Verbal overshadowing of multiple face recognition: Effects on remembering and knowing over time

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Verbal overshadowing ofmultiple face recognition:Effects on remembering andknowing over timeToby J. Lloyd-Jones a & Charity Brown ba Swansea University , UKb Leeds University , UKPublished online: 02 Apr 2008.

To cite this article: Toby J. Lloyd-Jones & Charity Brown (2008) Verbal overshadowingof multiple face recognition: Effects on remembering and knowing over time, EuropeanJournal of Cognitive Psychology, 20:3, 456-477, DOI: 10.1080/09541440701728425

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Verbal overshadowing of multiple face recognition: Effects

on remembering and knowing over time

Toby J. Lloyd-Jones

Swansea University, UK

Charity Brown

Leeds University, UK

‘‘Verbal overshadowing’’, the phenomenon whereby the verbal reporting of a visual

memory of a face interferes with subsequent recognition of that face, arises for the

presentation of multiple faces following a single face description. We examined the

time course of verbal overshadowing in the multiple face paradigm, and its

influence on recollection and familiarity-based recognition judgements. Partici-

pants were presented with a series of faces and then described a further face (or not,

in the control condition). Study faces were subsequently discriminated from

distractors at either a short or long lag after initial presentation, in a yes/no

recognition task using the remember/know procedure. Verbal overshadowing was

most apparent at the short lag, for discrimination and false ‘‘know’’ judgements. We

discuss these findings in terms of the nature of verbal interference in this paradigm.

How may language shape our thoughts? ‘‘Verbal overshadowing’’ refers to

the phenomenon whereby verbally describing a visual memory of a face can

interfere with subsequent visual recognition of that face (for reviews, see

Schooler, Fiore, & Brandimonte, 1997; Schooler, 2002; and a special issue of

Applied Cognitive Psychology, 2002).

In a seminal study, Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) presented

participants with a 30 s video of a bank robbery, after which participants were

assigned to either a description or no description control condition. Those in

the description condition were instructed to use the next 5 min to describe the

facial features of the bank robber, whilst control participants were given an

unrelated filler task. Description condition participants were less able to

Correspondence should be addressed to Toby J. Lloyd-Jones, Department of Psychology,

Swansea University, Singleton Park, Swansea, SA2 8PP, Wales, UK.

E-mail: T.J. [email protected]

This research was supported by ESRC research grant RES000-23-0057 to Toby J. Lloyd-

Jones.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

2008, 20 (3), 456�477

# 2007 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

http://www.psypress.com/ecp DOI: 10.1080/09541440701728425

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subsequently identify the robber, as compared with the control group, when

given a lineup comprising the robber and several potential suspects.Two accounts of verbal overshadowing are predominant: (1) Schooler

and colleagues have suggested a ‘‘transfer-inappropriate retrieval’’ account.

According to this account, performance is impaired because: (a) Participants

fail to apply the same nonverbal processing operations at retrieval that were

used at encoding, where a good match between encoding and retrieval

processes normally benefits memory performance (cf. the transfer-appro-

priate processing view; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989); and (b) engaging

in one kind of retrieval operation (e.g., verbal) may inhibit the subsequent

operation of another kind of retrieval operation (e.g., nonverbal). However,

as Schooler (2002) notes, retrieval inhibition may not be a component of

verbal overshadowing; and (2) Meissner, Brigham, and Kelley (2001) have

proposed a ‘‘misinformation’’ account. They found that forcing participants

to generate an elaborate description of the target face, thereby producing

details of which they were unsure, impaired later recognition of that face,

whereas warning participants to generate only correct descriptors benefited

face recognition. They proposed that nonveridical information elicited by

the description may have an unfavourable influence upon memory.

DIFFERENT TYPES OF VERBAL INTERFERENCE?

Studies of verbal overshadowing have almost exclusively used a single

stimulus exposure and tested recognition using a lineup procedure. However,

in a paradigm developed by Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003),

participants were exposed to a series of to-be-remembered stimuli (12 faces

or cars) and then described (or not) an additional stimulus (e.g., a 13th face).

Description of a single face impaired subsequent old/new recognition of

both faces and cars (see also Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997; Wester-

man & Larsen, 1997). They argued that verbalisation encouraged a relatively

long-lasting shift (over a number of trials) towards greater visual processing

of individual facial features, at the expense of more global visual processing

which is particularly useful for the recognition of highly visually similar

objects such as faces and cars.

Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002) also contrasted ‘‘piecemeal’’ description

instructions, encouraging the veridical recall of particular features of the

face, with ‘‘elaborative’’ instructions used by Meissner et al. (2001) and

which did not explicitly focus on particular facial features but rather

encouraged erroneous recall of the face. Verbal overshadowing was apparent

only for piecemeal instructions. Brown and Lloyd-Jones suggested that a key

difference between their paradigm and that used by Meissner and colleagues

was that description of a single face impaired recognition of a number of

VERBAL OVERSHADOWING OF MULTIPLE FACES 457

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different faces, whereas Meissner and colleagues elicited erroneous descrip-

tors of a face which later impaired recognition of the same face. Thus, they

suggested that verbalisation may reflect either a change in ‘‘processing style’’

or an alteration to a particular memory representation of a face, depending

on the nature of the paradigm.

In fact, the paradigm of Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003) differs in a

number of ways from the original paradigm of Schooler and Engstler-

Schooler (1990): (1) Participants describe a single face, which is not

subsequently presented for recognition (although see Dodson et al., 1997);

(2) performance is assessed over a series of study and test trials; and (3)

perceptual memory is assessed in an old/new recognition task rather than

identification using a lineup procedure (see also Clare & Lewandowsky,

2004). These differences may be responsible for a different form of

interference from that observed in the traditional paradigm, or a form of

interference that can contribute to the verbal overshadowing effect.

THE PRESENT STUDY

The aim of the present study was to place some parameters on verbal

overshadowing observed in the Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003)

paradigm. First, traditional studies have shown that verbal overshadowing

can persist for up to 2 days (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and possibly

2 weeks (Read & Schooler, 1994). We therefore examined whether verbal

overshadowing in the multiple face paradigm was apparent at relatively short

(across 0�46 intervening items) and long (across 47�70 intervening items) lags

after initial presentation. Note, the short lag here is comprised of more trials

than used previously (which was on average across 0�34 intervening items)

and we also used a new set of ‘‘morphed’’ faces (i.e., head models newly

constructed from real faces through synthesis by morphing). If verbal

interference here is comparable to that observed in the traditional paradigm

we may expect it to be evident at both short and long lags.

We should note however that, as in previous studies using the multiple

face paradigm, exposure to multiple faces can lead to both proactive (i.e.,

encoding of faces is impaired by prior exposure to earlier faces) and

retroactive (i.e., where the retrieval of faces is impaired by prior exposure to

earlier recognition tests) interference (e.g., Davies, Shepherd, & Ellis, 1979;

Deffenbacher, Carr, & Leu, 1981). This raises the concern that recognition

performance may be too low to observe any effects of verbalisation,

particularly at the long lag. Nevertheless, in the original paradigm verbal

overshadowing was observed over and above any influence of these factors,

and on the basis of previous studies we predict that recognition performance,

458 LLOYD-JONES AND BROWN

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even at the longer lag, will be sufficient for verbal overshadowing to be

observed here.Second, we examined the influence of verbal overshadowing on different

aspects of recognition memory. Models of recognition memory may be

classified broadly as comprised of one or two processes (for reviews, see

Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003; Yonelinas, 2002). Single-process models assume

that recognition judgements are based on the target items familiarity or its

total similarity to the contents of memory. Dual-process accounts propose

that a second, slower, recall-like process operates as well, which is more

accurate for fine discriminations between items. Familiarity is thought toreflect a purely quantitative ‘‘strength-like’’ memory signal, whereas

recollection yields qualitative information about the previous study event

(such as when or where an item was studied). One method used to measure

recollection and familiarity is the remember/know procedure (Tulving,

1985). This requires participants to introspect about the basis of their

recognition memory judgements and report whether they recognise items on

the basis of remembering qualitative information about the study event

(‘‘remember’’ responses) or knowing the item is familiar in the absence ofrecollection (‘‘know’’ responses).

Although many researchers consider the remember/know procedure

valuable (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn,

2002; Kishayami & Yonelinas, 2003; Parkin, Gardiner, & Rosser, 1995;

Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995), others have recently questioned

its usefulness (e.g., Wixted & Stretch, 2004). However, the focus here is

primarily on how dissociations between remember and know judgements

may inform our understanding of verbal overshadowing. We make no strongclaims concerning the relationship between remember and know judgements

and the underlying processes of recollection and familiarity, respectively.

The effect of verbal overshadowing on remember and know judgements

has not been studied previously. However, an unpublished study by Schooler,

Fiore, Melcher, and Ambadar (1996, cited in Schooler et al., 1997) examined

the influence of verbal overshadowing on just know/reason judgements in the

traditional paradigm. After the recognition task, participants decided whether

recognition was based on ‘‘specific reasons’’ or ‘‘just based on a ‘gut’ reactionwithout any specific reasons’’. Verbal overshadowing was observed only for

just know judgements. This suggests that verbalisation may influence a

particular aspect of recognition memory, namely the process of familiarity

rather than recollection, and may also be a useful variable in dissociating

behaviourally different aspects of recognition memory performance.

Finally, we should note an added complication to the present study. In

Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003) effects of verbal overshadowing were

moderated by task-specific carryover effects arising in their repeatedmeasures design. In particular, verbal overshadowing only arose when the


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verbalisation task followed the control condition. They argued that carryover

effects from the description onto the control condition attenuated theobservation of verbal overshadowing: When participants initially verbally

described the stimulus they were then more likely to covertly describe the

stimulus in the control condition. Verbal overshadowing is fragile, and a

number of laboratories have failed to replicate Schooler and colleagues

findings (e.g., Clifford, 2003; Davies & Thasen, 2000; Yu & Geiselman, 1993).

Furthermore, verbal overshadowing is attenuated in the standard paradigm

when participants are asked to repeatedly view, describe, and identify a series

of faces (Fallshore & Schooler, 1995; Schooler, Ryan, & Reder, 1996).Nevertheless, power in the Brown and Lloyd-Jones paradigm compares very

favourably with studies included in the meta-analysis of Meissner and

Brigham (2001; in Brown & Lloyd-Jones, 2003, p. 198, Fisher’s Zr��.40

was significantly greater than the meta-analysis value of Zr��.12). We

therefore decided to remain with the original design, and carefully examine

the influence of any carryover effects on verbal overshadowing.

The following experiment examined verbal overshadowing at short and

long lags after initial presentation on face recognition using the remember/know procedure.

METHOD

Participants

Sixty-four undergraduate students (49 females, 15 males) from the Uni-

versity of Kent participated as partial fulfilment of a course requirement. All

were native English speakers, with normal or corrected to normal vision.

Materials and apparatus

The study and test stimuli were greyscale head and shoulder images of 96

male faces. To ensure that the recognition task involved face recognition

rather than image recognition, two views of each face were used (cf.

Baddeley & Woodhead, 1983; Sporer, 1991). For each face, a full frontalview was presented during the study phase whilst a three-quarters view

(facing left) was presented at test.

Face stimuli were provided by the Max Planck Institute for Biological

Cybernetics in Tubingen, Germany. These were head models that had been

newly constructed from real faces through synthesis by morphing. None of

the faces had any distinctive marks or attributes and hair cues had been

removed. The stimuli therefore differ to some extent from those used by

Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003) where hair cues were present. The


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description stimuli were the full frontal images of two faces from the same

database, different from those appearing as study and test materials.Stimuli were presented on a PC using E-prime presentation software

(Version 1.1, Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) and appeared in the centre of

the computer screen. The faces images were approximately 8.5�6.5 cm in

size. Each face was centrally mounted on a black background measuring

9.5�9.5 cm.

Design and procedure

A 2�2�2 mixed factorial design was employed with both description

(description vs. no description) and lag (short vs. long) as within-participants

factors and condition order (description condition first vs. description

condition second) as a between-participants factor. The dependent variables

were taken from signal detection theory, and were discrimination (d?), and

response bias (C). In addition, remember and know responses were recorded

for hits and false alarms. Accuracy in the recognition test was measured by akeypress response.

Each participant received both description and no description conditions.

Thus, participants viewed two separate experimental blocks during the

experiment. Each experimental block comprised a study phase of 24 target

faces, and a test phase consisting of two separate stimulus blocks (note,

blocks were presented continuously to the participants). The first short lag

test block consisted of three-quarter views of 12 previously seen target faces

mixed randomly with 12 new distractor faces. The second long lag test blockconsisted of three-quarter views of the remaining 12 previously seen target

faces mixed randomly with 12 new distractor faces. To achieve this, the 96

faces were divided into eight sets of 12 faces. These were rotated across both

description and no description conditions as: (a) target faces presented at the

short lag (i.e., faces that appeared in the study phase and were presented

within trials 25�48 of the experimental block); (b) target faces presented at

the long lag (i.e., faces that appeared in the study phase and were presented

within trials 49�72 of the experimental block); and (c) distractors (i.e., newfaces in the experimental block). The eight face sets were rotated across

conditions so that every set appeared equally often as target faces presented

at the short lag, target faces presented at the long lag, and distractors for an

equal number of participants (i.e., eight participants within each description

condition). No face was repeated for any participant.

At study, two of the eight face sets were paired together so that 12 faces to

be presented subsequently as targets at the short lag were mixed with 12

faces to be presented as targets at the long lag. To carefully control forpossible effects of presentation order at study there were eight different


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pairings of particular face sets in the study phase. Four sequence templates

(i.e., orders of stimulus presentation) were constructed for the 24 study faces.These comprised two random (forward) sequences plus the reverse of these

two random sequences (reverse sequences were used to ensure that faces

presented late and early in the study phase were rotated). The four sequence

templates were rotated across the eight face-set pairings so that equal

numbers of participants viewed each sequence template within each face-set

pairing (i.e., four participants within each face-set pairing). In addition, the

four sequence templates were rotated so that equal numbers of participants

viewed each sequence template in both the description and no descriptionconditions (i.e., 16 participants in each condition).

In addition, two description stimuli (D1 and D2) were rotated so that each

appeared as the last item in both the description and no description

condition, for an equal number of participants. Thus, half of the participants

described D1 in the description condition whilst viewing D2 in the no

description condition and half described D2 in the description condition

whilst viewing D1 in the no description condition. Furthermore, the two

description stimuli were rotated across face-set pairings and sequencetemplates. For four of the eight face-set pairings presentation of D1 followed

faces presented in the two random (forward) sequences, whilst presentation

of D2 followed faces presented in the two corresponding reverse sequences.

For the remaining four face-set pairings, presentation of D2 followed faces

presented in the two random (forward) sequences, whilst presentation of D1

followed faces presented in the two corresponding reverse sequences. The

description stimulus appeared as the last item in the study phase, whether or

not it was to be described, and did not reappear in the recognition test.The order in which participants undertook the description and no

description conditions was counterbalanced, with half the 64 participants

undertaking the description condition as the first experimental block and

half the no description condition as the first experimental block.

Each participant was tested individually. During the study phase (for both

description and no description conditions) participants viewed a series of 25

faces. Faces were presented sequentially. Each face remained on the screen

for 5 s and was preceded by a fixation cross presented for 1 s. Prior toviewing the faces, participants were instructed to study each face for the

whole time that it appeared on the screen. In addition, participants were

informed that they would later be asked to recognise the items they were

about to see but that each of these items would be presented in a different

view from how they were to appear in the study phase.

Following the study phase participants were provided with instructions

concerning the experimental manipulation. These instructions were taken

from Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2003). During a 5 min period, descriptioncondition participants were asked to write a detailed description of the last


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face they had viewed in the study phase. The following general instructions

were provided: ‘‘Please try to write down a description of the last face you

saw in the study phase. Try to be as complete as possible so that another

person seeing only your description could get as accurate an idea as possible

of what the face is like.’’ Participants were then provided with a series of

specific questions directing them to consider six specific aspects of the face

(forehead, eyes and eyebrows, nose, mouth, chin, ears; cf. Finger & Pezdek,

1999). Participants were told that it was important for them to concentrate

on the task of describing the face for the entire 5 min period. No description

condition participants engaged in a filler activity for a period of 5 min. A

series of 10 numbers was presented upon the computer screen and following

the presentation of each number participants were given 30 s in which to

count backwards from that number in intervals of three. When the computer

sounded, participants were to stop counting and press the spacebar on the

keyboard to view the next number.

Immediately following the experimental manipulation, face recognition

was tested in a yes/no recognition task in which the 24 previously seen target

faces were mixed with 24 new distractor faces (at either the short or long

lag). Participants were instructed to respond ‘‘yes’’ if the face had appeared

in the study phase and ‘‘no’’ if it had not. The recognition decision was

indicated by pressing one of two keys (‘‘Z’’ or ‘‘M’’) on the computer

keyboard. Decision-key mapping and hand dominance were counter-

balanced. Each face remained in view until the participant responded as

quickly and accurately as possible.

Participants were also asked to make a further ‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘know’’

judgement to those faces they responded ‘‘yes’’ to in the recognition test.

Following a ‘‘yes’’ response the face was replaced by a prompt to press either

‘‘R’’ for ‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘K’’ for ‘‘know’’ on the keyboard. Following an

‘‘R’’ or a ‘‘K’’ response (or a ‘‘no’’ recognition decision) a prompt appeared

instructing the participant to rest their fingers on the recognition decision

keys (‘‘Z’’ and ‘‘M’’) and to press the spacebar to view the next face. Prior to

completing the recognition test, participants were provided with instructions

concerning the definitions of remember/know judgements. These definitions

were adapted from Dewhurst and Conway (1994) and were as follows:

When you see a face in this test that you recognize, you may be able to remember

specific details about seeing the face in the earlier study phase. You may, for

example, recollect the thoughts or feelings that the face evoked when you saw it

earlier, or some aspect of the face’s physical appearance. In short, any detail that

supports your belief that the face appeared in the earlier study phase. For other

faces, you simply know that they appeared earlier. These faces may feel familiar, but

you cannot recall their actual occurrence in the earlier list. Therefore, every time

you recognize a face press either R for remember if you can remember specific


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details of the face’s earlier occurrence, or K for know if you recognize the face from

the earlier study phase but you cannot recollect its actual occurrence.

Following completion of the recognition test for the first experimental

condition, participants immediately began the second experimental condi-

tion. They were informed that the second part of the experiment contained

completely new items and that the task in between the study and test phases

would be different.

RESULTS

Analyses of accuracy were carried out to assess whether verbalisation, lag,

and condition order influenced discrimination (d?) or response bias (C).

Statistical analyses of discrimination and response bias were calculated

according to the prescriptions set out by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988). That

is, difficulties arise for the signal detection theory model at hit or false alarm

rates of 1 or 0. Therefore, we transformed accuracy data by adding .5 to each

frequency and dividing by N�1, where N is the number of old or new trials/

stimuli. For d?, larger values indicate a greater ability to discriminate between

old and new items in the recognition test. For C, values above 0 indicate a

conservative bias (i.e., a tendency to say ‘‘no’’) and values below 0 a liberal

bias in the recognition test.

In addition, we examined whether verbalisation and lag influenced

participants’ sense of recollection and familiarity in face recognition. There

is some disagreement concerning the appropriateness of different measure-

ment methods. For instance, two contrasting models are the exclusivity (e.g.,

Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Gardiner et al., 2002) and

independence models (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). The

exclusivity view assumes that remember and know judgements provide

measures of two subjective states of awareness associated with memory

performance. Remember judgements reflect conscious recollection, whilst

know responses reflect conscious memorial states of familiarity. These two

states are assumed to be mutually exclusive and map directly onto the

absolute proportions of remember and know responses (e.g., Gardiner, 1988;

Parkin et al., 1995). Critics argue however, that the exclusivity approach

makes the implicit assumption that processes underlying recollection and

familiarity-based recognition are also mutually exclusive (Yonelinas, 2002;

Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995; although see Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, &

Java, 1996). A contrasting view is that the processes underlying recollection

and familiarity-based recognition judgements are independent (Yonelinas,

2002; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). In this approach, remember and know

responses are used as a basis for estimating the relative contributions of these


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independent processes to recognition memory. As participants are instructed

to respond ‘‘remember’’ whenever an item is recollected, the proportion of

remember responses can be taken as a relatively unbiased measure of

recollection. However, the proportion of know responses will underestimate

the probability that a given item is familiar. This is because participants are

instructed to give a ‘‘know’’ response whenever an item is familiar, but not

recollected, whereas under the independence assumption there will be some

proportion of items that are both recollected and familiar. Therefore,

estimates of familiarity are derived by dividing the proportion of know

responses by one minus the proportion of remember responses (Yonelinas &

Jacoby, 1995).We therefore examine know responses, and we also use know responses as

a basis for estimating the underlying process of familiarity as defined by

Yonelinas and Jacoby (1995).

Table 1 shows discrimination, response bias, hits, and false alarms as a

function of description condition, lag, condition order, and response type

(i.e., remember or know). Analyses consisted of three-way mixed design

analyses of variance (ANOVA) with description (description vs. no descrip-

tion) and lag (short vs. long) as within-participant factors and condition

order (description condition first vs. description condition second) as a

between-participants factor.1 The data were analysed in four ways: (1) We

calculated d? from signal detection theory as a measure of discrimination; (2)

the proportion of hits and false alarms were analysed separately for

remember and know judgements (i.e., the number of old (new) remember

or know responses was divided by the total number of old (new) items); (3)

we computed separate familiarity estimates for hits and false alarms, as

suggested by Yonelinas (2002). Note, that the proportion of remember

responses already provides a direct estimate of recollection under this

procedure; and (4) we further measured participant accuracy by calculating

separate d? scores for remember responses, know responses, and familiarity

estimates. We report only significant (pB.05) or marginally nonsignificant

(p5.06) findings.

Finally, as noted in the introduction, we were concerned that recognition

performance should not be too low for effects of verbalisation to be

observed, particularly at the long lag. To test this, we conducted pairwise

1 An alternative but less powerful analysis is to compare description versus no description

conditions between groups, when both groups received these conditions as either the first or second

experimental block. When we do this, there was some evidence of a trend towards overshadowing

when the description and no description condition was each presented first to participants: For

familiarity estimates derived for correct recognition decisions, there was a trend towards a

Description�Lag interaction, F(1, 92)�3.34, p�.07, MSE�0.012. The largest mean difference

indicated lower familiarity estimates associated with the description as compared with the no

description, at the short lag (.34 vs. .39, respectively). No other findings approached significance.


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TABLE 1Means (standard deviations in brackets) for discrimination, response bias, hits, andfalse alarms as a function of description, lag, condition order, and remember/know

judgements

Description No description

Short Long Short Long

Description first

d? .50 (.51) .30 (.61) .41 (.48) .47 (.60)

C .20 (.31) .32 (.42) .12 (.37) .33 (.35)

Remember

Hits .29 (.16) .19 (.14) .27 (.16) .24 (.12)

FA .13 (.12) .12 (.13) .15 (.13) .14 (.15)

d? .57 (.60) .26 (.54) .42 (.64) .44 (.64)

Know

Hits .23 (.11) .25 (.16) .26 (.11) .22 (.16)

FA .19 (.10) .19 (.15) .22 (.15) .15 (.12)

d? .12 (.44) .16 (.66) .15 (.44) .24 (.62)

Familiarity estimates

Hits .34 (.15) .32 (.21) .36 (.15) .29 (.20)

FA .22 (.12) .21 (.15) .26 (.18) .17 (.13)

d? .33 (.51) .29 (.73) .31 (.50) .38 (.66)

Description second

d? .39 (.58) .34 (.48) .70 (.67) .20 (.52)

C �.01 (.28) .28 (.33) .11 (.32) .26 (.37)

Remember

Hits .29 (.15) .23 (.14) .33 (.13) .21 (.14)

FA .16 (.16) .11 (.12) .13 (.12) .12 (.12)

d? .47 (.70) .48 (.50) .64 (.50) .33 (.60)

Know

Hits .29 (.15) .22 (.15) .26 (.15) .23 (.15)

FA .26 (.14) .21 (.15) .19 (.13) .23 (.14)

d? .07 (.46) .03 (.67) .22 (.74) �.02 (.57)


Hits .41 (.19) .28 (.18) .39 (.21) .29 (.17)

FA .31 (.15) .23 (.16) .23 (.16) .27 (.16)

d? .27 (.56) .16 (.71) .49 (.85) .06 (.61)

For d? larger values indicate a greater ability to discriminate between old and new items. For C,

values above 0 indicate a conservative bias and values below 0 a liberal bias. Familiarity estimates

are derived by dividing the proportions of know responses by one minus the proportion of

remember responses (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995), whereas remember responses are a direct estimate

of recollection.


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comparisons of each condition with zero, for the overall d? measure, using a

multistage Bonferroni procedure (Holm, 1979). T-values ranged from 2.15(for the no description, description second, long lag condition) to 5.88 (for

the no description, description second, short lag condition) and all

comparisons were significant (alpha�.05). We therefore do not regard

floor effects as a serious concern.

Overall discrimination

There was a main effect of lag, d? F(1, 62)�5.51, pB.05, MSE�0.34, with

discrimination significantly better at the short lag (mean discrimination

scores of .50 and .33, for the short and long lag, respectively). There was also

a significant Description�Lag�Condition order interaction, d? F(1, 62)�8.11, pB.01, MSE�0.25.

The interaction was analysed further by carrying out separate ANOVAs

for short and long lag conditions. For the short lag, there was a significantDescription�Condition order interaction, d? F(1, 62)�4.78, pB.05,

MSE�0.25. Discrimination was significantly poorer in the description

than no description condition, for participants undertaking the description

condition second (a description�no description difference of �.31), t(31)��2.34, pB.05.

Response bias

There was a main effect of lag, C F(1, 62)�67.90, pB.001, MSE�0.04,

with more liberal responding at the short lag (a mean response bias of .10

and .30, for the short and long lag, respectively). There was also marginally

nonsignificant Description�Lag�Condition order interaction, C F(1,

62)�3.94, p�.05, MSE�0.05. The means indicate a similar pattern tothat observed for discrimination at the short lag, with more liberal

responding in the description than no description condition, for participants

undertaking the description condition second (a description�no description

difference of �.12).

Remember judgements

Correct responses. There was a main effect of lag, F(1, 62)�33.05, pB

.001, MSE�0.01, with more remember responses at the short lag (mean

responses of .29 and .22, for the short and long lag, respectively). There was

also a significant Description�Lag�Condition order interaction, F(1,

62)�5.48, pB.05, MSE�0.01. The interaction was analysed further by

carrying out separate ANOVAs for the short and long lag. For the short lag


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there were no significant findings. However, for the long lag there was a

significant Description�Condition order interaction, F(1, 62)�5.41, pB

.05, MSE�0.01. There were fewer remember responses in the description

than no description condition for participants undertaking the description

condition first (a description�no description difference of �.05), t(31)��2.69, pB.05. (There were no significant findings for participants under-

taking the description condition second.)

Incorrect responses. There was a marginally nonsignificant main effect

of lag, F(1, 62)�3.67, p�.06, MSE�0.01. The means indicate that moreremember responses accompanied false alarms at the short lag (mean

remember responses of .14 and .12, for short and long lag conditions,

respectively).

Discrimination. There was a main effect of lag, d? F(1, 62)�5.46, pB

.05, MSE�0.24, with more remember responses for the short lag (mean

discrimination scores of .52 and .38, for short and long lags, respectively).

There was also a Description�Lag�Condition order interaction, d? F(1,62)�6.93, p�.01, MSE�0.24.

The interaction was analysed further by carrying out separate

ANOVAs for the short and long lag. For the short lag, there was a

marginally nonsignificant Description�Condition order interaction, d?F(1, 62)�3.66, p�.06, MSE�0.22. The means indicated that discrimi-

nation for remember judgements was poorer in the description than no

description condition, for participants undertaking the description condi-

tion second (a description�no description difference of �.17). Althoughwe should note that there was also evidence for poorer discrimination for

remember judgements in the no description than description condition for

participants undertaking the description condition first (a description�no

description difference of .15).

KNOW JUDGEMENTS


.05, MSE�0.01, with more know responses at the short lag (mean know

responses of .26 and .23, for short and long lag conditions, respectively).

Incorrect responses. There was a significant Description�Lag�Con-

dition order interaction, F(1, 62)�9.75, pB.01, MSE�0.01.


for the short and long lag. For the short lag, there was a description�condition order interaction, F(1, 62)�8.56, pB.01, MSE�0.01. There were


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more know responses to incorrect recognition decisions in the description

than no description condition, for participants undertaking the description

condition second (a description�no description difference of .07), t(31)�2.65, pB.05.

Discrimination. There were no significant findings.



.001, MSE�0.02, with higher familiarity estimates at the short lag (mean

familiarity estimates of .37 and .29, for short and long lag conditions,

respectively). There was also a Lag�Condition order interaction, F(1, 62)�4.19, pB.05, MSE�0.02. Familiarity estimates were higher for the short

than the long lag, for both condition orders, with a greater difference when

the description condition was second: a difference of .04, t(31)�2.05, pB

.05, when the description was first, and a difference of .11, t(31)�3.76, pB

.005, when the description condition was second.

Incorrect responses. There was a main effect of lag, F(1, 62)�5.81, pB

.05, MSE�0.01, with higher familiarity estimates at the short lag (mean

familiarity estimates of .25 and .22, for short and long lags, respectively).

There was also a Description�Lag�Condition order interaction, F(1,

62)�10.99, pB.01, MSE�0.01.


for the two lag conditions. For the short lag, there was a significant

Description�Condition order interaction, F(1, 62)�9.13, pB.005, MSE�0.01. There were higher familiarity estimates associated with false alarms in

the description than no description condition, for participants undertaking

the description condition second (a description�no description difference of

.08), t(31)�2.67, pB.05. For the long lag, there was a marginally

nonsignificant Description�Condition order interaction, F(1, 62)�3.79,

p�.06, MSE�0.01. The means indicate no difference between the

description and no description conditions for either condition order (a

description�no description difference of .04 and �.04, when the description

condition is undertaken first and second, respectively). The interaction is

best explained by higher familiarity estimates to incorrect recognition

decisions for those participants undertaking the no description condition

first as compared with second (a no description first�no description second

difference of �.10).


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Discrimination. There were no significant findings.

DISCUSSION

The present experiment has produced a number of novel findings. First, we

have replicated and extended the findings of Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002,

2003) with a greater number of items intervening between initial study and

test, and a new set of morphed faces. Verbal overshadowing influenced

discrimination performance with a lag ranging from 0 to 46 intervening

items between initial presentation and test (designated the short lag

condition, here). This extends verbal overshadowing from a lag of 0�34

intervening items observed in previous studies. However, as with Brown and

Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003) verbal overshadowing was only evident when the

verbal description followed the control task. A concern therefore, is that the

effects on performance observed here may not be the result of verbal

overshadowing, but rather the fact that performance decreases generally over

time, due to the build-up of proactive and retroactive interference through

exposure and testing on multiple faces (e.g., Davies et al., 1979; Deffenba-

cher et al., 1981). In fact, two pieces of evidence argue against such an

interpretation.

First, if the effects observed here were solely due to a build-up of

proactive and retroactive interference, performance should have been

statistically significantly poorer in the control condition when it followed

the verbal description. Generally, this was not the case (although an

exception was discrimination performance on remember responses).

Second, we suggest that the pattern of findings observed here at the short

lag is due to carryover effects from the description onto the control

condition which attenuate the observation of verbal overshadowing. If

verbalisation depresses accuracy, and if the effects of verbalisation carry-

over to the subsequent no description control task, then accuracy should be

reduced in three conditions in the present paradigm: In the description

condition when it is first and second, and in the no description condition

when it is second. An inspection of the mean accuracy scores in Table 1

confirms this assertion. For the short lag, mean accuracy is much higher in

the no description condition when it is presented first (d?�.70, SD�0.67) as

compared with the description condition when it is first (d?�50, SD�0.51)

or second (d?�.39, SD�0.58) and as compared with the no description

condition when it is presented second (d?�.41, SD�0.48). Furthermore, a

direct comparison of no description control conditions shows that perfor-

mance was poorer in the no description condition when it followed the

description condition as compared with when it preceded the description

condition, t(62)��1.96, p�.05.


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How might we explain this carryover effect theoretically? One possibility

is that when participants verbally describe the final face in the study phase ofthe description condition they are then more likely to covertly describe the

final face in the study phase of the subsequent no description control

condition. This is because there is no reason for participants to change their

‘‘mental set’’. A concern with this suggestion, however, is that we might

expect the demanding control task of counting backwards in threes to

suppress any effects of describing the final face on subsequent recognition

performance. Nevertheless, the filler task of counting backwards is very

different from learning, describing, and recognising faces, and we wouldexpect participants to differentiate easily between tasks involving faces and

numbers and so prevent one contaminating the other (cf. Brown & Lloyd-

Jones, 2005; Westerman & Greene, 1998, p. 385). A second possibility is that

the carryover effect is more general. For instance, Brown and Lloyd-Jones

(2002, 2003) have argued that describing the final face in the study phase of

the description condition may lead to a shift in processing ‘‘style’’ or strategy

towards greater processing of individual facial features during the recogni-

tion test, at the expense of more global visual processing which normallybenefits recognition. It follows that the carryover effect observed here may

reflect the continuation of an emphasis on processing individual features, at

least on some trials, during the study phase of the subsequent no description

condition. If this is the case and faces have not been encoded optimally in

this control condition, then we may expect poorer recognition as compared

with a control condition where faces have been encoded using a more

efficient global visual processing style. Moreover, this suggestion is also

consistent with the notion of transfer-inappropriate processing, as suggestedby Schooler (2002). When the control condition is presented first, for both

study and test phases, participants may be presumed to invoke an optimal

global visual processing style. However, when the control condition follows

the description condition, participants may have been encouraged to shift

towards a nonoptimal featural processing style during encoding before the

carryover effect dissipates and they return to an optimal global processing

style at recognition. Thus, for this control condition there is both: (a) a

mismatch between participants’ processing style at encoding and test; and(b) the use of nonoptimal encoding processes. On the basis of this, we would

expect recognition to be poorer in this control condition as compared to

when the control condition is encountered first during the experiment.

The second main finding was that verbal overshadowing was most

apparent at the short lag. It was evident on overall discrimination, know

responses to incorrect recognition decisions (i.e., know false alarms),

familiarity estimates associated with false alarms, and response bias. (We

note there was also some evidence for verbal overshadowing of rememberjudgements at the short lag, although in this case the finding could be solely


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a reflection of the build-up of interference from other faces that had been

encountered.) Importantly, verbal overshadowing was not apparent on thesemeasures at the long lag (i.e., across 47�70 intervening items). Together, these

findings suggest that verbal overshadowing is limited in this paradigm. This

limitation may be due either to the passage of time or to the build-up of

retroactive interference. We note here that some of the present lag effects

(e.g., on response bias, and on remember responses) are similar to those

observed in the Norman (2002) study of retroactive interference.

Third, it is of further interest that at the short lag verbally describing a

single face encouraged an increase in false alarms, and in familiarityestimates associated with false alarms, for a series of faces not encountered

previously.

Finally, we note that there was evidence of verbal overshadowing at the

long lag reducing the number of correct remember responses (although in

this case, unlike at the short lag, there was no evidence of an effect of verbal

overshadowing on overall discrimination performance when combining

remember and know judgements together). This was only the case when

participants first described a face and then completed the control task, andtherefore it cannot be explained by a build-up of proactive and retroactive

interference. This finding suggests the intriguing (but tentative) possibility,

under a dual-process approach to recognition memory, that verbalisation

may influence familiarity-based processes initially but later on its effects are

seen more strongly on recollection, perhaps when discrimination between

items becomes more difficult. This notion is only partly consistent however

with studies showing that familiarity decreases rapidly across intermediate

delays, whereas recollection is generally unaffected (for a review, seeYonelinas, 2002).

Let us turn now to the two main issues relating to this study, namely how

we may explain verbal overshadowing in the multiple presentation para-

digm, and how the interference observed here compares with that observed

in the more traditional paradigm.

The nature of verbal interference

Brown and Lloyd-Jones (2002, 2003) proposed that verbal overshadowing in

the multiple face paradigm involves a shift in processing ‘‘style’’. They

argued that verbalisation encouraged a relatively long-lasting shift (over a

number of trials) towards greater visual processing of individual facial

features, at the expense of more global visual processing which is particularly

useful for the recognition of highly visually similar objects (such as faces and

cars; see also Dodson et al., 1997, who invoked this idea as part of theiraccount of verbal overshadowing). Of the two dominant accounts outlined


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in the introduction, it is consistent with the view of verbal overshadowing as

a shift in processing rather than the acquisition of misinformation (cf.Meissner et al., 2001; Schooler, 2002).

The fact that verbal overshadowing was evident at the short lag, and most

evident for know judgements appears, on initial inspection, to be consistent

with this account. First, we can argue that the emphasis on verbalisation was

strong enough to encourage an initial shift in visual processing. However,

after a period of time and intervening trials the requirements of the

recognition task became more evident, encouraging a further shift towards

a processing style more efficient for recognition. Consequently, effects ofverbal overshadowing diminished. Second, a number of theorists have

proposed that knowing/familiarity is primarily sensitive to perceptual

properties of stimuli, whereas remembering/recollection is most sensitive

to conceptual processing (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1993; Rajaram, 1993;

Roediger, 1990; Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003).

Consistent with this account, there are studies using the traditional

paradigm that have shown effects of a postdescription delay on identification

which correspond to the findings presented here. The meta-analysis of verbalovershadowing studies by Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that verbal

overshadowing was evident when identification followed the description task

either immediately or shortly thereafter (510 min). In contrast, there was

no verbal overshadowing with a longer delay (]30 min). Indeed, at the

longer delay, participants in the control condition exhibited a significant

degree of forgetting, whereas there was no change in performance for the

verbalisation condition. We observed a similar pattern of findings in the

present study (discrimination in the control task fell from .70 at the short lagto .20 at the long lag, whereas discrimination in the verbalisation task

remained similar at short and long lags, at .39 and .34, respectively). This

suggests the possibility that in both kinds of paradigm the influence of

verbalisation may change over time from being initially disruptive to

becoming an aid to memory (see also Ryan & Schooler, 1998).

However, a simple perceptual/conceptual distinction mediating remem-

bering and knowing is more problematic (e.g., Dewhurst & Anderson, 1999;

Mantyla, 1997; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). Thus, Rajaram and colleagues(Rajaram 1993, 1996; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000) have proposed that whereas

remembering is influenced by processing the distinctive features of events,

knowing is influenced by the fluency of processing which can be modulated

either by perceptual or conceptual factors. On this account, verbal over-

shadowing arising from a shift from global to local visual processing

disrupted perceptual processing fluency. However, we found that verbalisa-

tion produced: (1) an increase in know false alarms; (2) an increase in

familiarity estimates associated with false alarms; and also (3) a shifttowards a liberal response bias driven by an increase in false alarms. In


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contrast, most manipulations of processing fluency have found an increase,

rather than a decrease, in processing fluency to be associated with anincrease in both hits and false alarms (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).

Thus, our findings are not consistent with a decrease in processing fluency

produced by a shift in visual processing style.

An alternative approach that maintains the notion of a processing shift

can be described as follows. If we assume, in line with current similarity-

based theories of false recognition, that similarity between targets and

distractors makes the distractors familiar and this in turn can lead to false

recognition, then it follows that a shift in processing style resulting from averbal description may have increased this similarity in some way (for a

review, see Roediger & Gallo, 2005; see also, e.g., Arndt & Hirshman, 1998;

Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001; Schooler, 1998). Consistent

with this suggestion, the vast majority of participants provided a generic face

description which could apply equally well to a number of different faces

that were subsequently encountered. For instance, different participant

descriptions of the eyes included: ‘‘dark eyes, fairly big’’, ‘‘dark eyes, quite

wide-set’’, ‘‘eyes were dark, but not particularly deep-set’’. Thus, the verbaldescription likely heightened familiarity for faces not previously encoun-

tered, which in turn reduced performance efficiency, for instance through

increased interference at retrieval.

To take one particular account, fuzzy trace theory proposes that

remember judgements usually result from the retrieval of verbatim traces

(or representations) of detailed item-specific information, whereas know

responses result from gist traces consisting of more general thematic,

semantic, or elaborative characteristics of items (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, &Kneer, 1995; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). On this account, verbalisation

encouraged a shift towards a greater reliance on the gist trace, and faces

consistent with the gist of faces presented at study were then highly familiar

and hence falsely recognised.

Finally, it is of interest that findings here were similar to those observed

by Schooler et al. (1996, cited in Schooler et al., 1997). In both studies verbal

overshadowing was apparent on familiarity-based recognition judgements.

Schooler and colleagues report that verbalisation reduced successfulrecognition, whereas here it increased false alarms. However, they report

correct responses assessed using a lineup procedure which we assume did not

have a ‘‘not present’’ option. If this is the case, then verbalisation must have

also increased false alarms. Thus, verbal overshadowing influenced famil-

iarity-based recognition judgements in similar ways across the yes/no

multiple forced-choice recognition procedure used here and the single target

lineup procedure.

In conclusion, the findings presented here show some similarities withthose observed in previous studies. Nevertheless, additional factors, such as


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proactive and retroactive interference over multiple items, or interference

from similar distractors in a multiple-item forced two-choice recognitiontask, may come into play depending on the nature of the paradigm.

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Documents

Verbal overshadowing of multiple face recognition: Effects on remembering and knowing over time