MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME24Docket: WCB-16-524Argued: September13,2017Decided: February8,2018Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andMEAD,GORMAN,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: JABARandALEXANDER,JJ.

VICTORS.URRUTIAv.

INTERSTATEBRANDSINTERNATIONALetal.HJELM,J.

[¶1]Aftersustaininginjuriesinanindustrialworkplaceaccident,Victor

S. Urrutia was paid total incapacity workers’ compensation benefits by his

employer, Interstate Brands International. For more than three years, he

receivedthefullamountofthosebenefitswhilealsocollectingSocialSecurity

retirementbenefits.WhenInterstatelearnedthatUrrutiawasreceivingSocial

Security benefits, it sought a credit, by way of a payment holiday, against

ongoingincapacitypaymentspursuanttoastatutoryprovisionthatreducesthe

amount of incapacity benefit payments by half of the amount of retirement

benefitstheemployeeisalsoreceiving.See 39-AM.R.S.§221(2017).

2

[¶2]Ahearingofficer(Stovall,HO)1orderedthatInterstatewasentitled

toacreditof$24,131.38,but theWorkers’CompensationAppellateDivision

decided the issue differently, determining that section221 doesnot allowa

reductionbasedonincapacityoverpaymentsmadeinthepast.Onthisappeal

byInterstateandACEAmericanInsuranceCompany(collectively,Interstate),

we conclude that section 221 entitles an employer to a credit for workers’

compensationbenefitspreviouslypaidforthesameliabilityperiodwhenthe

employeealsowasreceivingSocialSecurityretirementbenefits.Wetherefore

vacatethedecisionoftheAppellateDivision.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶3]Thefollowingfactsareundisputedbythepartiesandestablished

bytherecord.

[¶4]In2001,VictorUrrutiabeganworkingforInterstateasaproduction

mechanic.InJuly2009,whenhewas62yearsold,Urrutiaslippedonacatwalk

intheworkplaceandgrabbedarailingtocatchhimself,resultingininjuriesto

hisspineandextremities.

[¶5] Interstate began paying Urrutia total incapacity workers’

compensation benefits in December 2010. Unbeknownst to Interstate,

1 ThehearingoccurredonApril11,2014,priortothechangeintitlefrom“hearingofficer”to

“administrativelawjudge.”SeeP.L.2015ch.297(effectiveOct.15,2015).

3

however,UrrutiahadstartedreceivingSocialSecurityretirementbenefits in

August2010.2 InMay2013,InterstatesentUrrutiaaCertificateAuthorizing

ReleaseofBenefit InformationforhimtosignsothatInterstatecouldobtain

hisSocialSecurityrecords.InAugust2013,InterstatewasinformedbyUrrutia

that he had been and was currently receiving Social Security retirement

benefits.

[¶6]InapetitionfiledwiththeWorkers’CompensationBoard,Interstate

soughtadeterminationthatpursuanttosection221itwasentitledtoreduce

Urrutia’songoingworkers’compensationbenefitsbyhalfoftheamountofhis

SocialSecurityretirementbenefits—areductionthatUrrutiaultimatelydidnot

contest. Interstatealsosoughtacreditpursuant tosection221,bywayofa

paymentholiday,foramountsithadoverpaidUrrutiabeforelearningthathe

hadbeenreceivingretirementbenefits.

[¶7] Afteracontestedhearingheldon thelatter issueinApril2014,a

hearing officer granted Interstate’s petition, concluding that section 221

entitledInterstateto“acreditforallperiodsforwhichtheemployeereceived

old-age[S]ocial[S]ecuritybenefitsandworkers’compensationbenefits.”For

2InterstatedisclaimsanycontentionthatUrrutiaactedinbadfaithbynotadvisingInterstatethat

hewascollectingSocialSecurityretirementbenefitswhilealsoreceiving the fullamountof totalincapacitybenefits.

4

thatreason, thehearingofficerordered that Interstate “maycease lostwage

benefitspaymentuntilsuchtimeas itexhausts itscreditof$24,141.38”that

accrued between December 2010 and November 2013—the period when

Urrutia was receiving both Social Security retirement benefits and the full

amountofincapacitybenefits.

[¶8] Urrutia appealed the hearing officer’s decree to the Appellate

Division,see39-AM.R.S.§321-B(2017),whichvacatedthedecree,concluding

thattheplainlanguageofsection221doesnotpermitacreditforincapacity

overpayments already made to the employee when the employee was also

receiving Social Security benefits, and that the section 221 credit may be

applied only against ongoing incapacity benefits that are being paid for the

“sametimeperiod”astheSocialSecurityretirementbenefits. TheAppellate

DivisionconcludedthatInterstatethereforewasnotentitledtoacreditbased

on Urrutia’s past receipt of retirement benefits. Interstate filed a timely

petitionforappellatereview,whichwegranted.See39-AM.R.S.§322(2017);

M.R.App.P.23(Tower2016).3

3 TherestyledMaineRulesofAppellateProceduredonotapplybecausethisappealwasfiled

priortoSeptember1,2017.SeeM.R.App.P.1(restyledRules).

5

II.DISCUSSION

[¶9]Thiscasecallsforustoaddressanissuewehavenotpreviouslyhad

occasion to consider: whether the “coordination of benefits” statute in the

Workers’CompensationAct, 39-AM.R.S. §221(1), entitles anemployer to a

creditagainstongoingincapacitybenefitpaymentsforoverpaymentsmadein

thepastwhiletheemployeewasalsoreceiving“old-age”SocialSecuritybenefit

payments(i.e.,retirementbenefitpayments).

[¶10] Section 221(1) provides for an adjustment of the amount of

workers’compensationbenefitswhen

eitherweeklyorlumpsumpaymentsaremadetoanemployeeasaresultofliabilitypursuanttosection212or213withrespecttothesametimeperiodforwhichtheemployeeisalsoreceivingorhasreceivedpaymentsfor:

A. Old-age insurance benefit payments under the United StatesSocialSecurityAct,42UnitedStatesCode,Sections301to1397f.

(Emphasisadded.)Theamountoftheadjustmentisdeterminedpursuantto

section221(3),whichprovides,inpertinentpart:

Benefit payments subject to this section must be reduced inaccordancewiththefollowingprovisions.A. The employer’s obligation to pay or cause to be paidweekly[incapacity]benefits...isreducedbythefollowingamounts:

6

(1) Fifty percent of the amount of the old-age insurancebenefitsreceivedorbeingreceivedundertheUnitedStatesSocialSecurityAct.

(Emphasisadded.)

[¶11] Thequestionpresentedhere iswhetherthe“sametimeperiod”

identified insection221(1)means theperiodwhen theemployee isactually

receivingboththeretirementbenefitandtheincapacitybenefitthatissubject

to the adjustment, or the period when the employer is—or was—liable for

incapacity benefits and the employee is—or was—receiving retirement

benefits. If the phrase in section 221(1), “the same time period,” modifies

“payments”—theconstructionurgedbyUrrutia—thenanemployerwouldbe

entitledtoareductiononlyofthosepaymentsmadeduringthesameperiod

whentheemployeecontemporaneouslyreceivedold-ageretirementbenefits,

and Interstate would not be entitled to a retroactive credit on account of

Urrutia’s receipt of retirement benefits from December 2010 through

November2013. If,however—asInterstateasserts—“thesametimeperiod”

modifies“liability,”thenanemployerwouldbeentitledtoacreditforthesame

periodwhentheemployerwasliableforincapacitybenefitsandforwhichthe

employee received retirement benefits, regardless of when the incapacity

7

paymentswereactuallymade,therebyentitlingtheemployertoaretroactive

credit.

[¶12] The resolution of this dispute is entirely a matter of statutory

construction. SeeBeaulieu v.MaineMed. Ctr., 675A.2d110,112 (Me.1996)

(“‘[T]he law of workers’ compensation is uniquely statutory.’”) (quoting

Wentzell v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1980)). “Statutory

interpretationisaquestionoflawthatwereviewdenovo.”Darling’sv.Ford

MotorCo.,2003ME21,¶7,825A.2d344;seealsoFreemanv.NewPageCorp.,

2016ME45,¶5,135A.3d340.“‘Ourmainobjectiveinstatutoryinterpretation

istogiveeffecttotheLegislature’sintent.’”CityofBangorv.PenobscotCounty,

2005ME35,¶9,868A.2d177(quotingTownofEagleLakev.Comm’r,Dep’tof

Educ.,2003ME37,¶7,818A.2d1034).“[W]elookfirsttotheplainmeaning

of thestatutory language” inorder todetermine that intent. Jordanv.Sears,

Roebuck&Co.,651A.2d358,360(Me.1994). Indoingso,we“construethat

languagetoavoidabsurd,illogicalorinconsistentresults,”andweconsider“the

whole statutory schemeofwhich the sectionat issue forms apart so that a

harmoniousresult,presumablytheintentoftheLegislature,maybeachieved.”

Id. (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted); accord Ford Motor Co. v.

Darling’s,2014ME7,¶25,86A.3d35;TownofEagleLake,2003ME37,¶7,

8

818 A.2d 1034; Hallissey v. School Admin. Dist. No.77, 2000ME 143, ¶ 14,

755A.2d1068. Ifastatuteisunambiguous,wewillnotdefertoanagency’s

interpretationofthatstatute.SeeWorkers’Comp.Bd.AbuseInvestigationUnit

v.NateHolyokeBuilders, Inc.,2015ME99,¶16,121A.3d801(“Because the

statutesat issue in thiscaseareunambiguous,weneedgono further inour

examinationofthemthantheirplainmeaning.”);Friedmanv.Bd.ofEnvtl.Prot.,

2008ME 156, ¶ 9, 956 A.2d 97; Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof’ls Licensure,

2006ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.,

467U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Bailey v. City of Lewiston, 2017 ME 160, ¶ 9,

168A.3d 762 (stating that we will not defer to the Appellate Division’s

interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act where the statute’s plain

languageandlegislativehistory“compelacontraryresult”).

[¶13]Applyingtheseestablishedprinciplesofstatutoryconstruction,we

concludethattheplainlanguageofsection221(1)unambiguouslyentitlesan

employer to a credit based on an employee’s past receipt of Social Security

retirementbenefits.Wemakethisdeterminationbasedonseveralaspectsof

the language of section 221, as well as a consideration of the underlying

purposeofthestatute.

9

[¶14] We firstnote thegrammaticalstructureof thepertinentpartof

section 221(1), which lacks a comma or other punctuation to separate the

references to “liability” and “the same time period.” This indicates that the

phrase “with respect to the same time period” modifies the immediately

precedingword—“liability”—ratherthan“payments,”whichappearsearlierin

that sentence. SeeLabbe v. Nissen Corp., 404A.2d 564, 567 (Me. 1979) (“A

commaisgenerallyusedtoindicatetheseparationofwords,phrases,orclauses

fromothersnotcloselyconnectedinthestructureofthesentence.”).

[¶15]Next,andmoresubstantively,byitsexpresstermssection221(1)

provides for a reductionof the amountofworkers’ compensation payments

madeforaperiodduringwhichtheemployee“isalsoreceivingorhasreceived

payments” for old-age Social Security benefits. 39-A M.R.S. § 221(1)(A)

(emphasis added). The reference to past receipt of retirement benefits

demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the amount of incapacity

paymentsistobecoordinatedwithotherqualifyingbenefits—includingSocial

Security retirement benefits—even when the benefits were received in the

past,beforetheadjustmentisimplemented.

[¶16]Anotherprovisioncontainedinsection221specificallyreferstoa

“creditorreduction”ofincapacitybenefitsbasedonanemployee’sreceiptof

10

SocialSecuritybenefits. See39-AM.R.S.§221(3)(B)(emphasisadded). The

words “credit” and “reduction” must be seen to signify distinct recovery

mechanismsinordertoavoideitherwordbecomingsurplusage.SeeHicksonv.

VescomCorp.,2014ME27,¶15,87A.3d704. Thisdemonstrates thatwhile

section 221 allows for a “reduction” of ongoing incapacity payments arising

fromtheemployee’sreceiptofSocialSecurityretirementbenefits,thestatute

alsoprovidesforsomethingdifferent,namely,a“credit,”which—inlightofthe

statutoryreferencetoa“reduction”—canonlybebasedonpastoverpayments.

[¶17]Theavailabilityofa“creditorreduction”alsocorrespondstothe

statutoryreference insection221(1) toSocialSecuritybenefits“receivedor

beingreceived”bytheemployee:pastoverpaymentofincapacitybenefitswhen

the employee also “received” retirement benefits entitles the employer to a

“credit,”whereastheemployerisentitledtoa“reduction”ofincapacitybenefits

being presently paid based on retirement benefits “being received” by the

employee.See39-AM.R.S.§221(3)(B),(C),(D).

[¶18] Further, we construe the language of the statute in light of its

purpose. As we have previously held, the adjustment created by the

predecessortotheportionofsection221applicablehereisdesignedto“ensure

a minimum income during the period of an employee’s incapacity and to

11

prevent a double recovery of both retirement and compensation benefits.”

Jordan,651A.2dat361;4seealsoFoleyv.Verizon,2007ME128,¶11,931A.2d

1058.PermittingInterstatetopresentlyreceiveacreditbasedonincapacity

benefitoverpaymentsmadeduringthepastperiodwhenUrrutiaalsoreceived

old-age Social Security benefits comports with both of those objectives.

Withoutthecredit,Urrutiawouldretainthedoublerecoveryofbenefitsthat

section 221 is intended to prevent, while application of the credit formula

prescribedinthatstatuteresultsinUrrutia’sreceiptofthecombinedlevelof

benefitsintendedbytheLegislature.

[¶19] Supporting this purpose, section 221(3) states explicitly that

“[b]enefitpaymentssubjecttothissectionmustbereducedinaccordancewith

thefollowingprovisions.”(Emphasisadded.)Thestatutethusnotonlycreates

anemployer’sentitlementtothecreditbutmakesthatcreditmandatory.The

constrictive reading of section 221(1) urged by Urrutia would deny the

employer that stated entitlement and runs counter to the plain language of

section221(3),whichcreatesacreditcalculatedonthebasisofSocialSecurity

4ThestatuteconstruedinJordan,39M.R.S.A.§62-B(1989),wasthepredecessortothecurrent

section221“coordinationofbenefits”statute.Jordanv.Sears,Roebuck&Co.,651A.2d358,359-60(Me.1994).Thepertinentaspectsofthosestatutescontainsimilarlanguage.Compare39M.R.S.A.§62-B(3)(A)(1)(1985),with39-AM.R.S.§221(3)(A)(1)(2017),andP.L.1991,ch.885§§A-7,A-8(effectiveOct.7,1992)(repealedandreplacedTitle39M.R.S.A.§62-Basamended).Section221hassincebeenamended,mostrecentlybyP.L. 2013, ch. 152§1 (effectiveOct. 9, 2013)(codified at39-AM.R.S.§221(3)(2017)).

12

retirementbenefitsthattheemployeehasalready“received.”Section221(3)

thereforecomportswiththepurposeofthestatutebyprovidingamechanism

bywhichtoimplementthecreditandpreventadoublerecovery.

[¶20]AsUrrutiacorrectlypointsout,inseveraldifferentcircumstances

werejectedanemployer’sattempttorecouppastoverpaymentsofworkers’

compensation benefits. For example, in Pelotte v. Purolator Courier Corp.,

464A.2d186(Me.1983),theemployervoluntarilymadepaymentsthatturned

outtobeinagreateramountthantheemployeewasentitledtoreceive.Id.at

187. Weaffirmedthecourt’s refusal toallowtheemployerrecovery for the

pastoverpayments,observingthatsucharemedywasneithercreatedinthe

statute addressing voluntary incapacity payments, see 39 M.R.S.A. § 51-A

(Supp.1982-1983),5norrevealedinthatstatute’slegislativehistory.Id.at188.

InLaRochellev.CrestShoeCo.,655A.2d1245(Me.1995),weconcludedthat

theplain,expresslanguageof39M.R.S.A.§104-A(1)(1989),whichprovided

foranemployer’srecoveryofoverpaymentsthatwere“madependingappeal,”

5ThestatuteatissueinPelottev.PurolatorCourierCorp.,464A.2d186(Me.1983),wasrepealed

whentheWorkers’CompensationActwasrecodifiedin1991andnotreplacedinsubstance.SeeP.L.1991ch.885.Wenotethat,forreasonsthatarenotapparent,ourdecisioninPelottedidnotaddressoreven

acknowledgethe“compensationpayments;penalty”provision,39M.R.S.A.§104-A(1983),thatwasineffectat the timeandcontainedsimilar languageasthecurrentprovision foundat39-AM.R.S.§324(1)(2017).Compare39-AM.R.S.§324(1),with39M.R.S.A.§104-A.

13

didnotallowtheemployertorecoupoverpaymentsthatweremadebeforethe

appeal was filed. Id. at 1246-47; see also Bureau v. Staffing Network, Inc.,

678A.2d 583, 590 (Me.1996) (stating that, absent statutory entitlement,

reimbursementisnotavailableforpastoverpayments).Additionally,wehave

held that in order to promote timely filings and compliance with the

administrativeprocess,whenanemployerfailstofileatimelyresponsetothe

employee’s notice of injury, the employee is entitled to retain benefits

exceeding the amount to which the employee was otherwise entitled. See

Doucette v. Hallsmith/Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 2011 ME 68, ¶¶ 7, 24, 25-26,

21A.3d99.

[¶21] In contrast to those cases, both the plain language of section

221(1) and its underlying purpose—to prevent a double recovery by the

employee—establishthattheLegislatureintendedthatanemployerisentitled

to a “credit” forpastoverpayments resulting from theemployee’s receiptof

SocialSecurityretirementbenefitsduringthesameperiodwhentheemployer

was required to make the incapacity benefit payments. Consequently,

Interstateisentitledtoacredit for incapacitybenefitoverpaymentsmadeto

Urrutiaduring thesameperiodwhenhereceivedSocialSecurityretirement

14

benefits, fromDecember2010throughNovember2013,totaling$24,141.38.

WethereforevacatethedecisionoftheAppellateDivision.

[¶22] We also remand for further proceedings to allow the

administrative law judge, see infra n.1, to determine, based on a hardship

analysis,whetherthefinancialeffectofInterstate’sbenefitpaymentholidayon

Urrutiamaybeconsideredand,ifso,theextentandtermsoftheholiday.We

do so because, at oral argument, counsel for Interstate acknowledged the

prospectthattheALJisauthorized,pursuantto39-AM.R.S.§324(1)(2017)6

orother authority, to consider suchan effectwhendetermining the specific

terms of the credit and resulting payment holiday, to which we have now

establishedthatInterstateisentitled.7Becausetheissueisnotbeforeus,we

donotaddresswhether,inthecircumstancespresentedhere,anALJmaytailor

theimplementationofapaymentholidaytoaccommodateanyhardshipthat

the holiday creates. Because, however, Interstate has indicated that such

authoritymayexist,weremandtogivethepartiestheopportunitytodevelop

theissuefurther.

6 Section324(1)providesinpartthatthe“board”isauthorizedtodetermine“whetherornot

repaymentshouldbemadeandtheextentandscheduleofrepayment”inlightofitseffectontheemployee’sfinancialsituation.39-AM.R.S.§324(1).7AlthoughintheamendeddecreethehearingofficerpermittedInterstateto“cease”paymentof

incapacitybenefitsuntilthecreditwasexhausted,itisunclearfromtherecordwhethertheofficeractuallyconsideredwhethertheholidaywouldworka“hardshiporinjustice”onUrrutia.Id.

15

Theentryis:

ThedecisionoftheAppellateDivisionisvacated.Remanded to the Appellate Division withinstructionstoaffirmthedecisionthatInterstateBrands International is entitled to a credit of$24,141.38 and to then remand to the ALJ forfurther proceedings addressing the applicationandeffectofsection324.

JABAR,J.,withwhomALEXANDER,J.,joins,dissenting.

[¶23] We respectfully dissent because the Workers’ Compensation

Board Appellate Division was correct when it held that the Workers’

Compensation Act (the Act) does not provide an employer a remedy for

overpayments made to employees as a result of that employer’s failure to

coordinate workers’ compensation benefits with Social Security benefits

pursuantto39-AM.R.S.§221(2017).

[¶24]AdecisionoftheAppellateDivisionis“entitledtogreatdeference

and will be upheld on appeal unless the statute plainly compels a different

result.”Jordanv.Sears,Roebuck&Co.,651A.2d358,360(Me.1994)(quotation

marksomitted).Here,aproperreadingofsection221doesnotcompelaresult

in Interstate’s favor, and unlike the Court, wewould defer to the Appellate

Division’sanalysisandaffirmitsdecision.

16

A. ThePlainLanguage

[¶25] TheAppellateDivisionunanimouslyconcluded that “[t]heplain

language of section 221(1) requires that the offset or credit be taken ‘with

respecttothesametimeperiod’forwhichtheemployeeisalsoreceivingorhas

received payments.” Urrutia v. Interstate Brands International, Me. W.C.B.

No.16-35, ¶ 7 (App. Div. 2016). The Appellate Division reasoned that to

“permit an offset when weekly incapacity benefits are being made for a

different period than that in which the employee received Social Security

retirementbenefits...isincontraventionoftheplainmeaningofthelanguage

insection221(1).”Id.

[¶26] The Appellate Division was correct. Workers’ compensation

benefits for total incapacity (39-AM.R.S. §212 (2017))orpartial incapacity

(39-AM.R.S.§213(2017))arepaidonaweeklybasis.Followinganinjury,an

employerhas14daystodisputetheemployee’sclaimofincapacity.Me.W.C.B.

Rule,ch.1,§1;see39-AM.R.S.§304(3)(2017).Anemployeewillthenreceive

workers’ compensation benefits under two scenarios. See 39-AM.R.S.

§§205(2),305(2017).First,intheeventthattheemployerdoesnotdispute

theclaim,theemployermustbeginpayingtheemployeebenefitsonaweekly

basis,plusanyaccruedcompensation. See39-AM.R.S.§205(2). Under this

17

scenario,evenwheretheemployeragreestopaytheemployee,theremaybe

anaccruedamountdueforthetimeperiodbetweentheemployee’snoticeof

claimandtheemployer’sdecisiontoaccepttheclaim.

[¶27]Thesecondscenarioinwhichanemployeereceivescompensation

is when the employer disputes the claim. 39-A M.R.S. § 305. Under this

scenario,inordertoreceivebenefits,theemployeemustfileapetitionforan

award with the Workers’ Compensation Board. Id. This leads to hearings

before an administrative law judge (ALJ) and, unless the employer accepts

responsibilityduringthecourseoftheproceedings,theALJrendersadecision

either denying the claim or granting the claim and awarding the employee

benefitsforhis incapacity. 39-AM.R.S.§318(2017). If theemployeeisstill

incapacitated, the award will indicate that the employer has a continuing

obligation to make ongoing payments and, depending on the decision, the

employer may be held responsible for payments retroactive to when the

employee’speriodofincapacitybegan.Theemployee’scompensationforthat

pastperiodoftimewillthenbepaidinalumpsumbytheemployer.8

[¶28]Section221providesforadjustmentstoanemployee’sworkers’

compensation benefits covering these two scenarios. If the employee is to

8Thislumpsumpaymentforaccruedbenefitsisnottobeconfusedwithalumpsumsettlement

madepursuantto39-AM.R.S.§352(2017),wheretheentirecaseissettled.

18

beginreceivingweeklyworkers’ compensationbenefits and theemployee is

also receiving Social Security benefits, then the employer is entitled to an

adjustment against the ongoing workers’ compensation benefits that it is

requiredtopay.39-AM.R.S.§221(1).Ontheotherhand,iftheemployeeisset

to receive a lump sumworkers’ compensation payment—retroactive to the

employee’s period of incapacity—then the employer is entitled to an

adjustmentagainstthatlumpsumpaymentreflectingacreditfortheamount

ofSocialSecuritybenefitstheemployeereceivedduringthe“sametimeperiod”

thatheorshewasentitledtoreceiveworkers’compensationbenefits.Id.

[¶29] Accordingly, the plain language of section 221 cannot be

interpretedtoallowalumpsumcredit intheformofapayment“holiday”—

covering a past period of time—to be applied to ongoing weekly benefits.

Rather,thecoordinationsetoutinsection221mustbeappliedtothesametime

period forwhich theemployee is receivingSocialSecuritybenefits,or to the

sametimeperiodforwhichtheemployeehasreceivedSocialSecuritybenefits.

[¶30]Here,theCourtdoesnotrecognizethedistinctionbetweenpresent

andpastpaymentsinsection221.TheCourtconcludedthatthephrase“credit

orreduction”in39-AM.R.S.§221(3)(B)(2017)signifiesarecoverymechanism

becauseacredit“canonlybebasedonpastoverpayments.” Court’sOpinion

19

¶16.However,insoreasoning,theCourtfailedtoconsiderthata“credit”is

appliedwhen an employee is entitled to—buthasnot yet received—a lump

sumpaymentforworkers’compensationbenefitsretroactivetotheemployee’s

periodofincapacity.Similarly,theCourtwrongfullyconcludedthat“credit”as

used in section 221 can only be given meaning by applying it to a future

payment “holiday,” even though the credit applies to a lump sum payment

coveringapastperiodoftime.AccordingtotheCourt,“[t]hereferencetopast

receiptofretirementbenefitsdemonstratesthattheLegislatureintendedthat

the amountof incapacitybenefits is to be coordinatedwithotherqualifying

benefits—including Social Security retirement benefits—even when the

benefits were received in the past, before the adjustment is implemented.”

Court’sOpinion¶15.

[¶31]Wedonotagree,asthisanalysisfailstotakeintoconsiderationthe

lump sum provision in section 221. The language “credit or reduction” in

section 221(3)(B) is in the disjunctive, and therefore the adjustments to an

employee’sworkers’ compensationbenefitsare intended toaddress the two

methods by which an employee will receive those benefits. It is when the

employeereceivesworkers’ compensationbenefits in a lumpsumforapast

periodoftime—asisusualincontestedcases—thattheadjustmentbecauseof

20

SocialSecuritypaymentsreceivedduringthatperiodiscoordinatedwiththe

workers’compensationliabilityforthatsameperiodoftime.Statedsimply,the

statutedoesnotpermitanemployertoreceiveacreditforapastperiodoftime,

thatwasneverapplied,tothenbeappliedtooffsetongoingweeklybenefits.

B. PolicyConsideration

[¶32]Inadditiontocorrectlyconcludingthattheplainlanguageofthe

statutedeniesInterstatetheremedyofcollectinganoverpaymentbycrediting

ongoingweekly benefits, the Appellate Division also properly identified the

policy considerations underlying section 221. Urrutia v. Interstate Brands

International,Me.W.C.B.No.16-35,¶8(App.Div.2016).Itacknowledgedthat

thedualpurposeofthestatuteisto(1)“ensureaminimumincomeduringthe

periodof incapacity,” and(2) “prevent adoublerecoveryofbothretirement

and compensation benefits.” Id. (quoting Jordan, 651 A.2d at 361). The

AppellateDivisionreasonedthat“[a]llowinganoffsetthatisconcurrentwith

receipt of more than one type of benefit effectuates both of the articulated

purposes, whereas allowing an employer to take a payment holiday from

payingbenefitstocompensateforanoffsetnottakenpreviouslydoesnot.”Id.

Here,theCourtdiscussessection221’spolicyagainstdoublerecovery.Court’s

Opinion ¶ 18. However, in attempting to address the policy of ensuring a

21

minimum income during the period of incapacity, the Court has erred by

improperlyengraftinga“hardshipanalysis”ontotheplainlanguageofsection

221.SeeCourt’sOpinion¶22.

[¶33]Onnumerousoccasions,wehaveheldthattheActdoesnotcontain

anyremedytoprotectagainstadoublerecoverybyanemployee.TheCourt’s

decisionprioritizesthepolicyagainstdoublerecoveryoverthepolicytoensure

aminimumincome,andthisiscontrarytoournumerousdecisionsholdingthat

theActdoesnotprovideanemployeraremedy tocollectoverpayments. In

AmericanMutualInsuranceCompaniesv.Murray,weheld:

“To . . . engraft[] upon the statutory scheme judicially createddoctrinesof restitutionwould involveus in the establishmentofbroad social policy in a fieldof lawcreatedby the legislature inresponsetolegislativedissatisfactionwithjudicialsolutionstotheproblems of compensation for workers injured in industrialaccidents....Intheabsenceofanexpresslegislativecommandora clear indication of legislative intention, we leave the partieswherethelegislatureleftthem.”9

420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me. 1980); see also Pelotte v. Purolator Courier Corp.,

464A.2d 186, 188 (Me. 1983) (“Although the absence of a right to set off

9 The Court posits that its construction of section 221 fulfills the statutory purpose of

“prevent[ing]adouble recoveryof both retirement and compensationbenefits.” Jordan v. Sears,Roebuck&Co.,651A.2d358,361(Me.1994).However,theequitableremedyofrestitutionexistsinthe common law, outside theWorkers’ Compensation Act, and thus, there is nothing to preventInterstate fromattempting tocollectanyoverpayment inanaction forequitablerestitution. SeeHorton&McGehee,MaineCivilRemedies§7-5at178-83(4thed.2004).

22

voluntary pre-decree overpayments against subsequent periodic

compensationmaydiscourageemployersfrommakingmaximumpre-decree

payments, it is for the Legislature, rather than this Court, to address that

issue.”);LaRochellev.CrestShoeCo.,655A.2d1245,1247(Me.1995)(“Ifthe

Legislature intended to enable employers to recoup overpayments made

duringthependencyofamotionforfindingsoffact,itcouldhaveeasilydrafted

thestatutetosayso.”);Doucettev.Hallsmith/SyscoFoodServs.,2010ME138,

¶5,10A.3d692(reaffirmingtheprinciplethat“wearelimitedtothestatutory

remediesforrepaymentofbenefitsultimatelydeterminednottobeproperly

paid”).

[¶34] The Appellate Division properly concluded that the workers’

compensation statute—which is uniquely statutory—does not, with the

exceptionof39-AM.R.S.§324(1)(2017),providearemedytoanemployerto

recoupanoverpayment.Urrutiav.InterstateBrandsInternational,Me.W.C.B.

No.16-35,¶9n.2(App.Div.2016).WehaveconsistentlyheldthatthisCourt

hasnoauthoritytosupplementthestatutorylanguageoftheAct.SeeWentzell

v. Timberlands, Inc., 412 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1980) (“Since the Workers’

Compensation Act is a creation of the legislature, the legislature bears the

primaryresponsibilityforenunciatingwithclaritythepurposes it intendsto

23

achieve through thatstatute.”);Ryerson v.Pratt&WhitneyAircraft,495A.2d

808,812(Me.1985)(“Ifapolicydifferentfromthat laiddownbyth[e]clear

languageistobeadopted,itisthelegislaturethatshoulddoit....”).Assuch,

theCourt’s remand to theALJ to consider the issueof a “hardship analysis”

demonstrates the problemwith providing a remedy under section 221 that

does not exist. Ahardship analysis pursuant to section324(1)only applies

when,followinganemployer’ssuccessfulappealormotionforfindingsoffact

orconclusionsoflaw,itisdeterminedthatanoverpaymenttoanemployeehas

beenmadeduringthependencyofthatappealormotion.10Becausewearenot

dealing with this type of overpayment, the hardship analysis provided in

section324(1)doesnotapply.HowevercompassionatetheCourt’sapproach

1039-AM.R.S.§324(1)(2017)provides,inpertinentpart:

Iftheboardentersadecisionawardingcompensation,andamotionforfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawisfiledwiththeadministrativelawjudgeoranappealisfiledwiththedivisionpursuanttosection321-BortheLawCourtpursuanttosection322, payments may not be suspended while the motion for findings of fact andconclusionsoflaworappealispending.TheemployerorinsurermayrecoverfromanemployeepaymentsmadependingamotionforfindingsoffactandconclusionsoflaworappealtothedivisionortheLawCourtifandtotheextentthattheadministrativelawjudge,divisionortheLawCourthasdecidedthattheemployeewasnotentitledtothecompensationpaid. Theboardhasfull jurisdictiontodeterminetheamountofoverpayment,ifany,andtheamountandscheduleofrepayment,ifany.Theboard,in determining whether or not repayment should be made and the extent andscheduleofrepayment,shallconsiderthefinancialsituationoftheemployeeandtheemployee’s family and may not order repayment that would work hardship orinjustice.

(Emphasisadded.)

24

may be, and however consistent it may be with the policy of “ensuring a

minimumincomeduringaperiodofincapacity,”thereisnoprovisionintheAct

that provides such relief. The Court characterizes this remedy as an

“entitlement”fortheemployer.Court’sOpinion¶19.Ifitisanentitlementfor

the employer, the Legislaturewould have identified it as an entitlement—it

didn’t. By judiciallyengraftingthis“hardshipanalysis”ontosection221,the

Courtislegislating.

[¶35] Had the Legislature intended to permit the recovery of

overpaymentscausedbya failure tocoordinatebenefitspursuant tosection

221—or, for thatmatter, any overpayment other than the type specified in

section324(1)—it couldhavedone so. TheLegislaturedidnotprovideany

remedy in the Act to an employer who overpays as a result of failing to

coordinatebenefitsundersection221,andtheonlymechanismthatgrantsan

employer any such remedy is limited to the specific scenario contained in

section324(1).Becausesection324(1)isnotapplicablehere,itisinerrorto

remandtotheALJfora“hardshipanalysis.”

C. Conclusion

[¶36]ItisuptotheLegislatureandnotthisCourttoprovideemployers

aremedywithintheActto“recoup”overpaymentsthatanemployermadeto

25

anemployeebecausetheemployerfailedtocoordinateworkers’compensation

benefitswithSocialSecuritybenefitspursuanttosection211.Becausesection

211containsnosuchremedy,weshouldaffirmthedecisionoftheAppellate

Division.

StephenW.Moriarty,Esq. (orally),Norman,Hanson&DeTroy,Portland, forappellants Interstate Brands International and Ace American InsuranceCompanyJamesJ.MacAdam,Esq.,NathanA.Jury,Esq.(orally),andDonaldM.Murphy,Esq.,MacAdamJury,P.A.,Freeport,forappelleeVictorS.UrrutiaBenjaminK.Grant,Esq.,McTeagueHigbee,Topsham,foramicuscuriaeMaineAFL-CIORichardD.Tucker,Esq.,TuckerLawGroup,Bangor,foramicuscuriaeCatalystPaperCorporationThomasE.Getchell,Esq.,andDanielF.Gilligan,Esq.,TroubhHeisler,Portland,foramicuscuriaeS.D.WarrenCompanyWorkers’CompensationBoardAppellateDivisiondocketnumber15-0028FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY