Version V0 - Europa

EDA CBRN FAS Architecture Study

N109012-D410 CBRN FAS Architecture V0.2.doc Page 1 / 117

CBRN FAS Reference Architecture

Version V0.2

CBRN Functional Area Service Architecture Study

10-CAP-004

Doc.-No.: N109012-D410

Short Title: CBRN FAS Architecture

Release Date: 30.06.2010

Release No.: 0.2

All rights reserved. Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Duplication only with permission.

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Table of Contents

1. Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... 5

2. Management Summary ................................................................................................................................ 7

3. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 9

3.1. Project Context ..................................................................................................................................... 9

3.2. Objective ............................................................................................................................................. 10

3.3. Task .................................................................................................................................................... 10

4. Conduct of Work ........................................................................................................................................ 11

5. Reference Architecture CBRN FAS .......................................................................................................... 12

5.1. Scope of CBRN Architecture .............................................................................................................. 12

5.2. Architecture Framework and Methodology ......................................................................................... 13

5.3. Operational Perspective...................................................................................................................... 13

5.3.1. Operational Actors ......................................................................................................................... 13

5.3.2. Operational CBRN Activities .......................................................................................................... 16

5.4. CBRN FAS System Perspective ......................................................................................................... 27

5.4.1. CBRN System Functionalities ........................................................................................................ 28

5.4.2. CBRN FAS Internal and External Interfaces .................................................................................. 49

6. Findings and Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 58

6.1. Findings .............................................................................................................................................. 58

6.2. Recommendations .............................................................................................................................. 59

7. Annex A – List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 60

8. Annex B - List of Reference Documents .................................................................................................. 61

9. Annex C – Architecture Definition ............................................................................................................ 62

9.1. Definition of Actors (Operational Nodes) ............................................................................................ 62

9.2. Definition of Operational Activities ...................................................................................................... 65

9.3. Definition of CBRN FAS Data Bases .................................................................................................. 97

9.4. Definition of CBRN FAS Functionalities ............................................................................................ 105



List of Figures and Tables

Figure 2-1 Architecture Development (1) ................................................................................................................. 7

Figure 3-1 Reference Architecture & Requirements ................................................................................................ 9

Figure 3-2 Project Structure ................................................................................................................................... 10

Figure 4-1 Conduct of Work ................................................................................................................................... 11

Figure 5-1 Project Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 12

Figure 5-2 EU CBRN Actors (NOV-2) .................................................................................................................... 14

Figure 5-3 EU FHQ CBRN Actors (NOV-2) ........................................................................................................... 15

Figure 5-4 EU OHQ CBRN Actors (NOV-2) ........................................................................................................... 16

Figure 5-5 CBRN Operational Activities ................................................................................................................. 17

Figure 5-6 Derivation of Operational View into System View ................................................................................. 27

Figure 5-7 CBRN System Functionalities............................................................................................................... 28

Figure 5-8 CBRN FAS DIM .................................................................................................................................... 29

Figure 5-9 CBRN FAS Reconnaissance Management .......................................................................................... 29

Figure 5-10 CBRN FAS Reconnaissance Management ........................................................................................ 30

Figure 5-11 CBRN FAS Survey Management ....................................................................................................... 31

Figure 5-12 CBRN FAS Survey Management ....................................................................................................... 31

Figure 5-13 CBRN FAS Surveillance Management ............................................................................................... 32

Figure 5-14 CBRN FAS Surveillance Management ............................................................................................... 32

Figure 5-15 CBRN FAS Disease Management ...................................................................................................... 33

Figure 5-16 CBRN FAS Disease Management ...................................................................................................... 33

Figure 5-17 CBRN FAS SIBCRA Management ..................................................................................................... 34

Figure 5-18 CBRN FAS SIBCRA Management ..................................................................................................... 34

Figure 5-19 CBRN FAS Monitoring Management .................................................................................................. 35

Figure 5-20 CBRN FAS Monitoring Management .................................................................................................. 35

Figure 5-21 CBRN FAS Warning & Reporting ....................................................................................................... 36

Figure 5-22 CBRN FAS Warning & Reporting ....................................................................................................... 36

Figure 5-23 CBRN FAS Physical Protection .......................................................................................................... 37

Figure 5-24 CBRN FAS Physical Protection .......................................................................................................... 37

Figure 5-25 CBRN FAS Hazard Management ....................................................................................................... 38

Figure 5-26 CBRN FAS Hazard Precaution Management ..................................................................................... 39

Figure 5-27 CBRN FAS Hazard Control Management .......................................................................................... 40

Figure 5-28 CBRN FAS Medical Countermeasures and Support .......................................................................... 41



Figure 5-29 CBRN FAS Medical Countermeasures and Support .......................................................................... 41

Figure 5-30 CBRN FAS Force Preparation ............................................................................................................ 42

Figure 5-31 CBRN FAS Force Preparation ............................................................................................................ 42

Figure 5-32 CBRN FAS Planning .......................................................................................................................... 43

Figure 5-33 CBRN FAS Planning .......................................................................................................................... 43

Figure 5-34 CBRN FAS Logistics .......................................................................................................................... 44

Figure 5-35 CBRN FAS Logistics .......................................................................................................................... 44

Figure 5-36 CBRN FAS COP ................................................................................................................................. 45

Figure 5-37 CBRN FAS COP ................................................................................................................................. 45

Figure 5-38 CBRN FAS Reach Back ..................................................................................................................... 46

Figure 5-39 CBRN FAS Reach Back ..................................................................................................................... 46

Figure 5-40 CBRN FAS Lessons Learnt ................................................................................................................ 47

Figure 5-41 CBRN FAS Lessons Learnt ................................................................................................................ 47

Figure 5-42 CBRN FAS Simulation ........................................................................................................................ 48

Figure 5-43 CBRN FAS Simulation ........................................................................................................................ 48

Figure 5-44 CBRN FAS Incident Logging .............................................................................................................. 49



1. Preface

This document is the result of Work Package (WP) 420 ‘Definition of Architecture Framework’ and WP 430

‘Definition of Interfaces’.

The requirements for the CBRN FAS have been analysed applying the architecture methodology according to the

NATO Architecture Framework (NAF). Architecture diagrams have been modelled using the architecture

modelling tool IBM Rational System Architect Ver. 11.3. All architecture diagrams and definitions are depicted

and listed in this document. Additionally, the complete data base will be delivered as database file in .BAK-format

for subsequent architecture management tasks. Furthermore, the complete database has been generated as

Web-Export HTML file usable with a commercial web browser (optimised for Internet Explorer).



Intentionally left blank



2. Management Summary

The aim of the study has been the establishment of operational and technical requirements and the development

of a Reference Architecture (RA) for the CBRN Functional Area Service (FAS).

At first, all available CBRN related source information have been analysed to identify requirements and

constraints for the CBRN FAS. In addition, a survey study has been conducted to identify and investigate existing

commercial solutions that could/ should be considered for integration into the CBRN FAS. Moreover, interviews

and workshops with CBRN experts and a requirements workshop with the CBRN experts from EU Member

States and EDA has been conducted to review captured requirements and to specify additional ones.

The parallel development of the requirements document and the reference architecture delivered a

comprehensive set of consistent requirements illustrated by graphical depictions. This way of developing

requirements and the architecture has reciprocal effects. Identified requirements delivered input for architecture

modelling e.g. actors, system functions etc. and the architecture modelling process discovered conceptual gaps

or inconsistencies leading to refinement of existing or establishment of new requirements.

Reference Architecture

CBRN FAS


CBRN FAS

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

Questionnaire Questionnaire CBRN

Documents

CBRN

Documents

Information

Assessment

Survey Study

Workshop &

Interviews

Architecture Modelling

Requirements

Capturing

Figure 2-1 Architecture Development (1)



The established Reference Architecture CBRN FAS has delivered architecture models that facilitate the following

analytical purpose:

Who are the users of the CBRN FAS?

Which interfaces need to be considered externally and internally?

What operational activities are conducted in EU operations regarding CBRN at Military-Strategic and

Operational Level?

Which functionalities are required to support the operational activities?

What data sources must be realised/ considered?

The Reference Architecture builds the solid foundation for subsequent detailed planning of the CBRN FAS and

the establishment of the CBRN FAS Target Architecture (TA).



3. Introduction

The CBRN community has identified the capability requirement to develop a CBRN FAS in order to facilitate

CBRN operators at EU HQ level to optimise their CIS support and ensure effective and efficient conduct of their

tasks.

EDA has been tasked by its Member States (MS) with the realisation of the CBRN FAS. The development needs

to be seen in conjunction with other EU CIS developments like J1 FAS, Common Support User Interface (CSUI),

Information Exchange Gateway (IEG) etc.

The EDA project ‘CBRN FAS Architecture Study’ has developed the operational and technical requirements in

conjunction with a Reference Architecture.


CBRN FAS


CBRN FAS

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

Figure 3-1 Reference Architecture & Requirements

In addition, a vision for the CBRN FAS and a roadmap in combination with an implementation plan has been

developed for the CBRN FAS demonstrator.

The following document contains all architecture diagram models and definitions and illustrates the relevant

aspects in preparation for the CBRN FAS Target Architecture (TA).

3.1. Project Context

Figure 3-2 Project Structure illustrates the project’s work packages. This document contains the results of work

package WP 420 and WP 430.



T210

National FAS

Solutions

Survey Study

T310

Available Information

Assessment

T320

Definition EU CBRN FAS

Technical & Operational

Requirements

T430

Definition of

Interfaces

T510

Elaboration of

Roadmap

T520

Implementation

Plan

T410

Establishment of

EU CBRN FAS

Vision

T420

Definition of

EU CBRN FAS

Architecture Framework

T120

Technical

Coordination

T110

Project

Management

EU CBRN FAS

Architecture Study

T210

National FAS

Solutions

Survey Study

T310

Available Information

Assessment

T320

Definition EU CBRN FAS

Technical & Operational

Requirements

T430

Definition of

Interfaces

T510

Elaboration of

Roadmap

T520

Implementation

Plan

T410

Establishment of

EU CBRN FAS

Vision

T420

Definition of

EU CBRN FAS

Architecture Framework

T120

Technical

Coordination

T110

Project

Management

EU CBRN FAS

Architecture Study

Figure 3-2 Project Structure

3.2. Objective

The objective for WP 420 and WP 430 has been the complete and consistent development of planning

documentation for the CBRN FAS and its interfaces.

3.3. Task

The task of WP 420 and WP 430 has been to develop a Reference Architecture for the CBRN FAS. The task

included the identification and description of relevant interfaces.



4. Conduct of Work

Figure 4-1 Conduct of Work illustrates the applied way of elaborating the present results.

First, the available CBRN information (doctrines, concepts, SOPs) have been analysed and relevant

requirements as well as architecture elements have been identified. Secondly, a survey study has been

conducted to identify the applied CBRN CIS applications within EU Member States. The results of the identified

commercial products as well as self-developed solutions (like PHOENIX – Incident Manager tool) have been

considered in the analysis of CBRN FAS interface requirements and the overall architecture.

Workshops and interviews with CBRN experts and the requirements workshop held in EDA premises with CBRN

community have elaborated further details for requirements and the architecture model.

The development of the requirements document as well as the architecture has been conducted in close

coordination to ensure consistency and completeness.


CBRN FAS


CBRN FAS

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

CBRN FAS

Requirements

V1.0

Questionnaire Questionnaire

CBRN

Documents

CBRN

Documents

Information

Assessment

Survey Study

Workshop &

Interviews

Architecture Modelling

Requirements

Capturing

Figure 4-1 Conduct of Work



5. Reference Architecture CBRN FAS

The following chapter lists all aspects of the CBRN FAS Architecture including all established views and subviews

with definitions.

5.1. Scope of CBRN Architecture

The scope of the architecture reflects the scope of the CBRN FAS and with it its users/stakeholders.

A decision has been taken within the first intermediate progress meeting that the CBRN FAS should be

established for the EU headquarters at Military-Strategic- (OHQ) and Operational Level (FHQ) as illustrated in

Figure 5-1 Project Scope. Furthermore, the decision was confirmed that the CBRN FAS should be implemented

as service functionality on the EU Operations Wide Area Network (EU OPS WAN).

It has been discussed whether and how the Tactical Level (Component Commands, Battalions or Tactical

Elements e.g. CBRN patrols) are using the CBRN FAS. Due to the fact that the Tactical Level is equipped with

national CIS and has no connection to the EU OPS WAN, it has been decided that the Tactical Level needs to be

investigated in terms of information provider/ receiver but not as user of the CBRN FAS.

Project Scope

EU FHQDeployed

EU FHQDeployed

Tactical

Level

Tactical

Level

Tactical

Level

EUMSEUMSEUMS

EU OHQEU OHQEU OHQ

EU FHQ(Fixed Location)



EU OPSWAN

CAMEO

ELMA

MHS

CBRN FAS

EU OPSWAN

CAMEOCAMEO

ELMAELMA

MHSMHS

CBRN FASCBRN FAS

Figure 5-1 Project Scope

According to EU concepts three options are available for EU OHQs

1. Designated Headquarters provided by EU Member States (UK, FR, DE, IT, EL)



2. EU Operation Centre (Brussels)

3. Berlin+ Operations SHAPE

and several Force Headquarters with fixed (home base) and deployed location (Joint Operations Area).

5.2. Architecture Framework and Methodology

The development of the CBRN FAS Reference Architecture is based on the NATO Architecture Framework

(NAF) Version 3.

5.3. Operational Perspective

The following chapter provides the information captured from an operator’s point of view (Operational View).

The Operational View analyses aspects like who is involved, what are the operational activities and what

information exchange is required. It discovers the operational requirements for the CBRN FAS without postulating

specific system or technical solutions.

The system and technical solutions will be subsequently derived from the Operational View.

5.3.1. Operational Actors

Figure 5-2 EU CBRN Actors (NOV-2) depicts the respective actors involved in CBRN activities. EU OHQ and EU

FHQ are marked in green (user of CBRN FAS), all other entities are ‘external’ actors requiring an interface to

exchange the relevant operational information. The realisation of the ‘Reach Back Capability’ is under

development. It has been clearly stated that it will not become a centralised EU body with a dedicated EU

organisation, facility etc. The recourse to national resources under the framework nation concept will be the most

probable solution. To illustrate that the ‘Reach Back Capability’ will not be a centralised component it is marked in

dashed line.



EU OHQ

EU FHQ

Non-

Governmental

Institutions

Industrial

Institutions

Military

Institutions

Governmental

Institutions

Academic

Institutions

Reach Back

Capability

Tactical Level

Meteorological

Service

Others

IOs

NGOs

Host Nation

EUMS

Joint Operations Area

Europe

EU CBRN Actors

(Operational Nodes)

Figure 5-2 EU CBRN Actors (NOV-2)

The definition of all actors is provided in chapter 9.

Figure 5-2 EU CBRN Actors (NOV-2) has captured the analytical results relevant for the information exchange

between EU HQs and external actors in CBRN operations.

The following two diagrams reflect the HQ internal requirement for information exchange and thus the

implementation of interfaces between HQs CIS components (e.g. CBRN FAS and INTEL FAS).



EU FHQ_CBRN

EU FHQ_CJ8

EU FHQ_CJ1

EU FHQ_CJ7

EU FHQ_CJ2

EU FHQ_CJ3

EU FHQ_CJ6

EU FHQ_CJ9

EU FHQ_CJMed

EU FHQ_CJ5

EU FHQ_CJ4

EU CBRN Actors EU FHQ(Operational Nodes)

Figure 5-3 EU FHQ CBRN Actors (NOV-2)

Figure 5-3 EU FHQ CBRN Actors (NOV-2) depicts the information exchange requirement between the CBRN cell

within the EU FHQ and other FHQ branches.



EU OHQ_CBRN

EU QHQ_CJ1

EU QHQ_CJ8

EU QHQ_CJ7

EU QHQ_CJ2

EU QHQ_CJ4

EU QHQ_CJ5

EU QHQ_CJMed

EU QHQ_CJ9

EU QHQ_CJ6

EU QHQ_CJ3

EU CBRN Actors EU OHQ(Operational Nodes)

Figure 5-4 EU OHQ CBRN Actors (NOV-2)

5.3.2. Operational CBRN Activities

Operational CBRN activities have been investigated and modelled in order to identify the respective stakeholders

and their need to process information. Furthermore, the operational activities deliver the source to derive system

functionalities and services for the respective CBRN tasks.



A6.1 conductCBRN Intelligence

A6.4 manageCBRN Logistics

A6.5 manageCBRN COP

A.1 conductDIM

A.5 conductMedical Countermeasures &

Support

A.4 conductHazard Management

A.3 conductPhysical Protection

A.2 conductCBRN

Warning & Reporting

A.0 CBRNOperationalActivities

A6.6 conductCBRN Reach Back

A6.3 conductCBRN Planning

A6.2 conductForce Preparation

A6.7 conductCBRN Lessons Learnt

A.6 Cross FunctionalCBRN Activities

CBRN Operational

Activities

Figure 5-5 CBRN Operational Activities

Figure 5-5 CBRN Operational Activities shows the activity node tree structure with the main 5 CBRN components

(Detection, Identification and Monitoring; Warning and Reporting; Physical Protection; Hazard Management;

Medical Countermeasures and Support) as described in AJP 3.8 and ‘Cross Functional Activities’ identified.

Most of these activities have been further analysed (detailed activity break-down) and will be provided within the

next pages. The definition of each operation activity is provided in chapter 9.


N109012-D410 CBRN FAS Reference Architecture V0.2.doc Page 18 / 117

A3.3 manageMonitoring Operation

A3.2 conductPeriodic Monitoring

A3.1 conductContinous Monitoring

A2.2 manageSIBCRA Operations

A1.1.1 identifyAgents

(provosional)

A2.1 conductSIBCRA & Analytical

Operations

A1.4 manageDisease Surveilllance

A1.3 manageCBRN Surveillance

A1.2 manageCBRN Survey

A1.1 manageCBRN Reconnaissance

A.3 monitorCBRN Existence

A.2 identifyCBRN Substances

(Agents and Materials)

A.1 detectCBRN Incident

A.0 CBRN

DIM

A2.1.2.2 identifyAgents

(unambiguous)

A2.1.2.1 identifyAgents

(confirmed)

A2.1.3 transportSubstances (Agents

and Materials)

A2.1.4 identifySIBCRA Samples

_Reach Back

A2.1.2 identifySIBCRA Samples_JOA

A2.1.1 conductSampling

external e.g. Tactical Level (not relevant for

CBRN FAS)

Operational Activ ities

CBRN DIM

Activities marked in green are conducted by the EU HQs and therefore relevant for the CBRN FAS.



A4.3 submitCBRN w arnings_

TacLevel

A.6 conductHazard Prediction

A.7 monitorCBRN Contamination

A.5 identifyCBRN Incidents

A.1 plan W&R

A4.1 submitCBRN w arnings_

Mil.Strat.Level

A.4 conductCBRN Warning

A3.1 submitCBRN reports_Mil.Strat.Level

A.3 conductCBRN Reporting

A1.2 plan W&R_Operational Level

A.0 CBRN

Warning & Reporting

A.8 coordinateW&R in JOA

A1.1 planW&R_Mil.-Strat. Level

A.2 establish/activate

W&R organisation

A.10 recordCBRN Incidents

A.9 validateCBRN Reports

A4.2 submitCBRN w arnings_Operational Level

A3.2 submitCBRN reports_

Operational Level

A3.3 submitCBRN reports_

TacLevel

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Warning & Reporting




A.4 monitor & recordExposure of Personnel

A.0 CBRN

Physical Protection

A3.1 planCOLPRO Assets

A.2 manageIndividual Protection

A.3 manageCollective Protection

(COLPRO)

A3.3 protectCritical Infrastructure

A3.2 manageProtection of Fixed

Assets

A3.4 manageProtection of Mobile

Assets

A3.5 manageProtection of

Transportable Assets

A.1 manageCBRN Sensor

Application

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Physical Protection




A1.1.4 assessJOA Meteorological

Conditions

A1.1.3 assessJOA Terrain

A1.1.2 assessJOA Inf rastructure

A1.5.1 planDIM

A1.5 dev elopCBRN Estimate

A1.4.1 identif yPossible Risks

A1.4.2 monitor &ev aluate

Risks

A1.4.3 DetermineRisk Measures

A1.4 conductRisk Management

A1.3 conductVulnerabilityAssessment

A1.2 conductThreat Assessment

A1.1 contributeto IPB

(CBRN IntelligenceAssessment)

A2.9 conductWaste Management

A2.6 manageHazard Containment

A2.1 assessHazardous Situation

A1.2.1 v erif yPotential Hazards

A1.1.1 identif yHazardous Sites

A.1 conductHazard Pre-Cautions

MeasuresManagement

A.2 conductHazard ControlManagement

A2.7 manageDecontamination

A2.5 manageRotation of Assets

A2.8 manageCBRN Exposure

A2.4 relocateTroops

A2.3 conductMov ement Control

A2.2 markContaminated Areas

A.0 CBRN

Hazard Management

A1.6 planHazard Pre-Cautions

Measures

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Hazard Management



A.8 manageEvacuation of

Casualties

A.2 manageMedical Resources

A.1 planMedical Support

A.5 monitorHealth Status

A.4 establishMedical Surveillance

System

A.7 conductEvacuation of

Casualties

A.6 conductCasualty Treatment

A.3 manageMedical Pre-Treatments

A.0 CBRN

Me dical

Countermeasures

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Medical Countermeasures




A.4 establishSOPs

_Operational Level

A.3 establishSOPs, Doctrines_Mil.Strat Level

A.2 conductCBRN Training

_Operational Level

A.1 conductCBRN Training_Mil.Strat Level

A.0 CBRN

Force Preparation

Operational Activities

CBRN Force Preparation




A2.6 supportEU Operations

A2.5 supportOPP

A2.4 manageCBRN Databases

A2.3 analyseCBRN Information

A2.2 collectCBRN Related

Information

A2.1 monitorAreas of

Operation/Interest

A.2 conductReach Back(Homeland)

A.1 conductReach Back

(JOA)

A.0 CBRN

Reach Back

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Reach Back




A.3 developCBRN Contingency

Plans

A.1 identifyHN, IOs, NGOs, GOs

A.0 CBRN

Planning

A.2 developCONOPS & OPLAN

CBRN Parts

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Planning




A.4 retrieveCBRN Lessons Learnt

A.3 captureLessons Learnt_Tactical Level

A.2 captureLessons Learnt

_Operational Level

A.1 captureLessons Learnt_Mil.-Strat. Level

A.0 CBRN

Lessons Learnt

Operational ActivitiesCBRN Lessons Learnt




5.4. CBRN FAS System Perspective

The following chapter contains the information concerning CBRN FAS functions, required data flows and

databases. In addition it provides the definition of identified system interfaces.

The System View has been derived from the Operational View so that for instance each identified operational

activity has been analysed concerning required or useful system function support. The question addressed can

be stated as:

How can the operational activity be facilitated by a system function of the CBRN FAS?

Figure 5-6 Derivation of Operational View into System View



In addition all identified operational information exchange interfaces have been investigated in the System View

to analyse:

How can the information exchange between operational actors depicted in Figure 5-2 EU CBRN Actors

(NOV-2) be realised with system interfaces?

5.4.1. CBRN System Functionalities

The following chapter lists all system functionalities derived from operational requirements for the CBRN FAS.

Functionalities marked in green are relevant for the five CBRN components, functionalities marked in orange are

relevant for cross functional CBRN tasks, functions marked in blue are common support functions and functions

marked in grey are EU CIS services/ functions.

MedicalCountermeasures

and Support

1.1.5

CBRNKnowledge

1.2.9

CBRNIncident Logging

1.2.8

CBRNCOP

1.2.4

CBRNLogistics

1.2.3

Cross-Sectional

CBRN

Functionalities

1.2

EU CIS

Services/

Functionalities

1.4

Common

Support

Functionalities

1.3

CBRNLessons Learnt

1.2.6

CBRN PlansDevelopment

1.2.2

CBRN FAS

Services

1.1

CBRNReach Back

1.2.5

Simulation

1.2.7

HazardManagement (HM)

1.1.4

PhysicalProtection

1.1.3

Detection,Identification and

Monitoring

1.1.1

Force Preparation

1.2.1

CBRNWarning &Reporting

1.1.2

CBRN FAS

1

CBRN FAS

Functionalitie

s

Figure 5-7 CBRN System Functionalities



The following pages illustrate the functions and their respective data flow diagrams in detail.

CBRN MonitoringMgmt

1.3.1

SIBCRA Mgmt

1.2.1

CBRN DiseaseMgmt

1.1.4

CBRN SurveillanceMgmt

1.1.3

CBRN Survey Mgmt

1.1.2

CBRNReconnaissance

Mgmt

1.1.1

Monitoring

1.3

Identification

1.2

Detection

1.1


Monitoring

1

CBRN FAS Functionalities -

Detection, Identification and Monitoring

Figure 5-8 CBRN FAS DIM

CBRNReconnaissance

OperationMontoring

1.3

CBRNReconnaissance

OperationSimulation

1.2

CBRNReconnaissance

Ressource Monitor

1.1

CBRNReconnaissance

Mgmt

1

L3 CBRN Reconnaissance Mgmt

Figure 5-9 CBRN FAS Reconnaissance Management



CBRN Warning &Reporting

CBRNReconnaissance

OperationMontoring

1.4

Simulation

1.3

CBRNReconnaissance

OperationPlanning

1.2

CBRNReconnaissance

RessourceMonitor

1.1

CBRN Incident Database

CBRN DIM Database

CBRN Simulation Database

Geoinfo Database

CBRN Reconnaissance

Resource Database

Meteorological Database

Reconnaissance

Unit

CBRN COP

CBRN Reconnaissance Mgmt

CBRN Incident Data (captured)

Evaluated Reconnaissance Results

Evaluated ReconnaissanceResults

Reconnaissance Orders


Reconnaissance Results

CBRN ReconnaissanceOperation Plans

Reconnaissance Resource Status

Reconnaissance ResourceStatus

CBRN SimulationResults

CBRN Simulation Data

GeoInformation Data

Meteorological Data

Reconnaissance Resource Data


Figure 5-10 CBRN FAS Reconnaissance Management



CBRN SurveyOperations Mgmt

1.3

CBRN SurveyOperationsSimulation

1.2

Survey RessourceMonitor

1.1

CBRN SurveyMgmt

1

L3 CBRN Survey Mgmt

Figure 5-11 CBRN FAS Survey Management


CBRN SurveyOperations Mgmt

1.4

Simulation

1.3

CBRN SurveyOperationsPlanning

1.2

Survey RessourceMonitor

1.1

CBRN DIM Database

Geoinfo Database



CBRN Survey Ressource

Database

Survey Unit

CBRN Survey Mgmt

Evaluated Survey Results


Survey Results

Survey Operation Order

Survey Operations Plan

GeoInformation Data

Meteorological Data

Survey Resource Status

Survey Resource Data


CBRN Simulation Results

CBRN Simulation Data

Figure 5-12 CBRN FAS Survey Management



CBRN SurveillanceMonitoring Mgmt

1.3

CBRN SurveillanceResource Monitor

1.1

CBRNSurveillance

Mgmt

1

CBRN DetectorNetwork Planning

1.2

L3 CBRN Surveillance Mgmt

Figure 5-13 CBRN FAS Surveillance Management


CBRNSurveillance

Monitoring Mgmt

1.4

CBRNSurveillance

Resource Monitor

1.1

CBRN DetectorNetwork Planning

1.2

CBRNSurveillance

OperationPlanning

1.1

CBRN DIM Database

Geoinfo Database


CBRN Surveillance Resource

Database

CBRN Surveillance

Unit

CBRN COP

CBRN Surveillance Mgmt

Evaluated Surveillance Results


CBRN Surveillance Data

Surveillance Resource Status

Surveillance Resource Status

Surveillance Resource Data

CBRN Surveillance Plan

CBRN Surveillance Results

CRBN Surveillance OrdersGeoInformation Data

Meteorological Data

CBRN Detector Plan

CBRN Detector Data

Figure 5-14 CBRN FAS Surveillance Management



Disease DataAnalysis

1.1

CBRN DiseaseMgmt

1

L3 CBRN Disease Mgmt

Figure 5-15 CBRN FAS Disease Management

Disease DataAnalysis

1.1

CBRN Substance Database


CBRN COP

Other

Medical

Unit

CBRN Disease Mgmt

CBRN Substance Data

Disease Data(medical)

Disease Areas

Disease Incident

Disease Data(medical)

Figure 5-16 CBRN FAS Disease Management



SampleIdentification

ReportManagement

1.3

Sample EvaluationOrdering

1.1

Sample Tracking

1.2

SIBCRA Mgmt

1

L3 CBRN SIBCRA Mgmt

Figure 5-17 CBRN FAS SIBCRA Management

Sam pleIdentification

ReportManagement

1.1

Sam pleEvaluationOrdering

1.1

Sam pleTracking

1.1

CBRN Lessons Learnt


CBRN Reach Back

Capability Database

CBRN Sample

Database

J4 Logistiscs

SIBCRA

Laboratory

SIBCRA Unit

CBRN SIBCRA Mgmt

CBRN Incident Data (updated)

SIBCRA Analysis Report

SIBCRA Sample Report

CBRN Lessons Learnt


SIBCRASample Status




SIBCRA SampleEvaluation Order

SIBCRA SampleTransport Request

Reach BackCapability Data

Sample Transport Status



Figure 5-18 CBRN FAS SIBCRA Management



CBRN MonitoringOperation Mgmt

1.1

CBRN MonitoringMgmt

1

L3 CBRN Monitoring Mgmt

Figure 5-19 CBRN FAS Monitoring Management

MonitoringOperationPlanning

1.1

CBRN MonitoringOperation

Mgmt

1.2

Geoinfo Database

CBRN DIM Database


CBRN Documents

Database

Threat Assessment

Database

CBRN COP

Units Tactical

Level

CBRN Monitoring Mgmt

Threat Assessment Data

GeoInformation Data

Evaluated Monitoring Results

CBRN Monitoring Results

CBRN Monitoring Areas



CBRN Monitoring Operation Plan

CBRN Documents

CBRN Monitor Operation Order

Figure 5-20 CBRN FAS Monitoring Management



CBRN MessageTransmission

1.3

CBRN W&R DataImport

1.2

CBRN Predictions

1.5

CBRN Incident

Logging

1.6

CBRN Message

Handling

1.4

CBRN Message

Editor

1.1

CBRN

Warning &

Reporting

1

CBRN FAS FunctionalitiesWarning & Reporting

Figure 5-21 CBRN FAS Warning & Reporting


MonitoringCBRN Incident

Logging

1.10

MessageDecryption

1.9

MessageEncryption

1.8

CBRN Predictions

1.5

CBRN MessageHandling

1.4

CBRN MessageTransmission

1.3

CBRN W&RData Import

1.2

CBRN MessageEditor

1.1

TIM Database

Operations Database (EU CIS)

Hazard Prediction Calculation

Models



CBRN Message Database

Affected Units

CBRN COP

Meteorological

Service

GIS

CBRN Cell

Tactical Lev el

CBRN Warning and Reporting

CBRN Messages (Observer)

TIM Data




CBRN Messages(NBC Centre)

CBRN Messages(NBC Centre)

CBRN Messages(NBC Centre) encrypted

Own Troop Position

CBRN Messages(NBC Centre) encrypted

CBRN Messages(Decrypted)

CBRN Incident Data

CBRN Message Data

CBRN Incident Data

NBC Wind Reports

Hazard Prediction Results

Hazard Predictions Models


NBC Wind Reports

Meteorological DataCBRN Messages (Observer)


CBRN Messages (NBC Centre)

CBRN IncidentData (captured)

GeoInformation Data





CBRN Messages(Observer)

Figure 5-22 CBRN FAS Warning & Reporting



Posture Warning

1.3

CBRN ExposureMgmt

1.2

Posture Mgmt

1.1

PhysicalProtection

1


Physical Protection

Figure 5-23 CBRN FAS Physical Protection

Posture Warning


Posture Mgmt

1.3

CBRN COP Mgmt

1.2

CBRN ExposureMgmt

1.5

CBRN DIM Database

CBRN Incide nt

Database

CBRN Exposure

Database

Threat Asse ssment

Database

CBRN Cell

Tactical Lev el

Units Tactical

Lev el

CBRN COP

CJ 1

Pe rsonne l

CBRN Physical Protection

Threat Level

Threat Level

Posture Warning

Threat Level

CBRN SitRep

Status Contaminated Areas


CBRN DIM Results

Contaminated Areas


CBRN Exposure Data

Threat AssessmentData

CBRN and related casualty Figures


Figure 5-24 CBRN FAS Physical Protection



CBRN Waste Mgmt

1.2.3

Hazard SituationMonitoring

1.2.1

IPB

1.1.1

Sensor DeploymentAssistant

1.1.5

CIMIC Web Portal

1.3.1

DecontaminationManager

1.2.2

Risk Assessment &Management

1.1.4

ThreatAssessment

1.1.2

CBRNVulnerabilityAssessment

1.1.3

Hazard ControlSupport

1.3

Hazard Control

1.2

Hazard Precaution

1.1

Hazard

Management (HM)

1CBRN FAS Functionalities

Hazard Management (HM)

Figure 5-25 CBRN FAS Hazard Management



IPB

1.1.1

CBRN Predictions

CBRNVulnerabilityAssessment

1.1.2

ThreatAssessment

1.1.1

Risk Assessment& Management

1.1.3

SensorDeployment

Assistant

1.1.5

CBRN Planning

1.1.4


Hazard ManagementDatabase

Operation Planning Database

Operations Database

(EU CIS)

JOA Infrastructure & Terrain

Threat AssessmentDatabase

CBRN Risk Management

Database CBRN Sensor

Database

Meteorological

Database

CBRN Documents

Database

CBRN Intelligence

Database

TIM

Database

Hazard Site

Database

GIS

Others

Internet

CJ 2 INTEL FAS

CBRN Hazard Precaution Management (HM)

Hazard PredictionParameters

GeoInformation Data

Meteorological Data

Intelligence Information

Operations Planning Data


Own Forces Status

CBRN Hazards

Hazard Management Plan

CBRNDocuments

Operations Planning Data

CBRN Estimate

CBRN SensorDeploy ment Plan

CBRN Sensor Data

CBRN Intelligence Data

CBRN Risk (captured)

CBRN Risk (captured)

Own Forces Status

Adv ersary CBRN Capability

JOA Inf rastructure Data

Hazard Site

JOA Inf rastructure Data

Meteorological Data


TIM Data

Open Source

CBRN Hazards


TIM Data


Meteorological Data



CBRN Risk (new, updated)

Intelligence Information

Hazard Site

Figure 5-26 CBRN FAS Hazard Precaution Management



CBRN WasteMgmt

1.2.4

DecontaminationManager

1.2.3

Hazard SituationMonitoring

1.2.1

Ope rations Database (EU CIS)

CBRN DIM Database

Hazard Site

Database

Hazard Manageme nt

Database

CBRN Incide nt Database

Decontamination

Database

CBRN Substance

Database

CBRN Documents

Database

CBRN COP

CJ 4 LOGFAS

CBRN Cell

Tactical Lev el

CBRN COP

CBRN Hazard Control Management (HM)

Own Forces Status

Hazardous Decontamination Site

CBRN DIM Results

CBRN ReconnaissanceOrder

Movement ControlRecommendation

Waste Sites

Waste MgmtProcedures and Regulations

Waste Sites

Decontamination Status

Decontamination Planning Data

Decontamination Status

CBRN Decontamination Data

CBRN Substance Data

Logistic Routes,Locations

Status Contaminated Areas

Hazard Assessment Data

Hazard Assessment


Figure 5-27 CBRN FAS Hazard Control Management



MedicalCountermeasures

and Support

1

Patient Tracking

1.2

Health Statistic

1.1


Medical Countermeasures and

Support

Figure 5-28 CBRN FAS Medical Countermeasures and Support

Patient Tracking

1.2

CBRN Health DataAnalysis

CBRN Patient Tracking

Database


Protection Means

Database

CBRN Incident

Database

CBRN COP

CJ 4 LOGFAS

Medical Unit

CJ 1 Personnel

CBRN Medical Countermeasures and Support

Patient TrackingData CBRN Advice

CBRN Advice

CBRN Substance Data

Protection Means Data

ContaminatedAreas

CBRN Incident (medical)

Transport Data

Patient J1 Data

Medical Data

Medical Data

Figure 5-29 CBRN FAS Medical Countermeasures and Support



CBRN Tutorial

1.2

CBRN Training

1.1

Force Preparation

1


Force Preparation

Figure 5-30 CBRN FAS Force Preparation

CBRN Tutorial

1.2

CBRN Training

1.1


CBRN Documents

Database

CBRN TutorialCBRN Training Data

CJ 7 Training



CBRN Documents

CBRN Documents

Training RequirementsCBRN Training Results

CBRN Training Data

CBRN FAS Tutorials

Figure 5-31 CBRN FAS Force Preparation



MonitoringOperation Planning

1.5


1.4

CBRN SurveillanceOperation Planning

1.3

CBRNReconnaissance

Operation Planning

1.2


1.1


1


Planning

Figure 5-32 CBRN FAS Planning

Simulation

MonitoringOperation Planning

1.5


1.4

CBRN SurveillanceOperation Planning

1.3

CBRNReconnaissance

Operation Planning

1.2


CBRN Documents Database


Database

CBRN Surveillance Resource

Database

CBRN Reconnaissance

Resource Database

Geoinfo Database



CBRN Intelligence Databas e

Operation Planning

Database

CJ5 FAS

CBRN Planning

CBRN Monitoring Operation Plan

Survey Operations Plan

CBRN Reconnaissance Operation Plans

CBRN Surveillance Plan

CBRN Planning Data

CBRN Planning Data

CBRN Planning Data

CBRN Planning Data

CBRN Documents



Surveillance Resource Data

GeoInformation Data

Meteorological Data

CBRN Planning Data

CBRN Simulation Results Simulation Data


Operations PlanningData

CBRN Plans

CBRN Planning Data

Figure 5-33 CBRN FAS Planning



CBRN LogisticMgmt

1.1

CBRN Logistics

1

CBRN FAS CSF Logistics

Figure 5-34 CBRN FAS Logistics

CBRN Logistic Mgmt

1.1

Medical Resource Database

CBRN Logistic Database

CJ 4 LOGFAS

CBRN Logistics

CBRN Logistic Data

Medical Resource DataCBRN Logistic Data

Figure 5-35 CBRN FAS Logistics



CBRN COP Mgmt

1.1

CBRNCOP

1

CBRN FAS CSF - COP

Figure 5-36 CBRN FAS COP

CBRN COP Mgmt

Hazard Site Database

TIM Database

Symbology

Database

EU CIS Operation Database


GIS

CBRN COP

Hazard Site

TIM Data

CBRN Incident Data

GeoInformation Data

COP Symbols

Ow n Forces Status

Figure 5-37 CBRN FAS COP



Reach Back CaseTracking

1.2

Reach BackRequest

1.1

CBRN Reach Back

1

Reach BackResponseProcessing

1.4

Reach BackReceive Response

1.3


Reach Back

Figure 5-38 CBRN FAS Reach Back

Reach BackReceive

Response

1.3

Reach BackResponseProcessing

1.4

Reach BackRequest

1.1

Reach Back CaseTracking

1.2


CBRN Reach Back

Database

CBRN Reach Back Capability

Database

Affected Units

Reach Back

Capability

Reach Back

Requester

CBRN Reach Back

CBRN Advice

Reach BackResponse (assessed)

Reach Back Request Status

Reach Back Response (assessed)

Reach Back Case Status

CBRN Substance Data

Reach Back Case Status

Reach Back Response

Reach Back RequestReach Back Request

Reach Back Request Guide

Reach Back Capability DataReach Back Requirements

Figure 5-39 CBRN FAS Reach Back



Lessons LearntAdministration

1.2

Lessons LearntExport

1.4

Lessons LearntAnalysis

1.3

Lessons LearntQuestionnaire

1.1

CBRNLessons Learnt

1


Lessons Learnt

Figure 5-40 CBRN FAS Lessons Learnt

Lessons LearntQuestionnaire

1.1

Lessons LearntAnalysis

1.3

Lessons LearntExport

1.4

Lessons LearntAdministration

1.2

CBRN Lessons Learnt

Database

CJ 7 Training

ELMA Database

CBRN COP

CBRN Lessons

Learnt

Lessons Learnt Statistics & Analysis

CBRN Lessons Learnt (captured)

Lessons Learnt Template

CBRN Lessons Learnt(selected)

CBRN Lessons Learnt

CBRN Lessons Learnt

CBRN Lessons Learnt

CBRN Lessons LearntQuestionnaire Template

Figure 5-41 CBRN FAS Lessons Learnt



Simulation Replay

1.6

SimulationRecording

1.5

Simulation Runtime

1.4

Object Editor

1.3

Mission Editor

1.2

Terrain Editor

1.1

Simulation

1CBRN FAS CSF - Simulation

Figure 5-42 CBRN FAS Simulation

Simulation Replay

SimulationRecording

SimulationRuntime

Object Editor

Mission EditorTerrain Editor

Simulation Records

Simulation Objects

Database

Geoinfo Database

Display

Simultation

Operator/ User

External

Simulation

CBRN Simulation

Simulation Data

User Input/ Interaction

Simulation Data

Simulation Data (recorded)

Simulation Data (recorded)

Simulation Objects

Simulation Data (recorded)Simulation Data

Simulation Interaction

User Input/ Interaction

Simulation Data (external)

Simulation Mission Data

Simulation Terrain Simulation Objects

Simulation Objects (new)

Elevation Model

Satellite Images

Figure 5-43 CBRN FAS Simulation



CBRNIncident Logging

1.2.8

CBRN Lessons Learnt


CBRN Historical

Database

CBRN Sensor

Data Provider

Meteorological

Service

CBRN Cell

Tactical Level

CBRN Incident Logging

CBRN Sensor Data

Meteorological Data

CBRN Incident Data

CBRN Incident Data

CBRN Log Data

CBRN Lessons Learnt

CBRN Incident Data(captured)

Figure 5-44 CBRN FAS Incident Logging

5.4.2. CBRN FAS Internal and External Interfaces

Internal Interfaces

The internal interfaces have been identified within the operational view (NOV-2 Operational Node Connectivity

Diagram). The need to exchange information between those actors requires the implementation of data interfaces

or organisational procedures in case where no system interfaces should be realised.



EU FHQ_CBRN

EU FHQ_CJ8

EU FHQ_CJ1

EU FHQ_CJ7

EU FHQ_CJ2

EU FHQ_CJ3

EU FHQ_CJ6

EU FHQ_CJ9

EU FHQ_CJMed

EU FHQ_CJ5

EU FHQ_CJ4

EU CBRN Actors EU FHQ(Operational Nodes)

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – CJ1 FAS

Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface with the J1 FAS in order to

manage the tracking of CBRN exposure to personnel.

The J1 FAS is currently under development so that technical analysis of

the interface is not possible at this stage.



Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – CJ2 FAS (INTEL FAS)

Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface with the INTEL FAS in order to

exchange the following:

Demography factors

Political factors

Socioeconomic factors

Terrain

Population

Terrorism activity

A CJ2 FAS for EU operations is presently not available so that interface

requirements need to be determined when it will be developed.


Description CBRN FAS should become integral part of the CJ3 FAS.

The CJ3 FAS should provide geoinfo and meteorological data.

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – CJ4 FAS (LOGFAS)

Description The CBRN FAS should have an interface with the LOGFAS in order to

process consistent CBRN relevant logistic data.


Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface to a planning application in

order to provide CBRN relevant parts for operation planning (CONOPS,

OPLAN etc.)






Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface to CJ6 application in order to

manage CBRN relevant CIS requirements and networks.




Description

CBRN FAS lessons learnt and training module should have an interface

in order to process CBRN lessons identified/learnt data commonly with

operation wide lessons identified/learnt.




Description

CBRN FAS should have an interface to CJ8 FAS in order to manage

budgetary issues. Currently, CJ8 is using office application so that basic

data can be exchanged with data import/export function (e.g. csv-files)




Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface to CJ9 CIMIC application in

order to coordinate CBRN relevant data with NGOs, IOs,GOs e.g. submit

warnings.





Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – CJMed FAS

Description

The CBRN FAS should have an interface to CJMed application in order

to receive health record statistics and casualty incident data.

A CJMed FAS for EU operations is presently not available so that

interface requirements need to be determined when it will be developed.



External Interfaces

The external interfaces have been identified within the operational view (NOV-2 Operational Node Connectivity

Diagram). The need to exchange information between those actors requires the implementation of data interfaces

or organisational procedures in case where no system interfaces should be realised.

EU OHQ

EU FHQ

Non-

Governmental

Institutions

Industrial

Institutions

Military

Institutions

Governmental

Institutions

Academic

Institutions

Reach Back

Capability

Tactical Level

Meteorological

Service

Others

IOs

NGOs

Host Nation

EUMS

Joint Operations Area

Europe

EU CBRN Actors

(Operational Nodes)



Interface Identifier CBRN FAS - EUMS

Description

The CBRN operator in EU OHQ should be able to transmit reports

directly to the EUMS.

Due to the implementation of the CBRN FAS on the EU OPS WAN

network and connectivity of EU OPS WAN and SOLAN, EUMS personnel

could have direct access to the CBRN FAS application regulated by user

policy and access rights.

Otherwise data transfer would be established via email.

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – Reach Back Capability

Description

The CBRN operator in EU OHQ and EU FHQ should be able to

exchange data with the Reach Back Capability.

Due to the fact that the Reach Back Capability can not be specified in

terms of location, system, system interfaces a generic interface should be

foreseen for data exchange e.g. email, FTP

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – Host Nation

Description

The CBRN operator in EU FHQ should be able to exchange data with the

Host Nation if information exchange agreements are in place.

Systems used by Host Nations can not be specified and need to be

identified mission dependent.

Therefore the CBRN FAS should provide for a generic interface to

exchange data like email, FTP, web-portal.



Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – NGOs

Description

The CBRN operator in EU FHQ should be able to exchange data with

NGOs if information exchange agreements are in place.

Systems used by NGOs can not be specified and need to be identified

mission dependent.



Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – IOs

Description

The CBRN operator in EU FHQ should be able to exchange data with

IOs if information exchange agreements are in place.

Systems used by IOs can not be specified and need to be identified

mission dependent.



NATO or UN troops might be using CBRN tools with NATO standards

implemented e.g. ADat-P3 interface for dissemination of warning and

reporting messages.

The CBRN FAS will provide an ADatP-3 interface for W&R message

interchange.

The connectivity of systems/networks must be analysed on a case to

case basis (mission dependent).



Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – Tactical Level

Description


Tactical Level.

Systems applied in EU missions on the Tactical Level will be nationally

provided.

The exchange of W&R messages according to ATP-45, AEP-45 should

be realised.

Other information exchange of CBRN data will be realised via email or

file transfer. Additionally, the CBRN COP should be transmitted via web-

services to be incorporated into tactical CIS systems.

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – Others

Description


other entities e.g. merchant ships.

Systems used by other entities can not be specified and need to be

identified mission dependent.



In order to transmit the CBRN ‘MERWARN’ the CBRN FAS should have

an interface to transmit these messages via radio.

Interface Identifier CBRN FAS – Meteorological Services

Description


meteorological services.

The interface should enable data transfer of up to 300 MB according to

WMO Standard for weather data in GRIB respectively GRIB 2 format

(NATO Standard 6022 for weather data defines sub format GRIB/

GRIB2)



6. Findings and Recommendations

The following chapter lists the identified findings and provides recommendations for the way ahead.

6.1. Findings

The architecture development process has discovered the following findings:

Existence of EU CIS services (including Functional Area Services)

The EU CBRN FAS should be implemented on the EU OPS WAN as service for EU OHQ and EU FHQ CBRN

Cell. The analysis has evaluated operational requirements to exchange information with several EU HQ

branches. Currently, almost every HQ branch is using office application and email, calendar etc. (e.g. Lotus

Notes) and rarely any specific functional area applications. Information/ Data Exchange between CBRN Cell and

other branches is nowadays feasible via e-Mail or file exchange (import, export). The future CIS constellation

should rely on networked CIS with consistent data sources and workflows implemented according to well-defined

required military processes across HQ branches and command levels.

As a consequence, specific interfaces between CBRN Cell and other branches can not be specified yet but have

to be analysed and specified as soon as FAS development for other branches commences.

Stakeholder for EU CBRN FAS

The analysis of the CBRN FAS and its scope has clearly identified that the user/ stakeholder of the CBRN FAS is

the operator at EU OHQ or EU FHQ CBRN Cell.

Other entities like EU Military Staff could be provided with access to the CBRN FAS and a dedicated role in the

future.

CJMed Functionalities

The analysis of the conceptual area CBRN medical countermeasures and support has shown that further analysis

and decision is required to determine which functionalities are required and should become available in CJMed

FAS and others required in CBRN FAS for CBRN Cell operators. Currently, it is assumed that most activities are

conducted by medical personnel and CBRN advice is provided by CBRN Cell.



6.2. Recommendations

Development of CBRN FAS Target Architecture

The current Reference Architecture has built the foundation for subsequent detailed planning of the CBRN FAS

and the demonstrator phase. It is required to review and validate the current architecture over and over again with

multiple CBRN experts in order to confirm commonly established requirements documented by the architecture

diagrams.

It is strongly recommended to communicate and discuss the planning of the CBRN FAS by using the architecture

diagrams/repository e.g. publishing the architecture as HTML version. The HTML version provides a feedback

function so that feedback can be provided by a broad CBRN expert audience easily.

Analysis and Decision concerning Reach Back Concept

In order to determine the interfaces for Reach Back Capability and requirements for system data exchanges and

data stores in more detail, it is required to investigate the concept further and determine the EU concept for

Reach Back with information who is responsible in an EU operation, what type of systems should be used, how

should the coordination be between HQs and Reach Back Capabilities be realised and so forth.

Implementation of CBRN FAS in National CIS Systems

It is recommended to investigate whether the future EU CBRN FAS should be implemented also in national CIS

systems. This would lead to cost efficient procurement for EU Member States and further development/

enhancement of EU CBRN FAS functionality based on EU CBRN operators applying the FAS not only in EU

operations and exercises but also for national exercise training and operations.



7. Annex A – List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation Glossary

CIS Communication and Information System

COTS Commercial-Off-the Shelf

EDA European Defence Agency

FAS Functional Area Service

FHQ Force Headquarter

FTP File Transfer Protocol

HTML Hypertext Mark-Up Language

OHQ Operation Headquarter

RA Reference Architecture

SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol

SOP Standard Operating Procedures

TA Target Architecture



8. Annex B - List of Reference Documents

/R1/ Tendering Specifications 010-CAP-004 ‘CBRN Functional Area Service Architecture Study’

/R2/ ATP 45 C, Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and

Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard Areas (Operators Manual)



9. Annex C – Architecture Definition

9.1. Definition of Actors (Operational Nodes)

Name Description

Academic

Institutions

Academic Institutions are involved in CBRN tasks by providing scientific services. (Reach

Back)

EU FHQ EU Force Headquarter (EU FHQ)

EU FHQ_CBRN CBRN role/cell within EU FHQ

EU FHQ_CJ1 EU FHQ CJ 1 Cell. (Personnel)

EU FHQ_CJ2 EU FHQ CJ2 Cell (Intelligence)

EU FHQ_CJ3 EU FHQ CJ3 (Operations)

EU FHQ_CJ4 EU FHQ CJ4 (Logistics)

EU FHQ_CJ5 EU FHQ CJ 5 (Plans)

EU FHQ_CJ6 EU FHQ CJ6 (CIS)

EU FHQ_CJ7 EU FHQ CJ7 (Training)

EU FHQ_CJ8 EU FHQ CJ8 (Finance)

EU FHQ_CJ9 EU FHQ CJ9 (CIMIC)

EU FHQ_CJMed EU FHQ CJMed (Medical)

EU OHQ

EU Operations Headquarter (EU OHQ)

Three options for EU OHQ are foreseen in EU concepts:

1. EU OHQ provided by EU MS (designated EU OHQ)

2. EU OpsCentre Brussles

3. SHAPE (Berlin+ operations)

EU OHQ_CBRN CBRN role/cell within EU OHQ

EU QHQ_CJ1 EU OHQ CJ1 (Personnel)



Name Description

EU QHQ_CJ2 EU OHQ_CJ2 (Intelligence)

EU QHQ_CJ3 EU OHQ_CJ3 (Operations)

EU QHQ_CJ4 EU OHQ CJ4 (Logistics)

EU QHQ_CJ5 EU OHQ CJ5 (Plans)

EU QHQ_CJ6 EU OHQ CJ6 (CIS)

EU QHQ_CJ7 EU OHQ CJ7 (Training)

EU QHQ_CJ8 EU OHQ CJ8 (Finance)

EU QHQ_CJ9 EU OHQ CJ9 (CIMIC)

EU QHQ_CJMed EU OHQ CJMed (Medical)

EUMS EU Military Staff (EUMS)

Governmental

Institutions Governmental Institutions

Host Nation

Host Nation (HN) aggregates the following entities:

- Local Government

- National Armed Forces

and/or Civil Defence Authorities

IOs International Organisations (IOs) e.g. NATO, UN, OSCE

Industrial

Institutions Industrial Institutions

Meteorological

Service

CBRN weather reports are to be provided through the staff meteorological officer at every

operational and tactical level of Command. If an HQ has no Meteorological officer it should

coordinate weather requirements with its higher Command. For OOA operations, a lead nation

should be identified to provide the CBRN weather information for the JOA. Details should be

addressed in the OPLAN.

The meteorological service will collect data and distribute the messages. Meteorological data

are transmitted as a NBC Wind Report:

- NBC Basic Wind Report (NBC BWR)



Name Description

- NBC Effective Downwind Report (NBC EDR)

- NBC Chemical (Biological) Downwind Report (NBC CDR)

Military

Institutions Military Institutions

NGOs

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)

e.g. Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Non-

Governmental

Institutions

Non-Governmental Institutions

Others

This node aggregates all other actors not explicitly presented otherwise, e.g.:

Merchant Ships

Reach Back

Capability

The EU will make use of a Reach-Back capability for CBRN tasks in CSDP operations.

This will be national-based resources providing technical and/or scientific advice and services.

It is not foreseen that the EU will establish a centralised component. To underpin the

circumstance the node is marked in dashed line.

Tactical Level

This Node aggregates the following:

- Sub-ordinated HQs

- APOD

- Troops, Forces

- Source Level



9.2. Definition of Operational Activities

Activity Definition

CBRN DIM

Detection Identification Monitoring.

Needed to detect and characterise NBC events, identify the agents and hazards,

delineate areas of contamination, and monitor the changes.


The components of the Joint Force need to be well prepared for

NBC Defence in terms of the appropriate doctrine, equipment, procedures,

organisation and training (STANAGs 2150 and 2352). These NBC Defence

measures need to be prepared before deployment so that the necessary

operational

capability is present in-theatre. Such preparations are also to deter potential

adversaries from considering the use of NBC weapons or Toxic Industrial Materials

(TIM).

(Source: AJP 3.8 Allied Joint Doctrine for NBC)

CBRN Hazard Management

Hazard Management

This is needed to limit the operational impact of NBC hazards. Hazard

management is based on the principles of pre-hazard precautions and hazard

control through avoidance, control of spread, exposure control and

decontamination.


Hazard Management is a combination of pre-CBRN Incident and post-CBRN

Incident measures designed to minimize the vulnerability of forces to CBRN

hazards, protect friendly forces through hazard avoidance, maintain the forces

operational tempo through hazard containment and exposure control and restore

operational capability through decontamination. Hazard Management is needed to

limit the effects on personnel, material and the impact on operations in CBRN

hazards.

(Source: ATP 3.8.1 VOL I)



Activity Definition

CBRN Medical

Countermeasures

Medical Countermeasures and Support

These are needed both to diminish the susceptibility of personnel to NBC hazards

and to treat and evacuate casualties. The

treatment and evacuation of conventional casualties in an NBC environment is

included.


CBRN Operational Activities Top Level Activity of the Activity model.

CBRN Physical Protection

Physical Protection.

Individual and Collective Protection (COLPRO) are required so that personnel can

survive NBC attacks or Release other than attack (ROTA) and continue to operate

in an NBC hazard environment. Measures to protect equipment are also included.

Individual protection and COLPRO enhance survivability but can restrict freedom

of operations. Therefore, commanders need to reconcile the vulnerability of the

Joint Force to NBC hazards with the restrictions of protective measures and the

pursuit of the mission. This vulnerability analysis determines the levels of physical

protection to be adopted. STANAG

2133 establishes common methods for conducting vulnerability analysis of BW and

CW threats. Graduated levels of NBC threat and associated protection are given in

STANAG

2984.

(Source: AJP 3.8 Allied Joint Doctrine for NBC - 0223)

CBRN Reach Back

Reach-Back (CBRN) is defined as a process by which deployed Forces may be

provided with timely co-ordinated and authoritative advice on CBRN and TIH and

defensive countermeasures, drawing upon expert home-based sources of

information (AAP-21)

CBRN Warning & Reporting Warning and Reporting

These are needed to aid the rapid collection, evaluation



Activity Definition

and dissemination of data concerning NBC attacks and hazards, including the

prediction of hazard areas. The dissemination of data and the prediction of hazards

is carried out using CIS.


Determine Risk Measures - Decision to take risk yes, no

- options or courses of actions in relation to riks levels

analyse CBRN Information

The homeland Reach Back capability will analyse the CBRN information.

The analysis includes assessment and identification of indication of impending

CBRN/WMD threat.

The operational activity will deliver accurate CBRN assessments.

assess Hazardous Situation

After a CBRN incident commanders will need access to accurate and timely CBRN

hazard information so that the risk and penalties of hazard contamination can be

balanced against other operational priorities.

Commanders need to assess the consequences of hazard areas on Joint Force

operations.


assess JOA Infrastructure

Assess Joint Operations Infrastructure

- traffic constellation

- hospitals

- laboratories

- hydrants

- swimming pools

- First Responders (Fire Station,

- monitoring network (meteorological, radiological, etc.)

Where

POC

Capabilities



Activity Definition

assess JOA Meteorological

Conditions - according requirement docs

assess JOA Terrain

- areas of endemic diseases

- contaminated areas

- waste areas

- roughness (topographie)

- safe areas

assess NBC Incidents

Once an NBC event has taken place within the JOA, and all the pre-event, during

event and post event actions have been taken or are in hand, the JFC and the

Joint Force staff need to review the operational situation in the light of the NBC

event or events

and an updated NBC threat assessment.

The options open to the JFC are likely to be:

a. Continue the mission as before.

b. Continue the mission but in a modified form to minimise the mpact of the NBC

event or events.

c. It is not possible to continue the mission because NBC hazards are so severe

and direction is needed from the Strategic Command.

AJP 3.8. / 0443

collect CBRN Related

Information

The homeland Reach Back capability will collect all available CBRN relevant

information from all available sources.

conduct CBRN Lessons

Learnt

Operations provide the best evaluation of capability and NBC defence is no

exception. Lessons learned need to be identified and acted upon so that the

changes needed to the NBC defence capability of the Joint Force are implemented

in policy,

organisation, equipment, procedures and training. Changes will also need to be

implemented within NATO by the preparation of new NBC defence policy and

STANAGs so that NBC defence capability meets the needs of all users

AJP 3.8 / 0444



Activity Definition

conduct CBRN Planning

Guidance for subordinate commanders to cover possible different

operational situations needs to be included in the JFC’s concept of operations and

in the operation order to reflect the particular nature of the likely operation. The

application of international recommendations and different national legislation

covering exposure of Joint Force personnel to NBC hazards also needs to be co-

ordinated during planning and before deployment.


conduct CBRN Reach Back Conduct of relevant activities to realise the reach back capabilities for EU

operations.

conduct CBRN Reporting

conduct CBRN

Training_Mil.Strat Level

CBRN Defence scenarios should be included in all appropriate national and EU

exercises.

(Source: EU DIM Concept)

NBC incidents and events need to be included at all

levels of command in order to integrate NBC Defence into multinational training,

Simulation and Training Equipment. Preparation for NBC Defence includes the use

of NBC simulation and training equipment to permit regular training in order to

evaluate and sustain a satisfactory state of preparedness against NBC attacks and

TIH. Training equipment should represent the operational equipment as far as is

practicable.

NBC Defence training should not be conducted in isolation and needs to be

integrated into all operational training at all levels. Commanders, staffs and force

components need to practise

NBC Defence measures, procedures and SOPs whilst on exercise. Furthermore,

commanders and staffs need to take into account the effects of the NBC hazards

and TIH when training for operations.

STANAG 2150 sets out the minimum NBC Defence training standards of

proficiency which nations need to achieve to prepare their forces for NATO

operations.



Activity Definition


conduct CBRN

Training_Operational Level

CBRN Defence scenarios should be included in all appropriate national and EU

exercises.


NBC incidents and events need to be included at all

levels of command in order to integrate NBC Defence into multinational training,

Simulation and Training Equipment.

Preparation for NBC Defence includes the use of NBC simulation and training

equipment to permit regular training in order to evaluate and sustain a satisfactory

state of preparedness against NBC attacks and TIH. Training equipment should

represent the operational equipment as far as is practicable.

NBC Defence training should not be conducted in isolation and needs to be

integrated into all operational training at all levels. Commanders, staffs and force

components need to practise

NBC Defence measures, procedures and SOPs whilst on exercise. Furthermore,

commanders and staffs need to take into account the effects of the NBC hazards

and TIH when training for operations.

STANAG 2150 sets out the minimum NBC Defence training standards of

proficiency which nations need to achieve to prepare their forces for NATO

operations.


conduct CBRN Warning &

Reporting

Conduct of CBRN warning and reporting as described in procedures laid down in

ATP 45.

conduct Casualty Treatment

Casualty Treatment under NBC Conditions

The treatment of casualties (including conventional casualties) needs to continue

under NBC conditions. This can be achieved

through the siting of medical facilities inside cover to provide a degree of ballistic

protection and to avoid direct contamination by NBC weapons. COLPRO can be

added to avoid



Activity Definition

chemical vapour hazards and reduce the risk of secondary contamination during

entry and exit. The use of cover is also necessary for uncontaminated medical

supplies, food and

fluids. In hazard areas NBC casualty bags with air blowers can be used to place

casualties inside an uncontaminated environment.


conduct Continous

Monitoring

Monitoring equipment is required to provide information over time, in order to

determine whether or not a CBRN hazard is present. Monitoring is conducted as

static monitoring of the air or mobile monitoring of the air and surfaces. Monitoring

essentially uses networking detector technology and can be divided into the

following categories depending on the threat level and operational significance of

the installation or area requiring monitoring:

a.Continuous monitoring: static and/or mobile detectors are running all along and

are monitored by an operator.

b. Periodic monitoring: static and/or mobile detectors are turned on at stated

intervals to check status.


conduct DIM

Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM)

These are needed to detect and characterise NBC events, identify the agents and

hazards, delineate areas of

contamination, and monitor the changes.


conduct Evacuation of

Casualties

Evacuation of NBC casualties requires specialist medical support during

evacuation.

Additionally conventional casualties require appropriate protection when being

evacuated through an NBC environment. Thorough decontamination is required for

all contaminated casualties. Guidance on casualty treatment is given in STANAGs

2500 (AmedP-6), 2873 (AmedP-7) and 2879.




Activity Definition

conduct Force Preparation

The components of the Joint Force need to be well prepared for

NBC Defence in terms of the appropriate doctrine, equipment, procedures,

organisation and training (STANAGs 2150 and 2352). These NBC Defence

measures need to be prepared before deployment so that the necessary

operational

capability is present in-theatre. Such preparations are also to deter potential

adversaries from considering the use of NBC weapons or Toxic Industrial Materials

(TIM).


conduct Hazard Control

Management

conduct Hazard Control Management

The most effective hazard control measure is to avoid the hazard and the risk of

becoming contaminated; this will obviate or forestall the need for any other

measures. However, this may not be easy to achieve because operational

demands may result in the unavoidable exposure of forces. If the hazards cannot

be avoided, control of the spread of the hazard and exposure management

measures will apply. Decontamination is required to restore operational capability.

Depending on the level and extent of decontamination required and the efficiency

and capacity of decontamination equipment used it can be, extremely manpower,

equipment and time consuming and therefore requires careful planning. Hazard

Management measures apply for operations under a CBRN threat or in a CBRN

environment.


conduct Hazard Pre-

Cautions Measures

Management

conduct Hazard Pre-Cautions Measures Management

Pre-hazard precautions are needed to minimize the possibility of being targeted by

CBRN weapons or devices and to reduce the vulnerability of forces against the

malicious effects of CBRN incidents. These measures should be considered and

initiated on a flexible basis during the planning and preparation phase in home

bases and be completed as soon as possible with respect to the prevailing CBRN

threat level. These measures should not degrade the operational capability of the

units. The key principle of Hazard Management is to put the emphasis first on



Activity Definition

precautionary measures before the CBRN incident occurs. These measures are to

be considered well before the operations start and forces and assets are deployed.

The measures need to be included in the planning phase before deployment and

require an important level of intelligence support. As upon deployment it will be

necessary to adapt the initial planned measures to the local situation. Only if these

precautionary measures fail, must responsive measures be applied wherein the

key priority is hazard avoidance.


conduct Hazard Prediction The procedures for hazard plotting are divided into three general areas, simplified,

detailed and enhanced.

conduct Movement Control

Movement Control incl. Route Planning

Movement control measures are needed to prevent forces from

moving into hazard areas. This is achieved by the use of a hazard control line, or

clean-dirty line, and associated hazard control points to control or prevent

movement into a hazard area.

All movement will need to be controlled by the use of monitoring

and control points, and strict track and route discipline.

Restriction of Movement for Disease Control. When biological hazards are

encountered, early and continued restriction of movement measures needs to be

considered to prevent cross-infection.


Commanders need to implement a plan for the use of routes to avoid areas of

CBRN hazard. Movement control measures are needed to prevent forces from

moving into hazard areas which is achieved by the use of a Hazard Control line

and associated Hazard Control points to control or prevent movement into a

hazard area. Informed route planning can reduce the danger of picking up of

hazards in transit.

Determine the safety zones based on hazard risk assessment. Establish a

perimeter and control access to the site by establishing an entry Control point,



Activity Definition

which will serve as the sole entrance and exit from the incident site


conduct Periodic Monitoring

Monitoring equipment is required to provide information over time, in order to

determine whether or not a CBRN hazard is present. Monitoring is conducted as

static monitoring of the air or mobile monitoring of the air and surfaces. Monitoring

essentially uses networking detector technology and can be divided into the

following categories depending on the threat level and operational significance of

the installation or area requiring monitoring:

a.Continuous monitoring: static and/or mobile detectors are running all along and


b. Periodic monitoring: static and/or mobile detectors are turned on at stated



conduct Reach Back

(Homeland)

conduct of Reach Back operational tasks in homeland/ nation-based capabilitiy

providing CBRN services.

conduct Reach Back (JOA) conduct Reach Back operational activities in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

conduct Risk Management

The principle is Risk Management, not risk elimination.

Casualties and materiel degradation are inevitable in any military operation even

without conflict and a desire to avoid them totally is likely to impact adversely on

the achievement of the mission. There will thus be a need for commanders to

actively define and manage the balance of human costs against operational

imperatives. The Force Protection philosophies used by the different nations in a

coalition may however need to be co-ordinated.


conduct SIBCRA & Analytical

Operations

Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents

(SIBCRA) is defined as the collection, transportation and identification of

suspected chemical, biological

and radioactive materials within a chain of custody. There is an

operational need for SIBCRA to identify NBC hazards and to confirm, by forensic

techniques, the unequivocal use of NBC weapons and agents by an adversary.



Activity Definition

This degree of

certainty cannot be achieved by information obtained solely from operational NBC

sensors or unusual numbers of casualties. Although such evidence is often

required quickly, the proof

of use of these agents must be such that it cannot be refuted. Only when the

information is combined with samples from the field, their history and analytical

evidence from the

identifying laboratory can irrefutable evidence be provided.

conduct Sampling

Sampling is defined as the retrieval for analysis of material known or suspected to

have been employed in an NBC attack or to have arisen from ROTA. Sampling

needs to be conducted by trained personnel so that there is uniformity, viability,

safety, and

accountability in the sampling procedures. Sampling is only to take place when an

attack or release is indicated and, other than medical pathological sampling,

initiated as directed by the

NBC staff.


conduct Threat Assessment

Threat assessments, based on accurate and timely all source

intelligence, need to be continuously conducted so that the appropriate NBC

Defence capabilities and measures can be selected.


conduct Vulnerability

Assessment

Being an operations responsibility, CBRN defence staffs are involved in

vulnerability assessments. The aim of the vulnerability assessment is to identify

those areas where NATO elements are most vulnerable, and to propose means

whereby these vulnerabilities can be reduced, or otherwise mitigated. Vulnerability

assessment guidelines as outlined in STANAG 2133, and vulnerability assessment

of chemical and biological hazards are discussed in annex 5C.


The following information is required:

- status own troops (position, protection status/means, detectors)

- TIM database



Activity Definition

- enemy capability, will

- Hazard site database

Change of hazard level should be made available to CBRN officer (warning) at unit

level. This could be due to move of troops in vicinity of static sites as well as

mobile hazardous 'sites' (railways, ships, trucks etc.) moving in vicinity of own

troops.

As a result:

- warning

- dress state, protection level

- advise to commander

- pre-position of equipment

- medical countermeasures

CBRN FAS requirement:

- Status of troops should be displayed on COP

- submission of warning selecting troops on map

- recommendations of protective measures could be submitted to troops

conduct Waste Management

The waste products from the removal of hazards from contaminated forces, or the

removal of contaminated covers, need to be contained and marked in accordance

with annex A. Waste sites will need to be restored once operations are complete. A

part of CBRN decontamination operations is the management of resulting waste.

Appropriate in-theatre policy and disposal instructions need to be established to

ensure the responsible handling of waste. More details on waste management

activities are provided in annex B.


contribute to IPB(CBRN

Intelligence Assessment)

Contribute to 'Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield' (IPB)

A current, comprehensive and accurate intelligence assessment of the CBRN



Activity Definition

threat (including TIH risks) in the JOA is needed. This is achieved through the IPB

process. The CBRN defence IPB process is the planning tool that helps identify

and answer the commander's PIRs and is the first step in the JFC's OPP. IPB is a

cyclical process that occurs before and concurrently with mission analysis and the

other steps of the JFC OPP. Within this, an CBRN incident template is produced

that becomes the basis of further intelligence and operations planning. It includes

the evaluation of the threat and the area of operations, the readiness of friendly

forces, terrain analysis and meteorological evaluation.


- population dense areas

- meteorological analysis

- terrain analysis

- local infrastructure analysis (traffic, hospitals, industry facilities, etc.)

-

coordinate W&R in JOA

- identify relevant actors in JOA

- coordinate with HN, NGO, IOs etc.

- identify opportunities of connecting/integration of HN emergency W&R systems

detect CBRN Incident

Detection (NBC) is defined as the discovery by any means of the presence of a

chemical or biological agent or radioactive material, of potential military

significance.1 The equipment and procedures needed to detect events and protect

against them must be made ready and rehearsed at appropriate threat levels so

that hazards can be detected at the earliest possible opportunity and timely alerts

and/or alarms given. The detection component also includes reconnaissance,

survey, and surveillance.

develop CBRN Contingency

Plans

Contingency plans need to be made with the Host Nation to control and contain the

hazards if TIM facilities are

damaged. Whatever the circumstances of a TIM release, the impact on military

capability will need to be assessed. A large-scale release from TIM facilities,

particularly if there are

also large fires, has the potential to spread toxic aerosols and smoke across a

significant percentage of the operational area.



Activity Definition


develop CBRN Estimate

The CBRN defence estimate process is central to operational planning. All relevant

CBRN defence issues need to be included in the JFC's CBRN defence estimate

which supports the main planning estimate . A guide to a CBRN defence estimate

is at annex 5E. The estimate allow the JFC to select his course of action and issue

planning guidance. This enables his subordinate commanders and their staffs to

complete their own estimates and plans. These also need to include a CBRN

defence annex of the OPLAN.


- Personnel

- Material

Contribute to Force Generation process.

Develops a plan for the employment of CBRN Forces.

develop CONOPS & OPLAN

CBRN Parts

Develop CONOPS & OPLAN Parts

e.g. writing NBC related annexes for CONOPs at the strategic level

Drafting, reviewing and maintaining the Annex U to orders, directives, plans,

exercise, as well as, SOP's concerning CBRN Defence.

establish Medical

Surveillance System

Establish a Medical Surveillance System

Advise medical officers on likely signs and symptoms of CBRN exposure that may

be encountered in the operation, as a guide to the disease indicators incorporated

into the health surveillance system employed.

Establish an early warning system based on preventive medicine, disease

surveillance and medical laboratory data and coordinate the system with the CBRN

defence staff.

Produce documents and report radiation exposure and effects as part of the health



Activity Definition

surveillance system (SOPs in accordance with STANAG 2474).


establish SOPs,

Doctrines_Mil.Strat Level

It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels that plans take into account

CBRN defensive measures and that directives and SOPs are available and that

these fully meet the requirements of this ATP 3.8.1 Vol I and their respective

commands.

SOPs need to be considered, prepared and rationalised at, and between, each

operational and tactical level of the Joint Force before deployment. General and

CBRN defence operating procedures need to be validated, practised and possibly

amended in a simulated CBRN environment during training, exercises and

evaluations.


establish SOPs_Operational

Level

It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels that plans take into account

CBRN defensive measures and that directives and SOPs are available and that

these fully meet the requirements of this ATP 3.8.1 Vol I and their respective

commands.

SOPs need to be considered, prepared and rationalised at, and between, each

operational and tactical level of the Joint Force before deployment. General and

CBRN defence operating procedures need to be validated, practised and possibly

amended in a simulated CBRN environment during training, exercises and

evaluations.


establish/activate W&R

organisation

- installation of W&R CIS and connection to Forces CIS

- test connectivity between C2 levels

identify Agents (confirmed)

Confirmed identification which is permanent and unlikely to change.


identify Agents (provosional) Provisional identification (presumptive) providing for immediate needs only.



Activity Definition


identify Agents

(unambiguous)

Unambiguous (forensic) where classification is beyond doubt.


identify CBRN Incidents

Identification of CBRN incident source term (time, type and location) plus

prediction of hazard areas.

- correlation of CBRN incident reports

identify HN, IOs, NGOs, GOs

Other Agencies and the Host Nation.

In any conflict where NBC weapons may be used the Strategic Command and the

JFC will also need to recognise possible impacts on any nongovernment

organisations (NGOs) in-theatre and the Host Nation (HN). In Crisis Response

Operations (CRO) there may be a wide spread of other agencies through the JOA.

If NBC events occur, assistance to NGOs and the Host Nation may divert

resources from the Joint Force. Similarly operational

capability may also be degraded if HN facilities and personnel used in support of

the Joint Force are affected. If NBC events occur, the JFC may be called upon to

provide support to NGOs and the HN. This may divert resources from the Joint

Force.


identify Hazardous Sites

A continuous Intelligence Preparation of the Battelfield (IPB) process, taking into

account the safety distances from hazardous sites, needs to be in place.

Meteorological and topographical data collection is also of importance.

Accordingly, it will be important to scope likely TIM challenges within the IPB

process at the planning stage of an operation, enabling the modification or

procurement of appropriately capable equipment and the advance development of

hazard and risk management techniques in anticipation of release.


The sites of significant TIM facilities in the JOA need to be



Activity Definition

plotted and, whenever and wherever possible, avoided during operations.


identify Possible Risks

As commanders anticipate and identify CBRN risks, these actions should be

clearly communicated and rehearsed from command to individual levels. The

analysis and the subsequent decision taken by the commander of the risk is

determined by the probability of occurrence and by the gravity of the effects

caused.


Identification of risks:

- Risk ID

- Description

- Propability

- Loss of life

- negative impact on mission

identify SIBCRA

Samples_JOA

Identification of SIBCRA Samples in Joint Operations Area (JOA)

Identification (NBC) is defined as the determination of the identity of an agent or

material employed in a NBC attack or resulting from ROTA. The exact criteria for

each form of identification for each type of agent are detailed in AEP 10 and AEP

49. There

are 3 types of identification with varying degrees of reliability:

a. Provisional identification (presumptive) providing for immediate needs only.

b. Confirmed identification which is permanent and unlikely to change.

c. Unambiguous (forensic) where classification is beyond doubt.

Identification carried out by an accredited laboratory. This is to confirm the

presence and character of the NBC hazard from the samples collected by

specialist teams in accordance with AEPs 10 and 49. Such identification can only

take place either at an

accredited laboratory in-theatre or in national laboratories. If samples are to be

used as forensic evidence the appropriate chain of custody needs to be employed.



Activity Definition


manage CBRN COP Management of the CBRN parts of the Common Operational Picture (COP)

manage CBRN Databases The homeland Reach Back capability will sort and store collected data in CBRN

databases to enable further exploitation.

manage CBRN Exposure

Management of NBC Exposure

An accurate record of NBC information needs to be maintained for NBC attacks,

ROTA events, friendly force nuclear strikes,

counter-force operations and any exposure of personnel to NBC and/or TIM

hazards.

This is to assist operational planning, to avoid friendly forces inadvertently

encountering a hazard area and for post-conflict remediation.


Exposure of groups to radiation is controlled by the calculation of nuclear RES and

control doses so that the radiation doses received by groups are evenly distributed

in accordance guidance to commanders on the exposure of personnel to radiation

is given in annex E for Non Article V operations and for annex F for war operations

or applicable national obligations. Long-term medical records need to be

maintained for all Joint Force personnel after any exposure to ionizing radiation

above normal local background radiation in accordance with STANAG 2474.

An accurate record of CBRN information needs to be maintained for CBRN

incidents and any exposure of personnel to CBRN hazards. This is to assist

operational planning for post-conflict remediation and long-term individual health

management.


manage CBRN Logistics

Plans and coordinates logistical support requirements of subordinate CBRN

defence units.

Maintain the status of CBRN defence equipment.

Track CBRN defence equipment consumption rates.



Activity Definition

Forecasts CBRN defence equipment requirements.


manage CBRN

Reconnaissance

NBC Reconnaissance is defined as a mission undertaken to

obtain information by visual observation or other methods, to confirm or deny the

presence of NBC hazards or attacks. It may include gathering information on

enemy use of NBC weapons, associated hazards, or meteorological data for NBC

hazard prediction.


CBRN Reconnaissance is either conducted as CBRN Field Reconnaissance or as

CBRN Sensitive Site Reconnaissance (SSR).

CBRN Field Reconnaissance comprises CBRN Route Reconnaissance, CBRN

Zone Reconnaissance, CBRN Area Reconnaissance.

Battlespace CBRN reconnaissance includes:

a. The observation and reporting of local weather and terrain conditions.

b. Monitoring of potential TIH.

c. Detection and monitoring of CBRN hazards and contaminants.


manage CBRN Sensor

Application

Management of CBRN network sensors, testing of CBRN sensors, monitoring of

CBRN sensor performance and management of network security for the

operational support of CBRN sensors.


manage CBRN Surveillance

NBC surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of aerospace,surface

areas, places, persons, or things by visual, electronic, mechanical, or other means

for determining the presence or absence of NBC hazards.


manage CBRN Survey NBC Survey is defined as the directed effort to determine the nature and degree of

NBC hazards in an area of confirmed or suspected contamination, and to delineate



Activity Definition

the boundaries of the hazard area. This may include monitoring the degree of

radiation or the presence of a biological or chemical hazard, and the

sampling of items suspected of NBC contamination.


manage Collective

Protection(COLPRO)

Protection provided to a group of individuals in a chemical, biological, radiological

or nuclear hazard area, which permits relaxation of individual chemical, biological,

radiological and nuclear protection.

Summary Report of the 1st CBRN Countermeasures Functional Analysis

Workshop, 25-26 January 2010, EDA, Brussels

manage Decontamination

If hazard precaution and control measures are not effective,

decontamination may be necessary. Decontamination is defined as the process of

making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing,

making harmless, or

removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material

clinging to or around it. Decontamination may be passive or active, reflecting the

urgency of the operational situation.


Depending on the level and extent of decontamination required and the efficiency

and capacity of decontamination equipment used it can be, extremely manpower,

equipment and time consuming and therefore requires careful planning.

Decontamination capabilities available (resources, decontaminants) must be

considered.

Active decontamination involves the process of making any person, object, or area

safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or actively removing

chemical or biological agents, or by removing radioactive material clinging to or

around it.

The process of Thorough decontamination should be logged to track the progress

of regeneration of personnel and equipment.



Activity Definition


Manage CBRN decontamination operations. Designate proposed decontamination

sites, current weather data, water availability, trafficability, accessibility, and

logistics supportability.

manage Disease

Surveilllance

Biological Warfare Agent Detection by Disease Surveillance

In addition to the detection capability given above, Biological Warfare (BW) agents

can be detected through the systematic, large scale and regular health monitoring

of Joint Force personnel and, where possible and applicable, the Host Nation

population. Changes in health patterns can be targeted and analysed for the early

signs and symptoms of disease or illness induced by BW

agents.


manage Hazard

Containment

Hazard containment is needed to physically contain CBRN hazards so that they do

not spread to uncontaminated areas and pose a risk to unprepared forces.

Physical containment may also be necessary to control the spread of CBRN

hazards from leaking munitions, improvised devices, and industrial facilities or from

decontamination residues. Radiation sources may have to be buried or physically

shielded to reduce the hazard. Regardless of the containment means,

contaminated areas must be marked, and reported to military and civilian

authorities.


manage Individual Protection

Individuals need to be provided with an individual respiratory protection system,

prophylaxis/pre-treatment medications, antidotes, a decontamination kit, a first aid

kit, and protective clothing to protect against NBC hazards. Commanders need to

be aware that there may be significant limitations of IPE and respirator limitations

against certain threats including TIH. The exposure of personnel to NBC or TIM

hazards needs to be continuously monitored and recorded so that the appropriate

medical management, support and after-care can be arranged.


manage Medical Pre- Medical Pre-Treatments



Activity Definition

Treatments

Commanders and staffs need to make decisions, on advice from

the medical staff about the timely and appropriate administration of prophylactic or

preventive compounds (immunisation, medication) as well as other pre-treatment

measures

(skin barrier sprays or repellents). These need to be issued to personnel under

national guidelines.


Perform a pre-deployment medical assessment of personnel and verify the

immunization status of troops.


manage Medical Resources

The Medical Organization must guarantee the availability of specialized diagnostic

and treatment capabilities. Special attention should be given to stockpile of:

a. Prophylactic or pre-treatment drugs and antidotes for biological agents.

b. Prophylactic drugs and antidotes for chemical agents.

c. Iodine tablets and anti-emetics and radionuclide decorporation drugs (e.g.,

Prussian blue, calcium salts, sodium bicarbonate, Ca-DTPA, Zn-DTPA) for

radiological agents.

Administrate prophylactic or pre-treatment drugs and antidotes


This also includes:

medical personnel/ teams

manage Monitoring

Operation Operational task performed by EU OHQ/ EU FHQ.

manage Protection of Mobile

Assets

Mobile COLPRO is defined as COLPRO systems integral to land, sea or air

platforms. They may or may not be capable of operation on the move or of allowing



Activity Definition

entry and exit in the face of chemical, biological or radioactive hazards.

The Citadel on board ship is defined as group of interconnecting compartments

which can be included together within a vapour tight boundary within which air can

be recirculated to provide COLPRO.


manage Protection of

Transportable Assets

Transportable COLPRO is defined as stand-alone COLPRO systems capable of

being deployed into an area of operations. They will usually be unhardened (UCP)

but may be capable of erection within buildings or other enclosures.

UCP can also be used within ships which do not have built-in COLPRO.


manage Rotation of Assets

Rotation of Assets.

The rotation of force assets through an NBC or TIM hazard area

needs to be considered and planned. This is so that the degradation caused by

high levels of NBC protection is minimised and exposure to NBC hazards will be,

as far as possible, even and thus ALARA throughout the force. There is a

particular need to rotate personnel through radioactive hazard areas because

exposure (which can be monitored) will accumulate with time.


The rotation of force assets through a CBRN area needs to be considered and

planned. There is a particular need to rotate personnel through radioactive hazard

areas because exposure (which can be monitored) will accumulate with time. Such

rotation will require considerable planning effort by the joint staff if forces in the

hazard area have been or become contaminated by hazards. Movement control to

limit spread and decontamination will be needed.


manage SIBCRA Operations Task at EU OHQ and FHQ level to manage SIBCRA operations

manageProtection of Fixed

Assets

Fixed COLPRO is defined as COLPRO systems integral to static facilities; these

may be hardened, semi-hardened or unhardened



Activity Definition


mark Contaminated Areas

Marking.

Stores, equipment and areas of ground that are known to be contaminated, need

to be marked (STANAG 2002) so they can be avoided.


Areas of CBRN hazard need to be marked so that forces do not enter and risk

becoming contaminated. Hazard marking is carried out by forces at the hazard

area in accordance with annex A.


monitor & evaluate Risks evaluate the propability

monitor & record Exposure of

Personnel

Exposures or suspected exposures to NBC hazards

needs to be recorded to assist the short and possible long-term employment of

personnel.

Here exposure of Joint Force personnel to any radiation hazard needs to be

managed in accordance with STANAG 247314

because of possible long term medical consequences (the principles of exposure

management are addressed in paragraph 137 below). Certain population groups,

for example young

persons and women of childbearing age, are considered to be at additional risk

from radioactive hazards.


monitor Areas of

Operation/Interest During routine phase areas of operation or interest will be monitored.

monitor CBRN

Contamination

Reconciliation of measured detection, reconnaissance and survey results against

predicted hazard areas.

- evaluation of CBRN 4,5,6 reports

monitor CBRN Existence - delineate areas of contamination, and monitor the changes



Activity Definition

Monitoring is the continuous or periodic process of determining whether an NBC

hazard is present. NBC hazards can be significantly affected by a number of

factors including weather,

terrain, time of day and agent decay. Surface monitoring is conducted on

personnel, equipment, or terrain to establish the presence of surface contaminants

and to validate

decontamination. Monitoring assists the commander to determine the protective

posture of the force.


Monitoring is the continuous or periodic process of determining whether or not a

CBRN or TIM hazard is present. Monitoring is distinguished between Chemical

Monitoring, Biological Monitoring, Radiological and Nuclear Monitoring.

Monitoring uses network detector technology and is distinguished in the following

categories depending on the threat level and operational significance of the

installation or area requiring monitoring,:

a.Continuous monitoring; static and/or mobile detectors are running all along and


b.Periodic monitoring; static and/or mobile detectors are turned on at stated



monitor Contaminated

Routes, Areas & Assets

Avoid the use of contaminated routes, areas and assets

The exposure of personnel to NBC or TIM hazards needs to be continuously

monitored and recorded so that the appropriate medical management, support and

after-care can be arranged.


monitor Health Status The Medical staff has to plan monitoring program of the health status of people

potentially exposed as well as follow-up aftercare program for personnel already



Activity Definition

exposed to CBRN agents. Military Medical staffs must therefore plan the recording

of in-theatre clinical data and make it available, on request, to the competent

national health authorities.

Monitor disease and pathology occurrence in-theatre.

(Source: ATP 3.8.1.VOL I)

plan COLPRO Assets plan Collective Protection (COLPRO) Assets

plan DIM

plan Detection, Identification and Monitoring

- plan Detection Capabilities e.g. type & location of detectors (Point-, Stand Off-,

Remote Detectors)

plan Hazard Pre-Cautions

Measures

Hazard precaution measures cover a range of operational and equipment related

measures such as the use of cover, camouflage, concealment and dispersion of

the Force to avoid CBRN weapon/devices effects and hazards. These measures

need to be integrated into the Force deception and emission control plan,

prepared, and if the threat warrants, implemented before the incident occurs.

Precautions need to be planned and prepared pre-incident. For example, field

defences, shelters, structures and buildings will need to be strengthened and

reinforced against blast effects.

The Hazard Management plan needs to be well prepared in advance of the

incident. This will include measures ready to be implemented pre and post-

incident, depending on the nature and extent of the hazard and a re-assessment of

operational priorities.


plan Medical Support

Based on the threat and associated plans, an appropriate medical organization will

be established which will include facilities, personnel materials and re-supply.

Determine the qualitative and quantitative requirements for medical support

including required medical capabilities, size, transportability, isolation,

decontamination capabilities and specialized teams.

Plan CBRN defensive measures (COLPRO) e.g. for ROLE 2 facilities.



Activity Definition

Evacuation planning tasks require coordination with J3 Operations and J4 Logistics

for transportation of medical supplies and casualties. The medical planning staff

will assess the evacuation assets of all contributing nations including local and

civilian assets. Planning for medical evacuation of casualties includes identifying or

designating separate clean and dirty movement corridors, identifying

decontamination requirements for both casualties and evacuation assets and

identifying any agreements with the HN or other nations that limit movement of

contaminated casualties.


plan W&R

plan W&R_Mil.-Strat. Level

- organisation (CBRN Centres, command structure, W&R stucture) already in

Force Generation process

- areas (Areas of Observation, Zone of observation)

- reporting plan

- contribution to OPLAN and SOPs

- identify relevant external actors in JOA, e.g. HN, NGOs, IOs

- identify CBRN service providers (e.g. meteorological service)

protect Critical Infrastructure Critical Infrastructure needs to be protected from CBRN threats.

record CBRN Incidents CBRN records on confirmed CBRN incidents should be kept after the hazard has

passed.

relocate Troops

Relocation

Forces in an NBC or TIM hazard area need, where possible, to move away from

the hazard. The decision to relocate such forces depends on a number of factors:

(1) The current operational situation, the nature of the force's mission and their

ability to complete it in place and in their NBC protective posture.

(2) The nature of the hazard and whether the movement of the force will spread

contamination from the hazard to a clean area. The risk to other forces in the clean

area also needs to be considered.




Activity Definition

If faced with prolonged exposure to the hazard, the commander may consider

completing the mission after relocating from the area, delaying entry into the area,

or bypassing the area.

If it appears that a unit has been affected by a CBRN incident, the commander

should immediately initiate action to determine the type and persistency of the

contamination hazard and should make decisions based on the tactical situation

and unit effectiveness. Movement of forces to an uncontaminated area may be

necessary to minimize continued exposure to residual CBRN hazards.


retrieve CBRN Lessons

Learnt

Formerly captured CBRN Lessons Learnt are retrieved for various purposes e.g.:

- re-analysis

- briefings

- training

- etc.

submit CBRN

reports_Mil.Strat.Level

When identifying the content of a CBRN report, a distinction is to be made between

chemical (CHEM), biological (BIO), radiological (RAD) and nuclear (NUC) and not

known (NKN).

- CBRN 1 - Observer's report, giving basic data.(only first use)

- CBRN 2 - Report for passing the evaluated data from collected CBRN 1 reports.

- CBRN Situational Report (CBRN SITREP).

- STRIKWARN & HAZWARN

CBRN 4 - Report for passing detection data and CBRN monitoring and survey

results. This report is used for two cases:

(a) If an incident is not observed and the first indication of CBRN contamination is

by detection.

- CBRN 5 report

(b) To report measured CBRN contamination as a part of a survey or monitoring



Activity Definition

activity.

(only first use and no CBRN 1 report)

submit CBRN

reports_Operational Level



known (NKN).

- CBRN 1 - Observer's report, giving basic data.(only first use)

- CBRN 2 - Report for passing the evaluated data from collected CBRN 1 reports.




by detection.


activity.

(only first use and no CBRN 1 report)

- CBRN 5 report

- CBRN 6 report

- CBRN Situational Report (CBRN SITREP).

- STRIKWARN & HAZWARN

submit CBRN

reports_TacLevel



known (NKN).

own forces sub-ordinated and higher level as well as HN and NGO

CBRN 1 - Observer's report, giving basic data.



Activity Definition




by detection.


activity.

CBRN 4, 5 and 6. These reports, based on previous reporting (CBRN 1, CBRN 2

and CBRN 3), are to provide actual CBRN contamination data.

CBRN Situational Report (CBRN SITREP).

submit CBRN

warnings_Mil.Strat.Level

CBRN 3 - Report for immediate warning of predicted CBRN contamination and

hazard areas. This report can be used primarily to inform units without an organic

CBRN W&R capability about a CBRN incident.

submit CBRN

warnings_Operational Level


- submission of STRIKWARN and HAZWARN

- MERWARN

- Missile Intercept Report




submit CBRN

warnings_TacLevel


- submission of STRIKWARN and HAZWARN




support EU Operations CBRN home-based Reach Back capability supports ongoing CSDP operations

with



Activity Definition

- immediate on call initial assessment/advice

- with scientific reach back additional/follow-up comprehensive technical evaluation

and proposals

- provision of CBRN information as requested

support OPP

The home-based Reach Back capability supports the Operational Planning

Process (OPP) with

- CBRN intelligence information

- CBRN threat assessment

- CBRN advice

transport Substances

(Agents and Materials)

Transportation of suspected chemical, biological

and radioactive materials within a chain of custody.


validate CBRN Reports - correlate incident reports

- definition of incident ID

verify Potential Hazards

Formations operating in areas with large industrial facilities should conduct a

reconnaissance and liaise with the managers of these facilities if they are still

available, to understand the hazards and potential requirements for containing a

TIM release that may affect the mission.


Hazard are captured:

Hazard ID

Description

Type

Location (area, position)

Hazard prediction

frequency of re-assessment



Activity Definition

probability

automatic re-calculation of hazardouse area

protective measures applicable



9.3. Definition of CBRN FAS Data Bases

Name Definition

CBRN DIM Database The CBRN DIM database contains all CBRN detection,

identification and monitoring data e.g. DIM results.

CBRN Documents

Database

Database containing all relevant CBRN documents (directives,

SOPs, guides, specifications, etc.) e.g. ATP 3.8.1, AJP 3.8, ATP

45, AEP 45, ...

Database could become integral part of a CBRN Encyclopedia

Database containing

CBRN documents

Agents characteristics and effects

Weapons and devices

Protection required

Means of decontamination

etc.

CBRN Exposure

Database

CBRN database capturing data on CBRN exposure

CBRN exposure data contains information on personnel involved

in CBRN incident and needs to be archived taking into account

'personnel data protection policies'.

CBRN Historical

Database

CBRN FAS shall store all product generated for each operation

and all information related with each incident for further analysis,

conclusions and lessons learnt.

The information will be archived.


The CBRN Incident Database stores all CBRN incidents with the

following information:

- Incident ID

- Location

- Type

- Status

- etc.

CBRN Intelligence

Database

CBRN FAS shall store the following information of other forces in

a CBRN intelligence database:

- CBRN political wills

- CBRN intentions

- CBRN military capability

- CBRN doctrine



- CBRN infrastructure

- CBRN weapons and delivery means

- possible Course of Actions (COA) (most likely, next likely, most

dangerours)

CBRN Lessons Learnt

Database

Database storing all CBRN lessons learnt.

The database should be linked to the EU ELMA database.

CBRN Logistic Database

CBRN FAS shall store the following logistic information:

- Serial Number of each individual element of each IPE

- State of each individual element of each IPE

- Medical resources (amount and status)

- TBC

CBRN Message Database The CBRN FAS should provide a CBRN Message Database that

contains all CBRN Messages produced, received, sent etc.

CBRN Patient Tracking

Database

The Patient Tracking database stores all relevant data on patient

tracking with CBRN related matters.

CBRN Reach Back

Capability Database

Data base that provides all relevant data concerning Reach Back

Capabilities. This includes inter alia:

Reach Back organisation (Name, Address, POC, capability, MoUs

etc.)

CBRN Reach Back

Database

Database that contains all CBRN Reach Back Cases and its

tracking details e.g. (Case ID, Status, Description, Attachments

etc.)

CBRN Reconnaissance

Resource Database

Database containing CBRN resources e.g.:

- CBRN detectors

- CBRN Reconnaissance Means (Vehicles, UAVs, etc.)

- CBRN Specialist units

Information about entities:

- type

- who, where

- capability

CBRN Risk Management

Database

The identified and evaluated risks will be processed in a risk

management database.

A CBRN risk will be captured with the following information:

- Risk ID

- Description

- Propability



- Loss of life

- negative impact on mission

CBRN Sample Database

The CBRN Sample Database contains all data concerning

SIBCRA samples:

- Sample reports

- Sample status

- SIBCRA analysis reports

CBRN Sensor Database

A Database containing information about the available CBRN

sensors and their parameters to determin their possible or best

application.

Applications to assist commanders in determining optimum

placement of CBRN sensors, based on sensor sensitivity data.



Database containing

CBRN documents


Weapons and devices

Protection required


etc.

CBRN Simulation

Database

Database containing simulation relevant data e.g.

- scenarios

- simulation objects (CBRN units, CBRN means)

CBRN Substance

Database

CBRN Substances Database contains information on CBRN

substances.



Database containing

CBRN documents


Weapons and devices

Protection required


etc.

Database needs to be available in EU OHQ and EU FHQ.

CBRN Surveillance Database containing CBRN resources e.g.:



Resource Database

- CBRN detectors

- Surveillance Means



- type

- who, where

- capability


Database

Database containing CBRN resources e.g.:

- CBRN detectors

- Surveillance Means



- type

- who, where

- capability

CBRN Training Data

The database should contain the training data like

- training scenar (Map, troops, incidents etc.)

- training W&R messages

CBRN Tutorial CBRN Database with tutorials with the objective to instruct CBRN

operators on how to use the CBRN FAS.

Decontamination

Database

Database containing decontamination data like:

- decontamination substances (type, availability, application etc.)

- decontamination sites (type, capacity, location, status)

- decontamination logging

(The process of thorough decontamination should be logged to

track the progress of regeneration of personnel and equipment.

(Source: ATP 3.8.1 VOL I))

(Logistic re-supply of decontaminants is responsibility of

contributing Member States)


Database containing

CBRN documents


Weapons and devices



Protection required


etc.

EU CIS Operation

Database

Database integral part of EU CIS.

Database containing operations data like:

- own troops (Location, Status etc.)

- Operation Areas (JOA, AOO, AOI etc.)

- Adversary (Location, Status etc.)

- Other entities (HN, GOs, NGOs, etc.)

Geoinfo Database

Geoinfo Database containing information about:

- Maps

- Weather

- Topography

- Satellite Images

- Elevation Models

- ...

Hazard Management

Database

The Hazard Management Database contains all identified hazards

and the hazard management plan.

Hazard Prediction

Calculation Models

Hazard Prediction Calculation Models

Calculation Models based on Allied Engineering Publication

(AEP-45).

Hazard Site Database

other than TIM

- Railway station (Logistic facility)

- contaminated areas

- waste dumbs

- Power Plants

Where

What (processes, substances, quantities)

Status (functional, destroyed, security status)

POC

JOA Infrastructure &

Terrain

Database containing all relevant infrastructure & terrain data of the

Joint Operations Area.

This database should be most likely a common database of the EU

CIS where CBRN relevant data can be incorporated, edited,

deleted etc.

Medical Resource The CBRN medical resource database contains data about:



Database

- Prophylactic or pre-treatment drugs and antidotes

- Medical Resources for Evacuation


Database containing meteorological data relevant for CBRN.

CBRN FAS shall be able to consult an expected meteorological

FAS about:

Prevailing temperature

Humidity

Wind-speed

Wind direction

Precipitations

Stability needs

The database would contain meteological data from external

resources e.g. weather providers.

Operation Planning

Database

Database that contains operational planning documents e.g.

OPLAN, CONOPS, OPORD, etc.

Operations Database (EU

CIS)

Database containing data concerning:

- own troops (location, status, lines of communication etc.)

- areas (AOI, AOO etc.)

This database should be a common database as part of the EU CIS.

Protection Means

Database

Database that contains information about possible and available

means for COLPRO.

- available means

- capability of means

- logictic data


Database containing

CBRN documents


Weapons and devices

Protection required


etc.

Simulation Objects

Database

Simulation Objects Database containing objects like

- vehicles

- troops



- infrastructure

- etc.

Simulation Records Simulation Records Database containing all recorded simulations.

Symbology Database

Database containing the symbology for COP display.

- AAP-6A

TIM Database

A database containing inter alia information concerning industrial

sites and toxic production plants within the JOA.

ID

Industry Name

Where (Grid Zone, Coordinates)

What (processes, substances, quantities)

Type of storage

Status (functional, destroyed, security status)

Facility POC

Visited/ Observed by ... (Own Forces, HN, etc)

TIM Threat Level (High, Significant, Medium, Low)

Image or Video

Layout drawing

Threat Assessment

Database

Database that contains processed CBRN threat assessments.

The following data should be captured for identified hazards:

Hazard ID

Description

Type


Hazard prediction


probability







9.4. Definition of CBRN FAS Functionalities

System Function Definition

CBRN COP

CBRN FAS functionality to provide a CBRN common operational

picture.

CBRN FAS shall maintain, provide and geographically display layers

with:

- Information and position of active CBRN incidents,

- Predicted evolution of the associated contamination

- Hazard and contaminated areas

- Own forces and HN forces (military and civilian) position and its

CBRN defence capabilities

- Troops affected by contamination

CBRN symbols and tactical graphics shall be displayed according

APP-6A [Ref. 05]

CBRN COP Mgmt

CBRN FAS functionality that facilitates the CBRN Cell at EU

OHQ/FHQ level to establish, maintain and update the CBRN relevant

'Common Operational Picture' layers of information.

CBRN Detector

Network Planning

Application that supports the Detection Network planning and

installation at EU OHQ/EU FHQ level.

CBRN Disease

Mgmt CBRN Disease Management Functionality

CBRN Exposure

Mgmt

The function enables the tracking of personnel that has been exposed to

CBRN incidents.

Focus on operational availability of troops, units or assessment of

groups.

CBRN FAS TOP LEVEL Function containing all CBRN FAS relevant sub-

functions.

CBRN FAS Online

Help

CBRN FAS function that provides the user with an online help while

using the CBRN FAS.

CBRN FAS Services Aggregates all CBRN FAS functionalities.

CBRN Health Data

Analysis

Functionality enabling CBRN staff to detect disease or abnormal

situations based on analysis of medical data.

(Protection of personnel data needs to be taken into account)

CBRN FAS shall automatically warn about any suspicious statistic




outbreak in the stored health information of the friendly military force.

CBRN FAS shall be able produce and provide statistics of injured

people and casualties after any incident in order to be reference for

further casualties estimation (Hazard Management)

CBRN Incident

Logging

CBRN FAS shall register every CBRN incident detection and every

subsequent data actualization or additional received information related

to each incident. This register shall include, at least:

- Incident ID

- Location

- Type

- Timestamp

- Information (or message) description

CBRN Knowledge

The functionality should enable to build up a common CBRN

knowledge database, access CBRN information, discuss it with CBRN

experts, etc.

IT functions that could be considered are:

- Wiki

- Chat

- Forums

- etc.

CBRN Lessons

Learnt

Function to enable CBRN operator to create, modify, view, assign and

delete, archive, search, print, etc. observations and/or lessons as

elements of the main functionality.

CBRN FAS should facilitate the export of selected CBRN lessons

learnt to EU Lessons Learnt application ELMA.

CBRN Logistic

Mgmt

CBRN FAS function to manage the CBRN logistic aspects by EU

OHQ/FHQ CBRN Cell.

CBRN Logistics

CBRN FAS functionality that enables EU OHQ/FHQ CBRN Cell to

manage CBRN logistic aspects like:

- CBRN critical consumables

- Spare parts

Remark: Logistics for EU operations is national responsibility.

CBRN Message Editor that supports the development of CBRN messages according to




Editor specified formats (ATP45)

Composition of

- CBRN 2

- CBRN 3 (Warning)

- CBRN SITREP

CBRN Message

Handling

Functionality to process (including verification, validations, amending

Meta-Data, storing etc.) CBRN messages (ADat-P3 format).

The function facilitates:

- determination of location, time, type of incident, dimension of

incident

- Allocation of CBRN Message (e.g. CBRN 4) to already

known/captured CBRN incident

- depiction of CBRN Incidents on CBRN COP

- update of CBRN Incidents based on new information (e.g. CBRN 6

Message)

CBRN Message

Transmission

CBRN FAS functionality that allows export of Warning & Reporting

relevant data (e.g. CBRN Messages) send via different interfaces e.g.

mail interface, FTP server, radio ...

CBRN Monitoring

Mgmt

Functionality that enables HQ CBRN personnel to manage CBRN

monitoring operations.

CBRN Monitoring

Operation Mgmt

Functionality that enables the management of CBRN monitoring

operations.

CBRN Plans

Development

The CBRN FAS function should provide the capability to exchange,

share and co-ordinate information (based on word-processing,

data-base, spreadsheet, image and presentational applications and

support planning tools) to accumulate operational data and develop

CBRN relevant concepts and plans.(annexes to OPLAN/OPORD).

CBRN FAS shall be able to manage (create, update, delete) and

provide CBRN estimates during the planning process.

CBRN Predictions

CBRN FAS functionality that facilitates the CBRN Cell to calculate

hazard prediction based on incident information (location, type etc.),

weather data and prediction calculation models according to ATP 45

and AEP 45.

CBRN Reach Back CBRN Reach Back top level functionality for CBRN FAS reach back

sub-functions.

CBRN

Reconnaissance CBRN Reconaissance Management Functionality




Mgmt

CBRN

Reconnaissance

Operation Montoring

Reconnaissance Operation Monitoring Functionality

CBRN

Reconnaissance

Operation Planning

Functionality enabling the planning of CBRN reconnaissance

operations at EU OHQ/FHQ level.

CBRN

Reconnaissance

Operation Simulation

Simulation functionality to support the planning and decision process.

CBRN

Reconnaissance

Ressource Monitor

Functionality providing the status of available CBRN reconnaissance

resources e.g.

- availability

- capability

- POC

- restrictions for operations

- location

- ...

CBRN Surveillance

Mgmt CBRN Surveillance Management Functionality

CBRN Surveillance

Monitoring Mgmt Surveillance Operation Monitoring Functionality.

CBRN Surveillance

Operation Planning

Functionality enabling the planning of CBRN surveillance operations

at EU OHQ/FHQ level.

CBRN Surveillance

Resource Monitor

Functionality providing the status of available CBRN surveillance

resources e.g.

- availability

- capability

- POC


- location

- ...

CBRN Survey Mgmt CBRN Survey Management Functionality

CBRN Survey

Operations Mgmt Survey Operation Monitoring Functionality

CBRN Survey

Operations Planning

Functionality enabling the planning of CBRN survey operations at EU

OHQ/FHQ level.




CBRN Survey

Operations

Simulation

Simulation functionality to support the planning and decision process.

CBRN Training

The CBRN FAS should provide a training functionality in order to

train CBRN operators based on training/test data. The function should

make use of all CBRN FAS functions with exceptions e.g. sending test

messages to external entities.

CBRN Tutorial The CBRN FAS should provide a tutorial function in order to instruct

CBRN operators on how to use the CBRN FAS.

CBRN Vulnerability

Assessment

By consulting the CBRN Intelligence database, an expected

meteorological FAS, CBRN FAS shall allow the user to perform a

CBRN vulnerability assessment.

As part of the CBRN vulnerability assessment, CBRN FAS shall allow

the user to perform:

Estimate of adversary's capability

Generation of likely effects information

For generating effect information, CBRN FAS shall allow the user to

establish a set of time period / munitions delivery estimate

combinations, and for each of these combinations the user may develop

a set of effects information:

- Casualties estimates (using the CBRN intelligent database and the

expected meteorological FAS)

- Contamination barriers

- Persistence

- Times and locations of downwind agent effects

For determining casualties estimation, if the user introduces the target

position, target size and the probable agent or munition, CBRN FAS

shall estimate casualties using:

- hazard predictions function,

- demography information and

- procedures described in AMedP-8 [Ref. 04]

If required CBRN FAS should provide hint/recommendation to

involve/consult CJMed.

CBRN W&R Data

Import

CBRN FAS functionality that allows import of Warning & Reporting

relevant data (e.g. CBRN Messages) send via different interfaces e.g.

mail interface...

The function might include the transformation of data into the correct




data format.

CBRN Warning &

Reporting Top Level CBRN FAS Activty ' Warning and Reporting'.

CBRN Waste Mgmt

CBRN FAS function that facilitates the CBRN Cell to manage CBRN

waste and waste site.

The waste products from the removal of hazards from contaminated

forces, or the removal of contaminated covers, need to be contained

and marked in accordance with annex A. Waste sites will need to be

restored once operations are complete. A part of CBRN

decontamination operations is the management of resulting waste.

Appropriate in-theatre policy and disposal instructions need to be

established to ensure the responsible handling of waste. More details

on waste management activities are provided in annex B.


The function should support the adherence to Host nations legislation

and environmental issues.

CIMIC Web Portal

CBRNS FAS shall have a CIMIC web portal that could allow civil

organizations to provide information regarding:

Transport capability

Heavy equipment availability

Medical treatments and facilities availability

COLPRO facilities availability

Availability of supplies of uncontaminated food and potable water

Capability for disposal of contaminated waste

Capability for expert handle of hazardous materials

Information concerning TIM sites

The user shall be able to control what information will be shared on the

CIMIC web portal.

Civil access to the CIMIC web portal will be based logging by user and

password on TSL/SSL protocols.

CIMIC web portal shall provide a filtered COP to civil organizations.

Chat Chat functionality for communication provided by EU CIS.

Common Support

Functionalities

The Common Support Functionalities contains all CBRN FAS

functions that are required for the CBRN FAS to support the

operational functions or for administration.

Communication

Services

Top Level functionality (EU CIS service) containing all relevant

communication functionalities.




Cross-Sectional

CBRN

Functionalities

Aggregates all 'Cross Sectional' CBRN FAS functionalities.

Decontamination

Manager

CBRN FAS shall control the decontamination process of personnel,

equipment and material taking into account:

- Level of contamination

- Decontamination method

- Time after contamination

- Priority

- Level of decontamination (Immediate, Operational, Thorough)

- Clearance Decontamination

The functionality should enable for 'Clearance Decontamination':

- logging of decontamination (when, where, by whom, according to

standard xyz)

- verification of constraints fulfilled regarding legal regultations

(checklist)

- access to former cases (knowledge database)

The function should provide CBRN operators to track location,

capability and status of decontamination sites.

Detection Top Level function 'Detection'.

Detection,

Identification and

Monitoring

Top Level CBRN FAS Activty ' Detection, Identification and

Monitoring'.

Directory Services Directory Services provided by EU CIS.

Disease Data

Analysis

CBRN FAS functionality that enables CBRN Cell at EU FHQ level to

analyse disease data.

EU CIS Services/

Functionalities

External Services/Functionalities e.g. GIS as service implemented in

EU CIS environment.

Force Preparation

The CBRN FAS should facilitate the Force Preparation for CBRN

operations or EU operations under CBRN conditions.

The required functions should enable CBRN operators at EU OHQ/ EU

FHQ level to familarise with the CBRN FAS and apply it also for

training and exercise (training mode).

GIS

- Meteorology, topography and geography

- JOA's geographical and topographical data, and fauna and flora.





Hazard Control Top Level Function 'Hazard Control'.

Hazard Control

Support Top Level Function 'Hazard Control Support'.

Hazard Management

(HM) Top Level CBRN FAS Activty ' Hazard Management'.

Hazard Precaution Top Level Function 'Hazard Precaution'.

Hazard Situation

Monitoring

CBRN FAS function that enables the CBRN operator at EU FHQ level

to monitor the hazard situation.

After a CBRN incident commanders will need access to accurate and

timely CBRN hazard information so that the risk and penalties of

hazard contamination can be balanced against other operational

priorities.

The function must enable the CBRN operator to mark areas, routes on

the COP or change status of routes, areas accordingly.

Implications of contamination and changes in movement is

responsibility of troops or branches e.g. CJ4.

Health Statistic

CBRN FAS shall automatically warn about any suspicious statistic

outbreak in the stored health information of the friendly military force.

CBRN FAS shall be able produce and provide statistics of injured

people and casualties after any incident in order to be reference for

further casualties estimation (Hazard Management)

INTEL FAS Intelligence Functional Area Service (INTEL FAS) as part of EU CIS.

IPB

The CBRN FAS Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

function should enable the operator to

- identify and capture hazardous sites

- analyse and capture meteorological and topographic data

Identification Top Level function 'Identification'.

LOG FAS Logistic Functional Area Service (LOG FAS) as part of EU CIS.

Lessons Learnt

Administration

Lessons Learnt Administration function enables CBRN operator to

view, amend, delete, archive etc. captured lessons learnt

Lessons Learnt

Analysis

CBRN FAS function 'Lessons Learnt Analysis' should enable CBRN

Cell operators to search in/ for CBRN Lessons Learnt, analyse captured

Lessons Learnt e.g. how many LL regarding specific procedures,

agents etc.

Lessons Learnt CBRN FAS Lessons Learnt Export functionality must facilitate the




Export export of selected lessons learnt e.g. to ELMA lessons learnt

application or other entities.

Lessons Learnt

Questionnaire

CBRN FAS functionality that enables CBRN Cell to establish, submit

and receive questionnaires e.g. webportal template with workflow so

that affected operators can contribute.

Medical

Countermeasures and

Support

Top Level CBRN FAS Activty ' Medical Countermeasures and

Support'.

Message Decryption

depending on message content, CBRN messages are classified and

need to encrypted/decrypted/ transmitted via secure communication

channels

Message Encryption depending on message content, CBRN messages are classified and

need to encrypted/ transmitted via secure communication channels

Message Handling Message Handling function provided by EU CIS.

Mission Editor

MIssion Editor function to create missions

- placing troops and infrastructure

- selection of areas

- definition of artificial intelligence parameters for objects

- setting of mission specific object parameters

- etc.

Monitoring Top Level function 'Monitoring'.

Monitoring

Operation Planning Monitor-Operation Planning Function

Object Editor

The Object Editor provides the simulation planner to create, update,

delete simulation objects like

- vehicles

- troops

- infrastructure

- etc.

Office Automation Application (COTS) for writing documents, develop presentations etc.

Patient Tracking

Casuality Evacuation should be supported by a patient tracking

functionality.

Diagnosis and expected future effects on CBRN casualties, tracking of

patients with biological warfare symptoms and epidemiological data

processing and possible analysis.





CBRN FAS shall maintain a health record of each military personnel to

be filled in, in case of any incident and to be sent along with the

casualty or injure soldier to the reference hospital.

Task of CJMed

Physical Protection Top Level CBRN FAS Activty ' Physical Protection'.

Posture Mgmt

CBRN FAS shall be able to manage the threat level and the associated

defensive posture on every zone within the Area of Operations (AOO).

- next to the threat level the function should enable to attach further

information

- verification of threat level and implication e.g. actual temperature,

task, nature of work undertaken (could be realised by Pop-Up of dress

code picture, temperature, weather information)

Posture Warning

CBRN FAS shall use the determinate risk level zones, each unit

situation, to send to the deployed units specific messages (apart from

CBRN 3 message) advising of the risk level and the physical posture to

be adopted.

Reach Back Case

Tracking

The functionality should enable tracking of Reach Back requests and

their status (Cases).

Case details

Case ID

Sender

Receiver

Question

When

Status (in preparation, send, ...)

Reach Back Receive

Response

CBRN FAS functionality that enables the reception of reach back

responses.

Usually the reception requires close coordination and discussion with

the Reach Back Capability e.g. scientific personnel.

This includes collaboration platforms or VTC.

Reach Back Request The functionality should enable to compose a request for Reach Back

Services.

Reach Back

Response Processing

This CBRN FAS functionality should enable the CBRN staff to

process the reach back response inter alia to advice the Command

level.




Risk Assessment &

Management

CBRN FAS shall be able to manage (create, update, delete), and

provide CBRN risk assessment.

CBRN risk assessment shall consist in a list composed of the following

columns:

- Risk Identification

- Risk Description

- Threat

- Phase of the operation

- Cause

- Severity

- Probability



SIBCRA Mgmt Sampling and Identification of Biological, Chemical and Radiological

Agents (SIBCRA) Management Functionality

Sample Evaluation

Ordering

CBRN FAS functionality that supports the CBRN cell to manage the

sample evaluation ordering process.

- identification of appropriate reach back capability (laboratory)

- coordination with laboratory and J4 for transport

- provision of information regarding security conditions while handling

and storing

Sample Identification

Report Management

Receive and collect all reports coming from the analytical

identification of samples through the laboratory means as well as to

refer this identification and reports with the proper incident.

Sample Tracking

CBRN FAS functionality that allows the CBRN Cell at EU OHQ/EU

FHQ level to continuously track the sample.

Sample tracking software will support the requirement for an

uninterrupted chain of custody.


additionally:

- sampling report (who, where, how, when, why,...)

- chain of custody

- analysis report (from laboratory)

- status (transport, timestanp of transactions)




Sensor Deployment

Assistant

CBRN CIS should assist in determining the geographic placing of

sensors.


CBRN FAS shall display range of CBRN sensors in a selected position

taking into account:

Sensor sensitivity

Topography and Roughness

Sensor Coverage

Meteorological Data

CBRN FAS shall propose best location for a CBRN sensor within a

selected area taking into account:

Terrain topography

Sensor sensitivity

Simulation CBRN FAS should have the capability to apply simulation for planning

and exercise/training tasks.

Simulation

Recording

Simulation Recording functionality that captures all simulation aspects

and enables replay for e.g. debriefing purposes.

Simulation Replay Simulation Replay function to enable operators to replay simulation

runs for analysis and debriefing purposes.

Simulation Runtime Simulation Runtime that enables starting, stopping and running the

simulation.

Survey Ressource

Monitor

Functionality providing the status of available CBRN survey resources

e.g.

- availability

- capability

- POC


- location

- ...

Terrain Editor

The simulation terrain editor enables the creation of scenar terrain

based on real life satellite images, elevation model so that virtual or

real landscapes can be created and used in for the simulation.

Threat Assessment

CBRN FAS functionality enabling threat assessment.

By consulting an expected Intelligence FAS, an expected

meteorological FAS and the CBRN Intelligence database, CBRN FAS




shall allow the user to perform a threat assessment and determine the

most likely and most dangerous adversary's COAs.

The following data should be captured for identified hazards:

Hazard ID

Description

Type


Hazard prediction


probability





User Management

CBRN FAS functionality to enable user access management inter alia

user access rights, policies, roles.

The user shall be able to administer user names and passwords of the

CIMIC web portal.

Whiteboarding Whiteboarding as collaborative platform provided by EU CIS.