T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation

Top

1nc

Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt) Luck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

3 Engagement and Cooperation

Much existing work has defined cooperation only in terms of helpful agents that are predisposed to adopt the goals of another (eg[12 2]) This assumes that agents are already designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facilitate the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals Our view differs in that autonomous agents will only adopt a goal if it is to their advantage to do so while non-autonomous agents may benevolently adopt goals This leads to the distinction between cooperation and engagement as discussed below 31 Engagement A direct engagement occurs when a neutral -object or a server- agent adopts some goals In a direct engagement an agent with some goals which we call the client uses another agent which we call the server to assist them in the achievement of those goals Remember that a server-agent is non-autonomous and either exists already as a result of some other engagement or is instantiated from a neutral object for the current engagement No restriction is placed on a client-agent We define a direct engagement to consist of a client agent client a server agent server and the goal that server is satisfying for client An agent cannot engage itself and both agents must have the goal of the engagement

Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden

Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others

2ncmdashOverview

Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement

Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins

Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination Hachigian 14mdashNina Senior Fellow Center for American Progress ldquoWhat Joins the United States and China and What Divides Themrdquo httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecuritynews2014032186102what-joins-the-united-states-and-china-and-what-divides-them --br

The United States and China cooperate at the working level despite the fact that long-standing and seemingly intractable differences divide them In the new book Debating China the US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations I paired renowned American and Chinese policy experts and asked them to write letters back and forth to each other about key issues in the relationship including these very difficult ones As I reviewed the essays I was struck by the collegiality between the pairs of authors and their fervent desire for a constructive relationship But it was also clear that as former Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg observes in the conclusion ldquouncertainties and anxieties about the underlying motives and strategies of the two protagonists [are] a common thread running through the volumerdquo In the chapter on climate development in third countries and to some degree economics the authors shared some fundamental assumptions and goals which allowed them to push past their concerns to discuss policy options Kelly Sims Gallagher a professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University and Qi Ye director of the Climate Policy Institute at Tsinghua University endorse expanding joint research into energy efficient technologies while Elizabeth Economy director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Zha Daojiong a professor at Peking University explore several ways the United States and China could coordinate better over projects in developing countries Barry Naughton a professor at the University of California at San Diego and Yao Yang a dean at Peking University agree on the need for certain reforms of the Chinese economy if not on currency But in other exchanges mdashincluding those on human rights Taiwan and regional security mdashthe conversations did not move much past the authorsrsquo different frameworks Zhou Qi at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Andrew Nathan of Columbia University take wildly different approaches to human rights and political systems this is not surprising given the vastly different political systems and values in America and China Zhou describes the role of human rights and democracy promotion in US foreign policy points

Top

1nc

Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt) Luck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

3 Engagement and Cooperation

Much existing work has defined cooperation only in terms of helpful agents that are predisposed to adopt the goals of another (eg[12 2]) This assumes that agents are already designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facilitate the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals Our view differs in that autonomous agents will only adopt a goal if it is to their advantage to do so while non-autonomous agents may benevolently adopt goals This leads to the distinction between cooperation and engagement as discussed below 31 Engagement A direct engagement occurs when a neutral -object or a server- agent adopts some goals In a direct engagement an agent with some goals which we call the client uses another agent which we call the server to assist them in the achievement of those goals Remember that a server-agent is non-autonomous and either exists already as a result of some other engagement or is instantiated from a neutral object for the current engagement No restriction is placed on a client-agent We define a direct engagement to consist of a client agent client a server agent server and the goal that server is satisfying for client An agent cannot engage itself and both agents must have the goal of the engagement

Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden

Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others

2ncmdashOverview

Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement

Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins

Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination Hachigian 14mdashNina Senior Fellow Center for American Progress ldquoWhat Joins the United States and China and What Divides Themrdquo httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecuritynews2014032186102what-joins-the-united-states-and-china-and-what-divides-them --br

The United States and China cooperate at the working level despite the fact that long-standing and seemingly intractable differences divide them In the new book Debating China the US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations I paired renowned American and Chinese policy experts and asked them to write letters back and forth to each other about key issues in the relationship including these very difficult ones As I reviewed the essays I was struck by the collegiality between the pairs of authors and their fervent desire for a constructive relationship But it was also clear that as former Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg observes in the conclusion ldquouncertainties and anxieties about the underlying motives and strategies of the two protagonists [are] a common thread running through the volumerdquo In the chapter on climate development in third countries and to some degree economics the authors shared some fundamental assumptions and goals which allowed them to push past their concerns to discuss policy options Kelly Sims Gallagher a professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University and Qi Ye director of the Climate Policy Institute at Tsinghua University endorse expanding joint research into energy efficient technologies while Elizabeth Economy director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Zha Daojiong a professor at Peking University explore several ways the United States and China could coordinate better over projects in developing countries Barry Naughton a professor at the University of California at San Diego and Yao Yang a dean at Peking University agree on the need for certain reforms of the Chinese economy if not on currency But in other exchanges mdashincluding those on human rights Taiwan and regional security mdashthe conversations did not move much past the authorsrsquo different frameworks Zhou Qi at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Andrew Nathan of Columbia University take wildly different approaches to human rights and political systems this is not surprising given the vastly different political systems and values in America and China Zhou describes the role of human rights and democracy promotion in US foreign policy points

1nc

Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt) Luck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

3 Engagement and Cooperation

Much existing work has defined cooperation only in terms of helpful agents that are predisposed to adopt the goals of another (eg[12 2]) This assumes that agents are already designed with common or non-conflicting goals that facilitate the possibility of helping each other satisfy additional goals Our view differs in that autonomous agents will only adopt a goal if it is to their advantage to do so while non-autonomous agents may benevolently adopt goals This leads to the distinction between cooperation and engagement as discussed below 31 Engagement A direct engagement occurs when a neutral -object or a server- agent adopts some goals In a direct engagement an agent with some goals which we call the client uses another agent which we call the server to assist them in the achievement of those goals Remember that a server-agent is non-autonomous and either exists already as a result of some other engagement or is instantiated from a neutral object for the current engagement No restriction is placed on a client-agent We define a direct engagement to consist of a client agent client a server agent server and the goal that server is satisfying for client An agent cannot engage itself and both agents must have the goal of the engagement

Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden

Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others

2ncmdashOverview

Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement

Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins

Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination Hachigian 14mdashNina Senior Fellow Center for American Progress ldquoWhat Joins the United States and China and What Divides Themrdquo httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecuritynews2014032186102what-joins-the-united-states-and-china-and-what-divides-them --br

The United States and China cooperate at the working level despite the fact that long-standing and seemingly intractable differences divide them In the new book Debating China the US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations I paired renowned American and Chinese policy experts and asked them to write letters back and forth to each other about key issues in the relationship including these very difficult ones As I reviewed the essays I was struck by the collegiality between the pairs of authors and their fervent desire for a constructive relationship But it was also clear that as former Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg observes in the conclusion ldquouncertainties and anxieties about the underlying motives and strategies of the two protagonists [are] a common thread running through the volumerdquo In the chapter on climate development in third countries and to some degree economics the authors shared some fundamental assumptions and goals which allowed them to push past their concerns to discuss policy options Kelly Sims Gallagher a professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University and Qi Ye director of the Climate Policy Institute at Tsinghua University endorse expanding joint research into energy efficient technologies while Elizabeth Economy director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Zha Daojiong a professor at Peking University explore several ways the United States and China could coordinate better over projects in developing countries Barry Naughton a professor at the University of California at San Diego and Yao Yang a dean at Peking University agree on the need for certain reforms of the Chinese economy if not on currency But in other exchanges mdashincluding those on human rights Taiwan and regional security mdashthe conversations did not move much past the authorsrsquo different frameworks Zhou Qi at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Andrew Nathan of Columbia University take wildly different approaches to human rights and political systems this is not surprising given the vastly different political systems and values in America and China Zhou describes the role of human rights and democracy promotion in US foreign policy points

2ncmdashOverview

Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement

Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins

Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination Hachigian 14mdashNina Senior Fellow Center for American Progress ldquoWhat Joins the United States and China and What Divides Themrdquo httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecuritynews2014032186102what-joins-the-united-states-and-china-and-what-divides-them --br

The United States and China cooperate at the working level despite the fact that long-standing and seemingly intractable differences divide them In the new book Debating China the US-China Relationship in Ten Conversations I paired renowned American and Chinese policy experts and asked them to write letters back and forth to each other about key issues in the relationship including these very difficult ones As I reviewed the essays I was struck by the collegiality between the pairs of authors and their fervent desire for a constructive relationship But it was also clear that as former Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg observes in the conclusion ldquouncertainties and anxieties about the underlying motives and strategies of the two protagonists [are] a common thread running through the volumerdquo In the chapter on climate development in third countries and to some degree economics the authors shared some fundamental assumptions and goals which allowed them to push past their concerns to discuss policy options Kelly Sims Gallagher a professor at The Fletcher School at Tufts University and Qi Ye director of the Climate Policy Institute at Tsinghua University endorse expanding joint research into energy efficient technologies while Elizabeth Economy director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Zha Daojiong a professor at Peking University explore several ways the United States and China could coordinate better over projects in developing countries Barry Naughton a professor at the University of California at San Diego and Yao Yang a dean at Peking University agree on the need for certain reforms of the Chinese economy if not on currency But in other exchanges mdashincluding those on human rights Taiwan and regional security mdashthe conversations did not move much past the authorsrsquo different frameworks Zhou Qi at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Andrew Nathan of Columbia University take wildly different approaches to human rights and political systems this is not surprising given the vastly different political systems and values in America and China Zhou describes the role of human rights and democracy promotion in US foreign policy points

out US hypocrisy and outlines in broad terms how the Chinese conception of rights differs from that of the West as it is based more on individual duties than rights and freedoms Nathan for his part names specific dissidents wronged by the Chinese system and points out that ldquoInternational human rights law calls for political freedom and accountable government These are not controversial values in China hellip Chinese leaders have endorsed them and Chinese people seek themrdquo Zhou then states that the assignment was not to criticize the otherrsquos human rights records and refuses to engage in the tit for tat that Nathan views as constructive Finally Nathan observes that he and Zhou disagree on ldquohow to define the issue itself upon which we disagreerdquo This conversation will not get easier any time soon Beijingrsquos renewed crackdown on dissent continues and media reports suggest that Western values are among the dire threats that Chinarsquos new National Security Council is charged with addressing Differences also eclipse common ground on Taiwanese policy Because Taipeirsquos current leadership is on board with a stabilizing approach to cross-Strait relations tensions are lower than they have been in decades But Jia Qingguo of Peking University and the Stimpson Centerrsquos Alan Romberg show that this calm is not attributable to harmony in national interests or in underlying perspectives on the political status of this island Jia names Taiwan as ldquothe most important and sensitiverdquo issue in Sino-American relations and argues that America wants to keep Taiwan politically separate from the mainland Romberg disagrees vehemently citing Americarsquos longstanding ldquoOne Chinardquo policy and stating that the US interest is in promoting peace and stability and discouraging provocation by either side Taiwanrsquos status is so important to Beijingmdasha matter of fundamental sovereignty in factmdashthat Jia equates it to Texas or Hawaii and asks Romberg how Americans would feel if China claimed it did not want to abandon the citizens there to Washington Military relations are similarly conflicted and it is not hard to understand why Military professionals in both countries take the other country to be a potential adversary when planning future scenarios Whether over Taiwan or another contingency a Sino-American confrontation while disastrous is certainlymdashand unfortunatelymdashimaginable Christopher Twomey a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School worries about self-perpetuating spirals that are pushing both countries to arm themselves America responds to a new Chinese weapon system or concept with a new military concept that then prompts a Chinese response Senior Colonel Xu Hui at Chinarsquos National Defense University does not think this is a problem of self-perpetuating cycles and instead blames ldquohostile US intentionsrdquo He states that ldquothe main obstacle in the constructive development of Sino-American military relations is not so-called lsquospiralsrsquo but American security conceptions and strategic intentions toward Chinardquo He offers a constructivist argument In assuming that the United States and China are adversaries Twomey is creating a self-fulfilling prophecy At the same time Xu explains that many Chinese analysts believe that the United Statesrsquo rebalance to Asia was designed ldquoto contain Chinarsquos riserdquo Twomey cites evidence of large-scale Chinese government-sponsored cyber attacks and points out how dangerous these activities are in a realm where ldquored lines are unclearrdquo Xu claims that determining the origin of such attacks is not technologically feasible and in turn Twomey cites voluminous evidence to the contrary including a number of independent reports that link attacks to the Peoplersquos Liberation Army Even on the issue of North Korea which has been a locus of US-China cooperation in the past Mike Green of CSIS observes that he and Wu Xinbo a dean at Fudan University are ldquotalking past each otherrdquo China and America both want a nonnuclear peninsula and stability but tactics differ on how to achieve both goals Green asserts

that ldquoThe North Koreans will not let us buy stability no matter how much China is willing to pay they will only rent it and then charge a higher price later when their capacity to threaten us increasesrdquo Wu responds that the Chinese approach will work better in the long term like Chinese medicine it will treat the cause of the diseasemdashin this case North Korearsquos security concerns Where interests assumptions and goals differ on these issues another author Wang Shuo managing editor at Caixin Media sums it up best when he writes ldquoBetter mutual understanding solves problems caused by misunderstandings but not problems that have nothing to do with misunderstandingsrdquo

Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 uselessNeumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis 8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions ( analytical categories ) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize

diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practice s To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between

2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno

Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion

More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and excludeLuck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

The set of all direct engagements in the world is given by dengagement For any direct

engagement in dengagement there can be no intermediate direct engagements of the goal so there is no other agent y where client engages y for goal and y engages server for goal An agent c directly engages another server agent s if and only if there is a direct engagement between c and s All of these relationships are given as a set denoted by

dengages Finally the server-agents comprise all agents which are the server agent for some direct engagement and the agents are a superset of those agents which are part of some engagement An engagement chain represents a sequence of direct engagements For example if I use a computer terminal to run a program to access a database in order to locate a library book then there is a direct engagement of myself and the terminal of the terminal and the program and

of the program and the database all with the goal of locating the book An engagement chain thus represents the goal and all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements In the above

example the agents are Me Terminal Program Database Specifically an engagement chain comprises some goal goal the autonomous client-agent that generated the goal auto agent and a sequence of server-agents chain where each agent in the sequence directly engages the next For any engagement chain there must be at least one server-agent all the agents involved must share goal and each agent can only be involved once The set of all engagement chains in the world is given in the schema below by engchain For every engagement chain ec there must be a direct engage- ment between the autonomous agent

ecautoagent and the first client of ec head ecchain with respect to the goal of ec ecgoal Further there must be a direct engagement between any two agents which follow each other in ecchain with respect to ecgoal In addition all the autonomous agents involved in an engagement chain are a subset of all the autonomous agents In

general an agent engages another agent if there is some engagement chain in which it precedes the server agent An agent owns another agent if there is no other agent using it for a different purpose In other words c owns s if for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain in which s appears c precedes it or is the autonomous client-agent that initiates the chain Lastly an agent c directly owns another agent s if it owns it and is directly engaging it

2ncmdashChina In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China Christopher 96 --- Secretary of State at the time (Warren 51796 American Interests and the US-China Relationshiprdquo httpdosfanlibuiceduERCbriefingdossec19969605960517dossec1html)ernst

[W]e believe that Chinas development as a secure open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the United States

Second we support Chinas full integration and its active participation in the international community Third while we seek dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China we will not hesitate to take the action necessary to protect our interests

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

that ldquoThe North Koreans will not let us buy stability no matter how much China is willing to pay they will only rent it and then charge a higher price later when their capacity to threaten us increasesrdquo Wu responds that the Chinese approach will work better in the long term like Chinese medicine it will treat the cause of the diseasemdashin this case North Korearsquos security concerns Where interests assumptions and goals differ on these issues another author Wang Shuo managing editor at Caixin Media sums it up best when he writes ldquoBetter mutual understanding solves problems caused by misunderstandings but not problems that have nothing to do with misunderstandingsrdquo

Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 uselessNeumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis 8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions ( analytical categories ) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize

diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practice s To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between

2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno

Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion

More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and excludeLuck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

The set of all direct engagements in the world is given by dengagement For any direct

engagement in dengagement there can be no intermediate direct engagements of the goal so there is no other agent y where client engages y for goal and y engages server for goal An agent c directly engages another server agent s if and only if there is a direct engagement between c and s All of these relationships are given as a set denoted by

dengages Finally the server-agents comprise all agents which are the server agent for some direct engagement and the agents are a superset of those agents which are part of some engagement An engagement chain represents a sequence of direct engagements For example if I use a computer terminal to run a program to access a database in order to locate a library book then there is a direct engagement of myself and the terminal of the terminal and the program and

of the program and the database all with the goal of locating the book An engagement chain thus represents the goal and all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements In the above

example the agents are Me Terminal Program Database Specifically an engagement chain comprises some goal goal the autonomous client-agent that generated the goal auto agent and a sequence of server-agents chain where each agent in the sequence directly engages the next For any engagement chain there must be at least one server-agent all the agents involved must share goal and each agent can only be involved once The set of all engagement chains in the world is given in the schema below by engchain For every engagement chain ec there must be a direct engage- ment between the autonomous agent

ecautoagent and the first client of ec head ecchain with respect to the goal of ec ecgoal Further there must be a direct engagement between any two agents which follow each other in ecchain with respect to ecgoal In addition all the autonomous agents involved in an engagement chain are a subset of all the autonomous agents In

general an agent engages another agent if there is some engagement chain in which it precedes the server agent An agent owns another agent if there is no other agent using it for a different purpose In other words c owns s if for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain in which s appears c precedes it or is the autonomous client-agent that initiates the chain Lastly an agent c directly owns another agent s if it owns it and is directly engaging it

2ncmdashChina In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China Christopher 96 --- Secretary of State at the time (Warren 51796 American Interests and the US-China Relationshiprdquo httpdosfanlibuiceduERCbriefingdossec19969605960517dossec1html)ernst

[W]e believe that Chinas development as a secure open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the United States

Second we support Chinas full integration and its active participation in the international community Third while we seek dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China we will not hesitate to take the action necessary to protect our interests

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practice s To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between

2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno

Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion

More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and excludeLuck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

The set of all direct engagements in the world is given by dengagement For any direct

engagement in dengagement there can be no intermediate direct engagements of the goal so there is no other agent y where client engages y for goal and y engages server for goal An agent c directly engages another server agent s if and only if there is a direct engagement between c and s All of these relationships are given as a set denoted by

dengages Finally the server-agents comprise all agents which are the server agent for some direct engagement and the agents are a superset of those agents which are part of some engagement An engagement chain represents a sequence of direct engagements For example if I use a computer terminal to run a program to access a database in order to locate a library book then there is a direct engagement of myself and the terminal of the terminal and the program and

of the program and the database all with the goal of locating the book An engagement chain thus represents the goal and all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements In the above

example the agents are Me Terminal Program Database Specifically an engagement chain comprises some goal goal the autonomous client-agent that generated the goal auto agent and a sequence of server-agents chain where each agent in the sequence directly engages the next For any engagement chain there must be at least one server-agent all the agents involved must share goal and each agent can only be involved once The set of all engagement chains in the world is given in the schema below by engchain For every engagement chain ec there must be a direct engage- ment between the autonomous agent

ecautoagent and the first client of ec head ecchain with respect to the goal of ec ecgoal Further there must be a direct engagement between any two agents which follow each other in ecchain with respect to ecgoal In addition all the autonomous agents involved in an engagement chain are a subset of all the autonomous agents In

general an agent engages another agent if there is some engagement chain in which it precedes the server agent An agent owns another agent if there is no other agent using it for a different purpose In other words c owns s if for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain in which s appears c precedes it or is the autonomous client-agent that initiates the chain Lastly an agent c directly owns another agent s if it owns it and is directly engaging it

2ncmdashChina In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China Christopher 96 --- Secretary of State at the time (Warren 51796 American Interests and the US-China Relationshiprdquo httpdosfanlibuiceduERCbriefingdossec19969605960517dossec1html)ernst

[W]e believe that Chinas development as a secure open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the United States

Second we support Chinas full integration and its active participation in the international community Third while we seek dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China we will not hesitate to take the action necessary to protect our interests

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno

Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion

More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and excludeLuck and drsquoInverno 96 --- Michael Luck is at AUT University Auckland New Zealand Mark dInverno is a professor at the University of Westminster (Michael Mark 1996 ldquoEngagement and Cooperation in Motivated Agent Modellingrdquo)ernst

The set of all direct engagements in the world is given by dengagement For any direct

engagement in dengagement there can be no intermediate direct engagements of the goal so there is no other agent y where client engages y for goal and y engages server for goal An agent c directly engages another server agent s if and only if there is a direct engagement between c and s All of these relationships are given as a set denoted by

dengages Finally the server-agents comprise all agents which are the server agent for some direct engagement and the agents are a superset of those agents which are part of some engagement An engagement chain represents a sequence of direct engagements For example if I use a computer terminal to run a program to access a database in order to locate a library book then there is a direct engagement of myself and the terminal of the terminal and the program and

of the program and the database all with the goal of locating the book An engagement chain thus represents the goal and all the agents involved in the sequence of direct engagements In the above

example the agents are Me Terminal Program Database Specifically an engagement chain comprises some goal goal the autonomous client-agent that generated the goal auto agent and a sequence of server-agents chain where each agent in the sequence directly engages the next For any engagement chain there must be at least one server-agent all the agents involved must share goal and each agent can only be involved once The set of all engagement chains in the world is given in the schema below by engchain For every engagement chain ec there must be a direct engage- ment between the autonomous agent

ecautoagent and the first client of ec head ecchain with respect to the goal of ec ecgoal Further there must be a direct engagement between any two agents which follow each other in ecchain with respect to ecgoal In addition all the autonomous agents involved in an engagement chain are a subset of all the autonomous agents In

general an agent engages another agent if there is some engagement chain in which it precedes the server agent An agent owns another agent if there is no other agent using it for a different purpose In other words c owns s if for every sequence of server-agents in an engagement chain in which s appears c precedes it or is the autonomous client-agent that initiates the chain Lastly an agent c directly owns another agent s if it owns it and is directly engaging it

2ncmdashChina In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China Christopher 96 --- Secretary of State at the time (Warren 51796 American Interests and the US-China Relationshiprdquo httpdosfanlibuiceduERCbriefingdossec19969605960517dossec1html)ernst

[W]e believe that Chinas development as a secure open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the United States

Second we support Chinas full integration and its active participation in the international community Third while we seek dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China we will not hesitate to take the action necessary to protect our interests

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

2ncmdashChina In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China Christopher 96 --- Secretary of State at the time (Warren 51796 American Interests and the US-China Relationshiprdquo httpdosfanlibuiceduERCbriefingdossec19969605960517dossec1html)ernst

[W]e believe that Chinas development as a secure open and successful nation is profoundly in the interests of the United States

Second we support Chinas full integration and its active participation in the international community Third while we seek dialogue and engagement to manage our differences with China we will not hesitate to take the action necessary to protect our interests

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

2ncmdashCrocker Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)Crocker 9 --- a professor of strategic studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University was an assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989 (Chester A 9139 ldquoterms of Engagementrdquo httpwwwnytimescom20090914opinion14crockerhtml_r=0)ernst

PRESIDENT OBAMA will have a hard time achieving his foreign policy goals until he masters some key terms and better manages the expectations they convey Given the furor that will surround the news of

Americarsquos readiness to hold talks with Iran he could start with ldquoengagementrdquo mdash one of the trickiest terms in the policy lexicon The Obama administration has used this term to contrast its approach with its predecessorrsquos resistance to talking with adversaries and troublemakers His critics show that they misunderstand the concept of engagement when they ridicule it as making

nice with nasty or hostile regimes Letrsquos get a few things straight Engagement in statecraft is not about sweet talk Nor is it based on the illusion that our problems with rogue regimes can be solved if only we would talk to them Engagement is not normalization and its goal is not improved relations It is not akin to deacutetente working for rapprochement or appeasement So how do you define an engagement strategy It does require direct talks There is simply no better way to convey authoritative

statements of position or to hear responses But establishing talks is just a first step The goal of engagement is to change the other countryrsquos perception of its own interests and realistic options and hence to modify its policies and its behavior Diplomatic engagement is proven to work mdash in the right circumstances American diplomats have used it to change the calculations and behavior of regimes as varied as the Soviet Union South Africa Angola Mozambique Cuba China Libya and intermittently Syria

2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan

Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives Haass and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

Many different types of engagement strategies exist depending on who is engaged the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will

follow Generally conditional engagement is geared towards a government unconditional engagement works with a countryrsquos civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide

variety of incentives Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits investment insurance or promotion access to technology loans and economic aid 3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes investment bans or high tariffs which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in todayrsquos global market Similarly political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition access to regional or international institutions the scheduling of summits between leaders ndash or the termination of these benefits Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a countryrsquos armed forces and more feasibly to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts Funding non- governmental organisations facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement While

policy -makers should give greater consideration to the idea of engagement incentives will be applicable only in a limited set of circumstances In addition unlike other foreign-policy tools engagement is open to charges of appeasement from its critics Sceptics have also argued that engagement strategies can invite problems of moral hazard where a cash-strapped regime watching America lsquobuy outrsquo North Korearsquos nuclear programme may be inspired to embark on its own endeavour in the hopes of later lsquosellingrsquo it to the US Moreover as a strategy which often depends on reciprocal actions

between the US and the target country engagement is likely to involve even higher risks and uncertainties than other foreign-policy strategies But both the promises and the risks suggest the urgent need for a considered analysis of the strategy of engagement Guidelines need to be formulated drawing on instances where the US and Europe have previously used incentives rather than employed penalties alone in dealing with recalcitrant regimes Two critical questions must be asked when should policy makers consider engagement and how should engagement strategies be managed in order to maximise the chances of success Once these guidelines are formulated they can be used to assess recent US policy towards many problem states American relations with China Cuba Iran Libya and North Korea are of particular interest either for the promises that alternative strategies of engagement may hold or as examples of on-going attempts at engagement Rather than examining the possibility of engaging allies or even lsquofriendly tyrantsrsquo these cases represent some of the greatest challenges confronting American foreign policy-makers today4 Although prospects for further engagement with Iraq are not considered in detail here we make no pretensions that Iraq should not be included among the most problematic of Americarsquos state-to-state relations Indeed engagement is explicit in United Nations Security Council resolutions which offer Iraq specific rewards in exchange for compliance However Saddam Hussein ndash in spurring the UN resolutions mapping the path to better relations with its neighbours and the West ndash has rejected the possibility of any mutually reciprocal engagement for the time being

Violations

AIIB (no join)Violation ndash the aff maintains our opposition to the bank but presses for environmental standards improvements -- thats just expanding US-china environmental coop not altering the non-mutual areas of disagreement over AIIB

T version ndash join the AIIB

China wants to cooperate Ma 14 (Yuge Ma DPhil Candidate at the Environmental Change Institute (ECI) University of Oxford 12-5-2014 The

Environmental Implications of Chinarsquos New Bank Diplomat httpthediplomatcom201412the-environmental-implications-of-chinas-new-bank PD)

On October 24 this year 21 Asian countries signed an agreement in Beijing that signaled the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) whose main backer is China The agreement authorized $100 billion in capital for the new bank with an initial subscribed capital of around $50 billion But will the new bank be able to implement best practice when it comes to governance and environmental concerns According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) ndash Japan-led and the largest existing multilateral development bank in Asia ndash between now and 2020 the Asia and Pacific regions will require infrastructure investment of at least $8 trillion As Chinarsquos Xinhua news agency commented the existing international financial system is insufficient to meet this huge demand This gives China ample scope to play a crucial role While the Western world might fear losing influence in the growing Asian market or a potential challenge to the US-led international order

the AIIB raises another concern the potential threat Chinese money might represent to established international standards of foreign aid In her book By All Means Necessary How Chinarsquos Resource

Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford University Press 2014) Elizabeth Economy senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and her colleague Michael Levi argue that the best way to understand the local implications of Chinese overseas investments is to observe how it operates at home where neither the Chinese government nor companies pay much attention to environmental protection Despite the fact that China had established a nationwide system of environmental impact assessmen t (EIA) in practice it is hamstrung by widespread data fraud corruption and political intervention from local officials Only now is the Chinese government beginning to govern this chaotic field However the authors have also observed some improvements in Chinese companiesrsquo social and environmental awareness in recent years The first is top down in order to reduce unsustainable development Chinarsquos leadership has been encouraging companies especially state-owned enterprises to engage in more corporate social responsibility-related international initiatives by launching a set of policy incentives that apply to both domestic and overseas investments The second change is coming from outside As more Chinese companies go abroad they are receiving more exposure to the best practices of their foreign counterparts In addition Chinarsquos Ministry of Commerce has encouraged Chinese companies to be more active in the United Nations Global Compact and other international rating systems to improve their international image Finally the third change is from the bottom up and refers to the growing public awareness of the negative environmental and social

impact of Chinese investment and active NGO participation in pushing Chinese companies to change their behavior Still none of the above motivations have been sufficient to meaningfully alter the fundamental logic of growth-at-any-cost Without strict environmental regulations and effective enforcement from their host countries Chinese corporations still canrsquot stop using the tried and tested ndash albeit outdated ndash

methods they have used over decades When Chinese energy-related projects have entered more mature markets such as Australia Canada and even Poland and Brazil the host countriesrsquo environmental authorities and vibrant civil society groups have forced them to accept much stricter environmental laws As a result Chinese investors have had to pay a very high price to learn those lessons leading to unforeseen profit losses Cai Jinyong the first Chinese national to become CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) said in a recent interview that Chinese overseas investment projects are generally good at construction

Violations

AIIB (no join)Violation ndash the aff maintains our opposition to the bank but presses for environmental standards improvements -- thats just expanding US-china environmental coop not altering the non-mutual areas of disagreement over AIIB

T version ndash join the AIIB

China wants to cooperate Ma 14 (Yuge Ma DPhil Candidate at the Environmental Change Institute (ECI) University of Oxford 12-5-2014 The

Environmental Implications of Chinarsquos New Bank Diplomat httpthediplomatcom201412the-environmental-implications-of-chinas-new-bank PD)

On October 24 this year 21 Asian countries signed an agreement in Beijing that signaled the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) whose main backer is China The agreement authorized $100 billion in capital for the new bank with an initial subscribed capital of around $50 billion But will the new bank be able to implement best practice when it comes to governance and environmental concerns According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) ndash Japan-led and the largest existing multilateral development bank in Asia ndash between now and 2020 the Asia and Pacific regions will require infrastructure investment of at least $8 trillion As Chinarsquos Xinhua news agency commented the existing international financial system is insufficient to meet this huge demand This gives China ample scope to play a crucial role While the Western world might fear losing influence in the growing Asian market or a potential challenge to the US-led international order

the AIIB raises another concern the potential threat Chinese money might represent to established international standards of foreign aid In her book By All Means Necessary How Chinarsquos Resource

Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford University Press 2014) Elizabeth Economy senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and her colleague Michael Levi argue that the best way to understand the local implications of Chinese overseas investments is to observe how it operates at home where neither the Chinese government nor companies pay much attention to environmental protection Despite the fact that China had established a nationwide system of environmental impact assessmen t (EIA) in practice it is hamstrung by widespread data fraud corruption and political intervention from local officials Only now is the Chinese government beginning to govern this chaotic field However the authors have also observed some improvements in Chinese companiesrsquo social and environmental awareness in recent years The first is top down in order to reduce unsustainable development Chinarsquos leadership has been encouraging companies especially state-owned enterprises to engage in more corporate social responsibility-related international initiatives by launching a set of policy incentives that apply to both domestic and overseas investments The second change is coming from outside As more Chinese companies go abroad they are receiving more exposure to the best practices of their foreign counterparts In addition Chinarsquos Ministry of Commerce has encouraged Chinese companies to be more active in the United Nations Global Compact and other international rating systems to improve their international image Finally the third change is from the bottom up and refers to the growing public awareness of the negative environmental and social

impact of Chinese investment and active NGO participation in pushing Chinese companies to change their behavior Still none of the above motivations have been sufficient to meaningfully alter the fundamental logic of growth-at-any-cost Without strict environmental regulations and effective enforcement from their host countries Chinese corporations still canrsquot stop using the tried and tested ndash albeit outdated ndash

methods they have used over decades When Chinese energy-related projects have entered more mature markets such as Australia Canada and even Poland and Brazil the host countriesrsquo environmental authorities and vibrant civil society groups have forced them to accept much stricter environmental laws As a result Chinese investors have had to pay a very high price to learn those lessons leading to unforeseen profit losses Cai Jinyong the first Chinese national to become CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) said in a recent interview that Chinese overseas investment projects are generally good at construction

AIIB (no join)Violation ndash the aff maintains our opposition to the bank but presses for environmental standards improvements -- thats just expanding US-china environmental coop not altering the non-mutual areas of disagreement over AIIB

T version ndash join the AIIB

China wants to cooperate Ma 14 (Yuge Ma DPhil Candidate at the Environmental Change Institute (ECI) University of Oxford 12-5-2014 The

Environmental Implications of Chinarsquos New Bank Diplomat httpthediplomatcom201412the-environmental-implications-of-chinas-new-bank PD)

On October 24 this year 21 Asian countries signed an agreement in Beijing that signaled the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) whose main backer is China The agreement authorized $100 billion in capital for the new bank with an initial subscribed capital of around $50 billion But will the new bank be able to implement best practice when it comes to governance and environmental concerns According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) ndash Japan-led and the largest existing multilateral development bank in Asia ndash between now and 2020 the Asia and Pacific regions will require infrastructure investment of at least $8 trillion As Chinarsquos Xinhua news agency commented the existing international financial system is insufficient to meet this huge demand This gives China ample scope to play a crucial role While the Western world might fear losing influence in the growing Asian market or a potential challenge to the US-led international order

the AIIB raises another concern the potential threat Chinese money might represent to established international standards of foreign aid In her book By All Means Necessary How Chinarsquos Resource

Quest Is Changing the World (Oxford University Press 2014) Elizabeth Economy senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and her colleague Michael Levi argue that the best way to understand the local implications of Chinese overseas investments is to observe how it operates at home where neither the Chinese government nor companies pay much attention to environmental protection Despite the fact that China had established a nationwide system of environmental impact assessmen t (EIA) in practice it is hamstrung by widespread data fraud corruption and political intervention from local officials Only now is the Chinese government beginning to govern this chaotic field However the authors have also observed some improvements in Chinese companiesrsquo social and environmental awareness in recent years The first is top down in order to reduce unsustainable development Chinarsquos leadership has been encouraging companies especially state-owned enterprises to engage in more corporate social responsibility-related international initiatives by launching a set of policy incentives that apply to both domestic and overseas investments The second change is coming from outside As more Chinese companies go abroad they are receiving more exposure to the best practices of their foreign counterparts In addition Chinarsquos Ministry of Commerce has encouraged Chinese companies to be more active in the United Nations Global Compact and other international rating systems to improve their international image Finally the third change is from the bottom up and refers to the growing public awareness of the negative environmental and social

impact of Chinese investment and active NGO participation in pushing Chinese companies to change their behavior Still none of the above motivations have been sufficient to meaningfully alter the fundamental logic of growth-at-any-cost Without strict environmental regulations and effective enforcement from their host countries Chinese corporations still canrsquot stop using the tried and tested ndash albeit outdated ndash

methods they have used over decades When Chinese energy-related projects have entered more mature markets such as Australia Canada and even Poland and Brazil the host countriesrsquo environmental authorities and vibrant civil society groups have forced them to accept much stricter environmental laws As a result Chinese investors have had to pay a very high price to learn those lessons leading to unforeseen profit losses Cai Jinyong the first Chinese national to become CEO of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) said in a recent interview that Chinese overseas investment projects are generally good at construction

but weak at long-term management The environmental impact is an important component of managing a sustainable project in

terms of both financial and social consequences Put simply even though Chinese companies want to improve their environmental practices ndash not always the case in countries without de facto environmental regulations ndash a lack of expertise and experience remains a significant obstacle Xi Jinping has promised that the principles of AIIB will be equality inclusiveness and efficiency while Chinese Finance Minister Lou Jiwei has declared that AIIB will learn from the best practice in the world and adopt international standards of environmental

protection Yet infrastructure-hungry Asian countries are themselves causing severe environmental degradation ndash air pollution water scarcity and soil contamination to name a few They also suffer from weak government accountability and lack of civil society participation in environmental issues It is unlikely they will be able to enforce ldquointernational standardsrdquo on Chinese-financed projects solely on their own Elizabeth Economy argued in a recent opinion article that the international world especially the US should see the creation of the AIIB as a chance to introduce robust environmental standards to China-led infrastructure investments in Asia An editorial in The Hindu urged India presumably the AIIBrsquos second largest shareholder to work closely with China ldquoto ensure that best

practices are followed in projects for procurement and materials and in terms of labour and environmental standardsrdquo But will China readily accept involvement from the US its close allies and other emerging countries

in its ambitious multilateral initiative which aims to increase its political and economic influence in the

region One thing we can be sure about is the Chinese leadership understands very well that its long-term international influence does not solely depend on hard power it also relies on soft power mainly the social and environmental consequences of its extensive global presence As Joseph Nye creator of the popular ldquosoft powerrdquo concept said last year ldquoThe development of soft power need not be a zero-

sum game All countries can gain from finding each other attractiverdquo Leaders from the US China and other Asian countries developed or developing will need political wisdom as well as professional collaboration to ensure the sustainable development of the most populous and fastest-growing region in the world

Afghanistan Violation ndash the aff is cooperating over a common interest ndash plan text literally mandates engagement - by cooperating on Chinarsquos One Belt One Road Initiative in Afghanistan ndash at best xt

US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional securityClarke 101215 ndashMichael Associate Professor at the National Security CollegeANU 10-12-2015 Afghanistan An Opportunity for USndashChina Cooperation National Interest httpnationalinterestorgblogthe-buzzafghanistan-opportunity-usE28093china-cooperation-14052

Michael Auslin has called for a ldquonew realismrdquo in US foreign policy toward China in these pages one that ldquobegins with an official acceptance that we are locked in a competition

with China that is of Beijingrsquos choosingrdquo Moreover he suggests that Sino-US dialogue must be ldquoresetrdquo and ldquoconducted not as an unearned gift to

Beijing but only when there are concrete goals to be achievedrdquo While some such US National Security Advisor Susan Rice may dispute the first claim as ldquolazy rhetoricrdquo the second admonition to structure the relationship through a focus on the concrete goals and interests of each party isnrsquot as easily dismissed

The problem in the current climate of SinondashUS relations however is to identify areas in which those interests overlap to ldquomutual benefitrdquo more than they diverge Chinarsquos ldquoOne Belt One Roadrdquo (OBOR) strategy is an area that holds potential According to John Hudson where US officials see Chinarsquos resurgence and ambition in the AsiandashPacific as the core driver of regional insecurity in Eurasia they see a ldquosurprising convergence of US and Chinese

interestsrdquo that ldquoboils down to one mutual goal securityrdquo From this perspective Beijing shares Washingtonrsquos desires to see a stable and secure Afghanistan and Pakistan due primarily to Beijingrsquos own concerns with Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang The strength of this view is based on two major factors First the OBOR itself while growing out of a decades-long agenda to firmly integrate Xinjiang and overcome Uyghur separatism and terrorism through the delivery of economic development looks set to engage China more directly in the

problems of the region With its focus on the development of trans-regional infrastructure links and investment such as the ldquoChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor rdquo the OBOR would give China a greater stake in the future security and prosperity of Central Asia Afghanistan and Pakistan Obama administration officials have approvingly noted that Chinarsquos plan mirrors the intent of its own aborted ldquoNew Silk Road Initiativerdquo of 2011 Indeed the logic of that effort suggests some complementarity between US and Chinese interests Second the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang which

China has attributed to militants based in the Af-Pak tribal areas has arguably revealed to Beijing that it can no longer rely on the partial lsquooutsourcingrsquo of its security to the US military presence in Afghanistan nor the Pakistani military along the Af-Pak frontier Instead Beijing must revise its to-date largely lsquohands offrsquo approach to the security situation in Afghanistan as it pursues the OBOR strategy

US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads Wu 16 ndash PhD in international relations Associate DeanProfessor School of International Relations and Public Affairs Fudan University Shanghai (Xinbo ldquoCooperation competition and shaping the outlook the United States and Chinarsquos neighbourhood diplomacyrdquo International Affairs July httpdxdoiorgproxylibumichedu1011111468-234612651)SD

Broadly speaking China and the United States have shared interests in the stability of the AsiandashPacific region including Chinarsquos periphery however this does not mean they can always cooperate effectively as the two sides may have different views about the sources of instability and the best approaches to the problems Along Chinarsquos periphery the Korean peninsula and Afghanistan have been the two major areas in respect of which Beijing and Washington have

engaged in cooperation and coordination in recent years China and the United States have shared interests in a denuclearized Korean peninsula With the collapse of the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoplersquos Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the latterrsquos announcement in late 2002 of its intention to withdraw from the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Beijing and Washington started to cooperate in dealing with the problem of denuclearizing the peninsula This objective was pursued mainly through the six-party talks between China the United States North Korea the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Japan and Russia Washington complained from time to time that China was not being tough enough with North Korea with regard to its nuclear programme and other forms of provoca- tion on the peninsula In February 2013 North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in defiance of Chinarsquos strong dissuasion This elicited a strong Chinese reaction and facilitated more substantive Sino-US cooperation and coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue4 Beijing and Washington worked together to secure the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing unprecedentedly severe sanctions on North Korea When the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a special envoy to China in May 2013 with the intention of repairing damaged bilateral ties Beijing gave him a direct and stern warning fully expressing its profound disapproval of North Korearsquos nuclear activities In June when Presidents Xi and Obama held their summit meeting in Sunny- land California they had a substantive discussion on the North Korean nuclear issue and both sides pledged to step up their cooperation and coordination on that matter To demonstrate its seriousness in opposing North Korearsquos nuclear programme China promulgated a new regulation tightening controls on the export to North Korea of articles that might be used for its nuclear and missile programmes5 China also moved to strengthen its relations with South Korea after the accession to power of President Park Geun-hye in early 2013 Presidents Xi and Park exchanged visits in 2013 and 2014 but there was no such exchange of visits between Beijing and Pyongyang during the same period As a result a warm relationship between China and South Korea developed in marked contrast with the deepening chill between China and North Korea Meanwhile Beijing stayed in close consultation with Washington trying to reopen the stalled six-party talks It has also worked to dissuade Washington from taking actions that might give rise to tensions on the peninsula In early 2014 for instance when the United States and South Korea conducted their regular combined military exercises China urged the United States not to introduce strategic weapons in order to avoid provoking drastic reactions from the North Overall then Chinarsquos neighbourhood diplomacy in respect of the Korean peninsula has been marked by a strained relationship with North Korea a warmer relationship with South Korea and close coordination with the United States Cooperation between China and the United States has also been possible in respect of Afghanistan where the two countries have overlapping interests6 Both Beijing and Washington want to see a stable and secular Afghanistan that will no longer be a hotbed for terrorism As the United States fought the Taliban with its NATO partners China became a major investor in the country trying to help develop its impoverished economy This cooperative division of labour between China and America was well illustrated by a construction project in which Chinese workers built a road in a mountain valley while US soldiers protected them from attack by the Taliban Starting in 2012 China and the United States jointly launched an annual training programme for Afghan diplomats in which each year a group of young Afghan diplomats spent two weeks in China and another two weeks in the United States China also helped to train

officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos with poten- tially damaging effects on stability in Chinarsquos Xinjiang Autonomous Region The United States for its part was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal Against this background Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2013 in Washington DC the two sides decided to lsquoexpand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitaliza- tion in Afghanistanrsquo7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013 The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process and the United States welcomed Chinarsquos decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014 As the deadline for US withdrawal approached China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan Sun Yuxi appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014 visited Afghanistan and Pakistan telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that lsquoChina wants to enhance its role in Afghanistanrsquo8 In October the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017 more than doubling the US$250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001 In addition China promised to provide training for 3000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture hydroelectricity and infrastruc- ture9 Since late 2014 China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government and between Afghanistan and Pakistan Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that lsquowe will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Talibanrsquo and that lsquoChina is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistanrsquo10 A US State Department official welcomed Chinarsquos efforts stating that lsquothe US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistanrsquos government of national unity security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terroristsrsquo11 In early July 2015 talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the participation of Chinese and US representa- tives signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan12 For the foreseeable future China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghan- istan motivated by their shared and overlapping interests However there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination On the North Korean issue Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denucle- arization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state in which China has important geopolitical interests while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time On the Afghanistan issue the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation which China is unlikely to be willing to do considering the associated risks too great

Also Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

Afghanistan Violation ndash the aff is cooperating over a common interest ndash plan text literally mandates engagement - by cooperating on Chinarsquos One Belt One Road Initiative in Afghanistan ndash at best xt

US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional securityClarke 101215 ndashMichael Associate Professor at the National Security CollegeANU 10-12-2015 Afghanistan An Opportunity for USndashChina Cooperation National Interest httpnationalinterestorgblogthe-buzzafghanistan-opportunity-usE28093china-cooperation-14052

Michael Auslin has called for a ldquonew realismrdquo in US foreign policy toward China in these pages one that ldquobegins with an official acceptance that we are locked in a competition

with China that is of Beijingrsquos choosingrdquo Moreover he suggests that Sino-US dialogue must be ldquoresetrdquo and ldquoconducted not as an unearned gift to

Beijing but only when there are concrete goals to be achievedrdquo While some such US National Security Advisor Susan Rice may dispute the first claim as ldquolazy rhetoricrdquo the second admonition to structure the relationship through a focus on the concrete goals and interests of each party isnrsquot as easily dismissed

The problem in the current climate of SinondashUS relations however is to identify areas in which those interests overlap to ldquomutual benefitrdquo more than they diverge Chinarsquos ldquoOne Belt One Roadrdquo (OBOR) strategy is an area that holds potential According to John Hudson where US officials see Chinarsquos resurgence and ambition in the AsiandashPacific as the core driver of regional insecurity in Eurasia they see a ldquosurprising convergence of US and Chinese

interestsrdquo that ldquoboils down to one mutual goal securityrdquo From this perspective Beijing shares Washingtonrsquos desires to see a stable and secure Afghanistan and Pakistan due primarily to Beijingrsquos own concerns with Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang The strength of this view is based on two major factors First the OBOR itself while growing out of a decades-long agenda to firmly integrate Xinjiang and overcome Uyghur separatism and terrorism through the delivery of economic development looks set to engage China more directly in the

problems of the region With its focus on the development of trans-regional infrastructure links and investment such as the ldquoChina-Pakistan Economic Corridor rdquo the OBOR would give China a greater stake in the future security and prosperity of Central Asia Afghanistan and Pakistan Obama administration officials have approvingly noted that Chinarsquos plan mirrors the intent of its own aborted ldquoNew Silk Road Initiativerdquo of 2011 Indeed the logic of that effort suggests some complementarity between US and Chinese interests Second the increasing number of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang which

China has attributed to militants based in the Af-Pak tribal areas has arguably revealed to Beijing that it can no longer rely on the partial lsquooutsourcingrsquo of its security to the US military presence in Afghanistan nor the Pakistani military along the Af-Pak frontier Instead Beijing must revise its to-date largely lsquohands offrsquo approach to the security situation in Afghanistan as it pursues the OBOR strategy

US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads Wu 16 ndash PhD in international relations Associate DeanProfessor School of International Relations and Public Affairs Fudan University Shanghai (Xinbo ldquoCooperation competition and shaping the outlook the United States and Chinarsquos neighbourhood diplomacyrdquo International Affairs July httpdxdoiorgproxylibumichedu1011111468-234612651)SD

Broadly speaking China and the United States have shared interests in the stability of the AsiandashPacific region including Chinarsquos periphery however this does not mean they can always cooperate effectively as the two sides may have different views about the sources of instability and the best approaches to the problems Along Chinarsquos periphery the Korean peninsula and Afghanistan have been the two major areas in respect of which Beijing and Washington have

engaged in cooperation and coordination in recent years China and the United States have shared interests in a denuclearized Korean peninsula With the collapse of the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoplersquos Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the latterrsquos announcement in late 2002 of its intention to withdraw from the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Beijing and Washington started to cooperate in dealing with the problem of denuclearizing the peninsula This objective was pursued mainly through the six-party talks between China the United States North Korea the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Japan and Russia Washington complained from time to time that China was not being tough enough with North Korea with regard to its nuclear programme and other forms of provoca- tion on the peninsula In February 2013 North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in defiance of Chinarsquos strong dissuasion This elicited a strong Chinese reaction and facilitated more substantive Sino-US cooperation and coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue4 Beijing and Washington worked together to secure the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing unprecedentedly severe sanctions on North Korea When the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a special envoy to China in May 2013 with the intention of repairing damaged bilateral ties Beijing gave him a direct and stern warning fully expressing its profound disapproval of North Korearsquos nuclear activities In June when Presidents Xi and Obama held their summit meeting in Sunny- land California they had a substantive discussion on the North Korean nuclear issue and both sides pledged to step up their cooperation and coordination on that matter To demonstrate its seriousness in opposing North Korearsquos nuclear programme China promulgated a new regulation tightening controls on the export to North Korea of articles that might be used for its nuclear and missile programmes5 China also moved to strengthen its relations with South Korea after the accession to power of President Park Geun-hye in early 2013 Presidents Xi and Park exchanged visits in 2013 and 2014 but there was no such exchange of visits between Beijing and Pyongyang during the same period As a result a warm relationship between China and South Korea developed in marked contrast with the deepening chill between China and North Korea Meanwhile Beijing stayed in close consultation with Washington trying to reopen the stalled six-party talks It has also worked to dissuade Washington from taking actions that might give rise to tensions on the peninsula In early 2014 for instance when the United States and South Korea conducted their regular combined military exercises China urged the United States not to introduce strategic weapons in order to avoid provoking drastic reactions from the North Overall then Chinarsquos neighbourhood diplomacy in respect of the Korean peninsula has been marked by a strained relationship with North Korea a warmer relationship with South Korea and close coordination with the United States Cooperation between China and the United States has also been possible in respect of Afghanistan where the two countries have overlapping interests6 Both Beijing and Washington want to see a stable and secular Afghanistan that will no longer be a hotbed for terrorism As the United States fought the Taliban with its NATO partners China became a major investor in the country trying to help develop its impoverished economy This cooperative division of labour between China and America was well illustrated by a construction project in which Chinese workers built a road in a mountain valley while US soldiers protected them from attack by the Taliban Starting in 2012 China and the United States jointly launched an annual training programme for Afghan diplomats in which each year a group of young Afghan diplomats spent two weeks in China and another two weeks in the United States China also helped to train

officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos with poten- tially damaging effects on stability in Chinarsquos Xinjiang Autonomous Region The United States for its part was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal Against this background Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2013 in Washington DC the two sides decided to lsquoexpand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitaliza- tion in Afghanistanrsquo7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013 The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process and the United States welcomed Chinarsquos decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014 As the deadline for US withdrawal approached China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan Sun Yuxi appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014 visited Afghanistan and Pakistan telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that lsquoChina wants to enhance its role in Afghanistanrsquo8 In October the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017 more than doubling the US$250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001 In addition China promised to provide training for 3000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture hydroelectricity and infrastruc- ture9 Since late 2014 China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government and between Afghanistan and Pakistan Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that lsquowe will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Talibanrsquo and that lsquoChina is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistanrsquo10 A US State Department official welcomed Chinarsquos efforts stating that lsquothe US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistanrsquos government of national unity security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terroristsrsquo11 In early July 2015 talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the participation of Chinese and US representa- tives signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan12 For the foreseeable future China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghan- istan motivated by their shared and overlapping interests However there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination On the North Korean issue Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denucle- arization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state in which China has important geopolitical interests while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time On the Afghanistan issue the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation which China is unlikely to be willing to do considering the associated risks too great

Also Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

engaged in cooperation and coordination in recent years China and the United States have shared interests in a denuclearized Korean peninsula With the collapse of the Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic Peoplersquos Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the latterrsquos announcement in late 2002 of its intention to withdraw from the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Beijing and Washington started to cooperate in dealing with the problem of denuclearizing the peninsula This objective was pursued mainly through the six-party talks between China the United States North Korea the Republic of Korea (South Korea) Japan and Russia Washington complained from time to time that China was not being tough enough with North Korea with regard to its nuclear programme and other forms of provoca- tion on the peninsula In February 2013 North Korea conducted its third nuclear test in defiance of Chinarsquos strong dissuasion This elicited a strong Chinese reaction and facilitated more substantive Sino-US cooperation and coordination on the North Korean nuclear issue4 Beijing and Washington worked together to secure the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution imposing unprecedentedly severe sanctions on North Korea When the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un sent a special envoy to China in May 2013 with the intention of repairing damaged bilateral ties Beijing gave him a direct and stern warning fully expressing its profound disapproval of North Korearsquos nuclear activities In June when Presidents Xi and Obama held their summit meeting in Sunny- land California they had a substantive discussion on the North Korean nuclear issue and both sides pledged to step up their cooperation and coordination on that matter To demonstrate its seriousness in opposing North Korearsquos nuclear programme China promulgated a new regulation tightening controls on the export to North Korea of articles that might be used for its nuclear and missile programmes5 China also moved to strengthen its relations with South Korea after the accession to power of President Park Geun-hye in early 2013 Presidents Xi and Park exchanged visits in 2013 and 2014 but there was no such exchange of visits between Beijing and Pyongyang during the same period As a result a warm relationship between China and South Korea developed in marked contrast with the deepening chill between China and North Korea Meanwhile Beijing stayed in close consultation with Washington trying to reopen the stalled six-party talks It has also worked to dissuade Washington from taking actions that might give rise to tensions on the peninsula In early 2014 for instance when the United States and South Korea conducted their regular combined military exercises China urged the United States not to introduce strategic weapons in order to avoid provoking drastic reactions from the North Overall then Chinarsquos neighbourhood diplomacy in respect of the Korean peninsula has been marked by a strained relationship with North Korea a warmer relationship with South Korea and close coordination with the United States Cooperation between China and the United States has also been possible in respect of Afghanistan where the two countries have overlapping interests6 Both Beijing and Washington want to see a stable and secular Afghanistan that will no longer be a hotbed for terrorism As the United States fought the Taliban with its NATO partners China became a major investor in the country trying to help develop its impoverished economy This cooperative division of labour between China and America was well illustrated by a construction project in which Chinese workers built a road in a mountain valley while US soldiers protected them from attack by the Taliban Starting in 2012 China and the United States jointly launched an annual training programme for Afghan diplomats in which each year a group of young Afghan diplomats spent two weeks in China and another two weeks in the United States China also helped to train

officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos with poten- tially damaging effects on stability in Chinarsquos Xinjiang Autonomous Region The United States for its part was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal Against this background Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2013 in Washington DC the two sides decided to lsquoexpand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitaliza- tion in Afghanistanrsquo7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013 The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process and the United States welcomed Chinarsquos decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014 As the deadline for US withdrawal approached China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan Sun Yuxi appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014 visited Afghanistan and Pakistan telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that lsquoChina wants to enhance its role in Afghanistanrsquo8 In October the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017 more than doubling the US$250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001 In addition China promised to provide training for 3000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture hydroelectricity and infrastruc- ture9 Since late 2014 China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government and between Afghanistan and Pakistan Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that lsquowe will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Talibanrsquo and that lsquoChina is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistanrsquo10 A US State Department official welcomed Chinarsquos efforts stating that lsquothe US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistanrsquos government of national unity security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terroristsrsquo11 In early July 2015 talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the participation of Chinese and US representa- tives signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan12 For the foreseeable future China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghan- istan motivated by their shared and overlapping interests However there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination On the North Korean issue Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denucle- arization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state in which China has important geopolitical interests while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time On the Afghanistan issue the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation which China is unlikely to be willing to do considering the associated risks too great

Also Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

officers and soldiers in the Afghan security forces As the United States made plans to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan China felt concern at the prospect of Afghanistan falling back into chaos with poten- tially damaging effects on stability in Chinarsquos Xinjiang Autonomous Region The United States for its part was concerned about the potential for the Taliban to regain control of the country and wanted to see China play a more positive role there after the US withdrawal Against this background Beijing and Washington agreed to step up their coordination on Afghan affairs During the fifth Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in July 2013 in Washington DC the two sides decided to lsquoexpand coordination in advance of the 2014 drawdown in support of their shared interest in political stability and economic revitaliza- tion in Afghanistanrsquo7 They also agreed to continue the joint diplomatic training programme for Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials through 2013 The two governments also stated their intention to continue to work together in support of regional cooperation efforts such as the Istanbul Process and the United States welcomed Chinarsquos decision to host its fourth ministerial meeting in 2014 As the deadline for US withdrawal approached China notably strengthened its efforts on issues relating to Afghanistan Sun Yuxi appointed special envoy for Afghan affairs in July 2014 visited Afghanistan and Pakistan telling Afghan President Hamid Karzai in their meeting that lsquoChina wants to enhance its role in Afghanistanrsquo8 In October the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan was held in Beijing When the newly elected Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in the same month China pledged 2 billion renminbi (US$327 million) in aid to Afghanistan up to 2017 more than doubling the US$250 million China had already contributed to Afghanistan since 2001 In addition China promised to provide training for 3000 Afghan professionals as well as to help develop Afghan agriculture hydroelectricity and infrastruc- ture9 Since late 2014 China has actively facilitated dialogue between the Taliban and the Afghan government and between Afghanistan and Pakistan Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced during his visit to Islamabad in February 2015 that lsquowe will support the Afghan government in realizing reconciliation with various political factions including the Talibanrsquo and that lsquoChina is ready to play a constructive role and will provide necessary facilitation any time if it is required by various parties in Afghanistanrsquo10 A US State Department official welcomed Chinarsquos efforts stating that lsquothe US and China have agreed to work together to support Afghanistanrsquos government of national unity security forces and economic development to ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terroristsrsquo11 In early July 2015 talks were held in Pakistan between the Taliban and the Afghan government with the participation of Chinese and US representa- tives signalling a joint effort by the latter to promote the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan12 For the foreseeable future China and the United States are likely to continue to cooperate and coordinate their policies in respect of North Korea and Afghan- istan motivated by their shared and overlapping interests However there are some geopolitical factors that may constrain such cooperation and coordination On the North Korean issue Beijing will insist on pursuing the goal of denucle- arization without jeopardizing the stability of the North Korean state in which China has important geopolitical interests while Washington may be ready to see the current regime in Pyongyang collapse at any time On the Afghanistan issue the United States may want China to go so far as sending troops into the country under certain conditions to help stabilize the situation which China is unlikely to be willing to do considering the associated risks too great

Also Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

Also Washington may urge Beijing to put more pressure on Islamabad on the Afghan issue which Beijing would be reluctant to do out of concern for Sino-Pakistani ties

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

Arctic Environment Violation ndash aff mandates cooperation between the US and China ndash best case extra t

Herersquos the freaking plan text ndash China agrees to participate in bilateral cooperative agreements regarding Arctic scientific research environmental monitoring and environmental policy issues

The aff is cooperation Slayton and Brigham 15mdashDavid Slayton is research fellow co-chair and executive director of the Arctic Security Initiative at Stanford Universityrsquos Hoover Institution Lawson W Brigham is distinguished professor of geography and Arctic policy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks a fellow at the US Coast Guard Academyrsquos Center for Arctic Study amp Policy and a member of Hooverrsquos Arctic Security Initiative ldquoStrengthen Arctic cooperation between the US and Chinardquo Aug 27 Alaska Dispatch News (ADN) httpwwwadncomarticle20150827strengthen-arctic-cooperation-between-us-and-china --br

Five key areas of cooperation can enhance Arctic cooperation between the US and China First since the Arctic is at the epicenter of climate change Arctic climate change research and policy is a natural area of cooperation between our two countries We are already addressing global climate change issues in our formal dialogue so inserting Arctic issues such as black carbon from ship emissions and sea ice and glacier research should resonate with our ongoing discussions Working together on WMO Arctic initiatives and the linkages of the polar regions to global change is another fruitful course ahead

BIT Violation ndashthe US and China both definitely agree we should invest and share mutual interests in doing so ndash the aff just expedites the process

US and China are meeting over the BIT nowCassella 71416 -- trade reporter for POLITICO (Megan ldquoTPP outlook more grim by the momentrdquo POLITICO Morning Trade httpwwwpoliticocomtipsheetsmorning-trade201607tpp-outlook-more-grim-by-the-moment-215332ixzz4EPgRs8NAJC)

US-CHINA BIT TALKS UNDERWAY US and Chinese officials continue to press ahead with talks on a bilateral investment treaty The latest round taking place in Beijing began on Tuesday and is expected to continue through Monday The two sides are discussing their recent exchange of negative list offers detailing which sectors will remain closed to foreign investment as well as unresolved issues in the text officials said

Want a BIT ndash mutual interestsBEHSUDI et al 7616 (Doug Palmer and Megan Cassella ldquoLatest China BIT offer enough to keep talks goingrdquo httpwwwpoliticocomtipsheetsmorning-trade201607latest-china-bit-offer-enough-to-keep-talks-going-215180JC)

LATEST CHINA BIT OFFER ENOUGH TO KEEP TALKS GOING So many negotiations so little time left in the Obama administration mdash but one important set of talks we continue to watch closely are those between the United States and China on a bilateral investment treaty The two sides exchanged new offers in late June in their quest to reach a deal before President Barack Obama leaves office in less than 7 months So far therersquos no word from the Office of the US Trade Representative on the quality of Beijingrsquos proposal But it appears USTR ldquogot a sufficiently improved offer that itrsquos worthwhile for them to continue having these conversationsrdquo Erin Ennis a senior vice president at the US-China Business Council told POLITICO A new round of talks on the BIT is expected to be held soon with signs pointing to next week following the Group of 20 trade ministers meeting Saturday and

Sunday in Shanghai In addition Obama is expected to make his last trip to China in early September for the G-20 leaders summit in Hangzhou and investment is already primed to be a big theme of that meeting

China wants leaders to agree on guiding principles for global investment policies Foreign Minister Wang

Yi said in late May as Beijing began its final 100-day push to prepare for the summit ldquoThere are some over 3200 bilateral treaties to regulate international investment something that does little service to facilitating cross-border cooperation on investmentrdquo Wang said ldquoChina hopes that the summit could introduce a set of guiding principles for global investment which as the first framework of multilateral investment norms would have a pioneering effect on global investmentrdquo ldquoOf course it might be some time before these norms become more substantiate but the beginning of such a process does mean something importantrdquo Wang added Meanwhile China is also negotiating a bilateral investment treaty with the European Union and the two sides held their 11th round of talks last week according to the China Ministry of Commercersquos website

Climate

Violation ndash the aff doesnrsquot change Chinarsquos opinion on climate change ndash both the US and China agree that warming needs to be solved ndash try again if Trump gets elected

T version ndash have China ban coal or ban nonrenewable energy in the US and China

Lines from ev that will help

Valentine 11 - the two nations agreed in June 2008 on a Ten Year Framework (TYF) for Cooperation on Energy and Environment so another collaborative agreement is superfluous

Valentine 11 (so many coops now) - the TYF (and partnership plans that fall under the TYF) other Sino-American cooperative agreements on climate change (ie initiatives falling under the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate) or other multi-national initiatives (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate or the G20 climate change negotiations)

All the coop now Valentine 11 - Scott Victor Valentine is an Associate Professor and Associate Director of the MPPIP Program Graduate School of Public Policy University of Tokyo (ldquoTowards the Sino-American Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC)rdquo Chinese Journal of International Politics (Winter 2011) 4 (4) 447-474 doi 101093cjippor020

The analysis presented in the previous section implies that a strategy specifically designed to facilitate mutually beneficial commercial opportunities to reduce GHG emissions in the two nations would hold the most appeal and enhance prospects of both economic and political success Using Yans terms it may be possible to encourage a transition from lsquosuperficial friendshiprsquo to actual friendship between the two nations through efforts to harness economic opportunities inherent in climate change mitigation programs89

Critics may note that the two nations agreed in June 2008 on a Ten Year Framework (TYF) for Cooperation on Energy and Environment so another collaborative agreement is superfluous90 The framework suffers however from three structural weaknesses that make it ill-suited to supporting commercial-focused GHG emission reduction collaborations First the TYF lacks formal organizational structure which implies that overall effectiveness will be influenced by political winds of change and undermined by low levels of accountability and managerial

oversight To ensure that political goodwill generates on-the-ground results a formal organizational structure is required This should include (i) an organization-specific mission (ii) quantifiable organization objectives (iii) an annual strategic plan based on and reviewed according to quantitative outcomes (iv) formal job descriptions designed to support the organizational goals (v) outreach HR finance and marketing departments designed to enhance organizational effectiveness (vi) organizational performance standards (vii) performance management systems and (viii) autonomous budgetary control Second the TYF lacks the GHG emission reduction focus that is of paramount concern in this paper As the adage suggests one cannot manage what one does not measure Third the TYF is geared towards macro achievements as the numerous MOUs under the TYF attest It is not specifically designed to comprehensively facilitate commercial collaborations of the sort proposed in this paper In fact one could argue that the framework introduced in this article could actually fit under the TYF umbrella and in doing so provide it with an implementation mechanism

In other words the proposal put forth in this paper should not be misconstrued as suggesting that a different model should supplant the TYF (and partnership plans that fall under the TYF) other Sino-American cooperative agreements on climate change (ie initiatives falling under the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate) or other multi-national initiatives (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate or the G20 climate change negotiations) Rather this paper argues that Yans taxonomy has been insightful in identifying the inherent weaknesses in current bilateral agreements between China and the United States It advocates in response that rather than trying to modify an existing framework that is ill-suited to the challenges put forth in this paper a new entity should be established through a formal bilateral agreement specifically to manage collaborative cross-border commercial initiatives for reducing GHG emissions This new body referred to hereafter as the Sino-American Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC) would have a specific remit to maximize GHG emission reduction through facilitating Sino-American commercial collaborations and in the process accumulate small wins which should help to improve the nature of the Sino-American friendship

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

Climate

Violation ndash the aff doesnrsquot change Chinarsquos opinion on climate change ndash both the US and China agree that warming needs to be solved ndash try again if Trump gets elected

T version ndash have China ban coal or ban nonrenewable energy in the US and China

Lines from ev that will help

Valentine 11 - the two nations agreed in June 2008 on a Ten Year Framework (TYF) for Cooperation on Energy and Environment so another collaborative agreement is superfluous

Valentine 11 (so many coops now) - the TYF (and partnership plans that fall under the TYF) other Sino-American cooperative agreements on climate change (ie initiatives falling under the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate) or other multi-national initiatives (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate or the G20 climate change negotiations)

All the coop now Valentine 11 - Scott Victor Valentine is an Associate Professor and Associate Director of the MPPIP Program Graduate School of Public Policy University of Tokyo (ldquoTowards the Sino-American Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC)rdquo Chinese Journal of International Politics (Winter 2011) 4 (4) 447-474 doi 101093cjippor020

The analysis presented in the previous section implies that a strategy specifically designed to facilitate mutually beneficial commercial opportunities to reduce GHG emissions in the two nations would hold the most appeal and enhance prospects of both economic and political success Using Yans terms it may be possible to encourage a transition from lsquosuperficial friendshiprsquo to actual friendship between the two nations through efforts to harness economic opportunities inherent in climate change mitigation programs89

Critics may note that the two nations agreed in June 2008 on a Ten Year Framework (TYF) for Cooperation on Energy and Environment so another collaborative agreement is superfluous90 The framework suffers however from three structural weaknesses that make it ill-suited to supporting commercial-focused GHG emission reduction collaborations First the TYF lacks formal organizational structure which implies that overall effectiveness will be influenced by political winds of change and undermined by low levels of accountability and managerial

oversight To ensure that political goodwill generates on-the-ground results a formal organizational structure is required This should include (i) an organization-specific mission (ii) quantifiable organization objectives (iii) an annual strategic plan based on and reviewed according to quantitative outcomes (iv) formal job descriptions designed to support the organizational goals (v) outreach HR finance and marketing departments designed to enhance organizational effectiveness (vi) organizational performance standards (vii) performance management systems and (viii) autonomous budgetary control Second the TYF lacks the GHG emission reduction focus that is of paramount concern in this paper As the adage suggests one cannot manage what one does not measure Third the TYF is geared towards macro achievements as the numerous MOUs under the TYF attest It is not specifically designed to comprehensively facilitate commercial collaborations of the sort proposed in this paper In fact one could argue that the framework introduced in this article could actually fit under the TYF umbrella and in doing so provide it with an implementation mechanism

In other words the proposal put forth in this paper should not be misconstrued as suggesting that a different model should supplant the TYF (and partnership plans that fall under the TYF) other Sino-American cooperative agreements on climate change (ie initiatives falling under the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate) or other multi-national initiatives (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate or the G20 climate change negotiations) Rather this paper argues that Yans taxonomy has been insightful in identifying the inherent weaknesses in current bilateral agreements between China and the United States It advocates in response that rather than trying to modify an existing framework that is ill-suited to the challenges put forth in this paper a new entity should be established through a formal bilateral agreement specifically to manage collaborative cross-border commercial initiatives for reducing GHG emissions This new body referred to hereafter as the Sino-American Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC) would have a specific remit to maximize GHG emission reduction through facilitating Sino-American commercial collaborations and in the process accumulate small wins which should help to improve the nature of the Sino-American friendship

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

oversight To ensure that political goodwill generates on-the-ground results a formal organizational structure is required This should include (i) an organization-specific mission (ii) quantifiable organization objectives (iii) an annual strategic plan based on and reviewed according to quantitative outcomes (iv) formal job descriptions designed to support the organizational goals (v) outreach HR finance and marketing departments designed to enhance organizational effectiveness (vi) organizational performance standards (vii) performance management systems and (viii) autonomous budgetary control Second the TYF lacks the GHG emission reduction focus that is of paramount concern in this paper As the adage suggests one cannot manage what one does not measure Third the TYF is geared towards macro achievements as the numerous MOUs under the TYF attest It is not specifically designed to comprehensively facilitate commercial collaborations of the sort proposed in this paper In fact one could argue that the framework introduced in this article could actually fit under the TYF umbrella and in doing so provide it with an implementation mechanism

In other words the proposal put forth in this paper should not be misconstrued as suggesting that a different model should supplant the TYF (and partnership plans that fall under the TYF) other Sino-American cooperative agreements on climate change (ie initiatives falling under the Initiative for US-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate) or other multi-national initiatives (such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate or the G20 climate change negotiations) Rather this paper argues that Yans taxonomy has been insightful in identifying the inherent weaknesses in current bilateral agreements between China and the United States It advocates in response that rather than trying to modify an existing framework that is ill-suited to the challenges put forth in this paper a new entity should be established through a formal bilateral agreement specifically to manage collaborative cross-border commercial initiatives for reducing GHG emissions This new body referred to hereafter as the Sino-American Trade Organization for the Prevention of Climate Change (STOP-CC) would have a specific remit to maximize GHG emission reduction through facilitating Sino-American commercial collaborations and in the process accumulate small wins which should help to improve the nature of the Sino-American friendship

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Cyber Violation ndash China and the US cooperate on cybersecurity now ndash they both agree its necessary

T version ndash crack down on hackers and create a no first use policy for cyber weapons

Cooperation over cyber now Qun 16 - Director-General Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs Peoplersquos Republic of China (Wang ldquoShared Interests and Responsibility The US and China Must Join to Promote a Rules-based Cyberspacerdquo The Huffington Post May 11 2016 httpwwwhuffingtonpostcomwang-qunshared-interests-and-resp_b_9873642htmldmeth)Today the US and China are to launch in Washington DC their inaugural meeting of the Senior Experts Group on International Norms in Cyberspace This represents not only an earnest effort by the two countries to implement the important cyber-security consensus they reached during President Xi Jinpingrsquos state visit to the United States last September but also an extraordinary move by the two countries to work together

for better global governance in cyberspace The US and Chinarsquos shared interests As the two biggest economies and beneficiaries of the rapid development of information and communications technologies (ICTs) the US and China have broad and abundant shared interests in global cyberspace governance through intensified cooperation The world today whether online or offline is a network of both visual and physical reality The ICTs have brought a qualitative leap in productivity and empowered innovation especially in artificial intelligence IOT and

three-dimensional printing which serves as a new driver for global economy The digital economy is taking up an

increasingly large share of GDP in both the US and China two of the worldrsquos key players in cyberspace In the meantime the two countries have evolved towards a community of shared interests with each having a stake in the other China for its part has 700 million Internet users and 60000 IT companies among which 50 have been listed in the US including big names like Alibaba and Tencent with a total market cap of over 500 billion US dollars Meanwhile there are over 2500 IT companies from the US with investments in China generating higher returns Qualcom for instance earned half of its profits in China whereas Apple finds 50 of its new users in China While

contributing to their respective economies the IT companies in both countries are also helping to deepen their bilateral cooperation The digital and technical cooperation is in effect part and parcel of their bilateral cooperation Today the

cooperation between the two countries on this front has become even more relevant and imperative China is calling for new drivers of growth as its economy has entered a new normal Internet in this context has a greater role to play China is intensifying its efforts to shift its economic development model and adjust its economic structure through vigorous implementation of inter alia its national strategy for development based on growing the Internet sector national big-data strategy the ldquoInternet Plusrdquo action plan as well as its

programs for in-depth integration of digital and real economies Likewise in the case of the US much hinges on a robust digital economy and its intensified cooperation with China if it is to have a sound economic recovery and greater competitiveness Over the past 30 years the growth rate of its digital economy is five times that of the traditional industry Digital economy

accounted for 47 of its GDP in 2015 which has become one of the most dynamic sector in the US I t is thus axiomatic that the cooperation between the two countries are in line with their common interests Such cooperation in the meantime also contributes to the sustainable development of global cyberspace and the advancement of human society The US and Chinarsquos common challenges The Internet has brought digital opportunities and dividends but

unprecedented challenges as well in global socio-economic development The online challenges of threats and risks are increasingly prominent and in the meantime they have also begun to make their way to the political economic cultural social and

defense domains of the society The US and China are confronted especially with the following common challenges - Frequent infringements of individual privacy and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual

property rights as well as mounting cyber attacks and crimes These malicious activities have put into jeopardy the legitimate rights of the general public the economic interests of countries and the innovative capacity of society Chinarsquos websites suffer from an average of nearly 400 large-scale cyber attacks on a daily basis and the attacks from abroad continue to rise rapidly The US

for its part also faced a wide array of cyber intrusions ranging from criminal activity to cyber espionage - Cyber terrorism a global public

menace poses a threat to social and public security Terrorism coupled with the Internet has now been evident as the main source of violent and terrorist activities The IS East Turkistan and other terrorist groups take online audio and video as an important tool for dissemination of extremist ideology and terrorist tactics They also use Internet in their organization planning and implementation of terrorist

attacks - Cyber attacks on national critical infrastructures Such attacks pose severe threat to national economy and peoplesrsquo livelihood As the neural centre of economic and social operation the critical infrastructures in such areas as finance electricity communication transportation constitute the top priority in cyber-security Any problem once occurredwill lead to severe

traffic disruption financial chaos or power failures with devastating consequences The US and Chinarsquos shared responsibility To address such challenges the international community can only work together through intensified cooperation There are

no alternatives whatsoever No countries can do it alone It is thus the shared responsibility of the US and China to harness the global cyberspace While it is true that the US and China may sometimes be at odds with each other on some of the

cyber issues it shouldnrsquot affect the cooperation between them To fling accusations at each other is not a solution Only through cooperation can the US and China forge a unified and prosperous cyberspace Otherwise the cyberspace will divide and wither The important cyber-security consensus the two countries reached during President Xi Jinpingrsquos state visit to the United States last September is a classic case in point in which the two sides managed to address their differences through dialogue and cooperation Cyberspace by no means a lawless frontier Though relatively new cyberspace is by no means a lawless frontier It should not be a breeding bed for crimes still less a wrestling ground for countries To this end it is essential that all relevant parties engage in an objective study in the light of the very character of this new development on the applicability of international laws without pre-conceived views It is essential in the meantime that all relevant parties embark on a process in view of the prevailing situation of elaboration of the relevant international legal instrument in cyberspace governance within the framework of the United Nations focusing on international norms in cyberspace

in the first place Cyberspace is a common space for human activities and cyber-security is therefore a key issue which bears on the sovereignty security and development interests of all countries The international behavior should be grounded in such fundamental principles of peace sovereignty co-governance and universal benefit in harnessing cyberspace The US

and Chinarsquos common objective Todayrsquos inaugural meeting of Senior Experts Group on International Norms in Cyberspace is most timely The US and China should intensify their dialogue and cooperation on cyber-security with the objective of making it a bright spot in their bilateral relations As P5 and major players in cyberspace the US and China should demonstrate their responsibility in advancing the process of building international norms in cyberspace with the objective of fostering a peaceful secure open and cooperative cyberspace which benefits people of all countries and safeguards international peace security and stability

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

Cyber Violation ndash China and the US cooperate on cybersecurity now ndash they both agree its necessary

T version ndash crack down on hackers and create a no first use policy for cyber weapons

Cooperation over cyber now Qun 16 - Director-General Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs Peoplersquos Republic of China (Wang ldquoShared Interests and Responsibility The US and China Must Join to Promote a Rules-based Cyberspacerdquo The Huffington Post May 11 2016 httpwwwhuffingtonpostcomwang-qunshared-interests-and-resp_b_9873642htmldmeth)Today the US and China are to launch in Washington DC their inaugural meeting of the Senior Experts Group on International Norms in Cyberspace This represents not only an earnest effort by the two countries to implement the important cyber-security consensus they reached during President Xi Jinpingrsquos state visit to the United States last September but also an extraordinary move by the two countries to work together

for better global governance in cyberspace The US and Chinarsquos shared interests As the two biggest economies and beneficiaries of the rapid development of information and communications technologies (ICTs) the US and China have broad and abundant shared interests in global cyberspace governance through intensified cooperation The world today whether online or offline is a network of both visual and physical reality The ICTs have brought a qualitative leap in productivity and empowered innovation especially in artificial intelligence IOT and

three-dimensional printing which serves as a new driver for global economy The digital economy is taking up an

increasingly large share of GDP in both the US and China two of the worldrsquos key players in cyberspace In the meantime the two countries have evolved towards a community of shared interests with each having a stake in the other China for its part has 700 million Internet users and 60000 IT companies among which 50 have been listed in the US including big names like Alibaba and Tencent with a total market cap of over 500 billion US dollars Meanwhile there are over 2500 IT companies from the US with investments in China generating higher returns Qualcom for instance earned half of its profits in China whereas Apple finds 50 of its new users in China While

contributing to their respective economies the IT companies in both countries are also helping to deepen their bilateral cooperation The digital and technical cooperation is in effect part and parcel of their bilateral cooperation Today the

cooperation between the two countries on this front has become even more relevant and imperative China is calling for new drivers of growth as its economy has entered a new normal Internet in this context has a greater role to play China is intensifying its efforts to shift its economic development model and adjust its economic structure through vigorous implementation of inter alia its national strategy for development based on growing the Internet sector national big-data strategy the ldquoInternet Plusrdquo action plan as well as its

programs for in-depth integration of digital and real economies Likewise in the case of the US much hinges on a robust digital economy and its intensified cooperation with China if it is to have a sound economic recovery and greater competitiveness Over the past 30 years the growth rate of its digital economy is five times that of the traditional industry Digital economy

accounted for 47 of its GDP in 2015 which has become one of the most dynamic sector in the US I t is thus axiomatic that the cooperation between the two countries are in line with their common interests Such cooperation in the meantime also contributes to the sustainable development of global cyberspace and the advancement of human society The US and Chinarsquos common challenges The Internet has brought digital opportunities and dividends but

unprecedented challenges as well in global socio-economic development The online challenges of threats and risks are increasingly prominent and in the meantime they have also begun to make their way to the political economic cultural social and

defense domains of the society The US and China are confronted especially with the following common challenges - Frequent infringements of individual privacy and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual

property rights as well as mounting cyber attacks and crimes These malicious activities have put into jeopardy the legitimate rights of the general public the economic interests of countries and the innovative capacity of society Chinarsquos websites suffer from an average of nearly 400 large-scale cyber attacks on a daily basis and the attacks from abroad continue to rise rapidly The US

for its part also faced a wide array of cyber intrusions ranging from criminal activity to cyber espionage - Cyber terrorism a global public

menace poses a threat to social and public security Terrorism coupled with the Internet has now been evident as the main source of violent and terrorist activities The IS East Turkistan and other terrorist groups take online audio and video as an important tool for dissemination of extremist ideology and terrorist tactics They also use Internet in their organization planning and implementation of terrorist

attacks - Cyber attacks on national critical infrastructures Such attacks pose severe threat to national economy and peoplesrsquo livelihood As the neural centre of economic and social operation the critical infrastructures in such areas as finance electricity communication transportation constitute the top priority in cyber-security Any problem once occurredwill lead to severe

traffic disruption financial chaos or power failures with devastating consequences The US and Chinarsquos shared responsibility To address such challenges the international community can only work together through intensified cooperation There are

no alternatives whatsoever No countries can do it alone It is thus the shared responsibility of the US and China to harness the global cyberspace While it is true that the US and China may sometimes be at odds with each other on some of the

cyber issues it shouldnrsquot affect the cooperation between them To fling accusations at each other is not a solution Only through cooperation can the US and China forge a unified and prosperous cyberspace Otherwise the cyberspace will divide and wither The important cyber-security consensus the two countries reached during President Xi Jinpingrsquos state visit to the United States last September is a classic case in point in which the two sides managed to address their differences through dialogue and cooperation Cyberspace by no means a lawless frontier Though relatively new cyberspace is by no means a lawless frontier It should not be a breeding bed for crimes still less a wrestling ground for countries To this end it is essential that all relevant parties engage in an objective study in the light of the very character of this new development on the applicability of international laws without pre-conceived views It is essential in the meantime that all relevant parties embark on a process in view of the prevailing situation of elaboration of the relevant international legal instrument in cyberspace governance within the framework of the United Nations focusing on international norms in cyberspace

in the first place Cyberspace is a common space for human activities and cyber-security is therefore a key issue which bears on the sovereignty security and development interests of all countries The international behavior should be grounded in such fundamental principles of peace sovereignty co-governance and universal benefit in harnessing cyberspace The US

and Chinarsquos common objective Todayrsquos inaugural meeting of Senior Experts Group on International Norms in Cyberspace is most timely The US and China should intensify their dialogue and cooperation on cyber-security with the objective of making it a bright spot in their bilateral relations As P5 and major players in cyberspace the US and China should demonstrate their responsibility in advancing the process of building international norms in cyberspace with the objective of fostering a peaceful secure open and cooperative cyberspace which benefits people of all countries and safeguards international peace security and stability

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

property rights as well as mounting cyber attacks and crimes These malicious activities have put into jeopardy the legitimate rights of the general public the economic interests of countries and the innovative capacity of society Chinarsquos websites suffer from an average of nearly 400 large-scale cyber attacks on a daily basis and the attacks from abroad continue to rise rapidly The US

for its part also faced a wide array of cyber intrusions ranging from criminal activity to cyber espionage - Cyber terrorism a global public

menace poses a threat to social and public security Terrorism coupled with the Internet has now been evident as the main source of violent and terrorist activities The IS East Turkistan and other terrorist groups take online audio and video as an important tool for dissemination of extremist ideology and terrorist tactics They also use Internet in their organization planning and implementation of terrorist

attacks - Cyber attacks on national critical infrastructures Such attacks pose severe threat to national economy and peoplesrsquo livelihood As the neural centre of economic and social operation the critical infrastructures in such areas as finance electricity communication transportation constitute the top priority in cyber-security Any problem once occurredwill lead to severe

traffic disruption financial chaos or power failures with devastating consequences The US and Chinarsquos shared responsibility To address such challenges the international community can only work together through intensified cooperation There are

no alternatives whatsoever No countries can do it alone It is thus the shared responsibility of the US and China to harness the global cyberspace While it is true that the US and China may sometimes be at odds with each other on some of the

cyber issues it shouldnrsquot affect the cooperation between them To fling accusations at each other is not a solution Only through cooperation can the US and China forge a unified and prosperous cyberspace Otherwise the cyberspace will divide and wither The important cyber-security consensus the two countries reached during President Xi Jinpingrsquos state visit to the United States last September is a classic case in point in which the two sides managed to address their differences through dialogue and cooperation Cyberspace by no means a lawless frontier Though relatively new cyberspace is by no means a lawless frontier It should not be a breeding bed for crimes still less a wrestling ground for countries To this end it is essential that all relevant parties engage in an objective study in the light of the very character of this new development on the applicability of international laws without pre-conceived views It is essential in the meantime that all relevant parties embark on a process in view of the prevailing situation of elaboration of the relevant international legal instrument in cyberspace governance within the framework of the United Nations focusing on international norms in cyberspace

in the first place Cyberspace is a common space for human activities and cyber-security is therefore a key issue which bears on the sovereignty security and development interests of all countries The international behavior should be grounded in such fundamental principles of peace sovereignty co-governance and universal benefit in harnessing cyberspace The US

and Chinarsquos common objective Todayrsquos inaugural meeting of Senior Experts Group on International Norms in Cyberspace is most timely The US and China should intensify their dialogue and cooperation on cyber-security with the objective of making it a bright spot in their bilateral relations As P5 and major players in cyberspace the US and China should demonstrate their responsibility in advancing the process of building international norms in cyberspace with the objective of fostering a peaceful secure open and cooperative cyberspace which benefits people of all countries and safeguards international peace security and stability

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about

This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Green Finance Violation ndash US and China both do green finance now and agree itrsquos a good thing ndash yeses all around

Common interests and coop nowHart et al rsquo16 (Melanie Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress Pete Ogden Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Kelly Sims Gallagher professor of energy and environmental policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University ldquoGreen Finance The Next Frontier for US-China Climate Cooperationrdquo613 httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecurityreport20160613139276green-finance-the-next-frontier-for-u-s-china-climate-cooperation bgm)

China already is one of the biggest providers of international energy assistance through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China Now it is establishing major new financial institutions including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB the New Development Bank which is often referred to as the bank of Brazil Russia India China and South Africa or the BRICS Development Bank President Xirsquos signature Belt and Road initiative and Chinarsquos South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change In light of this guideline clarifications for both bilateral development aid and overseas investments represent an important opportunity for US-China collaboration going forward Not only would clarified policy statements be useful to guide investments and potentially harmonize standards but the two nations could also once again demonstrate joint leadership China and the United States could collaborate on positive climate-friendly investment strategiesmdashincluding on specific projectsmdashand establish information-sharing protocols regarding these investments Moreover both countries could experiment with a wider range of investment programs learning from each otherrsquos successes The most recent US-China joint statementmdashon the occasion of President Xirsquos September 2015 visit to Washington

DCmdashprovides a promising diplomatic opening for bilateral engagements During the visit China pledged to ldquostrengthen green and low-carbon policies and regulations with a view to strictly controlling public investment flowing into projects with high pollution and carbon emissions both domestically and internationallyrdquo For its part the United States reaffirmed its existing commitment to end ldquopublic financing for new conventional coal-fired power plants except in the poorest countriesrdquo Both nations reiterated these commitments at the June 2016 US-China Strategic and Economic

Dialogue or SampED meetings in Beijing Given this alignment the United States and China could work to maximize economic benefits for developing countries while minimizing environmental social and climate risks

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit

Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Green Finance Violation ndash US and China both do green finance now and agree itrsquos a good thing ndash yeses all around

Common interests and coop nowHart et al rsquo16 (Melanie Senior Fellow and Director of China Policy at the Center for American Progress Pete Ogden Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Kelly Sims Gallagher professor of energy and environmental policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University ldquoGreen Finance The Next Frontier for US-China Climate Cooperationrdquo613 httpswwwamericanprogressorgissuessecurityreport20160613139276green-finance-the-next-frontier-for-u-s-china-climate-cooperation bgm)

China already is one of the biggest providers of international energy assistance through the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China Now it is establishing major new financial institutions including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB the New Development Bank which is often referred to as the bank of Brazil Russia India China and South Africa or the BRICS Development Bank President Xirsquos signature Belt and Road initiative and Chinarsquos South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change In light of this guideline clarifications for both bilateral development aid and overseas investments represent an important opportunity for US-China collaboration going forward Not only would clarified policy statements be useful to guide investments and potentially harmonize standards but the two nations could also once again demonstrate joint leadership China and the United States could collaborate on positive climate-friendly investment strategiesmdashincluding on specific projectsmdashand establish information-sharing protocols regarding these investments Moreover both countries could experiment with a wider range of investment programs learning from each otherrsquos successes The most recent US-China joint statementmdashon the occasion of President Xirsquos September 2015 visit to Washington

DCmdashprovides a promising diplomatic opening for bilateral engagements During the visit China pledged to ldquostrengthen green and low-carbon policies and regulations with a view to strictly controlling public investment flowing into projects with high pollution and carbon emissions both domestically and internationallyrdquo For its part the United States reaffirmed its existing commitment to end ldquopublic financing for new conventional coal-fired power plants except in the poorest countriesrdquo Both nations reiterated these commitments at the June 2016 US-China Strategic and Economic

Dialogue or SampED meetings in Beijing Given this alignment the United States and China could work to maximize economic benefits for developing countries while minimizing environmental social and climate risks

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit

Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Health Diplomacy Violation ndash aff just improves upon common interests

Common goals in AfricaBrown et al rsquo13 (Matthew Bryan Liang Braden Hale amp Thomas Novotny 81713 Seton Hall University Senior Advisor at Office of Global Affairs US Department of Health and Human Services former Deputy Director at CDC China amp Professor Emeritus of Anesthesiology former Director of the San Diego Center for Patient Safety at the University of California received his BS from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology MD from Columbia University College of Physicians amp Surgeons PhD from the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy Studies and JD from Harvard Law School amp Associate Adjunct Professor at UCSD MD amp Division of Epidemiology and Biostatistics Professor Associate Director For Border and Global Health former UC Berkeley Professor of Epidemiology and Assistant Dean for Public Health Practice Global Health Policy Institute ldquoChinas Role in Global Health Diplomacy Designing Expanded US Partnership for Health System Strengthening in Africardquo httpblogsshuedughgfiles201402GHGJ_62_149-166_BROWN_ET_ALpdf)

2

Why would the US government explore expanded public health collaborations with China in Africa It is important to note that t hese two nations already have a shared history of public health collaboration The United States and China have collaborated for more than two decades on infectious diseases (HIVAIDS influenza and emerging infections) cancer and other non-communicable diseases37 T hese collaborations share common goals for improving the practice of public health as well as strengthening public health institutions in detecting and responding to public health problems in the United States and China Additionally improving medical infrastructure and health systems are shared global health objectives and stated priorities of African leaders and such activities may also facilitate economic development and commerce among these partner nations38-39 Despite common goals strategic cooperation in health development activities on the continent of Africa between the United States and China remains limited

MES Violation ndash they aff is only a shift from maybe to yes the violation requires a shift from no to yes

Potentially helpful lines from ev

Watson - Commerce could simply accept Chinarsquos transition toward a market system drop NME treatment altogether and rely on anti-subsidy laws to address any remaining distortions

Watson - The expiration of Chinarsquos NME exception in 2016

NME expires in 2016 Watson 14 ndash JD from Tulane University Law School and an LLM in international and comparative law from the George Washington University Law School (K William ldquoWill Nonmarket Economy Methodology Go Quietly into the Nightrdquo CATO Policy Analysis No 763)BB

The history of lawlessness in US practice toward China strongly suggests that the United States will not accept the 2016 deadline in good faith The US practice already exceeds the bounds of current WTO disciplines and the United States is currently entangled in a tit-for-tat litigation war with China over mutual antidumping abuses

The expiration of Chinarsquos NME exception in 2016 has the potential to further inflame tensions if the United States does not adopt a more reasonable policy There are a variety of ways that Commerce

could choose to respond with different legal and political consequences for each possibility They have the power under US law to simply ignore the change in WTO rules and continue their current practice They could also accept Chinarsquos new status in principle while continuing to use discriminatory methods Both of those approaches will almost certainly lead to years of litigation and retaliation at the WTOOn the other hand there are ways for Commerce to follow WTO and US law while taking into account genuine instances of Chinese state intervention in a fair way However such methods likely will not lead to the high margins Commerce is

able to ldquocalculaterdquo under current practices Finally Commerce could simply accept Chinarsquos transition toward a market system drop NME treatment altogether and rely on anti-subsidy laws to address any remaining distortions This final option would not only eliminate an unreasonable and abusive antidumping practice it would also do the most to improve USndashChina relations and increase US influence in the rules-based global trading system

If you have a card saying US will accept China as MES that would be fabulous

Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability Violation ndash just acknowledges a fact doesnrsquot change anything

T version ndash THAAD or acknowledge mutual vulnerability in exchange for modification of Chinese nfu policy

Key interestsRiquiang 15 (Wu Riquiang Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University in China ldquoStabilizing China-US Nuclear Dynamicsrdquo 9-25-2015 httpwwwnbrorgresearchactivityaspxid=610)

To maintain strategic stability C hina and the United States should reach a common understanding on strategic offensive and defensive capabilities For example the United States could limit its missile defensemdashenough to counter North Korearsquos unsophisticated missiles without threatening Chinarsquos more advanced strategic

missiles In return China could agree to refrain from expanding its nuclear arsenal If the United States is sincere in its declaration that homeland missile defense is not directed at China this solution is in Washingtonrsquos interest China has

maintained a small nuclear arsenal for several decades and the only reason it would have to increase its stockpile of weapons is to compensate for its nuclear deterrence capability being undermined by improved US missile defenses So this solution is also in Beijingrsquos interest The issue of a

potential deployment of THAAD in South Korea could also be resolved in a way that meets the United Statesrsquo declared purpose without threatening Chinarsquos nuclear deterrent China is concerned with THAAD radar because it could increase the target discrimination capability of US homeland missile defense But target discrimination is not a problem for terminal defense systems such as THAAD because the atmosphere simply screens out all decoys automatically Thus Chinarsquos concern over THAAD radar is not linked to the defense of South Korea Therefore a solution could be that only THAAD interceptors are deployed in South Korea and that they are integrated with South Korearsquos current missile defense radar the Green Pine system In order to encourage US restraint on missile defense China could explicitly link discussions on US missile defense with the Chinese nuclear arsenal If the United States improves the effectiveness or expands the scale of its missile defense capabilities China would build more nuclear missiles capable of targeting the United States to compensate for the negative impact on Chinarsquos nuclear deterrent Alarming signals would include the deployment of highly capable radar on Chinarsquos periphery more interceptors capable of engaging Chinese strategic missiles and new assets or firing doctrines that could improve target discrimination capability China and the United States should also work together to mitigate the risk of nuclear escalation if a conventional war were to occur First Chinarsquos lack of confidence in the survivability of its nuclear forces is a source of escalatory risk

In order to give China confidence the United States could publicly accept mutual vulnerability and promise not to attack Chinese nuclear weapons with conventional assets Second in order to discourage the United States from attacking Chinese nuclear weapons China could modify its no-first-use policy declaring that conventional attacks on nuclear weapons would be considered on par with nuclear strikes and might cause nuclear retaliation Third

China could make reasonable efforts to maintain or develop a clear distinction between its conventional and nuclear weapons For example China could demarcate its nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles by range maintaining short- and medium-range missiles only for conventional purposes and intermediate-range and intercontinental missiles for nuclear needs Finally political leaders from both countries must understand the implications of military

Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability Violation ndash just acknowledges a fact doesnrsquot change anything

T version ndash THAAD or acknowledge mutual vulnerability in exchange for modification of Chinese nfu policy

Key interestsRiquiang 15 (Wu Riquiang Associate Professor in the School of International Studies at Renmin University in China ldquoStabilizing China-US Nuclear Dynamicsrdquo 9-25-2015 httpwwwnbrorgresearchactivityaspxid=610)

To maintain strategic stability C hina and the United States should reach a common understanding on strategic offensive and defensive capabilities For example the United States could limit its missile defensemdashenough to counter North Korearsquos unsophisticated missiles without threatening Chinarsquos more advanced strategic

missiles In return China could agree to refrain from expanding its nuclear arsenal If the United States is sincere in its declaration that homeland missile defense is not directed at China this solution is in Washingtonrsquos interest China has

maintained a small nuclear arsenal for several decades and the only reason it would have to increase its stockpile of weapons is to compensate for its nuclear deterrence capability being undermined by improved US missile defenses So this solution is also in Beijingrsquos interest The issue of a

potential deployment of THAAD in South Korea could also be resolved in a way that meets the United Statesrsquo declared purpose without threatening Chinarsquos nuclear deterrent China is concerned with THAAD radar because it could increase the target discrimination capability of US homeland missile defense But target discrimination is not a problem for terminal defense systems such as THAAD because the atmosphere simply screens out all decoys automatically Thus Chinarsquos concern over THAAD radar is not linked to the defense of South Korea Therefore a solution could be that only THAAD interceptors are deployed in South Korea and that they are integrated with South Korearsquos current missile defense radar the Green Pine system In order to encourage US restraint on missile defense China could explicitly link discussions on US missile defense with the Chinese nuclear arsenal If the United States improves the effectiveness or expands the scale of its missile defense capabilities China would build more nuclear missiles capable of targeting the United States to compensate for the negative impact on Chinarsquos nuclear deterrent Alarming signals would include the deployment of highly capable radar on Chinarsquos periphery more interceptors capable of engaging Chinese strategic missiles and new assets or firing doctrines that could improve target discrimination capability China and the United States should also work together to mitigate the risk of nuclear escalation if a conventional war were to occur First Chinarsquos lack of confidence in the survivability of its nuclear forces is a source of escalatory risk

In order to give China confidence the United States could publicly accept mutual vulnerability and promise not to attack Chinese nuclear weapons with conventional assets Second in order to discourage the United States from attacking Chinese nuclear weapons China could modify its no-first-use policy declaring that conventional attacks on nuclear weapons would be considered on par with nuclear strikes and might cause nuclear retaliation Third

China could make reasonable efforts to maintain or develop a clear distinction between its conventional and nuclear weapons For example China could demarcate its nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles by range maintaining short- and medium-range missiles only for conventional purposes and intermediate-range and intercontinental missiles for nuclear needs Finally political leaders from both countries must understand the implications of military

strategy for nuclear escalation balance military efficiency and escalation concerns and maintain firm control over the level of escalatory risk

S+ED Violation ndash the S+ED is an area of mutual interests the fact that it has been occurring for the past 8 years is a reason why the aff is cooperation not engagement ndash just scheduling anotha one isnrsquot engagement

Best case fx t ndash the effects of the plan are engagement over areas of disagreement but these negotiations are not mandated by the plan text

I dare you read a definition of engagement that defines it as scheduling a meeting Good freaking luck

The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation Yung 2016- Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the US Marine Corps University Christopher and Wang Dang THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA CAN GET ALONG IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Jul 6 warontherockscom201607the-united-states-and-china-can-get-along-in-the-south-china-sea

China and the United States have fundamentally different philosophies about the nature and meaning of the sea Historically for modern China the sea is first and foremost a means of access by enemies to threaten and humiliate the country In contrast the United States views the sea as a potential barrier to foreign threats and simultaneously a means for the United States to push out and advance its own interests This explains the tension over US Navy surveillance and reconnaissance operations (SRO) The United States regards as its right the ability to fly surveillance aircraft or sail surveillance ships within Chinarsquos exclusive economic zone but outside Chinarsquos territorial waters and contiguous zone China however sees US SROs as an affront to

Chinese sovereignty intrusive in nature and potentially threatening to Chinarsquos security Complicating this divergence of interests and perspectives is the security dilemma involved when a hegemon is confronted by a rising challenger mdash the

so-called Thucydides Trap An additional complication is the vexing fact that all the present hot spots or potential conflict scenarios between the two countries reside in the maritime domain There remains the possibility that China and the United States could tangle with each other over a crisis emerging from a Taiwan a South China Sea or an East China Sea scenario Nevertheless there are enough overlapping interests in the maritime domain to warrant serious thought about deepening and strengthening cooperative programs already in existence The convergence of interests is substantial enough that new programs that can foster habits of cooperation and reduce tensions deserve consideration During President Obamarsquos visit to China in November 2014 the two sides signed memoranda of understanding on encounters at sea The annex on air-to-air encounters was signed during President Xirsquos state visit to the United States in September 2015 Now both sides should ensure that all parties adhere to the

agreements They could even consider conducting joint or separate training sessions for sailors and pilots from both sides The United States and China should build on existing cooperative activities between their respective coast

guards while sustaining and if possible extending cooperation on anti-pollution measures ocean observation marine scientific research and prevention of marine hazards Moreover the two powers could expand on the military-to-military cooperation that has taken place within the maritime domain over the past few years In particular the United States should consider inviting China to exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise that it conducts annually with Southeast Asian militaries China and the United States should also work to establish

a working group at ASEAN to discuss maritime security cooperation and dialogue Cementing these cooperation efforts would ensure that although Chinese and American maritime interests may vary the joint interest in preserving stability remains paramount

Space

Violation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space

Literally the entire 1ac conflates cooperation and engagement

Mutual issues in spaceZhang 11 [Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University Hong Kong He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article ldquoThe Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationshiprdquo accessed by means of JSTOR]

In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the US specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns One important measure often overlooked in the space relationship is for top civilian

leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs Often statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side If the US and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation On the US side the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the US Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security For example in October 2005 the US Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11

microsatellite According to internal Air Force studies the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program Theresa Hitchens a longtime watcher of the US military space program suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs She noted during an interview that the US

militaryrsquos move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout Thus the military cannot make that decision on its own As Hitchens said ldquoCongress hasnrsquot asked about this Congress hasnrsquot debated this There hasnrsquot been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate And I think it is a serious mistake This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input Itrsquos a bigger deal than just a military

decisionrdquo51 Chinarsquos civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program Indeed after the 2007 ASAT test some US experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue Just as many US

projects have caused concern in China and Russia the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying US decision makers Thus Chinarsquos political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the US

As suggested by Bruce Macdonald one specific measure for the Chinese leadership is to adopt new policy making mechanisms ldquoPresident Hu Jintao should establish a senior national security coordinating body equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council that he chairs Such a body would include all interested parties in Chinarsquos government to ensure that actions with significant

international implications are given the full and careful review they meritrdquo52 Further the Chinese political leadership needs to tone down the PLArsquos rhetoric on space warfare The PLA has published countless studies on the role of

space war in the future Although much of the rhetoric has been driven by its fear of US space dominance discussions on possible countermeasures by China have contributed to the rising mistrust between the two countries Macdonald argues that ldquoPresident Hu should address foreign concerns

over Chinarsquos ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offer ing to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concernsrdquo53 In this regard the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLArsquos space warfare rhetoric For example in November 2009 within days of the Chinese Air Force commanderrsquos statement on the historical inevitability of space war Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use

In addition China and the US need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion According to Joan

Johnson-Freese for China and the US to limit the impact of the space security dilemma ldquoBetter strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sourcesrdquo54 She also points out that the US ldquomust decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space and do so clearly and consistently The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemmardquo

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Coop now

Ressler 9 [Aaron R Ressler Major United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama ldquoAdvancing Sino-US Space Cooperationrdquo April 2009]

Both China and the US are open to international space cooperation as noted in their respective policy

documents on space and current cooperative programs History has shown that both China and US have gained from space cooperation which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations

S+ED Violation ndash the S+ED is an area of mutual interests the fact that it has been occurring for the past 8 years is a reason why the aff is cooperation not engagement ndash just scheduling anotha one isnrsquot engagement

Best case fx t ndash the effects of the plan are engagement over areas of disagreement but these negotiations are not mandated by the plan text

I dare you read a definition of engagement that defines it as scheduling a meeting Good freaking luck

The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation Yung 2016- Donald Bren Chair of Non-Western Strategic Thought at the US Marine Corps University Christopher and Wang Dang THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA CAN GET ALONG IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA Jul 6 warontherockscom201607the-united-states-and-china-can-get-along-in-the-south-china-sea

China and the United States have fundamentally different philosophies about the nature and meaning of the sea Historically for modern China the sea is first and foremost a means of access by enemies to threaten and humiliate the country In contrast the United States views the sea as a potential barrier to foreign threats and simultaneously a means for the United States to push out and advance its own interests This explains the tension over US Navy surveillance and reconnaissance operations (SRO) The United States regards as its right the ability to fly surveillance aircraft or sail surveillance ships within Chinarsquos exclusive economic zone but outside Chinarsquos territorial waters and contiguous zone China however sees US SROs as an affront to

Chinese sovereignty intrusive in nature and potentially threatening to Chinarsquos security Complicating this divergence of interests and perspectives is the security dilemma involved when a hegemon is confronted by a rising challenger mdash the

so-called Thucydides Trap An additional complication is the vexing fact that all the present hot spots or potential conflict scenarios between the two countries reside in the maritime domain There remains the possibility that China and the United States could tangle with each other over a crisis emerging from a Taiwan a South China Sea or an East China Sea scenario Nevertheless there are enough overlapping interests in the maritime domain to warrant serious thought about deepening and strengthening cooperative programs already in existence The convergence of interests is substantial enough that new programs that can foster habits of cooperation and reduce tensions deserve consideration During President Obamarsquos visit to China in November 2014 the two sides signed memoranda of understanding on encounters at sea The annex on air-to-air encounters was signed during President Xirsquos state visit to the United States in September 2015 Now both sides should ensure that all parties adhere to the

agreements They could even consider conducting joint or separate training sessions for sailors and pilots from both sides The United States and China should build on existing cooperative activities between their respective coast

guards while sustaining and if possible extending cooperation on anti-pollution measures ocean observation marine scientific research and prevention of marine hazards Moreover the two powers could expand on the military-to-military cooperation that has taken place within the maritime domain over the past few years In particular the United States should consider inviting China to exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise that it conducts annually with Southeast Asian militaries China and the United States should also work to establish

a working group at ASEAN to discuss maritime security cooperation and dialogue Cementing these cooperation efforts would ensure that although Chinese and American maritime interests may vary the joint interest in preserving stability remains paramount

Space

Violation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space

Literally the entire 1ac conflates cooperation and engagement

Mutual issues in spaceZhang 11 [Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University Hong Kong He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article ldquoThe Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationshiprdquo accessed by means of JSTOR]

In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the US specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns One important measure often overlooked in the space relationship is for top civilian

leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs Often statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side If the US and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation On the US side the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the US Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security For example in October 2005 the US Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11

microsatellite According to internal Air Force studies the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program Theresa Hitchens a longtime watcher of the US military space program suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs She noted during an interview that the US

militaryrsquos move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout Thus the military cannot make that decision on its own As Hitchens said ldquoCongress hasnrsquot asked about this Congress hasnrsquot debated this There hasnrsquot been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate And I think it is a serious mistake This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input Itrsquos a bigger deal than just a military

decisionrdquo51 Chinarsquos civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program Indeed after the 2007 ASAT test some US experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue Just as many US

projects have caused concern in China and Russia the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying US decision makers Thus Chinarsquos political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the US

As suggested by Bruce Macdonald one specific measure for the Chinese leadership is to adopt new policy making mechanisms ldquoPresident Hu Jintao should establish a senior national security coordinating body equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council that he chairs Such a body would include all interested parties in Chinarsquos government to ensure that actions with significant

international implications are given the full and careful review they meritrdquo52 Further the Chinese political leadership needs to tone down the PLArsquos rhetoric on space warfare The PLA has published countless studies on the role of

space war in the future Although much of the rhetoric has been driven by its fear of US space dominance discussions on possible countermeasures by China have contributed to the rising mistrust between the two countries Macdonald argues that ldquoPresident Hu should address foreign concerns

over Chinarsquos ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offer ing to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concernsrdquo53 In this regard the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLArsquos space warfare rhetoric For example in November 2009 within days of the Chinese Air Force commanderrsquos statement on the historical inevitability of space war Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use

In addition China and the US need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion According to Joan

Johnson-Freese for China and the US to limit the impact of the space security dilemma ldquoBetter strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sourcesrdquo54 She also points out that the US ldquomust decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space and do so clearly and consistently The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemmardquo

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Coop now

Ressler 9 [Aaron R Ressler Major United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama ldquoAdvancing Sino-US Space Cooperationrdquo April 2009]

Both China and the US are open to international space cooperation as noted in their respective policy

documents on space and current cooperative programs History has shown that both China and US have gained from space cooperation which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations

a working group at ASEAN to discuss maritime security cooperation and dialogue Cementing these cooperation efforts would ensure that although Chinese and American maritime interests may vary the joint interest in preserving stability remains paramount

Space

Violation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space

Literally the entire 1ac conflates cooperation and engagement

Mutual issues in spaceZhang 11 [Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University Hong Kong He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article ldquoThe Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationshiprdquo accessed by means of JSTOR]

In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the US specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns One important measure often overlooked in the space relationship is for top civilian

leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs Often statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side If the US and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation On the US side the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the US Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security For example in October 2005 the US Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11

microsatellite According to internal Air Force studies the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program Theresa Hitchens a longtime watcher of the US military space program suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs She noted during an interview that the US

militaryrsquos move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout Thus the military cannot make that decision on its own As Hitchens said ldquoCongress hasnrsquot asked about this Congress hasnrsquot debated this There hasnrsquot been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate And I think it is a serious mistake This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input Itrsquos a bigger deal than just a military

decisionrdquo51 Chinarsquos civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program Indeed after the 2007 ASAT test some US experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue Just as many US

projects have caused concern in China and Russia the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying US decision makers Thus Chinarsquos political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the US

As suggested by Bruce Macdonald one specific measure for the Chinese leadership is to adopt new policy making mechanisms ldquoPresident Hu Jintao should establish a senior national security coordinating body equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council that he chairs Such a body would include all interested parties in Chinarsquos government to ensure that actions with significant

international implications are given the full and careful review they meritrdquo52 Further the Chinese political leadership needs to tone down the PLArsquos rhetoric on space warfare The PLA has published countless studies on the role of

space war in the future Although much of the rhetoric has been driven by its fear of US space dominance discussions on possible countermeasures by China have contributed to the rising mistrust between the two countries Macdonald argues that ldquoPresident Hu should address foreign concerns

over Chinarsquos ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offer ing to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concernsrdquo53 In this regard the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLArsquos space warfare rhetoric For example in November 2009 within days of the Chinese Air Force commanderrsquos statement on the historical inevitability of space war Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use

In addition China and the US need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion According to Joan

Johnson-Freese for China and the US to limit the impact of the space security dilemma ldquoBetter strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sourcesrdquo54 She also points out that the US ldquomust decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space and do so clearly and consistently The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemmardquo

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Coop now

Ressler 9 [Aaron R Ressler Major United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama ldquoAdvancing Sino-US Space Cooperationrdquo April 2009]

Both China and the US are open to international space cooperation as noted in their respective policy

documents on space and current cooperative programs History has shown that both China and US have gained from space cooperation which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations

Space

Violation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space

Literally the entire 1ac conflates cooperation and engagement

Mutual issues in spaceZhang 11 [Baohui Zhang is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Asia Pacific Studies at Lingnan University Hong Kong He wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for the helpful comments that contributed to the revision of this article ldquoThe Security Dilemma in the US-China Military Space Relationshiprdquo accessed by means of JSTOR]

In the context of the changing strategic landscape between China and the US specific measures could be taken to reduce their mutual concerns One important measure often overlooked in the space relationship is for top civilian

leaders to exercise greater oversight over military space programs Often statements and actions by the military have driven the fears of the other side If the US and China intend to build a new partnership in world affairs civilian leaders must recognize that unscrutinized actions by their own militaries can invite mutual mistrust which in turn hinders broader political and security cooperation On the US side the Obama government needs to take a much closer look at the US Air Force (especially its Space Command) and the Missile Defense Agency These two institutions periodically try out new space projects that China and Russia perceive as threatening to their national security For example in October 2005 the US Air Force conducted a maneuverability experiment with its XSS-11

microsatellite According to internal Air Force studies the XSS program was intended as a precursor to an anti-satellite program Theresa Hitchens a longtime watcher of the US military space program suggests that both Congress and the White House should exercise much tighter control over military space programs She noted during an interview that the US

militaryrsquos move toward space warfare is a strategic issue with a lot of potential fallout Thus the military cannot make that decision on its own As Hitchens said ldquoCongress hasnrsquot asked about this Congress hasnrsquot debated this There hasnrsquot been a change of White House policy and therefore there has been no public debate And I think it is a serious mistake This is something that ought to be debated at the national level with congressional and public input Itrsquos a bigger deal than just a military

decisionrdquo51 Chinarsquos civilian leadership must also rein in the military space program Indeed after the 2007 ASAT test some US experts questioned whether the Chinese civilian leadership fully grasped the issue Just as many US

projects have caused concern in China and Russia the Chinese leadership must recognize that its own military space projects may be worrying US decision makers Thus Chinarsquos political leadership needs to understand that restraining its military space program will be vital for forging security cooperation with the US

As suggested by Bruce Macdonald one specific measure for the Chinese leadership is to adopt new policy making mechanisms ldquoPresident Hu Jintao should establish a senior national security coordinating body equivalent to a Chinese National Security Council that he chairs Such a body would include all interested parties in Chinarsquos government to ensure that actions with significant

international implications are given the full and careful review they meritrdquo52 Further the Chinese political leadership needs to tone down the PLArsquos rhetoric on space warfare The PLA has published countless studies on the role of

space war in the future Although much of the rhetoric has been driven by its fear of US space dominance discussions on possible countermeasures by China have contributed to the rising mistrust between the two countries Macdonald argues that ldquoPresident Hu should address foreign concerns

over Chinarsquos ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offer ing to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concernsrdquo53 In this regard the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLArsquos space warfare rhetoric For example in November 2009 within days of the Chinese Air Force commanderrsquos statement on the historical inevitability of space war Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use

In addition China and the US need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion According to Joan

Johnson-Freese for China and the US to limit the impact of the space security dilemma ldquoBetter strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sourcesrdquo54 She also points out that the US ldquomust decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space and do so clearly and consistently The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemmardquo

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Coop now

Ressler 9 [Aaron R Ressler Major United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama ldquoAdvancing Sino-US Space Cooperationrdquo April 2009]

Both China and the US are open to international space cooperation as noted in their respective policy

documents on space and current cooperative programs History has shown that both China and US have gained from space cooperation which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations

over Chinarsquos ASAT test by releasing a more specific statement on the issue and offer ing to engage in dialogue with the US on mutual space concernsrdquo53 In this regard the Chinese leadership has indeed taken bolder measures to limit the political negativities generated by the PLArsquos space warfare rhetoric For example in November 2009 within days of the Chinese Air Force commanderrsquos statement on the historical inevitability of space war Hu Jintao categorically stated that China was firmly against military activities in space and was willing to work with other countries to pursue its peaceful use

In addition China and the US need more dialogue to reduce their mutual suspicion According to Joan

Johnson-Freese for China and the US to limit the impact of the space security dilemma ldquoBetter strategic communication is required to prevent history from repeating itself Misunderstandings are better avoided through direct communications than inferences and speculations based on sometimes less than credible sourcesrdquo54 She also points out that the US ldquomust decide what message it wants to send to China and other countries about space and do so clearly and consistently The effort would be very useful in alleviating the security dilemmardquo

Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperationChuanjie rsquo15 (Zhang Chuanjie is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy where he leads a program focusing on the impact of Chinese public opinion on Chinarsquos foreign policy He is also an assistant professor in Tsinghua Universityrsquos Department of International Relations and the deputy director of Tsinghuarsquos Center for US-China Relations PhD MA Yale University BA Beijing Foreign Studies University ldquoWhat Xi Jinpingrsquos State Visit Means for US-China Relationsrdquo 91515 httpcarnegietsinghuaorg20150915what-xi-jinping-s-state-visit-means-for-us-china-relationsihn1 Poetic Justice)

Xi and Obama also will likely exchange ideas about a variety of specific policy issues related to the bilateral relationship After Obamarsquos first visit to China in November 2009 the two governments released an extensive joint statement that lists almost 30 areas of potential cooperation What is striking is the sheer number of issues that the two leaders can talk about This is a very complicated relationship and many practical measures can be taken to work together more Judging from the document prominent issues like energy climate change counterterrorism people-to-people exchanges aviation space cooperation and cybersecurity all could be discussed during Xirsquos visit He will bring select cabinet ministers and businesspeople to the United States with him to ensure that the outcomes of these discussions will be fruitful

Coop now

Ressler 9 [Aaron R Ressler Major United States Air Force A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama ldquoAdvancing Sino-US Space Cooperationrdquo April 2009]

Both China and the US are open to international space cooperation as noted in their respective policy

documents on space and current cooperative programs History has shown that both China and US have gained from space cooperation which could be an ideal solution in seeking to deter China from exercising ASAT operations

Aff is cooperation and diplomacyIBT 15 (International Business Times Future Space Policy Is Built On International Cooperation NASA Administrator Charles Bolden httpwwwibtimescomfuture-space-policy-built-international-cooperation-nasa-administrator-charles-bolden-2186627 111615)

NASA Administrator Charles Bolden says a manned mission to Mars will happen in the 2030s but unlike the Apollo moon missions in the 1960s and 70s it will take an international coalition -- including Russia and China -- to get there America remains the unquestioned leader when it comes to space exploration but in a talk at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday Bolden said future efforts will look like the International Space Station an international effort that has kept humans continuously living and working in space for the past 15 years Meanwhile current missions such as New Horizons Cassini and the Curiosity rover are providing new insights on the world beyond near-Earth orbit NASAs journey to Mars includes the launch of new rovers orbiters and the Orion spacecraft The space agencys future missions will rely on collaboration with Russia and China Yours will be a future where human beings as President Obama has said have pushed farther into the universe not just to visit but also to stay To me public diplomacy and cooperation in space go together like peanut butter and jelly Bolden said That diplomacy with NASA leading the charge is important for the next phase of space exploration Obama laid out the ambitious plans for NASA in an address from the John F Kennedy Space Center in Florida on April 15 2010 The roadmap to Mars includes the return of manned launches to the US the development of a deep space spacecraft and the Asteroid Redirect Mission The mission to Mars will require additional commercial and international support Boeing and SpaceX have been tasked with bringing manned launches back to the United States The first commercial crew astronauts are training for the first flight to the ISS with crew flight tests scheduled for 2017 SpaceX and Orbital ATK are currently sending cargo to the space station with the formers Dragon being the only craft capable of returning science investigations back to Earth Despite individual launch failures Orbital ATK in 2014 and SpaceX in 2015 the two companies are preparing for cargo missions in December Aside from the Apollo missions human exploration of space has been Earth-reliant -- astronauts have spent most of their time in space in low-Earth orbit Bolden said That will change in the 2020s when NASA attempts to capture a boulder from an asteroid and place it in a stable lunar orbit The cislunar -- athe area between the Earth and the moon -- phase of space exploration will take astronauts around the moon but also serves as a test for international support When we go up to cislunar space itrsquos going to give our international partners an opportunity to be with us because no venture into deep space is going to be done by one nation Itrsquos just too difficult itrsquos too expensive Bolden said Going to Mars would make space exploration Earth-independent for the first time since the Apollo missions Despite the US current tensions with Russia NASA and the Russian Space Agency -- Roscosmos -- continue to have a strong working relationship Through the funding of the ISS -- along with NASAs reliance on Roscosmos to send astronauts to low-Earth orbit -- the two space agencies continue to work cooperatively That relationship could change once NASA

becomes less reliant on Russia -- the space agency agreed to pay $816 million per seat aboard the Soyuz for six flights in 2018 -- with the launch of its commercial crew program but Bolden said hes committed to the partnership Conspicuously absent from NASAs international partners is China Politics have stymied this relationship following a ban included in the 2011 US Federal budget There are some loopholes that have allowed Bolden to collaborate with the Chinese Academy of Science on Earth science research NASA also provided China with lunar imagery that helped the Change 3 mission select a landing site Air traffic management is another area of cooperation Itrsquos critical to partner with China Bolden said Space exploration is peaceful but the area above Earth could become a source of contention as more countries send satellites into orbit More partnerships would lead to a safer orbit If wersquore partnered with the Chinese as we are with other nations I think they would be much less prone to do something that puts low-Earth orbit in jeopardy like you know anti-satellite stuff Now that may be a naiumlve thought but I think thats what gives me hope that the more we can have many nations working toward a common goal the better off wersquoll be Bolden said

SSAViolation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space ndash at best extra T

T version ndash have the US repeal the wolf amendment and remove space technology from the list of munitions items regulated by the US International Traffic in Arms Regulation framework and pledge non-interference with Chinese space assets in exchange for the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos expansion of data exchange pertaining to space technology operational information and a pledge of non-interference with US space assets

Interested in coopWeeden and He 16- Brian Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former US Air Force Officer Xiao writer USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA TIES (httpwarontherockscom201604use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties) JB

With the end of the Cold War outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness But today space is back and more important than ever Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers And in national security circles there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race the United States against the rising power of China The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil military and commercial space sectors Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige Over time

what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability or a means of strengthening the US-China relationship The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for US national security enabling communications with US strategic forces allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties forming the cornerstone of the United Statesrsquo intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and serving as essential enablers

for the United Statesrsquo ability to defend its borders project power to protect its allies and interests overseas and defeat adversaries Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the US mdash and the global mdash economy China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible and even in competition with other key players especially the United States China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power From Chinarsquos perspective the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions mdash particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China and adoctrinal focus on ldquoactive defenserdquo have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting From the Chinese perspective it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security close the power gap and defend itself from American

aggression Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both side s Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable cooperative and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security While

China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities Thus the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement Accordingly the

SSAViolation ndash the aff cooperates with China in space ndash both China and the US want to be in space and have similar goals in space ndash at best extra T

T version ndash have the US repeal the wolf amendment and remove space technology from the list of munitions items regulated by the US International Traffic in Arms Regulation framework and pledge non-interference with Chinese space assets in exchange for the Peoplersquos Republic of Chinarsquos expansion of data exchange pertaining to space technology operational information and a pledge of non-interference with US space assets

Interested in coopWeeden and He 16- Brian Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and a former US Air Force Officer Xiao writer USE OUTER SPACE TO STRENGTHEN US-CHINA TIES (httpwarontherockscom201604use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties) JB

With the end of the Cold War outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness But today space is back and more important than ever Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers And in national security circles there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race the United States against the rising power of China The United States and China have identified space as a strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil military and commercial space sectors Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige Over time

what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability or a means of strengthening the US-China relationship The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for US national security enabling communications with US strategic forces allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties forming the cornerstone of the United Statesrsquo intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and serving as essential enablers

for the United Statesrsquo ability to defend its borders project power to protect its allies and interests overseas and defeat adversaries Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the US mdash and the global mdash economy China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible and even in competition with other key players especially the United States China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power From Chinarsquos perspective the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions mdash particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China and adoctrinal focus on ldquoactive defenserdquo have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting From the Chinese perspective it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security close the power gap and defend itself from American

aggression Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both side s Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable cooperative and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security While

China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities Thus the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement Accordingly the

United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term sustainability and security of space Working together and with other

stakeholders to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers The United States and China as well as the private sectors of the two countries should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects including science and human exploration though doing so will need to overcome strong political

challenges At the same time both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look

to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage they could put in place

unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities Finally both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community

Mutual interestsPekkanen 15 - Lob and Gertrud Tamaki professor at the Jackson School of International Studies in the University of Washington Seattle works on the international relations of Japan and Asia with a special interest in outer space governance security and policy co-chairs the US-Japan Space Forum (Saadia ldquoFrenemies In Space China Needs To Protect Its Assets Toordquo Forbes August 26 2015 httpwwwforbescomsitessaadiampekkanen20150826frenemies-in-space-china-needs-to-protect-its-assets-too727d36512959dmeth)

It is common to equate Space Situational Awareness (SSA) only with US national security One reason for this is the omnipresence of the United States military which has been central to our way of thinking about the concept in outer space security In theory the SSA mechanics are simple how do you figure out where something is where it is going and what it might do to your stuff out

there In practice at this stage no one does SSA better than the US military primarily through its Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) The US military is already pretty formidable in terms of its capabilities relative to the rest of the

world Now it is also working on coalitions to make itself even more indispensable to governing SSA realities worldwide In 2010 the US Air Force Space Commandrsquos long-standing Schriever Wargames validated the importance of an institutional infrastructure to safeguard space capabilities Among the organizational possibilities were a Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) a Combined Joint Task Force-Space (CJTF-Space) and a Space Council Of these the idea of CSpOC conceived as a center to leverage allied space capabilities all the way to the operational level of war is critical from a global and Asian perspective The idea of emphasizing in other words not just

ldquojointrdquo (as in the US military) but ldquocombinedrdquo (as with US allies) has been around for some time But perhaps today there is greater appreciation of the fact that ldquoJ does not equal Crdquo that the US has to partner with allies and other stakeholders that it cannot fight a war alone The theme of partnering with responsible nations international organizations and commercial firms around the world is evident also in the US governmentrsquos 2011 National Security Space Strategy The theme is turning into a reality

moving at a brisk pace Although little public information is available on the trajectories of the CSpOC itself there is a bilateral and multilateral reality going into place that might eventually consolidate and bring it about down the line USSTRATCOM has moved forward on this front signing direct agreement after agreement with a band of trusted allies As of 2015 it already has SSA agreements with eight countries namely Canada Germany the UK France Italy Israel Australia South Korea and Japan In addition the US has signed agreements with two international organizations the European Space Agency and the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites It has also reportedly signed agreements with 49 commercial

entities in 18 countries There is a similar movement toward multilateral arrangements with the US inking a memorandum of understanding on a Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO not a center) with Australia Canada and the UK in late 2014 Given the sensitivity about national space assets and data-sharing as well as the inequality of allied

capabilities however it is not too difficult to see the US military remaining at the heart of this spreading SSA governance for a long time to come Even the CSpO Initiative for example places JSpOC at the center of a collaborative mechanism between the US and its allies Recommended by Forbes MOST POPULAR Photos The 10 Best And Worst States To Make A Living In 2016 +175746 VIEWS Millennials Are Doomed To Face An Existential Crisis That Will Define The Rest Open TextVoice Inside The Data-Driven

Race For President But several realities should also guide US efforts to shape the emerging SSA governance frameworks The rise of a whole new generation of stakeholders in the global space game means that the centrality of the US military alone is not something that can be taken for granted Consider the formal non-profit Space Data Association (SDA) and especially its Space Data Center that bills itself as the first global operator-led network for providing data to improve SSA and satellite operations Formed in 2009 its membership is open to all interested players in

and out of the US Then there are the prospects of US engagement with Asia home to two of the worldrsquos most

ambitious military space powers Japan and China For Japan as a formal US ally all this resonates with its own efforts to create a new force that will participate in space surveillance It also chimes with Japanese efforts to improve national capabilities for space surveillance not just for debris but also ldquosuspicious satellitesrdquo that could harm the countryrsquos assets Japan foresees having its own radars and optical telescopes as well as integrated dedicated systems for identifying analyzing and cataloguing orbits In line with what Japan has done to date in the interest of its space security it is

difficult to imagine it will give up the opportunity to indigenize SSA capabilities Much of what the US is doing appears to be directed at the famed China threats in outer space that we hear so much about mdash the irresponsible

debris-creating Chinese behavior the increasing Chinese counterspace capabilities There might be limits to straight-line projections The nondiscriminatory realities of orbital debris may lead China to back away from what are effectively space suicide missions that can devastate all equally There is also the huge technological uncertainty that comes with militarizing or weaponizing space in the face of an opposed US military and now a spreading US-centric coalition framework worldwide Not to be forgotten is the cost of traveling down this road problematic in light of a downturn in Chinarsquos economy and a populace that might be more difficult to

placate with technology fireworks alone if negative economic conditions are prolonged We should remember Chinarsquos space assets are just as important to Chinese comprehensive security in the long run as to all other ambitious space powers China wants to protect its space assets as much as the US does its own Although other motives might be at play this may be one reason why the Chinese military has already reached out to the US military more formally and directly on SSA issues It is an opportunity that the US military can help shape in prudent and watchful ways This would not be naiumlve just responsible behavior for the US too

DistinctionsCaselist

Distinction Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopicalXinhua 33116 (Xinhua 33116 ldquoSpotlight China US agree to expand common interests control differencesrdquo httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglish2016-0401c_135243258htm Poetic Justice)

REGIONAL ISSUES Talking about the Korean Peninsula issue Xi stressed that all parties concerned should fully and strictly carry out UN resolutions on the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang started off a new year with the testing of what it claimed was its first hydrogen bomb in January and followed up with the launch of a string of short- and medium-range projectiles Xi called on all parties concerned to refrain from any rhetoric and act that could escalate regional tension and any move that might impair the security interests of other countries and the strategic balance in the region Although the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is not on the NSS agenda the recent flare-up of tension in Northeast Asia in the wake of the nuclear test and satellite launch by the DPRK has caused widespread concern Xi told Obama that his country is adamant on realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula and on solving relevant issues through dialogue and negotiations as well Addressing the South China Sea issue Xi vowed that his country will not accept any act under the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty and damages its security interests Xi reaffirmed that Beijing respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight other countries are entitled to under international law in the area one of the worlds busiest waterways China he stressed is resolute both in defending its sovereignty and related rights in South China Sea and in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and sticks to the principle that the disputes should be settled in a peaceful way by relevant claimants through direct consultations and negotiations Beijing hopes that the United States will abide by its commitment to not taking sides on the sovereignty and territorial rows in South China Sea and play a constructive role in maintaining regional peace and stability said the Chinese president Xi also urged the United States to stick to the one-China policy Reaffirming Chinas stance on the Taiwan issue Xi demanded that the US side continue taking concrete moves to help maintain the peaceful development of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait which he said will also benefit the China-US relationship in the long run Zheng said that the two leaders had frank exchange of opinions on sensitive issues in the China-US relationship one of the most important bilateral relations in the world and agreed to control and manage differences in a constructive manner The senior diplomat said that Obama had pledged that his country does not support independence of Taiwan and Tibet COORDINATION COOPERATION On his part Obama reiterated that his country welcomes the rise of a peaceful stable and prosperous China He said that the two countries share extensive common interests in the Asia Pacific and the United States stands ready to control differences with the Chinese side in a constructive way Obama voiced his support for the uphill efforts of the worlds second largest economy to stage the economic transformation including its supply-side structural reform which was proposed by

DistinctionsCaselist

Distinction Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopicalXinhua 33116 (Xinhua 33116 ldquoSpotlight China US agree to expand common interests control differencesrdquo httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglish2016-0401c_135243258htm Poetic Justice)

REGIONAL ISSUES Talking about the Korean Peninsula issue Xi stressed that all parties concerned should fully and strictly carry out UN resolutions on the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang started off a new year with the testing of what it claimed was its first hydrogen bomb in January and followed up with the launch of a string of short- and medium-range projectiles Xi called on all parties concerned to refrain from any rhetoric and act that could escalate regional tension and any move that might impair the security interests of other countries and the strategic balance in the region Although the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is not on the NSS agenda the recent flare-up of tension in Northeast Asia in the wake of the nuclear test and satellite launch by the DPRK has caused widespread concern Xi told Obama that his country is adamant on realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula and on solving relevant issues through dialogue and negotiations as well Addressing the South China Sea issue Xi vowed that his country will not accept any act under the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty and damages its security interests Xi reaffirmed that Beijing respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight other countries are entitled to under international law in the area one of the worlds busiest waterways China he stressed is resolute both in defending its sovereignty and related rights in South China Sea and in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and sticks to the principle that the disputes should be settled in a peaceful way by relevant claimants through direct consultations and negotiations Beijing hopes that the United States will abide by its commitment to not taking sides on the sovereignty and territorial rows in South China Sea and play a constructive role in maintaining regional peace and stability said the Chinese president Xi also urged the United States to stick to the one-China policy Reaffirming Chinas stance on the Taiwan issue Xi demanded that the US side continue taking concrete moves to help maintain the peaceful development of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait which he said will also benefit the China-US relationship in the long run Zheng said that the two leaders had frank exchange of opinions on sensitive issues in the China-US relationship one of the most important bilateral relations in the world and agreed to control and manage differences in a constructive manner The senior diplomat said that Obama had pledged that his country does not support independence of Taiwan and Tibet COORDINATION COOPERATION On his part Obama reiterated that his country welcomes the rise of a peaceful stable and prosperous China He said that the two countries share extensive common interests in the Asia Pacific and the United States stands ready to control differences with the Chinese side in a constructive way Obama voiced his support for the uphill efforts of the worlds second largest economy to stage the economic transformation including its supply-side structural reform which was proposed by

Distinction Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopicalXinhua 33116 (Xinhua 33116 ldquoSpotlight China US agree to expand common interests control differencesrdquo httpnewsxinhuanetcomenglish2016-0401c_135243258htm Poetic Justice)

REGIONAL ISSUES Talking about the Korean Peninsula issue Xi stressed that all parties concerned should fully and strictly carry out UN resolutions on the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) Pyongyang started off a new year with the testing of what it claimed was its first hydrogen bomb in January and followed up with the launch of a string of short- and medium-range projectiles Xi called on all parties concerned to refrain from any rhetoric and act that could escalate regional tension and any move that might impair the security interests of other countries and the strategic balance in the region Although the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is not on the NSS agenda the recent flare-up of tension in Northeast Asia in the wake of the nuclear test and satellite launch by the DPRK has caused widespread concern Xi told Obama that his country is adamant on realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula and on solving relevant issues through dialogue and negotiations as well Addressing the South China Sea issue Xi vowed that his country will not accept any act under the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty and damages its security interests Xi reaffirmed that Beijing respects and safeguards the freedom of navigation and overflight other countries are entitled to under international law in the area one of the worlds busiest waterways China he stressed is resolute both in defending its sovereignty and related rights in South China Sea and in safeguarding peace and stability in the region and sticks to the principle that the disputes should be settled in a peaceful way by relevant claimants through direct consultations and negotiations Beijing hopes that the United States will abide by its commitment to not taking sides on the sovereignty and territorial rows in South China Sea and play a constructive role in maintaining regional peace and stability said the Chinese president Xi also urged the United States to stick to the one-China policy Reaffirming Chinas stance on the Taiwan issue Xi demanded that the US side continue taking concrete moves to help maintain the peaceful development of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait which he said will also benefit the China-US relationship in the long run Zheng said that the two leaders had frank exchange of opinions on sensitive issues in the China-US relationship one of the most important bilateral relations in the world and agreed to control and manage differences in a constructive manner The senior diplomat said that Obama had pledged that his country does not support independence of Taiwan and Tibet COORDINATION COOPERATION On his part Obama reiterated that his country welcomes the rise of a peaceful stable and prosperous China He said that the two countries share extensive common interests in the Asia Pacific and the United States stands ready to control differences with the Chinese side in a constructive way Obama voiced his support for the uphill efforts of the worlds second largest economy to stage the economic transformation including its supply-side structural reform which was proposed by

Chinas policymakers as the latest remedy for economic ills The two countries agreed to deepen cooperation in a host of areas including economy and trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement and cyber-security and enhance coordination and cooperation in a slew of international and regional issues related to Iran and Afghanistan and on peacekeeping and development In a joint presidential statement issued by the two countries on Thursday they said that they will sign the Paris Agreement on April 22 months after the historic pact on climate change was adopted during the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) in France The two leaders have also agreed to issue a joint statement on nuclear security cooperation and work to make the fourth NSS a success Zheng said that both sides believe that the healthy and stable development of the China-US relations is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and the two peoples as well Xi and Obama who expect to meet again during the G20 Summit in Hangzhou in September agreed to make the gathering a success Zheng said

CaselistmdashTaiwan Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and ChinaRamzy lsquo9 (Austin Ramzy is a foreign policy correspondent for Time ldquoFive Things the US and China Still Disagree Onrdquo httpcontenttimecomtimeworldarticle08599193956800html 11169 Poetic Justice)

Taiwan The democratic self-governed island is one of Beijings most important foreign policy considerations It puts a huge amount of effort into diplomatically isolating Taiwan which Beijing considers Chinese territory that should be reunified by force if necessary China maintains an estimated 1300 ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait to be used against the island in event of war While the US does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan it remains its biggest ally and protector Under the Taiwan Relations Act US law requires that it sell military hardware to provide for Taiwans defense which infuriates China Last year Beijing cut off military-to-military interactions between the US and China to protest an American arms deal with Taiwan (See pictures of President Obama visiting Asia) Those relations resumed in October when Xu Caihou vice chairman of Chinas Central Military Commission visited Washington Xu went to America and talked to Obama about arms sales says Yan Xuetong director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing But the arms sales will continue because of the Taiwan Relations Act That shows that they can talk nicely but cant reach an agreement

CaselistmdashTaiwan Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and ChinaRamzy lsquo9 (Austin Ramzy is a foreign policy correspondent for Time ldquoFive Things the US and China Still Disagree Onrdquo httpcontenttimecomtimeworldarticle08599193956800html 11169 Poetic Justice)

Taiwan The democratic self-governed island is one of Beijings most important foreign policy considerations It puts a huge amount of effort into diplomatically isolating Taiwan which Beijing considers Chinese territory that should be reunified by force if necessary China maintains an estimated 1300 ballistic missiles along the Taiwan Strait to be used against the island in event of war While the US does not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan it remains its biggest ally and protector Under the Taiwan Relations Act US law requires that it sell military hardware to provide for Taiwans defense which infuriates China Last year Beijing cut off military-to-military interactions between the US and China to protest an American arms deal with Taiwan (See pictures of President Obama visiting Asia) Those relations resumed in October when Xu Caihou vice chairman of Chinas Central Military Commission visited Washington Xu went to America and talked to Obama about arms sales says Yan Xuetong director of the Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing But the arms sales will continue because of the Taiwan Relations Act That shows that they can talk nicely but cant reach an agreement

CaselistmdashCurrency Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreementRamzy lsquo9 (Austin Ramzy is a foreign policy correspondent for Time ldquoFive Things the US and China Still Disagree Onrdquo httpcontenttimecomtimeworldarticle08599193956800html 11169 Poetic Justice)

Currency During his confirmation hearings in January US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner accused China of manipulating its currency driving down the value of the renminbi to make Chinese exports cheap That provoked a furious response from Beijing and since then Geithner has toned down his message While he expressed a belief commonly held by economists an official finding of currency manipulation by the US government would trigger negotiations with China and possibly duties on Chinese imports In October the Treasury Department said that the renminbi was undervalued but that China was not a currency manipulator Many economists argue the low value of Chinas currency helped contribute to the global imbalances that precipitated last years financial crisis China has rejected that idea and instead points the finger at the USs profligate spending and weak control of financial markets Obama is expected to raise the renminbi issue during his visit to China but with China trying to prop up an export sector that has suffered from the downturn there is little hope that it will allow its currency to appreciate anytime soon

CaselistmdashIP IP Rights in China is an area of controversyRamzy lsquo9 (Austin Ramzy is a foreign policy correspondent for Time ldquoFive Things the US and China Still Disagree Onrdquo httpcontenttimecomtimeworldarticle08599193956800html 11169 Poetic Justice)

Intellectual Property Rights Illegal copying of everything from handbags to DVDs to medicine in China is a source of extreme frustration for many US companies American software and music companies say that more than $35 billion worth of their goods are pirated in China each year The US has pushed China to step up its enforcement of intellectual-property rights arguing that its one way to narrow a trade gap that reached $268 billion last year While the US is unlikely to make any progress on pushing China to allow its currency to appreciate it could make a stronger case on preventing piracy says James McGregor the former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China As China tries to move beyond cheap manufacturing its companies will begin to suffer more from poor protection of intellectual property Piracy is still a horrendous problem here and its alarming for the business community he says Its a win-win because China wants to build an innovation society

CaselistmdashHuman Rights Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than ChinaRamzy lsquo9 (Austin Ramzy is a foreign policy correspondent for Time ldquoFive Things the US and China Still Disagree Onrdquo httpcontenttimecomtimeworldarticle08599193956800html 11169 Poetic Justice)

Human Rights When Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October some Chinese bloggers joked that President Hu Jintao was ecstatic about the decision because it meant the honor wouldnt go to a Chinese dissident Now human-rights activists wonder if Obama will use the bully pulpit of the prize to push for the release of dozens of jailed activists being held throughout the country Expectations arent high In February Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said the US wouldnt allow human rights to derail cooperation with China on issues like climate change and rebuilding the global economy Then last month Obama decided to postpone meeting with the Dalai Lama the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader until after his visit to China That was widely seen as an effort to avoid upsetting Beijing If the Chinese government appreciated the gesture it chose an odd way to show it Days ahead of Obamas arrival Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said that as a black President Obama should be especially sensitive to Chinas position on Tibet In 1959 China abolished the feudal serf system [in Tibet] just as President Lincoln freed the black slaves Qin told a news conference according to the Associated Press So we hope President Obama more than any other foreign state leader can have a better understanding on Chinas position on opposing the Dalais splitting activities

CaselistmdashKorea Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreementSnyder 1816 (Scott Snyder is the resident expert on North Korean relations on the council on foreign relations ldquoWhere China and the United States Disagree on North Koreardquo 1816 httpblogscfrorgasia20160108where-china-and-the-united-states-disagree-on-north-korea Poetic Justice)

The ldquoartificial earthquakerdquo in North Korea caused by its fourth nuclear test has set off geopolitical tremors in US-China relations exposing the underlying gap between the two countries that has long been papered over by their common rhetorical commitment to Korean denuclearization At their Sunnylands summit in June of 2013 Presidents Xi Jinping and Barack Obama vowed to work together on North Korea Last September in Washington the two leaders underscored the unacceptability of a North Korean nuclear test But Secretary of State John Kerry stated in his January 7 conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi that previous approaches to the North Korean problem have not worked and that ldquowe cannot continue business as usualrdquo The Global Times a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party responded by stating that ldquo[t]here is no hope to put an end to the North Korean nuclear conundrum if the US South Korea and Japan do not change their policies toward Pyongyang Solely depending on Beijingrsquos pressure to force the North to give up its nuclear plan is an illusionrdquo The now exposed Sino-US gap over North Korea runs deep and extends to at least four critical dimensions Influence Since China controls the food and fuel lifelines to North Korea Western analysts see Beijing holding Pyongyangrsquos fate in its hands Yet North Korea snubbed China and exposed its lack of influence by going ahead with a nuclear test that Xi Jinping had opposed publicly and privately North Korea has taken Chinese support for granted by assuming that Beijingrsquos geopolitical interests in stability will not permit China to pull the plug Washington is now pressing Beijing to move in that direction Ideology It is particularly hard for China to turn on its last ally despite the clear economic and strategic divergences that have weakened the Sino-North Korean relationship for decades It appears even harder for China to give up the idea that despite four North Korean nuclear tests US enmity toward Pyongyang is the root cause of peninsular hostility This view persists despite US-North Korea negotiations leading to agreements such as the Agreed Framework forbearance despite continued North Korean double-dealing and renewed negotiation efforts through Six Party Talks even despite North Korearsquos first nuclear test and even seeming indifference to Pyongyangrsquos provocations under the moniker of ldquostrategic patiencerdquo during the Obama administration Instruments The record of diplomacy with North Korea shows that neither incentives nor efforts at coercion have been successful in inducing North Korean cooperation Neither has US signaling (in the form of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 overflights of the Korean peninsula) worked to draw a line designed to contain North Korean provocations But China fears that additional pressure will lead to peninsular instability and has moved too slowly to ratchet up pressure on Pyongyang End state Underlying surface agreement on the necessity of denuclearization is a yawning gap over the type of Korean peninsula that would be acceptable if as more and more Americans have concluded the only way to get rid of North Korearsquos nuclear weapons is to get rid of the Kim

Jong-un regime China opposes a unified Korea allied with the United States preferring to maintain a security buffer on the Korean peninsula against US forces The broader impact of rising competition from the US rebalance and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea has begun to inhibit prospects for Sino-US cooperation on North Korea North Korea to date has counted on Sino-US geopolitical mistrust to secure space for its survival North Korearsquos underlying assumption behind its nuclear gambit is that it can survive and perhaps even benefit from an open geopolitical rift between the United States and China Sino-US cooperation is costly to North Korea while a failure to cooperate on Pyongyang would severely exacerbate Sino-US friction and competition However if North Korea cannot exploit geostrategic mistrust between China and the United States for its own gain the assumption behind Pyongyangrsquos man-made tremors may lead to fatal consequences for the Kim regime

CaselistmdashSCS Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCSAndrade 71216 (Tonio Andrade a professor of history at Emory University is author of ldquoThe Gunpowder Age China Military Innovation and the Rise of the West in World Historyrdquo ldquoFor US leaders confronting China is a dangerous gamerdquo 71216 httpswwwwashingtonpostcomopinionsglobal-opinionsfor-us-leaders-confronting-china-is-a-dangerous-game2016071276060390-482e-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_storyhtml Poetic Justice)

China is increasingly asserting itself as a great power and nowhere is its rise more likely to lead to war than in the South China Sea This vital seaway not only is filled with shipping lanes but also contains rich fishing grounds and oil and gas deposits and China claims vast swaths of it Neighboring countries have reacted angrily to its assertions and China has responded by ratcheting up air and naval patrols and building artificial islands with airstrips and barracks These tensions are likely only to increase in the wake of the Permanent Court of Arbitrationrsquos ruling Tuesday undermining Chinarsquos claims and bolstering those of the Philippines one of the closest US allies in the region China has rejected the ruling its state-controlled media outlets call the court a ldquolaw-abusing tribunalrdquo The United States for its part is determined to enforce the ruling and has stepped up naval patrols in the region in anticipation of Chinarsquos negative reaction This is a dangerous game China is more prepared for a confrontation than Western experts may expect We are quite literally in perilous waters US leaders would do well to understand Chinarsquos military past a history far more warlike and bellicose than has long been assumed

CaselistmdashSCS Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCSAndrade 71216 (Tonio Andrade a professor of history at Emory University is author of ldquoThe Gunpowder Age China Military Innovation and the Rise of the West in World Historyrdquo ldquoFor US leaders confronting China is a dangerous gamerdquo 71216 httpswwwwashingtonpostcomopinionsglobal-opinionsfor-us-leaders-confronting-china-is-a-dangerous-game2016071276060390-482e-11e6-90a8-fb84201e0645_storyhtml Poetic Justice)

China is increasingly asserting itself as a great power and nowhere is its rise more likely to lead to war than in the South China Sea This vital seaway not only is filled with shipping lanes but also contains rich fishing grounds and oil and gas deposits and China claims vast swaths of it Neighboring countries have reacted angrily to its assertions and China has responded by ratcheting up air and naval patrols and building artificial islands with airstrips and barracks These tensions are likely only to increase in the wake of the Permanent Court of Arbitrationrsquos ruling Tuesday undermining Chinarsquos claims and bolstering those of the Philippines one of the closest US allies in the region China has rejected the ruling its state-controlled media outlets call the court a ldquolaw-abusing tribunalrdquo The United States for its part is determined to enforce the ruling and has stepped up naval patrols in the region in anticipation of Chinarsquos negative reaction This is a dangerous game China is more prepared for a confrontation than Western experts may expect We are quite literally in perilous waters US leaders would do well to understand Chinarsquos military past a history far more warlike and bellicose than has long been assumed

Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation

CI ndash Takeyh

CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions Takeyh 9 --- Hasib J Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies (Ray 1079 ldquoThe Essence of Diplomatic Engagementrdquo httpwwwcfrorgdiplomacy-and-statecraftessence-diplomatic-engagementp20362breadcrumb=issue65international_peace_and_security)ernst

It is Obamas declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed When France chides you for appeasement you know youre scraping bottom Acknowledgement of Americas misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion After all North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles Cuba spurns Americas offers of a greater opening and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George

Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation However the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions North Korea Cuba Syria and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation

2ac AT Mutual Goals

Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interactionLynch 2 --- a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University where he is also director of both the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program (Marc June 2002 ldquoWhy Engage China and the Logic of Communicative Engagementrdquo)ernst

Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as lsquothe use of non- coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major powerrsquos behaviorrsquo (1999 14)11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant international order A strategic mode of action might seem to be built in to such a definition since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change the behavior of another state The concept of

communicative action does not rule out purposive action however The distinction rests upon the orientation of the action and the approach to the other Whether strategic or communicative engagement strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations between states not a condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an unintended byproduct of interaction Engagement typically involves some combination of the provision of incentives the increase of trade and investment diplomatic dialogues the building of interdependencies and the induction of the target state into international organizations

A ndash Artificially restricts the lit ndash this interp throws out HUGE parts of the best US-China solvency lit in favor of managing a difficult general distinction between normalization and fundamental disagreement in the context of ALL ldquoengagementrdquo the US does Your examples are smarthelpful but I still think it splits hairs on the nature of US-China affs in an unnecessarily strict manner

B ndash Aff ground ndash wandering into areas where China has completely opposite views seems untenable for the aff Perhaps this requires the aff to think even harder about transformational diplomacy but this seems a lot like lsquohard debate is good for the affrsquo on conditionality debates Conditoinality mostly serves the neg as does this interp I think the strategic out for most of these affs is to spot ldquosay nordquo and play a bunch of tricks which Wake GL did with great success when they won the NDT in 2008 I donrsquot think that vision of debate is better for anyone it moves debate away from the lit and privileges trickery over thought

C ndash It solves the limitsground args Irsquove seen you make above I think ldquocanrsquot just enforce existing cooprdquo is a great T arg and Irsquom glad you helped me think it through I disagree that the solution is this interp of diplomatic engagement (or ldquoTmdashsubstantialrdquo or ldquoTmdashQPQrdquo) I also agree that whether there is an appeasement link is a separate question from T because it mixes burdens which is why I also think ldquono FUNDAMENTAL disagreement nowrdquo is a ldquoSQ solvesno impactrdquo arg more than a T arg

2ac Overlimits

Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education Neumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions (analytical categories) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is

relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practices To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior

CI ndash Takeyh

CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions Takeyh 9 --- Hasib J Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies (Ray 1079 ldquoThe Essence of Diplomatic Engagementrdquo httpwwwcfrorgdiplomacy-and-statecraftessence-diplomatic-engagementp20362breadcrumb=issue65international_peace_and_security)ernst

It is Obamas declared engagement policy that has raised the ire of critics and led them to once more take refuge in the spurious yet incendiary charge of appeasement Columnist Charles Krauthammer recently exclaimed When France chides you for appeasement you know youre scraping bottom Acknowledgement of Americas misjudgments is derided as an unseemly apologia while diplomacy is denigrated as a misguided exercise in self-delusion After all North Korea continues to test its nuclear weapons and missiles Cuba spurns Americas offers of a greater opening and the Iranian mullahs contrive conspiracy theories about how George

Soros and the CIA are instigating a velvet revolution in their country Tough-minded conservatives are urging a course correction and a resolute approach to the gallery of rogues that the president pledges to embrace Such views miscast the essence of diplomatic engagement Diplomacy is likely to be a painstaking process and it may not work with every targeted nation However the purpose of such a policy is not to transform adversaries into allies but to seek adjustments in their behavior and ambitions North Korea Cuba Syria and Iran would be offered a path toward realizing their essential national interests should they conform to global conventions on issues such as terrorism and proliferation

2ac AT Mutual Goals

Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interactionLynch 2 --- a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University where he is also director of both the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program (Marc June 2002 ldquoWhy Engage China and the Logic of Communicative Engagementrdquo)ernst

Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as lsquothe use of non- coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major powerrsquos behaviorrsquo (1999 14)11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant international order A strategic mode of action might seem to be built in to such a definition since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change the behavior of another state The concept of

communicative action does not rule out purposive action however The distinction rests upon the orientation of the action and the approach to the other Whether strategic or communicative engagement strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations between states not a condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an unintended byproduct of interaction Engagement typically involves some combination of the provision of incentives the increase of trade and investment diplomatic dialogues the building of interdependencies and the induction of the target state into international organizations

A ndash Artificially restricts the lit ndash this interp throws out HUGE parts of the best US-China solvency lit in favor of managing a difficult general distinction between normalization and fundamental disagreement in the context of ALL ldquoengagementrdquo the US does Your examples are smarthelpful but I still think it splits hairs on the nature of US-China affs in an unnecessarily strict manner

B ndash Aff ground ndash wandering into areas where China has completely opposite views seems untenable for the aff Perhaps this requires the aff to think even harder about transformational diplomacy but this seems a lot like lsquohard debate is good for the affrsquo on conditionality debates Conditoinality mostly serves the neg as does this interp I think the strategic out for most of these affs is to spot ldquosay nordquo and play a bunch of tricks which Wake GL did with great success when they won the NDT in 2008 I donrsquot think that vision of debate is better for anyone it moves debate away from the lit and privileges trickery over thought

C ndash It solves the limitsground args Irsquove seen you make above I think ldquocanrsquot just enforce existing cooprdquo is a great T arg and Irsquom glad you helped me think it through I disagree that the solution is this interp of diplomatic engagement (or ldquoTmdashsubstantialrdquo or ldquoTmdashQPQrdquo) I also agree that whether there is an appeasement link is a separate question from T because it mixes burdens which is why I also think ldquono FUNDAMENTAL disagreement nowrdquo is a ldquoSQ solvesno impactrdquo arg more than a T arg

2ac Overlimits

Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education Neumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions (analytical categories) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is

relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practices To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior

2ac AT Mutual Goals

Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interactionLynch 2 --- a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University where he is also director of both the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program (Marc June 2002 ldquoWhy Engage China and the Logic of Communicative Engagementrdquo)ernst

Johnston and Ross define engagement generically as lsquothe use of non- coercive means to ameliorate the non-status quo elements of a rising major powerrsquos behaviorrsquo (1999 14)11 Engagement strategies generally intend to induce a rising power to adopt foreign or domestic policies in line with the norms of the dominant international order A strategic mode of action might seem to be built in to such a definition since it implies the purposive use of a policy by one state to change the behavior of another state The concept of

communicative action does not rule out purposive action however The distinction rests upon the orientation of the action and the approach to the other Whether strategic or communicative engagement strategies are intentional policies aimed at creating more cooperative relations between states not a condition defined by empirical levels of interaction or an unintended byproduct of interaction Engagement typically involves some combination of the provision of incentives the increase of trade and investment diplomatic dialogues the building of interdependencies and the induction of the target state into international organizations

A ndash Artificially restricts the lit ndash this interp throws out HUGE parts of the best US-China solvency lit in favor of managing a difficult general distinction between normalization and fundamental disagreement in the context of ALL ldquoengagementrdquo the US does Your examples are smarthelpful but I still think it splits hairs on the nature of US-China affs in an unnecessarily strict manner

B ndash Aff ground ndash wandering into areas where China has completely opposite views seems untenable for the aff Perhaps this requires the aff to think even harder about transformational diplomacy but this seems a lot like lsquohard debate is good for the affrsquo on conditionality debates Conditoinality mostly serves the neg as does this interp I think the strategic out for most of these affs is to spot ldquosay nordquo and play a bunch of tricks which Wake GL did with great success when they won the NDT in 2008 I donrsquot think that vision of debate is better for anyone it moves debate away from the lit and privileges trickery over thought

C ndash It solves the limitsground args Irsquove seen you make above I think ldquocanrsquot just enforce existing cooprdquo is a great T arg and Irsquom glad you helped me think it through I disagree that the solution is this interp of diplomatic engagement (or ldquoTmdashsubstantialrdquo or ldquoTmdashQPQrdquo) I also agree that whether there is an appeasement link is a separate question from T because it mixes burdens which is why I also think ldquono FUNDAMENTAL disagreement nowrdquo is a ldquoSQ solvesno impactrdquo arg more than a T arg

2ac Overlimits

Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education Neumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions (analytical categories) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is

relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practices To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior

2ac Overlimits

Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education Neumann et al 15mdash Iver B Neumann (London School of Economics) Dr Vincent Pouliout (Scholar and Professor McGill U) and Ole Jacob Sending (Norweigan Institute of intrsquol Affairs) Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics Cambridge Press p 4-6 ndashbr

Our strategy differs in two respects First we move from diplomacy as a category of practice to diplomacy as a category of analysis8 Too often there seems to be a conflation of the two the folk-models and self-understandings of diplomats have been codified and described at length in historical treatises and books over time also becoming part of the scholarly attempt to unpack and account for the nature and functioning of diplomacy For example while Kissingers account of diplomacy is important it is more so because of its influence on the ideal typical self-understanding of diplomats and more generally of diplomatic culture 10 than as a source from which to try to unpack and account for diplomatic culture We strongly believe in the value of inductively restoring categories of practice in social analysis as such many of the classics in diplomatic studies are of great value but then not as theoretical propositions (analytical categories) but for what they tell us about how diplomats themselves categorize the world We therefore take great pains to treat diplomats (practice) categories as a prelude to theoretically and historically informed accounts of where these categories come from how they were made possible and what effects they produce The categories used by people to be studied should not be the end point of social inquiry 11 Second and related we problematize the contours of what diplomacy is and is not by conceiving of it as a profession What makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law 12 In this regard diplomats form what Ashley once termed a mutually recognized community that administers the recognized public sphere of international life 13 Very importantly we do not treat the tasks over which diplomats claim jurisdictional control as givens nor do we limit the tasks that we may define as diplomatic to official diplomats Rather the extent to which diplomats actually administer or control the recognized public sphere between states is something to be assessed empirically not taken as a definitional starting point To be able to assess diplomacy empirically as a set of durable practices we need to cast our net wider to capture the relationships between diplomats and a broader array of actors who are engaged in practices that have conventionally been defined as core diplomatic tasks to analyze how new tasks emerge and become more or less recognized as constituting diplomacy We believe that this move is of crucial importance for it allows us to theorize diplomacy as an emergent phenomenon whose form changes over time This way not only do we embed diplomacy in broader institutional changes we also gain perspective on how much diplomacy matters in defining the infrastructure through which world politics is produced and reproduced As a category of analysis premised on a particular kind of jurisdictional claim diplomacy may be defined in the broadest possible terms as a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world Pitched at this level of abstraction the concept reduces to three key dimensions first diplomacy is a process (of claiming authority and jurisdiction) second it is

relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practices To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior

relational (it operates at the interface between ones polity and that of others) and third it is political (involving both representation and governing) To study diplomacy then we need analytical categories that offer distance and clarity as well as sufficient analytical flexibility to allow for the analysis of change Indeed if we are to understand the social processes through which diplomacy is central to the making and remaking of world politics we need analytical tools that can unpack diplomacy as a set of durable social practices Using a relational perspective we propose two such theoretical lenses configurations and authority claims These two analytical tools allow us to specify what if anything at all is actually changing in contemporary diplomatic practices To situate our focus on configurations and on authority claims we first discuss in some detail what we mean by a relational perspective

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior

AT HaassOrsquoSullivan

We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior Haas and OrsquoSullivan 2k ---Richard N Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush is Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution Washington DC and author of The Reluctant Sheriff The United States After the Cold War (Washington DC Brookings Institution Press 1997) Meghan L O1113088Sullivan is a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution Together they are editors of Honey and Vinegar Incentives Sanctions and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press 2000) (Richard Meghan Summer 2000 ldquoTerms of Engagement Alternatives to Punitive Policiesrdquo)ernst

The term lsquoengagementrsquo was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administrationrsquos policy of

lsquoconstructive engagementrsquo towards South Africa However the term itself remains a source of confusion Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country America arguably lsquoengagesrsquo states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them To be a meaningful subject of analysis the term lsquoengagementrsquo must refer to something more specific than a policy of lsquonon-isolationrsquo As used

in this article lsquoengagementrsquo refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives Certainly it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force in practice there is often considerable overlap of strategies

particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements

• T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
• • Top
  • • 1nc
    • • Interpretation and violation ndash engagement is distinct from cooperation ndash engagement convinces an agent to adopt a goal which isnrsquot mutually held ndash cooperation enforces existing mutual interests ndash the aff is just cooperation because (gtgtgtinsertltltlt)
      • Set a limit on the topic ndash view the debate through the lens of incentives theory ndash affs have a strategic incentive to deviate as little as possible ndash even if their aff is debatable therersquos no shared interpretation of ldquodiplomatic engagementrdquo ndash their interpretation drives affs that just alter existing cooperation ndash that decimates ground fairness and education ndash it takes negative link uniqueness and ldquosay nordquo from being a challenge to being an impossible burden
      • Our interpretation solves ndash it creates a fair functional limit by ensuring the aff chooses a controversial deviation from the status quo ndash it does what vague terms like ldquosubstantialrdquo and ldquosolvency advocaterdquo canrsquot while still allowing a litany of good affs on core policy controversies over divergent interests like human rights currency Taiwan Korea SCS AIIB and tons of others
      • • 2ncmdashOverview
        • • Therersquos a big difference between strengthening cooperation and resolving disagreement
          • Luck and drsquoInverno have an intent to define and exclude ndash setting a clear limit is the major key ndash the topic is already huge and affs always run to the margins
          • Therersquos a clear difference between divergence and clear fundamental disagreement ndash the latter is the best academic expert debate ndash it is the core of US-China engagement and drives all neg ground because it requires controversial difficult diplomacy before jumping into policy coordination
          • Our interpretation sets a clear metric of analysis for what is and isnrsquot diplomacy ndash diplomacy drives non-mutual change ndash their contextual definitions are qualified but 100 useless
          • Defer neg ndash China is huge therersquos no limiting interp of ldquosubstantiallyrdquo or ldquodiplomaticrdquo and good negative generics are few and far between
          • • 2ncmdashXT LuckDrsquoInverno
            • • Luck and drsquoInverno has an intent to define and exclude ndash they say the difference between cooperation and engagement is the lack of a shared goal ndash the US and Canada never engage because we have shared interests ndash the US and China often cooperate but rarely engage which ensures a fair controversy for discussion
              • More ev ndash our interp sets a clear limit and has a clear intent to define and exclude
              • • 2ncmdashChina
                • • In practice the US uses engagement to manage differences with China
                  • • 2ncmdashCrocker
                    • • Engagementrsquos goal is to change the target countryrsquos interests (if concede this card ndash no link appeasement)
                      • • 2ncmdashHaass and OrsquoSullivan
                        • • Engagement must involve a higher level of uncertainty than general cooperation or foreign policy ndash itrsquos distinct from mere incentives
                          • • Violations
                            • • AIIB (no join)
                              • • China wants to cooperate
                                • • Afghanistan
                                  • • US-China cooperation over Afghanistan is driven by common goal of regional security
                                    • US-China engagement now non-uniques all the disads
                                    • • Arctic Environment
                                      • • The aff is cooperation
                                        • • BIT
                                          • • US and China are meeting over the BIT now
                                            • Want a BIT ndash mutual interests
                                            • • Climate
                                              • • All the coop now
                                                • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                • • Cyber
                                                  • • Cooperation over cyber now
                                                    • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                    • • Green Finance
                                                      • • Common interests and coop now
                                                        • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                        • • Health Diplomacy
                                                          • • Common goals in Africa
                                                            • • MES
                                                              • • NME expires in 2016
                                                                • • Nuclear Dialogue ndash Mutual Vulnerability
                                                                  • • Key interests
                                                                    • • S+ED
                                                                      • • The plan only develops existing mechanisms ndash just cooperation
                                                                        • • Space
                                                                          • • Mutual issues in space
                                                                            • Energy Climate Change Counterterror people-to-people exchanges aviation space coop and cyber security are areas of cooperation
                                                                            • Coop now
                                                                            • Aff is cooperation and diplomacy
                                                                            • • SSA
                                                                              • • Interested in coop
                                                                                • Mutual interests
                                                                                • • DistinctionsCaselist
                                                                                  • • Distinction
                                                                                    • • Korean unification NoKo nukes the SCS and Taiwan are T but economic affs trade military people-to-people exchanges law enforcement cyber security Iran Afghanistan climate change and normalizing relations are untopical
                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashTaiwan
                                                                                        • • Taiwan is a point of genuine controversy between the US and China
                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashCurrency
                                                                                            • • Confronting currency devaluation is a point of disagreement
                                                                                              • • CaselistmdashIP
                                                                                                • • IP Rights in China is an area of controversy
                                                                                                  • • CaselistmdashHuman Rights
                                                                                                    • • Human rights is something China doesnrsquot like very much and the US tends to appreciate more than China
                                                                                                      • • CaselistmdashKorea
                                                                                                        • • Dealing with Kimrsquos shit in NoKo and figuring out what to do with the damn peninsula is a point of disagreement
                                                                                                          • • CaselistmdashSCS
                                                                                                            • • Believe it or not ndash there are conflicting disagreements in the SCS
                                                                                                              • • Aff vs T ndash Engagement vs Cooperation
                                                                                                                • • CI ndash Takeyh
                                                                                                                  • • CI ndash Engagement seeks adjustments in behavior and ambitions
                                                                                                                    • • 2ac AT Mutual Goals
                                                                                                                      • • Engagement leads to cooperation ndash its inseperable ndash it canrsquot be defined by empirical levels or types of interaction
                                                                                                                        • • 2ac Overlimits
                                                                                                                          • • Err against over-limiting ldquodiplomaticrdquo ndash it decimates meaningful ground and education
                                                                                                                            • • AT HaassOrsquoSullivan
                                                                                                                              • • We meet Haass and OrsquoSullivan ndash engagement is the usage of incentives to change a countryrsquos behavior