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Vermont Yankee Presentation to VSNAP 7/9/12 VY/Entergy Fukushima Response Bernard Buteau

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  • Slide 1
  • Vermont Yankee Presentation to VSNAP 7/9/12 VY/Entergy Fukushima Response Bernard Buteau
  • Slide 2
  • Tonights Presentation Industry Actions Immediately Following the accident at Fukushima Key Priorities for longer term responses Industry response to INPO Event Report and NRC Orders Industry FLEX approach VY Specific Response to INPO Event Report VY Schedule to respond to NRC Orders Entergy Organizational Structure addressing NRC Orders
  • Slide 3
  • Industry Starting Points NRC Near Term Task Force (NTTF) established to identify Fukushima Lessons Learned NRC Management established priorities to address Task Force Recommendations 3 Priorities established: Tiers 1, 2, and 3 Tier 1 Issues being addressed now NRC Orders and 50.54(f) address Tier 1 Recommendations Tier 1 issue on Station Blackout (SBO) Rulemaking intended to address gaps between current SBO regulations and loss of power due to Beyond Design Basis Events Joint industry/Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Task Forces working with NRC for all issues; Entergy represented on all Task Forces Standardization industry/fleet working through NEI to establish common guidance, methods, and submittals; Entergy developing fleet solutions
  • Slide 4
  • Design Basis and Beyond Design Basis Design Basis information identifies specific functions performed by a system, structure or component as defined in the Vermont Yankee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Design Basis Events incorporate realistic worst case scenarios (e.g. Maximum Expected Flood conditions, Seismic Events, etc) Beyond Design Basis Events postulate events that are more severe than those considered as Design Basis Events
  • Slide 5
  • Key Priorities Maintain Operational Safety Focus Create an Entergy Fukushima response Organization Establish Points of Contact Corporate Governance and Site Execution Brief Site Points of Contact Select Vendors Develop work breakdown structure/project scoping Establish plans, resource needs, and budgets Enhance integration with and communications to sites
  • Slide 6
  • Tier 1 Recommendations Seismic/Flooding Reevaluation [Analyses] Seismic/Flooding Inspections SBO/Extended Loss of AC Power Rulemaking Mitigation of Beyond Design Basis Events Loss Of Ultimate Heat Sink [LUHS] and Extended Loss of AC Power [ELAP] Reassess Mark I Hardened Containment Vent Install new Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Enhance Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) and Extensive Damage Management Guidelines (EDMGs) Reassess Emergency Plan (EP) Staffing and Communications
  • Slide 7
  • NRC Orders and 50.54(f) Letter March 12, 2012 Three Orders Hardened Containment Vents Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Note: For VY the design basis river level is 252 feet normal river level is around 219 feet. River level rose to a max of 223 feet after Hurricane Irene) 50.54(f) Letter - (NRC Requests for Information) Perform Seismic Reevaluation and Inspections to new criteria Perform Flooding Reevaluation and Inspections to new criteria Assess Emergency Plan Staffing and Communications to new criteria
  • Slide 8
  • Order 1 - Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis (BDB) External Events Strategies must maintain/restore core cooling, containment, and Spent Fuel Pool cooling Response equipment must be reasonably protected from external events Three phased approach to severe events, including Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) Phase 1 relies on installed equipment and resources to respond to severe event Phase 2 relies on portable, onsite equipment to extend response capability Phase 3 relies on offsite resources for long term response Industry has proposed FLEX system Interim Staff Guidance to be issued by NRC in August 2012
  • Slide 9
  • Order 2 - Hardened Containment Vent Design Features: Requires remote operation AND monitoring capability Sized to prevent containment overpressure No spurious actuation Upgrades containment vent in place since early 1990s Interim Staff Guidance scheduled to be issued by NRC in August 2012
  • Slide 10
  • Order 3 - SFP Instrumentation Design Features: Independent primary backup instruments to measure pool level Protected from hazards Mounted to ensure functionality post-seismic event Can withstand expected environment Interim Staff Guidance scheduled to be issued by NRC in August 2012
  • Slide 11
  • The Industry FLEX Approach Industry response to Order on Beyond Design Basis (BDB) Events Key Goals: Prevent fuel damage (Core and Spent Fuel Pool) Provide diverse, redundant, flexible means to restore and maintain core and fuel pool cooling and containment Assumes Extended Loss of AC Power and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink N+1 Sets of Portable equipment for mitigation Interim Staff Guidance scheduled to be issued by NRC in August 2012 First round of equipment ordered for each site
  • Slide 12
  • NEI 12-06 Diverse and Flexible coping Strategies (FLEX)
  • Slide 13
  • NRC Orders Key Dates Mar 2012 NRC Orders issued Apr 2012Sites acknowledge no hardship with the Orders; COMPLETE Aug 2012NRC to issue Interim Staff Guidance Oct 2012Initial Status Reports due from industry Feb 2013Overall Integrated Plans due (update every 6 months thereafter) Full Compliance to all Orders must be achieved by the sooner of December 31, 2016 or the 2 nd RFO from submittal of the integrated plan
  • Slide 14
  • INPO and NRC Fukushima Orders INPO Requirements 3/15/11 INPO Event Report (IER) 11-1* [All actions required complete by 4/16/11] NRC Requirements 4/18/11 NRC issued Inspection Manual / Temp Instructions 4/22/11 NRC Inspection of VY per Temp Instructions {NRC Inspection / no findings} 5/11/11 NRC Bulletin 2011-11 Mitigating Strategies issued to obtain a comprehensive verification that licensees' mitigating strategies maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel cooling, and containment following a large explosion or fire 3/12/12 NRC issued Orders to modify licenses * Tsunami occurred on 3/11/11
  • Slide 15
  • VY Immediate Response to INPO Event Report 11-1 Addressed recommendations made in INPO Level 1 Event Report 11-1 by doing the following: Verified plant staffs ability to mitigate conditions that result from beyond design basis events (Security, Severe Accident Management) Verified that emergency equipment is available and functional Tested active equipment and walked down and inspected passive equipment Verified that procedures to implement needed strategies are in place and executable Verified qualifications of operators and support staff who operate the emergency equipment Verified that needed agreements and contracts are in place to help mitigate consequences Above actions were performed by March 23 rd, 2011
  • Slide 16
  • VY Immediate Response to INPO Event Report 11-1 Verified the capability to mitigate Station Blackout (SBO) required by station design is functional and valid Performed walk downs and inspections to verify all required materials properly staged Demonstrated through walk downs that procedures for response to SBO are executable Completed walk downs and inspections by March 30 th, 2011
  • Slide 17
  • VY Immediate Response to INPO Event Report 11-1 Verified the capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events meets station design: Verified through walk downs and inspections that required materials and equipment are adequate and properly staged Verified that accessible doors and barriers are functional Completed verification actions by April 6 th, 2011
  • Slide 18
  • VY Immediate response to INPO Event Report 11-1 Performed walk downs and inspections of equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events to identify the potential that the equipments function could be lost during a seismic event Identified mitigating strategies for identified vulnerabilities Performed walk downs and inspections of important equipment such as: Storage tanks Plant water intake structure and Fire and flood response equipment to develop mitigating strategies to cope with loss of important functions These walk downs and inspections were completed by April 13 th, 2011
  • Slide 19
  • VY Immediate response to INPO Level 1 Event Report Results Enhancement/Improvement recommendations included items such as: Creation of new Preventive Maintenance activities to check air pressure in vehicle tires, modify cooling tower panels to allow faster access to deep basin, create test to check pump flow, etc Replacement of small portable generator Enhancing procedures to add or improve content Creating new or improved training modules Any issues identified during the INPO walk downs were entered into the VY Corrective Action Tracking system
  • Slide 20
  • VY Fukushima Projected Response Dates to NRC Orders
  • Slide 21
  • SR Vice President Fukushima Project Management Organization Over 100 staff & Contract Personnel VP EngineeringVP Project ManagementVP Project LicensingVP Fukushima Project Sr. Licensing ManagerExecutive AssistantGeneral Manager Project Director Engineering Lead Fleet Project Manager Licensing Lead Director Project Mgt Fleet DE Leads Fleet Licensing Leads
  • Slide 22
  • Fukushima Project Design Engineering Organization Contractor Lead Eng VP Engineering Lead Engineer SBO/FLEX Lead Seismic Lead Flooding Lead Cont. Vent Lead SFP Instr. Lead EP Lead Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Entergy Site Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - VP Fukushima Project GM Engineering Seismic Lead
  • Slide 23
  • Executive Sponsor Asst. Executive Sponsor PM Director Fleet PM Assistant PM Manager of Projects (9 sites) Entergy Site PMs ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Site Project Teams Estimator Scheduler Cost Eng. Engineering Field Eng. Licensing EP Support Operations Maintenance (Others as needed) Sr. Licensing Mgr Licensing Engineer Site Licensing Mgrs (9 sites) EP Director Site Licensing Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - EP Managers (9 sites) Site EP Staff Leads ANO - GGNS - IPEC - JAF - PLP - PNPS - RBS - VY- W3 - Fukushima Project Project Team Organization Corp. Project Team Scheduler Estimator Cost Eng. - Communications - Corporate Positions DE Director
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  • Questions?