12
Vicksburg Battle of Raymond

Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Vicksburg

Battle of Raymond

Page 2: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Grant’s Strategy

• After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg

• Instead, Grant decides to move northeastward

• By cutting loose from his own communications, Grant can focus on Pemberton’s by attacking the railroads

Page 3: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Grant’s Strategy

• Feint toward the Big Black with the true objective being the Southern RR that connected Jackson and Vicksburg

• Once the Southern was in his control, Grant could turn and attack Vicksburg

• Cut Pemberton off and then destroy him

Page 4: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Advantages of Grant’s New Plan• The open terrain east of

Vicksburg would allow Grant to make good use of his artillery

• The unfordable Big Black River would secure Grant’s left flank

• An attack directly on Vicksburg would allow Pemberton to concentrate his army, but an attack toward Edwards would force him to divide it in order to protect his railroad supply line

Four Mile Bridge on the Southern Railroad, four miles east of Vicksburg

Page 5: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Grant’s March Northeast: Logistical Concerns

• The reliance on forage meant that the army could obtain food only 2 to 3 miles away from its axis of advance– The army was like a vacuum sweeper stripping

everything edible along a 6 mile swath

• The lead divisions could fare fairly well, but the following divisions had slim pickings

Page 6: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Grant’s March Northeast: The Solution

• Divide the army into separate columns on more or less parallel roads 5 to 10 miles apart

• McClernand marched on the left flank– Protected by the Big Black

• Sherman marched in the center– Grant traveled here to facilitate command and control

• McPherson marched on the right flank– On the road from Utica toward Raymond– 10,000 men

Page 7: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Importance of Speed

• “Move your command tonight… with all activity into Raymond. At… [Raymond] you will use your utmost exertions to secure all the subsistence stores that may be there, as well as in the vicinity. We must fight the enemy before our rations fail, and we are equally bound to make our rations last as long as possible. Upon one occasion you made two days’ rations last seven. We may have to do the same thing again.”– Grant to McPherson, May 11

Page 8: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,
Page 9: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

The Forces Join• As McPherson advanced on May

12, he encountered Confederate forces under BG John Gregg who had arrived in Jackson from Port Hudson on May 8 and on May 10 had been ordered to Raymond– Gregg’s scouts had seen only

the lead elements of McPherson’s corps and their report led Gregg to grossly underestimate the size of his enemy

– He attacks McPherson’s 10,000 man corps with his 3,000 man brigade

Page 10: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Gregg’s plan was to turn McPherson’s right flank but he had insufficient forces to do so

Page 11: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Federal Victory• McPherson piecemeals his forces into the attack,

but still prevails thanks to overwhelming numbers• Gregg retreats toward Jackson

SHELLING THE REBEL REAR

Page 12: Vicksburg Battle of Raymond. Grant’s Strategy After Grant’s victory at Port Gibson, Pemberton expects him to head directly north to Vicksburg Instead,

Grant Changes Plan

• Success at Raymond convinces Grant to shift his decisive point from the Confederate railroads to the capitol of Jackson– Knows Gregg has withdrawn in that direction and gets

reports Johnston is en route there with additional troops

• Victory at Jackson will allow Grant to isolate Vicksburg from Johnston’s reinforcements

• Takes advantage of central position between Confederates at Edwards and Jackson– Requires audacity