O. A. KGBITZ

VARONA'S "FUNDAMENTO DE LA MORAL"AS A VERSION OF SPENCER'S ETHICS

ExcelIent analyses of Varona's work are already extensive (1). Theseanalyses recognize a general kinship with the views of Spencer but are almostimmediately concernecl to show that Varona's argument is not confined to Spen-cerian sources. The conviction guiding the present paper is that the significanceof these c1epartures cannot be properly evaIuatecl unless the extent of Varona'sdependence upon Spencer is clarified. Several limitations I11UStbe granted here.It has 110t bcen practicable to consult various possible revisions of the Funda-mento first cornposed in 1883. Hence, this exposition I11UStaclhere to the 1920edition e). Á' or wcre the Iectures 011 Psychology ancl Logic, which immecliatelyprecede the F 11l1da111en lo J accessible. N or will the later pessimistic aphorismsreceive discussion ,

Echocs of Spencer's views are perceptible in Varona's writing as early as1876, anc\ incrcase through 1883 (3). In 1876 Varona seerns to allucle to Spencerwhen he peaks oí "the enjoyment of the greatest, intensity of life", theevolutionary periocl, and the law oí progre ss (4). In IS7~ he confe ses that his re-pulsion for the religious paternalism oí Comte's later positivism induced him toprefer non-dogrnatic British empiricism anc\ the method oí Spencer e). M oralsin Euolution of the S:l111eyear reveals complete awareness of the problem of induc-tive moralists, thc explanation oí the sen e oí c1uty and of moral intuitions (6).Like Spencer (anel in opposition to Comte) he c\efenc\s a bio-psychological paral-lelism in 1878. In 1880 Spencer is usec\ against Krausist absolutism, feelings oíobligation are explainecl by the evoIutionary principIe, but without explainingthem away, theory is c\istinguishec\ frOI11 practice, and ernpiricism from rna-terialism (7).

\Vith such preparation the Fundamento embarks upon a genetic accountof the sentiment of duty. Xloral theory is suborc\inatec\ to sociology (8). 1\10-rality has its origin in human association for cornrnon ends with rcsulting coope-

(l) See the wor ks of Agramonte, Entralgo, Vitier on Varona; Also Revista Cubanade Filosofía, Y 01. 1, ?\9 4, 19~9.

(~) D. Appleton & Co., ~[ew York, 1920.(3) Bcar in mind the influential publications of Spencer frorn Social Statlcs, 1850, to

Data of Ethics, 1879.(4) VARONA, Estudios Literarios y Filosóficos (ELyF), La Habana, 1883, p. 69.(5) lb., pp. 279~85.(G) lb., p. Z-9 See Spencer's Soclal Statics, Applet on, 1903, "The Moral Sense Doc-

trine", pp. 1--24; p. 56. Cf. Darwin, The Descent of Lan, ch ú.(7) EFy L, pp. 305-339.(8) Fundamento de la Moral (Fdl Xl ), p. 8.

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ration and conflict (O). If actions result in benefit or injury to co-associates,tt1ey are moral; otherwise, non-moral. By this stipulation morality i entirelysocial and excludes individual "morality" (10).

From Spencer's pattern of viewing morality from four aspects, Varonaornits the physical and does 110t utilize Spencer's individual hedonism in the chap-ter treating the biological aspects. Instead. he finds the biological aspects ininherited emotive dispositions subject to the law of variation by circumstances.

For the pS'j'chological aspects Varona uses many assumptions and devicesfrom Part IX of Spencer's Principies of Psychology. Spencer had ought toderive sociality, gregariousness, and sympathy frorn experiences resulting fromassociation advantageous in common pursuits. But Varona is content to assumeegoistic and altruistic instincts (11). Both fincl the p ychological origin oí moralsentiment in a representation by the subject of a being similar to oneself (12).Both hold that the sentiments of life, liberty, property, and dignity are egoisticin origin, but have sympathetic counterparts in equity, generosity, and admiration,not sympathetically excitable without experience of the former (13). However,normally the most important sentiments are ego-altruistic, sentiments which res-pond not to pure egoism or altruism, nor to authentic consequences of action, butto partially extraneous considerations oí reward, praise, and blame (14). Spencerdefines sentiments as "the highest orders of feelings which are entirely re-repre-sentative", while Varona similarly defines sentiment as a "general tone of sen-sibility with reference to a whole class of idea and actions" (1(í). Genesis ofsentiments ancl of abstract ideas is similar (16). Indeed. at clifferent levels ofgenerality the relative emotional saturation of abstract icleas varies . From thisprinciple Varona infers, with a casual reference to Fouillée's power-ideas, thatabstract moral principles anclo in general, no SlI7n111a bona can move men effective1ybecause they lack ernotional resonance and support enjoyecl by more concreteends-in-view (lí). Nevertheless, Varona at this point replaces Spencer's indi-vidual hedonism by the law of conservation and principIe of habit, ancl discussesthe sentiment of pure malignity. But this cloes not prevent him from using hedo-nism in other passages as a principle of psychological mechanics.

(9) lb., p. 24.(lO) Varona never wavers on this point since 1878: "duties of man toward himself

lack meaning, since the individual does not look to his conservation, deveJopmentand perfection with a view to the specles". ELyF, p. 261. Cf. FdIM, p. 234.Spencer 's opinion is not as conc1usive: "The performance of every function is,in asense, a moral obligation." Data of Ethics (DoE), sec, 3l.

(11) SPENCER, Princ. of Psych., secs. 503ff. Perhaps Varona agrees with LITTRE, LaPhilosophie Positive, 1880, vol. 24, pp. 161-176.

(12) FdIM, pp. 25-32. Varona and perhaps succeeding Spencerians have formulatedSpencer's principie more precisely. Spencer speaks oí "perception of kindredbeings", "presence of others like itself" as involved in the origin of sympathy.Princ. of Psych. secs. 504-5.

(13) FdIM, pp. 88-90. Spencer, Princ. of Psych., seco 529-30.(14) FdlM, pp. 95-96.(15) lb., p. 34.(16) Princ. of Psych., seco 513; DoE, 46.(17) FdIM, p. 83, 267-8.

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Sociological factors in the generation of moral sentiments are found in--vo1untary and involuntary education, public opinion, and social differentiation (18).

oluntary education, as Spencer had pointed out, should include adaptation to!he present state oí society and not look exclusively to perfection (19). Publicopinion, custom, and finally differentiation of social functions, chieftainship, pries-tbood, castes, etc., explain the variability of sentiment, "the fee1ing or concept ofob1iaation" in different relations (Z0).

After this preparation, Varona introduces a French word, "solidarity",apparently never used by Spencer. Spencer spoke of "social aggregation", in--erease or decrease of "sociality", "social coherence" as a result oí, and condition

r, the development of sympathy. Varona probably first used the word in 1879,ce to designate interdependence and mutual relationship in the intellectual,

esthetic and social world, and again to designate the practice of solidarity inimproving cooperation required for more perfect social organization el).

Thus, on Spencer's assumption that life is an adjustment of internal toextemal relations, Varona's moral sentiment becomes one of "social solidarity",a "category of feeling, within which are produced all of our relations to othermen" (22). The relativity of moral sentiment to ethical community is shownb the fact that sentiments oí idealistic escapists are relative to the ideal societyfor which they yearn, and the Iact that sentiments oí outlaws are relative to theirparticular societies. If the relevant society includes past generations and gods,the ent ment oí olidarity will extend even to them. Varona concludes, "actsol índividuals living in association are moral if they respond to solidarity", and

oral sentiments are those "favoring the accomodation of the individual to thesocial médium" e~).

) Involuntary education includes praise, blame, authority, submission, gestures, fa-cial expression. Adaptations required differ in savage, pastoral, agricultural, mi-litary and industrial societties. Similar discussions are found in SPENCER, Prínc.01 Sociology, secs, 34-6, 423-26.

) FdIM, p. 119.-) Lección IX. Social differentiation is discussed by Spencer, Princ. of Soco parts

V, VI.::!l.) FLyF, pp. 233, 249. Apparently Varona took over the word from contemporary

Fr ench social discussions. For Bastiat and Proudhon, "solidarity" had meant alegal relationship. (Leon Bourgeois, Solidarite, p.l.) Littre refers to solidarity.among positivists (La Phil. Pos., 1877, vol. 19, p. 169). Compayre sees a solidarityamong higher and lower human functions (Rev, Phil., vol. 3, 1877, p. 171). ForFouillee it is a "reciprocity of action among all beings", identical with the assurn-ption of universal determinism by which the acts of each affect al! (La liberteet le aeterminisnte, 1890, but originally dating from the "70", p. 3(0); Crit. dessystemes de morale contemporaraine, 1893, p. 359. Fouillée further cites usages-of word by Renouvier, Sccretan, Marion, ancl Renan. Guyau, writing after 1883,finds a soJidarity among al! beings and natures. By 1896 Bourgeois thinks theword designates some new idea seeking expression, and by 1907, Fleurant ex-plores its ethical implications (Sur la soUdarité). Philosophical minds were sen-sitive to the difference between solidarity as Iact and as ideal, as was Varonawhen he distinguished between ethics as a science and as an arto and in an.attempted psychological derivation of the ought-to-be and moral idealismo (FdIM,p. 211). For Spencer s's equiralents of "solidarity" see Princ. of Psych., secs.32, 35, 38, 271, 309.

-) FdlM, p. 180.) lb., p. 184.

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Obviously, solidarity as a fact psychologically generated has imperceptibly-changed into a principie of obligation. But as a moral principie, it needs quali--fication. First, to avoid smothering the individual in complete socialization, acco-·modation or adaptation of the individual to his social environment must take placein such a way that "full development of both is harmonized", for the idea ofdevelopment is analytically "contained in that of organism", and both individualand society ought to be regarded as organisms (24). This qualiíication preven-the use of the principie to justify despotic, criminal, and even proposed ideal.societies. Further, society is not static. While Varona had difficulty in accountingfor saints, heroes, martyrs, whose efforts he regarded as unfruitíul and evenpathological in 1878 (25), he now admits that social disequilibria stimulate "idea!combinations. .. of possible changes... foresight of ends more desirable thanpresently maintained" (26). Such creative "ernotional Daltonism" (27) mu t beadmitted in the re-forrnation of moral sentiment. Solidarity, thus qualified, is-a criterion no more difficult to apply than any other, insists on the moral minimum..produces sanctions as powerful as the physical, accounts íor remorse, merit, res-ponsibility, and moral progress (28).

While Varona's primary aim was to provide a theoretical foundation for-morality, he did venture to state certain maxims by way of exhortation : "do notinjure", "cooperate", and "do good" (29). The dependence of these rnaxims, amiperhaps even the meaning of "solidarity", on the general evolutionary ethic olSpencer is the final illustration possible here. Section SS of Spencer's Data ofEthics defines the function of the sociological view of ethics as the disclosure oí"those conditions under which only associated activities can be so carried on, thatthe complete living of each consists with, and conduces to, the complete livinszof all. "Under conditions of struggle, a society subordinates individual welíare ,Under conditions of peace the advancement of individual lives becomes the Ím-mediate purpose. Transitional periods are periods of compromi e between thesetwo tendencies. Out of enforced cooperation in war-tirne grows the code of voluu-tary cooperation in peace-time , Therefore,

"The fundamental requirernent is that liíe-sustaining actions oí each,shall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally achievedby them; and this implies firstly that he shall suffer no direct aggressions on liis:person or property, ancl secondly that he shall suffer no indirect aggre ion bybreach of contract. Observance of these negative conditions to volllntary coope-ration having íacilitated life to the greatest extent by exchange of services underagreement, life is to be further facilitated by exchange of services beyond agre-ement: the highest life being reached only when, besides helping to complete one-another's lives by specified reciprocities of aid, men otherunse helt: lo conipletone another's lioes" (30).

(24) lb., p. 186.(2~) ELyF, p. ZQZ.(26) FdnI, p. 190.(27) ELyF, p. 243.(28) FdlM, pp , 209-211.(29) lit., Lección XIII.(30) ~fy italics.

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Thus, Varona has accepted the problem of the inductive moralist to explain.genetically the rise of a priori and cornmon sense moral intuitions by the psycho-, ogical adjustment of internal relations to those external relations which arise írom!ife in association; the modes of compromise between egoistic and altruistic fe e-lings under stimulation by the representation of beings similar to one's self. LikeSpencer, he approaches moral feeling heavily from the side of the ernotions,examines, morality from three oí the four points of view of the Spencerian scheme,He introduces the word "solidarity" to cover Spencer's "society", "association"and "sociality", and like Spencer qualifies it to include a test of equilibriumbetween society and individual, both regarded as organisms. Finally. his three-fold classification of basic obligations reflects the analogous classification of- pencer.