Vico Criticism of Descartes-HES

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History of Education Society

Giambattista Vico and "The Method of Studies in Our Times": A Criticism of Descartes'Influence on Modern EducationAuthor(s): Henry J. PerkinsonReviewed work(s):Source: History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Mar., 1962), pp. 30-46Published by: History of Education SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/367334 .

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GIAMBATTISTA VICO AND"THE METHOD OF STUDIES IN OURTIMES": A CRITICISM OF DESCARTES'INFLUENCE ON MODERN EDUCATION

Henry J. PerkinsonGiambattista Vico was born in 1668, at a time when Italy was

just beginning to recover from the enervating effects of more thana century of clerical and foreign domination. In 1559, a centurybefore Vico's birth, the long contest between France and Spainfor supremacy in the peninsula had been decided in favor of Spainby the treaty of Cateau-Cambresia. Following this, hope for theindependence of Italy had definitely been abandoned. The minorprinces submitted to being Spanish vassals, and the Spanish rulersjoined hands with the Roman Curia in a strict surveillance of thethought and action of the Italian people. The Church, fearful ofthe spread of Protestantism, drew more straight and narrow theway of orthodoxy, increasing at the same time the degree ofpunishment for those who strayed. The decadence and torporthat engulfed Italy during this period has come to be calledsecentismo or baroque.

After having initiated Europe to the new civility of Humanism and of theRenaissance, after having opened the way to speculation and to modern sciencewith naturalism, with the experimentalism of the Galilean school, with theintuition of real politics of Machiavelli, and with the grandiose and prematuresynthesis of Bruno and Campanella, Italy was cut off from spiritual commercewith other peoples and passively underwent a double political and religiousservitude.1

By the end of the seventeenth century pressure from bothSpain and from the Catholic Church was lessened. Spain wasnow a waning power, and by this time, too, the growth of Protes-tantism had been constrained by the work of the Counter Refor-mation. The time was ripe for a rebirth in Italian thought. Sucha rebirth did occur, and one of the most important centers of thisrebirth was Naples, the city of Vico's birth.

Naples had traditionally been the home of Italian philosophers,Thomas Aquinas and Bruno having been born in or near it. Brunohad taught there, as had his somewhat younger contemporaries,30


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Campanella and Telesio. Now, once again, Naples was to becomethe center of intellectual activity. The primary cause of the rebirthin Italian thought, or its motivating force, was the discovery andimportation of the philosophy of Rene Descartes. "It can be saidthat in the eighteenth century Italy became Cartesian: it is likea new renaissance of which Naples is the center and the seat."2The works of Descartes were not introduced into Naples until1649. In that year, Tommaso Cornelia (1614-1684), a teacher ofmedicine, returned from a trip abroad with the works of Descartes.3As a result, the influence of Descartes was first felt in the fieldof medicine. But it was not only in the field of medicine that theCartesian philosophy came to dominate Neapolitan thought. A

second generation of Cartesians soon arose, those whose primaryinterests were in metaphysics, the metaphysics contained in theMeditations of Descartes.4 There was still a third sphere ofthought that was affected by the Cartesian philosophy: educa-tional theory.I. Cartesian Theory of Education

Descartes' philosophy contains no references to education,other than his criticisms of his own in the Discourse on Method.5Nevertheless, his philosophy contains principles that have been,and to a certain extent still are predominant in the assumptionsof modern educational theory. First, all men, according to Des-cartes, are equally endowed with the ability to learn. "Good senseis the thing of all else in this world that is most equally distributed. . . the latent ability to judge well, to distinguish the true fromthe false, is naturally equal among all men."6

Secondly, this good sense or sound intelligence of man can beand should be developed. It is not enough to have a sound mind;the principal thing is to make a good use of it. Reason is devel-oped by the enforcement of a strict method of knowing-a methodthat provides criteria for accepting or for rejecting whatever isreceived under the label of "knowledge." This brings us to thethird element in Descartes' philosophy that has been taken up inmodern educational theory, i.e., for the mind to require proof orself-evidence for all that is presented to it as true. Descartespropounds this view in the very first rule of his Method: "Thefirst of these rules was to accept nothing as true which I did notclearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid pre-cipitation and prejudice in judgements, and to accept in them

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nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly anddistinctly that I could have no occasion to doubt it."7

The first appearance of a Cartesian-inspired theory of educationwas in the so-called "little schools of Port Royal." Started bySaint Cyran in 1638, these schools played an important part inthe Jansenist movement in France. Their short, although activecareer was ended in 1660 when the Jesuits finally succeeded ingetting them permanently closed. The theological controversybetween Jesuits and Jansenists need not concern us, since moreimportant to us is that in its later years many of the teachers ofPort Royal were also ardent Cartesians, and it was through thewritings of these men that Cartesianism was first introduced intoeducational theory. The most important, and most well-knownbook that did this was the Port Royal Logic, or the Art of Thinking,written jointly by Nicole and the "Great Arnauld." Indeed, Cadetgoes so far as to say that the greatest merit of this book is that itintroduced Cartesian philosophy into education.8 Published in1662, two years after the closing of the Port Royal schools, theLogic had a wide readership in both France and Italy during thelast half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenthcenturies. Maugain's exacting scholarship has uncovered six sepa-rate editions of this work (three in Latin, three in Italian) pub-lished in Italy between 1722 and 1749.9 If we accept Vice'saccount of this work in his Autobiography, then it would supplyfurther evidence that the Logic was widely known and used inNaples. In the Autobiography, Vico includes part of an annuallecture that he gave to young men at the University. In thislecture he speaks of the "pernicious practice" of giving children"barely out of grammar school the so-called Logic of Arnauld."'l0

In the first Discourse of the book, Amrnauld, ho is commonlyheld to be the principal author of the work, announces that "hehas borrowed from the books of a celebrated philosopher of thisage, who is distinguished as much for perspicuity as others are forconfusion of mind.""l He is referring, of course, to Descartes. Intrue Cartesian form, Arnauld immediately declares that the aimof all studies is to "perfect the reason,"and to "render our judgmentas exact as possible."l2 Since "correct thinking" is infinitely moreimportant than all the speculative knowledge that we can obtain--even by means of the most solid and well-established sciences-then this aim should lead men to engage in those speculative

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disciplines "only as far as they may contribute to that end, andto make them the exercise only, and not the occupation of themental powers."'3 So, according to Arnauld, what is taught isonly taught as a means-a twofold means that renders judgmentas exact as possible, and perfects reason.

If we have not this end in view, the study of the speculative sciences, suchas geometry, astronomy, and physics, will be little else than a vain amusement,and scarcely better than the ignorance of these things, which has at least thisadvantage-that it is less laborious, and affords no room for that empty vanitywhich is often found connected with these barren and unprofitable knowledges.These sciences not only have nooks and hidden places of very little use, theyare even totally useless, considered in themselves, and for themselves alone.Men are not born to employ their time in measuring lines, in examining therelations of angles, and considering the different movements of matter-theirminds are too great, their life is too short, their time too precious, to beengrossed with such petty objects; but they ought to be just, equitable,prudent, in all their converse, in all their actions, and in all the business theytransact; and to these things they ought specially to discipline and trainthemselves. This care and study are so very necessary that it is strangethat this exactness of judgment should be so rare a quality.14

We must rid ourselves of "confused ideas," Arnauld continues,and the only way to do this is the way we have been shown byDescartes: to throw aside the prejudices of youth and "to believenothing which is within the province of that reason through whichwe have judged of it before, but only through that which we judgeof it now."'l5 Only in this way shall we arrive at natural ideas;i.e., "clear" ideas, "true" ideas.

So, according to Arnauld, after completing a successful educa-tion-that is, one that perfects reason and renders judgment exact-man is able to know which ideas are "true,"which "false." Thetrue, the certain ideas, are those that are clear and distinct, and"we may affirm of a thing all that is contained in its clear anddistinct idea."'l6 (Italics added.)Inherent in this theory of education is the lurking belief thatman is an absolute subject; that is, that man can have an idea,an image, or a conception that corresponds perfectly and absolutelyto reality. It is this conception of man as absolute subject thatVico criticizes most severely.

II. Vico and the Cartesian Theory of EducationAs professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples, Vicodelivered seven inaugural lectures to the students and faculty.

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In the seventh oration, delivered in 1709 and entitled "The Methodof Studies of Our Time" (II metodo degli studi del tempo nostro),Vico attacks the Cartesian educational theory.In the education based upon the Cartesian philosophy, Vicosaw a result diametrically opposed to his own views on the aimsof education. Throughout all of his previous six orations given atthe University of Naples he had developed the conception thateducation was the means by which man could overcome his naturalconditions of alienation. But now in the Cartesian inspired educa-tion what he saw was an intensification of that alienation.

Cartesian Education and the Alienation of Man from Truth"Today, all studies," Vico says, "are initiated by critica."17Critica he never defines, but in context it seems to mean a criticalattitude toward all knowledge, typified by the Cartesian philoso-phy. The aim of critica, he continues, is to liberate genuine truthnot only from every error, but also from whatever may wake thesmallest suspicion of error. Critica insists that we rid the mindof all secondary truths, or what he calls the "verisimili (i.e., likely

things), in the same way that one rids oneself of whatever isfalse.l8 Verisimili are intermediate between the true and thefalse; they are opinions, beliefs, ideas, etc., that are usually true,or, conversely, are rarely false. "As science is to truths and erroris to falsehoods, so common sense generates the verisimili."19"Common sense" is an important notion in Vice's philosophy.Generally speaking, he used the term to mean more or less whatwe mean, i.e., the normal, unsystematic, rigorless "logic" commonto the masses, that creates and sustains certain opinions, beliefs,ideas, etc. Vico maintains that students should be educated inthat common sense so that in their maturity, when they are calledupon for practical action, they will not "burst forth in estrangedand rebellious acts."

Vico is not against critica, or the use of the critical attitude,but he is against teaching this attitude to children. At one levelhis criticism of this kind of education is based upon the theory ofhuman development that he had outlined in his sixth oration.This theory states that the reason is active in manhood, whereasduring youth the imagination and memory are more active. Vico'sargument is that if the order of education does not follow the orderof human development, then the development of the memory andimagination might be impeded.

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As reason dominates old age, so imagination dominates youth, nor is itadvisable to blind this faculty in children, since it has always been regardedas an index of their future talent.20It is necessary to develop the faculty of imagination as wellas faculty of memory ("which if it is not the same thing as imagi-nation is certainly almost the same"),21 because these facultiesare of prime importance in the arts of poetry, oratory, and juris-prudence. But the fundamental reason for Vice's criticism ofthis Cartesian-inspired education is not that such education is animpediment to the development of certain arts, but rather that itis through these arts that man, in part, pursues wisdom. In whatfollows it will be seen that his basic criticism of this kind of edu-

cation is that it intensifies man's alienation from himself, alienateshim from what by his very nature he seeks: Truth.Before the teaching of critica, he cautions, there should beinstruction in topica, The term topica, or loci communes, wasfirst used by Aristotle, and later by Cicero to refer to the studyof arguments that experience had demonstrated to be particularlyeffective.22 But as Vico uses the term, he seems to mean morethan this; topica, for Vico, means the invention of arguments

designed to investigate the matter at hand.Today, critica exclusively is cultivated: topica, far from being placed firstin order, is completely forced out. And this is wrong, since, as the inventionof arguments precedes by nature the evaluation of truth, so topica should

precede critica.2Topica, as Vico uses the term, can only be understood byrecourse to the works of the English philosopher, Francis Bacon,who exerted a great influence upon the Neapolitan at this time.24

According to Bacon, topica, or topics, is concerned with the inven-tion of arguments. "The use and office of this invention is no otherthan out of the mass of knowledge which is collected and laid upin the mind to draw forth readily that which is under considera-tion."25 Yet topics, Bacon says, are not of use in debate only,for they also function to uncover new knowledge pertinent to thequestion in hand.Only it may be observed by the way, that this kind of topic is of use

not only in argumentations where we are disputing with another, but also inmeditations, where we are considering and resolving anything with ourselves;neither does it serve only to prompt and suggest what we should affirm andassert, but also what we should inquire or ask.'

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Bacon divides topics into two classes, general and particular.The former, he says, has been sufficiently heralded in logic so thatthere is no need to dwell on its explanation. Here he is probablyreferring to the "places" treated by Aristotle.27 But of the par-ticular topics, which concern "places of invention and inquiryappointed to particular subjects and sciences," Bacon gives us anextended example. The example is entitled "Articles of InquiryConcerning Heavy and Light." It is a series of nineteen questions,by means of which one inductively comes to know more aboutheavy and light.28

When Vico asserts that the teaching of topica should precedethe teaching of critica for the reason that "the discovery of argu-ments comes naturally before the judgment on the truth," he musthave been referring to topica as a method of investigation or dis-covery. He must, that is, have maintained a conception of topicasimilar to that expressed by Francis Bacon, who had also saidabout topics:. . . the fuller and more certain our anticipation is, the more direct andcompendious is our search. The same places therefore which will help us toshake out the folds of the intellect within us, and to draw forth the knowledgestored therein, will also help us to gain knowledge from without; so that ifa man of learning and experience were before us, we should know how toquestion him wisely and to the purpose; and in like manner how to selectand peruse with advantage those authors, books, and parts of books, whichmay best instruct us concerning that which we seek.29

But today, laments Vico, we exclude the teaching of topics,judging it good for nothing. Provided as men are with critica,they affirm-discovering and distinguishing whatever there is oftruth in everything taught-without having learned any topica.One result of this is that by following the very criterion of truth(i.e., critica) they learn nothing of the likely things (verisimili)that are about. But, in addition, he asks, who can be certain ofhaving seen all of the circumstances? In other words, withouttopica, which, according to Bacon and Vico, aids us in obtainingthe greatest amount of information about something, it is impossi-ble to be certain of having made a "true" judgment.

Although human nature is susceptible of errors, nevertheless, the singleend of the arts is to render ourselves certain of having acted rightly, and ifcritica is the art of true oration, topica is the art of fecund oration."

So far Vico has criticized the Cartesian-inspired education,which teaches critica to the exclusion of fopica, because it alienates36


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man from the truth in two ways. First, by following critica alone,one accepts only what is "certain," and so neglects or cuts oneselfoff from whatever is likely (the verisimili). Second, by followingcritica alone, one judges of a thing before knowing the greatestpossible amount of information about it, so that one's judgmentscannot be '"true"and "certain." He next makes the assertion thatnot only are the students alienated from truth by this kind ofeducation but so, also, is the rest of society. Those who have beentaught only critica are unable to share with or to teach to the restof the community whatever new truths they might obtain. Thisis because those who are not exercised in topica "never have theexperience of immediately seeing whatever persuasive is implicitin every cause." For this reason the students of the Cartesian-inspired education are not able to persuade the masses to acceptthe truths they try to share with or to teach them. The Cartesianapproach, of course, as Vico realizes, is that "they claim to teachpeople to think." But Vico, who was a professor of rhetoric,maintains that the art of teaching, like the art of oratory, is basedcompletely upon the listeners (or learners). Therefore, the orator(or the teacher) must adapt his oration to the opinion of the public.He asserts that the public is often unmoved by ponderous reason-ing, but their opinions are moved by some light arguments moreoften than not. Vico, as an example, cites Cicero's defense ofMilo after the latter had killed the tribune Clodius in 52 B.C.Clodius was a scoundrel and has even been called a "gangster"by a modern historian.31 According to Vico, Brutus "who actedlike the modern critics," insisted that Cicero defend Milo byreciting only the facts about the murder, and by indicating Milo'sgreat merit for having exterminated the pest, Clodius. Cicero,against his own wishes, did so, with the result that Milo was exiled.Cicero then composed an oration as he would have delivered it,had he been able, in which he developed all of the favorablecircumstances, not facts alone. Milo read it and "was convincedthat had it been so given he would not have been condemned."32

At this point Vico appears to be hovering close to expediency.It must be recognized that the threat of expediency is imminentthroughout all of his work. But expediency is, in fact, repugnantto his philosophy. In all of his orations the central problem wasthe contradiction between what men are and what they can be.Vico believed that men, by their very nature, can know truth andcan perform good acts. Men can, but many do not. Vico has

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conceived education as the means for the transformation of manfrom what he is to what he can be. In this present oration,what has sounded like the espousal of expediency is really theexpression of a methodological principle of pedagogy-one thatis widely recognized today-which states that to teach effectivelyone must take into consideration the abilities and capabilities ofone's students.Vico earlier applied this principle to the formal, or institutionaleducation, and now he applies it to the informal, or non-institutionaleducation that the students will, in the future, attempt to give tothe masses. He earlier prescribed topica as a prerequisite to criticain the schools, for the reason that topics is a necessary complementto critica in man's search for truth, but, in addition, he did thisfor pedagogical reasons; that is, because topica is more in keepingwith the capabilities and abilities of youth since youth is domi-nated by imagination and memory, just as critica is more in keepingwith the capabilities and abilities of later youth and manhoodsince at this time reason is more dominant. So when Vico now

prescribes topica to be used in the communication of new truthsto the masses, his reasons are again pedagogical. The masses, hebelieves, are for the most part incapable of reasoning. Conse-quently, topica, which not only helps us to gain new knowledgebut also helps us to perceive what is persuasive in any cause,should be used in teaching to the masses those truths of whichwe ourselves are already certain through means of critica.

In conclusion, then, Vico believes that both topica and criticaare necessary in education. In this he disagrees with both Arnauldand Cicero, since the former disparaged the learning of topica,while the latter advocated the study of topica to the exclusionof critica.3 The teaching of both will cultivate in the studentsthe common sense of their time, will lead them to civil prudenceand to eloquence, and will enable them to judge what is true andwhat is false. As a result of such an education, Vico claims, thestudent will be. . . exact in science, vigilant in the practical conduct of their lives, fecundin eloquence, imaginative in poetry and painting, and rich of memory injurisprudence."

Through such instruction, he concludes, the students will notbecome rash as those who dispute the material they are to learn,38


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nor will they become religiously credulous, as those who regardeverything that they are told by a teacher as true.Cartesian Education and the Alienation of Man from Good

After criticizing the Cartesian-inspired education because itintensified man's alienation from truth, Vico next attacks it becauseit intensified man's alienation from good, or from the performanceof good acts.But the gravest danger of the modern method [i.e., the Cartesian inspirededucation] is that while we occupy ourselves diligently with natural sciences,we neglect morality, especially that side that concerns itself with the characterof our soul and of its tendencies to civil life.35"Today," he continues, "the single end of studies is truth."36Accordingly, we study nature insofar as it seems certain to us,and we do not observe human nature because it is uncertain. But,Vico claims, the result of this method of study is to prevent the

development of sufficient prudence in students so that they canconduct themselves in civil life. Nor can they conduct a discoursecolored with knowledge of their own customs and mores, he adds.Thus we see that for Vico, goodness, or the performance of

good acts, takes place in the context of human society, and civillife must be conducted according to prudence. Civil life, he says,cannot be conducted according to science, because human affairsare dominated by occasion and choice, both of which are uncertain.Those who are taught to cultivate truth exclusively have difficultyin availing themselves of the means to act in civil life and evenstill greater difficulty in following their ends. "So,"he concludes,"deluded in their very propositions, they frequently desert politicalaction."37

In place of the method of science, which he claims is justnot suited to the guidance of civil life, Vico offers the method ofprudence.

In science they excel who go in search of a single cause to which theyare able to reduce multiple natural phenomena; whereas in civil prudence,they persist who, from one fact alone, give themselves to investigate a greatnumber of possible causes, in order to conjecture which among them is thetrue one.88

Science, Vico says, tends to the highest truths, whereas pru-dence tends to the lowest. The highest truths are eternal andnever changing, whereas the lowest are those that from one39


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moment to the next become false. Since human affairs, in hisview, are dominated by occasion and choice, both of which areuncertain, then it is the lower truths toward which prudence tendsthat are important for the conduct of civil life. Vico next gives apicture of four different approaches to the conduct of civil life,the last of which is the approach he is advocating.

The "fool" tends neither to the lofty truths nor to those of theinferior order and so continually pays the penalty of his foolish-ness. The "illiterate astute," who is privileged with a practicalsense by which he gathers practical truths but not universal truths,"draws advantages today, but not tomorrow." The learned man,who lacks a practical sense, moves from the universal truths tothe particular, but in doing so he is '"tangled in the tortuosity oflife." But the wise man, who moves from the lowest truths tothe highest, is able to conduct his affairs advantageously, because"when he sees that it is impossible to take the right way, movesaround the obstacle and takes useful decisions in a mature mannerand as naturally as possible."39According to Vice, then, the result of exclusive concern withthe modern (Cartesian) educational aim of "truth," is that thestudents become incapable of performing good acts. The reasonfor this is that this singular aim dictates the method of scienceas the best and only rule for the guidance of life in all its aspects.

Science, however, Vico maintains, is not suited for the conduct ofcivil life, and the attempts to employ it thus result in an alienationof man from the pursuit of good. In place of science Vico pro-poses the method of prudence.

Next-in a criticism analogous to the one that he made earlierin regard to the alienation from truth resulting from the Cartesian-inspired education-Vico claims that this education alienates notonly the students from the pursuit of goodness, but it alienatesthe rest of the community as well. The reasoning behind thisclaim is similar to that employed in the earlier instance; that is,that this kind of education prevents the students from sharingtheir knowledge of the good with the masses, that it preventscommunication or instruction in what are good acts, what are not.

Vice's argument is that those who adopt the method of sciencein civil affairs measure facts according to reason, while the restof mankind do not rule themselves according to rational decision

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but according to caprice and chance; and, since these "scientists"have not cultivated common sense, nor even followed the likely,being contented solely with truth, they do not bring before menwhat is concrete or what seems to be true.40 In other words,even when these students of the Cartesian-inspired education dohave a true knowledge of what are good acts, they are unable tocommunicate this because they lack the ability to make it seemtrue to the masses. Vico is not unaware that this sounds likeanti-intellectualism, but, he points out, from the ancient academyand lyceum of Athens there came forth such politician-philosophersas Cicero and Demosthenes, who did adapt their reasoned doctrinesto civil prudence.41 Vico here is, of course, insisting upon theinterrelatedness of the good and the true, insisting that "wisdomis virtue."

To the accusation that he wants to produce courtiers insteadof philosophers, Vico replies that he wants "philosophers of thecourt,"who "indeed love the truth, but at the same time love whatseems so, followers indeed of honesty, but also followers of thatwhich receives universal approval."42 The Cartesians, of course,Vico realizes, will say that it is better to "attack" a mind withreason, which cannot be evaded, rather than with oratory, or merewords, after which the soul returns to its earlier character. Vico,however, believes otherwise. He replies that eloquence appealsto the animo, or the soul of man, and that the soul was not, asthe Cartesians seemed to believe, the mind. Though the mind,he admits, can be enveloped with what is certain by starting witha subtle network of truth, not so the soul. To conquer, to movethe soul, requires concrete oratory. Wise men perform their dutybecause they understand it, but such is not the case with the masses.The masses must be made first to love their duty by being alluredto it through the corporal images of oratory. Once they love it,it is easy to induce them to believe and finally to will it.

The proposals Vico has just made in regard to the pursuit ofthe good have a definite relationship to the proposals he madeearlier in regard to the pursuit of truth. In the case of the latter,Vico had said that critica, which tends to the absolutely certain,must be complemented by, indeed follow, topica, which tends tothe particular, and the likely. He also maintained that in theteaching of new truths to the masses, the art of rhetoric, or oratory,must be employed, which is dependent upon critica for the truths41


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presented, but upon topica for the way in which these truths arepronounced. Now, in regard to the pursuit of the good, he saysthat the method of science or philosophy (since to the Cartesiansthere was but one method applicable to all branches of knowl-edge), which tends to the absolute and eternal, must be comple-mented by, indeed preceded by, the method of prudence whichtends to the particular and the uncertain. He also maintainsthat in the teaching of what is good to the masses, the art ofrhetoric, or oratory, must be employed.In both of these cases it is obvious that Vico is placing atremendous moral responsibility upon the shoulders of those whom

he calls "wise." But such a conception does not take into accountthe fact that frequently highly intelligent and knowledgeablemen do use their intelligence for ends that are not virtuous,e.g., demagogues. A necessary prerequisite for the appearanceof demogoguery is the freedom of the masses to judge and tofollow whatever appeals to them as desirable. Yet the only curefor demagoguery, in which the cure is not a form of tyranny, isthe further extension of freedom to the masses. Such a methodof averting demagoguery depends upon a deep faith in the masses.This faith, the seeds of which are already apparent, comes to thefore in Vico's later works, particularly in his greatest and mostwidely known book, The New Science. Were this not to happen,the dictum "Wisdom Is Virtue" could be employed, as it was byPlato, to support a totalitarian, hence tyrannical philosophy ofsociety and of education.43

Before resuming the analysis of Vice's seventh oration, some-thing must be said about Vice's conception of rhetoric or eloquence.Though the purpose of this study is not to trace the origins ofVice's thoughts, nor to indicate their relationship to those ofother philosophers, something of this sort is necessary if one is tounderstand his conception of rhetoric, which is for him intrinsicallya part of man's pursuit of wisdom, his pursuit of the true andthe good.According to Francis Bacon, "the duty and office of Rhetoricis to apply Reason to imagination for the better moving of thewill."44 The important point here is the phrase "better movingof the will." By this Bacon means that rhetoric moves men to

actions, actions that are good.42


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For we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that whichis good than in coloring that which is evil; for there is no man but speakethmore honestly than he can do or think: and it was excellently noted byThucydides in Cleon that because he used to hold the bad side in causes ofestate, therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech;knowing that no men can speak fair of courses sordid and base.46

Today we usually think of rhetoric purely in terms of style,and if at all in connection with reason, as something opposed toit. But for Bacon, and Vico, rhetoric is an aid to reason. "Theend of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason, and notto oppress it."46 Both philosophers agree that man's conductought to be governed by reason, but they also agree in believingthat because of the nature of man and of society, such is notalways the case. In a passage anticipating Vice's notion thatknowledge of good should be made "concrete" or made to "seem"to be good, Bacon says:... it is the business of rhetoric to make pictures of virtue and goodness,so that they may be seen. For since they cannot be showed to the sense incorporal shape, the next degree is to show them to the imagination in as livelyrepresentation as possible by ornament of words.47

But Vico enlisted rhetoric not only in the service of teachinggood actions but also in the teaching of new truths as well. Andthis function of rhetoric can be found expressed in the work ofBacon also. Without the aid of rhetoric to teach new and strangetruths to the masses, such truths, says Bacon, are lost.

So those knowledges are like to be received and honoured which havetheir foundation in the subtlety or finest trials of common sense, or such asfill the imagination; and not such knowledge as is digged out of the hardmine of history and experience, and falleth out to be in some points as adverseto common sense or popular reason, as religion, or more. Which kind ofknowledge, except that it be delivered with strange advantages of eloquenceand power, may be likely to appear and disclose a little to the world andstraight to vanish and shut again.4"

Vice's conception of rhetoric seems largely derived from thatof the English philosopher. It is a conception quite foreign to ustoday, for after the time of Bacon and Vico it was lost.49 But inthis idea of rhetoric, both the Englishman and the Italian sharedan understanding of the dynamics of the intellectual developmentof society. Unlike the Cartesian rationalists, whom Vico called"Stoics"-recalling Bacon's indictment of the latter50-both phi-losophers saw that the advancement of knowledge for the wholesociety could not be accomplished merely by appealing to the

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reason inherent in all men. For any lasting advancement ofknowledge, which must include teaching the masses what is trueand good, rhetoric is indispensable.Cartesian Education and Man as Absolute Subject

In the seventh oration it is apparent that in attacking theCartesian-inspired education Vico is attacking the philosophy ofDescartes himself. At least he is attacking the assumption implicitin this philosophy that man can know with certainty what is other,i.e., the conception of man as absolute subject. Descartes hadattempted to discover or invent the method by which man couldobtain absolute certainty, a method by which man, through theuse of his reason alone, could be led to true knowledge and tothe performance of good acts. In his Method, Descartes believedthat he had found such a way to certainty. But Vico saw in this"Method" a rejection of man as he really is. In other words, Vicosaw in the Cartesian philosophy an alienation of man from himself,because, according to Vico, the Cartesian philosophy could notlead all men to the truth and goodness toward which they tend.

Paradoxically, it was Descartes' insistence on the ability of allmen to attain absolute certainty that convinced Vico of the limita-tions of Descartes' philosophy. Vico did not believe man was anabsolute subject. Descartes did, and, as is well known, basedhis belief on the certainty of mathematics.Vico in the seventh oration makes a rather remarkable com-ment on the Cartesian conception of mathematics as the modelof perfect or absolute knowledge. Speaking of the use of mathe-matics in physics he says:

We demonstrate geometrical things because we make them; if we wereable to demonstrate physical things we would make them.65This is not a criticism of the certainty of mathematics but aninsight into the reason for its certainty. What it does do is todeny that mathematical knowledge is knowledge of what is "other."In so doing, Vico is attacking (and if he is correct, demolishing)the cornerstone of the Cartesian conception of man as absolutesubject. These few rather cryptic remarks which Vico makesabout mathematics are the first expression of his famous andimportant epistemological formula: Verum est factum (truth is

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Having shown that the Cartesian philosophy does not enableman to overcome his natural alienation from truth and goodness,but rather intensifies it, Vico in his future works devoted himselfto the formulation of a philosophy that guarantees the overcomingof this alienation.NOTES

1. E. Codignola, Problema Della Educazione (Firenze, 1955), II, 167-68.2. L. B. DeBessucele, Les Cartesiens D'ltalie (Paris, 1920), 47.3. R. Cotugno, La Sorte di Giovan Battista Vico (Bari, 1914), 22. See alsoM. H. Fisch, "The Academy of the Investigators in Science, Medicine,and History," Essays in Honor of Charles Singer (Oxford, 1953), I.4. G. B. Vico, Opere, a cura di F. Nicolini, La Letteratura Italiana Storiae Testi, Vol. XLIII. (Milano, 1953), n. 10 of Nicolini, 30.5. R. Descartes, Discourse on Method (1637), Philosophical Works, Vol. I,trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York, 1931), 83-87.6.. Ibid., 81.7. Ibid., 92.8. F. Cadet, Port Royal Education, trans. A. D. Jones (London, 1898), 30.9. G. Maugain, Etude sur l'Evolution intellectuelle de lI'ltalia de 1657 a1750 environ (Paris, 1909), 199.

10. Vico, Opere, Autobiografia, 17. See also G. B. Gerini, Gli Scrittori Peda-gogici Italiani Del Secolo Decimo Settimo (Torino, 1900), 223-26 and228-39.

11. A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking, Being the PortRoyal Logic, trans. T. S. Bayres (Edinburgh, 1850), 8.12. Ibid., 1.13. Ibid., 2.14. Ibid.15. Ibid., 67.16. Ibid., 332.17. Vico, Opere, II metodo degli studi del tempo nostro, 176.18. Ibid.19. Ibid.) 177.20. Ibid.21. Ibid.22. Ibid., n. 3 of Nicolini, 178.23. Ibid., 178.24. Vico, Opere, Autobiografia, 39.25. F. Bacon, Philosophical Works, reprinted from the text and translation withthe notes and prefaces of Ellis and Spedding, edited by J. M. Robertson(London, 1905), 511.26. Ibid., 512.27. E. R. Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric (ChapelHill, 1943), 57.28. Bacon, 513 et seq.

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29. Ibid., 512.30. Vico, Opere, II Metodo, 176.31. F. R. Cowell, Cicero and the Roman Republic (London, 1956), 242-49.32. Vico, Opere, II Metodo, 180.33. Ibid.; cf. Arnauld and Nicole, Chap. XVII: "Places or the Methods ofFinding Arguments.-That This Method Is of Little Use."34. Ibid., 181-182.35. Ibid., 192.36. Ibid.37. Ibid.38. Ibid., 193.39. Ibid.40. Ibid., 194.41. Ibid., 196.42. Ibid., 196-197.43. K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton, 1950), PartI, especially Chapter 7.44. Bacon, 127.45. Ibid., 128.46. Ibid.47. Ibid., 536.48. Ibid., 120.49. Wallace, Chap. 13: "Bacon and Post-Elizabethan Rhetorical Theory.''"50. Bacon, 536.51. Vico, Opere, II Metodo, 184.

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Vico Criticism of Descartes-HES