Venezuela Relations Disadvantage - MSDI 2013

8/13/2019 Venezuela Relations Disadvantage - MSDI 2013

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Venezuela Relations DA

NEG

Top Shelf ....................................................................................................................................................................................

1NC Venezuela relations ........................................................................................................................................................

Uniqueness .................................................................................................................................................................................

Cuba/Venezuela relations UQ ................................................................................................................................................

A2 Chavez’s death ..................................................................................................................................................................

Links ............................................................................................................................................................................................

Reforms link ............................................................................................................................................................................

Embargo link ...........................................................................................................................................................................

Geography link ........................................................................................................................................................................

U.S. relations link ....................................................................................................................................................................

Meduro link ............................................................................................................................................................................

Plan sends a signal .................................................................................................................................................................

A2 Venezuela and Cuba not linked ........................................................................................................................................

Impacts .......................................................................................................................................................................................

Impact ext. ..............................................................................................................................................................................

War impact .............................................................................................................................................................................

Venezuela investment = war .................................................................................................................................................

Terrorism mod ........................................................................................................................................................................

A2 Cuba diversifying ...............................................................................................................................................................

AFFNo Cuba trade switch ............................................................................................................................................................

Venezuela relations decline good - reforms ..........................................................................................................................

A2 Embargo issues .................................................................................................................................................................

No impact to alliance collapse ...............................................................................................................................................



NEG



Top Shelf



1NC Venezuela relations

A. UNIQUENESS: Cuba’s close relationship with Venezuela will continue – U.S. is odd one out.

Richard Gott, 2-25-2013, the guardian, “Cuba looks forward to closer US ties in a post-Castro world,”

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul

Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas

Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed throughout the continent, no

with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the most intriguing

question now concerns Cuba's future relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel

emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget what the quarrel was all about.

B. LINK: Cuban shift towards the U.S. would sour relations and embolden Venezuela to become

aggressive against U.S. interests – strengthens alliances with Iran.

Stratfor, 9-21-2010, “A Change of Course in Cuba and Venezuela?,”

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100920_change_course_cuba_and_venezuela

Venezuela's open-door policy to Cuba was intended to bolster the regime's security, but Cuba's pervasiveness in

Venezuela's government, security apparatus and economy can also become a threat, especially if Cuba shifts its orientation back

toward the United States. Cuba may now be in a position to use its influence in Venezuela to gain leverage in its relationship with the United States. Washington's Venezuela Problem The list of U.S. complaints again

Venezuela goes well beyond Chavez's diatribes against Washington. Venezuela's aggressive nationalization drive, contributions to narco-trafficking (in alleged

negligence and complicity)

and suspected support for Colombian rebel groups have all factored into the United States'

soured relationshipwi

Venezuela. More recently, the United States has watched with growing concern as Venezuela has enhanced its relationships with Russia, China and, especially, Iran. Venezuela is believed to have serve

a haven of sorts for the Iranians to circumvent sanctions, launder money and facilitate the movement of militant proxies. The important thing to note here is that, while C

lacks allies that are adversarial to the United States, Venezuela has them in abundance.

C. IMPACT: Furthering Venezuela’s alliance with Iran will cause Venezuelan proliferation.

Jaime Suchlicki, 8-6-2012, is director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Iran’s

Influence in Venezuela: Washington Should Worry,” InterAmerican Security Watch,

http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/irans-influence-in-venezuela-washington-should-worry/The same week that President Obama downplayed the threat to U.S. security from Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, a high-level delegation from Hezbollah was visiting Caracas and Havana. Ammar Musawi, head of Hezbollah Internat

Department, praised Cuba as a model on how to oppose “imperialist hegemony, arrogance, and plunder.” In Venezuela, he met with the Vice-Foreign Minister and condemned the “ferocious attack” against their Syrian ally.

Venezuela’s growing relations with Iran and Chávez’ support for terrorist groups both in the Americas and the Middle Ea

should worry the U.S. The most remarkable and dangerous foreign policy initiative of the Chávez regime has been allying Venezu

with Iran. Chávez has allowed the Iranians to use Venezuelan territory to penetrate the Western Hemisphere and to min

for uranium in Venezuela. Chávez policy is aiding Iran in developing nuclear technology and in evading U.N. sanctions and U.S. vigilance of the Iranian drug trade a

other illicit activities. The Chávez regime is also providing Venezuelan passports to Iranian operatives. Venezuela’s Mining and Basic Industries Minister Rodolfo Sanz, acknowledged that Iran is “helping

Venezuela to explore for uranium.” What would stop the Iranians , once they develop their own weapons, from providin

some to their close ally in Caracas? Or worse, will the Iranians use Venezuela as a transshipment point to provide nucl

weapons to terrorist groups ? Or with the help of Venezuelans, would the Iranians smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S. ? Given

Chávez’s erratic and irresponsible behavior, these possibilities should not be dismissed lightly. Fidel Castro helped the Sovie

Union surreptitiously introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba aimed at the United States. The October 1962 missile crisis is a gr im reminder that poor U.S. vigilanc

daring leader in the Caribbean and a reckless dictator in Russia almost brought the world to a nuclear holocaust. Iran is also providing Venezuela with

technical assistance in the areas of defense, intelligence, energy and security. Iranians, as well as Cuban personnel, are advising and protecting Chávez and tra

his security apparatus. This triple alliance represents a clear threat to the hemisphere . Chávez is also using Venezuela’s oil wealth for

purposes. Chávez’ support for Cuba exceeds $7 billion per year in subsidized petroleum shipments and investments in Cuba’s oi l infrastructure. The Venezuelan regime supports a variety of leftist, anti-Americ

regimes in Latin America including Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador. And Chávez has spent more than $6 billion in purchasing Russian weapons, creating a longterm Venezuelan dependency on the Russian

military. Venezuela remains an open back door for Cuba’s acquisition of sophisticated Russian weapons. Emboldened by

Venezuela’s vast oil resources and his close relationship with Iran and Russia, Chávez has laid claim to the leadership of the anti-American

movement in the region. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Fidel Castro’s illness and Cuba’s weak economy thrusted the leadership of Latin America’s left onto Chávez. If Fidel was the

godfather of revolutionary/terrorist/anti-American groups, Chávez is the trusted “capo.” The Venezuelan leader has manipulate

elections, and will manipulate future ones. He is increasingly deepening his Bolivarian revolution by weakening and subverting Venezuela’s

democratic institutions. At best, Venezuela’s weapons purchases from Russia are leading to a major arms race in the region ,

with Colombia acquiring U.S. weapons and Brazil turning to France. Other countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, are also







spending their much-needed resources in the acquisition of weapons. A coalition of Venezuela and its allies, Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia a

Nicaragua, may develop into a club of well-armed, anti-American regimes exercising influence in the region by intimidating its

neighbors. Over the years, U.S. policy has either ignored or mildly chastis ed Chávez for his extremism. That policy is no longer viable or prud ent.The U nited S tates needs to develop polici

that undermine the Chávez regime, organize the opposition and accelerate the end of his rule. Covert operations to strengthen opposition grou

civil society need to be implemented. Vigilance and denunciation of Venezuelan- Iranian activities and Chávez’s meddling in Colombia and elsewhere are critical to gain international support for U.S. policies. While regime chang

Venezuela may be a difficult policy objective, U.S. policymakers need to understand that the long-term consolidation of Chavista power may present a greater threa

than the Castro regime posed in the 1960s. Unlike Cuba, Chávez has significant oil wealth and Venezuela is a large countr

that borders on several South American neighbors. Chávez’s alliances with Iran, Syria and other anti-American countries,

and his support for terrorist groups, are as formidable a challenge as the old Cuba-Soviet alliance. The U nited S tates can also

weaken Chávez’s power, and that of Russia, Iran and other countries, by a systematic policy that lowers the world price

petroleum . A comprehensive, alert policy is required to deal with the Venezuela-Iran threat. Chávez is, after all, Fidel Castro’s disciple and heir in the region. The lessons of the Missile Crisis of 1962 should increase o

uneasiness about Chávez’s adventurism and Iranian motivations in Latin America.

And, Venezuelan prolif causes arms racing, miscalc, and nuclear war—draws in great powers.

MIT, 2009, citing Licio da Silva, Astrophysicist at the Observatorio Nacional de Río de Janeiro- Brasil, “The ABC's of Nuclea

Disarmament in Latin America,” http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-951-nuclear-weapons-in-international-

politics-past-present-and-future-spring-2009/projects/MIT17_951S09_abcs.pdf

There are several resources that indicate that Latin American political scientists were worried about the effect nuclear weapons would have o

the region. Several theorists believed that the introduction of even the hint of a weapons program would make the entire

region paranoid and further increase a state's incentive to produce a bomb. Other theorists view the development of nuclear weapo

in the region as a risk in that it draws attention from the rest of "los conceptos de equilibrio intrarregional y de confianza entre los países de la región (Portales 25)" 9 the world

onto Latin America. This unwanted attention could lead to disastrous affects for the region if any country was perceived as a threat

any of the greater superpowers. Security perception motivates a country's weapons development. Carlos Portales discusses how the introduction of a new weapon t

the Latin American region has a " contagious" effect ; first one country has it and then the rest of them struggle to obtain

If any country is perceived to be looking or developing a new weapon, all countries will follow in order to keep the balance of power within the region. Th

introduction of a new weapon limits any arms control treaties until all countries possess the new weapon (Mercado Jarrín; Portales 27). In his article "Consequences of a Nuclear Conflict for the Climate in South America," Licio

Silva 3 describes the consequences to South America if there were to be a nuclear attack on North America. He calls this the "Optimistic Hipothesis [sic]" for South America and calculates population death by smoke in the

atmosphere. His "Pessimistic Hipothesis [sic]" involves attacks on South American cities and the destruction that could be cause, he even takes into account the possibility of the Amazon going up in flames. His article is quite ala

and one can see that he is truly terrified at the possibilities. As a conclusion, he calls for countries to be prepared for the worse and for the region to try and avoid international conflict by not obtaining nuclear weapons. da Silva

states that if no South American country possesses a nuclear weapon, then no nuclear weapon state should perceive South America as a threat. If a Latin American state were to have a

nuclear weapon, then that country could be perceived as a threat and thus could be targeted in an international conflict

seen as taking sides: "When a country becomes the owner of a nuclear arsenal, it also becomes a potential target (da Silva 56)." Therefore , da Silvfor Latin American countries to remain disarmed so as not to put the Astrophysicist at the Observatorio Nacional de Río de Janeiro- Brasil10 region in peril. His directly names Argentina and Brazil for their involvement in nuclea

weapons programs and accuses them of putting the entire region at risk: This shows the temerity of Argentine and Brazilian military who are in favour of the pos session of nuclear weapons in their respective countries; we be

that the price we would have to pay for the dubious pride of belonging to the small group of nations in possession of nuclear technology for military purposes is too high. da Silva 56 Here we see a sincere fear of the security risk

one country can pose on an entire region. For da Silva, the destabilizing effect that nuclear weapons would have on South America alarm him

enough to single out the two countries and negatively describe their search for nuclear weapons as "dubious pride." He cont

on to ask for "the commitment not to install any nuclear arms in their [South American's] territory (da Silva 56)." The use of the word "their" refers to a collective identity shared by those in South America. Military improvemen

individual countries should not be as important as the well being of the entire region. South Americans countries are lumped together and thus, must take into account the entire region before pursuing precarious programs. A

arms race in the region would affect all countries in Latin America since such an arms race "contributes to increase both

international tensions and the danger of armed conflicts , in addition to diverting resources indispensable to the econom

and social progress of the peoples of the world. (Brazil and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 19)." One country's search for nuclear weapon

even nuclear power, increases all the other countries' likelihood to obsess, overreact or become hostile during the situation. Regio

that are economically dependent on each other, such as South America, would have a very hard time surviving if there

existed no trust between the nations.



Uniqueness





A2 Chavez’s death

Cuban reforms frighten local Venezuelan leaders – Chavez’s death has no impact.

Marc Frank, 3-6-2013, thecubaneconomy, “Marc Frank: “Stunned Cuba ponders future without Chavez”,”

http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/tag/cuba-venezuela-relations/

Chavez’s resolute ideological embrace of Cuba helped propel the once isolated communist island back into the center of

regional politics, and oil-rich Venezuela’s largesse under Chavez proved a life saver for the embargoed and near bankrupt Caribbean island after the collapse of its long

benefactor, the Soviet Union. Even so, analysts do not expect Chavez’s death to have any short-term impact for Cuba. “I’m sure the Cubans are concerned, bu

don’t think this will be a game changer for the Cubans. They have weathered worse storms before,” said Frank Mora, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the first Obama administratChavez is viewed in Cuba as an irreplaceable leader of the region and savior of socialism, portrayed day and night by official media as a champion of regional unity, independence and the island. During his two-year battle with c

Chavez had four operations in Cuba and spent months receiving treatment on the island. “Once again the horizon for all of Latin America has grown dark,” Havana snack vendor, Eric Rodriguez, said. “I only hope Venezuela can

support this blow, but the road ahead for them won’t be easy, nor for Cuba,” he said. There were tears for the 58-year-old Venezuelan and his family over the tragedy of succumbing to cancer. Then there were the calculations

what events in Caracas might mean for daily life on the Communist-run island, so dependent on the preferential trade relations under Chavez. There was dread that Cuba would once more lose a strategic ally and be plunged ba

into a grave economic crisis similar to the scarcity in the 1990s that followed the demise of the Soviet Union. Soon after Chavez won his first election in 1998, Fidel Castro anointed the young and vitriolic firebrand as his revolut

successor in Latin America. President Raul Castro, who replaced his ailing brother in 2008, has strengthened relations with Venezuela even as he forged closer ties with other oil-producing nations such as Brazil, Angola, Algeria

Russia. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE Most Cuban economists point out that the economy has become more diversified over the last 20 years with the development of tourism, pharmaceuticals and increased oil and nickel

production. But they say it remains far too dependent on Venezuela. Cuba and Venezuela have formed more than 30 joint ventures over the y

most of them based in Venezuela. They range from a fishing fleet, to port and rail repair, to hotels, agriculture, nickel and steel production and just about all of Cuba’s downstream oil industry. In 2011, Venezuela accounted for

billion of Cuba’s $20 billion in foreign trade. It pays Cuba an estimated $6 billion or more annually for the services of 40,000 doctors, nurses and other professionals, local economists say. That is around 60 percen

of the foreign exchange Cuba earned from services. Venezuelan banks provide soft credits for dozens of development projects across the island. Venezuela serves as a guarantor for

investment and trade with the island. While many Cubans fretted, others were more optimistic that Chavez’s hand-picked successor, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, would win the election that must now take place within 30 d

UNCERTAINTY AND REFORM Cuba is in the process of lifting some restrictions on civil liberties and revamping the state-dominated economy into a more mixed and market f

one. Experts said that regardless of the election’s outcome the pace and depth of reform would most likely pick up. An opposition victory, viewed as unlikely, would certainly force Havana to scamper, they said, and while a M

win would spell no changes for Cuba in the short term, the threat of instability in Venezuela’s future would loom large on local leaders’ minds. “Assuming thaMaduro is elected, Venezuela will continue its critical oil subsidies, but both international credit markets and the Cuban leadership can now more clearly see a future where Cuba will have to bolster its energy self-sufficiency an

improve its credit ratings,” said Carlos Saladrigas, head of the Cuba Study Group, a Cuban American business organization that advocates engagement with Havana. “The pro-reform factions within the Cuban system will have

additional arguments in their quiver for moving forward with all deliberate speed,” he said. Mora agreed that mid-term instability in Venezuela would be Cuba’s biggest challenge. “I think everyone will try and unite behind Mad

It’s what becomes of Venezuela after, and whether Maduro can keep all the disparate factions within Chavismo together for a long period of time, especially if the Venezuelan economy runs into macro-economic troubles and i

able to continue subsidizing political support (for Cuba),” he said.





Links



Reforms link

Opening up Cuba undermines control from countries like Venezuela.

William Ratliff , 1-30-2013, Research Fellow, Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution, “Cuba's Tortured Transition,”

http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281

Thus more than five decades of stagnation and atrophied ideological dogmatism still impede Cuba’s morphing from a retrograde

family dynasty dictatorship into a more modern nation . In general the opening undermines CCP control, as would an absence of reforms. Castroite leaders also fear the loss o

handouts if Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s cancer gets the better of him. There have not been equally significant non-economic reforms, though there has

drift to somewhat greater freedom of expression than during the Cold War. Most of Fidel's political prisoners have been released, but government critics under Raúl are still harassed and arrested and pro-democracy advocateOswaldo Payá died in an automobile “accident” last July. Still, some changes may improve life, the most recent being the liberalization of laws on foreign travel.

Cuba is completely dependent on Venezuelan exports – reforms signal a break.

José R. Perales, August 2010, Senior Program Associate, Woodrow Wilson Center of Latin America,”The United S tates and

Cuba: Implications of an Economic Relationship,”

http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/LAP_Cuba_Implications.pdf

Since the Acuerdo de Cooperación Energética de Caracas and the Convenio Integral de Cooperación entre Cuba y Venezuela of 2000, Cuba’s oil dependence on the U.S.S.R. has been

replaced by Venezuelan dependence. Thanks to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez, Cuba receives heavily subsidized petroleum. Cuba today consumes

approximately 150,000 barrels of oil per day, 93,000-100,000 of which comes from Venezuela (the rest comes from domestic crude oil and natural gas production), according to Piñón. In exchange for the oil,Cuba offer

Venezuela a mix of goods and services, such as medical services and technical assistance involving upwards of 40,000 Cuban professionals. Under the

agreements Cuba must pay 60 percent of its Venezuelan oil invoice within 90 days of purchase in the form of bartered goods and services. The remaining 40 percent of the invoice is to be paid in the lapse of 25 years, at an ann

interest rate of 1 percent.Two thirds of Cuba’s petroleum demand currently relies on imports , and Venezuela is the single source of these imports under heavily subsid

payment terms. This petroleum dependency, valued at over $3 billion in 2008, could be used by Venezuela as a tool to influence a Cuban government in maintaining a politically antagonistic and belligerent position toward the

States. Piñón estimates that the value of the oil received by Cuba from Venezuela over the last six years (2003-2009) amounts to more than $14 billion, of which nearly $9 billion has accounted for goods and services barter exc

and over $5 billion long term 25 years debt. Cuba has learned from past experiences and is very much aware of the political and economic ris

and consequences of depending on a single source for imported oil . The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 2003 Venezuelan oil strike taught Cuba very expen

lessons. Only when Cuba diversifies suppliers and develops its offshore resources, estimated by the United States Geological Survey to be at 5.5 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas undiscovered reserves

the Cuban people have the economic independence needed in order to consider a political and economic evolution. A Cuban government influenced by its energy benefactors

would most likely result in a continuation of the current political and economic model. If Cuba’s future leaders are unable to fill the power vacuum lef

the departure of the old cadre, they could become pawns of illicit business activities and drug cartels, and the United States could face a mass illegal immigration by hundreds of thousands of Cubans.





Embargo link

Sanctions encourage Cuban trade-networking with Venezuela – repealing sets precedent.

Daniel Hanson et al., 1-16-2013, is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute, Dayne Batten is affiliat

with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy, and Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst, Forbes, “It's Tim

For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s

to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/

What’s worse, U.S. sanctions encourage Cuba to collaborate with regional players that are less friendly to American interests. For instance, in 2011, the country inked a deal with

Venezuela for the construction of an underwater communications link, circumventing its need to connect with US-owned networks close to its shores. Repealithe embargo would fit into an American precedent of lifting trade and travel restrictions to countries who demonstrate progress towards democratic ideals. Romania, Czechoslova

and Hungary were all offered normal trade relations in the 1970s after preliminary reforms even though they were still in clear violation of several US resolutions condemning their human rights practices. C

communist country and perennial human rights abuser, is the U.S.’s second largest trading partner, and in November, trade restrictions against Myanmar were lessened notwithstanding a fifty year history of genocide and hum

trafficking propagated by its military government.

Lifting the embargo makes the U.S. a major energy supplier.

Chelsea A. Zimmerman, 2010, Barnard College, “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a

Broken Policy,” http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf

Meanwhile, other countries are filling the vacuum created by the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. China more than double d its trade with Cuba in 2006 to $1.

billion. Venezuela exports to Cuba increased from $2 billion in 2005 to $2.6 billion in 2006. China and Venezuela currently repres ent 35% of Cuba’s total trade (Reuters, February 26, 2007). Cuba

recently entered into an agreement with China for the sale of 4500 pickup trucks, and has developed a cooperative relationship with China in developing its energy resources. Furthermore, Brazil, Turkey, Canada, Mexico, South

Africa, Spain and Vietnam have in recent years solidified their trade relationships with Cuba. In late 2008, the European Union signed an agreement to renew its ties with Cuba after having formally lifted its diplomatic sanctions

against Cuba. Lifting the trading ban with Cuba could directly benefit the U.S. by providing an additional supplier of oil, gas andethanol only ninety miles from its coast. Cubapetroleo, the state oil company, claims that Cuba has 20 billion barrels of recoverable oil in its offshore waters (Reuters, October 16, 2008). If efforts to develop more offshor

proceed as planned, Cuba could produce as much as 525,000 barrels per day of oil, most of which could be exported to the United States if the trade embargo was lifted (Reuters, June 12, 2008).

Lifting the embargo pulls Cuba away from Venezuela.

Tim Padgett, 3-3-2008, Time, “Cuba's Chance,” Ebsco

Lacking the vast charisma that enabled his brother to hold on to power for nearly a half-century, Raúl can go one of two ways to establish his legitimacy: he can return to his hard-line roots and use his security forces to c

down on dissent, or he can earn the affection of his beleaguered people by further loosening the economic and political screws--a path that may be easier to take if

Washington drops the embargo. "If we don't," says Jake Colvin, director of the Washington-based USA*Engage, an arm of the National Foreign Trade Council, "the U.S. risks

alienating another generation of Cubans and pushing the Cuban government further into the arms of countries like Venezuela and China."

http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/



http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf







Geography link

Geographic constraints mean it’s either the U.S. or Venezuela for Cuba.



Cuba and Venezuela face very similar geographic constraints. Both are relatively small countries with long Caribbean coastlines and primarily resource-extractive economies.

Venezuela's mountainous and jungle-covered borderlands to the south largely deny the country any meaningful economic integration with its neighbors, Cuba sits in a sea of small economies similar to its own. As a resu

neither country has good options in its immediate neighborhood for meaningful economic integration save for the dominant

Atlantic power, i.e., the United States. In dealing with the United States, Cuba and Venezuela basically have two options: either align with the United States orseek out an alliance with a more powerful, external adversary to the United States.





U.S. relations link

Adversarial relations with the U.S. has made Cuba and Venezuela co-dependent.



For most of the past decade, Cuba and Venezuela have found themselves in a unique position. Both now have adversarial relationship

with the United States, and both lack strong allies to help them fend off the United States. As a result, Cuba and Venezuela have drawn closer together, with

Cuba relying on Venezuela primarily for energy and Venezuela turning to Cuba for its security expertise.





Meduro link

Cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba complicates relations with Venezuela – assumes Maduro.

Carl Meacham is the director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in

Washington, D.C., and Ana Rodríguez, an intern scholar with the Americas Program at CSIS, provided research assistance

4-11-2013, CSIS, “Venezuela’s Presidential Election: How Significant is the Outcome for the United States?,”

http://csis.org/publication/venezuelas-presidential-election-how-significant-outcome-united-states

Some have suggested that Venezuela could serve as a valuable interlocutor in a U.S.-Cuba rapprochement. However, this is likely wishful thinking. The link between Maduro and the Castro

brothers brings no added value to talks between the United States and Cuba and may further complicate the issue. In this regard, if Washing

were to initiate efforts to find areas of cooperation with the Venezuelan government it may consider dealing directly with the Cuban government, as Cuba, not Venezuela, s

to be the senior partner in the Cuba –Venezuela relationship. Much has changed in the U.S.-Venezuela relationship. A new environment highlights why the United States can allow itself to operate from a differe

posture when dealing with Venezuela.





Plan sends a signal

U.S. and Cuba normalizing relations is a signal of switching away from Venezuelan oil.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, 2010, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD,

Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academ

Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic

Approaches to Cooperation”

Why is it important to clarify the current status of Cuban energy in the face of a continuing opposition by the United Stat

to anything resembling what can be construed as “good news” for the Castro regime? Obviously, because up until this point it hasn’t cost the United States much if

anything. The current policy continues to clearly place at the forefront the sanctity and utility of a comprehensive economic and political embargo in the hopes that it helps to foment a change in regime and a peacefu

transition to a democratic system of governance and a complimentary market economy.As energy security concerns continue to percolate up to an increasingly

important status in the realm of national security objectives we may begin to see the erosion of the hard position again

the Cuban regime regardless of its leadership. The overview of the Cuban energy developments clearly and unambiguou

reveals that the Castro regime has every intention of continuing to promote, design and implement energy development policies that will benefi

for generations to come. Cuba is sparing no effort by instituting bottom-up and top-down policy initiatives to meet this challenge. It has

significantly increased its international cooperation in the energy sector and continues to enhance its efforts to ensure

energy security in these most uncertain of times. But it stands to reason that no matter how successful these efforts are, they will come up short. Tw

factors may alter this present situation. First, Cuba may indeed realize a bonanza from the offshore tracts that will allow it to possibly address its many energy challenges, from increasing oil

production and refining capacity, to improving the nation’s energy infrastructure, ensuring a stable energy future. Second, and no less significant, is the possibility of normalization

trade relations with the United States. This is important not only because it will allow direct foreign investment, technology

transfer and information sharing between these neighboring states but it possibly enhances the energy security of both states, and hence, the region, r

through a division of labor and dispersion of resources that serve as a hedge against natural disaster and market disruptions.



A2 Venezuela and Cuba not linked

Venezuela is essential to Cuban financial success.

Mitchell Bustillo, 5-9-2013, International Policy Digest, “Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo,”

http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/

No doubt, it has been a fruitless 50 years since the embargo was enacted. Little has changed as far as democracy and human rights are concerned. To maintain control, Cuba has “mana

to offset much of the effects over the years in large part because the Soviets subsidized the island for three decades, because the regime welcomed Canadian, Mexican and European capital after the co

of the Berlin Wall, and because Venezuela is its new patron,” according to Llosa. However, Venezuela is now undergoing a political transition of its own with the recent death of Hugo Chávez, its presiden

the past 14 years, and the controversial election of Nicolás Maduro. Despite being Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro only won by a narrow margin and will likely be forced to cut spending on social programs and foreign

assistance in an effort to stabilize Venezuela’s dire economic problems. Therefore, now is the ideal time to take action. Without Venezuela’s support, the Cuban government wil

assuredly face an economic crisis. Strengthening the embargo to limit U.S. dollars flowing into Cuba would place further pressure on the Cuban government and has the potential to trigger an econ

collapse.





Impacts



Impact ext.

Venezuelan instability causes Latin American arms races and cartel financing.

Jaime Suchlicki, October/December 2009, is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and director of the Institute f

Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, Center for Hemispheric Policy, “The Cuba -Venezuela Challe

to Hemispheric Security: Implications for the United States,” http://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-

policy/VenCubaSecurityChallenges.pdf

At best, Venezuela’s weapons purchases are leading to a major arms race in the region, with Colombia acquiring U.S. weapons and Brazil turning to Fran ce. O

countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, are also spe nding their much-needed resources in the acquisition of weapons. A coalition of Venezuela and its allies, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua, may develointo a club of we ll-armed, anti-American regimes capable of intimidating its neighbors and exercising significant influence in the region. As recent evidence

shown, Venezuela has been supporting the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Th e principal challenger to the Colombian regime, the FARC is a guerrilla/narcotraffick ing g

operating through out the country. Chávez has provided them safe haven and po litical support. High-profile FARC operatives have used Venezuelan territory w ith impunity. In the past, small arms from Venezuelan military

inventories have turned up in the hands of the FARC. FARC guerrillas and drug smugglers us e Venezuelan territory for the transshipment of drugs from the cocaine-producing regions of Bolivia and Colombia to the markets in t

United States and Europe. According to a Gove rnment Accountability Office (GAO) report, cocaine flowing throug h Venezuela grew fou rfol d (from 60 to 260 metric tons) between 2004 and 2007. 25Venezuela’s

alliance with the FARC has evolved into a major enterprise, smuggling narcotics and laundering money through Venezu elan financial institu tions and state-run enterprises.

Simultaneously, Chávez ende d all U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) operations in Venezuela, expelled U.S. DEA officials and has de nied visas to U.S. anti-drug personnel.

http://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-policy/VenCubaSecurityChallenges.pdf







War impact

U.S. intervention in Latin America against Venezuela invites war.

El Rincón del Vago, 2006 or later, http://html.rincondelvago.com/international-conflict.htmlOn the other hand, Donald Nuechterlein claimed that “the fundamental national interest of the United States is the defence and the well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional system”. (3, Pg. 310) The Se

of State Condoleezza Rice promised to resist what she called “the growth of anti-democratic populism in Latin America” (4). While asserting that some rhetoric defined as populist is constructive, Rice said

in Latin America, that normally is not the case. The U.S. agenda's vital interest is to push back a multilateral programme between the Venezuelan government and the “axis of evil” that could shatter the flims

Latin America stability. In other words, under unipolarity dominated by a democratic pole we are likely to see more attempts to

create or advance regional security arrangements (5, Pg. 282), and this is being threatened by Hugo Chavez's new ideologies. Accto the logic of the balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1987), “a hegemonic state can preserve its unipolar position by using policies of accommodation and reassurance in its dealing with status quo states. The dominant state shou

reinforce their sense of security and should also provide opportunities for these states to demonstrate power or enhance prestige without challenging the existing order. It should also try to take steps to integrate `undecided' s

more fully into the existing order, thus turning then into status quo states (Mastanduno, 1999: 148-9 (5, Pg.286))”. Other reasons why the U.S. government is deciding to strike against Venezuela is related to its oil. Venezuelan

reserves are 78 billion barrels plus the new reserves founded on the Orinoco: 300 billion are making this the biggest Oil reserve on the planet, and they are geographically located under the United States front door, with no dire

threats to be exported until Hugo Chavez's rise to power. Based on those facts, the U.S. International policy against terrorism and such threats apply to Venezuela; Hugo Chavez is not a trustworthy leader, he has not been afrai

set back approach from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is where the American government is taking action, looking for sanctions based on Hugo Chavez antidemocratic deeds, and using the Inter-American Democr

Charter to aisle the Venezuelan government. If this is not enough, the U.S. government might start using the policy of direct intervention (First military option, with a low intensity). This phase is identified by a low profile of

paramilitary actions, sabotages, and others small war strategies. If their attitude remains aggressive and fearless, that is when the complete U.S. military power starts taking action. In contrast, Hugo Chavez had already strike th

not as a terrorist but as a people's person, his strategy is completely unusual, he is given free oil using CITGO Company, a subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), that is located is the U.S., to the people who are living in

shelters, and subsidizing up to 40 per cent of the oil market price for the people with low income. This strategy is making him to be recognized as a hero on the east coast of the U.S. But this is not everything, the resulting savin

from this initiative, known as Low Income Heating Oil Program, are being used to pay the rent of the people with the lowest income in those communities. Also is dividing politicians, in one side John Negroponte said `Chavez is

using Venezuelan petrodollars to finance an “extravagant international policy”, with no direct reference to the generosity with the poor of U.S.', on the other sid

Charles Rangel, a Democrat, says `This gesture is an example, more Americans are complaining and asking for help to tackle the high price of heat their places (status quo disruption) (6). This strategy have been a complete succ

his populism has strike the heart of the United States. Hugo Chavez is following also the scholarship of Griecco: `Dealing with the danger of domination, at

same time, the very wide power disparities with the hegemon create a constant fear of domination and entrapment. The

overwhelming power of the hegemon threatens mainly the foreign policy autonomy of the regional states , and also raises the danger

being pulled into unnecessary adventures on its behalf. This also creates for regional states a strong incentive to organize on a regional level. A regionarrangement can be formed in order to be able to maintain a reasonable degree of independence and `voice' within its

sphere on influence (Griecco, 1995). While the ability of each individual state to influence the hegemon is limited, by working collectively they can have greater influence, and can make more credible and mea

threats to raise the cost of certain policies the hegemon may wish to pursue.' (5, Pg. 289). And that is the accord that Hugo Chavez is building in Latin America. This agreement is their first steps between Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, an

Argentina as a regional enclave to step out from the American economic domain, and with the indirect-direct help from the Colombian Revolution Army Forces (FARC, with more than 35,000 men) in case of an eventual attack

the U.S. Army against Venezuela. As well, the Venezuelan Army reserves are three times the size of the American counterpart.



Venezuela investment = war

Lessening dependence will cause conflict with the U.S., Cuba, and Venezuela – Venezuela’s investment

guarantees this.

Javier Corrales, Fall 2006, is associate professor of political science at Amherst College, Hemisphere: A Magazine of the

Americas, “Cuba's New Daddy,” Ebsco

One of the most consistent themes of the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, even before they came to power, has been the defense of the island's sovereignty. For Fidel Castro, this slogan seems to mean nothing more tha

maximizing his personal freedom to rule the island with no accountability. He has constantly searched for some international patron willing to shower his

government with benefits while simultaneously allowing him to dictate with impunity. Luckily for him, he has always found one, and Venezuel

his latest find. While the deals with Venezuela have been fortunate for Fidel Castro's local freedom, they represent a political curse for Cuba. The deals have eliminated the pressures, strong in the 1990s, that were

pushing Cuba to restructure its economy and manage globalization more ingeniously. Paradoxically, granting the Cuban government more political autonomy has served to reinforce rather than lessen its historical proclivity tow

mono-dependency. In the end, Castro should know, dependency on one commodity, one market, and one foreign government ends up restricting rather than expanding any states room for maneuvering. As long as the Cuban

government continues to uphold a personalist view of political sovereignty, real freedom for Cubans will remain a dream. That Cuba has become Venezuela's new colony has

implications for US-Cuban relations. These deals will give Chávez enormous leverage during Cuba's post-Castro transition. Venezuela's presence in Cuba is

increasing not only economically, but also militarily. The number of Venezuelan military personnel and state officials in residence in Cuba is at an all-time high. Venezuela's current

ambassador in Havana is none other than Adan Chávez, Hugo's brother. Cuba's future leader will inherit the obligations and dependence that the Castros and Chávezes are cultivating. And any regime succession in

Cuba will also occur with significant US involvement — either by US citizens acting privately or by government figures

carrying out official policy. The Cuban transition may even descend into a military confrontation, possibly involving Cuban-

Americans, and thus, the United States. It is impossible to predict the outcome of such a conflict, but we can now be certain that the Venezuelans will be part of it.



Terrorism mod

Alienating Venezuela from Cuba reduces oil revenue and forces them towards narcotics.

Gregory D. Miller, assistant professor of political science at the University of Oklahoma, “The Security Costs of Energy

Independence,” Center for Strategic International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 107-119, April 201http://www.asiaresearch.ir/files/10apr_Miller.pdfBased on these trends, many OPEC states will likely continue to become more dependent on oil revenues unless steps are taken now to eliminate some of the future security concerns. OPEC states outside of the Middle East se

better situated to withstand the loss of oil revenue, although making comparisons with regional neighbors suggests that the same security threats discussed above are possible. For example, Latin America has three major oil-

exporting states: OPEC members Ecuador and Venezuela and nonmember Mexico. Venezuela and Mexico are much better off economically than their Latin American neighbors, 18 at least partly because of oil;Venezue

gets nearly one-fourth of its GDP from the sale of petroleum. Although internal conflict already exists there, the security

threat will likely grow if Venezuela suffers a significant reduction in its petroleum revenue. In¶ addition, the loss of Venezuela’s o

income will force that government to make a choice. One path involves economic hardship similar to experiences in other Latin American states, such as Bolivia and

Paraguay. The second path involves the narcotics trade . As we have seen with Colombia, even if the Venezuelan government chooses to stay

of the drug trade, individuals within the country will likely opt in rather than suffer personal hardship.

Drug trafficking props up Colombian terrorism.

Michael Catanzaro, 10-22-2001, Evans-Novak Political Report Political Reporter, “Colombian FARC threatens U.S.,”

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200110/ai_n8955835/

Two weeks after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, an insidious threat emerged not from the Middle East or the hinterlands

Central Asia, but in nearby South America. On September 24, Reuters news agency obtained a tape recording of a Colombian guerrilla lead

describing his plans to attack the United States. "To combat them [the United States] wherever they may be, until we get to their own territory, to make them feel the pain which they have inflic

other peoples," said Jorge Briceno, a leader of the Marxist Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, commonly known as FARC." To take away their economic resources from them by any means in order to defeat them,"

Briceno continued. "Reach out to North Americans who are unhappy and organize them. Reach out to black North Americans and make them see how they are discriminated against."Briceno also referred to the formation of a

Americas-- wide "anti-imperialist" front, presumably designed to counter the U.S. military presence in Colombia. During an October 10 hearing of the House subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Rep. Cass Ballenger (R.-N

also noted that FARC leader Manuel Marulanda recently threatened to "hit American targets" in response to this country's efforts in combating the international drug trade, of which FARC is intimately involved. Colomb

has long been the most abundant supplier of cocaine and heroin in North America. FARC, along with other paramilitary

groups fighting for control of Colombia, provide protection to farmers who grow cocoa and poppy and finance their operations throug

drug sales. Through murder, kidnapping, and intimidation, FARC has perpetrated a reign of terror in Colombia, which experts now believe could

spill into American soil. "There's no reason we shouldn't take this threat seriously," said a Republican aide who handles U.S.-Colombian relations. "FARC through its networks can distribute cocaine right into

Washington, D.C. They certainly could use that network to attack our cities." On its most recent list of terrorist organizations, the State Department cited FARC, along with al Qaeda, the terrorist network headed by Osama bin L

and several other groups hostile to the United States. Experts are now seeing links between FARC, bin Laden, and other Middle Eastern terrorist

groups. According to the Associated Press, FARC has sent fighters to train in bin Laden's secretive camps in Afghanistan, many of which have now been destroyed by U.S. military air assaults. FARC also has close ties to th

Taliban, the militant faction controlling much of Afghanistan, which grows nearly three-fourths of the world's heroin. Over the last several years, Colombia has become a proving ground for terrorists. Officials with the Colombia

government, in briefings on Capitol Hill, have confirmed the presence of Islamic extremist groups Hamas and Hezbollah in 'Colombia, whose members are training under FARC auspices. In 1983, Hezbollah spearheaded the suic

bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 Americans. In July, the Colombian National Police arrested three members of the Irish Republican Army, accused of training FARC members in the use of explosive dFARC has established links with the IRA to "increase its ability to conduct urban terrorism," said James Mack, deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the State Departm

Such activities are not confined to Colombia. They are spreading into the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which has a growing population of Middle Eastern and South Asian terrorists. Profits from drug sales in

region "are sent directly to the Middle East to support the operation of [terrorist] organizations, possibly even the planning of terrorist acts," Ballenger noted. "I have no doubt that funds raised in

the tri-- border area have made it to the pockets of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden." "Every time an American buys cocai

or heroin," he said, "he is directly funding the terrorists who are responsible for the deaths of over 6,000 innocent

Americans."

That spills over to international nuclear terrorism.

Investor's Business Daily, 3-4-2008, "Let Colombia Win," Lexis Nexis

Colombia's armed forces and national police performed one of the most spectacular anti-terror strikes in history, taking out FA

chieftain Raul Reyes, the No. 2 terrorist in the Marxist cocaine-trafficking guerrilla group. Using American training and satellite technology,the hit took out a member of the FARC's inner

circle for the first time, ending all illusion of safety at the top. Identified by his Rolex watch, the Marxist thug had a $5 million price on his head. Better still, Colombia

well-trained armed forcesseized three of his computers with some surprising contents: A FARC plan to buy 50 kilograms of uranium to expand into

international terrorism. Colombia's victory followed a series of powerful blows against other FARC leaders. As defections from the group rise and the terrorist leadership is decapitated, a picture emerges of

being won after nearly 50 years of fighting. But outside Colombia, do we hear "congratulations"? No. We hear complaints from nations such as France, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Italy that Colombia's forces went into Ecua

chasing a terrorist, violating its "sovereignty" — even though, as documents show, Ecuador helped Colombian guerrillas make themselves at home in that country. Colombia apologized for the incursion, and had every right to e

understanding. But instead of a spotlight on Ecuador for harboring terror camps, critics focused on Colombia's trespassing.

Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in great powers and culminates in extinction - also causes

rising alert levels.

Robert Ayson, July 2010, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at th

Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Confl ict &

Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld

http://www.asiaresearch.ir/files/10apr_Miller.pdf



http://www.asiaresearch.ir/files/10apr_Miller.pdf



A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are

reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here

the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century

bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds

even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-st

actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could

precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess th

In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear

between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount o

imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might

wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem f

responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react

was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of thanuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragm

its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of wher

nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion wou

shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North

Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurr

against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted

assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each

from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension

even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington

early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or Chi

example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected t

place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment,

when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this

a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such

actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and espe

the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetch

but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison

is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation fro

Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reaso

be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Coun

But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate ag

groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the g

increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and

Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, n

weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and

demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, an

indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States fro

such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps

offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is

subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its sta

supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite p lausible

options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this

occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to

pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do”

immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terroris

This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.



A2 Cuba diversifying

Oil’s key to Cuba’s economy.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvadaro, 2010, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD,

Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academ

Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic

Approaches to Cooperation”

The power and hydrocarbon sectors are inextricably linked , as Cuba produces about 85 percent of its power using liqui

fuels, a very high percentage compared with other countries.3 The total value of the energy consumed in Cuba has been

estimated at 14 percent of GDP , compared with a world average of about 10 percent. In 2007, domestic production of crude oil accounted for about 4

percent of total consumption and the rest was imported from Venezuela. About 50 percent of the total supply of fuel oil

applied to power generation and 50 percent for transportation and other uses; this is consistent with the usage breakdown seen in other countries.

Oil interests are tied up in the embargo.

Richard Sadowski, Fall 2011, J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, Fall 2011, “IN THIS ISSUE: NATURAL RESOURCE

CONFLICT: CUBAN OFFSHORE DRILLING: PREPARATION AND PREVENTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED STATE

EMBARGO,” Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol'y 37, p. lexisA U.S. Geological Survey estimates that Cuba's offshore oil fields hold at least four and a half billion barrels of recoverable oil and ten trillion cubic feet of natural gas. n29 Cupet, the state-owned Cuban energy company, insists

actual reserves are double that of the U.S. estimate. n30 One estimate indicates that Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil per day. n31 Given this vast resource, Cuba has already leased offshore oil exploration blocks

operators from Spain, Norway, and India. n32 Offshore oil discoveries in Cuba are placing increasing pressure for the United States to end theembargo. First, U.S. energy companies are eager to compete for access to Cuban oil reserves. n33 [*38] Secondly, fears of a Cuban oil spill

argued to warrant U.S. investment and technology. n34 Finally, the concern over Cuban offshore drilling renews cries that the embargo is largely a failure and harms human rights.¶

ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the embargo creates concern that they will lose out on an opportunity to develo

nearby resource. n35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political pressure for self-serving purposes . n36 American

politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs , are especially susceptible to oil-lobby pressures . n37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when t

Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast

Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are , in cooperation with the Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a goo

answer to high prices is more supply" n38 This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increa

in consumption rates. n39 Oil company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves. n40 Thus, more leases, including

those in Cuban waters , equal higher stock valuation. n41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trappe

on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on

doorstep of the United States." n42



AFF



No Cuba trade switch

No Cuban switch to the U.S. – food purchases prove.

William Vida, 2-26-2013, ontwoshores, “What if the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Ban and the Embargo?,”

http://ontwoshores.com/?p=1785

Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount of products in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million

dollars of food in the U.S. That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is not likely to

abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major trading partner of the U.S.





Venezuela relations decline good - reforms

Cut in Venezuela aid is beneficial for Cuba – faster reforms.

Juan O. Tamayo, 3-5-2013, “How will the Venezuela-Cuba link fare after Chávez’s death?,” Miami Herald,

http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/05/3268483/how-will-the-venezuela-cuba-link.html

Some analysts argue that a cut in Venezuelan aid might prove beneficial to Cuba in the long run by forcing ruler Raúl Castro to drastically broad

and speed up the reforms toward a market economy that he has been pushing since 2007. Castro’s reforms so far have done little to resolve the massive problems in the economy, from bottom-of-the ba

industrial productivity and salaries to a stalled rural sector that forced Havana to import $1.6 billion worth of agricultural products in 2011. “It’s imperative to have a truly deep opening that would allow Cubans to import and e

professionals to be productive and enterprising citizens to become the motor for the economy,” wrote Emilio Morales, head of the Havana consulting Group in Miami. Havana also might not feel an acutoff as sharply as it felt the end of the Soviet subsidies because its good relations with China and Brazil could attract so

additional support from them, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit report. And Venezuela may only trim and not totally cut off its assistance because it benefits from the relationship through the Cuban

doctors, who treat poor families that tend to vote for Chávez’s party, as well as security, military and other advisers.





A2 Embargo issues

No direct relationship between security concerns and the embargo.

William Ratliff , 1-30-2013, Research Fellow, Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution, “Cuba's Tortured Transition,”

http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/139281The Eisenhower administration recognized Fidel Castro’s government in early 1959 but soon broke diplomatic relations and imposed an economic embargo—tightened in 1962 by President John Kennedy—because Cuba nation

American properties and became an ally of the Soviet Union. The embargo was an integral part of U.S. Cold War strategy against the Soviet bloc and shou

have been lifted after the bloc collapsed, but wasn’t. Though some security concerns exist today, including the gathering of Chinese intelligence from the island, and extensiv

Cuban meddling in Venezuela, these challenges are not lessened by the embargo.

Venezuela has asked for the U.S. to lift the embargo

Cubaheadlines, 9-27-2009, “Latin American Leaders Demand U.S. Lift the Cuban Embargo,”

http://www.cubaheadlines.com/2009/09/27/18475/latin_american_leaders_demand_us_lift_cuban_embargo.html

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, a friend of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, also asked that the embargo be lifted, a demand he resta

Thursday night during a one-hour CNN interview with Larry King. "As we asked him in June,Obama should break the embargo already," Chávez told King, referring to the OAS meeting. The opposit

the failed embargo policy goes beyond Latin America. In what could be a record, the General Assembly has voted overwhelmingly for 17 years in a row to urge the U.S. to lift the anachronistic embargo. The time is long overdue

Congress and President Obama to heed the world's opinion and toss the failed embargo into the ash heap of history. That would really be in sync with his administration's policy of engagement with

mutual respect for Cuba, Latin America and the world.







No impact to alliance collapse

No major regional impact from the Venezuelan/Cuban alliance.

Daniel P. Erikson, 2004, is director of Caribbean programs at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C., World Pol

Journal, “Castro and Latin America: A Second Wind?,” Ebsco

There is no question that Venezuela’s oil is crucial to Cuba, and that Chávez derives some political benefit from Castro’s support. Yet Chávez owes his rise to domesti

political factors that are entirely independent of Cu- ba, and the loss of Venezuelan oil shipments would be a significant b

manageable set- back for Castro. Cuba’s nearly $2 billion in annual tourist revenues and $1.2 billion in remittances from Cubans living in the United States are both more important economically, an

island has made significant strides in cultivating domestic energy sources and reducing dependency on oil imports. While most hemispheric leaders maintain relations with bocountries, they have so far steered clear of allying themselves with the two men and instead focused mainly on regional integration and manag- ing relations with the Un

States. Castro and Chávez have a penchant for grand rhetoric. But in conjuring a hemisphere united against American

hegemony, they remain a distinctly two-man club.

Documents

Venezuela Relations Disadvantage - MSDI 2013