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Massimo Verdicchio

The weakening of Gianni Vattimo

Gianni Vattimo came on the philosophical scene as the philosopher of weak thought (pensiero debole), a name which he later believed may have diminished its philosophical relevance by not sounding very philoso-phical (troppo poco losocamente caratterizzata), but rather acceptable,urbane, innocuous (OLI, p. 5).1 Yet, Vattimos theory is anything butweak. His philosophy is solidly grounded in the thought of Nietzsche,Heidegger and Gadamer from whom he borrows the key elements of hishermeneutics: a critique of philosophy, an ontology and the central roleof language (Sprachlichkeit) , respectively (BI, p. 5). Vattimo chose toname his philosophy weak in antithesis to the strong thought of meta-physics and its strong claims of truth and knowledge. With this term,Vattimo wants to denounce the inherently self-deluded character of meta-physics whose teleological claims are illusionary and destined for failure.Vattimos weak philosophy, therefore, is weak only in so far as it distancesitself from an apparently strong metaphysical thought which, to all evi-dence, is precisely what is weak. With this nihilistic ontology, which com-bines the thought of three of the best philosophical minds of the lastcentury, Vattimo hopes to save philosophy from failure, steering it away from the pitfalls of metaphysics and re-adjusting it to the more adequateand more accountable conditions of postmodernity.

Yet it appears that not all is well with Vattimos philosophy of pensierodebole. In his most recent theoretical work, Beyond Interpretation , he refersto his nihilistic hermeneutics as scandalous because, in his view, it twistsweak thought and nihilism into a totally different sense from the usual,ending somehow in the arms of theology (BI Preface, my italics). Thisshift, to be sure, is scandalous but not unpredictable because the passagefrom pensiero debole to theology is, to some extent, predictable. What isunpredictable, or unpredicted by Vattimo is the totally different sense inwhich his weak thought is actually twisted, or undermined, and is made to

denounce the strong, or metaphysical, character of his weak hermeneutics.The object of this paper is to outline the rhetorical unfolding of Vattimos

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weakening, namely, the totally different sense that leads to its inevitableundoing in the theology of metaphysics.

Vattimos weak thought combines what is critical in these threephilosophers while avoiding their metaphysical shortcomings. FromNietzsche, Vattimo borrows the notion of the devaluation of all values andthe notionof the realworld as fable (BI, p. 12). This enables Vattimo to estab-lisha nihilistic ontology that not only views all values asarbitrary but, since theworld is a fable, there is no one truth but only interpretations. His nihilisticontological interpretations are not truth-bound but are open to be contra-dicted and superseded. Yet, with Nietzsche there is always the danger thatthought, in its constant self-criticism,might self-destruct in hopelessnihilism.It is only with Heideggers and Gadamers ontology that philosophy as her-meneutics can nd its proper balance and can hope to retain its purpose and

function as interpreter of the world. Vattimo, however, does not follow Heidegger completely either. He takes up his preoccupation with Being but he is careful to avoid falling into the metaphysical trap of a potentialreturn to Being. Vattimos turn to Being, rather, wants to allude to a history of being as the story of a long goodbye, of an interminable weak-ening of Being (BI, p. 13). This process entails, rst of all, an examinationof all those inherited openings (di quelle aperture ereditate) (BI, p. 14,OLI, p. 19), which open to Being, of which the rst of these is, following Heidegger, language, the house of Being (BI, p. 14). A preoccupation,

as I have indicated, also shared by Gadamer in the notion of Sprachlichkeit .Nietzsches nihilism, the weakening of Being, and these inheritedopenings, such as language, make up Vattimos nihilistic hermeneuticontology, or weak thought, whose prime resolve is the dissolution of truth as peremptory and objective evidence (BI, p. 19, my italics).

Vattimos theory of weak thought comes on the philosophical sceneas a powerful theoretical model which, while announcing that it is justanother interpretation, wants to make for that interpretation a truthclaim. His theory, in fact, allows for a number of interpretations, orso-called weakenings, that even though they may contradict and super-sede each other point us, nevertheless, to a truth, however variable orweak it may be. It is an hermeneutics, writes Vattimo, clearly aware of its own nihilistic vocation (BI, p. 75), namely, that it is just one inter-pretation among many, and can only make weak claims, since these areinherently contradictory and nihilistic.

Unless we conceive of hermeneutics as a metatheory of inter-pretations, the only alternative is to conceive it as the outcome of events, or of a series of events, that we can only relate in the samenihilistic terms found in Nietzsche, that is, as a story that cannotreally be told. (BI, p. 11)

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Vattimos hermeneutics does not lead to a theory of historicity, asopposed to a metaphysical one, limited to the description of some objectivestructure of existence. It is rather a radical historical truth (BI, p. 6), in theHeideggerian sense of a response to a sending, a Ge-Schick , which is whatdifferentiates it from a purely metaphysical conception of truth.The hermeneutic conception of truth lies in its historical legacy, in theinterpretation that we venture to give and to which we give a response(BI, p. 6). For Vattimo, the best example is Nietzsches announcementof the death of God which is not meant to be interpreted metaphysically in the sense that God does not exist and that we have nally come torealize it, but in the sense that He is no longer necessary. The God of meta-physics was necessary in order that society could be organized and shelteredfrom the threats of nature, but to modern man this notion of God appears

to be an hypothesis too extreme and too excessive and has to be dismissed(OI, p. 11). Our reality, after all, is nothing more than an interpretation, a fable that is told, and this is the central point that Vattimos modernhermeneutics shares with Nietzsches nihilism.

Hermeneutics tells a story, a fable, an interpretation that poses itself as valid until another interpretation presents itself that contradicts it, orshows it to be a lie (BI, p. 13). In this sense, hermeneutics qualies as a philosophy of modernity (in both the subjective and objective sensesof the genitive) and even professes to be the philosophy of modernity.

Its truth may be entirely summed up by the claim that it is the mostpersuasive philosophical interpretation of that course of events of whichit feels itself to be the outcome (BI, p. 11). We have here, something similar to what Thomas Kuhn characterized as a scientic paradigm.The errors and contradictions of one interpretation, of a scientic para-digm, are valid until disproved or, as Vattimo puts it: Their value liesin being able to establish a coherent picture we can share while waiting for others to propose a more plausible alternative (BI, p. 11).

In order to illustrate the applicability, and viability, of Vattimostheory of weak thought I will refer once again to his main theoreticalwork, Beyond Interpretation , a work which best exemplies the workingsof his method and which bears the appropriate subtitle the Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy. While Vattimo applies his hermeneutictheory to science, ethics, religion and art, I will limit my comments only to a consideration of art which is, perhaps, the most telling, since art oraesthetic hermeneutics have made similar claims to capture true experi-ence (vera esperienza) (BI, p. 76). In Vattimos analysis of art, however,it is clear that something is lacking (BI, p. 78) in the hermeneutic of the truth of art, especially when we reect on the conicting relationbetween art and religion, on the destiny of art with respect to theprocess of modern secularization (BI, p. 78). This conict is clearly

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exemplied by the cultural distinction that separates art and religion, andby what Vattimo calls the experience of Saint Ivo, after Saint Ivo della Sapienza Church in Rome.2 Museums are not the only places where weview art. Tourists often go to churches to see works of art that are being used, at the same time, as places of worship. The reverse, however, isnot the case. We do not go to a museum to worship before some artisticpainting with a religious theme. While there are signs that warn us notto go into a church when the mass service is on, there are no signs in a museum that tell us when we can go in to worship the paintings.

The difference exemplies, for Vattimo, the essential problematic of art: its confusion with religion. The question is at what point art ceasesto be art and becomes religion, or at what point art ceases to be religion,and becomes art. At what point do we not kneel in front of art to

worship it but just admire it as an aesthetic object?

In the history of western civilization, the confusion which art has hadto avoid in order to assert its own specicity and to exercise, there-fore, the function which is most proper to it, is principally, in fact,exclusively, that with religion (OLI, p. 80, my trans.)

Vattimo also calls on Georg Luka cs 3 and Walter Benjamin,4 who havetackled a similar issue from other perspectives but in every case the eman-

cipation of art always seems to be tied up with the experience of religion.Luka cs difculty, and probably also Benjamins, and perhaps of modern aesthetics in general . . . consists . . . in the fact that one isunable to think the secularization [of art] in all its signicance.The development of art as specic phenomenon (and of aestheticsas theory) seems to be tied to the emancipation of art from religion.But the meaning of aesthetic experience, once we wish to capture itin all its specicity, refers once again to a sphere that cannot bedened unless it is with reference to the experience of religion(BI, pp. 656).

The solution, for Vattimo, is to move away from a transcendental con-ception of art as beautiful toward one that has to listen to the truththat opens up in the works (BI, p. 83). This does not mean that oneshould look for philosophical or existential truths in art, but rather thatone should recognize art as a phenomenon of secularization and, inevita-bly, as bound up with religion, that is, as having ambiguous ties thatconnect it with, and separate it from religion (BI, p. 85). With specicreference to Heidegger and, in particular, to the essay What are poetsfor? (Wozu dichter?), Vattimo arrives at the conclusion that what is at

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or lesser degree of their dependency on the nihilistic interpretation of modernity.

If we said that the limit between what is of worth and what is not inthese experiences is signaled by their greater or lesser delity to theguiding thread of nihilism (the reduction of violence, the weakening of strong and aggressive identities, the acceptance of the other, to thepoint of charity) would this not be a faithful interpretation of the meaning of the nihilistic vocation of hermeneutics ? (BI, p. 73, my italics)

In this passage, the nihilistic interpretation reads art in terms of religionand of the way in which the sense of community and collectivity is estab-lished among these groups. The interpretation takes for granted the ben-

ecial effects of the religious roots of art over musical groups in terms of reduction of violence, weakening of strong and aggressive identities,acceptance of the other, to the point of charity. This weakening of vio-lence in art tempered by religion is contradicted, however, by the reality of the violence at some of these rock or punk concerts, and the very anar-chic and atheistic character of some of these rock groups and their songs. Although there may be a weakening of violence due to the benecial effectsof religion over art, there is also, on the other hand, an increase in violencedue to the distance of art from religion. In any case, this is certainly not

what one would expect from a faithful interpretation of the meaning of the nihilistic vocation of hermeneutics!In the second example provided by Vattimo, there is not even the

attempt to deal with the consequences on contemporary art of its distancefrom religion, that is, the possibility of an increase in violence. Theexample, instead, turns out to be a critique of contemporary art and itsfailure to function as a new mythology, a rational religion, a place wherea society or determined groups can recognize themselves and their convic-tions. Art, in other words, is now being faulted for not being religion, a secularized religion for the modern community.

The inessential character that has overtaken certain manifestations of contemporary art (which often appeals only to a public of specialists,of artists involved in the same work, or of dealers who exploit itslasting cult value and thereby, very remotely, its connections withreligion) may well be explained by the fact that secularizationbegan and has been lived as the abandonment of any lingering illu-sion over the capacity and the duty of art to serve as a new mythology, a rational religion, in short, as a place in which a society or determinate social groups recognize themselves and their shared convictions . (BI,p. 73, my italics).

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Vattimo, however, makes a similar critique of religion for not being artisticor sufciently aestheticized, or secularized.

If art can rediscover its own essentiality by becoming aware of its ownconstitution as secularized religion, religion could nd in this con-nection a reason to think of itself in terms that are less dogmaticand disciplinarian, and more aesthetic, more in line with that third age, the age of the spirit . (BI, pp. 7374, italics mine).

In conclusion, it would appear that Vattimos hermeneutic theory privi-leges a weakening tempered by religion and a qualitative and positiveoutcome over a negative one, as a nihilistic experience would at rst leadone to believe. From Vattimos hermeneutics as interpretation, we

would at least expect that both aspects be taken into consideration. It isclear, however, that the nihilism that Vattimo takes from Nietzsche, asdevaluation of all values, turns out to be a valorization of all values,albeit subject to contradiction.

Vattimos philosophy of weak thought in its shift toward religion, dis-allows, precisely, those nihilistic interpretations that move away from reli-gionand from a religious content (acceptance of the other, charity, etc.), suchas the possibility of violence resulting from a distancing between art and reli-gion. This one-sided aspect in Vattimos hermeneutic ontology, which

decidedly privileges the positive over the negative, or religion over art,betrays its strong roots and the fact that what is supposed to be a weak her-meneutics, that is, interpretive and open to arbitrariness, favors, instead, a shift toward the religious and away from art. The result is an attempt to secu-larize religion, at the same time that art is faulted for taking its distance fromreligion. This shift is symptomatic of a confusion between art and religionwhich are made to appear similar, and therefore exchangeable when, infact, they are not. While art whichrepresents religious themes canbe appreci-ated as art, or worshiped as religious icon, religion, since it is not a mode of representation, cannot be taken to be artistic. One can worship any artifact,but not every artifact is religious. Art can be interpreted as religious butreligion cannot be interpreted as art or as being artistic. Art is a mode of rep-resentation, religion is a type of interpretation. The confusion is based on themetonymic relation of proximity between art and religion which allows forthe metaphorical exchange and transfer of characteristics between art andreligion, and, ultimately, for the nal substitution: art ought to be a religion,religion ought to be more aesthetic. Thus, Vattimo can fault art for notbeing a new myth or a new religion for modern man, and only the dominionofa small elite, and he can fault religion for being too strict and too severeandnot sufcientlyaesthetic and friendly, as we would say today, to everyone, oras Christ would have it, as we shall see.

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But there is no proximity between art and religion. The proximity ispurely accidental due to the apparent similarity that the so-called experi-ence of St. Ivo establishes between art and religion, namely, that art canshare both in the artistic and the religious, that it can be appreciatedboth as an aesthetic object and as a religious object. This supposedcommon ground between art and religion, however, is itself the result of an act of interpretation that turns an arbitrary relation of proximity intoa necessary and metaphorical one which allows for the possibility of estab-lishing an hermeneutic ontology, even if only a weak one. Or rather, whatis weak, is only apparently so since the arbitrary and accidental relation of art and religion becomes strong when this relation is made necessary, justas it occurs in any strongand metaphysical philosophical system, whichVattimo rejects and wants to take his distance from. In fact, what is

really weak in Vattimos hermeneutics is precisely this misuse of rhetori-cal language, his avoidance in acknowledging its importance, which passesfor experience and interpretation and thus for the possibility to speak about the truth (BI, p. 75, OI, p. 95) while claiming not to makeany epistemological claims.Vattimos analysis of art points to a problematic in his use of the notion of nihilism which he claims to take from Nietzsche and which he sees exem-plied in the statement God is Dead. Vattimo rejects the commonly accepted reading that God does not exist and that he is just a creation of

man, but understands it to mean that God is no longer necessary formodern man. This interpretation of nihilism characterizes the distance,within the framework of Vattimos hermeneutic ontology, betweenNietzsches critique and devaluation of all values, and Vattimos nihilismdened as a weakening (indebolimento) rather than a denunciation of error. In order to better understand the implications of this distance, Iwould like to turn now to Vattimos reading of Nietzsche, in Nietzsche: An Introduction ,5 an introductory essay on Nietzsches work which inaddition to providing an account of Nietzsches philosophy also explainshis own indebtedness to the German philosopher and the role that nihilismplays in his hermeneutics.

Vattimo reads Nietzsche along the same lines as Heidegger, as a hermeneutic ontology, a meditation on the meaning of Being (NI,p. 5). His reading aims to show that even as early as The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche could be said to have established the foundations for an herme-neutic ontology: Nietzsche laid the foundations here of his inter-pretation-based ontology which is developed later in his mature worksand in the notes contained in The Will to Power (NI, p. 21). Nietzsches cri-tique of Socrates rationalism and Platonism inThe Birth of Tragedy is a rstindictment of metaphysics, which returns in his later works as a critique of present-day enfeebled and decadent culture(NI, p. 23).

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Clues, according to Vattimo, of a similar critical process inNietzsches later works can be found in Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,6 where he sketches a similar theory of philosophy, thoughincomplete, and in the second and third of the Untimely Meditations .7

In these later works, the Dionysian dimension of The Birth of Tragedy becomes gradually associated with the aesthetic as the only alternative tothe rationality of metaphysics but, in these works, the aesthetic does notreturn as either myth or music, that of Richard Wagner, as Nietzschehad hoped. The break with Wagner is symptomatic, above all, of a rejec-tion of the aesthetic as a return of tragic culture, his dream of a reborntragic culture, he no longer envisaged it in connection with a phenomenonlike Wagners music, nor perhaps with any art (NI, pp. 267). Artreturns, rather, as constitutive of the rationality of science. The freedom

of spirit and of the Dionysian impulse, which for the Greeks had charac-terized the realm of art before the appearance of philosophy, unfolds now in science rather than art, in that philosophy which results from the crisisof metaphysics.

In the second and third of the Untimely Meditations , the decisive roleof art appears to be tied to a critique of culture , as opposed to civilization ,which characterized Socratic decadence, and to a critique of historicism inthe Second Untimely Meditations , On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life. In these works, Nietzsche comes close to dissolving

the original conception of a metaphysics of the artist as he shows thatthis metaphysics is no longer an alternative to civilization , but can only develop in a theory of culture as criticism. Similarly, in the critique of historicism, conducted in its historiographical rather than metaphysicalform, Nietzsche denounces the problem of a century dominated by history as historical sickness (p. 35). He condemns its excess of knowl-edge about the past which brought about a lack of style and essentially constituted their decadence (NI, p. 36). Contemporary culture couldonly hope to recover from this historical sickness and from decadencethrough art and religion with the help of the supra-historical or eternalpowers of art and religion. According to Vattimo, Nietzsches cultural(nihilistic) critique comes close here to anticipating his own nihilistichermeneutic ontology.

In the third Untimely Meditations , on Schopenhauer as Educator,Vattimo emphasizes Nietzsches critique of philosophy as taught in theuniversities, and how the only worthwhile philosophy is the one thatputs in question the status quo . The denition of beauty also changes radi-cally as it is no longer identied with Dionysian-Apollonian beauty but isrelated to Life and experience, to those who have experienced a greatenlightenment as to the character of existence(UM III, #5, p. 376, NI,p. 40). This view is in accord with the three images of man represented

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by Rousseau, Goethe and Schopenhauer, and where a combination of thelast two constituted Nietzsches ideal of man: He can quite legitimately bedescribed as a critical spirit who forces himself toknow everything like theman of Goethe, but with a heroic love of truth which also forces him tosacrice himself (NI, p. 41). But we are still in the preliminary and youth-ful phase of Nietzsches philosophy and most of these notions are in theirembryonic stage and will be reintroduced and rehabilitated later in a weaknihilistic hermeneutic ontology.

The turning point and the beginning of Nietzsches more maturethinking occurs, however, in Human, All Too Human which marks, asVattimo emphasizes in the title to this section, The Deconstruction of Metaphysics. This middle period is crucial for Vattimos reading of Nietzsche and for the notion of nihilism, which he borrows from him.

Vattimo, once again, follows Heideggers reading of Nietzsche based onthe later works and mainly on his posthumously published fragments, now collected in The Will to Power. Vattimo acknowledges that Heideggersinterpretation has not received common acceptance and that the samematerial has been interpreted differently by other critics, such as JacquesDerrida, a most important reader of Nietzsche. For Vattimo, however,the move away from Heidegger has resulted in a straying away fromNietzsches original conception of nihilism, which he now wants tocorrect. But a certain distancing, from Heideggers interpretation has

caused the Nietzsche literature of recent years to view the problem in a different light (NI, p. 43).For Vattimo, it is in the so-called middle period, and in Human, All

too Human , that we can gain an insight into Nietzsches concept of nihi-lism, which is so central to his later hermeneutics. In this middle period,which spans Human, All too Human to Zarathustra (187882), Nietzscheappears to be concerned with both the gradual development of ontologicalideas and cultural criticism(NI, p. 44). Although these elements are alsopresent in the later period, in these works they also become excessive,in Vattimos view, in ways that one may easily miss many of the particu-larities of Nietzsches philosophy (NI, p. 44). In the middle period, on thecontrary, and with the break with Wagner and Schopenhauer, Nietzschesposition, sketched rst in The Birth of Tragedy , as a dualism between theDionysian and the Apollonian, acquires the content that it lacked in theearlier phase. As Vattimo understands it, in fact, nihilism is the namefor the close connection between Nietzsches philosophy and his intellec-tual biography: For Nietzsches philosophical ideas (even those that par-ticularly interested Heidegger) make sense , as we shall see, in the lightpartly of Nietzsches intellectual biography and partly of that picture of him that we as readers can only form against the background of his cul-tural criticism(NI, p. 43, italics mine). The importance of Nietzsches

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thought lies in this close connection(NI, p. 44), or, proximity, betweenhis philosophical ideas and his cultural criticism.

It is at this point that Vattimos hermeneutic ontology can be said toapproximate Nietzsches thought through the close connection of nihi-lism which also links his weak thought to the cultural criticism whichre-surfaces through the critique of art and religion, as we have seen. Theproximity of Nietzsches philosophical criticism and Vattimos ownhermeneutics, which makes Vattimo Nietzsches heir, if not Heideggersor Gadamers, makes it possible to read the rest of Vattimos analysis ina double register that allows us to determine the extent of the distance,or the proximity, between the two.

According to Vattimo, what changes in Human All too Human isprincipally Nietzsches attitude toward science, which in his earlier work

he had viewed as one of the great enemies of any true culture(NI,p. 45), and toward art, which can no longer lead us out of decadence(NI, p. 45). Vattimo speculates that Nietzsche, in the period from 1878to 1882 was inuenced by new acquaintances such as Franz Overbeck,and by his friendship with Jacob Burckhardt, and by his readings of thenatural sciences (chemistry, physics, paleontology), and of the French mor- alists , Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, Chamfort, Fontenelle and Pascal(NI, p. 467). From these experiences, personal and scientic, but also lit-erary, Nietzsche seems to have concluded that art represents a superseded

phase in the education of mankind, leaving science to play a dominant role.The criticism applied to art, in Human All too Human , is that art is nolonger timely, it is superseded, and it is a thing of the past(NI, p. 50).In order to function, art needs a particular world and a particular culture,and what makes it untimely is the change in societys underlying condi-tions(NI, p. 49). While science advances, the relationship between art andlife is altered so that art is no longer capable of affecting us: in order toaffect the human spirit, art needs a world that is no longer our own. If itwishes to stay alive in our world, it must invoke the past and create arti-cially those preconditions which gave it relevance in other epochs (NI,p. 50). The same goes for science, however, which Nietzsche does not pri-vilege as providing us with a more objective knowledge of reality but withthe foundation of a more mature and ultimately less intemperate and lessviolent culture (NI, p. 51). To be sure, science is based on errors andarbitrary assumptions, but these errors are the necessary foundation of science: Our picture of the world (the picture with which science alsooperates) is founded on these errors (NI, p. 51). The passage quoted by Vattimo spells out the limitations of science: Rigorous science is capableof detaching us from this ideational world only to a limited extent,since science is inherently incapable of making any essential inroad intothe power of habits of feeling acquired in primeval times (quoted by

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Vattimo, NI, pp. 512). Only art can do that. Nietzsche values sciencemore as a mental attitude than as a means of achieving knowledge. Know-ledge, in fact, is no longer viewed by Nietzsche as something to which weshould be committed for the salvations of our souls(NI, p. 52). Science isa model way of thinking which is not fanatical and proceeds methodically,soberly and objectively in the sense that it remains capable of making judgments outside the immediate pressure of interests and passions (NI,p. 53). For Nietzsche this constitutes the way of thinking of a freespirit (NI, p. 53).

But there are also ambiguities that crop up in the text of Human All too Human , where Nietzsche shows how art and science are not differentfrom each other, since the former is purely a play of the imagination, whilethe latter is cold knowledge of the things themselves (NI, p. 54). Even the

view that science approaches the world with greater freedom is counteredby the notion that science cannot free itself from the world of appearances,which is the result of a long history of errors that have become secondnature to humans (NI, p. 54). Finally, it is said that sciences claim toarrive at a knowledge of the thing in itself (Ding an sich ) is thought by Nietzsche to be worthy of Homeric laughter (HAH I, #16, p. 34, NI,pp. 52 and 54). This implicit critique of science, however, leaves some-thing unsaid. The statement that sciences claim to knowledge, to arriveat the thing itself, is worthy of Homeric laughter implies more than

just a critique of science. The fact that Homer is being quoted alsoimplies that it is art, or literature, that laughs at sciences absurd claims.Homeric laughter is not simply an expression of a critique of science, asVattimo believes when he quotes it, but is also an indication of art laughing at science. The difference is telling. In one case we are just speaking of sciences limitations which, as we are told, are the very bases on whichscience develops and progresses. In this case, the shortcomings of scienceare a necessary and an integrative aspect of its evolution. In the case of art laughing at science, it is an indication of the preposterous and exagger-ated claims of science which claims to do what it cannot do. Homericlaughter, in other words, is ironic laughter, which mocks mans deludedclaims to compare himself to the Gods, like the man of science whoclaims to know what he cannot know.

This aspect of art which laughs at the errors of science is already foreshadowed in Nietzsches dedication of the rst edition of Human All to Human 8 to Voltaire, which Vattimo mentions but does not follow up. Is Nietzsche dedicating the volume to Voltaire the philosopher or toVoltaire the writer of Candide , a conte philosophique , an ironic philosophi-cal tale? The latter would seem to be the case, as is clear from aphorism#213, partly quoted by Vattimo, which alludes to the laughter of art atthe nonsense which transpires when we move beyond the iron laws of

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science. The laws of science, in fact, are made of iron precisely to preventanyone from discerning the errors that they conceal. Vattimo quotes thepassage just to emphasize a concept of art as nonsense that frees us fromthe rigors of science: In that passage the laughter is occasioned by artsability to make us enjoy nonsense for brief moments when art suspendsthe iron laws of our usual apprehension of the world (NI, p. 54). Butthe rest of the quotation, which Vattimo leaves out, relates that when artsuspends the iron laws of science, as Voltaire does in Candide , it does soironically by denouncing the absurd claims of scientic man. And theresult is Homeric or Voltairian laughter.

The overturning of experience into its opposite, of the purposive intothe purposeless, of the necessary into the arbitrary, but in such a way

that this event causes no harm and is imagined as occasioned by highspirits, delight us, for it momentarily liberates us from the constraintsof the necessary, the purposive and that which corresponds to ourexperience, which we usually see as our inexorable masters; we play and laugh when the expected (which usually makes us fearful andtense) discharges itself harmlessly. It is the pleasure of the slave atthe Saturnalia (HAH, #13).

The passage, which bears the title The pleasure of nonsense, gives an

interesting modern version of the Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy in theway the latter playfully undermines the seriousness of the former, the way the slave makes fun of the iron rules imposed by the master. The iron lawsof science are reversed by the irony of art that denounces the nonsense of its laws.

Vattimo goes on to quote the last line of aphorism #223 whereNietzsche appears to establish a continuity between the artist and the scien-tist, rather than an opposition: the scientic man is the further evolutionof the artistic. The statement, however, in no way, counters what wasstated in aphorism #213. Scientic man may very well be the further evolu-tion of artistic man, just as for Giambattista Vico in the New Science , thephilosopher or the man of science replaces the poet. In Nietzsche, as inVico, however, what appears to be an evolution, or a progress, from anunstable artistic or poetic model to a scientic model, turns out to be a mere substitution where what used to be the shortcomings of art havenow become the shortcomings of science. Both in Vico and in Nietzschethe illusion of evolution from the errors of art to the truth of science orphilosophy is precisely the delusion of knowledge that art laughs at.

Unless, of course, we are dealing with a man of science, or a philosopher, such as Voltaire or Nietzsche who undermine through artthe very claims of science. Art may disappear but what remains, in

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philosophers or men of science such as Voltaire and Nietzsche, is the ability to counter the development of errors. This is what art has always taughtman, as Vattimo acknowledges: This long education through art has pre-pared the ground for science and the free spirit, and both must therefore begrateful to art (NI, p. 55). This statement, of course, is ironic because whatscience ought to be grateful to art for is really the way art curbs the exces-sive claims of science by making fun of them.

Vattimo quotes in earnest aphorism #107 from the Gay Science onOur Ultimate Gratitude to Art where the passage simply reiterates thisnew Nietzschean conception of science which has inherited the joys of art. Nietzsche denes art as, the cult of the untrue and adds that weought to be grateful for this invention because, otherwise, we would notbe able to see through the deceits of science:

Our Ultimate Gratitude to Art. If we had not approved of the arts andinvented this sort of cult of the untrue, the insight into the general untruth and falsity of things now given us by science and insightinto delusion and error as conditions of intelligent and sentientexistence would be quite unbearable . (Quoted by Vattimo, NI,p. 55, italics mine)

We have here quite a different function of art from the one attributed to art

in the experience of Saint Ivo where art was viewed in its relationship toreligion and as having failed to establish itself as a new myth, as theplace where the individual and society could recognize themselves andshare their convictions. Similarly, the nihilistic function of art in Nietzsche,which Vattimo claims to make his own, is radically different from the closeconnection between philosophy and cultural criticism conceived by Vattimo. Nietzsches nihilistic view of art as cultural critique does notlead to a plurality of interpretations, as Vattimo claims, but denouncesthe very possibility of an hermeneutic ontology that claims to speak thetruth, even in a weak sense. The proximity between Nietzsche andVattimo, as in the case of the proximity of art and religion, is arbitrary and rhetorical.

Nietzsches nihilism is evident in the Homeric laughter that mocksthe excesses of science, just as the statement that God is dead entailsthe unmasking of a truth which is essentially rhetorical, namely, thatGod is a metaphor created by man who has forgotten he created Him.For Vattimo, however, the statement God is dead means that in our con-temporary world God is no longer necessary because as Christ becameman, so religion ought to be secularized. The two positions could not befurther apart. This is clear when we take into account the last twist thathis weak thought has taken and which, as I have indicated, he calls

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scandalous because it takes him to a totally different sense from theending he had anticipated, one which leads him somehow in[to] thearms of theology (BI Preface, my italics). For the purposes of thispaper, we do not need to sift through the large amount of material thatVattimo has written on the subject. It will be sufcient to look at a work which in many ways is representative of his thinking on religion, theshort text, Credere di credere (Believing to believe).

In Credere di Credere ,9 Vattimos discovery of religion, and principally of Christianity, is understood within the context of his weak hermeneuticontology, his weak thought, at the end of metaphysics. Religion is notviewed in terms of absolutes but as a process of secularization and desacra-lization. According to Vattimo, a similar process of weakening occurs intheology and is characterized by its essentially kenotic structure. Kenosis,

from the Greek meaning emptying, is the theological term that indicatesthe divesting of divinity when Christ became a man. Saint Paul illustratesthis principle in his Letter to the Philippians 10 stating that Christ: thoughhe was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to begrasped, but emptied himself , taking the form of a servant, being born in thelikeness of men (LP, pp. 67, my italics). In order to become man, Christrenounced His divine nature to be weak among the weak. This is why Christ does not talk down to his disciples as a master to his servants, butas a friend to friends. Vattimo concludes, therefore, that Christianity is

based on the principles of friendship and humanity. It is friendly,human and, therefore, weak.Vattimo sees a parallel between these origins of Christianity and his

weak hermeneutic ontology. Present-day secularization of religion consists,in fact, of a shift similar to the one undergone by hermeneutic philosophy from strong to weak. Just as Christ became weak, leaving behind his divinenature, so Vattimos hermeneutic ontology, from its very beginning,declared itself weak in contrast to the strong philosophies of Kant andHegel. Consequently, Vattimo believes that his weak ontology isnothing more than the transcription of the Christian doctrine of incarna-tion of the son of God (CC, p. 21), thought in terms of secularization, as a weakening of the sacred, especially of the violent sacred.

But the analogy between the secularization of religion and weak thought conceals a difference within the apparent similarity. Whereas inreligion, kenosis, according to Saint Paul, occurs when Christ decided toempty Himself of his divine nature, intentionally, in order to becomeman, and weak, the weakest among the weak, in philosophy thephilosopher does not have the same option. The philosopher does notpossess a strong and a weak thought which gives him or her the possibility of shedding their strong thought for their weak thought. Weak thoughtarises out of an awareness of the impossibility of absolute meaning, of

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the impossibility of adequately establishing a stable and permanent absol-ute truth. Weak thought presupposes the awareness that there is no such a thing as strong thought or, which is the same, that what is called strong thought is really weak thought. Strong thought is never strong, and evenwhen it is thought to be strong it can always be shown that the claim isillusory, that it is always weak, that is, always unable to fulll the meta-physical claims it makes. Strong thought is metaphysical thought and a critique of metaphysics implies showing that what is strong thought isreally weak thought.

To simplify a great deal, Nietzsches critique of metaphysics, whatVattimo calls his nihilism, does precisely that, it undoes the strong claims of nineteenth-century thought, such as our belief in God, by stating that God is dead. While Vattimo claims to continue from

Nietzsche, it is clear from our reading of his reading of Nietzsche thattheir stance toward art, and weak thought, is radically different. Fromthe examples quoted earlier, it is clear that what we are grateful to artfor, according to Nietzsche, is precisely the function to curb the excessesof science, or, which is the same, strong thought. For Vattimo, however,who does not read this aspect in Nietzsche, his critique resolves itself ina weakening rather than in an undermining of the claims made by science, or strong thought. This is where Nietzsche and Vattimo partcompany, and Vattimo misrepresents Nietzsche and his nihilism while

claiming to be following in his wake. As I have already indicated, theirdifference is clearly exemplied by their attitude toward Christianity.For Nietzsche, God is dead; for Vattimo, Christ becomes man. The differ-ence could not be greater.

If Vattimo calls his thought weak, as opposed to the strong thoughtof his predecessors, his choice of terminology does not make his thoughtany weaker with respect to their philosophies. At best, there is the realiz-ation that great philosophical systems such as Kants and Hegels are nolonger possible. The terminology of weak thought introduces a dichotomy that was never there before between weak and strong thought. This isbecause the possibility of a stable and absolute meaning is not dependenton a characteristic of thought as such, that is, whether it is weak or strong,but depends on a characteristic of language, rhetorical language, which isarbitrary, and over which the philosopher has no control. For this reasonthought has always been weak and when it was said to be strong, it wasalways possible to prove the contrary, namely, that the strong claims of science, or philosophy, were unfounded, or founded on an unstable rhe-torical language and not on any natural or phenomenal reality.

By calling his hermeneutic ontology weak, Vattimo is, in fact,making strong what is essentially weak. He is creating an entirely new possibility of thought which grows stronger the more it claims to be

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weak. His latest pronouncements on religion, Christianity and belief are allsigns of a philosophy that grows stronger even if just in belief every day. If Vattimos philosophy were really weak, as it claims to be, itwould denounce the linguistic or rhetorical characteristics that make itweak. If his thought were really weak it would denounce the constitutiveideology of an hermeneutic ontology that claims to speak about the truth,despite being weak. Unlike Nietzsche or Voltaire, however, Vattimos phil-osophy never turns into a philosophical fable, a conte philosophique, a story that talks about science or philosophys deluded claim of strengthand authority concealed under the appearances of weak thought. Ratherthan undermining the ideology of this claim, Vattimo turns it into a strength, a weak-strength, to the point that it becomes inevitable, if notscandalous, that his philosophy leads to theology, or better, to religion,

to a mode of thinking that purports to be weak when, in fact, it is strong.Vattimos hermeneutic ontology is a powerful theory precisely

because in claiming to be weak it accepts the possibility of a plurality of interpretations in the place of the impossibility of a strong reading. Thistype of hermeneutic theory, whether Vattimos, Heideggers or Gadamers,depends on an avoidance of rhetorical language as the condition of thisimpossibility. In a gesture which is as old as philosophy I will limitmyself to recalling Benedetto Croces reading of Giambattista Vico the separation of rhetoric from philosophy always entails a distinction

between strong and weak. Croce claimed that all the errors of his predeces-sor were the result of a weak mind that was more poetical than philosophi-cal.11 Vico, of course, had stated the same about the early poets of civilization whose minds were unable to form concepts until the mind pro-gressed and was able to form philosophical or scientic concepts.12 Thenovelty of Vattimos philosophy is that he chooses to be weak withoutbeing poetic. He moves in the direction of religion which places hisweak thought among the early myths of the New Science .

University of Alberta

Notes

1 See G. Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation , trans. David Webb (Stanford,California: Stanford University Press, 1997). A translation of Oltre lInterpre- tazione. (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1994). Hereafter cited as BI and OIL and pagenumber.

2 The Baroque Church is one of the major landmarks of Rome with its specta-cular architecture designed by Borromini. The tourist goes to St Ivo to experi-ence the art, is Vattimos point, rather than for the religious experience.

3 See G. Luka cs, A esthetik, Vol. 2 (Luchterhand: Berlin, 1963).

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4 See W. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,in Illuminations , trans. H. Zohn, ed. H. Arendt [1936] (London: Cape, 1982).

5 See G. Vattimo, as Nietzsche: An Interpretation , trans. Nicholas Martin,(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). A translation of Introduzione a

Nietzsche , (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1985). Hereafter cited as NI.6 See F. Nietzsche, Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense(1873), Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language , ed and trans with a Critical Introductionby Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair and David J. Parent (New York, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1989).

7 See F. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations , trans. R. J. Hollingdale, (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1983). Hereafter cited as UM.

8 See F. Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human , trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1983). Hereafter cited as HAH.

9 See G. Vattimo, Credere di credere (Milano: Garzanti, 1996). Hereafter cited as

CC. The translation is mine.10 See Saint Paul, Philippians, The Letters of Paul, The New Testament .Hereafter cited as LP.

11 See B. Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico , trans. R. G. Collingwood(New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 423.

12 See G.B. Vico The New Science of Giambattista Vico , trans. T.G. Bergin andM.H. Fisch (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970).

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