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Conférence internationale EAEPE "Gouverner l'entreprise : Propriété, institutions, société" Au Cnam, Paris - Les 22 et 23 mai 2008 THOMAS CLARKE " The ownership perspective and beyond: a critique of Anglo-American model of corporate governance". Varieties of Capitalism?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Conférence internationale EAEPE "Gouverner l'entreprise : Propriété, institutions, société"
Au Cnam, Paris - Les 22 et 23 mai 2008
THOMAS CLARKE
"The ownership perspective and beyond: a critique of Anglo-American model of corporate governance"
Varieties of Capitalism?
Hall, P. and Soskice, D. (2001) Varieties of Capitalism, New York: Oxford University Press.
The varieties of capitalism approach suggests the interdependency and complementarity of institutions
Defining feature of European corporate governance is its institutional diversity
Whether countries of Europe will converge towards a common corporate governance system, or sustain the present diversity of institutions is one of the key issues facing the continent
Varieties of Inequality?
Transformation towards market based system of corporate governance and shareholder value orientation
Different pattern and degree of social inequality
Governance and CEO objectives change
Structure of industry, employment, skills and reward likely to change
Englander, E. and Kaufman, A. (2004) Executive Compensation, Political Economy and Managerial Control: The Transformation of Managerial Incentive Structures and Ideology, 1950-2000, George Washington University SMPP Working Paper No.03-01, pp34
Robert Boyer (2005) From Shareholder Value to CEO Power: the Paradox of the 1990s, Competition & Change, Vol. 9, No. 1, March 2005 7–47
The Recent Origins of Shareholder Value
Three phases in US corporate governance and strategy –
From ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’:
1960s-1970s Managerial Capitalism
1980s Market for Corporate Control
1990s Shareholder Value[Coffee (2004); Lazonick and O’Sullivan
(2000)]
Distribution of Stock Market Holdings by Wealth Class
0.6% 1.7%
7.1%
11.9%
41.9%
36.9%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Bottom 40% Middle 20% Next 20% Next 10% Next 9% Top 1%
Source: Economic Policy Institute :The State of Working America 2006-2007
Median CEO Pay in the US 1980- 2001
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Med
ian
CE
O p
ay (
$ M
illio
ns)
Salary and bonus Equity-based pay
The level and composition of median CEO pay in the USFrom 1980 to 2001
Source: Hall B. J; 2003.
99%
93%
90%
95%
96%
92%
86%
32%
37%
40% 43
%
49%
54%
58%
60 %
63 % 66
%
Out of Control? Corporate CEO Pay in the United States - The Social and Economic Consequences?
CEO Centrality ?
Lucian Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers, and Urs Peyer (2007)
The relationship between CEO centrality – the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power – and the value, performance and behavior of public firms.
Proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the CEO.
CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). This result is robust to controlling for all standard controls in Q regressions as well as additional controls such as CEO tenure, whether the CEO is a founder or a large owner, and whether the company’s top-five aggregate compensation is high or low relative to peer companies.
CEO Centrality ?
CEO centrality also has a rich set of relations with firms’ behavior and performance. In particular, CEO centrality is correlated with:
(i) Lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability;
(ii) Lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements;
(iii) Higher odds of the CEO’s receiving a "lucky" option grant at the lowest price of the month:
(iv) Greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck due to positive industry-wide shocks;
(v) Lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover; and
(vi) Lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time.
Imperial CEO?
The Regeneration of Inequality ?
American business interests have conspired to suborn the state
The lessons to be drawn from the consequences of the rise of the political power of American business ..are universal
Inaction by the gatekeepers left the field open to the untrammelled rapacity of imperial CEOs
Sir Adrian Cadbury
Governance, March 2008:8
The Transfer of Wealth ?
“History will look back on the 1990s and early 2000sas a time when the principal officers of American
corporations transferred to themselves approximately$1 trillion
or ten per cent of the market value of public exchanges.
This must be the largest peacetime movement of wealthever recorded, and it was accomplished through stealth
that amounted to theft and in a spirit of regulatory permissiveness that certainly rises near to the level of criminal neglect.”
Bob Monks, Corpocracy (2007)
Top Ten US Highest Paid CEOs
Table 1.2 US Top Ten Highest Paid CEOs in 2005 Rank
Company
CEO
Pay (USD )
Market Capitalization (USD Billions)
1 IAC/ Interactive Barry Diller 295 000 000 14 2 Capital One Financial Richard D. Fairbank 249 000 000 18 3 Yahoo Terry S. Semel 230 000 000 47 4 Nabors Industries Eugene M. Isenberg 203 000 000 11 5 Colgate Palmolive Reuben Mark 147 970 000 27 6 Country Wide Financial Angelo R. Mozilo 142 000 000 22 7 Cendant Henry R. Silverman 139 960 000 21 8 KB Home Bruce E. Karatz 135 560 000 6 9 Lehman Brothers Holdings Richard S. Fuld 122 670 000 26 10 Abercrombie & Fitch Michael S. Jeffries 114 000 000 6 Source: Compiled from Sahadi J. (2006); Forbes (2006); Company proxy reports; FT Global 500.
Top Ten Highest Paid Rest of World CEOs
Table 1. 3. Rest of the World Highest paid CEOs in 2004 Rank
Company
CEO
Pay
(USD )
Market Capitalization (USD Billions)
1 UBS Peter Wuffli 6 820 000 95 2 Roche Group Franz Humer 5 569 000 96 3 Banco Santander Central Alfredo Saenz 5 448 000 76 4 BP Lord Browne of Madingley 5 356 000 221 5 Nestle Peter Brabeck-Letmathe 5 165 000 110 6 Glaxo SmithKline Jean-Pierre Garnier 4 688 000 134 7 Nokia Jorma Olilla 4 292 000 72 8 Siemens Group Heinrich von Pierer 3 804 000 70 9 BHP Billiton Charles Goodyear 3 544 000 82 10 Novartis Group Daniel Vasella 3 290 000 124 Notes: Figures on market capitalisation are based on reports as per 31 March 2005. Source: Compiled from Kitchens S. (2004); Forbes (2006) CEO Pay, Company proxy reports, FT Global 500.
Average US Top Ten Ceo Pay vs Rest of World
4.8 million
178 million
0Non US CEOs US CEOs
(2004) Average
Rest of the worldTop ten CEO Pay
(2005) Average
US CEO top ten Pay
4.8 million
178 million
0Non US CEOs US CEOs
(2004) Average
Rest of the worldTop ten CEO Pay
(2005) Average
US CEO top ten Pay
Source: Data compiled from Kitchens S. (2004); Forbes (2006) CEO Pay, Company proxy reports, FT Global 500; Sahadi J. (2006).
Executive Pay as a Percentage of Workers Pay in the US 1990-2004 (S & P 500)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1990 92 94 96 98 2000 2002 2004
•Includes salary, bonus, restricted stock, payouts on other long term incentives, andThe value of options exercisedSource: Institute for Policy Studies/ United States for a Fair Economy.
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
450%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average CEO pay 409.2 %
S&P 500 Index
326.6%
296.2%
260.6%
106.7%
4.3%
-9.3%
Corporate Profits
Average worker pay
Minimum wage
Source: Institute For a Fair Economy (2006).
CEO Pay / S & P Index / Profits / Average Pay in US
Comparison of CEO Pay and Average Worker Pay
30,000
100,000
1,000,000
2,500,000
5,000,000
10,000,000
14,010,695
15,000,000
1980 1990 2000 2002
Employee pay US CEO pay Business Week 350 companies
7,400,000
2,814,084
1,392,857
27,94626,354
Ratio 50 : 1 Ratio 109 : 1
Ratio 525 : 1
Ratio 281 : 1
Source: Adapted from Ertuk, I., et al. (2005)
Top Five US CEOs vs Top Five US Fund Managers CEOs 2005
147.97203
230 249295
500550
840
1400
1500
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
Reuben
Mark
Eugene M
Isenberg
Terry S.
Semel
Richard D.
Fairbank
Barry Diller Paul Tudor
Jones II
Stev en
Cohen
George
Soros
T. Boone
Pickens Jr
James
Simons
US $ million
Colgate-Palmolive
NaborsIndustries Yahoo
CapitalOne
FinancialIAC /
InteractiveTudor
InvestmentsSAC
CapitalSoros Fund
Management
BPCapital
ManagementRenaissanceTechnologies
Contemporary Dilemma
Instead of Advising, Monitoring and Regulating,
Advisors, Monitors and Regulators are often In on the Act
Dick Grasso CEO New York Stock Exchange
“I’m not giving the money back!”
NYSE Annual Profit and CEO’s Annual Compensation(US$ Millions)
0
25
50
75
100
NYSE's profit Grasso's compensation
‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘01 ‘02
Source: NYSE.
‘00
0
25
50
75
100
NYSE's profit Grasso's compensation
‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘01 ‘02
Source: NYSE.
‘00
Source: NYSE Webb Report
Pay of National US Regulators
Eliot Spitzer
Dick Grasso CEO New York Stock Exchange
“Do I have toGive the money back?”
Germany: Dividends Number of Employees and Personnel Expenditure per Employee
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Expenditure per Employee
Employees
Dividends
Net Value Added
Source: Beyer and Hassel (2001)Source: Beyer J. and Hassel Anke (2001)
The Distribution of net value added in large German firms, 1992-4 and 1996-8
Labour Creditors Government Dividends Retained earnings
1992-4 85.3 5.4 5.2 2.0 2.2
1996-8 78.4 4.3 6.8 2.8 7.8
Change in % -8.1 -20.4 +30.8 +40.0 +254.5
Source: Beyer J. and Hassel Anke (2001 : 320)
Penetration of Active Share Ownership in Some European Countries
STATE OF LOCAL ACTIVISM COUNTRIES
Established market culture for institutional Investors and many fund managers
Ireland, UK
Driven by a limited number of (but nonetheless powerful) activist players
Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland (Pension funds or institutional investors)
Austria, France, Germany, Italy(Research organisations or fund managers)Greece(Institutional investors)
Driven by strong small shareholder associations
Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands
Rather non-existent Other countries
Sources: Deutsche Bank Corporate Governance Research, TUAC, Eurosif,
THE NEED FORLARGER CAPITAL
Limit of Family owned firm
Creation of the Joint stock corporation
Excessive liability Of the stock-holder
Limited liability of shareholder
Risk diversificationfor individuals
Liquid financial markets
Separation of Ownership andcontrol
THE MANAGERIALCORPORATION:
The leading Organisational form
Emerging weaknesses
Sleepy conglomerate /Productivity slow-downPoor innovation
Twin crisis ofThe growth regimeThe corporation
ACT 1: The Triumph
ACT 2: The demise
1980s /1970s
Mid 20th Century
Early 20th Century
Mid 19th Century
Early 19th Century
Adapted from: Boyer (2005)
Corporate Governance as Shakespearian Tragedy:Act I The Triumph of the Corporation Act II The Crisis of the Managerial Conglomerate
Methods to Realign the interest of
manager and shareholder
Shareholder Value/
value creation
A response to theCrisis of Fordism
FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
Search for higherreturns
New financial investors(pensions funds)
Rather low return of Managerial corporations
Concern for governance
Adapted from: Boyer (2005:7-47).
Incentive remuneration of executives
Performance related salary Stock options
1990s
1980s
Corporate Governance as Shakespearian Tragedy:Act III Financial Liberalisation, Shareholder Value And Stock Options
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
• Enforces CEO/CFO Sign off on accounts• Financial disclosure• Auditor Independence
Corporate Governance as Shakespearian Tragedy:ACT IV From “Good Governance” to Infectious Greed to Final Downfall
Difficulties inDelivering the Expected ROE
Innovation:New derivatives
SEC
Auditors
Privacy ofRelevant
information
Lobbying forRemovingAny regulation
Expectation of highRate of return
Attractiveness of new instruments
Booming stockmarkets
Collusion betweenManagers, auditors And analysts
Speculativebubble
Inflow of Employees and
Uninformedsavings
Corporate financeRuns into itsOwn limit
Cashing of stockOptions bymanagers
Easy exit ofManagers with
Golden parachutes
BankruptcyOf the firm
Loss of confidence in Fairness of financial marketsAnd honesty of executives
Adapted from: Boyer (2005:7-47).
2001
2000
1999
Late 1990s
From “GOOD” GOVERNANCETO INFECTIOUS GREED Creative
accounting
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Dec
-01
Feb-
02
Apr
-02
Jun-
02
Aug
-02
Oct
-02
Dec
-02
Feb-
03
Apr
-03
Jun-
03
Aug
-03
Oct
-03
Dec
-03
Feb-
04
Apr
-04
Jun-
04
Aug
-04
Oct
-04
Dec
-04
Feb-
05
Apr
-05
Jun-
05
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AUDIT COMM COMPENSATION COMM
NOMINATION COMM EXEC SESSION GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES
%
Source: Adapted from Aggarwal and Williamson (2006).
Adoption of NYSE/SEC Rules in US Firms (2001-2005)
Total Number of US Corporation Earnings Restatements 1997-2005
92 102
174201 225
330
514
613
1195
0
92 102
174201 225
330
514
613
1195
01997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: Adapted from Coffee J. (2002) Source: Adapted from Coffee J. (2002)
Source: Adapted from Coffee J. (2002), Glass, Lewis and Co (2006)
Trends towards globalisation?
Globalisation of capital markets
Emergence of new financial intermediaries
To tap global financial resources require certain governance conditions
Stronger international competition in product markets
Mandates de facto convergence of cost structures and firm organisation
These pressures could impact upon firm behaviour and decision-making
[Nestor and Thompson (OECD 2000)]
Evidence of European Convergence?
AGAINST
Despite pressures towards adopting Anglo-Saxon standards remains considerable divergence – ‘institutional complementarity thesis’
Diversity of corporate models at the root of their competitiveness
Stakeholder model closer to the reality of European social democracy
Evidence of European Convergence?
FOR Anglo-American logic of corporate governance diffusing beyond
major corporations of DAX 30 in Germany Not just external forces but internal institutional investors Management introducing shareholder value incentive systems Small but significant change in distribution of net value added
towards shareholders Orientation of firms towards international financial markets Change in distribution will threaten viability of diversified quality
production
[Reberioux(2002); Cernat 2004); Lane (2003); Jurgens, Naumann and Rupp (2000); Beyer and Hassel (2000)]
Leverage Differentiation?
Corporate governance systems are embedded in legal traditions, interact in complex ways with other institutional features, and are affected by national political dynamics.
Longitudinal evidence suggests limited international convergence in governance systems in recent decades.
Rather than the abandonment of structures that delivered efficiency and prosperity in the past, there is considerable scope for diversity.
The “one size fits all” approach of convergence advocates is culturally and economically insensitive.
The dominant form of ownership throughout the world remains family ownership. [Guillen(2000); Rhodes and Apeldoorn (1998); Branson (2001)]
Multiple Convergence and Divergence
Multiple Convergence of Governance Institutions and Relationships
ANGLOAMERICAN
GERMAN
JAPANESE
Responsibility (Institutional Investors
Stakeholder Communities)
Accountability(Institutional Investors)
STAKEHOLDERS
MARKET
LAW
RE
LA
TIO
NS
HIP
S
PRINCIPLES
Transparency Disclosure(Regulators/ investors)
RU
LE
S
ACCOUNTABILITY /WEAK RESPONSIBILITY
REPRESENTATION/STRONG REPRESENTATION
Future Direction of European Corporate Governance?
The distinctiveness of Europe has produced some of the most valued corporations in the world, together with an exceptional quality of life in many communities.
Though Europe has embarked on a process of change in corporate governance and company law in recent years to integrate better into international financial and product markets, CEOs have not seized control to the same degree, and shareholder value remains mediated by stakeholder values
There are important signs that the commitment to European institutional diversity, diversified quality production and social cohesion may survive the present transformatory experience.
Transcendence of US Model?
Shareholder Value
In the United States
The Recent Origins of Shareholder Value
Three phases in US corporate governance and strategy –
From ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’:
1960s-1970s Managerial Capitalism
1980s Market for Corporate Control
1990s Shareholder Value[Coffee (2004); Lazonick and
O’Sullivan (2000)]
Retain and Invest
1960s-1970s Managerial Capitalism
– Revenues invested in corporate growth– Conglomerates mitigate the business cycle– Diversified portfolio could cross-subsidise– Maximised sales, profit satisfied rather than maximised– Balanced interests of different constituencies– Shareholders only one interest– Managers intent on increasing own security and reward
Retain and Invest
Rise of International Competition– Higher skills higher quality overseas competitors– US manufacturing too centralised and lacked innovation
Agency Theory– Need market for corporate control to discipline management– Rate of return on corporate stock the measure of corporate
performance– The maximisation of shareholder value the driving focus
[Coffee (2004); Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000)]
Downsize and Distribute I
1980s Market for Corporate Control
– Shift in Wall St from focus on longer term investment activities (bonds) to stock
– Deregulation of institutions investors (ERISA 1978) permitted investment in equities and junk bonds rather than high grade corporate and government bonds
– Pension funds, insurance companies and savings ( S & L) companies entered the junk bond market
– Unwieldy conglomerates unwound in takeovers and management buyouts
– Takeovers served to ‘disgorge the free cash flow’ from companies (Jensen 1989)
– Managers needed to sell assets to meet new financial obligations and maintain market value
Downsize and Distribute I
New Incentives for Managers
– Goal of leveraged buyout firms link management interest to firm’s market value
– Institutional investors encouraged use stock options to increase management sensitivity to the market
– Congress levied punitive tax on executive ‘parachute payments’ (1984) and denied a tax deduction to public corporations that paid top executives more than $1 million
– Restriction on cash compensation promoted shift to equity compensation
[Coffee (2004); Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000)]
Downsize and Distribute II
1990s Shareholder Value
– Institutional investors, deregulatory environment, the longest bull market, and hyperactive analysts and media increased both the sensitivity of managers to their firm’s market price, and their willingness to take risks to increase their stock price
– The median equity-based compensation of top US executives at S & P 500 industrial companies rose from 0 per cent in 1984 to 8 per cent in 1990, and to 66% in 2001 (Hall 2003:23)
– In 1991 the SEC relaxed the holding period requirements for stock options if held for six months or longer, meant most executives free to sell stock on the same day they exercised options
– This meant executives could exploit a temporary spike in the price of the firm’s shares and this became the prevailing pattern
Downsize and Distribute II
High Market Valuations
– Aggressive earnings forecasts drove a firm’s stock price up– Recognising income prematurely, misappropriating it from future
periods– “Advancing the moment of revenue recognition”– Investors, analysts, auditors and other gatekeepers abandon
scepticism in bubble euphoria
[Coffee (2004); Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000)]
Business Orientation and Environment
Germany
Long Term
Strong Manufacturing Base
Bank Equity and Credit Finance
Organic Growth
High Corporate Taxation
Large Owner Managed Firms
More Concerned With Operations
Emphasis on Sales and Volume
UK
Short Term
Weak Manufacturing Base
Short Term Market Equity
Legitimacy of Takeovers
Low Corporate Taxation
Impersonal Ownership Finance
More Concerned With Strategy
Emphasis on Profit and Marketing(Pugh 1991)
Transientowners
Transaction-driven
Fragmentedstakes
OutsideInformation
Valuation-drivenbuy-sellchoices
Owners withlittle influence
United States
Fluid Capital
The External Market: Fluid Capital and Dedicated Capital
Source: Porter, Capital Choices (1992)
Permanentowners
Relationship-driven
Significantstakes
InsideInformation
Valuation doesnot affect
buy-sell choices
Significant over influences
Japan and Germany
Dedicated Capital
The External Market: Fluid Capital and Dedicated Capital
Source: Porter, Capital Choices (1992)
ROI orstock price
Limitedowner-director
Influence
Infrequent topmanagementintervention
Performancebased
compensation
Quantitativecapital
budgeting
Limitedinformation
flow
Strictfinancialcontrols
Non-technicaltop
management
Internal Markets Overview
United StatesMaximise measurable investment returns
Source: Porter, (1992)
Corporateperpetuity
Significantowner-director
On-going topmanagement involvement
Salary-orbenefit-basedcompensation
Holistic viewof
company
Extensiveinformation
flow
Non-financialand financial
controls
Technicaltop
management
Internal Markets Overview
Japan and GermanySecure corporate position
Source: Porter, (1992)
Anglo-Saxon Model (US and UK)Strengths
Dynamic market orientation Fluid Capital Internationalization extensive
Weaknesses Volatile Short Termism Inadequate
Source: Clarke and Bostock, ‘International Corporate Governance’ (1994)
European (Germany)Strengths
Long-term industrial strategyVery stable capitalRobust governance procedures
WeaknessesInternationalization more difficultLack of flexibilityInadequate investment for new industries
Asian Market (Japan)Strengths
Very long-term industrial strategyStable capitalMajor overseas investment
WeaknessesFinancial speculationSecretive Governance ProceduresWeak accountability
Strengths and Weaknesses of Governance Systems
Stakeholder theory
Long term
Stakeholder values
Intangible assets
European/Asian
Knowledge
Relationships
Inclusive
Corporate citizenship
Agency/stewardship theory
Short Term
Shareholder value
Tangible assets
Anglo-Saxon
Property
Transactions
Exclusive
Corporate image
Stakeholders/non-financial
Performance indicators
Shareholders/financial
Performance indicators
Source: Thomas Clarke and Stewart Clegg, Changing Paradigms:The Transformation of Management Knowledge for the 21st CenturyHarperCollins Business 2000
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
Two parallel universes of corporate governance have emerged:
A dispersed ownership model characterized by strong and liquid securities markets, high disclosure standards, high market transparency, and where the market for corporate control is the ultimate disciplining mechanism; and,
A concentrated ownership model characterized by controlling shareholders, weak securities markets, low transparency and disclosure standards and often a central monitoring role for large banks who have a stake in the company (Coffee 2000; Clarke 2005).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
I. Hansmann and Kraakman in an article prophetically entitled The End of History for Corporate Law (2001):
“Although there remained considerable room for variation in governance practices and in the fine structure of corporate law throughout the twentieth century, the pressures for further convergence are now rapidly growing. Chief among these pressures is the recent dominance of a shareholder-centred ideology of corporate law among the business, government and legal entities in key commercial jurisdictions. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value. This emergent consensus has already profoundly affected corporate governance practices throughout the world. It is only a matter of time before its influence is felt in the reform of corporate law as well” (2001:1).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
II. McDonnell (2002) Widening the Lens
Criteria of corporate governance systems– Efficiency– Equity– Participation
“The universe of theoretical possibilities is much richer than a dominant strand of the literature suggests, and we are currently far short of the sort of empirical evidence that might help us sort out these possibilities. Most commentators have focused on efficiency to the exclusion of other values. Moreover, even if convergence occurs, there is a possibility that we will not converge on the best system. Even if we converge to the current best system, convergence still may not be desirable” (McDonnell 2002:2).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
III. Mark Roe’s (1994;2003) path dependence thesis
How political forces in America, anxious about the influence of concentrated financial or industrial monopolies, resisted any effort at concentration of ownership or ownership through financial institutions, resulting in dispersed ownership.
In contrast European social democracy has tended to favour other stakeholder interests, particularly labour, as a system that promotes welfare among all citizens and attempts to prevent wide disparities.
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
IV. Jacoby (2001)
“Regulatory policy in the United States had the unintended consequence of pushing U.S. companies in the direction of unrelated diversification, whereas in Germany and Japan it continued on a pre-war trajectory of discouraging mergers in favour of cartels and of promoting corporate growth through internal expansion rather than acquisitions.
In other words, modern regulatory policy in the U.S. produced corporations who relied on markets to acquire ideas and talent, whereas in Germany and Japan it produced corporations whose primary emphasis was on production and on the internal generation of ideas through development of human capital and organizational learning.
The implications for corporate governance are straightforward: corporations favour shareholders in the U.S. so as to obtain capital for diversification and acquisitions; they favour managers and employees in the Germany and Japan so as to create internal organizational competencies” (Jacoby 2001:8).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
V. La Porta et al (1998; 1999; 2000;2002)
Extensive international empirical research concerning countries with dispersed and concentrated ownership, which demonstrates differences in the legal protection of shareholders was very influential.
In many countries without adequate laws guaranteeing dispersed shareholder rights, the only alternative appeared to maintain control through concentrated ownership.
This leads to the conclusion the law determines the ownership structure and system of corporate finance and governance. Jurisdictions where the law was more protective encouraged the emergence of more dispersed ownership (Pinto 2005:19).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
VI. Coffee (2001) concludes that it was market institutions that demanded legal protection rather than the other way around:
“The cause and effect sequence posited by the La Porta et al thesis may in effect read history backwards. They argue that strong markets require strong mandatory rules as a precondition. Although there is little evidence that strong legal rules encouraged the development of either the New York or London Stock Exchanges (and there is at least some evidence that strong legal rules hindered the growth of the Paris Bourse), the reverse does seem to be true: strong markets do create a demand for stronger legal rules….
Eventually, as markets have matured across Europe, similar forces have led to the similar creation of European parallels to the SEC. In each case, law appears to be responding to changes in the market, not consciously leading it” (Coffee 2001:6).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
VII. Licht (2001) Deep Cultural Causation
“A nation's culture can be perceived as the mother of all path dependencies. Figuratively, it means that a nation's culture might be more persistent than other factors believed to induce path dependence. Substantively, a nation's unique set of cultural values might indeed affect — in a chain of causality — the development of that nation's laws in general and its corporate governance system in particular” (2001:149).
Convergence or Diversity in Corporate Governance?
VIII Gordon and Roe (2004) Institutional Complementarities
“Corporate governance consists not simply of elements but of systems…Transplanting some of the formal elements without regard for the institutional complements may lead to serious problems later, and these problems may impede, or reverse, convergence” (Gordon & Roe (2004:6).
Optimal corporate governance mechanisms are contextual and may vary by
industries and activities. Identifying what constitutes good corporate governance practice is complex, and cannot be templated into a single form.
One needs to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the system but also
the underlying conditions which the system is dependant upon (Pinto 2005:31; Maher and Andersson 2000). The institutions that compose the system of corporate governance and complement each other consist not just of the law, finance, and ownership structure.
Convergence AND Diversity in Corporate Governance? I. COMPETING OBJECTIVES
MARKET
SHORT TERM LONG TERM
STAKEHOLDERS
ANGLO - AMERICAN ( Shareholder Value) ?
? (Corporate Social Responsibility)
EUROPEAN
JAPANESE