Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

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Geoforum

journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /geoforum

Variable adaptations: Micro-politics of environmental displacementin the Okavango Delta, Botswana

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.08.0060016-7185/� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

⇑ Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: jes5695@psu.edu (J.E. Shinn), king@psu.edu (B. King),

kryoung@austin.utexas.edu (K.R. Young), kelley@utexas.edu (K.A. Crews).

Jamie E. Shinn a,⇑, Brian King a, Kenneth R. Young b, Kelley A. Crews b

a The Pennsylvania State University, Department of Geography, 302 Walker Building, University Park, PA 16802, USAb The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Geography and the Environment, 305 E. 23rd Street-A3100-CLA 3.306, Austin, TX 78712-1697, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 6 March 2014Received in revised form 31 July 2014

Keywords:AdaptationTransformative adaptationOkavango DeltaBotswanaEnvironmental displacementVariability

Increasing environmental variability associated with global climate change is expected to produce socialinstability and human displacement in future decades. As such, there remains a pressing need to under-stand the implications of environmental changes for human populations and their adaptive capacities.This paper analyzes governmental and intra-community responses to environmental variability througha case study from the Okavango Delta, Botswana. We report findings from fieldwork conducted duringMay–June 2011 and October 2012–May 2013 in the village of Etsha 13. Following an increase in annualflooding in 2009, 2010, and 2011, the Government of Botswana permanently relocated hundreds of res-idents to a nearby dryland area, asserting that this new settlement was necessary to reduce future risksfrom flooding variability. While some residents accepted this position, others elected to return to thefloodplain or to illegally divert the flow of the water to protect their homes. This paper explores themicro-politics of these relocation efforts and competing responses in order to examine differential adap-tive responses to increased flooding levels. We situate these findings within the burgeoning literature ontransformative adaptation and suggest that micro-political dynamics are critical in shaping the limita-tions to, and possibilities for, effective adaptive responses to global environmental change.

� 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

It is widely accepted that global climate change will have signif-icant and unpredictable social and ecological impacts. The resultsof environmental change are already manifesting in local contextsthrough extreme weather events and increased environmental var-iability (Pelling, 2010). Marginalized groups are often the least pre-pared to respond to such impacts, as a result of ‘‘everydayvulnerabilities’’ stemming from existing social, political, and eco-nomic dynamics (Adger, 2006; Ribot, 2009). These impacts areexpected to disrupt agrarian and other livelihood practices andhave the potential to increase existing vulnerabilities. There is alsoa growing concern about human displacement as a result of cli-mate change. During the 2012 meeting of the American Associa-tion for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), it was announcedthat the United Nations predicts there will be 50 million environ-mental refugees by 2020. While the concept of a ‘‘climate refugee’’has yet to be accepted by the United Nations, this announcementhighlighted the increasing attention to the ways in which global

environmental change will transform human settlements andmigration patterns (Hollifield et al., 2011; Biermann and Boas,2010.) How people are able to respond to such environmentalchanges will be simultaneously produced by ecological conditions,existing vulnerabilities, and local-level socio-political dynamics. Assuch, investigations of micro-level adaptive responses can revealnot only the impacts of climate change in specific settings but alsoimportant non-climatic sources of vulnerability.

This article analyzes the adaptive responses within the commu-nity of Etsha 13 to variable flooding events in the Okavango Deltaof Botswana. The Okavango Delta is a dynamic wetland landscapecharacterized by spatiotemporal variability in flooding patterns.Annual floods in 2009, 2010, and 2011 were higher than theyhad been in many decades and in some areas, including Etsha 13,they were spatially distinct from previous flooding regimes. Thespatial variability of these floods was differentially experiencedwithin Etsha 13, resulting in intra-village variations in impactsand resulting responses. In drier years during the past three dec-ades, some residents of Etsha 13 built homes in the occasionallyinundated floodplain; higher water in recent years returned to thisarea and flooded many people’s households (known locally as com-pounds). Beginning with annual floods in 2009, the Government ofBotswana began relocating hundreds of these residents to a nearby

22 J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

dryland area now known as the ‘‘New Stands,’’ arguing that resi-dents must permanently settle in the dryland to avoid risks offuture flooding. While some residents favored relocating to theNew Stands permanently, others acted against the wishes of thegovernment by returning to their former compounds in the occa-sionally inundated floodplain in order to more easily access nearbyresources necessary for livelihoods oriented around the wetland. Inanother notable response, some village residents altered the flowof the water in direct violation of governmental edicts in order toprotect their homes from rising waters. These responses, whichare detailed in this article, show that adaptive capacities withinEtsha 13 are therefore variable and can either be actualizedthrough collusion with the government or by contesting its partic-ular vision for adaptation (Fig. 1).

This article explores the micro-politics of these responses,focusing on competing visions between the government and resi-dents to document variations of adaptation to environmental var-iability. We report findings from research conducted betweenMay–June 2011 and October 2012–May 2013, relying primarilyupon qualitative interviewing and participant observation in Etsha13. The case study demonstrates that adaptation takes differentforms for different actors within a socio-ecological system, andthat different adaptive responses can reflect prevailing dynamicsrelated to vulnerability, access, and governance. Additionally,through investigation of the spatially varied impacts of flooding,we demonstrate how micro-level adaptation is both socially andspatially constructed and differentially experienced. We build onrecent scholarship to suggest that a re-conceptualization of adap-tation as a potentially transformative political process must attendto micro-politics, or risks intensifying existing systemic issues ofinequality and vulnerability that have the potential to underminethe success of adaptation measures for already marginalizedactors.

Fig. 1. Map of Etsha 13, indicating location of New Stands and seasonally

Adapting to environmental change

Scholarship within the social sciences has a long and compli-cated relationship with adaptation. Within geography, the conceptfirst gained purchase within cultural ecology and natural hazardsscholarship in the 1970s and 1980s (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013;Osbahr et al., 2008; Head, 2010; Zimmerer, 2010). Work duringthis time tended to emphasize adaptation as human adjustmentto ecological surroundings and considered biophysical risks asmanageable through the application of technical and top-downsolutions (Bassett and Fogelman, 2013). This was in part a resultof adaptation’s ecological legacy, which led to a view of societyas a type of self-regulating system that worked to maintainhomeostasis (Watts, 1983; Head, 2010). This view of adaptationcame under critique in the late 1970s and early 1980s for a lackof attention to political-economic root causes of societal vulnera-bility. Of note, Watts (1983) illustrated how households in Nigeriawho were ‘‘conceptually prepared’’ to respond to drought insteadsuffered from famine as a result of social, economic, and politicallegacies of colonialism and capitalism. The geographic subfield ofpolitical ecology emerged at least in part out of concerns aboutthese previous understandings of socio-environmental dynamicsand quickly shifted from a focus on adaptation to one on vulnera-bility (Robbins, 2012; Bassett and Fogelman, 2013). Vulnerabilitywas seen as a way to address underlying structural conditionsmore explicitly while providing opportunities to attend to ques-tions of political and power dynamics within specific socio-envi-ronmental settings. As scholarship on the impacts of climatechange has increased in recent years, attention has returned toadaptation to consider the ways in which social systems canrespond to environmental change, including within IPCC reports(IPCC, 2014; Moss et al., 2013; Birkenholtz, 2012; Ribot, 2011;Tschakert and Dietrich, 2010; Adger et al., 2009; Smith et al.,

and occasionally inundated floodplain (map made by Aaron Dennis).

J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29 23

2000). The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as ‘‘The process ofadjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In humansystems, adaptation seeks to moderate harm or exploit beneficialopportunities. In natural systems, human intervention may facili-tate adjustment to expected climate and its effects (Noble et al.,2014, p. 4).’’

This resurgence of engagement with adaptation is not withoutsome articulated reservations. Adaptation has long been critiquedas a ‘‘slippery’’ concept (Head, 2010, p. 235), and some scholars feelcurrent uses of adaptation are too similar to earlier applicationscritiqued by political economists. As a result, some scholars arenow working toward an understanding of adaptation that attendsto issues of power and structural vulnerability. Ribot (2011) arguesthat a focus on adaptation implies the question of ‘‘how’’ peoplerespond to environmental change, but not ‘‘why’’ they must adaptin the first place. Because adaptation has no ‘‘implicit link’’ to mar-ginalization, it erases any causality in the process of adaptation(Ribot, 2011, p. 2). Since the concept of adaptation is ‘‘not goingaway,’’ Ribot (2011) argues that studies of adaptation must includean explicit focus on vulnerability in order to ensure not just a focuson adaptation itself, but also on the root cause of who needs toadapt and why. Pelling (2010) further emphasizes the importanceof understanding the limits to adaptation, and suggests that mostof the related literature has been framed around technical solu-tions, rather than in cultural, social, and political terms. Likewise,Moser (2009, p. 328) argues, ‘‘. . .there is a growing need to under-stand and empirically test our understanding of the social dynam-ics that underpin. . . on-the-ground adaptation strategies andactions through existing governance structures and mechanisms.’’Adger et al. (2009) similarly suggest that scholars must considersocial limits to adaptation, rather than just ecological, economic,and technological ones. While current work tends to focus primar-ily on exogenous limits to adaptation, Adger et al. (2009, p. 338)argue that many limits are actually endogenous to society, notingthe need to think ‘‘about the ways in which societies are organized,the values that they hold, the knowledge that they constructand the relationships that exist between individuals, institutionsand the state.’’ They argue that through the investigation of theseendogenous factors, social scientists can begin to understand limitsto adaptation that originate from structural vulnerabilities within asociety.

In a recent and notable paper, Bassett and Fogelman (2013, p.50) find that even with this growing body of critical work on adap-tation, there is still ‘‘. . .considerable continuity between the naturalhazards debate of the 1970s/1980s and the different interpreta-tions of vulnerability and adaptation in the current climate changeliterature.’’ Bassett and Fogelman (2013) reviewed articles onadaptation from four major climate change journals and placedeach article into a related category: (i) Adjustment adaptation,(ii) Reformist adaptation, and (iii) Transformative adaptation.Whereas adjustment adaptation is politically conservative andseeks to maintain the status quo, transformative adaptation seeksto understand structural causes of vulnerability in different politi-cal-economic and environmental contexts with the explicit inten-tion of challenging existing power dynamics. Reformistadaptation is located at the middle of the continuum. While ourintention is to engage directly with Bassett and Fogelman’s defini-tion of transformative adaptation, it should be noted that they arenot the only scholars engaging with this concept (for a similar def-inition, see Pelling, 2010; for a more conservative definition, seeKates et al., 2012). Indeed, even the most recent IPCC report brieflydiscusses the concept, though it notes ‘‘The clear operational defi-nitions of what constitutes transformational adaptation remainelusive. . .’’ and that, ‘‘The current complexity and ambiguity inthe definition of transformational adaptation may constrain its

effective operationalization in policy environments (Klein et al.,2014, p. 25).’’ Thus, while attention to transformative adaptationis expanding, it still lacks clear definition and normative intention.

There is a growing body of case study based research working tolink causal roots of vulnerability to potentially transformativeadaptive strategies. Osbahr et al. (2008) offer one impressiveexample. Using a case study from Mozambique, these authors find‘‘complex cross-scale engagements and diverse institutions to beessential. . .’’ in tackling climate change (Osbahr et al., 2008, p.1952). Recognizing that adaptation is a process shaped by broaderpolitical economic and social dynamics, they suggest that develop-ment agendas concerned with climate change and its impacts willbe more successful if they support social institutions. This workhighlights the importance of uncovering limits to adaptation thatoriginate not only from the broader socio-political context but alsofrom within societies themselves. Of particular relevance to thecase study of Etsha 13 detailed below, these authors detail policyfrom within Mozambique designed to promote transitional accessto lowland and upland fields to facilitate agricultural responses toflooding variability. With these questions and insights in mind, wenow turn to our case study from the Okavango Delta, Botswana tohighlight the role of micro-politics in shaping the possibilities foradaptive responses to environmental changes. We argue thatmicro-politics highlight not only differential intra-communityexperiences with flooding and relocation, but also the multi-scalarinstitutional relationships that have the potential to impede orpromote transformative adaptation.

Case study and methods

Case study

The research that informs this article was completed in theOkavango Delta of northwest Botswana, which serves as an excel-lent setting for examining human responses to environmental var-iability and change. The Okavango Delta is a system characterizedby dynamic biophysical processes, such as precipitation and flood-ing that vary spatially and temporally. While water is always pres-ent within portions of the Delta, floodwaters typically arrive in theregion of Etsha 13 around April and May, fed by both local andupstream precipitation from the highlands of Angola. The Deltacontains three major hydro-ecological zones: permanent swamp,seasonal (regularly flooded) floodplains, and occasional floodplains(Wolski and Savenije, 2006; McCarthy et al., 2000). Rechanneliza-tion of the Delta is common due to the movement of sedimentthrough the system (Wolski et al., 2012) so that different locationsin the system experience water in distinct ways. There is also inter-annual and quasi-decadal variability (Neuenschwander and Crews,2008). Floodwaters arrive slowly and are somewhat predictabledue to water gauges along the Botswana–Namibia border that helptrack inflow into the Delta. Given the gradual increase in floodwa-ters, one of our governmental respondents noted with confidencethat they knew approximately when the water would arrive.Knowing when the water will arrive, however, is quite differentfrom knowing its eventual location because the spatial extent,amount, and timing of the floodwaters can vary significantly. TheEtsha region is emblematic of this dynamism, as it has recentlyexperienced significant levels of spatiotemporal variability.

The Okavango Delta is located in the Kalahari (Kgaligadi) desert,making the wetland an important source of water for humans andwildlife. Livelihood systems within the Okavango Delta are diversi-fied and often dependent upon precipitation and flooding regimes(Meyer et al., 2011; Mbaiwa and Darkoh, 2005; Kgathi et al., 2007;Mbaiwa et al., 2008). Residents engage in both molapo (floodplain)and dryland agricultural practices. Molapo farming is an histori-

Fig. 2. A household gathers under a government-issued tent in the New Stands.

24 J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

cally adapted practice that depends upon the recession of floodwa-ters to provide nutrients and moisture to the soil (Magole andThapelo, 2005). Because of the reliance upon the flood to provideirrigation, the spatial and temporal dynamism can present a chal-lenge to this practice. Even as early as 2005, research found thatgovernmental rules limiting farming in the floodplain were com-bining with flooding variability to produce less available territoryfor this form of agricultural production (Kgathi et al., 2005). Dry-land farming, on the other hand, occurs outside of the floodplainand is largely reliant upon variable precipitation for crop produc-tion. Crops grown in either the dryland or molapo fields can includemaize, millet, beans, melons, and sorghum. Livestock husbandry,primarily of cattle, is also practiced in the region with one recentstudy suggesting it was the most common livelihood strategywithin a number of villages in the Delta (Motsholapheko et al.,2011). Natural resource collection also occurs for subsistence andcommercial purposes. Wood and shrub products are collected forcooking fuel and fencing materials. Reeds (Common Reed or Phrag-mites australis), palm, and thatch grass are gathered for buildingmaterials and the weaving of baskets for commercial sale. Wildfruits and water lilies are reported to be gathered by some resi-dents and are used to augment household diet. These collectionpatterns are sometimes supplemented with fishing as a source offood or income.

In addition to biophysical processes, livelihoods in the regionare also interlinked with cultural dynamics. A number of differentethnic groups reside within the research setting, including the Bay-ei and Hambukushu. This research was completed within the Etsharegion, located along the western edge of the Delta in thirteen vil-lages (Etsha 1–13) that were originally designed for Hambukushuwho migrated from Angola in the late 1960s during that country’scivil war. A smaller population of Bayei from nearby areas movedto the Etsha villages after the Hambukushu began to settle anddevelop them. While the ethnicities have overlapping livelihoodstrategies, the Bayei tend to rely more heavily on wetland basedresources, while the Hambukushu tend to engage more in drylandfarming practices. Both ethnicities maintain strong cultural identi-ties related to their respective agricultural practices. Further, theBayei tend to live in closer proximity to the floodplain and engagein multiple wetland-based livelihoods. Even after settling in Etsha13, many Bayei households maintained close links to smaller Bayeisettlements on the edges of or in the interior of the Delta, oftenshifting between them throughout the year based on agriculturaland fishing seasons.

Methods

This paper reports on findings from research that is designed tounderstand livelihood production and social dynamics within aregion that has recently experienced environmental variability inflooding regimes. The findings reported here derive from qualita-tive semi-structured interviewing and participant observation thattook place within the village of Etsha 13 from June–July 2011, withadditional fieldwork completed by the first author in 2012–2013.Twenty-seven household interviews in total were completed inEtsha 13 in 2011, of which twenty were randomly sampled, withan additional seven intentionally sampled to collect informationfrom the New Stands. An additional twenty-five qualitative house-hold interviews were conducted in Etsha 13 by the first authorfrom October 2012–May 2013. This was designed to provide amulti-year assessment of the multiple adaptive responses to flood-ing variability within the case study region. All interviews werecompleted with representatives of the households with assistancefrom local interpreters in English, Setswana, and Hambukushu.Additional interviews were conducted with governmental officialsand members of the local tribal authority during 2013.

Findings

Life in the New Stands

In drier years during the past three decades, residents of Etsha13 built homes in the occasionally inundated floodplain. Floodsduring the months of annual peak flooding of April and May of2009, 2010, and 2011 caused displacement of hundreds of theseresidents from their homes. In response, the Government of Bots-wana relocated many of these residents to a dryland area on theoutskirts of Etsha 13, now known as the ‘‘New Stands.’’ The dis-placement of Etsha 13 residents had implications for the entire vil-lage, not just for those who were relocated. Eighty-one percent ofthose interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011 discussed issues with therelocation, whether they themselves were relocated or not. Whileeach of the relocated households has a unique story of displace-ment, there are common threads that run throughout. For example,displaced residents reported that while they expected flooding tooccur near the village in 2009, they did not expect it to reach theirparticular compounds. Moreover, the floodwaters came quicklythat year and arrived in the village during the night. Respondentsshared stories of waking up in the middle of the night only tonotice that their blankets were wet and their compound wasflooding.

The Government of Botswana responded rapidly to the 2009floods. Governmental officials arrived the day after floods reachedthe village with trucks and boats to move people to the designateddryland area. People were then given tents as temporary shelter forthemselves and any belongings salvaged from their compounds.The New Stands are located on land that was once agriculturalfields owned by villagers. The government reportedly compen-sated the previous owners of the land and provided them withnew dryland fields further from the village. During the floods of2009, displaced people were also given food baskets, temporarytoilets, and firewood, in addition to relocation assistance and tents.The government also provided large water tanks and eventuallyinstalled a few permanent public water taps at the New Stands.It should be noted that during the 2010 and 2011 floods, no aidwas given beyond relocation assistance and tents. According toan Assistant Development Officer at the regional District Commis-sioner office, the Red Cross and other non-governmental organiza-tions (NGOs) had donated the additional resources given in 2009.In 2010 and 2011, the government was the only entity offeringassistance (Fig. 2).

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While people living in the New Stands recognized the govern-mental assistance they received, it was common for people to bedissatisfied with the government response to flooding. This dissat-isfaction was particularly notable for those displaced in 2010 and2011, when no additional assistance was given from external orga-nizations. In some cases, people complained that the tents theywere given were in need of repair and did not provide adequateshelter. Others suggested that the government should build newhomes for all displaced people. In a very few cases, the governmentdid build people new small concrete houses. A young woman livingin one of these homes explained that she qualified because she hadno family to help her and that she had many children of her own,though most of the other people who were built houses wereelderly. She said that she was happy with the house and plannedto stay there. An elderly woman living in another cement homebuilt by the government expressed her gratitude for the house,even though parts of it were of poor quality. When asked if shewould remain there, she said she would stay ‘‘for the whole ofher life.’’

In contrast, the vast majority of displaced people were not pro-vided with new homes. Typically, they remained in a temporarytent camp for a few months before being allocated a new plot fromthe regional Land Board in a part of the New Stands that quicklybecame a permanent part of Etsha 13. The Land Board is the gov-ernmental authority responsible for allocating plots of land andthe regional Tawana Land Board is the agency responsible for issu-ing plots in the New Stands. Of important note, residents can onlylegally have one plot of land, so when they accepted the allocationof a plot in the New Stands, they forfeited their right to their for-mer plot in the floodplain. After the certificate for the land wasgiven, people moved their tents and any belongings that survivedthe floods to the new plot and began the process of building anew permanent compound. Residents had little say in where theirnew plot was located and some respondents reported that whilethey would have preferred to resettle elsewhere, they were unableto ‘‘since this is the plot the Land Board gave them.’’

While not everyone chose to stay in the New Stands, those whodid gave a number of reasons for permanently relocating ratherthan returning to their previous compounds. Some people felt thattheir old compounds were ‘‘too dangerous’’ due to higher water.When one woman was asked about the possibility of returningto her old plot, she explained that she would not return becausethe water was so high people were fishing where her home usedto be. Others felt that life would be easier at the New Stands.One respondent said that people ‘‘are not free to live’’ at the oldcompounds, because they are always worried about gettingflooded. Another respondent reported that life in the New Standsis better, because there is no risk of drowning. Another householdexplained that they were ‘‘relieved’’ to be living in the New Stands,because at their previous compound the children had to cross theriver to go to school. When asked whether she wanted to return toher old plot, one woman replied ‘‘this is our home now, becausethe old house has been destroyed.’’

The relocation demonstrates several points about the responsesto the flooding levels in Etsha 13. First, the government respondedquickly in 2009 and in subsequent years to relocate residents awayfrom the occasional floodplain. While additional resource supportdeclined after 2009, the government continued to work with resi-dents to provide new plots through the Land Board, as long asthose residents were willing to forfeit their plot in the occasionalfloodplain. Many did because of the perception that it was prefer-able, or at least safer, to be in the New Stands. However, not all res-idents shared these sentiments. Rather, some people chose toreturn home and continue living in the occasionally inundatedfloodplain, even with the risk of flooding in future years. As thenext section details, for these residents adaptation to environmental

variability involved other types of responses, some of which were indirect conflict with the wishes and rules of the national governmentof Botswana.

Returning home

While many residents responded to the flooding by resettling innew areas demarcated by the state, others decided to return totheir homes in the flooded area. Those who chose to return to theiroriginal compounds after the annual floods receded gave a numberof reasons for doing so. Some said they would have preferred tolive in the New Stands but could not afford to build new homesthere. One household explained how they moved to the NewStands in 2010 but moved back to their old plot in 2011 becausethey did not have enough money or the skills to build new houses,and the government was going to take away their tents. Anotherfamily described how they had already been allotted tents and aplot in the New Stands, but had not yet decided whether to move.They were considering building a house there in the future becausethey believed the higher annual floods would continue, but did nothave the income necessary to do so. They said, ‘‘We cannot preparebecause of lack of resources. We would like to move to the newplot away from the flood, but we are unable to construct newhouses.’’

Other households returned to their old compounds temporarily,and while they preferred to remain there, they felt pressured bythe government to move permanently to the New Stands. One fam-ily interviewed in 2013 was still living in their original compound,but was in the process of building in the New Stands where theyhad been given a plot by the Land Board. Like many of their neigh-bors, their compound was flooded in 2010 and one of their homescollapsed. They moved to the New Stands during the floods butreturned to their plot after two months when the floods dried. Eventhough they planned to move to the New Stands when their newcompound was completed, the family had significant concernsabout the relocation, including the inability to move their electric-ity and water connections with them. They said they would preferto stay at their original compound and move back and forth to theNew Stands as needed. They explained that the President of Bots-wana, Ian Khama, visited Etsha 13 and the residents told him abouttheir concerns about moving to the New Stands. The Presidentreportedly responded that they could choose to return to theirold compounds, but that they would not be given additional helpif they were to get flooded again. The man explained that eventhough they do not want to move, they did not want to argue withthe government and preferred to ‘‘follow the rules.’’

Other households explained that while they have not yet beenflooded, the government was still encouraging them to move tothe New Stands to avoid future flooding. One household explainedthat the government was encouraging them to move to the NewStands because their house will likely be in the path of futurefloods. However, moving would be difficult, because no one inthe household is working and they do not have enough money tobuild a new compound. An adult member of the household felt thatthe government should assist those who need to move because ofthe floods. However, he explained that they are given no assistancewith relocation because they are encouraged to move, but notforced to do so.

In addition to speaking with residents of Etsha 13, interviewswere completed with governmental officials with jurisdiction overthe Etsha region. When asked her opinion on people returning tohomes that had been previously flooded, the Assistant Develop-ment Officer at the District Commissioner’s Office explained thatit is a bad thing, and that people should rather stay in the drylandpermanently. She explained that the Government watches theinflow of water into the Delta and informs communities before

Fig. 3. A partially finished house in the New Stands awaits completion with reedsand grass thatch.

26 J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

the annual floods whether they should move out of the floodplain.But she said that some people tell them they are ‘‘people of theriver’’ and want to stay where they are, even though ‘‘We. . . knowthey will be the same ones we will be helping.’’ She continued, ‘‘Itis a lot of trouble, but what can we do?’’ While there is no penaltyfor moving back to your old plot, she made it clear that it is againstthe wishes of the government. She indicated that the same peopleare moved every year. In another interview, a District Commis-sioner for the region confirmed that it is not illegal to return tothe flooded compound. He said that all they can say to people is‘‘please move to the other area,’’ but that they cannot provide any-thing other than a new plot. He said, ‘‘If you go back and watercomes, do not come for assistance.’’ But, he said they provide assis-tance anyway because, ‘‘we cannot ignore them.’’ While it is clearfrom these comments that the government prefers people to movepermanently out of the floodplain, interviews indicate this posessignificant challenges for many households. As the next sectiondetails, the implications for livelihood systems can be significantand thus challenge the possibilities for successful adaptiveresponses, particularly ones that are consistent with the vision ofthe state.

Increased need and decreased access to natural resources

One of the major challenges of moving to the New Stands is thatof decreased access to natural resources and other capital assets forrebuilding, an issue which intensifies already existing issues formany vulnerable households in the region. People detailed having‘‘to get used to a new lifestyle’’ in the New Stands. This includedproblems that had not been experienced in their old plots in thevillage, including ants and termites that destroy house buildingmaterial and baskets used for storage. In addition, people com-plained that they were unable to lock the tents and unfinishedhouses. People also mentioned that the distance and effort togather firewood were greater. During interviews conducted inthe New Stands during May–June 2011, many respondents wereconcerned they would not be able to rebuild homes before the gov-ernment came to take the tents back. Often mentioned as a reasonfor accepting the temporary tent housing was the fact that gettingtogether the needed reeds and thatch for building a new housedepended not just on having a site, but also on having the mobilityand time to harvest the plant materials from the Delta. Further,increased flooding levels decreased access to grasses and reedsneeded for building. One household explained that if they leavein the morning it ‘‘takes until 2 PM to reach the reed and grass col-lection area. . .making it necessary to spend the night there. It takes10 days to collect enough for our building needs because you haveto rest from the aches and pains in your arms from collecting.’’

Sixty-seven percent of people interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011,whether displaced or not, mentioned increased difficulty from thefloods in collecting grass and reeds, which are important buildingmaterials for homes and fences for compounds. Some people inthe New Stands were able to salvage some resources such as bricksand reeds from their previous plots and use them to begin newstructures, however virtually all people in the New Stands wereforced to collect at least some new natural resources to build com-pounds. As one person explained, things became more difficultbecause ‘‘now everyone is starting from the beginning.’’ As recentlyas May 2013, it was common to see partially assembled houses, aspeople waited for the money or ability to collect enough resources(Fig. 3).

One family explained how the season for collecting reeds andgrass is usually from July to August, but they are now collectingearlier because of the urgency to rebuild. This means that the reedsand grass are of a sub par quality because they have not hadenough time to grow and are not yet ‘‘ready.’’ Further, they

described that there are rules for time of collection set by the gov-ernment, and that they now need to break those rules out of des-peration to complete their house before the tents are takenaway. So while the national government has been assertive inadvocating the relocation of residents from the occasional flood-plain, the institutional environment shaping natural resource col-lection has remained rigid to the detriment of establishing newhomes. The same family detailed how they now collect some grassat the dryland, but the type of grass that grows there has ‘‘thorns’’and is of lower quality than the wetland grass. There is no alterna-tive to reeds. While people also have the option to buy reeds andgrasses, there were reports of increased prices of resources for saledue to the added difficulty of collection.

Not only did the floods of 2009–2011 decrease access toresources needed for building homes in the New Stands, therewas also a lack of access to resources necessary for important nat-ural resource-based livelihoods in the region. While this was feltmost acutely by those trying to rebuild in the New Stands, itimpacted residents throughout the village. Thirty-seven percentof respondents in 2011 mentioned an increased need for a tradi-tional canoe (mokoro) to access wetland resources due to thehigher floodwaters. However, mekoro (plural) are expensive tobuy and difficult to build, so people often discussed trying to bor-row one from friends or family. Without a mokoro, people wereforced to not collect at all, or to risk wading in deep water to collectresources. This was associated with fears of drowning, as well asfears of the increased presence of dangerous animals, includingcrocodiles and hippopotamuses.

Flooding also had significant impacts on molapo farming. Agri-cultural livelihoods related to both dryland and molapo farmingare critical to household food security in the region. While manypeople participate in molapo farming, it is a particularly importantlivelihood for people in the Bayei tribe in Etsha 13. As one Bayeiman said, ‘‘The whole family [molapo] farms, that is who we are.’’Fifty-nine percent of people interviewed in Etsha 13 in 2011described complete or partial loss of their molapo fields. Some peo-ple described molapo fields too inundated with water to grow anycrops at all, while others described partially inundated fields inwhich they were able to continue to plow a smaller part of thefield. One woman explained, ‘‘[the field] is getting smaller nowbecause the flowing is changing.’’ People often view molapo farm-ing as an easier way to grow crops than at the dryland, making theloss of these fields particularly serious. As one respondentdescribed, when you plow by the river, you always know there will

Fig. 4. The dam built by residents to block water, shown here during the 2011flooding season.

J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29 27

be water. However, in the dryland fields they are not sure when therain will come, making it more difficult to farm. People alsodescribed a lack of equipment needed to transition to drylandfarming. One family described how they are unable to farm a dryfield because they do not have the necessary equipment, such asa donkey cart.

Transitions to the New Stands and to dryland farming pose spe-cific challenges to the many female-headed households in Etsha13. One respondent explained how building new homes beforethe tents are taken away would be difficult, as she had ‘‘no hus-band to build strong houses.’’ When one woman who farms atthe molapo was asked if she intended to transition to dryland farm-ing, she said she is unable to do so because she does not have ahusband to do the difficult work of clearing the land. Likewise,another woman explained that even if the Land Board gives her adryland plot, it would be difficult for her because her husbandpassed away and it was he who did the demanding work of clear-ing fields for farming. Another commented that since her husbandhad passed away, she struggled to maintain fences to keep cattleand wild animals from destroying crops. However, very few peoplesaid they would stop farming completely, whether they planned tocontinue to eke out crops at the molapo or to attempt the difficultwork of clearing a dryland field. As one woman said when asked ifshe would stop farming, ‘‘I will not give up, because if I give up Iwill starve.’’

Adaptation as resistance: changing the flow

As the above section indicates, the story of flooding and reloca-tion in Etsha 13 highlights differences in power and desires of gov-ernmental and local actors. While many residents chose to relocatepermanently to the New Stands, most are not completely satisfiedwith the relocation assistance they received. Moreover, many ofthose who preferred to return to their original plots against thegovernment wishes are slowly in the process of moving perma-nently to the New Stands, with varying levels of success. However,the rising waters of the Delta provoked other interesting responsesfrom local people who chose to not relocate at all. Of note, weobserved an illegal response that involved efforts to control andchange the flow of the floodwaters. Such interventions are prohib-ited by national level legislation meant to allow the ‘‘natural’’ flowof the Okavango Delta’s waters to occur. Members of the researchteam were shown a makeshift dam about 40 meters long made ofsand bags and poles that was designed to protect about 20 com-pounds from the flood. Local people constructed this dam withbags they purchased from the health clinic. It provided about onemeter of height of protection, which was enough to at least post-pone the moment when their compounds became flooded (Fig. 4).

A key informant involved with the construction of the damnoted that ‘‘the assistance of the government was not enough:the rains get tents wet, crops are destroyed by the flood. It is betterto build a wall and stop the flood.’’ He also hoped to get local per-mission to build another wall that would provide additional pro-tection for his house, which is ‘‘not a safe place to live.’’ It washis opinion that without the wall, the entire town would haveflooded. He confirmed plans to rebuild and strengthen the wallto make it permanent for protection against future floods.

The Assistant Development Officer at the District Commis-sioner’s Office explained that without permission from the Depart-ment of Water Affairs the building of such a dam is illegal. Sheexplained that the problem with the dam is that it blocks the waterfrom flowing in its natural direction, which can force it to flow tosomeone else’s compound. An interview with the District Commis-sioner for the region echoed these concerns. He explained howwhen people build small boundaries or embankments where thechannel would normally flow, the water can accumulate behind

the boundary and eventually breaks the wall, doing even moredamage. He explained that rather than diverting the flow of water,it is better just to move out of the path of flooding. However, eventhough the government is aware of the dam and disapproves, as ofMay 2013, the dam still existed and there have been no repercus-sions for those who built it.

Discussion

In Etsha 13, a range of social actors enacted a variety ofresponses to the floods of 2009–2011. Many of the state-level gov-ernmental responses involved new strategies to permanently mit-igate the negative impacts of flooding, including the relocation ofresidents living in the occasional floodplain. At the same time,other responses from residents built on long histories of more fluidtypes of adaptation, by shifting between the dryland and wetlandareas as necessitated by floods. And in one major instance, resi-dents took matters into their own hands by blocking the flow ofwater altogether. Residents who chose to adapt by moving perma-nently to the New Stands acted within the desires of the govern-ment, while those residents who chose only temporary relocationto the New Stands, as well as those who blocked the flow of water,acted against government wishes. While no punitive action has yetbeen taken against those operating outside of government strate-gies, there is a strong perception from residents that they will beincreasingly pressured to move to the dryland area permanentlyin the future.

When studied together, these competing types of responsesreveal the diverse ways residents of Etsha 13 are both enabledand constrained in their ability to successfully respond to recentincreases in flooding variability. If residents are willing to enactthe response desired by the state, they are offered some amountof governmental support, which can go a long way in helpingalready socio-economically vulnerable residents securely respondto a changing environment. However, if a resident prefers torespond in other ways, even if those responses are based on cul-tural practices, they are offered very little or no governmental sup-port. In this way, residents are pressured toward a particular typeof state-sponsored adaptation to flooding variability. So while noone claimed to have been outright forced to relocate, it is evidentthat many residents living in the floodplain feel a sense of power-lessness in the face of governmental requests that they do so. Evenas people described a desire to remain living in the floodplain, or to

28 J.E. Shinn et al. / Geoforum 57 (2014) 21–29

transition back and forth to the dryland, many of the same house-holds detailed current or future plans to move permanently to theNew Stands, because as the one household said, it is better ‘‘to fol-low the rules.’’

This micro-political context of Etsha 13 highlights importantpower relationships between actors at a variety of scales. It alsohighlights differential desires for adaptation, between state andnon-state actors, and also between groups within the village itself.Complex institutional relationships related to government, ethnic-ity, and gender determine if a household has the power to adapt toenvironmental variability using desired and culturally influencedstrategies. Bayei people tend to have stronger ties to molapo farm-ing and other wetland-based livelihoods, resulting in differentialimpacts for this group than for members of other ethnicities. Addi-tionally, women tend to face more difficulty making the transitionto the dryland than men, resulting in a differential impact of flood-ing variability for female-headed households. Thus, while the tran-sition to living and farming in the dryland is technically an optionavailable to all residents, its desirability and feasibility are partlytied to local-level institutional relationships that are culturallyrooted and understood.

These local-level institutional dynamics are also informed bypower relationships at different scales. National- and regional-levelgovernmental decisions overrule the desires of residents to remainin the occasional floodplain, where they can more easily gain accessto the natural resources that have long formed the basis of wetland-based livelihoods. While small acts of resistance occur, as with theboundary dam described above, many residents transition to thedryland against their wishes, highlighting the influence of statepractices in Botswana. While the state might view the relocationof residents from the floodplain as a matter of safety, the viewignores important local-level socio-ecological relationships, partic-ularly for the Bayei. Asking (or subtly forcing, as the case might be)Bayei residents to move to the dryland is asking them to move to alocation with which they have little cultural identity, and wherethey will experience increased difficulty maintaining culturallyimportant wetland-based livelihoods, such as molapo farming. Fur-ther, these relocation efforts do not recognize the gendered impactssuch residential and agricultural transitions will have for female-headed households. As such, this case study highlights ways inwhich adaptive capacity (and its limits) are informed by factorsboth endogenous and exogenous to the community in question.

Finally, one of our objectives with this study is to detail thecase-specific challenges to transformative forms of adaptation. Asof now, the Botswana state is promoting adaptation of a sort, butis effectively impeding a culturally sensitive or empowering formof adaptation. We argue based on Bassett and Fogelman’s contin-uum, these current responses clearly fall into the adjustment cate-gory (and perhaps the reformist category, in the case of the dam).For truly transformative adaptation to take place in Etsha 13, mea-sures would have to, as Adger (2006, 276) suggests, ‘‘redress mar-ginalization as a cause of social vulnerability.’’ As such, it wouldmean addressing issues of marginalization for people of this ruralregion generally, and of women and Bayei people specifically.The state would need to create space for a continuation of the longhistory of fluidity of life in the Delta. This would give residentsaccess to the dryland in times of high water and allowing themto return to their homes after the recession of floods. This maynot sound transformative per se, and yet the study of micro-politicsof Etsha 13 shows that allowing residents the power to maintaincultural practices also allows them to enact their own desiredresponses to variability. This would require at least two key ele-ments: a reduction in the rigidity of certain existing rules throughchanges to policy that would surrender some state power to resi-dents of Etsha 13, and the creation of policy that facilitates fluidadaptive responses. This relocation of power and creation of

empowering policy would allow true transformation to flourishin Etsha 13. However, based on extensive research in the region,it is unlikely that such transformations will occur in the nearfuture. Rather, it is likely that the residents of Etsha 13 who remainin the occasional floodplain will experience increasing pressurefrom the government to move permanently to the dryland. In com-ing years, this pressure to relocate poses a potential risk of loss ofcultural identity for the Bayei and will increase the already heavyburden for many of the female-headed households in the region.As such, this top-down and static approach to adaptation willintensify existing vulnerabilities and constrain the possibilitiesfor transformative adaptation for residents of Etsha 13.

Conclusions

The impacts of climate change will continue to intensify aroundthe globe (IPCC, 2014). As evidenced by the case of Etsha 13, in someareas these impacts will include displacement (permanent and tem-porary) of people from homes and sites of livelihood production. It isless certain the extent to which people will be able to respond tothese impacts in effective and culturally desired ways. The case ofEtsha 13 shows that adaptive responses can be the result of complexsocietal dynamics, both endogenous and exogenous to impactedcommunities. The state may not desire the same responses as resi-dents, and not all residents will want the same responses as eachother. Nor will all actors have equal capacity to adapt in desiredand effective ways. Additionally, as shown by flooding variabilityin Etsha 13, adaptation is not just socially and ecologicallyconstructed but also spatially variable, even at the local scale.

We use this case study to show that the investigation of micro-political dynamics can reveal existing issues of power and sourcesof existing vulnerabilities. Once identified, effective adaptationmeasures must address these root issues, thereby addressing notonly the ‘‘how’’ of adaptation, but also the less explicit questionof ‘‘why’’ certain actors must adapt at all. In some cases, this deeperquestioning will necessitate a transformation of the social systemitself, in order to foster a form of adaptation that is desired, just,and effective. As social scientists continue to engage with theconcept of transformative adaptation, we must recognize that thepossibilities and desires for adaptation are differential within asocio-ecological system, and that a particular adaptive response,or failure to engage in that response, can reflect critical issues ofpower, access, and governance. If transformative adaptation is tobecome a possibility, scholars and practitioners must attendto the micro-politics that have the potential to empower orundermine adaptive potential for certain actors.

Acknowledgments

The research that informs this article was supported by the Uni-ted States National Science Foundation (BCS/GSS-0964596 andBCS/GSS Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Award-1234018), the Fulbright Foundation, the Penn State GeographyDepartment, the Penn State Africana Research Center, and theExplorer’s Club. We are grateful to Fuata John, Japhet John, andKentse Madise for their invaluable work as research assistants, aswell as to Allison White and Evan Griffin for their help with inter-views. We would like to thank Aaron Dennis for making the mapfor this article. Finally, we offer thanks to two anonymous review-ers whose feedback helped to strengthen this manuscript.

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