding document for the project ‘Analysis for European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Countries and the Russian Federation on social and economic benefits of enhanced environmental protection’. Brussels.

International Monetary Fund. 2016. Haiti Article IV. Washington, D.C.

Navrud, Ståle. 2009. Value Transfer Techniques and Expected Uncertainties. New Energy Externalities Developments for Sustainability (NEEDS). Project no: 502687. Deliverable n° 2.1 - RS 3a. SWECO. Stockholm.

Navrud, S. and Lindhjem, H. 2010. Meta-analysis of stated preference VSL studies: Further model sensitivity and benefit transfer issues. Prepared for the Environment Directorate, OECD.

World Bank.2012. Senegal Stormwater Management and Climate Change Adaptation Project. Report No. 66451-SN. Washington, D.C.

World Bank. 2017. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.

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Annex 4. Grant Preparation and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Table A4.1: Task Team members

Names Title Responsibility/Specialty

Lending and supervisionSylvie Debomy Sr. Urban Planner TTLAli Alwahti Urban Specialist Co-TTLElisa Muzzini Sr Economist TTLJonas Ingemann Parby Sr. Urban Specialist TTLJoan Foami Sr Urban Development ConsultantFelix Jakob ConsultantFabio Pittaluga Sr. Social Development Specialist SafeguardsValerie Hickey Environment Specialist SafeguardsFranck Bessette Sr. Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementJoseph KizitoMubiru Sr. Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementYao Wottor Sr. Procurement Specialist ProcurementProsper Nindorera Procurement Specialist ProcurementRose Caline Cadet Procurement Specialist ProcurementJosue Akre Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementFabienne Mzorcka Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementLydie Madjou Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementEmeline Bredy Financial Management Specialist Financial ManagementViviana Maya Counsel LegalMark Walker Chief Counsel Legal

Trish Barrett Disaster Risk Management and Urban Analyst

Sergio DellAnna DRM SpecialistDavid Lallemant Structural Engineer and Urban AnalystNavid Rahimi Junior Professional AssociateHassine Hedda Financial OfficerPatricia Acevedo Program Assistant

Jean Christophe Adrian UN-Habitat Country Programme Manager – Haiti, Peer Reviewer

Abhas Jha Lead Urban Specialist Peer ReviewerGeorges Soraya Lead Municipal Engineer Peer Reviewer

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Table A4.2 Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project CycleStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks US$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY11 20.30 107,895

Total: 20.30 107,895Supervision/ICRFY11 2.68 54,335FY12 54.24 252,079FY13 23.46 133,345FY14 28.71 143,811FY15 35.66 165,714FY16 25.31 113,919FY17 9.83 65,073Total: 179.89 928,276

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey ResultsA beneficiary survey was not carried out.

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and ResultsN/A

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Annex 7. Summary of Recipient's ICR and/or Comments to the Draft ICR

Summary of Recipient's ICR

The PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD Projects were financed by an IDA grant of US$ 30 million and a Trust Fund (US grant managed by the World Bank) of US$ 65 million respectively. They were part of a government-oriented approach to improve the living conditions of the residents of certain districts of Port-au-Prince, seriously affected by the earthquake of January 12, 2010. The objective of both projects called hereon in Program was to facilitate the return of the residents of these districts to their communities by helping them repairing and / or rebuilding their homes or returning to rental housing, and improving the basic infrastructure and services of neighborhoods. The Program was officially launched in February 2011 and ended in December 2016. This report: (i) presents the Program and its intervention environment; (ii) provides an exhaustive account of its achievements with an emphasis on its impacts; (iii) gives a critical assessment of the different aspects of this assessment; and (iv) outlines the main lessons learned from this experience.

In its implementation strategy, the Program has focused on a partnership between the State, local and regional authorities and community-based organizations. The strategy sought to ensure the use and strengthening of local expertise, as well as the effective participation of communities through their constituted bodies. Overall, it focused on a participatory approach, on the ability of families and local communities to make collective decisions about their future. In this sense, COPRODEP (where this structure exists at the level of a neighborhood), local authorities, grass-roots organizations, young people in the community, and direct and indirect beneficiaries of these initiatives have been involved in the Program with the aim to achieving better articulated and managed outputs and broad community ownership. The activities to be implemented within each neighborhood have followed an approach defined in the Manual of Operation of the Program. Their Programming required a prior assessment of the needs and a framework of the interventions considering a timetable of the tasks and their implementation.

Different actors were involved in the implementation of the Program: (i) The World Bank (IDA and US grant monies), which granted the funds to the Government of Haiti, oversaw the overall management of the funds; (ii) The Office of Monetization of Development Assistance Programs (BMPAD) is the National Agency for the execution of the Program for the Haitian State through its Directorate of Analysis and Evaluation (DAE) and its Project Coordination Unit (PCU). The DAE is responsible for the administration and management of the Program, i.e., monitoring and evaluation of implementation, audits (technical and financial) and all other impact studies. It directly managed Component 1 of PRODEPUR Habitat and Components 3 and 4 of PREKAD; (iii) The six Delegated Project Managers (MDODs), i.e., PADF, IOM, CHF, HFH, CECI and J/P HRO, were selected on the basis of their capacities and experience in the implementation of Component 2 of PRODEPUR Habitat and Components 1 and 2 of PREKAD; (iv) The OPM/UCLBP to whom the BMPAD has delegated, through an amendment to the PREKAD grant agreement and a protocol signed between the two organizations on 23 January 2013, the technical responsibility for the implementation of the " Return of displaced people to either rebuilt or rehabilitated premises"; (v) the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC), which should provide a mandatory visa for the components, i.e., repair and reconstruction of houses and infrastructure, approve planning and town planning plans and coordinate with the BMPAD communication officer on all aspects of the Habitat communication strategy; (vi) The Municipalities of Port-au-Prince and Delmas, acting as facilitators on various aspects of the implementation of the Program, i.e., land tenure, social and environmental aspects, approved planning and town planning plans; (vii) The Inter-Ministerial Committee for

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Territorial Planning (CIAT), which was involved in the preparation of the terms of reference and the follow-up of the studies on the Operational Planning Plans and other procedures involving urban planning and urban development issues in the Port-au-Prince urban area ; and (viii) The MAST/EPPLS involved in the management of rental stock / home ownership.

The Program has financed a total of 382 infrastructures works, of which 94 under the PRODEPUR HABITAT and 288 under the PREKAD. The works are distributed in four districts of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area: Delmas 32, Carrefour-Feuilles, Simon-Pelé, Nazon / Christ-Roi / Poupelard. All the infrastructures works were carried out through six major fields of activity spelled out in the Program Operations Manual (Activities A, B, C, D, E, F). Within the framework of Activity A, a total of 45,222 m3 of excavated material was evacuated with the support of MDODs, i.e., PADF, HFH and CHF; 3,078 houses were repaired as part of Activity B, with the support of MDODs, i.e., IOM, J/P HRO, CHF and PADF; Approximately 262 housing units were built as part of Activity C with the support of MDODs, i.e., IOM, J/P HRO, CHF and PADF; Approximately 14,572 families benefited from voluntary movement to a safer housing and more than a dozen closed camps as part of Activity D with the support of MDODs, i.e., IOM, CHF, CECI, HFH and J/P HRO; Approximately 12,591 linear meters of track have been rehabilitated or constructed, approximately 25,500 linear meters of corridors and staircases have been installed and at least 617 solar-powered streetlights have been installed as part of the E / F activity with the support of the six MDODs, i.e., PADF, IOM, CHF, HFH, CECI and J/P HRO.

Apart from the direct beneficiaries, the infrastructures works contributed to the improvement of the living conditions of more than five hundred thousand people (500,000 people), for considerably reducing the risks of infectious disease by the rehabilitation of hydraulic networks, undrained roads and corridors, which transformed into a dumps accumulating all kinds of garbage and refuse; For reducing the isolation of neighborhoods by rehabilitating roads connecting neighboring districts; For allowing the return of many displaced families to their renovated and strengthened homes. The Program also highlighted opportunities for much deeper improvements in the building environment by defining different models of collective dwellings. The Center for Reconstruction Support (RAC), which had been transformed into an interface between the communities and the Program, laid the foundations for the "Community Resource Center" concept. Not only did it host training sessions for the public but it also allowed neighborhood residents to learn about the Program's projections and achievements, and to pass on their grievances and requests for support regarding their personal projects.

The Program has made a significant contribution to local governance through the introduction and ownership of best practices of participation, negotiation, dialogue, dialogue and accountability in communities.

Although not part of the Program's main deliverables, there has been an ongoing and important effort to build the capacity of individuals, particularly young people. In this sense, a training Program has been put in place to improve technical skills in safer construction as well as knowledge for better management of living together. The themes selected corresponded to knowledge that would better arm the community to deal with recurring events: conflicts between armed groups, neighborhood conflicts, management of income from activities, vulnerability of the community to certain disasters and natural disasters and most certainly the need to improve the structure of houses to reduce the damage in the event of other earthquakes. The RACs have played an important role in this campaign to promote and develop construction skills among young people to promote job creation and the revitalization of neighborhoods. The aim of these activities was to create a critical mass of human resources that could contribute to the revitalization of the neighborhood reconstruction process.

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The Program was to measure 39 indicators: 29 for PRODEPUR Habitat and 10 for PREKAD. Referring to the table that exploited the information provided by the MDODs (outcome framework) and the different reports on the impact of the Program, we can say that the objectives were met and were exceeded in many cases. Expectations for improving living conditions in target neighborhoods as a response to the January 12, 2010 disaster, by facilitating the return of residents to their communities, helping them repair and / or rebuild their homes and by improving basic community infrastructure and services, have been largely met.

Major constraints significantly affected the Program's progress and management during its six years of implementation. They were linked, among other things, to the emergency caused by the earthquake, where it was necessary to respond rapidly while respecting technical and environmental standards, which were often poorly understood by most stakeholders. Moreover, the intervention sites of these projects shelter precarious neighborhoods with a degraded environment in a difficult community context where security is sometimes threatened by well-organized armed gangs. Security constraints have sometimes hampered the smooth running of the work, and hence the timeliness of the work.

There are considerable lessons learned from the implementation of the Program. These include: The availability of treated water in neighborhoods improves availability but access remains to

be facilitated; The construction of collective dwellings in these neighborhoods constitutes a way of

improving the habitat and the living environment in a global way; The integration of state institutions in certain critical phases of the Program has given it the

opportunity to ensure compliance and implementation of state guidelines throughout the Program implementation process;

Communicating the Program to the population by highlighting almost exclusively the work of the MDODs entails a risk of delegitimization of the State for the benefit of NGOs. When the Haitian state finances an action, it must be totally put forward and claim its paternity whatever the structure that implements it;

The construction and appropriation of apartments in the form of coops testify to the capacity of the population to fit into modernity. Contrary to popular belief, it has not shown any resistance to innovation in this new ownership model in Haiti.

To maintain the achievements and improve the quality of the results, it is desirable to be able to take account of the following recommendations:

Return of the inhabitants living in camps; A committee of owners should be set up and strengthened within the apartments to guarantee

the rights of owners on the one hand and to maintain cleanliness in their immediate environment on the other hand;

For future interventions, it is important to have a diagnostic phase to ensure that all unmet needs are considered. It would therefore require a strong involvement of the different potential beneficiaries and adapted communication strategies;

To better integrate displaced persons, it is strongly recommended to follow up the displaced persons in their host communities and provide them with support for the revival of economic activities;

The diversity of actors with the same mandate deserves a harmonized approach to intervention in certain areas.

People with reduced mobility should be better considered in construction work both in neighborhoods and in apartments. Because the earthquake has left behind many physical cripples to whom it is necessary to facilitate the integration. Attention should be paid to vulnerable populations: women, children, persons with reduced mobility, families living below the absolute poverty line.

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To promote greater social cohesion among the inhabitants, the cultural needs of the inhabitants, especially the young, should be considered in the reconstruction activities of the neighborhoods. Consideration should be given to the establishment of socio-cultural centers capable of encouraging the development of cultural and sports activities in the neighborhoods.

It is strongly recommended that, in a future Program of the same type, MDODs submit all their reports, both financial and business, in an identical format. The data from these reports should be automatically integrated into the MIS from the MDODs. This will make the final evaluation work easier. For better monitoring and evaluation of projects, it would be desirable for MDODs to submit reports covering both the technical and financial aspects.

Summary of comments to the draft ICR provided by the GoH

The GoH recognized the positive outcomes of the project and agreed with the findings and ratings of the ICR, including the “Satisfactory” overall outcome rating. Comments received by the GoH clarify certain findings as detailed below:

Financial Management (FM): The GoH recognized the FM shortcomings experienced during project implementation and clarified that delays in disbursements were mostly due to strict internal control measures necessary to ensure compliance with Bank procedures. Additionally, the GoH noted that the lengthy processing of certain No-Objection requests by the Bank contributed to some delays in disbursements.

Performance of MDODs: The GoH agreed the MDODs’ performance to be satisfactory despite working in challenging areas and under harsh conditions. However, the GoH notes that BMPAD’s project management suffered from the systematic delays in the submission of technical and financial reports from MDODs. These delays impacted M&E but also exacerbated delays in BMPAD’s financial reporting. BMPAD was not able to use its M&E system, the MIS, to its full potential to monitor project implementation on the ground as MDODs did not submit up-to-date and regular M&E information to the system. BMPAD struggled to strictly enforce compliance to M&E requirements by MDODs and requests for Bank support in this regard did not result in concrete solutions.

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Full comments to the draft ICR provided by the GoH

Commentaires sur les rapports de bilan de fin d’exécution et de résultats des projetsPRODEPUR et PREKAD

Le Gouvernement Haïtien accepte l’évaluation de la Banque Mondiale ainsi que la note globale pour l’exécution des projets PREKAD et PRODEPUR jugée « satisfaisante ». Cependant, il demeure certains points qui méritent d’être souligner ; ainsi nous vous prions de bien vouloir trouver ci joints nos commentaires sur ces deux (2) projets :

Evaluation de la gestion financièreLa gestion financière des deux projets a été jugée moyennement insatisfaisante par la banque pour diverses causes telles que le retard accusé dans les décaissements et dans la soumission des rapports financiers. L’agence d’exécution est consciente de la lenteur dans le décaissement de certains fonds mais tient toutefois à noter que cela est en partie dû à son service de contrôle interne qui se doit d’être stricte en vue de respecter les exigences de la Banque. De plus, il est important de souligner que les délais de traitement de certains dossiers soumis pour Non-Objection à la Banque a aussi contribué au retard de certains décaissements.

Au niveau du PREKAD, il est fait mention que « […] certains MDODs avaient dépassé leur budget ». Le BMPAD a toujours tenu à ce que toutes les dépenses des MDOD se fassent à l’intérieur du budget contractuel. Des réaménagements budgétaires ont toutefois été effectués à l’intérieur du budget mais aucun MDODs n’a dépassé l’enveloppe qui lui était allouée.

Evaluation de la performance des MDODComme indiqué dans les (2) évaluations, la plupart des MDODs ont rempli leur contrat avec des résultats satisfaisants tout en évoluant dans des conditions extrêmement difficiles, mais nous pensons qu’il est important de faire mention de certains soucis que l’agence d’exécution a dû confronter avec les MDODs au cours de la mise en œuvre des projets.

Le BMPAD a dû faire face à des retards systématiques dans la soumission des rapports techniques et financiers des MDODs. Ces retards ont rendu particulièrement difficiles le travail de suivi et d’évaluation ; mais aussi ont accentué les retards dans la soumission des rapports financiers intermédiaires (RSF), déjà compliquée de par le chevauchement entre la date de soumission des rapports des MDODs et celle des rapports du BMPAD.

Le BMPAD déplore l’échec de la mise en œuvre efficace du Système d’Information et de Gestion (MIS) conçu pour les deux (2) projets. En effet, le MIS aurait dû être un élément fondamental dans la structure de gestion et de suivi des projets, et malgré les investissements (ressources humaines et financières) consentis pour sa conception et sa mise en service, l’outil n’a jamais pu remplir adéquatement son rôle de banque de données. Ce système était conçu sur le principe que le BMPAD devait s’appuyer sur les MDODs pour saisir les entrées dans le système avec pour but d’avoir en temps réel l’évolution des réalisations sur les deux (2) projets. Toutefois, la réalité a été tout autre ; la mise à jour des informations sur le système n’était pas effectuée de manière systématique par les MDODs au

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point ou souvent les informations soumis dans leurs rapports trimestriels était plus à jour que ceux disponibles dans le système. Malgré plusieurs interventions du BMPAD, les MDODs n’ont jamais pu redresser la barque.

Ces situations viennent du fait que l’agence d’exécution ne disposait d’aucun moyen de coercition afin de contraindre les MDODs à soumettre les rapports (techniques et financiers) et effectuer la mise à jour des données sur le MIS dans les délais impartis. Le BMPAD a mené plusieurs interventions auprès de la Banque afin d’inclure dans les conventions de financement avec les MDODs des clauses permettant à l’agence d’exécution d’appliquer des sanctions en cas de non-respect de leurs responsabilités contractuelles. Ces démarches n’ont malheureusement jamais abouti.

Il faut aussi souligner que c’est grâce à l’insistance du BMPAD afin de maximiser les investissements du projet sur les activités de terrain que les MDODs ont acceptés sur le PREKAD de réduire leurs frais généraux pour réorienter ces ressources vers les sous-projets au bénéfice des populations.

PREKAD – Les Capacités institutionnelles dans le secteur du logement Selon le rapport, « L’EPPLS au sein du ministère des affaires sociales et du travail (MAST) a développé, en collaboration avec l’UCLBP et le BMPAD, le Manuel opérationnel du RSCG 2014 qui fournit un cadre logistique et éthique autour de la subvention de location bénéficiant les personnes déplacées vivant dans des camps pour qu’elles puissent recouvrer leur dignité en ayant accès à des logements sûrs. »

Nous tenons à clarifier que le BMPAD, l’UCLBP et l’EPPLS ont travaillé sur un « Guide de Procédures » pour l’attribution des nouveaux logements, décents et surs, construits dans le cadre des deux (2) projets. Ce guide fixait la marche à suivre pour que le processus d’attribution se fasse dans la plus parfaite transparence.

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Annex 8. List of Supporting Documents

PREKAD EPP 2011PREKAD Grant Agreement 2011PRODEPUR-PREKAD ESIAF 2011PREKAD EPP Restructuring Paper 2012PREKAD EPP Restructuring Paper 2015PREKAD EPP Restructuring Paper 2016 PREKAD Mid-Term-Review report 2014 PREKAD ISR (13)PREKAD Aide-Memoire (12)PREKAD BMPAD progress reports and audits World Bank. 2014. Rental Support Cash Grant Programs: Operational Manual. Washington, D.C.PRODEPUR HABITAT/PREKAD Government ICR (in French)External Evaluation of Haiti Reconstruction Fund 2015BMPAD, EPPLS et UCLBP. 2015. Procédures d’attribution et de remise des clés des logements construits dans le cadre du programme PREKAD-PRODEPUR : Guide des procédures. Port-au-Prince.

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Annex 9: Exogenous and Endogenous Factors that Affected PREKAD Implementation

The exogenous and endogenous factors include: Political turmoil and social unrest: punctual social unrest and tense political

environment where repeatedly postponed parliamentary elections, especially in 2015 and 2016 resulted in a political standoff that was finally resolved by early 2017. These were intermittent events that should be factored in during project implementation and the postponement of the project closing dates.

Catastrophic Events: before the 2010 earthquake, catastrophic events hit Belle-Anse and Fonds Verrettes affected more than 100,000 people in May 2004 and claimed more than 1,000 lives; Storm Jeanne caused flash floods affecting 300,000 people in the region between Cap Haitien, Port-de-Paix and Gonaives in September 2004 killing more than 3,000 people due to floods; Tropical Storm Noel in October 2007 causing severe floods affecting 194,000 people, killing 330 people and damaging Haiti’s public and private infrastructure; and Tropical Storms Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike in 2008 affected 1 million people and killed 800 people. After the 2010 earthquake, Haiti kept being hit by catastrophic events that exacerbated cholera outbreak notably in displaced camps, e.g., Thomas on November 5, 2010, Isaac on August 25, 2012 that triggered PREKAD 1 st

Restructuring with the objective to reduce displaced living in camps and Mathew on October 2-4, 2016 where the toll of the latter was by far the highest with about 1,300 deaths and about 35,000 left homeless from the storm surge mainly in coastal rural areas. These hurricanes complicated the reconstruction management efforts but mildly affected PREKAD implementation in Metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Incidentally, 803,000 cases of cholera and 9,455 deaths were reported in Haiti from January 2010 till December 2016 and the summer of 2010 outbreak triggered the Bank 2/2011-3/2014 Cholera Emergency Response Project.

Poverty prevalence remained important despite economic growth and had some bearing on displaced people in camps to afford decent housing despite the cash grant: The earthquake international emergency response fueled by aid money accelerated the GDP per capita that remained positive over the 2011-2016 period but was not high and sustained enough to meaningfully reducing poverty and hence reaching the Millennium Development Goals targets on poverty reduction: actual 58.6 percent in 2014 against a target of 30.9 percent in 2015.

Overheating economy: the reconstruction drive heated up the economy and increased the public deficit since 2013 which required the Central Bank of Haiti to tighten up monetary policy that nevertheless led to the depreciation of the Gourdes by almost 50 percent by the end of 2016 when compared to just before the earthquake. This had some bearing on project implementation and required BMPAD to amend some MDOD contracts to account for inflation.

Post-earthquake GOH disruption: the 2010 earthquake disrupted the GOH capacity, decision-making process and intervention effectiveness as illustrated by PREKAD 2-month effectiveness delay, slow start and an 8-month-no-disbursement after effectiveness.

Lack of Urban planning and unclear land tenure hindered reconstruction. The earthquake destroyed an untold number of title deeds and land registry records and has exacerbated land tenure claims. With some 220,000-people dead, inheritance and sale of land after the earthquake raised all sorts of questions about property owners. Disputes between land owners and homeless survivors squatting in damaged homes or on private

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land were evicted by force. The lack of clarity about land ownership opened the door for land grabbing which was already rampant in the capital's slums before the earthquake hit. Moreover, the lack of governance made the enforcement of land rights very difficult while legal protection is almost non-existent. Land tenure affected the implementation of PREKAD as after determining land ownership and compensating displaced people to clear the land areas to be reconstructed, a surrounding wall needed to be built to avoid new squatters to claim the land. It occurred few times and the new squatters had to be compensated to leave the premises. The land tenure problem was compounded by the lack of a clear urban planning policy.

Inherent project design shortcomings: The pre-earthquake deficit and substandard quality of the housing stock and infrastructure and vulnerability of many sites made the whole reconstruction process even more challenging as two important factors arose after effectiveness: (i) it was difficult to convince households to participate in house repair and reconstruction before the repair and improvement of communal infrastructures; and (ii) the targeted households were not fully identified in terms of owners or renters during project preparation as the majority was former renters (80 percent) which required a shift to ensuring access to rental housing stock. These two factors led the Team to restructure twice the project to put more emphasis on integrated neighborhood approach in terms of community infrastructure repair and improvement as well as financial incentive packages applicable to all housing intervention including the cash grant for household renters. This approach was in line with the GOH’s replicable community planning and neighborhood upgrading models that were piloted under the Rehabilitation of 16 Neighborhoods and Voluntary Return from Associated 6 Camps Project called also the “16/6 Project”.

BMPAD implementing capacity: despite its resilience after the 2010 earthquake, BMPAD had neither the leadership nor specific capacity in housing reconstruction or in urban upgrading after effectiveness. Moreover, BMPAD showed: (i) delays and weaknesses in financial management and reporting; (ii) delays in recruiting consultants to perform the technical and financial audits (legal covenant); (iii) weaknesses in terms of M&E system, and reporting as well as an absence of communication strategy; and (iv) overall delays of the implementation agency to react to NGOs infrastructures works proposals and misguided directives, and to cooperate with the Bank. Moreover, there was initially a clear resistance from BMPAD to switch to a corporate culture as a Technical Assistance (TA) mission to BMPAD was carried out in May 2013 and provided the necessary tools for BMPAD to better program, supervise and monitor the project activities, adopt a result-oriented practice, and update the operation manual. The TA made sure that BMPAD would work closely with: OPM/UCLBP to produce the Practical Guide for Small Buildings in Haiti and to unburden its operations by delegating some of its mandate to OPM/UCLBP that became technically responsible for the implementation of the return of displaced people to either rebuilt or rehabilitated premises; with MAST/EPPLS to effectively take over the management of new housing projects on public lands; and with municipalities to take over the communal infrastructure maintenance. These shortcomings started to be drastically addressed after the 1st Restructuring as reported in the 2014 MTR thanks to an effective Bank support and TA (see Section 6).

Housing policy shortcomings: PDNA assumed the GOH would finance the contingent liability of housing reconstruction and repair for low-income Haitians, which was assumed to be the highest cost item, whereas the GOH assumed a combination of humanitarian funds and credit would be used while the HAPNERD assumed the major costs would be for land acquisition and infrastructure for major relocation sites; the NRHRF dismissed strategy illustrated a lack of GOH leadership (one institution with a clear mandate for housing and building code) and communication regarding the reconstruction strategy that created unreasonable expectations across the displaced population that was hoping for free

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houses; a belief also supported by BMPAD after effectiveness. Moreover, there was a lack of guidance on the size of the houses to be built and subsidy amount as BMPAD was siding against the originally designed owner driven reconstruction as construction standards were difficult to enforce. In 2012, the OPM/UCLBP mandate was reemphasized and a TA helped OPM/UCLBP formulate a new Housing Policy based on NRHRF that was long-ado after the 2010 earthquake and was released in October 2013 or 20 months after project effectiveness. Incidentally, communal housing or coop was suggested in the Housing Policy and launched by BMPAD with MDODs to test the grounds for such a new housing arrangement.

Institutional set up: there was no clear division of roles and responsibilities between BMPAD and OPM/UCLBP in coordinating and implementing the reconstruction strategy after project effectiveness which started being resolved after the 1 st Restructuring where OPM/UCLBP assumed a leading role in supervising and guiding housing and neighborhood reconstruction projects although the MAST/EPPLS delayed the transfer of buyers to new built houses as proper guidelines, which needed to be produced, were finally released in 2015. After the 2014 MTR, the institutional set up improved although bureaucratic procedures delayed somewhat the clearance system at all stages of the sub-project reconstruction and repair of communal infrastructures and houses.

Unsafe areas of intervention: Cité Soleil and Carrefour-Feuilles in Port-au-Prince were targeted areas that proved challenging for MDODs to keep contract implementation on schedule as riots could break out at any time, civil unrest was frequent and gangs were roaming the streets. Third party contractors operating in these areas made commendable efforts to help deliver the works.

Mismanagement of municipal waste: except for clearing debris and some small dumps to build houses and communal infrastructure (e.g., Rue de l’Union complex with 16 houses, 8 commercial spaces, an open-air amphitheater and basketball court in Delmas 32), the mismanagement of municipal waste in Port-au-Prince and Delmas 32 where improved drainage was conducted in various neighborhoods will probably not reap the expected benefits unless drainage are stopped being used as municipal waste dumps. As municipalities are not properly assuming the provision for municipal waste services, this could have serious consequences on social benefits (lost opportunities, flooding, damages to houses and commerce and the spread of communicable diseases) and the sustainability of the drainage assets.

Unsecured and un-hygienic displaced camps: several events of displaced people fleeing Port-au-Prince camps occurred after the earthquake due to security and an un-hygienic environment (see cholera outbreak above and cholera incidence in Annex 3) in the camps which required the 1st Restructuring to increase the envelope and speed up the one-time cash grant for rental.

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Annex 10 Implementation Arrangements

Overall project implementation arrangements will remain unchanged from PRODEPUR. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) will oversee the Project. MEF will delegate overall project execution to BMPAD. BMPAD, in turn, will delegate management of most day-to-day operations to PMCs (Project Management Contractors) which will be hired on a competitive basis and can be either NGOs (as in PRODEPUR) or other non-public sector entities.

A. Executing entities

BMPAD is an autonomous public institution, created in 2007 (as a successor to the PL 480 management office established in 1985) to: (i) receive and convert into cash the food aid from the international donors; and (ii) identify and fund Government development projects with relevant institutions and/or agencies, in areas such as road construction, agriculture, education, health, and commerce. BMPAD is governed by a Board chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance and including several other key line ministries as active members. BMPAD has a strong track record of working together with other sector Ministries, combined with detailed knowledge of procedures applied by the various donors. BMPAD is managed by a General Director, who reports to the Board’s Secretariat, and is composed of technical, finance, and administrative units.

Steering Committee: To follow, and provide guidance to, the implementation of the proposed project the Government will set up a steering committee. As proposed the committee which will be chaired by the Ministry of Economy and Finance will include the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communication, the Ministry of Interior and Territorial Collectivities, as well as representatives of the municipalities concerned by the project in the Port-au-Price Metropolitan Area.

Project Coordination Unit (PCU/BMPAD) is responsible for overall project coordination, management, administration, and oversight. The PCU/BMPAD‟s responsibilities include: (i) continuous oversight of the execution of information campaigns; (ii) project reporting to the Bank; (iii) overall project financial management; (iv) maintenance and updating of the Project Management Information System (MIS); and (v) impact evaluation.

Project Management Contractors (PMCs) are operators that will be contracted as maîtres d’ouvrage délégué (MDOD) to: (i) manage the implementation “on-the-ground” on behalf of BMPAD.

Neighborhood Development Councils (NDCs): These are existing community organizations such as the COPRODEP set up for PRODEPUR in the target neighborhoods of that project, or other organizations such as CASECs and others in non-PRODEPUR areas. As the principal entity representing the community NDCs play an instrumental role in project implementation by, inter alia, (i) providing a link between the communities and the municipal authorities on the one hand, with PMCs and BMPAD on the other hand; (ii) informing the communities about implementation progress and possible problems; and (iii) explaining project features and benefits and taking part in the administration of cash grant allocation for housing reconstruction. Features of NDCs operations may vary slightly from neighborhood depending on the type and structures of the existing organization and the physical and social context of the area. More specific instructions on the use of NDCs will be contained in the updated OM.

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Community Reconstruction Centers (CRCs): To facilitate the implementation of the project, BMPAD and the municipalities responsible for the project areas will jointly establish CRCs (Centres de Reconstruction Communautaire). These centers will be located within the project neighborhoods and their purpose will be to provide the neighborhood communities with a one-stop consultation and training place open to all neighborhood residents (i.e., not limited to identified cash-grant beneficiaries) for all questions related to housing repair and reconstruction, compliance with new building codes, and/or identification and prioritization of community infrastructure improvements including, but not limited to, technical advice and counseling on legal/social issues. The centers will also serve as an information facility creating a strong and permanent interface between communities, municipal authorities, BMPAD and PMCs as well as urban planning consultants. To this end, the CRCs will be staffed with experts with adequate professional experience in the fields of structural engineering and construction management, urban planning, and all aspects of community work. Ultimately, it is expected that these centers could be converted into branch offices of the municipal administration for the project area.

B. Implementation Arrangements

Arrangements for Debris Removal and Building Demolition: Debris removal from project areas will be undertaken under NHRP if no other donor agency or GOH entity has an ongoing debris removal and/or demolition program or plans to start one in the near future. Removal activities will be organized by the PMC on close consultation with the municipality, the COPRODEP or other relevant community organizations. Debris will be removed from streets and open public spaces, as well as from private lots subject the consent of the owner, through either cash-for-work programs or the hiring of one or several contractors. For reasons of operational safety and environmental management demolition of buildings will be carried out primarily by enterprises possessing both the necessary technical equipment and appropriately trained workers. Demolition will only be undertaken for structures damaged beyond repair subject to the consent of the owner or the order of municipal authorities in the case of buildings representing a public safety hazard. Demolition may also include houses tagged „yellow‟ but for which upon close technical assessment repair costs are economically unjustifiable. All debris removal from streets and open spaces and hauling to the Truitier landfill or any other official landfill site will be undertaken by licensed contractors. The PMC will also be responsible for ensuring the compliance of contractors and cash-for-work workers with environmental regulations and instructions for the handling of possibly found human remains. Operational plans prepared by the contractors and reviewed by PMC and CRCs will be submitted periodically to the communities concerned for consultation prior to implementation. An existing Debris Management Pilot Program at the landfill site supports the recycling of construction material. Other recycling programs have recently been initiated by UNDP and other donors and will be associated with the project, if necessary.

Arrangements for Housing Repair and Reconstruction: The proposed NHRP will finance to eligible residents the repair and/or retrofitting of houses tagged „yellow‟ and cash grants to eligible beneficiaries for the construction of a replacement dwelling. The implementation of both the repair and reconstruction program will rely on the support provided by teams of appropriately trained facilitators operating through the CRCs.

The scope and cost of repairs (which are estimated to cost on average US$ 1,350 equivalent) will be determined on a case by case basis through an examination of the needs and type of works required by the experts of the CRC, assisted as needed by the PMC. Upon completion of the assessment, the owner (or in some cases the renter/occupant) will submit an application to the CRC for review, to be forwarded to a Grant Award Committee comprised of representatives of the neighborhood NDC, the area Municipality, and BMPAD. Upon approval of the application by the committee, the owner will sign a contract with the PMC authorizing the implementation of works according to the initially agreed

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upon work program and costs. Repair and retrofitting works will be carried out by local contractors under the supervision of the PMC. Payments to contractors for works executed will be made from a specific account opened for the PMC by BMPAD.

Cash Grants for housing reconstruction will be of US$ 3,500 equivalent. For the reconstruction of houses, all potential grant beneficiaries will be encouraged to form small neighborhood beneficiary groups of about ten to twelve households which will, to the extent feasible, collectively organize and manage the implementation of reconstruction works under the supervision of a team of specifically assigned facilitators and the CRC engineering/technical staff. A first step in the reconstruction process will be the identification of ownership or occupancy rights. In the absence of written documents these rights will be determined through community-based mapping and certification procedures (expected to be carried out by other donor agencies). Grant applications prepared, with the help of the group-specific facilitators, by qualified potential beneficiaries will be submitted to the CRCs for technical review. Applications deemed acceptable will be forwarded to a Grant Award Committee, comprised of representatives of the neighborhood NDC, the area Municipality, and BMPAD, for review and approval in accordance with specific GOH policies and/or instructions and guidelines. Because of the complexity of the tenure situation in most of the identified areas, special attention will be paid to encourage provisions for simple, transparent and explicit rules regulating the rights of previous renters vis-à-vis building or land owners, in order to secure their continuing access and occupancy of their repaired or rebuilt previous dwellings. A detailed description of all procedures pertaining to grant administration is contained in the updated OM. Upon approval of a grant, the beneficiary will, after a site visit by CRC technical experts, discuss and agree with the CRC facilitators on: (a) Design of the proposed construction (using preferentially standard designs preapproved by MTPTC); (b) Design and engineering issues and ensuing technical specifications for construction in the case of non-standard pre-approved design; (c) Methods and schedule of work implementation; (d) Arrangements for work supervision by CRC; (e) Grant disbursement arrangements.

Grants for housing reconstruction will be disbursed in four successive tranches: 25% on approval of design by CRC; 25% on completion of foundation/platform, 25% on completion of walls, and 25% on completion of roof. Changes to the above disbursement schedule may be agreed to between the beneficiary and the PMC in the case of constructions undertaken with a sizeable upfront cash contribution from the owner, or in the use of the grant as a down payment for a construction credit from a financial institution. All disbursements will be contingent on prior certification by CRC of conformity of construction work with agreed design and technical specifications and building codes.

Grant disbursements will be made by the PMCs to bank accounts opened either by individual beneficiaries or collectively by neighborhood beneficiary groups. For security reasons, no cash transactions will be made.

Arrangements for Community Infrastructure Repair and Improvement: Proposals for road and pedestrian access repair and improvement, drainage repair and improvement, solid waste collection improvement, and rehabilitation of water distribution points will be identified by neighborhood communities and/or in the case of water and sanitation by existing water committees and submitted to the CRC for technical review and discussion with the relevant local or central government authorities. Upon agreement by the communities of final designs, proposals will be submitted to the neighborhood NDC for approval. Implementation methods will largely depend on the nature of works and their technical requirements. Execution of potential repair work on the water supply network will be a joint decision of the NDC, DINEPA (Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement), the area Municipality, and the PMC.

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MAP

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