VI. Construction of Particular Statutes a-E

8/13/2019 VI. Construction of Particular Statutes a-E

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CHAPTER VIII STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF STATUTESGENERAL PRINCIPLESIf a statute should be strictly construed, nothing should be included within thescope that does not come clearly within the meaning of the language used.But the rule of strict construction is not applicable where the meaning of thestatute is certain and unambiguous , for under these circumstances, there is noneed for construction.On the other hand, there are many statutes which will be liberally construed.

The meaning of the statute may be extended to matters which come within thespirit or reason of the law or within the evils which the law seeks to suppress orcorrect.Liberal interpretation or construction of the law or rules, however, applies onlyin proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is truethat litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every casemust be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure anorderly and speedy administration of justice.PENAL STATUTES

Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of theaccused. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is tosubject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as tosafeguard the right of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of tworeasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of aparty accused under its provisions is to be preferred.

C. Remedial statutesFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77154 June 30, 1987JESUS DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs.

HON. JAIME HAMOY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch XV, Region IX,Zamboanga City, and WILEADO DE LEON, DOMINGO DE LEON,CRISTINO DE LEON, HENCIANO DE LEON, MARCIANO

AIZON, and EPIFANIA DE LEON, respondents.SARMIENTO,J.:For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney forpre-trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of the plaintiff, thepetitioner in this case, the respondent Judge declared him non-suited anddismissed the complaint "for failure of the plaintiff to appear for pre-trialconference. 1We do not agree. The respondent Judge manifestly erred. Heacted with indecent haste. He could have easily required the counsel for the

plaintiff to buy the required one-peso documentary stamp outside the courtroom and affix the same to the special power of attorney and that respite wouldnot have taken ten minutes. Had he been less technical and more sensible, thepresent proceedings and the consequent waste of time of this Court and of hisown would have been avoided.

The respondent trial Judge had three chances to rectify his grave error but hemissed all of them. He was adamant. By such rigidity he denied the petitionersubstantial justice.(1) He procrastinated when the plaintiff and his counsel immediately after thehearing on the same morning of July 25, 1986, made oral representations withhim inside his chamber for the reconsideration of his order declaring theplaintiff non-suited and dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff, through hiscounsel, explained that he was actually inside the court room while his lawyerand the defendants' counsel, were arguing, but he (plaintiff) was too timorous tointerrupt the proceedings and make known his presence to his counsel or to thecourt. Despite the immediacy of the representations and the plausibility of thisexplanation considering the plaintiff's nescience, being merely an agriculturaltenant and can hardly write his name, the respondent Judge still required him to

file a written motion and set it for hearing "in accordance with the Rules ofCourt."(2) Complying, the plaintiff's counsel forthwith filed the written motion, 2dulysupported by an Affidavit of Merit of the plaintiff, on the same day, July 25,1986, and set it for hearing as ordered by the respondent Judge. This motion forreconsideration was denied "for lack of merit" on August 29, 1986. 3The orderof denial states in part:

xxx xxx xxx A judicious appraisal of the facts alleged in the motionfor reconsideration and in the accompanying affidavit of merit fail toconvince the Court to reconsider the Order. As admitted by theplaintiff, he was inside the Court room when the case was caned for

pre-trial conference and when his counsel, Atty. Alejandro Saavedraand defendants' counsel Atty. Navarro Belar Navarro were arguingabout the insufficiency of the special power of attorney, but he nevermade known his presence to the Court or to his counsel or to thedefendants. He approached his counsel and presented himself to him

when they were already outside the Courtroom and after the case wasalready dismissed. To the mind of the Court, the foregoingcircumstances detailed by the plaintiff do not constitute excusablenegligence or mistake. 4 xxx xxx xxx

(3) Undaunted, seven days later, on September 5, 1986, the petitioner filed asecond motion for reconsideration 5verified by his counsel, setting it for hearing


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on September 19, 1986, which was promptly denied on the same day of thehearing.

And, on October 7, 1986, as a coup de grace, an over-kill to be sure, therespondent Judge issued a court order which reads:

xxx xxx xxx The Court having denied the second motion forreconsideration for not being allowed by Section 4 of the InterimRules as per Order entered on September 19, 1986, the case at bar istherefore considered closed and terminated. SO ORDERED. 6xxx xxx xxx

The respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of Courtthemselves, fortified by jurisprudence, mandate a liberal construction of therules and the pleadings in order to effect substantial justice. 7After an,"[O]verriding all the foregoing technical considerations is the trend of therulings of this Court to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity forthe proper and just determination of his cause, freed from the constraints oftechnicalities. 8In a recent case 9where the trial court, as in this instance, declared the petitionernon-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference, and consequently

dismissed the complaint, this Court reiterated the doctrine of liberality in theconstruction of the rules of procedure to be followed by all courts.

While it is true under Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court, it ismandatory for the parties and their counsel to appear at the pretrialto consider inter-alia "the possibility of an amicable settlement, thesimplification of the issues, the possibility of obtaining stipulations oradmission of facts, totally or partially, and such other matters as mayaid in the prompt disposition of the action," and that a party whofails to appear at the pre-trial may be non-suited or considered as indefault, this rule was by no means intended as an implacablebludgeon but as a tool to assist the trial courts in the orderly and

expeditious conduct of trials. Time and again WE have emphasizedthat the rule should be liberally construed in order to promote theirobject and assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy, but moreimportantly, just and inexpensive determination of every action andproceeding. 10

Practically on all fours with this case is Gabucan vs. Hon. Judge Luis D. Manta, etal.,11in which the petition for the probate of a notarial will was dismissed onthe sole ground that the will did not bear a thirty-centavo documentary stamp,and, hence, according to the respondent Judge, it was not admissible inevidence, citing section 238 of the Tax Code, now section 250 of the 1977 TaxCode, which reads:

xxx xxx xxxSEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. Aninstrument, document, or paper which is required by law to bestamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or transferred

without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or anycopy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used inevidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall havebeen affixed thereto and cancelled.No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shalladd his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject todocumentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps areaffixed thereto and cancelled. 12

In reversing the interpretation of the provisions of sections 238 and 250 of theold Tax Codes above copied which are Identical to those of section 214 of theNational Internal Code of 1986, as amended, the law now obtaining, this Courtheld:

xxx xxx xxxWhat the probate court should have done was to requirethe petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-centavodocumentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which

is the taxable portion of that document.That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238that the non-admissibility of the document, which does not bear therequisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite stampor stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."

Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at thetime the taxable document is presented in evidence (Del Castillo vs.Madrilena, 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note does not bear adocumentary stamp, the court should have allowed plaintiff's tenderof a stamp of supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5 Phil.67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that

the lack of the documentary stamp on a document does notinvalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs.

Jeanjaquet, 12 Phil. 195, 201-2 and Delgado and Figueroa vs.Amenabar, 16 Phil. 403, 405-6.) 13

This is as it should be because the quality of justice is not strained.WHEREFORE, the orders of the trial court complained of the first dated July25, 1986 declaring the petitioner non-suited and dismissing his complaint, andthose dated August 29, 1986 and October 7, 1986, denying the petitioner'smotions for reconsideration are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. CivilCase No. 3331 is hereby remanded to the respondent trial court for furtherproceedings. No costs.


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Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of therespondent judge. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-69560 June 30, 1988THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK INC., petitioner, vs.THE IMMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ZOILO

AGUINALDO, as presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,Branch 143, NATIVIDAD M. FAJARDO, and SILVINO R. PASTRANA,as Deputy and Special Sheriff, respondents.PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court ofAppeals dated October 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. SP No. 02912 entitled "THEINTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC. v. Hon. ZOILO

AGUINALDO, et al.," dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari against theRegional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 143) for lack of merit, and of itsResolution dated January 7, 1985, denying petitioner's motion forreconsideration of the aforementioned Decision.

Petitioner also prays that upon filing of the petition, a restraining order beissued ex-parte,enjoining respondents or any person acting in their behalf, fromenforcing or in any manner implementing the Order of the respondent trialcourt dated February 13 and March 9, 1984, and January 10 and January 11,1985.

The facts of this case, as found by the trial court and subsequently adopted bythe Court of Appeals, are as follows:In the early part of 1980, private respondent secured from petitioner'spredecessors-in-interest, the then Investment and Underwriting Corp. of thePhilippines and Atrium Capital Corp., a loan in the amount of P50,000,000.00.

To secure this loan, private respondent mortgaged her real properties in

Quiapo, Manila and in San Rafael, Bulacan, which she claimed have a totalmarket value of P110,000,000.00. Of this loan, only the amount ofP20,000,000.00 was approved for release. The same amount was applied to payher other obligations to petitioner, bank charges and fees. Thus, privaterespondent's claim that she did not receive anything from the approved loan.On September 11, 1980, private respondent made a money market placement

with ATRIUM in the amount of P1,046,253.77 at 17% interest per annum for aperiod of 32 days or until October 13, 1980, its maturity date. Meanwhile,private respondent allegedly failed to pay her mortgaged indebtedness to thebank so that the latter refused to pay the proceeds of the money marketplacement on maturity but applied the amount instead to the deficiency in the

proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged properties. With Atrium beingthe only bidder, said properties were sold in its favor for only P20,000,000.00.Petitioner claims that after deducting this amount, private respondent is stillindebted in the amount of P6.81 million.On November 17, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint with the trialcourt against petitioner for annulment of the sheriff's sale of the mortgagedproperties, for the release to her of the balance of her loan from petitioner inthe amount of P30,000,000,00, and for recovery of P1,062,063.83 representingthe proceeds of her money market investment and for damages. She alleges inher complaint, which was subsequently amended, that the mortgage is not yetdue and demandable and accordingly the foreclosure was illegal; that per herloan agreement with petitioner she is entitled to the release to her of the balanceof the loan in the amount of P30,000,000.00; that petitioner refused to pay herthe proceeds of her money market placement notwithstanding the fact that ithas long become due and payable; and that she suffered damages as aconsequence of petitioner's illegal acts.In its answer, petitioner denies private respondent's allegations and assertsamong others, that it has the right to apply or set off private respondent's

money market claim of P1,062,063.83. Petitioner thus interposes counterclaimsfor the recovery of P5,763,741.23, representing the balance of its deficiencyclaim after deducting the proceeds of the money market placement, and fordamages.

The trial court subsequently dismissed private respondent's cause of actionconcerning the annulment of the foreclosure sale, for lack of jurisdiction, butleft the other causes of action to be resolved after trial. Private respondent thenfiled separate complaints in Manila and in Bulacan for annulment of theforeclosure sale of the properties in Manila and in Bulacan, respectively.On December 15, 1983, private respondent filed a motion to order petitioner torelease in her favor the sum of P1,062,063.83, representing the proceeds of the

money market placement, at the time when she had already given her directtestimony on the merits of the case and was being cross-examined by counsel.On December 24, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition thereto, claiming that theproceeds of the money market investment had already been applied to partlysatisfy its deficiency claim, and that to grant the motion would be to renderjudgment in her favor without trial and make the proceedings moot andacademic. However, at the hearing on February 9, 1984, counsel for petitionerand private respondent jointly manifested that they were submitting forresolution said motion as well as the opposition thereto on the basis of thepleadings and of the evidence which private respondent had already presented.


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The petitioner having failed to comply with the above-cited Order, therespondent trial court issued two (2) more Orders: the January 16, 1985 (Annex"CC," Rollo, p. 190) and January 21, 1985 Orders (Annex "DD", Rollo, p. 191),directing several employees mentioned therein to show cause wily they shouldnot be cited in contempt.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a restraining orderand for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Three days after this petition was filed, or specifically on January 18, 1985,petitioner filed an urgent motion reiterating its prayer for the issuance of an ex-

parte restraining order (Rollo, p. 132).Simultaneous with the filing of the present petition, petitioner, as defendant,filed with the trial court anex-partemotion to suspend the implementation of anyand all orders and writs issued pursuant to Civil Case No. 884 (Annex "A",Rollo, p. 135).

This Court's resolution dated January 21, 1985, without giving due course to thepetition, resolved (a) to require the respondents to comment: (b) to issue,effective immediately and until further orders from this Court, a TemporaryRestraining Order enjoining the respondents from enforcing or in any manner

implementing the questioned Orders dated February 13, 1984, March 9, 1984,January 10, 1985 and January 11 and 16, 1985, issued in Civil Case No. 884.The corresponding writ was issued on the same day (Rollo, pp. 139-140).As required, the Comment of private respondent was filed on January 28, 1985(Rollo, pp. 141- 150).

Thereafter, petitioner moved for leave to file a supplemental petition on theground that after it had filed this present petition, petitioner discovered that thebond filed with, and approved by, the respondent lower court showednumerous material erasures, alterations and/or additions (Rollo, p. 151), whichthe issuing insurance company certified as having been done without itsauthority or consent (Annex "Z", Rollo, p. 178).

The Supplemental Petition was actually filed on February 1, 1985 (Rollo, pp.154-171). It pointed out the erasures, alterations and/or additions in the bondas follows:

a. below "Civil Case No. 884" after the words, "Plaintiff's Bond," thephrase "For Levying of Attachment" was erased or deleted;b. in lines 2 and 3 after the word "order," the phrase "approvingplaintiff's motion dated Dec. 15, 1983, was inserted or added;c. in line 3, the phrases "Of attachment" and "ordered that a writ ofattachment issue' were erased or deleted;d also in line 3 after the words "the court has" the phrase "approvedthe Motion was likewise inserted or added;

e. in line 9, the phrase "and of the levying of said attachment" wasalso erased or deleted;f. in line 13, the word "attachment" was likewise erased or deleted;g. also in line 13 after the deletion of word "attachment" the phrase"release of the P1,062,063.83 to the plaintiff was similarly inserted oradded."

Petitioner contended therein that in view of the foregoing facts, thegenuineness, due execution and authenticity as well as the validity andenforceability of the bond (Rello, p. 174) is now placed in issue andconsequently, the bond may successfully be repudiated as falsified and,therefore, without any force and effect and the bonding company may therebyinsist that it has been released from any hability thereunder.

Also, petitioner pointed as error the respondent trial court's motuproprio transferring Civil Case No. 884 to the Manila Branch of the same Courtarguing that improper venue, as a ground for, and unless raised in, a Motion toDismiss, may be waived by the parties and the court may not pre-empt the rightof the parties to agree between or among themselves as to the venue of theirchoice in litigating their justiciable controversy (Supplemental Petition, Rollo, p.

160).On being required to comment thereon, (Rollo, p. 192) private respondentcountered (Rollo, pp. 193-198) that bond forms are ready-prepared forms andthe bonding company used the form for "Levying of Attachment" because thecompany has no ready-prepared form for the kind of bond called for orrequired in Civil Case 884. Whatever deletions or additions appear on the bond

were made by the Afisco Insurance Corporation itself for the purpose ofaccomplishing what was required or intended.Nonetheless, on May 7, 1985, private respondent filed "Plaintiffs Bond" in therespondent trial court in the amount of P1,062,063.83 a xerox copy of which

was furnished this Court (Rollo, p. 219), and noted in the Court's Resolution

dated May 29,1985 (Rollo, p. 225).On March 11, 1985, petitioner was required to file a Consolidated Reply (Rollo,p. 199) which was filed on April 10, 1985 (Rollo, p. 201).

Thereafter, a Rejoinder (Rollo, p. 238) was filed by private respondent onSeptember 18, 1985 after Atty. Advincula, counsel for private respondents wasrequired by this Court to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt

with or held in contempt for his failure to comply on time (Rollo, p. 226) andon August 19, 1985 said lawyer was finally admonished (Rollo, p. 229) for hisfailure to promptly apprise the Court of his alleged non-receipt of copy ofpetitioner's reply, which alleged non-receipt was vehemently denied bypetitioner in its Counter Manifestation (Rollo, p. 230) filed on August 5, 1985.


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Finally, on October 7, 1985, this petition was given due course and both partieswere required to submit simultaneous memoranda (Rollo, p. 249) but before thesame were filed, petitioner moved for leave to file sur-rejoinder (Rollo, p. 250),the sur-rejoinder was filed on October 14,1985 (Rollo, pp. 252-254).Petitioner's memorandum was filed on December 28, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 264-292)

while that of private respondent was submitted on January 10, 1986 (Rollo, pp.295-304).Petitioner again moved for leave to file a Reply Memorandum (Rollo, p. 307)

which, despite permission from this Court, was not filed and on August 22,1986, private respondent prayed for early resolution of the petition (Rollo, p.311).In a resolution dated October 13, 1986 (Rollo, p. 314) this case was transferredto the Second Division of this Court, the same being assigned to a member ofthat Division.

The crucial issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not there can be legalcompensation in the case at bar.Petitioner contends that after foreclosing the mortgage, there is still due fromprivate respondent as deficiency the amount of P6.81 million against which it

has the right to apply or set off private respondent's money market claim ofP1,062,063.83.

The argument is without merit.As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals

Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right,are creditors and debtors of each other. (Art. 1278, Civil Code)."When all the requisites mentioned in Art. 1279 of the Civil Code arepresent, compensation takes effect by operation of law, even withoutthe consent or knowledge of the debtors." (Art. 1290, Civil Code).

Article 1279 of the Civil Code requires among others, that in orderthat legal compensation shall take place, "the two debts be due" and

"they be liquidated and demandable." Compensation is not properwhere the claim of the person asserting the set-off against the other isnot clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot extend to unliquidated,disputed claim arising from breach of contract. (Compaia Generalde Tabacos vs. French and Unson, 39 Phil. 34; Lorenzo & Martinez

vs. Herrero, 17 Phil. 29).There can be no doubt that petitioner is indebted to privaterespondent in the amount of P1,062,063.83 representing theproceeds of her money market investment. This is admitted. But

whether private respondent is indebted to petitioner in the amount ofP6.81 million representing the deficiency balance after the foreclosure

of the mortgage executed to secure the loan extended to her, isvigorously disputed. This circumstance prevents legal compensationfrom taking place. (CA Decision, Rollo, pp. 112-113).

It must be noted that Civil Case No. 83-19717 is still pending consideration atthe RTC Manila, for annulment of Sheriffs sale on extra-judicial foreclosure ofprivate respondent's property from which the alleged deficiency arose. (Annex"AA", Rollo, pp. 181-189). Therefore, the validity of the extrajudicialforeclosure sale and petitioner's claim for deficiency are still in question, somuch so that it is evident, that the requirement of Article 1279 that the debtsmust be liquidated and demandable has not yet been met. For this reason, legalcompensation cannot take place under Article 1290 of the Civil Code.Petitioner now assails the motion of the plaintiff (now private respondent) filedin the trial court for the release of the proceeds of the money marketinvestment, arguing that it is deficient in form, the same being unverified(petitioner's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 266). On this score, it has been held that"as enjoined by the Rules of Court and the controlling jurisprudence, a liberalconstruction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effectsubstantial justice." (Maturan v. Araula, 111 SCRA 615 [1982]).

Finally, the filing of insufficient or defective bond does not dissolve absolutelyand unconditionally the injunction issued. Whatever defect the bond possessed

was cured when private respondent filed another bond in the trial court.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned Decision and Resolution of therespondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-56590 May 29, 1981PERLA COMPAIA DE SEGUROS, INC., petitioner, vs.HON. ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION as Presiding Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of Cavite, Branch IV-Tagaytay City and MIGUEL

ILAGAN, respondents.TEEHANKEE,J:The Court hereby sets aside the questioned orders of respondent judgedisapproving herein petitioner's appeal bond in Civil Case No. TG-438 of theCourt of First Instance of Cavite, Branch IV, Tagaytay City, upon the groundthat said bond "is void and unenforceable for lack of a principal debtor orobligation," and peremptorily declaring his judgment under appeal as havingbecome final and executory and ordering execution thereof. A mere technicaldefect or imperfection in the filing of an appeal bond does not render thedecision subject of the appeal immediately final. and executory, for where saidbond is in substantial conformity with the provisions of the law such that its


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legal effect accomplishes the objective of insuring to the appellee the paymentof the costs of appeal, the appeal should be given due course.In an action for the enforcement of a commercial vehicle comprehensiveinsurance policy with damages, judgment was rendered by respondent judgesentencing petitioner as defendant to pay respondent-plaintiff Ilagan "the totalsum of P18,773.58 minus the sum of P500.00 representing the deductiblefranchise, plus attorney's fees in the amount of P5,600.00 or the total sum ofP23,873.58, with interest thereon at the rate of 36% per annum from February21, 1978 until said amount shall have been fully satisfied; and to pay the costs."From said judgment, petitioner-defendant timely filed a notice of appeal, appealbond and a record on appeal. But the herein private respondent, the prevailingparty in the lower court, filed therein a motion to dismiss the appeal and for theissuance of a writ of execution, impugning the validity of petitioner's appealbond as having no principal debtor and therefore void.Despite opposition, respondent judge upheld respondent's contention anddenied due course to the appeal and further directed the issuance of thecorresponding writ of execution of judgment, in his questioned Order of

January 28, 1981, as follows:1wph1.t

No issue exists regarding the seasonable filing of the notice, bondand record of appeal. the issue centers on the efficacy of the appealbond executed by Rodrigo Y. Arandia and Porfirio B. Yabut, bothlawyers, as sureties whereby they 'jointly and severally bind(themselves) in favor of Miguel Ilagan, ... for the payment of cost ...

As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff the disputed appeal bond isvoid and unenforceable for lack of a principal debtor or obligation.Indeed, while the sureties bound t herself to pay, jointly and severally,'such an undertaking presupposes that the obligation is enforceableagainst someone else besides the sureties and the latter could alwaysclaim that it was never ( their) intention to the sole person obligated

thereby. (Manila Railroad Co., et al. vs. Alvendia, 17 SCRA 154,156.)It therefore, follows that the judgment rendered in this case hadbecome final and executory, because the defendant had not filed anyappeal bond in due time.

Reconsideration was denied in respondent judge's Order of March 27, 1981.Hence, this petition for certiorari which we find to be meritoriousSection 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. reads1wph1.t

Section 5.Appeal Bond. The appeal bond shall answer for the paymentof costs. It shall he in the amount of one hundred and twenty pesos(P120) unless the court shall fix a different amount. If the appeal

bond is not in cash, it must be approved by the court before thetransmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court.

The last sentence of the abovequoted section presupposes that before elevatingthe record on appeal to the appellate count, the trial court has the duty to passupon the sufficiency of the appeal bond, and it is called upon to require theparty-appellant within a period of time to fully comply with the requirements asto said appeal bond in case of some defect in its execution, in the same mannerit requires correction or amplification of a deficient record on appeal. Thus, itbehooves the trial court upon opposition to the effectivity of an appeal bond toexamine it, to declare it lacking of the requirements if ii be so, and then torequire and allow the appellant to complete or amend it in accordance withinstructions within a reasonable period, so as to perfect the appeal. 1Indeed, as in the filing of records on appeal, 2the Court has invariably taken aliberal attitude in favor of the appellant when it comes to the filing of appealbonds in relation to perfection of appeals. 3

Thus, it has been held that an appeal bond is sufficient when it is in substantialconformity with the provisions of the law as long as the legal effect is to insureto the appellee the payment of all costs required by law. 4

InJavier Cruz vs. Enriquez, 5which is similar to the case at bar, the respondentjudge therein ordered the disapproval of the appeal bond after discovering thatthe same consisted merely in the signatures of two lawyers. The Court ruledtherein as follows:1wph1.t

This provision of law 6does not prescribe a special form for appealbond. It only requires that the same be for the amount of sixty pesos,(at that time) conditioned for the payment of costs which theappellate court may award against the appellant.' The bond inquestion complies substantiallywith the provision of law, and we see noreason why the respondent judge found it defective. When heapproved the record on appeal, there has been an implied approval of

the original bond, and we find no reason either why after suchapproval, he had to disapprove said bond and dismiss the appeal onthe allegation that the new bond was filed out of time. Furthermore,granting that the first bond was really defective,justice demands thatherein petitioners, as appellants in that case, be given an opportunity tocure its defect by filing, as they did another bond. In dismissing the appeal therespondent judge has entirely overlooked the fact that the secondbond was not a new one but merely a correction of the originalsupposedly defective bond. ...Respondent Laserna vigorously contends that under the inherentpowers of the court to amend and control its process and orders so


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as to make them conformable to law and justice, the dismissal of theappeal on the ground that the first bond was defective and thesecond one was filed out of time, should be sustained; but under thefacts obtaining in the case, this contention is evidently untenable forthe original bond, in our opinion, is not defective, and even grantingthat it were, petitioners herein were diligent in curing the supposeddefect by filing a new bond in order to protect their right to appeal.

Certainly, the respondent judge should not have been strictlytechnical in the application of the rules, for in so doing he has deprivedherein petitioners of their right to appeal, or at least to perfect it within thetime allowed by law.

There is no question in the instant case, as acknowledged in the challengedorder, that the record on appeal, notice of appeal and the appeal bond werefiled on time. However, as in the above cited case of Cruz, the appeal bond inquestion was executed by petitioner's lawyers, Attys. Rodrigo Y. Arandia andPorfirio B. Yabut, both lawyers of the law firm representing herein petitioner asdefendant in the main case, as well as in the case at t bar, whereby they did"hereby jointly and severally bind ourselves in favor of Miguel Ilagan, in the

amount of One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P120.00) conditioned for the paymentof costs which the appellate court may award against appellants." Clearlyenough. this undertaking, albeit not signed by herein petitioner as party-appellant, effectively insures to the appellee the payment of costs and is,therefore, in substantial compliance with the requirement of the cited Rule, forthey certainly are estopped from denying principal liability under the said bond,as baselessly feared by respondent judge in his Order.One additional observation. The authority cited by respondent judge in thequestioned order,Manila Railroad Company (MRC) vs. Alvendia 7wherein theappeal bond was held void and unenforceable for lack of a principal debtor orobligation since the MRC as co-appellant of the Manila Port Service was not a

sigtatory to the bond, has been superseded by the decision of the is same courtin the later case ofManila Railroad Company vs. Alvendia 8where we held that theManila Port Service must be deemed part of the Manila Railroad Company andnot a separate entity in a suit against the MRC based on arrastre operationsundertaken by it through its "agents and subsidiary," the Manila Port Service.Similarly, in this case the lawyers as agents and attorneys of petitioners properlyexecuted the appeal bond in their own name but for the benefit and on behalfof petitioner as their client who has in turn ratified as principal the execution ofsaid appeal bond with the very prosecution of this action, as evidenced by the

verification of the petition at bar by petitioner's vice-president. 9

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside respondentjudge's orders of January 28, 1981 and March 27, 1981 and ordering respondentjudge to give due course to the appeal and to transmit the records to the Courtof Appeals for proper proceedings and determination of the appeal on themerits. With costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

D. Penal statutes

E. Statutes in Derogation of Fundamental RightsEN BANC

G.R. No. L-53460 May 27, 1983THE PROVINCIAL CHAPTER of LAGUNA, NACIONALISTAPARTY (NP), petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FELICISIMO T. SANLUIS, respondents.

Marciano P. Brion Jr. for petitioner. The Solicitor General for respondent COMELEC.Felicisimo T San Luis and Rustico F. de los Reyes for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:This is a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner against respondents whichseeks to impugn the validity of the proceedings held before the respondentCommission on Elections (COMELEC) in PDC No. 165, wherein thedisqualification of herein private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis was sought,the same being allegedly violative of the due process clause of the Constitution;and to reverse the dismissal resolution issued by respondent COMELEC in saidPDC No. 165, as being allegedly in contravention of the Constitution (ArticleXII-C, Section 10) and of Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52.In the elections of November 8, 1971, private respondent Felicisimo T. SanLuis was the official candidate of' the Liberal Party (LP) for Governor of

Laguna. Private respondent won and accordingly assumed said position, theterm of which would have ordinarily expired on December 31, 1975.On January 18, 1980, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition (docketedas PDC No. 165) to disqualify the private respondent from running as officialcandidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for the organization,'as ofGovernor in the province of Laguna based on "turncoatism" as provided forunder Section 10, Article XII-C, of the 1973 Constitution in relation to Section4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 [pp. 22-24, rec.].Section 10, Article XII-C, of the 1973 Constitution reads:

Sec. 10.No elective public officer may change his politicalparty affiliation during his term of office, and no candidate for


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any elective public office may change his political partyaffiliation within six months immediately preceding orfollowing an election.

The pertinent portion of Section 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 reads:Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. In addition to violation of Section10 of Article XII-C, of the Constitution and disqualifications mentionedin existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of

the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired electiveprovincial, city or municipal official, who has received paymentof the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the lawand who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencementof the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall notbe qualified to run for the same elective local organization,'asfrom which he has retired (emphasis supplied).

The records likewise reveal that prior to January 23, 1980, a similar petition todisqualify on the ground of turncoatism (docketed as PDC No. 172) was filedby the Provincial Chapter of Laguna, Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) against

Wenceslao R. Lagumbay, the Nacionalista Party (NP) official candidate for

Governor of Laguna, in the January 30, 1980 elections [pp.. 79-80, rec.].On January 21, 1980, private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis filed with theCommission on Elections (COMELEC) his answer in PDC No. 165 [pp. 25-28,rec.]. On the same date, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) set forjoint hearing PDC No. 165 and PDC No. 172 on January 24, 1980 at 10:00

A.M. [pp. 75-76, rec.].On January 23, 1980, the private respondent filed with the public respondentCOMELEC his "Formal Submission of Annexes" [pp. 31-32, rec.].On January 24, 1980, private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis (respondent inPDC No. 165) filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) amemorandum [pp. 77-78, rec.l. Likewise, on the same date, Wenceslao R.

Lagumbay, respondent in PDC No. 172, filed with the COMELEC a "FormalOffer of Documentary Evidences with Comments on Petitioner's OwnEvidences" [pp. 85-A to 87, rec.].On January 25, 1980, herein petitioner filed with the Commission on Electionsa memorandum [p. 2, COMELEC's Comment; p. 95, rec.].On February 4, 1980, the private respondent filed with the COMELEC amotion for an early favorable resolution of the case, it allegedly appearing thathe had won over Wenceslao R. Lagumbay, the Nacionalista Party (NP) officialcandidate, by a majority of around 55,000 votes [p. 2, COMELEC's Comment;p. 95, rec.].

On February 6, 1980, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC its reiteration todisqualify private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis [p. 2, COMELEC'sComment; p. 95, rec.].On February 21, 1980, the COMELEC, in a resolution, denied the petition todisqualify private respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis as "the petitioner failed topresent sufficient evidence against herein respondent. " Thus, Resolution No.9188 reads:

9188. (PDC No. 165). In the matter of the petition fordisqualification, dated January 18, 1980, tied by the ProvincialChapter of Laguna, Nacionalista Party (NP), represented by

Wenceslao R. Lagumbay, Acting Chairman, against FelicisimoT. San Luis, respondent, on the ground that said respondentallegedly violated the provision of Section 10, Article XII- C,Constitution in relation to Batas Pambansa Big. 52.

A review of the said petition shows that the petitioner failed to presentsufficient evidence against herein respondent.Premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED to denythe Petition of the Provincial Chapter of Laguna, Nacionalista

Party (NP).SO ORDERED [p. 33, rec.; emphasis supplied].

Hence, the instant petition.IIt is initially contended by the petitioner that public respondent Commission onElections issued the questioned resolution (No. 9188) dismissing the petition inPDC No. 165, without observance of the cardinal precepts of due process.

While petitioner admitted that the disqualification case was set for hearing onJanuary 24, 1980 at 10:00 A.M., nevertheless, it vehemently argued that the meresetting alone of such hearing cannot be taken as satisfying the requirements ofdue process.

Thus, petitioner insisted "that at COMELEC no formal hearing was conductedwherein the parties could have confronted witnesses against each other. "NOTA SINGLE COMMISSIONER WAS IN ATTENDANCE. Only a staffmember of its Legal Department was present when the case was called forhearing, and he directed the parties to submit their respective 'Annexes'(exhibits) after which, their memoranda" [p. 1, Petitioner's Reply; p. 118, rec.].

The aforesaid allegations of the petitioner have no foundation. It is to be notedthat private respondent in its comment filed before this Court alleged thefollowing.

Private respondent thru counsel manifested that he was formally resting hiscase on the basis of the exhibits 1 evidence which he had formally offered in


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writing, and a copy of which was further presentation Atty. MarcianoBrion Jr., counsel for the petitioner. Atty. Brion reserved his right toregister his objections to the exhibits in writing, and manifested that hewas; not presenting any more evidence, in view of the admission of privaterespondent that he was elected Governor of Laguna on November 8,1971as official candidate of the Liberal Party and then ran for the same

position as the s tandard bearer of the KBL Party during the January 30,

1980 elections.In fact, this was the same trend of argumentadopted by petitioner when it argued as follows:

If private respondent is bound, as all partieswho filed pleadings in Court should bebound, by his affirmative allegations andadmission in his pleadings signed by himunder oath, then the case should end here

with his disqualification and without any needfor any presentation discussion.'

Not that private respondent agrees with the aforegoing Argument ofPetitioner. The same was merely cited to show that in the proceedings

before respondent COMELEC, petitioner really preferred not to presentevidence, contrary to its claim now, that it was denied procedural due

process, in that its counsel was not able to present evidence confrontwitnesses or object to exhibits. Parties were even required to submit theirrespective memoranda. Private respondent submitted his memoranda inboth cases, PDC No. 165 and 172, xerox copies of which arehereto attached as Annexes 3 and 4 of this comment.If Petitioner did not submit its memoranda, that is its fault, butcertainly, it cannot shift the blame on the respondentCOMELEC or to private respondent for not doing what itshould have done.

Attached to this Comment as Annex 5 is the xerox copy of theFormal Submission of Annexes of Respondent in PDC No.166 showing on the bottom of page 2 thereof, that petitionerthru counsel was duly furnished a copy thereof.The fact of thematter is that counsel for petitioner concentrated his efforts more on PDC

No. 172 entitled the Provincial Chapter of Laguna (KBL) vs. WenceslaoR. Lagumbay, as shown by the fact that on the date of the hearing on

January 24, 1980, he submitted therein his own 'Formal Offer ofDocumentary Evidence with Comments on Petitioner's Own Evidences' axerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 6 of this Comment[pp.

46, Comment of Private Respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis;pp. 48-50, rec.; emphasis supplied].

In its reply, petitioner miserably failed to deny the said allegations of the privaterespondent. This is fatal to the cause of the petitioner. WE are constrained tosustain the stand of private respondent; for, apart from the presumption ofregularity accorded to respondent Commission in the performance of its duties,petitioner failed to timely assert his right prior to the issuance of the above-

questioned resolution. From January 24, 1980 up to February 21, 1980, whenrespondent COMELEC issued the aforementioned resolution, petitioner failedto press before respondent COMELEC its bid for an opportunity to be heardand belatedly cry for an alleged denial of due process only after receipt of anadverse resolution.

As correctly pointed out by the private respondent, "(I)ndeed, if petitioner hadevidence to present or wanted to confront witnesses or object to evidence inopen session (instead of submitting a written objection as he manifested beforerespondent COMELEC) why did it not file a motion to set the case again for hearing,knouting that elections were over and either its candidate or the private respondent would be

proclaimed sooner or later. Surely, if petitioner sincerely believed that it has not presented

evidence, it should have acted immediately by asking the COMELEC to set the case forhearing for reception of its evidence, unless of course, petitioner thought that its candidate wouldwin the elections, which was, of course, presumptuous on its part [pp. 8-9, Comment ofPrivate Respondent Felicisimo T. San Luis, pp. 52-53, rec.; emphasis supplied].

The requirements of due process are obeyed as long as the parties are given theopportunity to be heard. In the case at bar, petitioner was afforded all thechances to be heard until it submitted the case for resolution by hismanifestation that, because of the admission of private respondent that he ranas Liberal Party candidate in the 1971 elections, he was not presenting any moreevidence, only reserving his right to object to respondent's evidence.In the case of Maglasang vs. Ople (L-38813, 63 SCRA 508 [19751, then

Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, ruled that the rightof due process is not denied where the aggrieved party was given theopportunity to be heard.

The essence of due process is the requirement of notice and hearing, thepresence of a party at a trial is not always of the essence of due process, and anthat due process requires is an opportunity to be heard (Auyong Hian vs. Courtof Tax Appeals, et al., L-28782, Sept. 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110; Asprec vs.Itchon, L-21685, April 30, 1966, 16 SCRA 921; Cornejo vs. Secretary of Justice,et al., L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663).It is significant to note that respondent COMELEC's resolution was issuedafter private respondent submitted his "Formal Submission of Annexes" and


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after both parties submitted their respective memoranda. Thus, respondentCOMELEC stated that it "decided PDC No. 165 based on the petition andmemorandum of the petitioner and the answer, memorandum and the motionfor the early favorable resolution of the case of the private respondent. To say,at this late hour, that the petitioner was denied the process in the COMELEC isunwarranted, ... . The petitioner had been allowed ample opportunity to

ventilate its charge before the respondent COMELEC, as seen above, and failed

in its attempt to support the same with proof " (p. 4, COMELEC's Comment;p. 97, rec.).In other words, the petition filed against private respondent in PDC No. 165

was deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the pleadings, annexes andmemoranda of the parties. And there is no denial of due process if the decision

was "rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in therecord and disclosed to the parties affected (Interstate Commerce Commission vs. L. &N.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431; cited in Ang Tibay, et al.

vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 69 Phil. 635, 643; emphasissupplied).

A case in point is the case of Armedilla vs. COMELEC, et al. (No. 53393,

recently decided by this Court on March 31, 1981). In said case, the COMELECdismissed Armedilla's petition to disqualify private respondent Dizon. Thedismissal was anchored on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Thus:

30. With respect to the disqualification case against Dizon, Armedillainterposed in this Court on March 18, 1980 an 'appeal by certiorari'

wherein he contended that the Comelec did not observe due processin dismissing the case (G.R. No. 53393).31. Dizon in his comment on that appeal traversed the allegation asto nonobservance of due process. He said that at the hearing of thepetition for disqualification on January 26, 1980 in the Comelec thecase was submitted on the basis of the pleadings(p. 30, rollo of G.R. No.

53393) [emphasis supplied].In Ruling to the effect that the COMELEC complied with the basicrequirements of procedural due process in deciding the case on the basis of thepleadings submitted by the parties, this Court declared:

With respect to the disqualification case against Mayor Dizon (G.R.No. 53393), the contention that due process was not observed indismissing that case is not well-taken because petitioner Armedilla

was given a chance to controvert Dizon's defense that he was alreadya KBL partisan in April 1978, or more than six months prior to

January 30, 1980 but Armedilla was not able to overthrow that

defense.He submitted the case for decision by the Comelec on thepleadings (emphasis supplied).

Similarly, in the more recent case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, et al., (No. 53793,June 29,1981), this Court ruled:

Likewise, We are not in accord with the argument of the petitionerthat she was denied due process because she was not afforded theopportunity 'to refute the alleged findings of the handwriting experts

of the Comelec.' Such contention is without merit. At the outset, itshould be recalled that at the hearing on March 11, 1980 before theCOMELEC, the parties dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence,and merely prepared oral arguments and submitted the case for decision after filingtheir 'Annexes' memoranda. Petitioner therefore waived further presentation ofevidence(emphasis supplied).

Aside from the fact that petitioner expressly waived its right to presentpresentation evidence, the mere act of petitioner's counsel in merely filing amemorandum after being satisfied with the alleged admission of privaterespondent until the issuance of the aforequoted adverse resolution, is alreadyan implied manifestation that he was waiving his right to the other elements of a

judicial hearing, like the presentation of additional evidence or the cross-examination of witnesses.

And petitioner's right to a hearing embracing particular elements, appropriate tojudicial proceedings may be waived by taking part in informal proceedings

without objection (Martin vs. Wolfson, 218 Minn. 557, 16 NW 2d 884; cited in2 Am. Jur. 2d 114). Thus:

... The right to present evidence, to have witnesses sworn and to havethem subjected to direct and cross-examination in accordance withrecognized judicial procedure was the right of any interested personpresent at the hearing. But unless that right was asserted, it must beconsidered waived While courts have a tender regard for the rights

and privileges of citizens, there is no reason of public policy why theyshould invoke for him constitutional or statutory rights which hehimself has voluntarily relinquished .... And, if the failure to swear a witness in an ordinary civil trial, oreven in a criminal trial, may be waived by failure to object or byexpress consent (70 C.J., Witnesses, S 654; 39 Am. Jur., New Trial, S532), clearly the right to have witnesses sworn and subjected to examination in anadministrative hearing conducted without traditional court ritual must beconsidered as waived where interested participate therein without questioning the

procedure. People ex rel. Niebuhr v. McAdoo 184 N.Y. 304, 77 N.E.


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260, 6 Ann. Cas. 56; Proctor v. Smith, Tex. Civ. App., 299 S.W. 663... [Martin vs. Wolfson,supra, p. 890; emphasis supplied].

It is finally contended by petitioner that private respondent Felicisimo T. SanLuis is guilty of "turncoatism," in violation of Section 10, Article XII (C) of the1973 Constitution in relation to Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 and P.D.No. 1661, as amended by P.D. No. 1661-A.It is undisputed that private respondent won the gubernatorial organization,'as

in the 1971 local elections under the banner of the Liberal Party and that whenhe filed his certificate of candidacy for governor on January 3, 1980 for the

January 30, 1980 elections, he indicated his party affiliation as that of KilusangBagong Lipunan (KBL). Since 1971 however, "much water has passed underthe bridge." A review of the political events prior and subsequent to theNovember 8, 1971 local elections becomes imperative to resolve the aforesaidissue.

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed ResolutionNo. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body,adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to proposeamendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution

No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of whichthe election of delegates to said Convention was held on November10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to performits functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in sessionon September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29,1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of thePhilippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of thePhilippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, 'submitting to theFilipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 ConstitutionalConvention, and appropriating funds thereof,' as well as setting theplebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the ProposedConstitution on January 15, 1973. ... (Javellana vs. The ExecutiveSecretary, 50 SCRA 30, 55).

In a Presidential Decree dated December 31, 1972, the President issued P.D.No. 86 organizing Citizens Assemblies in each barrio in municipalities and ineach district or ward in chartered cities "to broaden the base of citizensparticipation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunities forthe citizenry to express their views on important national issues." This wassubsequently amended by P.D. No. 86-A on January 5, 1973 and P.D. No. 86-B

on January 7, 1973 requiring the submission of important national questions orissues, among them the approval of the New Constitution, and the holding of aplebiscite on the New Constitution. On January 17, 1973, the President issuedProclamation No. 1102 "(A)nnouncing the ratification by the Filipino people ofthe Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention."On March 31, 1973, this Court ruled in the above-quoted Javellana case that"there is no presentation judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being

considered in force and effect."The aforesaid new Constitution in its Transitory Provisions extendedindefinitely the term of organization,'as of all incumbent public officers andemployees at the time of the ratification of the said Constitution. Thus:

All officials and employees in the existing Government of theRepublic of the Philippines shall continue in organization,'as untilotherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President ofthe Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by thisConstitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their 'Annexes'offices upon the appointment and qualification of their successors(Sec. 9, Art. XVII).

It is significant to point out at this juncture that a novel provision of the 1973Constitution pertinent to the case at bar reads:

No elective public officer may change his political party affiliationduring his term of office, and no candidate for any elective publicorganization,'as may change his political party affiliation within sixmonths immediately preceding or following an election (Sec. 10, Art.XII [C]).

A casual perusal of Section 10, Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution wouldreadily show that it imposes prohibition, on two classes of individuals, namely:(1) an elective public officer who changes political party affiliation during histerm of office, and

(2) a candidate for any elective public office who changes political partyaffiliation within 6 months immediately preceding or following an election.It is very much apparent from the pleadings filed by the petitioner that inseeking the disqualification of herein private respondent before respondentCOMELEC it heavily relied on the first clause of Section 10, Article XII (C)-prohibiting electivepublic officers from changing party affiliation during their termof office.In arguing that private respondent is guilty of "turncoatism" under the secondclause of Section 10, Article XII (C) of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner asserted:

More than anything, it may not be safe to admit that privaterespondent, legally speaking, moved over to the KBL on March 15,


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1978, as contended. Not even if the genuineness of his purportedCertificate of Affiliation with that organization is admitted. To bereckoned with, unfortunately for him, are the pronouncements of theHonorable Supreme Court in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 andLakas ng Bayan vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 196, to the effect that theKBL was not a political party in 1978, but only 'an umbrellaorganization,'as it specifically said:

The KBL is NOT A POLITICAL PARTY. It is agroup or aggrupation ..., which is "a tempo-alliance,union, or coalition ... of persons or parties for thepurpose of joint action and combining their resourcesto support a common list of candidates (emphasissupplied).

And so, insofar as the now involved, constitutional ban is concerned,when did private respondent transfer affiliation to the KBL?Certainly, not before KBL became a political party 'only in lateDecember, 1979, after the sudden calling of the elections for January30, 1980,' by the words of Justice Teehankee in concurring in the

Reyes vs. Comelec decision.Thus, did private respondent also violate the second phase of thesame constitutional prohibition that of changing party affiliation

within six months before election (pp. 6-7, Petitioner's Reply; pp.123-124, rec.).

The above contention is not wen taken. In the case of Sevilleja vs. COMELEC(Nos. 52793 and 53504, August 31, 1981), reiterated in Geronimo vs.COMELEC (No. 52413, September 26, 1981), this Court ruled:

... (T)he question of whether or not the KBL is a political party hasbeen foreclosed by subsequent political developments. Assignificantly observed by this Court in Santos vs. Commission on

Elections, et al., supra-Under its Resolution Ne 1406, promulgated December22, 1979 laying down rules on the accreditation ofpolitical parties, Section 1 thereof provides that anyduly registered political party in the April 7, 1978election shag be entitled to accreditation. Pursuant tothis Resolution, KBL was duly accredited separatelyfrom the NP That KBL had always been a politicalparty or aggrupation can, therefore, no longer be opento question. Were KBL not such a political party,block voting as was declared valid in the case of

Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, could not have been availedof, by it, as it unquestionably did, in the 1978 elections.For block voting is voting for a political party.

Moreover, after the decision in the case of LABAN vs. COMELEC(82 SCRA 196 [19781), the KBL was transformed into a distinctpolitical party and ceased as a mere umbrella organization, as shown

by subsequent political developments. It is significant to note that,after the April 1978 election, in the Interim Batasang Pambansa,majority of the assemblymen are Identified and Identify themselves

with pride as KBL members sporting T-shirts, hats and pins labelledKBL; while the handful of opposition diehards Identify themselves asmembers of the Nacionalista Party or Pusyon Bisaya or Mindanao

Alliance Much later, until December, 1979, the majority members ofthe IBP kept referring to themselves as KBL members and heldcaucuses or meetings to discuss vital issues and proposed legislationsas such KBL members. On the floor of the IBP, the members of theKBL Identify themselves as such and the KBL has been referred to

as the party of the administration. The actuations of the organizers,leaders and members of the KBL established the said party as a defacto political party since April 1, 1978. The acts performed by theKBL leaders and their members, not the formality of its registrationas a party, should determine the commencement of its existence assuch political party. It has been held with reference to illegalassociations that the nature and true character of an organization areoftentimes determined by the speeches and activities of its leadersand members rather than by its constitution and by-laws (Mr. JusticeMariano Albert in People vs. Ramos, CA-G.R. No. 5318, Dec.28,1940,40 O.G. 2305, Sept. 30,1941).

The hesitant stance taken by petitioner in assailing the candidacy of privaterespondent based on the second clause of Section 10, Article XII (C),prohibiting candidatesfor any elective public office f rom changing partyaffiliation within 6 months immediately preceding or following an election is not surprising.It must be noted that as early as March, 1978, private respondent wasundisputedly expelled from the Liberal Party together with other Liberal Partystalwarts as Governor Eduardo Joson of Nueva Ecija, Governor Faustino Dyof Isabela and Assemblyman Eddie Ilarde-about fifteen (15) months before thesix-month prohibitive period commenced in July, 1979 (pp. 83-84, rec.). Theexpulsion was obviously due to private respondent's open support for andaffiliation with the then newly organized Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). This


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is shown by the fact that he became Chairman of the KBL, Provincial Chapterin Laguna, and Chairman and Campaign Manager for Region IV-A consistingamong others of the Southern Tagalog provinces and hence activelycampaigned for KBL candidates in the April, 1978 elections for the members ofthe Interim Batasang Pambansa. It is likewise undisputed that privaterespondent has been a holder of a certificate of affiliation as a bona fide KBLmember as early as of March, 1978.

Of course, there can be no doubt that had private respondent sought within sixmonths before January 30, 1980, his expulsion from the Liberal Party toanticipate a forthcoming elections as alluded to by petitioner, the same is clearlyan act of political opportunism. But such expulsion could not have been soughtby private respondent as there was no certainty as to the calling of electionsonJanuary 30, 1980. As a matter of fact, the January 30, 1980 local elections wasnot even contemplated in April, 1978. In the language of petitioner, "(N)o onefor a fact, then knew when the next elections would be called" (p. 6, Petitioner'sReply; p. 123, rec.).

The contention of petitioner that private respondent switched party affiliationduring his term of organization,'as and hence guilty of "turncoatism" is not

tenable. It is appropriate to note that private respondent was elected governoron November 8, 1971 for a frameup. term or up to 1975. As correctly pointedout by private respondent, that the term of office of those elected in the November 1971elections expired on December 31, 1975, the period intended by the framers to becovered by the constitutional prohibition, can be gleaned from among thequestions asked during the February 27, 1975 referendum and from one of the

whereases of P.D. No. 1296, also known as "The 1978 Election Code."Thus, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the following specific questionwas among the questions asked:

ON LOCAL OFFICIALSAt the expiration of the terms of office of your local elective officials on December

31, 1975,how do you want their successors chosen: to be appointedby the President or elected in accordance with the Election Code?(Emphasis supplied).

And among the whereases of P.D. No. 1296, more popularly knownas "The 1978 Election Code" reads:WHEREAS, the elective local officials whose terms of office expired onDecember 31, 1975were allowed to continue in organization,'as subjectto the pleasure of the President; (emphasis supplied).

Furthermore, in the case of Seares vs. COMELEC (L-34381, May 31, 1977, 77SCRA 273, 278), this Court ruled that four-year term of office of those electedin the November 8, 1971 elections already expired. In the aforesaid Seares case,

a petition was filed onNovember 23, 1971against private respondents CarmeloBarbero and Gavino Balbin, who were duly elected as governor and vice-governor respectively, assailing the minute resolution issued by respondentCOMELEC denying for lack of merit, petitioner's petition for the cancellationof the certificate of candidacy of private respondents and the minute resolutionlikewise issued by respondent COMELEC denying petitioner's motion forreconsideration subsequently filed.

In dismissing the said petition, this Court, speaking through then AssociateJustice Felix Q. Antonio, statedinter alia: "and considering further, that the four-year term of office of those elected and proclaimed in the election of November 8, 1971,particularly the offices of Governor and Vice -Governor has already expired, We find thepresent petition moot and academic" (emphasis supplied).Noteworthy in the above-cited case is the fact that it was decided by thisCourt after December 1975 and over four (4) years prior to the January 30, 1980 localelections.

While there might be plausibility in the contention of petitioner that Section 9,Article XVII in the Transitory Provisions extended indefinitely the term oforganization,'as of all incumbent public officers and employees, nonetheless, the

same will not suffice to bring the case of the private respondent within theconstitutional prohibition.

WE take the view that the evident intention of the new Constitution was toapply the prohibition, as to party switching (turncoatism) to the term of office forwhich one was previously elected in relation to the political party under which he ran andwon.In the present case, the prombition, should only apply to the termfor which

private respondent was elected governor as a Liberal Party candidate from January 1, 1972 toDecember 3l,1975.It must be noted that the new Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973

when the term of office of local elective public officials, who were elected assuch under the two major political parties, the Nacionalista Party and Liberal

Party, had not expired. Having been elected in the November, 1971 localelections, their term of organization,'as expired on December 31, 1975.It is worth noting that private respondent was allowed to continue in office atthe pleasure of the President by virtue of the provisions of the TransitoryProvisions and supplemented by the results of the referendum on February 27,1975, thru which the people opted for appointment by the President as themanner of choosing the successors of local offtce whose terms were to expireon December 31, 1975.

The period beyond December 31, 1975 is no longer within the coverage of thephrase "term of office" for which respondent was elected as a Liberalcandidatefor purposes of applying the constitutional prohibition.


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Thus, private respondent argued that "(E)ven granting arguendo therefore, thatprivate respondent changed political party affiliation when the constitutionalprohibition, was already in effect, and not before, as discussed earlier in thisComment,still it could not be said that he changed affiliation during the term for which hewas elected Governor as a Liberal which is what is obviously contemplated in the

prohibition.A public officer is prohibited from changing political party affiliationduring his term of organization,'as to prevent opportunism of one who after

having been catapulted to organization,'as with the help of a political partysimply abandons his party and switches to another, while serving his term,thereby ignoring the meaning of the electoral results and making a mockery ofthe popular will. But if the change took place after the expiration of the term to which hehad been elected under a particular party, as in this case, where private respondent ran as aKBL four (4) years after the expiration of his frameup. term on December 31, 1975, then the

prombition, does not apply, for the reason that, that part of his term from December 31, 1975up to March 2, 1980, was not by virtue of his having been elected as a Liberal but because hewas allowed to continue in office 'at the pleasure of the President,' who apropos is thetitular head of the KBL party" (pp. 24-25, Private Respondent's Comment; pp.68-69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In fine, what is essential is the political party of the elective public official as ofthe date of his election and during the four-year term to which he had beenelected and not his political inclinations after the said frameup. term expires.Finally, to make the constitutional prohibition, applicable to the period beyondthe frameup. term to which public officials were elected in the 1971 localelections under their respective political parties would work manifest injusticeand unduly impinge on the freedom of association guaranteed to all individuals.Incumbent public officials who ran during the last election (1971 elections)prior to the 1973 Constitution which embodies the said novel provision, wouldbe undoubtedly unjustifiably prejudiced if the party under the banner of whichthey ran and won, would no longer participate in the succeeding elections after

the effectivity of the new Constitution, such as the Liberal Party in the case atbar which boycotted all elections during and after the lifting of martial law. Inthe present case, it appears that most of the prominent LP leaders whoparticipated in the elections held after the effectivity of the new Constitution,campaigned and ran under new opposition groups such as the Lakas ng Bayan(LABAN), National Union for Liberation (NUL) Mindanao Alliance (MA)Pusyon Bisaya, Bicol Saro and other new political aggrupations. This We believe

was not the manifest intention of the framers.Indeed, "of two reasonably possible constructions, one of which wouIddiminish or restrict fundamental right of people and the other of which wouldnot do so, latter construction must be adopted" (16 C.J..S 69 footnote). Hence,

the more logical interpretation is that which gives effect to Section 10 of ArticleXII (C) of the 1973 Constitution and does not violate the individual's basic rightto association. WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 108718 July 14, 1994GENARO R. REYES CONSTRUCTION, INC. and UNIVERSAL

DOCKYARD., petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE DEPARTMENTOF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, JOSE P. DE JESUS,ROMULO M. DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.

J.P. Villanueva & Associates and Ricardo J.M. Rivera Law Office for petitioners.MELO, J.:Herein petitioners Genaro G. Reyes Construction, Inc. (or GGRCI) andUniversal Dockyard Ltd. (or UDL) seek the nullification of the decision datedOctober 20, 1992 and the resolution dated January 20, 1993 of the EighthDivision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28632. The said decisionand resolution affirmed the two orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of the

National Capital Judicial Region (Branch 15) dated June 22, 1992 and August 5,1992 in its Civil Case No. 92-61345 which denied herein petitioners' applicationfor a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjointhe Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and then DPWHSecretary Jose P. de Jesus, and others therein impleaded from enforcing andimplementing the notice of pre-termination of petitioners' contract for theimplementation of Lower Agusan Development Project, Stage I, Phase 1,Butuan City, or any part thereof, to any person; and prohibiting said defendantsfrom bidding said project or any part thereof, or awarding it to any person.On March 1, 1992, the Government through respondent DPWH on one hand,and the joint venture of Genaro G. Reyes Construction, Inc. (GGRCI),

Universal Dockyard, Ltd. (UDL), a British construction firm, HomeConstruction (HC), and JPL Construction (JPLC), (represented by petitionerGenaro G. Reyes, as President of lead contractor GGRCI) on the other hand,entered into a "Contract for the construction of the flood control facilities andland improvement works of the Lower Agusan Development Project, Stage 1,Phase 1, Butuan City" (Annex B, Petition; pp. 75-88, Rollo).In the bidding which preceded the awards by the DPWH of the contract to theGGRCI, et al. Joint Venture, petitioners submitted the lowest bid below the

Approved Government Estimate (AGE) of P492,563,998.00.The following bids were submitted:


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1. Petitioner P445,858,196.02 9.45% below approved governmentestimate of P492,563,998.00.2. D.M. Wenceslao & Associates P659,980,029.00 33.99% abovegovernment estimate.3. Hanil Development Corporation P696,524,897.91 41% abovegovernment estimate.4. F.F. Cruz and China Stage Engineeringbacked out.

5. C.M. Pancho and A.M. Oretadisqualified.On May 8, 1992 the Notice to Proceed (Annex C, Petition; p. 89, Rollo) wasissued by DPWH Undersecretary Romulo Del Rosario. It was received bypetitioners on May 9, 1992 and they forthwith mobilized and deployed theirmen and equipment. The notice to proceed specifically stated that the contract

would take effect not later than thirty days from its receipt by petitioners.On April 23, 1992, the other respondents, DPWH Project Engineers JapaneseEiichiro Araide and Engineer Aquiles C. Sollano recommended termination ofthe contract alleging that as of that date "the project work progress is already9.50 percent behind schedule (negative slippage)" (Annex F, Petition; pp. 92-93, Rollo). Four days later, or on April 27, 1992, Consultant Eiichiro Araide gave

another figure of 9.8% negative slippage (Annex G, Petition; pp. 93-96, Rollo).Under the law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1870, the Government(herein represented by the DPWH) is authorized to take over delayedinfrastructure projects only whenever a contractor is behind schedule in itscontract and incurs 15% or more negative slippage based on its approved PERT/CM,and the implementing agency, at the discretion of the Minister concerned, mayundertake the administration of the whole or a portion of the unfinished workor have the whole or portion of such unfinished work done by anothercontractor through a negotiated contract at the current valuation price.

Also, Department Order No. 102, Series of 1988 of the DPWH, provides:To insure timely and effective remedial steps in response to delays in

project implementation, all Project Managers (PMs), RegionalDirectors (RDs) and District Engineers (DEs) concerned shallundertake the following calibrated actions where contracts forinfrastructure projects reach the levels of negative slippage(attributable to the contractor) indicated below:1. Negative Slippage of 5% (Early Warning Stage). The contractorshall be given a warning and required to submit a "catch-up" programto eliminate the slippage. The PM/RD/DE shall provide temporarysupervision and monitoring of the work.2. Negative Slippage of 10% ("ICU" Stage). The contractor shall begiven a second warning and required to submit a detailed action

program on a fortnightly (two weeks) basis which commits him toaccelerate the work and accomplish specific physical targets which

will reduce the slippage over a definite time period. Furthermore, thecontractor shall be instructed to specify the additional input resources

money, manpower, materials, machines, and management inwhich he should mobilize for this action program. The PM/RD/DEshall exercise closer supervision and meet the contractor every other

week to evaluate the progress of work and resolve any problems andbottlenecks.3. Negative Slippage of 15% ("make or break" stage). The contractorshall be issued a final warning and required to come up with a moredetailed program of activities with weekly physical targets together

with the required additional input resources. On-site supervision shallbe intensified, and evaluation of project performance will be done atleast once a week. At the same time the PM/RD/DE shall preparecontingency plans for the termination and rescission of the contractand/or take over of the work by administration or contract.4.Negative Slippage beyond 15% ("terminal" stage). The PM/RD/DE shall

contract and/or take over of the remaining work by administration or assignmentto another contractor/appropriate agency. Proper transitory measures shall betaken to minimize work disruptions, e.g., take over by administration whilerebidding is going on.

Because of negative slippage of 9.50% as of April 23, 1992, or 9.86% as revisedon April 27, 1992, respondent Project Director Antonio A. Alpasan wrote amemorandum (Annex H, Petition; p. 98, Rollo) dated May 8, 1992 to respondentDPWH Undersecretary Romulo Del Rosario recommending either of twoalternatives:1. Negotiate the entire balance of the work with the second lowest bidder, but ifthe second lowest bidder is blacklisted, then to the third lowest bidder; or

2. Rebid the whole balance of the work or divide it into contract packages.On May 14, 1992, DPWH Acting Secretary Gregorio Alvarez notified petitionerGGRCI that its contract is being terminated (Annex D, Petition; p. 90, Rollo).

Also on May 14, 1992, respondent DPWH Undersecretary Romulo Del Rosariowrote respondent Secretary De Jesus a memorandum (Annex I, Petition; p.99, Rollo), "recommending that the balance of the work be offered to the thirdlowest bidder, the Korean firm of Hanil Development Corporation and that inthe event that the negotiation with Hanil fails, the balance of the work berepackaged into several components for rebidding as soon as possible.

At this juncture, note must be taken of the circumstance that the bid price ofHanil of P696,524,897.96 was 41.4% over and above the approved government


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estimate (AGE) of P492,563,998.00 for the project. Hanil's bid was higher byP254,666,701.94 vis-a-vispetitioners' bid and contract price.On May 14, 1992, respondent DPWH Secretary De Jesus wrote petitioners thatits contract for the project was terminated (Annex E, Petition; p. 91, Rollo). OnMay 22, 1992, petitioners wrote a letter requesting reconsideration of thetermination order, pointing out, inter alia,that:

. . . the bid of Hanil Corp. when the project was bidded 15 October

1990was already P696,524,897.00, 41.4% above the ApprovedAgency Estimate (AAE), which amounts to P492,563,998.00.Categorically, we are taking a price difference of P203,960,849.00,

which is obviously much to the disadvantage of the Department andthe Filipino people.In comparison to the contract price of P445,858,196.00, 9.48% belowthe AAE, the government and Filipino people stand to earn a savingsof P46,705,802.00 and P250,666,651 compared to Hanil's bid price.. . . Reviewing the incurred negative slippage in detail, it can clearly beseen that the bulk can be attributed to the unaccomplished spoilbankand dredging section of the project.

The spoilbank section, supposedly 100 hectares in area had right ofway problems; that is, only 40 hectares or 40% of the total area havebeen acquired. (Annex J, Petition; pp. 100-101, Rollo.)

The request for reconsideration was reiterated on May 26, 1992 and June 14,1992 (Annexes K and L, Petition; pp. 102-106, Rollo) inviting the DPWH'sattention that: (a) based on Hanil's bid price the government stands to loseP250,666,651.00, apart from the additional P100 Million worth in escalationprice as indicated in the recommendation of respondents Alpasa (Annex H,Petition) and Del Rosario (Annex I, supra); (b) the delay and failure of theDPWH Project Office (PMO) to procure the 100 hectares right of way for theproject's spoilbank area (only 40 hectares was acquired by the DPWH) as

provided for in the tender documents, thereby contributing to a negativeslippage equivalent to 3% due to the suspension of work in that area because ofright of way problems.On June 2, 1992, DPWH Secretary De Jesus terminated the contract of theGGRCI, et al. Joint Venture (Annex M, Petition; p. 107, Rollo).On October 8, 1992, respondent DPWH Undersecretary Romulo del Rosariosent a letter (Annex N, Petition; pp. 108-110, Rollo) to Mr. Hideo Tanaka, ChiefRepresentative of Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (or OECF)recommending that the termination of petitioners' contract be liftedupon thefollowing observations:

. . . some reasons contributed to the delay covering the negativeslippage was also due to the government's fault, such as:

a. Overlapping of duties and responsibilities amongthe expatriates, the local consultants and the fieldPMO.b. Unauthorized variation order with the projectmanager and the expatriate consultant issuing it

without prior authority from the central officereducing the length of the flood wall from 5.825 km.to 1.868 km. and change it to levee, with a total costreduction of P75,458,091.03.c. The right of way problem where the project has aso-called spoiled bank section which is supposed to be100 hectares and the government has to secure theright-of-way. But as of the present, only about 40hectares or 40% has been acquired, out of which,about 20 hectares are contiguous while the remainingare scattered. Because of this the contractor found it

difficult to pursue the project as it is quite unrealisticto dispose of the dredged materials. Aside from this,there is also the right-of-way problems encountered inthe floodwall and levee construction.

3. With the termination effected, the contractor filed a case in thetrial court twice denied by the trial court. Right now the case hasbeen appealed to the Court of Appeals.4. The DPWH sent an investigating team to verify the allegations ofthe contractor on the faults of the Government and found to havebeen true.5. To resolve the issue, we have studied and came up with three

options to continue the project as presented in our report toSecretary De Jesus (copy attached). Considering the advantages anddisadvantages presented, we recommend that the termination orderbe lifted and the contract with the joint venture be pursued on thepremise that the vigorous action of the contractor in pursuing thecase, it is evident that they have all the intention to finish the project.Otherwise all their actions would prove nothing and futile.

The above recommendation was based on the report of Andres Canlas, DPWHProject Manager IV, dated September 8, 1992 (Annex C-2, Urgent Motion forIssuance of Temporary Restraining Order; p. 196, Rollo)that the negative slippage ofthe project was caused not only by the contractor but also by the government side.


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On May 28, 1992 GGRCI, et al. Joint Venture filed a case for prohibition,specific performance, and injunction against respondent DPWH as the soledefendant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 92-61345).

The joint venture subsequently filed an Amended Petition impleading additionaldefendants (respondents herein) and including claims for damages.On June 25, 1992 and August 5, 1992, the regional trial court issued ordersdenying the joint venture's prayer for preliminary injunction citing Section 1 of

Presidential Decree No. 1818 providing that:No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue anyrestraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatoryinjunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving anyinfrastructure project or a mining, fishery, forest or other naturalresource development of the government or any public utilityoperated by the government including any other public utilities forthe transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastrecontracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmentofficial from proceeding with, or continuing the execution orimplementation of any such project, or the operation of such public

utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution,implementation or operation.

On August 11, 1992 the joint venture filed with the Court of Appeals a petitionfor certiorariand prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction toset aside the trial court's orders.

The petition in CA-G.R. 28632 was dismissed by respondent Court of Appealsin a decision dated October 20, 1992 (Annex A, Petition; pp. 68-75, Rollo) and asubsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January20, 1993 (Annex A-1, Petition; p. 77, Rollo).Much reliance is placed on the prohibition embodied in Section 1 ofPresidential Decree No. 1818 which forbids any Court in the Philippines,

including this Court, from issuing any restraining order, preliminary injunction,or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversyinvolving, as in the case at bar, an infrastructure project, to prohibit any personor entity from continuing with the execution or implementation of such project.It is on the basis of such provision that the door is being closed on petitioners'prayer for redress.Such proposition is not well-taken.

Against the backdrop of the undisputed facts that (a) respondents terminatedpetitioners' contract based on slippage of 9.86% and (b) the contributory faultof the government which substantially added to the slippage the primaryquestion that presents itself is whether the termination was proper even if the

slippage had not reached the 15% level mentioned by the law as to justifytermination. This is a legal, not a factual question. In consequence, if thetermination be adjudged unjustified, are the courts powerless to intervene dueto the caveat under the aforequoted Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818?

Although we entertain serious doubts in regard to the constitutionality ofPresidential Decree No. 1818, we nonetheless feel that said decree finds noapplication to the case at bench. It will be observed that what Presidential

Decree No. 1818 proscribes is the issuance of a writ of injunction to impede or,in the language of the statute:

. . . to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmentofficialfrom proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation ofany such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing anylawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation oroperation.

In the case at bench, the net effect of granting the petition is not to staveoff implementation of a government project but precisely to say to publicrespondents that they ought to implement the award and should not thus cancelthe contract of petitioners inasmuch as the negative slippage is less than the

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Documents

VI. Construction of Particular Statutes a-E