OSPR EY· VANGUARD I

British 7th ARMOURED DIVISION 1940-45

John Sandars

..

VANGUARD SERIES

EDITOR: MARTI N WINDROW

British 7th ARMOURED

DIVISION 1940-45

Text by JOHN SANDARS

Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

OSPREY PUBLIS HI NG LONDON

1 I

Published in 1977 by O sprey Publishing Lid Member company of the George Philip Group 12- 14 Long Acre, London WC2[ 9LP © Copyright 1977 Osprey Publishing Ltd

This book is copyrighted under the Berne Convention . AI! righls reserved. Apart from any fai r dealing for th e purpose of private stud y, research, crit icism or rev iew, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no pa rt of this publ ica tion may be reproduced , stored in a re trieval sys tem, or Iransmi ncd in any form or by a ny mea ns, clcClfonic, elec tri ca l, chemical, mecha nica l, optical , photocopying, record ing or oth erwise, wi thou t the prior permiss ion of the copyright owner. Enquiri es should be addressed to the Publishers.

Filmset a nd prin ted by BAS Printers Limited , O ver \'\Ia llop, Hampshire

The au thor wishes to thank the Imperial \'Var Museum , the Kent and Sharpshooters Yeomanry a nd Boris Mollo, Mike Connirord , and T erry Gander ror permission to use phorographs from their collect ions, and David List for making available the results o f research in ro vehicle camou Aage and markings not yet published.

The mai n sources consulted were: The Desert Rats by Maj Cell Verney, 71h AmlOllred Division by Li ndsa y and J oh nson, The SIOry rifthe RASC 193'r45, CrajtsmeJI of lhe Army. The regimenta l hisro ries of3rd , 7th a nd 8th Hussars, I I th Hussars, 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd & 4th C LY, 2nd RGH , The Royal Tank Regiment , Th e Rifle Brigade, the KRR C, and the Queens, a nd the Royal Artillery Com memoration Book have proved most helpful , as have British and Commonwealth Anlloured Formatiolls by Duncan Crow, and Our Armoured Forces by Martel.

Cover painting by Mike Chappell shows A I 0 a nd A9 Cruiser tanks of 6th Roya l Tank Regiment , willler

1940 .

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Introduction The story of 7th Armoured Division is one of a lmost continuous front-line service throughout six years of war: a record un equal led by any similar British formation. I t is told against a background of cOlll inuous changes in composition , equ ipm ent, and organi za tion. Units were replaced as th ey became depicted by casualties or were required elsewhere; better weapons were iss lied as they became available, and the orga ni zational 'mix' of units was a ltered frequentl y in the light of ex ­perience, and to cater for different th eatres ofwar.

The Bri tish Army started to ex periment with mechanized formatio ns orall arms in th e late 1 9~ws

and early 1930s. By 1934 it had decided on- but not formed - two types of division: a mechanized infantry division wi th its own battalion o f slow heavy tanks to support the foot soldiers in dismo un­ted actions, and a mobile division with a brigade of lighter tanks : a mechanized cava lry brigade in tru cks (intended to fight dismounted like dragoons

I U niversal carrier of a motor batta lion with I talian prisoners, laiC 1940; lypical armament of Boys ami-lan k riflc in front sponson and (covered) Bren gun on AlA mounting. These vehicles were subsequen tl y used by carrier platoons in lorried inranlfY ballal io ns, and as arlillery OP vehicles, ambulances, mo rt ar and machine.gun carri ers in NW E.urope. ( Imperial War Museum)

of old) and a small number of guns and sa ppers. The laller type of formation , w hi ch was in due course to become th e armoured division of World War ll , was naturall y based on lessons learnt from th e previous war and the id eas of current military theorists such as Fuller and Liddell Hart. As a result its role was envisaged as one of exploiting break­throug hs, turn ing flanks and other 'i ndirect' actions, rather than the assa ulting of fixed defences, whi ch task was to be left to the infantry division. At the sa me time, th e relative invulnerability of vVorld War I tanks , once they had got behind the narrow defended belts into the rear areas, with at best primitive anti-tank measures and few if any tanks for counter-attack, led to an overestimate of the capabilities of unaccompanied tanks and a failure to understand the need for adequate infantry and artillery in armoured formations.

Tank desig n therefore split into two streams] with speed taking precedence over armour and

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hitting power in vehicles destined to serve in th e mobile divisions, and pro tection taking precedence in those (' I ' tanks) for the infantry divisions. This di chotomy, which made it difficult for the two types to opera te together, was to continue throughout th e war even after the 'I' tanks were removed from the actual infantry d ivisions. This was foll owed by the absorption of the mecha nized cavalry in to the Roya l Armoured Corps and their re-eq uipment with tanks on the eve of the wa r. Although at th e same tim e specia l Motor In fantry battalions, mounted, unlike th eir mechanized counterparts, in small cross -country tru cks and carriers were added to what were by then armoured divisions, the result was a very tank-heavy organization with in­adequate infantry, guns, or support services. These early assumptions as to type of tank and orga ni­zation were to dog 7th Armoured , among other British divisions, for much of the war.

As tanks were few, and the cavalry, apart from a couple of armoured-ca r regiments, was still mostl y horsed in ' 934, the first mobile division, which subsequentl y became First Armoured Di vision, was not in fact formed until la te ' 937. In the mea ntime th e threat to Egypt posed by th e I talians in Libya during the Abyssini a n crisis had led to th e mechanization of the Cairo Cavalry Brigade in '935 , and this was the nucl eus arou nd which 7th Armoured Division was to be formed some fi ve years la ter. The brigade consisted of , Ith Hussars in armoured cars, 8 th Hussa rs in trucks, and 7th Hussars in light tanks. They origina lly formed th e basis of the 'Matruh Mobi le Force', or ' Immobile Farce', as it came to be known. Between '935 and th e Muni ch crisis in '938, when it next 'stood-w' in the desert , the force had learnt mu ch a bou t operating there, and had been a ugmented by a tank regiment, a regiment of guns, and skeleton service units. Further reinforcements followed in th e form of ano ther tank regiment and a motor in fantry battalion and th e force was renamed 'Mobile Division Egypt'; at the same time the re­eq uipm ent of 8th Hussa rs with light tanks trans­formed th e cavalry brigade into a light armoured brigade. I t was during this period between the M-unich crisis and the declaration of war with Cermany in September ' 939 th at many of the drills and procedures for operating in the desert , which were to remain as dogma throughout the cam -

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paign, were d evised and practised und er th e dynamic leadership of the divisional commander, Maj Cen P. C. S. Hobart. This offi cer had been involved in th e earl y armoured formation experi­ments in Eng land , and was subsequently to form 79th Armoured Division, with specia li zed types of armour, for th e 'ormand y invasion.

Even after the war in Europe had sta rted there was a further period for training and reinforcement before Ita ly came in on the Cerman side in June ' 940. In Februa ry th e d ivision was renamed 7th Armoured and became part of 'Western Desert Force' under Lt Cen R. N. O 'Connor. Maj C en Hobart was relieved by Maj Cen M . O ' Moore Creagh as div isional commander.

2 Bofors 37m m anti ·tank gu n- not a standard British Arm y weapon. A batch on their way to the Sudan were com · mandeered in [940 and issued to the div ision, ror lack or an alternative. Carried pon ce on 15cwt tr ucks, they were rep laced earl y in [94 [ by regu lat ion 2pdrs, also portccd on 30cwt and 3 ton trucks. (Gander)

War with Italy The deserts of western Egypt and Libya where the division was to fi ght for the next three years were ap tl y described by a Cerman genera l as a 'tacti cian's drea m and a quartermaster's night­mare'. Much of th e area is covered by a feat ureless, level, gravel platea u on which movement at speed in any direction, even by wheel ed vehicles, is usual ly possible. At two points, nca r Agheila and Alamein , salt marshes and an impassable depres­sion form bottl enecks to within a few miles of the coastl ine. These a rc the only places where defences can be built that ca nnot be ou tfla nked through the open desert , until lhe mountains and cultivated areas of western T ripolitania ancl Tunisia are reached. These gaps are not th e only milita ril y

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Orders of Battle 1939 and 1940

MOB I LE D IV IS IO N EGY PT August ' 939

Divisiollal HQ.

~-------DiV troops: I RASC Coy. . I Field Aumbulance

Light Arm'd Bdt HtO/!)' Arm'd Bdt Pivot Group 7lh Hussars (light tanks) 8th Hussars (Iighl la nks)

lSI RTR (Iighllanks) 6lh RTR (light ta nks &

3rd RHA (field & A/T guns) 1St KRRC (molOr infantry)

I I lh Hussars (arm'd cars) cruisers)

7th A RM O R ED D IV ISION 'ovcm ber I 940

Divisiollal HQ. I

I 4th Anll'd Bdt 7th Hussars 2nd RTR 6th RTR

I Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T )

7th Anll' d Bdt 1st RT R grd Hussars 8 th Hussars

I Bty. 3rd RH A (A/T )

(Mk V IB light tanks, A9 & A ,o Cru isers, 37mm Bofors A/T guns, I 8/2s pdr fi eld guns)

signifi ca nt fea tures, however ; in Egypt a nd C yr­enaica the level inland plateau steps down to a narrow coastal plain in a series of steep esca rp­ments, and the points at which these pelcr o ut, south ofSidi Barrani and west o fTobruk, or where ga ps ena bled vehicles to pass up or down them , such as H a lfaya near Sollu m a nd S idi R ezegh JUSt south of T obruk, were to be th e focus of much action. I n the fl at dcsen even the low hills and ridges of the coasta l pla in a nd in the Ala mein ga p achieved an imporla nce out of a ll proportion to their size. The single metalled coast road , a long wh ich a ll supplies had to tra vel , was to become th e lifeline of bo th sides, linking them to their bases a t

Support Group 4th RHA (field guns) ISI KRR C 2nd RiAe Ede

Diu troops 11th Hussa rs (arm 'd

cars) lo6th RHA (A/T &

AlA) I Bty. 3rd RHA (A/T ) R E : Fld. Sqn . & Pk .

Tp. RASC : 6 Coys RAM C: 2 Cav Amb RAOC : Workshop, Pk

& 3 It rcpa ir sees

Alexa ndria a nd Tripoli a nd limiting their speed of advance and depth of penetration into the desen 1O

the south . The o ther ma in features were the hilly cultivated a rea of th e Djebel Akhdar in the Bengha zi-Mechili-Derna tria ngle, a nd the barbed­wire ba r ri er wh ich the Italians had built a long Lhe Li byan-Egyptian rrontier. It was here 'on the wire' thatlhe divisio n first wenl inlo acuon in mid - I940.

Despite th eir five divisions in Cyrena ica backed up by nine more in Tripolitania the Ita lians made no immed ia te a ttempt to invad e Egypt. Instead they preferred to remain within the defended perimelers o rlhc coastal lOwns, and in 'Beau Gesle' forts behind the frontie r, esconing convoys be -

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3 Crusader Mk II of 3rd County of London Yeomanry, pho tographed at a momenl of domestic tranquillity! The markings of'A' Sqn, 4 T roop are just visi ble on the rear of lhe turret bin, beyond the lowered NO.9 set aeria l which is here being used as a washing-line. A name (' A I LSA II '?) is dimly visible on the turret side , but there are no divisional or unit tactical signs. The rack of2gal water ti ns, and the use of cut­down 4gal 'Aimsics' as stoves, are typical , as is the tarpaulin bivouac slung from a side ra il origina ll y fitted to mount a hessian 'lorry' camouflage rig. (Sharpshootcrs)

tween them with tanks and trying to dominate the desert by air power a lone. With 7th Armourecl Division still in the process or re-equipping and th e onl y other trained division , 4 th In dian infantry, short or a brigade, as well as an acute overa ll shortage or artill ery and motor transport, the Western Desert Force was hardly in a position to o ffer an e ffec tive defence, let alone to mount an attack . It thererore establ ished ilSelr in depth wi th the in ran try based on the derended area or Mersa Ma truh whi le 7th Armoured Division lay behi nd th e rronti er with a small rorce, usua lly consisting or th e I I th H ussars, pa rt or the support group, and one of the armoured regi ments, right up on the wi re. This rorce had the task or ra id ing in to Libya to fi nd out the enemy d ispositions, to harass his garrisons and convoys, and genera lly to take and keep the initiative in th e area, as well as giving advance warn ing orany moves tha t he might make. So effecti ve was this policy that in the first rew weeks o f hostiliti es several hundred prisoners were taken with little loss, some of them even unaware that war had been declared.

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~- .-. . '.

This press ure was maintained for the next fou r months and led to th e complete dom ination or th e Libya n side or the rrontier by th e division 's patrols. Not onl y was mu ch userul intell igence gained about the enemy's defences and th e nature of the desert (th e 'going' ), bu t q uite substantia l rorts were captured and sacked ; even cucumber patches cul tivated by th e Libyan troops were not immune from sudd en ra ids by hungry riA emen or hussars in search or a change or diet I Armou red clashes a lso occurred in which th e skilrul combination or the speed orth e light tanks and th e hitt ing power orthe cruisers, backed up by their own a ttached anti -tank guns (a combin ation which the Germans were to use most effec tively, but whi ch Bri tish com manders seemed to rorget in later battles) led to spectacular small-scale successes. O n one occasion the RiAe Brigade even engaged an Ita li an destroyer with Bren guns.

All this led th e I ta lian Commander- in-Ch ier, Marshal Graziani, to overestimate British strength grea tly, so it was not until 13 Sep tember that, und er increasing pressure from Mussolini , he sent his large bu t poorl y equipped and a lmost entirely unm echa ni zed army across the rronti er into Egypt. The division , with an attached battali o n of Coldstream Guards and some machine-gu nn ers, rell back as planned towards Matruh borore an enem y who adva nced w ith great ca ution in formations more sui ted to th e parade gro und than the battlefi eld , covered by heavy arti llery ba rrages

usually dirccted onto arcas of cmpty desert. Delays were imposed by mines and hit-and-run attacks where possible, and some 3,500 casualti es were inflicted for about '50 British losses in the first three days. Then, to th e surprise of the British, the advance slopped orits own accord a t S idi Ban·ani , onl y half way from the frontier to the dcfences at Matruh . Thc Italians sCllled down to improvc the road and build fortifi cd ca mps where the escarp­ment ended south of Sidi Barrani ; they then a nnounced to the world that th ey had restorcd the tram services in that city (which was in fa ct nothing more than a coll ection of SLOne huts).

Thus began another three months of sta ti c warfare during which th e division continued its harassing and reconnaissa nce tasks and went on building up its strength. It was during this pcriod that the 'J ock Column', which was to become such a feature or the division's acLivilies in quie t periods, came into being. Named after Lt Col J ock Camp­bell of 4th RHA , these columns consisted of a fcw fi eld g uns, some armoured ca rs and usually a company of motor infantry. Their offensive mano ­euvres did much to foster British morale and to upset that of the encmy, but the material damage they could inflict was small.

By the cnd of November ' 940 the arrival of new troops and equipmcnt had built Western Desert Force into quite a hand y lillie corps consisting of 7th Armoured Di vision ; 4th Indian Infantry Division; two medium-gun and three ficld-gun banerics in addition to those in the divisional artillerics; 7th RTR (a ballalion of the heavy Ma tilda infantry support tanks which were imper­vious to any Italian and-tank g un) and a minimum of necessary service uniLS . 7th Armoured Division had at las t more or Icss ca ught up with the o ffi cial establishment of an armou red division of that time

Bizel1a 'b""\.. A M~ . - TUNI S \ J Enlidavllie ~ - le Kel ~'Sousse

\ Siax ) ~ . for. ; i''' ~\,.\ Gain . Aklill ~r."

. 1 ~'fjO

I Gabes / l>c,.. Medenine ' '-. '/.- ,

-'

"'0 MALTA

M edi t erranean

(it was seldom to coincide exactly with any official composition). The difference between cavalry and tank formations had disappeared , at least on paper, a nd the three regiments in each armoured brigade all had a mixture of light and cruiser tanks, achieved in some cases by swapping squadrons between units.

Thc ' lights' were by then mostl y the three -man Vickers Mk Vlb, a fast, generall y reliable lillie tank which suffered from poor tracks and from being armed only with machine guns. Although it could not compete with the gun-armed Ita lia n medium tanks M, , and M ' 3, its speed usually kcpt it out of trouble ; a nd the small number of A9 and A, 0 Cruisers, a lthough obsolcscent by Europcan standards, were both faster and better-armed tha n the Italian mediums, while the Italia n light tanks were no match for any of ours . The support group was up to strength, shortages in th e KRRC having been made good by Rhodesian voluntcers; butthe combined AA-A/T regiment only had the lilli e Bofors 37mm gun, carried ponce on the back of a 15c\vltruck, in its two AfT batteries. Even this was ca pa ble of stopping most [talian ta nks at over 600 yards however, and the presence of an ex tra regiment of these guns, 3rd RHA, meant that ba lleries could be allached to the armoured brigades, and troops distributed to individual units. The ,"h Hussars had also been augmented by Rh odesian troops, and were subsequentl y to borrow a squadron of RAF armoured cars. They still retained th eir ' 9'0-'4 pattern Rolls-Royces, armed only with Bren guns and A /T rifles of do ubtful va lu e, and were without wireless, but regimental and squadron HQs and troop leaders now had th e roomier Morris cars which carried No. g seLS. Units had their own first-line services such as filters, signa llers, medical officer, and usually two

· 8eda Fomm j ,

CA'RO\~ •

EGYPT ~ 100 200 300 I .... /S / A , .' LIB Y A EI A!lhella L-__ ~, __ ~l' ~~'~~

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4 Stuart ('Honey') fo ll owed by Crusader Mk Is, late 194 1, in typical desert scrub coun try with escarpment in background. All appear to be finished plain stone without added camou Aage or markings. ( Imperial War Museum)

transport and suppl y echelons: 'A' to carry fuel and ammunition needed in action, and 'B' to link this with th e divisional services fa rther back and to hold vehicles such as office trucks nOt needed in th e battle area. Divisional services were still very wea k. Two of the RAS C compa nies were borrowed from Commonwealth formations; the divisional sig nals were a scratch unit with very little eq uipment, and the workshop orga ni zation was largely stati c, with less than a dozen recovery vehicles in th e whole division.

This was the state when th e C-in-C Middle East , Gen Sir Archiba ld Wavell , ordered Gen O 'Connor to lau nch a surprise attack on th e Italian ca mps south of Sidi Barrani. Pa trols of the division had discovered an unprotected ga p between them through which the Indian infantry and the in­vincible Matildas were able to pass, undetected , to

attack them from the-rear at dawn on 9 December ' 940, while 7th Armoured Division swept up through the desert to cut ul e coast road west ofSidi Ba rra ni , which fell on th e following day. This signall ed the start of the Bri tish advance that was to drive the I talians right out of Cyrena ica, and during which the division was able to report the prisoners taken in acres rather than numbers. In

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th e next two months they cut off first Bard ia and th en Tobruk prior to their assa ult and ca pture by 6th Austra li an Division (which had replaced the Indians). On , J a nuary ' 94' th e Wes tern Desert Force, by th en well clear of th e western desert of Egypt, was renamed ' 3 Corps. Although the advan ce w~s rapid and the enemy's tact ics were orten more suitabl e to the Na poleoni c wa rs than LO

the 1940s, the di visionIs losses from enem y ac tion and attrition were not insig nificant. The 3rd H ussars lost 13 light tanks in a matter of minutes when th ey bogged down in a sa lt marsh in th e face of enemy guns cast of Sollum, and other isolated reargua rds and counter-attacks took their toll . By mid-J anuary one regim ent in each armoured brigade had to be dismou nted to keep the re­mainder up to a reasonable tank strength. The farth er west th ey went- before the coaSt road was cleared th rough Bardia and T obruk- th e more acute the supply situation became. Eventua ll y the infantry trucks had to be pressed into service to keep the di vision supplied , and water was severely rationed. Food stocks were often augmented by ca ptured Ita lian del icacies such as tinned tunny fi sh . Petrol was the main prob lem, made worse by the high rate of leakage from the flimsy 4-gallon tins in which it was suppli ed- this remained a headache until the appearance of the 'j erri can ' in

'943· By earl y February a d epleted but highl y con-

fid ent 7th Armoured Division had reached Mech­iii , where it became known that th e Italians were plann ing to abandon Benghazi, their last major town in Cyrenaica. At this point one of the boldest decisions of the campaign was made, and the division was ordered to move almost 150 miles a t full speed across a ppal li ng cou ntry in ord er to cut the enemy off from escape in to Tripolitania along the road past Beda Fomm . This move sta rted on 4 Febru a ry, bu t it soon became clear that if the division continued to move as one formation it would arri ve too late. A fl ying column consisting of 2nd Bn Rifle Brigade, 11th Hussars, a battery of field guns and less than a dozen anti -tank guns was therefore sent on ahead with orders to block the road and hold it until th e rest of the division ca ught up. Despite ai r attacks and minefields, this col umn of 140 vehicles reached the road south of Beda Fomm near Sidi Saleh at 14.30 hrs on the 5 th , less than an hour before the advance guard of loth Italian Arm y a ppeared from th e north, all un aware of th e ambush.

From then until dawn two days later the thin line of gunners and riflem en beat off frequent, bu t luckily unco-ordinated attacks from some 20,000 bewi ldered Ita li ans, while a solitary sq uadron of the KDGs, who had just joi ned the d ivision, protected their rear against possible a ttack from the direction of Tripol i. At one stage a Rifle Brigade

sergeant major even succeeded in capturing an M 13 tank by knocking its commander over the head with a rifle butt, and many other instances of close combat occurred. By nightfa ll on 5 Februa ry the two remaining regiments of 4th Armoured Brigade, 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR, had reached the road in the vicini ty of Beda Fomm and were ab le to a ttack the massive I ta lian column from the fl ank ; by early the next morni ng the 3rd Hussars and leading elements of 7th Armoured Brigade were also in position a little furth er north. The battle raged a ll that day bu t the Ital ians never managed to co-ordina te th eir efforts and break out, although it was often touch-a nd-go. Their final effort came at dawn on the 7th when a column of some 30 tanks attacking straight down the road broke through the Rifl e Brigade companies and destroyed most of th e anti -tank gu ns at the roadblock before being stopped by field gunfire within yards of the ba tta lion HQ At th is point, Gen Bergonzol i and fi ve other generals sur ­rend ered, together w ith over 20,000 men and their

5 Armoured regiment breaking leag uer; tanks and softskin vehicles open o ut from the close formation adopted at night. Grants and 15cWl lorries arc visible in the background and ae ri al pe nnons arc in evidence. Th e Crusader in the foregrou nd has a seru[ly camouflage finish, sugges ting the use of coloured cement applied wet with CO llon waste- a method used for a lime in 22nd Armoured Brigade. The turret bears the 'A' Sqn sign, and the number T 43739, tOge ther with the slogan 'Avon/i .1 Avonti.1 ') the I talian fo r 'Forward!' (Sharpshooters)

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200 guns and 100 tanks, having cost 7th Armoured Division 9 killed and 15 wounded during the two­day battle.

Thus ended the division's first campaign. Shortly after the victory at Beda Fomm it was withdrawn to re-equip as its vehicl es were now totall y worn out. Before it wenl, however, it was to see om inous signs of things to come in the form of German aircraft over the battlefield. Although th e campaign culminating in Beda Fomm, and the difficulties it had produced for the division , should not be belittled , the com para ti ve ease with which a well­led, highly-trained mobi le force had been able to

defeat a badly-led, poorly-equipped army with low morale (many of whom were local Libyan troops), led to some tactics and practi ces which proved less satisfactory against sterner opponents, and gave undue confidence in the make-up of the armoured division of that tim e.

The Desert 1941-42 After leaving the desert in early 1941 the ' Desert Rats' (so named by Mussolini in a gibe that misfired ) were virtuall y disbanded due to a lack of tanks and other eq uipm ent fo r them. Un its found themselves doing guard duties in Egypt while the divisional commander gave lectures in Turkey, but by late April first the KRRC battalion and then the 11th Hussars, hurriedly re-equipped with South African Marmon-HerringtOn cars which offered little improvement over the Rolls, were back in

7 Chevrolet CooL 3·(on 4 x 4 CS lorry. Together with similar Canadian Fords and Brilish 3-tonners of various makes, these provided the workhorses of the divisional RASC companies and the unit echelons; in the desert they also carried the infantry of 131 Brigade. Desert tyres are shown, but 'trackgrip' and ' run flat' tyres were also common, even mixed on the same veh icle. (Conniford)

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6 Fordson WOT'2c 15 cwt 4 x '2 infantry truck ; each section in a motor infantry platoon rode one of these, g iving greater tactical flexibilit y than in the lorried infantry, where a whole · platoon rode in asingle 3-ton lorry. Morris, and la ter Chevrolet 15cwts were also extensively used. (Conniford)

action. The crisis was ca used by the arrival of the German 5th Light Division at Tripoli under Lt Gen Erwin Rommel. This officer, fresh from leading a Panzer Division in spectacular fashion during the Blitzkrieg in France, quickly rea lized the weakness of the British troops in Cyrenaica and turned a reconnaissance in force by his own units and the Italian Anele Armoured Division into a major offensive. The two und erstrength and in­ex perienced British divisions, 2nd Armoured and 9th Australian infantry, augmented by 3rd Hussars and 6th RTR left behind by 7th Armoured with the few serviceable light tanks and captured lta lian ones, were no match for this Axis advance, which was not halted until it was across the Egyptian frontier near Soli urn, with only Tobruk holding out behind it.

This sudden reversal of fortun e, which had included the capture of Gen O 'Connor, was far from welcome to Mr Churchil l, who responded by taking the bold step of di verting a tank convoy through the M editerranean rather than sending it round the Cape, to enable an earl y counter­offensive to be launched. As a result, by mid -J un e 7th Armoured Di vision was once again in business, but only as a 'scratch' formation, with two brigades each of two regiments and the support group. In 7th Brigade 2nd RTR had the old Cruisers while 6th R T R got the first Crusaders, as yet untried in battle and unfamiliar to their crews. In 4th Brigade 4th and 7th RTR were given Matilda'!' tanks, as nothing else was available.

Wavell 's plan for Operation Battleaxe was for the 4th I ndian Division supported by 4th Armoured Brigade (since they had all the ' I' tanks) to move up

O RD ER O F BATTL E November '94'

Divisional H Q I

4th Arm'd Bd, Cp 22nd Arm'd Bde

3rd R T R Stuart 8th HUSSarS}

5th R TR tanks

2nd RHA (Fld. guns) 2nd Scots Guards

2nd R .G. Hussars 3rd C. L.Yeomanry 4th C.L.Yeomanry (Crusader tanks)

I 7th Arm'd Bd, 7th H ussars 2nd RTR 6th RTR (Crusader, Alo & AI3

tanks)

Support Croup 3rd RHA (2pdr A/T guns) 4th RHA 1 60th Fld. RA 25pdrs IStKRRC 2nd Rifl e Bde

the coast and capture the area where the coast road made its way up th e escarpment near Soli urn. At th e same tim e 7th Armoured Division was to sweep round to the south a nd west on the inl a nd plateau to cut off the enemy defences near the frontier, before moving north-wes t to relieve Tobruk . U ntil the in fa ntry cou ld release 4th Armoured Brigade, however, this inla nd th rust wou ld only consist of the two regiments of 7th Brigade. In the event the Germa ns had placed haIf­a-dozen of th ei r 88mm guns a nd had la id mine­fi elds in the So llum area, a nd by 15]une, when the British a ttack was launched , had placed the newly­arrived 15th Panzer Division near Bardi a, as well as 5th Light near Tobruk. 4th Armoured Brigade lost heavi ly to the 88mms a nd were tied down by counter-attacks which prevented their reverting to 7th Armoured Di vision as intended ; the weak 7th Armou red Brigade on its own could not break through the skilful tank a nd a nti-ta nk gun a m­bushes laid by th e G erma ns a mong a seri es of low ridges in their path, and , without a thi rd regiment, had difficulty in repulsing flank a ttacks by 5 th Light. After two days Lt Gen Beresford -Pierce, the Corps comm and er, ca lled off the operation, having

DivisionaL troops 3 arm'd car regts (I I1h Hus, KDGs, 4th SAAC) A/T regt (2pdrs) A/A regt (Bofors 40mm) Div Signals regt RE: Field and Park Squadrons RASC : 6 Companies RAMC: 3 ligh t Field Ambulances RAOC: Div Workshop & Park, LAA WS

+ J It repa ir sec, I It recovery sec & 1 park sec to each brigade & Supp gp

lost some 90 ta nks for very litt le gain. Al though Battleax, was a fa iled offensive rather

than a maj or defeat it showed the da ngers of spli tting up the availa ble armour, a nd gave a clear wa rning that the Germans, despi te lack of desert experi ence, were formid able opponents. It was also clear that the Bri tish ta nks no longer had the edge over the enemy; the M a tilda, although superior to the Germ a n tanks of the time except in speed, was now vulnerable to anti- tank fi re. M ore important, fro m 7th Armoured's po int of view, the Crusader, which was th e latest design a nd whi ch was to rema in with the division until mid- 1943, had proved unsatisfactory on several coun ts. Theoreti­cally superior to the Germ an pzK w III a nd IV ta nks until a t least mid-1 942 on a gun/armour basis, it was found to be difficult to maintai n, and tria ls in Egypt showed tha t it could be penetrated more easily th an should have been possible con­sidering the thi ckness of its armour. Perha ps even more serio us in the long run was its chron ic unreli ability, d ue to a fa ulty waterpump a nd lubricating system whi ch frequently immobilized the ta nk ; inaccessibility of these mean t tha t it was often impossible to repair them, a nd so Crusa-

II

ders were abandoned intO enemy hands without having suffered any action damage. These fau lts were never properly cured .

After the fai lure of Ballieaxe many changes LOok place. Gen Wavell was relieved as C-in-C by Gen Auchinleck, and within the division Maj Gen 'Strafer' GOlt, an old desert hand who had commanded the KRRC ballalion and later th e support group, assum ed command. His place in cha rge of th e support group was taken by Brig J ock Campbell , eX-4th RHA. By November 1941 , when the next British offensive Operation Crusader was launched, suffi cien t reinforcements had ar­rived in the desert for 8th Army to be formed und er Lt Gen Sir Alan Cunningham. This consisted of tWO corps: the old 13th became a mainly infantry formation with 4th Indian and 2nd New Zealand Divisions supported by a brigade of 'I' tanks, and the new 30th had 7th Armoured Di vision with 1St South African In fantry Division and a Guards mOLOr infantry brigade.

7th Armoured Division itself was made up LO the unprecedented size of three armoured brigades by the addit ion of the 22 nd , which was really part of 1st Armoured Division, then on its way out to th e Middle East. Although this meant that with some 500 tanks in units and as replacements th e division had superiority over th e combined Italian ar­moured division and the two German ones of the Afrika Korps, who could only muster 320 between them, th e quality was very variable. 7th Armoured Brigade still had nea rly 100 obsolete A I 0 and A 13 cruisers, some of which were so decrepit that th ey had to be taken inLO ballie on the few tank transporters that were in the desert a t that time. 4th Armoured Brigade was completely eq uipped with the American Stuart or ~ Honey' light tank, which although reliable had a very short range and a poor

12

8 White -Ruxtallg22 18-ton 6 x 4 tank transporter oneofthe early models used by the division in 194 1. The fo ll owing year they were largely replaced in recovery units by cammell sem i­trai lers. The vehicle shown appears to have been sprayed with a dark coloured camouflage over the basic stone shade j the so ft edges are ulllypica l, as most Middle East theatre camou flage dircctivt.'S stressed the need for sharp-edged pattcrns. (Con­niford)

gun ; it a lso needed special aviation -grade petrol. 22 nd Brigade not only had the unrelia ble Crusader, but was entirely composed of as-yet inexperienced Yeomanry (territoria l cavalry) regimen ts . With only one suppOrt group, the whole organiza tion was very tank-heavy compared with 15th and 2 1St Panzers and Ariele, which each had their own infantry and a rtillery units.

Efforts to provide brigades with more direct support by a naching baneries of fi eld guns, troops of anti-tank guns and companies of mOLOr infantry from the support group to them on a semi­permanent basis only led to such a dispersal of the ava il able guns and infantry that neither th e remains of th e support group nor th e individua l brigades had enough to be able LO look after th emselves without calling on the other formalions for assistance. The unwieldy nature of the division , and the British policy of using extreme dispersion as protection against air attack, mea nt th at all too often the tight, well-balanced divisions of the much more easil y-controll ed Afrika Korps were able to

ca tch single brigades, or the support group, on their own. Another problem for Gen Gon was the fact that the corps commander, Gen Pope, was killed in an air crash and had to be replaced by Maj Gen Norrie, himself only a divisional commander and new to the desert. As a result, th e forthcoming banle was marked at times by more consultation than decision in 30 Corps, and on one occasion Gen GOlt was left virtuall y in charge of the whole corps.

By 18 j ovember wh en, after va rious postpone­ments, Crusader was finall y launched , Rommel was on the point of assaulting T obruk, whi ch was still holding out. For this he had 15th Panzer and th e German 90th Light infantry division in that area, as well as the three static I ta lian divisions tha t were investing the fortress. T o cover his rear he had Ariele at Gubi some 30 miles due south of T obruk, and another J talian division backed by German guns, plus 21St Panzer behind them in his frontier defences, which had been extended some 20 miles

south-west from Sollum. Gen Cunningham 's pl an was to send 30 Corps on a sweep round the end of this defence line to take up a position behind , from which it could threaten Rommel's communica tions in such a way that he wou ld be forced to a ttack the massed tanks of 7th Armoured Division on ground of their own choosing, (using up' his Panzer Divisions in the process. As soon as the armoured battle was decided , 13 Corps was to capture the fronti er defences and move along the coast to Tobruk , where the garrison should already have broken out to link up with th e victorious 30 Corps. At first a ll went well , but such was the secrecy of the initial moves that Rommel was unaware that he was being threatened and fa iled to respond to 30 Corps's thrust as anticipated. The massed a rmour of the division, therefore, bega n to split up: 4th Brigade drifted east to protect the Aank of I 3 Corps, 22 nd Brigade was sent to a ttack Ariele in th e west, and 7th Brigade went north to the real key a rea, th e ai rfield at Sid i Rezegh on the escarpments, just south ofT obruk, overl ooking the road leading up to the front ier. Each was individua lly too weak for its task; 22 nd Brigade partly overran the Ita li ans a t Gubi but, owing to lack of in fantry, could not hold its gains; 7th Brigadefollowed by the support group occupi ed Sidi Rezegh, but could not take the

dom inating surrounding areas ; and 4th Brigade was attacked on its own by first one, and then both , Panzer Divisions, which then swung north in concert and mau led 7th Brigade so severely that it was unable to take any further part in th e battle or even the campaign . Despite the switching of 22 nd Brigade, first to help 4th Brigade and then to Sidi Rezegh, and efforts by the T obruk garrison to break out, th e division never managed to achieve a local superiori ty, and on 22 November the support group was driven south off the airfield. During th e two days th ey had held it, the support group had won a ll three of the ves th a t the d ivision was to win in the desert. R fmn Beeley of the KRRC di ed wh ile charging a machine-gun nest ; Lt Ward Gunn , RHA, was kill ed whi le firing a 2pdr anti-tank gu n from a burning portee ; and Brig Campbell per ­sonally orga nized and led many counter-attacks in

9 Humber Mk I II armoured car. These followed the simi lar Mk li s, wh ich were the first modern cars to reach the di visio n, late in '94 1. With beller armour and a , smm BESA machine­gun they could conrront German rccce uni ts on more equal terms than their predecessors. Sand channels, fo r pUlling under the wheels in soft sand, can be seen secured below the spare wheel ; the engine deck is in the raist."<i posi ti on, enabling the dri ver to sec out behind when reversing. Bedrolls, 4gal petrol 'f1imsies', '2 ga l water tins and a captured water jerrican can be seen stowed on the car. ( Impe ri al War Museum)

- >.

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his open car, holding the defence together by his example.

By 24 November the first phase of the ba ttle was over ; 4th Brigade had had its HQand 8th Hussars overrun in night leaguer, and 22nd was red uced to a single composite regiment followi ng ullslIccess fu l attempts to prevent the destruction of one of the South African in fa ntry brigades. At this point Rommel erroneously, but perhaps understandably, thought that 30 Corps was fin ished , and set olf east to the frontier with the Afrika Korp> to tackle 13 Corps. Here, a lthough this example of Blil~krieg

unnerved Gen Cunningham to the po int where Auchinleck decided to replace him with Lt Gen Ritchie, Rommel was too late; much of the frontier had a lready fallen and the New Zealanders were well on thei r way west a long the coast as planned, eventua ll y recapturing Sidi R ezegh and linking up with the Tobruk garrison. While this was going on, the division was able to reorganize and coll ect new tanks, as well as salvaging man y from the battle­field, despite the odd brush with Ariele. As a result , when the Panzers returned to the west on 27 November in response to cries for help from the Axis troops a round T obruk, now themselves threatened by the New Zealanders, 4th and 22nd Brigades with 120 tanks were able LO ca tch a wea kened 15th Panzer Division on its own. Once again, however, it had its supporting arms with it, including attached 88mm guns; and despite intervention by th e RAF it was able LO hold olfthe two brigades un til nightfa ll when, in accordance with long-established British desert custom, they withdrew from th e battlefield to leaguer, thus losing their best opportunity to destroy the enemy and a llowing him to link up with his troops at T obruk. In the following days the New Zealanders were eventually forced to give up Sid i R ezegh and the link with Tobruk was broken, whi le 30 Corps were kept to the south and prevented from coming LO th eir aid by th e skilfu l usc of anti-tan k screens. By th is tim e, however, attrition had taken its toll , and whereas Auchinleck still had reserves availab le, Rommel had not. H e was forced to aba ndon his remaining frontier defences and pull back first to Gazala and finall y to Agheila at the end of the year.

Crusader was a rguably the high point of 7th Armoured Division's career. Never aga in was it LO

command so many tanks, and this was the last

14

occasio n on wh ich it foug ht as the sole armoured division in any area. Crusader was also th e fastest moving, farthest ranging and most complicated battl e of the whole desert war, and despite its vicissi tud es it ended in a considerable if tempora ry victory. In retrospect it is perhaps less surprisi ng that th e divisional command set-up was at times unabl e to cope, than that the supply and other services did so well .

Following Crusader the division was once again withdrawn to re fit , and was at the same time radi ca ll y reorganized in to a much more balanced form ati on, not un like th e Panzer Divisions in composition . The old concept of two a rmou red brigades equipped solel y with tanks, with the few guns and infantry being fo rmed into a support group, was abandoned in favour of two more-or- less self-contained brigade groups. The armou red one retained its three regiments of tanks but had its own mO LOr infantry battalion and a field a rtill ery regiment, to which ha lf of the divisional anti -tank regiment was usua lly attached. The second brigade consisted of three motor infantry battalions, now with lheir own anti- tank and machine guns, wi th similar arti llery supporl. The engineers, service arms, and the light AA regiment were split up between the two brigades and the much reduced divisional troops, who retained the armoured ca r regiment. Although this organization got away from th e 'a ll tank' idea, the self-contai ned nature of the two brigades led to them frequently being used separa tely rather than in mutual support, and the continued tendency to split the motor brigade into columns meant that the division was still li abl e to

find itself at a d isadvantage aga inst the better co­ordin ated Panzer Divisio ns.

New equ ipment was also available. Two of the Stuart squad rons in each armou red regi menl were replaced by ones with 12 Gra nt tanks apiece. These, although slower than the Stuarts, were much more heavily armou red and were the first in th e division to ou tgun the German tanks, being fitted wi th a 75mm weapon as well as a 37mm. They also proved generally reliable . The increase in th e numbers of field and anti-tank guns was to some extent olfset by the fact th a t the new 6pdr on ly reached units in any numbers after the next battle had started, and in the meantime the field guns still had to be used to back up the inadequa te 2pdrs, to

~ .0

th e detriment of their proper tasks. Most of the soft transport was now made up of Canad ian mili tary pattern Chevrolet and Ford vehicles in place of the older British designs. An increased number of tractors and transporters, as well as a fu ll workshop company for each brigade in place of the previous light repair and recovery sec tions, g reatly increased the division 's ability to sa lvage and refit its own casualti es.

T wo losses to the division, one permanent and the oth er tem porary, occu rred at thi s tim e. Maj Gen 'J ock' Campbell ve, who had just taken over as divisional commander when 'Strafer' Gatt was promoted to command 13 Corps, was kill ed in a motor acciden t ; M aj Gen M esservy from 4th Indian Di vision took over in his place, and I I th Hussars, who had been in the desert from the start, took thei r Humber armoured cars off for a spell in Iraq , being replaced by the KDGs in th e less -well· armed M armon-Herrington Mk Ills.

Wh en the division returned to the desert in April 1942 Rommel had aga in d riven 8th Arm y back

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10 Half-squadron of Grants on 'good goi ng', ie, Hal, hard gravel desert. All seem to be pailllcd in light SlOne over a darker shade- probably the US ol ive drab delivery scheme- which shows around the serial number and on the suspension units. The crew's steel helmets protect the headl igh ts; note the tripod mount for a "gocal-machine gun stowed front left , and the large pe trol filling funnel slowed len rcar, both typical features, as is the bracketed rai l along the top of the trackguard. A fai nt '8 ' Sqn sign (perhaps overpainted) is visib le on the turret side. (Imperial War Museum)

from Agheila, but this time onl y as fa r as a li ne stretch ing from Gazala south to Bir H acheim. During th e spring Gen R itchi e had fortified this lin e as a start point for a further offensive, with a continuous mi nefi eld belt backed by dispersed infantry brigade ' boxes' (sta tic wired -in defensive locations) . T he 1st Armoured Division was pos­itioned behind the centre of this line and th e 7th behind the southern end. During the following month the motor brigade and armoured cars operated columns round the enemy's southern Rank and in to his rear areas.

In the event Rommel struck before R itchie was

ready wi th his offensive, coming round to the south ofBi r H acheim and then swinging north and north­east with both Panzer Divisions and 90th Light, on the night of 26 M ay. Despite this move being reported by the armo ured ca rs, the divis ion was not warned in time to take up its battle positions. The armoured brigade was caught dispersed and on the move by th e concentra ted tanks and guns of 15th Panzer, which made short work of first 8 th Hussars and then 3rd R T R . The motor brigade was a lso unable to hold its partia ll y-completed box east of Bir Hacheim, and the divisiona l HQ was overrun , Gen M esservy being captured but later escaping. 30 Corps HQ, which commanded both a rmoured divisions, was also forced to pack up and move in a hurry. After this promising start th e Panzers continued to move north but were engaged by 1st Armoured Division, and having suffered heavy losses were brought to a ha lt and virtually sur­rounded. The Grant tanks and the fi rst 6pdrs had proved a nasty shock for them.

The next few days were critical ; if the British could keep the Afrika Korps cut off from its supplies behind the intact Gaza la line they would win the battle. The division, in its weakened and d isorga­nized state, was able to contribute little towards this (except for the inevitable motor brigade columns) unti l th e end of the month , by which time Romm el had retri eved the situation by his tighter control and better co-ordination of all arms and had fa llen back onto the eastern side of the British minefi elds, capturing 150 Brigade box which covered th em and clearing supply routes through. During the next ten days 8th Army made repea ted piecemeal and un co-ordinated efforts to break into this 'Cauldron '; these resulted in much heavier losses to themselves than to the Axis, who were able to beat off each individua l attack with their whole re­sources. By I I June the Free French box at Bir Hacheim had fa llen, and the Gazala line had to be abandoned to prevent the infantry in the northern boxes being cut off. It was whi le a ttacking fu rth er enemy moves eastwards tha t the remaining ta nks of the two d ivisions were taken in rear by the Panzers from the 'Cauldron' and suffered such losses tha t the initiative passed irrevocabl y to Rommel. From then on the battle became a retreat. By mid-June 8th Army was down to 60 tanks grou ped in mixed regiments under 4th Armoured Brigade, and by I

16

Ju ly the remains of th e division were back at th e Alamein position a fter a seri es of delaying actions near Sidi R ezegh and Matruh . Tobruk had fa ll en on2 lJune .

This ended the second phase of the division's war in the desert, which had included th e large-sca le mobile ba ttles against the Afrika Korps that are perh a ps the best-remembered feature of the whole campaign. AlulOugh the events of th is period read like a chapter of disasters when treated as bri eAy as is necessary here, it was during this year, from mid-1941 to mid-1 942, and largely as a result of th e efforts of the division , that much of the 'cream' of the Axis forces were d estroyed , so tha t their effectiveness from then on was much reduced . Thus, a lthough 7th Armoured Division was not to play such a leading role in the victories th a t were to follow, it had done much, during this period of poor equ ipm ent and unsatisfac tory organi zation, to make those victories easier.

Alamein and After When th e di vision reached the Al amein position in Ju ly 1942 it was commanded by Maj Gen]. M . L. Renton, a rifl eman, and it took over the southern end of th e rather nebu lous defensive line. During th e nex t couple of months there were num erous changes in organization as th e losses o f the retreat were made good and the positio n was stabilized , but for most of that time the 4th, renamed 'Light' , Armoured Brigade consisted of a composite regi ­ment of 4/8th Hussars and two a rmoured-ca r regiments, the latter being eventua lly replaced by the Roya l Scots Greys . As their onl y tanks were Stuarts they could do little more than form columns wi th the motor brigade to watch the minefi elds. Fortuna tely the real figh ting took place farther north , with Cen Auchin leck now in personal command of the a rm y.

I n August, following a visit to th e desert by Chu rchill , Auchinleck was reli eved by Gen Al ex­and er as C-in-C Middle East, and Lt Gen Gott was appoi nted to command 8th Arm y. Unfortuna tely he was shot down and kill ed while fl ying to take over. This was the end of an era as fa r as the a rm y and th e division were concerned. The new Arm y Commander, Lt Gen B. L. Montgomery, was not a

man to be overawed by the reputation of Rommel, or to be influenced by the desert ' folk-lore ' which had grown up over the years. This had spawned ad hoc formations, with an accent on dash, sometimes at the expense of sound military practice; and a tendency to make hurried but ambitious plans regard less of the state of tra ining and eq uipment of the troops involved , initia lly from necessity but later almost from habit. Montgomery worked on the assumption that the usual principles applied in the desert as elsewhere, and insisted on keeping close personal control over what went all, modify­ing his plans where necessa ry to ensure that they were within the capabi liti es of his arm y, and thus removing the chance of defeat, even if his chances of snatching spectacular vi ctories were reduced. He was fOrlunate in taking over at a time when in numbers, quality of equipment, and in air support, the British had finall y achieved a lasting superiority over Axis forces, exhausted by previous fi ghting.

In the battle of Alamein , and its forerunner Alam-el-Halfa, 7th Armoured Division played a

1 I Daimler Dingo scout car of 4lh Ficld Sqn, RE. Combined divisional and uni t tacsigns can be seen on the front plate ; a sand channel is strapped across lhe front for usc on 'soft going'. T he late desert camouflage scheme o f wavy·cdged lines of a sing le dark colour (bluc.black , green or brown) over light Slone or pink is clearly visible. ( Imperial War M useum)

subsidiary role. When Rommel launched his fina l attempt to break through to Alexandria at the end of August they delayed his advance through th e southern mine fi elds of the Alamein line, the 6pdr guns of the motor battalion really proving their worth for the first time, before the massed tanks of other divisions halted the Panzers on the slopes of Alam-el-Halfa ridge. Between this encounter and th e battl e of Alamein in October, th e 22nd Armoured Brigade, with Grant and Crusader tanks, rejoined th e division. The 7th Motor Brigade was replaced by 131 Quecns Brigade, which , having been part of the recently arrivcd 44th Home Counties In fantry Division, was no t mo torized and had fcwer support wea pons but morc men than a motor brigade. During th e battlc it was given its

17

own RASC transport and became a lon'ied brigade, remaining with the division, like 22 nd Armoured Brigade, until the end of the war.

Maj Gen J Ha rding, later to become a Field Marshal and post-war governor of Cyprus, took over the division with the task of attacking through the enemy minefields opposite the southern end of the Alamein line, primarily to keep 21st Panzer Division tied down there while the main a ttack by the infantry divisions of 30 Corps went in furth er north, Gen Horrocks of 13 Corps, of whi ch the division was part, was told not to incur heavy

1'2 Mk I I 6pdr anti·tank gun, as issued to the di visio n from mid-1942 j it was capable of defeating all enemy tanks at normal fighting ranges. Like the 2pdr which it replaced, the 6pdr was carried portee on the back ora lorry, in N. Africa. Later the more powerful Mk IV gun, with longer barrel and muzzle brake, was used by divisional infantry units unti l the end of the war in Europe. ( Imperial War Museum)

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casualti es because his armour would be needed as a reserve for 10 Corps, which contained the majority of the a rmoured divisions and had the job of making th e final brea kthrough once 30 Corps had broken into th e enemy defences, When the battle opened on the night of 23 O ctober th e division moved through gaps cleared in th e enemy mine­fields by a specially trained task force from 44th Divisional Reconna issance R egiment, and formed a bridgehead 'as crowded as the car pa rk at Cheltenham races', but was unable to get as far as had been hoped; it did , however, keep 21St Panzer in the south unti l the 28th, during a cri tical stage of the main battle, Thereafter, now without 4th Light Armoured Brigade, it moved north behind the front on 3 1 O ctober, and became part of 10 Corps ready for th e breakout planned as Operation Supercharge,

" . '

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ORD ER OF BATTLE November 1942

Divisional HQ.

I 4th Lt Ann'd Bde Royal Scots Greys 4/8th Hussars (both Stuart &

Grant tanks) 2nd Derby Yeo. (arm'd

cars) 3rd RHA ( 2SpdI~) 1st KRRC

I 22nd Ann'd Bde 1st RTR Sth RTR 4th C.L.Yeo. (aU Crusader &

Grant tanks) 4th & 97 th Fld Regts

RA (2spdrs) 1st Rifle Bde

Although, unlike the other armoured di visions, 7th ha.d received no new tanks, th ey had suffered less heavil y in the ba ttle and so took a more prominent pa rt in the pursuit than had been anticipa ted . On 4 November, led by I I th Hussars, they fina lly broke out to the west of the enemy positions; a ft er a shon action with th e remains o f the Ariete Division during which they destroyed six M1 3s, and a confused battl e between divisiona l HQand German stragglers, they pushed on to cross the Egyptian fronti er for th e las t time on the 9th . A combina tion of ra instorms which bogged even the tanks inextrica bly, a nd petrol shortages, frustra ted efforts to cut off the bulk of the enemy on the coast road, a lthough a tra in was shelled by 22 nd Brigade's ta nks to th e south of Bardia . The sta te of the division's antiquated tanks, many of them veterans from Gazala, was a constant worry; but the fa ct that th ey were advancing, and well­supported by the newl y formed REME, meant tha t many could be recovered and repa ired . In genera l the a rmoured brigade and I Ith Hussars led the chase, with the Queens Brigad e moving behind and coming up to occupy lowns, such as Tobruk, or to

attack when th e tanks were held up in unfavour­able country, as happened nea r Agheila in mid­December. The 4th Light Armoured Brigade had

I I

'3' ( Qyems) Bde I/Sth Queens I/6th Queens I/7th Queens

(aUlorried infa ntry) S3rd Fld Regt RA

(2Spdrs) 2 A/T Btys (6pdrs) I Fld Coy RE

I Divisional troops I I th Hussars (arm 'd

cars) I sth LAA Regt RA 6Sth A/T Regt RA

(6pdrs) Div. Signals 2 Fld & I Pk qns RE RA C: 7 Coys RAMC : I Fld & I L,

Fld Amb. REME : In f Bde,

Arm'd Bde, and LAA Workshops

RAOC : Fld Park

rej oined just after the division left Egypt ; and in early December 8th Armoured Brigade, with the fi rs t Shermans to reach the division, temporarily reli eved 22 nd Brigade with its Grants and Crusa­d ers. A medium a rtillery regiment of5"sin guns was a lso a ttached at this time for a couple of months.

The adva nce progressed in fits and starts, oft en with th e Queens or one of the armoured brigades 'grounded ' for lack of petrol while the ports of T obruk and then Benghazi were hurri edly put back into service. Casualties from mines and rearguard ambushes were frequent ; Cen Harding was woun­ded by shell fire and had to leave th e division. Maj Gen G. W. E. J. Erskine took over and led it on through Tripoli and , in conjunction with thrusts by the New Zealand and Highland infantry divisions, into Tunisia. Here, amid increasingly rugged and cultivated country, a halt was made a t Medenine to a llow th e rest of th e arm y and supplies to catch up prior to an assault being la unched on the heavil y­defended Mareth line. The division was initia ll y somewha t out on a limb, but was shortly joined by 5 1st Highland Division , and 20 lSt Gua rds Brigade whi ch came und er command . 22 nd Armoured Brigade, now with di esel-engined Sherman and 6pdr- arm ed Crusader Mk III tanks, had rejoined in place of 4th Light Armoured Brigade, which

19

13 ~\'l in ehunting wilh electrical detectors , which came illlo use at the time of Alamein ; previously the usual method was to prod the ground with a bayonet. The NO.2 in each learn carries markers to place over the position of any mine found. (Sharpshoolm )

weill to the New Zea la nders.

a rtillery was a lso augmented by extra fie ld and medium regiments. One aspect of the tightening­up of control at, and after, Alamein had been to in troduce high-level control of th e a rt illery so that regiments supporting ind ividua l uni ts could be q uickly co-ord inated in to an overall fi re pla n when necessary. This policy was well vindicated wh en the German armour was switched from attacks on the Americans (who, with the Bri tish LS t Army, had been fi gh ting in western Tunisia since they la nded just a fter Al amein) to at tack at M edeni ne on 6 M arch '943. All day German and Italian attacks were broken up by massive artillery concentrations, sometimes by the whole divisional artillery; ma ny of th em never even reached the British positions as a resul t, whi le those tha t did were eflectiveiy stopped by the infa ntry and d ivisiona l anti-ta nk guns. Even

It was clear that an attack was im minent, so the division took up a defensive position with the Guards and Queens Brigades in front , and the armour in reserve behind. Although the positions were not mined or wired th ey were well supplied with anti- ta nk guns, even the Queens now having 6pclrs as well as a few of the old 2pdrs; thecl ivisional

20

a ) '940: RHO. HQSqn Sqns

b ) '94" RHO. HQSqn Sqns

c) '942-43 : RHO. HQ Sqn Sqns

d ) '944: RHO. HQSqn Sqns

T H E A RMOU RED REG I M ENT

4 x Mk VIB ligh t ta nks Admin troops, A & B echelons, MO, fitters, etc. * :2 sqns with light tanks, I with cruisers. Each has HQ of 4 tanks, and 4 Troops each of 3 ta nks

4 x cruiser tanks (A 13, Crusader or Stuart ) Admi n troops, A & B echelons, MO , fi llers, etc. 3 sqns; each has HQ with :2 x cruiser and :2 x close support tanks, and 4 Troops each of3 cruisers**

4 x cruiser and 8 x ligh l A/A wnks Adm in troops, etc., and recce troop with 12 scout cars 3 sqns;:2 wi th Gram or Sherman, I with Stuan or Crusader. Each has HQ with 4 tanks and 4 Troops each with 3 tanks

4 x Cromwell, 8 x A/A tanks (latter discarded after Normandy landi ng) Admin troops, etc. , and Recce T roop with 10 Stuans, 1:2 seoUl cars 3 sqns; each has HQ with :2 x 75 mm and :2 x 95mm Cromwells, and 4 T roops each wi th 3 x 75 mm Cromwells and I x Sherman Firefl y or Challenger* * *

• Unil echelons: A echelon nonnally had aboul 12 softskin transport vehicles, and B echelon up 10 100 .

•• Close support tan ks were cruisers (A9, A 10, A IS or Crusader) fitted with 3in or S·7in howitzer to fire H E and smoke shell , which was nOI possible with 2pdr armament of other ta nks. ··· 'n 19448th Hussars sqns had 5 Troops eachorS lanks.

ORDER OF BATTLE Seplem ber 1943

I

Divisional HQ I

22nd Arm'd Bdt

lSI RTR } 5th RTR Shermans 4th CLY lSI RiAe Bde

I 131 ( Queens) Bdt 1/51h Queens 1/61h Queens 1/71h Queens (aillorried infa ntry) MG Coy (Cheshires)

Stuka attacks were driven olf by AA fire before they were a ble to press home; over 40 enemy tanks were destroyed , many by the Queens, for few British losses and without it being necessary to commit the armoured brigades a t a ll. A subseq uent night attack by the Guards motor brigade on 16 March to clear a fea ture known as th e Horseshoe was less successful, and heavy casualties were suffered in unsuspected minefields before the attack was call ed olf.

The division was not directly involved in the next two battles a t Mareth and Wadi Aka rit , a lthough 8th Armoured Brigade and part of 22 nd went to other divisions for tha t purpose. Tiger tanks first appeared in April , and I Ith Hussars actua lly captured a disabled one. After preparing to attack Enfidaville at the end of the month the division was sudd enly switched from 8th to 1st Arm y, together with 4th Indian D ivision and 201 Guards Brigade, so as to attack towards Tun is from the west. This involved a 300-mile journey on transporters for the tanks, which also had to be repainted green, as th e desertschemeofcamouAage was highly conspicuous among the oli ve groves .

The attack was made from M edjez to Tunis by two infantry divisions abreast followed by two

14 Regimental aid pOSt , the fi rst link in the casualt y evacuation chai n. The unit Medica l O ffi cer can be seen with stretcher-bearers and wounded in an open desert location. The ambulance car is the Austin K2 used by divisional Ficld and Light Field Ambulance units. I n Europe armoured half-tracks and carriers were also used. ( Imperial War Museum)

1

Royal Artillery 3rd RHA (25Pd,,) 51h RHA (Priest SPs) 2 Fld RegIS RA LAA Regt RA A/T Regt RA (17pdrs) Med Regl RA (Y5in)

I Divisional troops 1 Ilh Hussars (arm 'd

ca,,) Div Signals 2 Fld & 1 Pk Sqns RE RASC: 6 COl'S RAMC : 1 Fld & 1 LI

Fld Amb RAOC: 3 Fld Pks REME : 4 Workshops

a rmoured divisions, of which one was the 7th, all under th e command of Gen Horrocks (now of 9 Corps), with heavy arti llery and a ir support. It was highly successful and a fitting example of how British methods had progressed during the cam­paign . Divisions from two different armies worked to a co-ord inalcd plan with intimate co-operation between tank , artillery and infantry units at all levels : a far cry from th e dispersed brigade groups and columns of the desert days. The attack started on 6 May and the l!th Hussars led the way into Tunis on the 7th - nearl y 2,000 miles and SIX

months' fi ghting from Alamein. Thus end ed the division's active service in Africa.

The fina l phase in the Midd le East was a brief

21

three-month spell in Italy. During the invasion of Sicily [h e division remained in Africa and 2'2nd Brigade was fe-equipped with new Sherman tanks throughout; I Ilh H llssars reorganized on a Euro­pean basis, and 5th RHA provided a self-propelled regiment of 'Priest' I 05mm guns to work with the armour. On 15 September 1943 th e division landed in Ital y in the bay of Salerno as the follow-up division of 10 Corps, behind 46th a nd 56th Divisions. Here many new problems were en-

15 Lifting o ut the engine of a Stuart lank with lhe gamry of a breakdown lorry, possibly from the RAOe light repair section or the unit LAD. This task was much quicker \V"jth the air­cooled Continental engine of the Stuart than with th e water­cooled Libert yofthc Crusader. A Neil Robertson stretcher, for removing casualties from inside a vch icle by strapping them in a restraining frame of thin laths, can be seen on the side of the lank. (Imperia l War Museum)

22

coun tered. The sappers had to gra pple with Bailey a nd tank-mounted scissors bridges for the first Lime, as well as making up inferior roads, 'while th e close country made even finding the enemy difficult , a nd much ammunition was expended on likely hide­outs. Malaria began to ta ke its toll , and even the generall y friendl y I talia ns, now on the Allied side, were not above reel ing up the divisional telephone cables for use as wash ing lines. After a fi erce fight just to the south by the Queens, the road bound division, covering some 50 miles on a single road, reached Naples on I October. After this the country opened OUl a bil and the armour was able to take th e lead , but the maize fi elds and small farms and villages kept the motor ba ttalion, 1st RB, busy. By the 5th the division had reached the river Volturno

/

16 A 3i n mOrlar in action in h aly. MOlor battal ions received these at the time of Alamein, and [31 Brigade always had them. Firing a [olb bomb some 1 ,60oyds, they were a welcome add it io n to the battalion's fire power . In NW Europe the [31 Brigade SU PP0rl com pany had the still more powerful 4 ''2in mOrlar. ( Imperia l War M useu m)

near Capua, to find a ll the bridges blown a nd th e enemy dug in on the far ba nk. During th e following week energeti c pa trolling by the Queens, which involved parties swimming th e river, revealed most of th e enem y positions. The main attack was to be made elsewh ere by th e in fantry di visions, bu t 7th Armoured mounted its own diversion ary crossing on 12 O ctober. The Queens secured a sm a ll bridgehead in to which m achine g uns and a nti-ta nk guns were ferri ed, and behind which the sappers sta rted bridging th e ri ver, whil e th e a rmoured brigade fo und a ford where, by dint o f wa terproofing their ta nks a nd mu ch use of bull­dozers a nd ingenuity, th ey a lso crossed. After a furth er minor attack a t Mond ragone, fa rther down the Volturno towards th e coast, the division was withdrawn a nd on 19 November 1943 sta rted to sail for hom e, as one of the formati ons earmarked for the Norm andy invasion.

Normandy During th e fi rs t six mon ths o f ' 944 mu ch re­orga nization and re -equi pment took place in preparati on for th e Norm and y in vasion. Even so, 7th was not to end up as a n enti rely stand a rd armoured di vision of th e period , sin ce 22 nd Armoured Brigade was issued with th e C rom well cruiser instead of th e Sherm an medium tank used by the o ther divisions. The C romwell was a fas t reliabl e ta nk with a dua l-purpose 75 mm g un. It did not burn as easily as the Sherman when hit, and it was to prove highly successful during the more fluid phases o f th e campaign ahead; however, its gun/arm our comb ination was no match fo r th e slowe r a nd less reli a bl e G erm a n Tige rs a nd Panthers in close fi ghting, where it co uld no t use its speed. The lack of gun -power was to some ex tent allevia ted by th e add ition of a Sherman 'Firefl y' with a 17pdr g un to each troop of Cromwells, and of two Cromwells armed wilh 95mm howitzers to each squ adron headq uarters. Tn th e reconnaissance troops, Stuarts had la rgely replaced scou t cars and

carri ers, but some had th eir turrets removed and '5in heavy machine guns fi tted instead, lo red uce their silhouette.

The 11th Hussars, who tempora ril y left the division lO become corps troops but soon retu rned in Norm andy, were now organi zed with their own artill ery (75 mm ha lf-tracks) and infa n try/sapper lroops, bOlh of whi ch were to prove invaluable; the former had to be ' pension ed of!' before th e end of the campaign with worn-out barrels, such was the use made o f th em. The S taghound armoured car in their HQs was no t popula r, being cumbersome a nd un able to reverse quickl y, and as someone put it, 'onl y good for knocking down gateposts'. The Da imler cars in the squ adrons were good , and a lso sometim es had their turrets removed, whil e th e three-man Humber scout cars, often equi pped with twin Vickers 'K ' gu ns, were much liked.

Another unit that rejoin ed the division as a new­style armoured reconnaissance regiment was the 8th Hussars, but since its equi pment of C romwells a nd S tuarts was identi ca l to that of22 nd Armoured Brigade it was used as a fourth armoured regiment under divisiona l contro l, being a llocated to the armoured or th e infantry brigad e as req ui red . I ni tia ll y it had no Fire fl ys, bu t during th e campaign it received instead Cha ll engers, which a lso had I 7pdr guns. The Crusader a nd Centau r AA tan ks

23

THE ARMO RED CA R REGIMENT

a) '94': RHQ4 cars HQsquadroll Admin and echelons, Ct C

3 Squadrons each with 4 or 5 Troops of3 cars (2 Rolls & I Morris in ' 940- 2 Humbers & I Daimler in 1943)

b ) '944: RHQ.3 car.; (Staghounds) HQ.Squadro1/ Admin and echelons, etc 4 Squadrons each with HQ (3 Staghounds & 3 Humber scout car.;), I troop of '2 x 75mm gun half-lracks, I SCOU l lroop in armoured half-lracks, and 5 Troops each of '2 Da imler armoured cars a nd I Hum ber scoul car.

ART ILL ERY REGIME NTS

a ) RHA RegiInent 1941- 42: '2 Batteries each Of2 Troops of 4 or 6 x 25pdr

b ) Field Regintent RA: 3 Bancries each of'2 Troops of 4 x 25pdr

c) Light A/A Regintent: 3 Balleries each of 3 Troops of 6 x 40mm Bofor.;

d ) Anti-tank Regintent : 3 Batteries each of 4 Troops of 4 x zpdr, 6pdr, or 17pdr gu ns ( I ballery self-propelled in 1944- 45)

In all regiments were found to be unnecessary owing to Allied a ir superiority, and were discarded shortly after landing.

The mOLOr infantry received armou red ha lf­tracks in place of th eir section trucks, whil e th e Queens Brigade remained lorry-borne by courtesy of the RASC. Both had improved 6pdr AfT guns firing disca rding sabot ammunition and LOwed fi rs t by Lloyd and later Windsor tracked carriers. Some considered the 6pd r a handier weapon than the more powerful but more cumbersome t7pdr in close country, where the infantry's PLAT, a hand­held close-range AfT weapon firing a hollow charge bomb, also proved use ful. In the Queens the machine-gun company of the Cheshires was replaced by a support company of th e Roya l NOrlhumberla nd Fusil ier'S with 402 in mortars as well as Vickers machine-guns.

The artillery received Sherman OP tanks, and reta ined one RHA regiment of towed 25pdrs, whil e the other exchanged the American 105mm PriestS for 25pdr Sextons, also sel f-propelled, LO ease ammu nition supply problems. The AfT regiment of Norfolk Yeomanry had two ba lleries of SP

24

17pdrs while the other two were LOwed, first by lla lf-tracks and later by Crusaders conven ed to gun tractors. The LAA regimelll a lso had some of its Bofors mounted on trucks for mobile work .

The REME now had workshops for each brigade, for the divisiona l troops, and for the LAA guns, as well as Centaur or Cromwell a rmoured recovery vehicles with each regiment, whil e the RE had six scissors bridges on Valentine tan ks with the armou red brigade as well as Bai ley bridging equipment. The RAMC had dental and hygiene units as well as the field ambulances, but th e RASe were red uced from their desen establishment to a mere three or four companies. "'lith improved eq uipm ent such as the No. 19 set, and shorter distances, th e di visional signa ls were to have an easier task than in the Middle East.

The division sta rted lO land at Arromanches, to

the north-east of Bayeux, in the wake of 50th (Northumbrian) Division on D + 1,7 June 1944. They formed pan of 30 Corps under Lt C en Bucknall , which was the right-hand corps of 2nd British Arm y commanded by Cen Dempsey. This in LOfn combined with the American 1St Army

THE DIVISIONAL SIGN

Vehicl .. hi." '9<1, .....

'-t; , L-=: --.J

V .. hlcI" " I,n '940 TOI'"'' f ... ~h ' !HQ V.,hlcl" "II" ' 9'1"·"~

S h o .. ld .. .. fI~ .. h ' 9 .... ·0

ORDER OF BATTLE Dlvihional HQ

MA l ' '~':hho ... in. ,,,,i, ~"hh: l e "i.m' and ""P bad.e ..

".h Arlno .. rlHi 8rl,.d .. ,'h Mo,or Hri,,,d ..

\l Sil"" lh S'I"

IIr' l"d .. A .. mour.-d Ca r R,.

ATRfljl

Arlnour .. d Rlh Motor 'Iou, 1., All. Rfij '

RE

1.. fit!

Uni,~

Ilr',:ad .. Work"hol' ~

"

B Egyptian Frontier, 1940

c_ .• > C Support Group,Sidi Rezegh, November 1941

,

D North~West Europe, winter 1944~45

" 2A 2B

~ ' 67 5A~ 21C 5c

5B& e 4A

4B

4c 5D BB

BA [JJ Angus I:

~ a~ .. ... ., ~-

'a1Ntf I.:j ,t~ lO A lOB

T4:J720 IIA

A 1211686 liB

E

further west to form the All ied invasion force of 2 1st Army Group und er Montgomery. The division was therefore now a fairl y sma ll cog in a fairl y big wheel, and this was not the only change they had to adjust to in the North-West Europe campaign. This was no longer a war of easil y defined battles interspersed with periods of preparation in the rear areas; it became a continuous push over a wide front, with the emphasis shifted period ically from one area to another. Sometimes the division would be in the lead , at others it would be holding the line while th e ma in effort was elsewhere, but gone were the days of leave between battles in Cairo or Alexandri a. Gone a lso was the ebb and flow of previous years; here the movement was a ll for­wards, however slow.

After the battles of the beachh ead during whi ch Panzer and infantry div isions were used en masse (including th e division 's old enemy, 21st Panzer) the principal opposition became small groups of tanks, or more often self-propell ed guns; snipers

and panzerfaust teams; and small fana ti cal battle­groups. These were a change from the massed Panzer formations, the mines and the Stukas which had been the ma in problems in the desert. In an area of fields and towns such as North-West Europe, where advances norma lly had to be made a long roads, such opposition was highly effective, and as a result the tanks often had to play second fidd le to the infantry within the division, being una ble to get forward un til a way had been cleared for th em. The I I th Hussars soon realized that the only way that they could scout ahead of the division was to drive on until the leading car was fired on­often a t point-blank range- and hope that some­one survived to send back the news. Rivers were another problem ; before the campaign was over the sappers of 21st Army Group had to bui ld over 500 bridges and repair many more. The slowness of opening up ports posed a fam ili ar headache for the d ivisional RASC, who found that ex posed centre­line roads were j ust as vuln erable to par ties of by-

THE I N FANTRY BA TTALIO N

a) Motor Battalion 1940: BHQand: 4 motor compani es each orS motor platoons Or3 sections ( I x 15cwl lruck , 6 men, I

LM G each) and onc scout pl atoon of 3 sections (3 universal carriers each)

b) Motor Battalion 1942: B HQand: I A fT company of 4 pl atoons each of 4 x 2pdr or 4 x 6pdr gu ns

3 motor companies each with a mortar section (2 x sin mortars), '2 motor platoons, I scout platoon, and I MG platoon (4 x Vickers MMG)

c) Motor Battalion 1944: BHQand: I support company of 12 x 6pdr A fT guns and 8 x Vickers MMGs

3 motor compa nys each of 3 motor platoons (in armoured half-tracks) a nd I scout platoon (still in carriers)

d) Lorried Battalion 1943- 44: BHQ and: HQcompany wi th

I mortar platoon (6 x 3in mortars) I carrier platoon ( 13 carriers) I A fT platoon ~8 x 2pdr, later 6pdr guns) I pionecr platoon (20 mcn)

4 riflc companies each of 3 platoons of3 scctions of 10 mcn + I LMC ( I MMC pl atoon with 4 x Vickers and I RASe tra nsport platoon with 30 x 3 ton lorries often attached from Brigade)

passed enemy as the open desert had been. On the cred it side, changes in cl uded rriendly populations, at least until Germany itselrwas reached , and hel p from the resistance; I I th Hussars even engaged some as scouts on a semi-official basis. The highly co -ordinated air and heavy artillery support that was almost a lways quick ly available, and the continuous air cover, were welcome novelties.

T he first month arter th e landings differed rrom what was to follow, however, as the Germans threw in a ll thei r reserves in the West in an effort to drive the Allies back into the sea rrom the ideal derensive bocage country orsmal l fields, thick hedges, sunken roads and orcha rds, to the west or Caen. Montgomery's pla n was to lead the enemy to

concentrate all available arm our against th e British 2nd Arm y, so as to give th e Americans th e chance to break out against minimal opposition and drive round rrom the Cherbourg Peninsular into the heart or France behind the rormations racing the coast. To achi eve this, repeated attacks had to be made in the Caen area to keep th e Panzers occupi ed, and the division had much stiff fi ghting ror negligible territorial gains. During the first three weeks they lost 1,150 casualti es, mostly rrom the inrantry units (compared with about 20 a t Beda Fomm). So close was the fighting that tan ks were actually 'boarded' at tim es, and a hurried issue or Sten gu ns to AFV crews became necessary.

During this peri od two actions in w hi ch the division took part stand ou t. On 12- 13 June, as

26

I7 Divisional HQ vehicles in Pompei i during the drive on Naples. The box-like AEC 'Dorchesler' armoured command vehicle (left ) was used from early in 194' until the end of the war. Divisional HQ used four or more of them as command and signals vehicles, and they were also issued to brigade HQ§ from 194'2. Even Rommel used captured Dorchesters! ( Imperial War Museum)

German armour was struggling rorward in the race of murderous air attacks to counter-attack the Allied bridgeheads, an opportu ni ty occurred ror the division to work south rrom Bayeux on th e extreme west of the British sector, and then east towards high ground ncar Vil lers Bocage. This enabled them to outflank th e Panzer-Lehr Division , which was racing the British positions to the north and preventing them rrom en larging the bridge­head. Speed was essent.ial, as 2nd SS Panzer Division Dos Reich was coming up rrom rurther south and wou ld shortl y close the gap. As a result the cl ivision got bad ly strung out a long th e Normandy roads, and it was not possibl e to ro llow them up with 50th Division as planned. When the leading units were in and just beyond Villers Bocage they were suddenly attacked by Tiger tanks, one or which , commanded by Obersturmftih­rer Michael Wittmann , destroyed th e bunched-up vehicles or 4th CL Y RHQ and an entire squad ron of tan ks, as well as 'A' company or I st RiAe Brigade who were with them. This action, which has perh aps become the most celebrated single tank action or a ll time, was a result or two Tiger compani es or 501 SS H eavy Tank Battalion happen ing to be in the area behind Panzer-Lehr's fl an k. Later in the day the remai ns orthe armoured brigade and the Queens restored th e situation to

some ex tent by holding Vill ers Bocage against 2nd SS Panzer- and the local fire brigade, who wou ld insist on trying to exti nguish the burning German tanks- but the advance had been halted and the d ivision had to ra il back into a 'box' in the bocage where it rought a fi erce derensive action until it could retire to the north again. A measure of the degree or co -operation now common can be gauged from the fact that their withdrawal was covered at relatively short notice by RAF Lancaster strategic bombers and fire rrom R N warships and US heavy artill ery. This was the last opportu ni ty ror mobile warfare, as more Germ an divisions moved in to seal off th e landing areas.

By mid-Jul y in fa ntry losses had reached serious proportions throughout 2nd Army; the bridgehead was still very congested, and there were signs that th e Germans, who still held parts of Caen, might fee l tha t they were containing the Bri tish and that they could di vert some armour against the Amer­icans who were still bu ilding up for their breakout further west under Gen Patton . To rectify this si tuation Montgomery staged Operation Goodwood, whereby 8 th Corps under Gen O 'Connor (the victor of Bed a Fomm, who had been captured in Africa and had subsequentl y escaped from Italy) consisting of three armoured divisions- I I th, the Guards, and 7th - was to advance several m iles in morc open country across the river Orne to th e south-east ofCaen to capture th e Bourguebus ridge threatening Fa la ise. This armoured assault was to

be preceded by a ir and artillery preparation of massive weight, but in cluded no in fantry divisions to clear the way for the tanks. In the event, Goodwood fai led to reach its objectives owing to over-estimation of the damage air a ttacks would cause (a common error from Dunkirk to V ietnam), and the fact that the Germ an defences extend ed much farther back th an had been anticipated. The two leading arm oured divisions were severely

N O R T H

ma uled ; 7th was following up ready to exploit a breakth rough and so suffered rela tively lightly. In fact the main recollection of many who took part was th e nightmare journ ey by the whole division from the wes t of Caen and across a single bridge over the Orne under enemy observation in to a conges ted forming-up area already occupied by the two oth er divisions. Despite its cost, the attack did achieve Montgomery's primary objective of keep­ing up the pressure in the a rea so th at the enemy were unable to release armour from it.

Du ring the rest of Jul y th e d ivision made further limited a ttacks east of the Orne, and when the Ameri ca ns finally broke out a t the beginning of August 30 Corps, to which the division had returned , was rapidly switched back to the western end of the Bri tish area for fur ther attacks south ­wards from the Villers Bocage area. Slow progress was made during th e first week in August, but then an ill-advised German counter-attack to th e west was defeated and the Americans reall y got moving, swinging round south ofFa la ise and catchi ng many o f the remaining enemy units in the 'pocket' between them and the Canad ians and other British troops coming south from Caen. After taking part in this fina l push from the north , the division was

SEA

BERLl N@

Cologne

100 '. ,

mile<

too wea k in infantry to continue and was reli eved in the line. The 4th CL Y had al ready left after Goodwood to amalgamate with their sister regiment , 3rd CL Y, elsewhere, and their place had been taken by 5th Royal l nniskilling Dragoon G uards, hurriedly converted to a Cromwell regiment for the purpose. At this stage in the campaign the GOC, Genera l Erskine, was relieved by Maj Gen G. L. Verney.

France and the Low Countries With the trapping of some 50,000 German troops in th e Fala ise pocket in mid-August th e enemy's efforts to contain the invasion in Norma ndy were over, and the British as well as the Am erica ns were able to brea k out of th e constri cting bocage. The British and Canadian task was to move cast and north to capture th e 'V -weapon' sites from whi ch

28

London was being bombarded, and the major ports, in particu la r Antwerp, which the Alli es would need to support thei r ultimate drive into German y. 'T'he division first adva nced east to th e Seine through more open country, but was im­peded by several minor rivers and determined rearguards. The I I th Hussars th erefore led on a wide front to find un blown bridges and unblocked roads, wi th the infantry brigade 'two up', and with each battalion supported by a squadron of 8th Hussars, behind them ; the a rmoured brigade brought up the rear. After some fi erce fi ghting round Lisieux , which also involved 51St Highland Division, a ga p was found , and the armou red brigade sw ung into th e lead , reaching the Seine on th e 31St. Pa ris had a lready fallen to the America ns

[8 Sherman tank in Italy; this vehicle has the rubber block tracks sim il ar to those used o n Grants and Stua rLS , which were latcr rcplaced by all·mctal assem blies. It appcars to be paillled in the standard light mud/blue·black camou flage schemc, and has an 'A' Sqn triangle and a rcd/ white/red recognition fl ash on the lUrrCl. Note the No. [9 set acrial , th inner than that oCthe NO.9 sc t scen in previous illustrations. (Sharpshootcrs)

19 No. 19 rad io set, complete with covcr and and protcctivc cage, in turret of a Sherman tank. Imroduccd shortly before Alamcin, th is sct bccame standard for tan ks and othcr vchiclcs; it provcd reliable, aftcr some initial problems due to high temperature. (Sharpshooters)

and Free French on 25 August. From here on, the armoured divisions were to

lead with the in fantry coming up to consolidate or subdue areas of stiff' resista nce. 7th Armoured was directed on Ghent as pa rt of 12 Corps und er Lt Gen Ritchi e (erstwhile comma nder ofSth Arm y in the desert), wi th the Canadians moving along the coast on their left a nd 11th Armoured on their right going for Antwerp. Now th e advance rea ll y got going. The Cromwells proved ideal , being highly rel iable and capable of continuous high-speed running, even keeping up with wheeled transport on the roads with no trouble. The Som me was crossed north of Amiens on 1 September. After the division met resista nce among the coalmin es and ca nals north of Lill e on the 4th, permission was given to by-pass this area to the south , and it reached Ghent on the following day. After haggles with th e German garrison command er, who refused to surrender to any lesser person tha n a genera l, and who saw through the efforts of th e colonel of 5 th RTR to impersonate one, th e town was entered a nd th e I nniskill ings found themselves with a complete horsed cavalry regiment, among other prisoners. The 11th Hussars had cap tured several 'V-bomb' sites during the advance.

The divis ion had advanced '2'20 miles in a \veek, cap turing over 1,000 prisoners for the loss of less than 100 men (compared with 1,300 casua lti es duri·ng their tim e in the bocage). Such was th e speed of advance that rnaps ran ou t and wireless contact was lost with Corps HQ Though they increased th e spare petrol at the expense of am munition, a nd grounded units such as the LAA regiment, the las t 70 miles into Ghent could on ly be made by a composite grou p of units from both brigades while the rema inder of the di vision stayed ncar Lill e. T he di visiona l RASC now had a formidable task as suppl y lines still stretched from the Normandy beaches a nd the ever-lengthening centre line was often tempora ril y cu t. REME was able to move up only its recovery units, not its workshops, and the evacua tion of the wounded began to cause problems. The leading troops had

received ecstati c welcomes from the local pop­ul a tions, o ften ex pressed with Aowers and - less com fortabl y- fruit and vegetables thrown onto the passing vehicles. At this stage many of the unit histories also mention passing baltl efields where their regiments had fought before, from Oudenarde in the days of 1arlborough to the Escaut Ca na l in

1940. There was a pause a t Ghent. The armoured

brigade was down to abou t two thirds of its proper ta nk strength and the Queens were as low as half strength ; a lso, th e bu lk of the d ivision had to ca tch up, a nd there was a threat of a n attack by th e rema ins of the German 15th Arm y wh ich was cut 0[[, north of the Scheidt. In the face of this the sa ppers had to switch hurried ly from repa iring bridges to blowing them up! In th e event no attack was made and after a week the division was able to go forward aga in when the Ca nad ia n infantry came up a nd reli eved them. The motor batta lion had helped a ll evia te its shortage of men by enlisting loca l Belgia ns, a nd had increased its firepower by fitting Browning machine gu ns to some of its earners.

The nex t step was Opera tion Market Cardell, which included the a irborne la nding a t Arnhem. For this, 12 Corps- of which the division was still pa rt- moved into H oll and with th e task of guard­ing th e western side of the corridor that 30 Corps, led by th e Guards Armoured , was to crea te in order to link up with th e a irborn e troops, wh ile S Corps with 11th Armoured protected it from th e cast. The country was unsuitable for armo ur, with flat marshy polder a nd dykes, the poor roads usually being exposed on top of ba nks. During this period, the second ha lf of September 1944, infantry

29

20 Sappers launch ing a Bai ley bridge in Italy. This invention, together with the armoured scissors bridge which was also used by the divisiona l R E, proved inva luable in N \ V Europe, where most of the bridges over the numerous rivers and canals had been blown. (Imperial War ~"I useum )

shortage within the division reached the point where ta nk crews had lO act as foot soldiers to help hold the line against the various a llacks, usua ll y by battalion-sized baulegroups of paratroops, such as Gruppe Hubner and Gruppe Hardegg, which were renown ed for th eir fanatic ism.

After the remains of the British airborn e division had been pull ed out on 25- 26 September the 7th Armoured pushed on to the M aas. Although Antwerp had been ta ken, it could not be used as the enemy still held the ba nks of the ScheIdt estuary below it ; 12 Corps was therefore swung west in to Brabant lO clear the northern shore. In fi erce fighting the Queens a nd Sth Hussars, assisted by minesweeping Aail tanks a nd Aamethrowing Chur­chill Crocodiles, eliminated the various strong ­points in the area. Fo llowing this, the division had its fi rst real rest since landing in Normandy while

30

keeping a sta tic watch on the Maas, as forces and supplies were built up fo r th e crossing of the Rhine in to Germany further easl. Even this period was interrupted by the need to capture ule lock ga tes at Panheel on 14 November before the enemy could destroy th em and j eopardize the ponlOon bridges that were being used to cross a canal lower down. Although onl y a minor operation by a ba tta lion of the Queens and a squadron of Sth H ussa rs, it met with heavier artillery fire than had been en­countered since Normand y; heavy casualties were suffered, and it was onl y due to th e initiative o f a platoon command er, recently transferred from the REME and in action for the first tim e, that success was achieved.

The problem of rein forcement was now so grave th at corps and anti-aircra ft troops were being increasingly retrained as in fa ntry; even so, one in fa ntry division, the 50th , had lo be disbanded. Following this, the much reduced ' 16th and ' 17th Queens depa rted from 7th Armoured, leaving only ' 15th Queens in ' 3 1 Brigade. Their places were ta ken by 2nd Devons a nd 9th Durham Light

ORDER OF BATTLE November '944

Divisiollal HQ I

I 22nd Aml'd Bde 1st R TR } Cromwells 5th RTR & Sherman 5th DGs FireAies 1st RiAe Bde

I /3/ ( Queens) Ede 1/5th Queens 9th Durham L. I. 2nd Devons Support Coy (RNFus,

MMGs & 4·2in mortars)

In fantry from 50th Division, while Maj Gen Lyne, also from th e NOrlhumbri an d ivision, relieved Gen Vern ey in command of the d ivision.

The division was not in volved in repelling the German Ardennes offensive in mid-December, but those at home were perha ps remind ed of its existence on Christmas Day, when a corporal o f the Queens was interviewed on the rad io immediately before the king delivered his C hristmas message. The year of 1944 ended wi th 7th Armoured still on

I Royal Artillery 3rd RHA (25Pdrs) 5th RHA (Sexton SPs) A /T Regt (SP & LOwed

17pdrs) LAA Regt (SP & LOwed

Bofors)

I Divisional troops II th Hussars (arm'd

cars) 8th Hussars (Reece

regt) Div Signals RE : 3 Sqns RASC: 4 Coys RAMC: 2 Ambs RAOC: 3 Parks REM E: 4 Workshops

th e M aas in murderously cold weather which froze lank tracks solid inLO th e mud , caused several cases of frostbite, and immobi lized a patrol of I I th H ussars, with frozen weapons and veh icles ea rly on Boxing Day.

2 1 Bedford QLT 3-ton troop carrier, which replaced (he general service 3-lOn ner as a IOfried infantry veh icle in NW Europe. This vchicle is finished in the standard softskin European camou Aage of khaki overpa illled with black 'Mickey Mouse cars' (Conniford)

3 1

22 Scammell SV /2S, the standard hcavy recovery traclOr used in the dcscn and NW Europe. In N. Africa they werc attached to unit LAOs as well as RAOe 01' REME workshop and rccovcry uni ts, but by 1944 they had been replaced for from· linc work by tanks convencd into armoured recovery vehicles. (Conni ford)

Into Germany In mid-January 1945 advantage was taken of the freezing weath er for I' Corps to launch Operation Blackcock to ca pture a pocket of marshy ground north of Aachen. Though the division had to use a single one-way road, and had to cope with hazards such as smoke screens freezing to form fog, it operated most successfull y under th ese conditions; 13 1 Brigade was provided with 'Kangaroo' troop carriers (tanks with the turrets removed ) for th e first tim e, and th e tanks co-operated well with a Commando brigade. Much fi erce fi ghting was involved , including th e capture of the village of St J oost from the notorious Parachute R egiment Hubner.

Training and preparation for Opera tion Plunder- th e crossing of th e Rhine, and in the case ofthe division the advance to H amburg- started in late February. Extra supp lies were to be carri ed on tanks and no vehi cle recovery was to be attempted beyond the river, although a rrangements were made to pick up stranded crews. Twenty-five brand new tanks were received from England , and Churchill scissors bridges, Sherman flail s, Kan­garoos for the infantry, and flamethrowing Croco­diles were all allocated to th e division , which now a lso had an a ir artillery observa tion squadron. The actual crossing took place on '7 March following infantry assaults by other divisions and an airborne land ing on the other side; 7th was the first British armoured division across th e Rhine and , during th e following week, advanced to the Ems with th e a rmoured brigade leading. Resistance was con­tinuous but came from small unco-ord inated groups; the in habitants were natura lly hosti le, but subdu ed. The country was wooded and an ex tra infantry brigade, 1 55 th , was attached to guard the division's open left flank.

By this time the end was in sight and com­mand ers threw away their maps, as they ran o ff them, confid ent tha t th ey would not need th em

3'

agam to withdraw. A brief check occurred at Ibbenburen , north of Hanover, wh ere excep­tionall y stubborn resistance by staff and train ees of a Wehrmachl offi cer training school proved trouble­some, but the division side-stepped and left th em to 53rd Infantry Division , who were following up. Another ha lt occurred at th e Weser and th e division was diverted to the north to help round LIp 1st German Parachute Arm y, but Bremen itself proved too well defended to be taken by an armoured division , so once aga in it was by-passed and left for th e in fantry ; this time, 3rd Division. I t was a period of stubborn fi ghting for every village; on one occasion 8th Hussars were surprised and attacked in leaguer at night, and in cidents occurred of ambushes being sprung und er cover of the white fl ag, but progress continu ed. On 16 April 8th Hussars liberated two large prisoner-of-war ca mps at Fa llingbostel; one of th ese had a lready been taken over by the inmates, and had British sentries in pressed battledress and clean webbing on th e ga tes, a nd a pa ratroop RSM very much in command!

The final actions lOok place south and west of Hamburg, rounding up groups of police, SS, paratroops, marines and even redundant sub­marine crews, fighting in th e heath lands of th at region. The Rifle Brigad e made good use of their newl y- issued carri er-borne Wasp fl amethrowers. They also ca ptured a large number of German 'vVrens' in Buxtehud e, with no casualties except th e RSM's foot, on which one formidabl e frauleill dropped a heavy object.

On '9 April 1945 surrender negoti a ti ons for

Hamburg commenced , and on the a fternoon of 3 May units ofthe divisions drove unopposed into th e shattered city. Fittingly, perhaps, one of the first vehicles to enter th e main square, where the commandant and o ther dignitaries waited in full dress to surrender, was the scout car of the CO of 11th Hussars; that officer, who was very inform ally dressed and not a whit impressed by the reception committee, stopped to feed the pigeons with a rmy biscuits. So ended six years of war for 7th Armoured Division .

It has not been possibl e to mention a ll th e many un its that served in the division during that lim e, nor a ll the higher forma tions to which it was attached , let a lone a ll th e individua ls involved , but it is hoped that this very brief account will have given some idea of how th e British armoured division came to be form ed , and how it developed both in equipment and organization during the 2nd World Wa r. I t was indeed a fa r cry from the ' Immobile Farce' of 1935, or th e over-a rmoured and under-supported forma tion of the ea rl y wa r years, to th e fl exible well-ba lanced mixture of a ll arms, ca pa ble of advancing or side-stepping as necessary, and swinging either armour or in fa ntry into the va n, whi ch entered Hamburg in 1945.

The Plates A The Division Sign Thejerboa was added to the pla in whi te disc early in 1940, by Gen Creagh ; th e exact date is uncertain, but some vehicles arc known to have reta ined the early form a fter the outbreak of war with Italy. The jerboa on a plain white square was used in NW Europe a longside the earlier type featuring thejerboa on a white disc on a red square. The brownish animal on th e la te shoulder fl ash caused queries as to whether d ivisional troops in NW Europe were Austra lians!

Order of Battle, unit vehicle signs and cap badges, May 1942 At this time the division was organized into sel f­conta ined brigade groups and two of the divisiona l AT regiment batteries were integra ted into th e RHA regiments and used their signs. Detachments of RE, LAA and oth er services were a lso allached permanentl y to brigades. Brigade workshops would a lso have had brigade colours behind the numbers

'23 Sexton scl r-propcllcd 25pdr guns in action in NW Europe, 1944; note Allied recogn ition stars. This weapon, based on the American M3 chassis, equipped 5th Royal Horse Arti llery, who norma ll y supported the armoured brigade; 3rd RH A, who norma ll y worked wilh the infanlry brigade, kept towed 25Pdrs. (Gander)

33

24 Achilles M I 0 self-propell ed I 7pdr anti-tank guns follow a laped 'safe' lane in the bocage of Normandy. At least onc battery of the divisional AfT regiment in NW Europe was self­propelled to work with thc armoured brigade; the remainder supported the infantry with towed 17 Pdrs. ( Imperial War Museum)

on their signs when operating wi th the brigades independen tly, rather th an under divisional con­trol. In late ' 942 a ll a rtill ery reverted to d ivisiona l control so th at th e CRA could co-ordinate its efforts, although still often attached to su pport th e brigades. On the fo rma ti on of R EM E before Al a mein , a ll work shop un its ad opted bl ue/yellow/red hori zo ntall y-st ri ped signs a nd came under d ivisiona l CREME control, whil e the remaining RAO C units had verticall y-stri ped bl ue/red /bl ue signs.

U nit tactical signs were supposed to be combined wi th the d ivisiona l sign on the reverse of th e PASS plate (8tin square, mounted on nearside of so ft skin vehicles, used to indica te vehicle out of action) but were often pai nted on opposite sides of fron t a nd rear, on mudg uards, sandshields, etc. Brigade and arm of service colour plates remained more or less constant throughou t th e war, but unit num bering systems cha nged , o ffi cially, at least four ti mes; th a t shown here was in fo rce, with minor alterations, from mid- '94' to early '943 . Style varied from unit to unit or even from crew to crew. Division and un it

34

signs were often omi tted in the desert , particul arl y on AFYs, bu t were a lways used in NW Europe where tra ffi c control made them more necessary .

Cap badges were meta l a t this period; later in the war, those of O th er R anks were made of coloured plastic simul ating silver, brass and bronze fi nishes.

B Egyptian Frontier, 1940

I t is su mm er on the coastal plain; escarpments lead up to the inla nd pla teau in the background. The AFYs are in earl y straight-edged ca mouA age patterns of two contrasting colours over light stone; offi cial varia tions included black a nd green (mid­' 940) a nd si lver-grey with sla te (November '940), bu t other colours were used at commanders' d iscretion. F rom left to right: Rolls-Royce 1924 Pattern Armoured Car, 11th Hussars Armed with a Bren g un on an AA mounting, a Boys anti-tank rifle, and a smoke-bomb projector, the car carri es no radio and no markings except the vehicl e serial nu mber. Desert eq ui pment incl udes radiator cond enser, sand chann els, sun com pass, and cut-down petrol tin as 'brew can'. Crew wear brown, crimson-band ed 1 1 th Hussar berets w ith­o ut badges; the stand ing warrant o ffi cer wears his ra nk badge on a leather wrist strap . Pis tols were seldom worn ; when they were, then waistbelt hols[ers were at least as common as th e Royal

Armoured Corps pattern with leg strap shown here. Lance-Corporal, King's Royal Rifle Corps Summer combat dress, wi th bleached ' 937 partial webbi ng se t ; respirators, packs and picks and shovels in li eu of entrenching tools were normall y carri ed in seClion trucks. The shorts a re 'taken up' a few inches from length as issued; note black Rifle ran k chevron on sleeve. The weapon is the SMLE No. , Mk III rifle with ,8in ba yonet- termed 'sword' in Rifl e regiments. Lieutenanl, King's Royal Rifle Corps Other R anks wore khaki fi eld-service (side) caps with regi mental badge on the left ; officers often wore No. , Dress caps in rifl e-green with black bUllons, and a silver bugle-horn badge on a small raised red boss, as here. Removable shoulder-straps on the khaki shirt bear black meta l or woven rank pips and ' KRRC'; the slacks and rubber-soled suede desert boots are private-purchase items. The equ ipment is the officer's '937 webbing set with holstered NO.2 Mk I Webley revolver, am munition pouch, compass pouch and binocular pouch ; an officer's small pack , slimmer than the OR's type, hangs on the hip. Private, Royal Amry Service Corps Wolsley pattern sun helmet with RAS C puggri flash (genera ll y removed on the outbreak of war for security reasons) . Blancoed skeleton webbing with small '907 pouches, , 8in bayonet scabbard , 'Bombay bloomers' buttoned up and worn as shorts, and full- length puttees were all common in earl y '940 but, except in rear areas, the helmet and puttees had generally d isappea red by the following year. Vickers M k VIB Light Tank, lsi RTR Armed with ·5 in and ·303in Vickers water-cooled machine-guns in combined mounting, with two smoke-bomb projectors. The spotlight a nd AA mounting for the ·303in gun on the sides of the cupola were rarely seen a fter the first cam paign. Pennons were positioned on the NO.9 set aerial in accordance with a recognition code. Separate unit tactical sign and divisional sign were normal at this date. Black tan k corps overa lls were still worn quite

25 A 40mm Bofors light anli-aircraft gun, winter 1944; this was the standard light A/A gun throughout the war. Earlier models used in the desen lacked the shield and the sight correc ting gear shown here . In NW Europe some SP Bofors mounted on lorry chassis were also used. (Imperial War Museum)

widely in '940 but seem to have been replaced by khaki denim overalls later ; shirt, shorts or slacks were a lso worn in summer and partial or complete battledress in winter. Background: Morris CS II /30 30cwt truck Pla in light stone fini sh with Egyptian civil ian-type number plates, typical of types used in '940 by unit echelons, etc. Foreground: Discarded 4gal ' flimsy' petrol tins had many uses; pierced , and placed over a hurricane lamp, they made night signs. This, and the cut-out metal day sign point to divisional main HQ The triangle on the partly buried telephone line indicates an infantry battalion line.

C Support Group, Sidi R ezegh, Novelllber

1941 The desert was both cold and wet at tim es, particularly at night, a lthough usua lly warm and dusty la ter in the day. In some areas, rock below the surface prevented anything but shallow weapon pits being dug; a lternatives were 'sangars' wi th walls of rocks or sandbags, but these were dan­gerously more consp icuous. From left to righ t: 25pdr Mk 11 with No. 27 Artillery Trailer (limber) , 1st Field Regiment, Royal Arlillery As with a ll guns used in the desert, this is without muzzle brake and counterweigh t; it also lacks, at this date, a direct fire sight- tanks were engaged using the di a l sight until, 942. Yellow shells piled on the pit are HE ; black shells held by the detachment are AP shot. Detachment members' warm clothing includes woollen cap comforters, balaclavas, great­coats, leather jerkin, battleclress blouses, and even rubber Wellington boots. Kneeling figure at limber

35

26 Desert Rat in N\'" Europe~but not 7th Armoured Division. These vehicles bearing the black jerboa with its tail over its head are from 4th Armoured Brigade, which retained the old sign on leaving the division in Africa. The Hum ber scout car and M3 half-track are, however, typical of vehicles used in the division: the former by I Ith Hussars and HQ§, and the lattcr by thc RiAc Brigade mOtor companics, RE, RAMC, and other services. (Sharpshooters)

has RA fl ash on sleeve, but others wear clothing as issued, wilho ut insignia. RA cannon insignia appears above chevrons of standing sergeant in field serVIce cap. Brigadier 'J ock' Campbell, vc Dressed in a leather golfing jacket and corduroy slacks, Campbell wears no insignia apart from his hat wilh rank distinctions. His staff car is a cu l­down Ford station wagon, a type widely used by senior officers in lh e desert . Signs on il include a bridging circle, combined divisional and Support Group HQ tactical signs, and the veh icl e serial number. There are racks of 2ga l water tins and a radiator condenser, made from an empty one. The windshi eld is smeared with grease and coated with sand , apart from a small area, to ki ll refl ections. Bren LMC team, 2nd Bn Rifle Brigade No . I has his helmet covered in sandbag hessian; he has a tape and cotton bandoli er of'303 amm unition

36

clips over his shoulder, and is loading a Bren magazine by hand. Note chevron in regimental black on green, and black shoulder title. No.2 has an issue jersey over khaki drill shirt and slacks, and is using his comforter as a scarf. Equipment around the pit includ es a No. 36 hand grenade (red crosses on green band indicate a fu sed grenade ready for use) , pouches of Bren magazines, and a captured German MP.38. U nl ike German rifl e platoons and British divisiona l infan try, with their Thompson guns, British motor infantry had no sub-machine g un issued to sections. Background : infantry support weapons Boys ·ssin anti -tank rifle, one of whi ch was carried in each section tru ck and carrier; and 2in mortar, a platoon HQ weapon capable of fir ing smoke or H E bom bs up to soo yards.

In th e foreground , discarded evidence of the British soldier's staple ration- a bu ll y beef tin.

D North-West Europe, winter 1944 A road junction somewhere in H olland. From left to right: Private, 131 ( ~ueens) Brigade, Lorried IIIJantry The new steel helmet was now in use a longside the old type. Service issue steel-rimmed spectacl es were designed to be wearable under a respirator. T he

No. 4 Mk I rifle with short spike bayonet was standard issue by this date, as was the entrench ing tool slung in a wall et on th e back of the belt. The camouflaged windproof smock, origina ll y issued for Norwegian operations is worn here ove r both battledress and the sleeveless leather jerkin. REME Officer, InniskiLlings LAD, on BSA B30 Motorcycle Congested European roads brought mo torcycles back in to favour : in the desert, jeeps or pick-ups were preferred. Th is officer wears the black RAC beret with REME cap badge, and semi-uniform rai ncoat. Note tactical sign on fuel tank of BSA. Cromwell Tank, 8th Hussars Overa ll kha ki with no add itional pai nted camouflage; chi cken wire and hessian scrim on tu rret onl y, to obscure distinctive turret sha pe above walls a nd hedges. Combined divisiona l and reconnaissance regiment tactica l sig ns, th e latter a white '45' on a horizontally-striped blue-over­green patch. Tank name partly visibl e on turret

side. Commander wears black beret, and radio operator the riml ess RAC helmet introduced in 1943. Aeri al pennons were not used in Italy or NW Eu rope except by some higher HQs. T ank arma­ment, 75mm main gun and two '303in BESA machine-guns. Lance-Corporal, Divisional Provost CompatI)' Motorcycl ists' helmet, boots and breeches; battle­dress wi th meda l ribbons and divisional shoulder flash ; red on black MP brassard on right arm, and traffic control sleeves; white webbing. MPs on lonely traffic control points were often attacked by enemy stragglers, hence the Sten gun and spare

27 Challenger tank armed wilh 17pdrgun in a high turret on a modified Cromwell chassis. The lan k shown is marked as oncof 'A' Sqn of the armoured recce regiment of 11 th Armoured Division , but , apart from the d ivisional sig n, is identical to those used by 8th Hussars in 7th Armoured Division. Note the remova l of the bow machi ne-gun during modification , also a fcalUfc of tile Sherman Firefly, the 17pdr gun lank of lhe o ther regimenlS in the divisio n. ( Imperial War Museum)

37

28 \'Vindsor carriers of the ami-tan k platoon of 1/5th Queens towing 6pdr guns in Germany. Timber baulks lashed 10 the from seem to have been a com mon feature of carriers in Europe. Note mixture of old and new steel helmets, and the facl thal mOS t of the crew wear the RAe win ter lank sui t. The Windsor was an elongated and more powerful version of the universal carrier. (Im perial War Museum)

magazin e in boot top, as well as the revolver. Reece Troop Stuart /vI k V, 8th Hussars More heavil y camouflaged than the gun tank, this recce vehicle, known as a 'J alopy' or 'Sawn-Off"" has had the turret removed, and a '5in machine­gun fitted , to reduce the silhouette. Officer, 8th Hussars H e wears the green, gold -l aced ' tent hat ' peculia r to this regiment. The winter tank suit- 'pixie' or 'ZOOt' sui t- was issued to all ranks. I t had a blanket lining and two neck-to-ankle zipped openings, and by manipula tion of the zips could be converted into a sleeping bag. J eep, Divisional RE Field Park Squadron J eeps had been used in th e division since 1942, and had gradually replaced pick-ups and 8cwts for officers' runabouts, despatch riders) etc. The driver wears the general service cap, wh ich had now replaced the fi eld-service cap as standard Other Ranks' headgear ; the badge is plasti c. The major

38

wears the soft kha ki peaked cap, with leather strap and metal badge, of the commissioned ranks, and the semi-offi cial 'British Warm' coat.

E Camouflage and Markings Official camouflage schemes vari ed frequentl y, and many uno ffi cial ones were used; some of th e most common a re illustra ted on this and preced ing pla tes. All the com monly used types of vehicl e sign a re a lso shown ; method and position of application va ried with units. Most signs were used by all vehicles to which they a pplied in lW Europe, with th e exception of some armoured cars. In th e desert they were often omitted , a lthough squad ron and a ir recognition sig ns seem to have been commoner lhan either divisional or uni t sig ns.

I AI 3 Cruiser, 1941 , of3 Troop, 'A' Squadron, senior regiment in brigade. Light ston e with single colour overpainted in semi-slraight-edged scheme, used before wavy-edged schemes became stand ard . 2 Bridging circles, 5in figures on front offside of vehi cles: 2A Hollow type sometimes a pplied to avoid breaking camouflage pattern . 2B ormal type. 3 Pri est 105mm SP gun, 5th RHA, I taly 1943. Light mud colour overpai nted with black wavy-

edged scheme. Note white undersurface of gun ; in th e Middle East und ersides a nd shadow areas were ofte n whi te at this time . 4 Aerial pennons, 9in x ' 3in: -tA CO, th ird regt. III

senio r o r onl y a rmoured brigade. -tB 'A' Sqn CO in second senior regt. 4C 2 Troop tank, junior regt. Some units fl ew pennons in regimenta l colours instead of those indi ca ting brigade or seniority. 5 Squadron/company signs, painted on turret sides and rear and sometimes front of AFVs, and cab doors of softskin tra nsport . Colour indica tes regi­ment by seniority; a rmoured cars used white. 5A 16in x 12in ; second-ill -comm and HQ Sqn, senior regt. sB 9in sides; 3 Troop, 'A' Sqn, second regt. 5C ' 211l square; HQ, 'B' Sqn, junior regt. 5D 6in rad ius ; CO, ' C ' Coy, armoured brigade motor batta li on. 6 Daimler Dingo Scout Car, used '940-45; plain 'Portland stone' colour, as were many desert vehicl es. M ed ica l officer's runabout in a rm oured

Legendes I tJiliversaJ carrier d 'un balail1OI1 motorise avec prisonnicrs ilaliclIs, '940 ; I'armcmcnt comprcnd un fusil Bo)'ll anti-tank, <':1 UIlC mitrailleusc Brcn , sous les couvcrtures da ns cen e photo, avec mOntage anti-aCrien. 11: Canon anti-tank Bofon 37 mm - ce n'etai ! pasd'anne reglemcntairedc l'Arm&! Britanniquc, mais la division fut forc~ de Ie r6quisitionner en 1940. 3 Un char Crus.1der Mk II d ' A Squadron 4 Troop, County of London Yeoma nry. Une vue typique d'un Ct]uipage de char, a une periode calme, et de leur char encombrC. 4 Lcs chaNi Stuart et Crusader Mk I, fin 1941 , dans Ie deserl ; ils sonl pcints en beige pale, sans camouflage ni enblCmcs. 5 I..cs chars ella camions se disjoignent de I'ordrc serre adople chaque nui l. Observez Ics chars Crusader el Granl , eelui- lit. avec I'emblcme lriangulaire d'A Squadron el Ics mots 'Avanti ! Avant i !' - cri de guerre italien. 6 Un cll111ion Fordson 15 cwt scrvait a tra nsporter chaq ue groupe d 'une seclion d'i nfa nterie mOlorisee. 7 Un cam ion Chevrolel 310n , servait it transporter ulle sect ion enticre de la brigade inf.1.nterie-camion et accomplit beaucoup d' autres taches de transportation. 8 Transl)()rteur de chaNi \Vhite­Ruxlall 181On, rem place plus lard par Ie transporteur art iculC, Scammell. 9 Automobile blindee H umber Mk III dans cette vue t)'piquede desert observez ['auto tout couvene d 'cfrels, attaches partoul CI Ie nom ·Clara' sur la lOurelle. 10 ChaNi Grant sur la plainedescne; Ic char Ie plus prochc porte I'emblcmea ca rredc ' B' Squadron sur la tourelle.

II Un Daimler Dingo, \·oiture de reconnaissance du 4th Field Squadron Royal Engineen. Lcsemblema typiquescomprellnent I'attribut de la division avec, en meme temps, [' insignc tactique de ['unite. 12 Canon anti-tank l\<\k [I 6 pound, comme il ~ Ia i t ulil ise par la division de la mi-t942. II elait transportc sur un camion dans I' Afriq ue d u nord. 13 L deteCleUNi clcclriques de mines, distribucs immcdiatemenl avant la balaille d 'Alamein. '4 Un poste sanitaire de regiment dans Ie desert avec une ambulance Austin K'2. 15 On demonte Ie !Iloteur d 'un char Stuart. 16 Morlier de 3- en combat, en h alie 1943. 17 Lcs voilUres de quartier general a Pompei i; a gauche un Dorehester - une voiture de commandement blindce. Rommel se servit d'un Dorchester pris a I'cnncmi dans Ie desert . • 8 Un char Sherman en Italie, carnoune de beige el de noir, avec I'emblcrne triangulaire d 'A Squadron et Ie panncau d'idelHifi ca tion cn rouge el blanc sur 101 IOu rei Ie. 19 Lc posle rccepteur No 19, Ie poste reglementaire pour Ics chan et d'aulres voilUres pcildanl la deuxieme p..1rtie de la guerre. 20 Lcs ingenicurs 'Ianccnt' un 'Baile:y bridge:' en Italie.

21 Un camion Halford 3lon, Ie carnion normalement util ise pour tranSI)()rter les troupes en 1944- 45. 22 Un tracteur Scammell qui servait a remorquer les chars abimes. 23 I..es canons autopropulses de campagne - Ics Sexton 25 I)()Ulld, en France, 1944. 14 I..es pieces anti-tal.lks autopropulsees, les M lo Achilles 17 jXlund, en Norma nd ie. Une ballerie de canons autOpropulses f.-,.isait partie de I'armcment du regimem ami-tank. 25 Vne piece ami-aerienne 40mm Bofon, en Allemagne: 1944. Avcc quelquc:s peti lcs modifications, Ie Bofon etait I'anne legere regiemelllaire anti-aerienne pendant toule la guerrc. 26 Une volturc de recon naissance 1·lumbcr el une aUlo-chenille M3 dc la ,ph Armoured Brigadc. Dans la 7th Armoured Division Ie Humber sen 'ai l plusieun Elau-Majon el les

regt ; unit a nd di visiona l signs obscured by sand cha nnel. 7 Air recognition signs, on truck bonn ets or tilts, AFV turre ts or engine decks, as la rge as possibl e: ,A ' 94' , round edge of turre t top. ,B ' 942. ,C Late ' 942- mid-'943, shown on pink a nd green scheme used on AFVs around tim e of Ala mein. ,D ' 943 onwards. 8 Ground recognition signs : 8A Tunisia a nd Ita ly. 8B Desert, ' 94 '. 9 75 mm ha lf- track, ,nh Hussa rs, ' 944, in kha ki and black N W Europe scheme. 10 Vehicle names, often not appli ed: lOA 1St RTR, ' 940. lOB 3rd CLY, '942. II Vehi cle serial number styles: IIA T a nk in desert. liB Ambulance, NW Europe. 12 Da imler Mk I Armoured Car, "th Hussars, winter '944- 45. Plai n kha ki overpa inted whi te in snow. Liul ejohn adapter on 2pdr gun a nd Vickers 'K ' gun on turret pintl e were standard a llhis tim e.

11th Hussan, CI Ie ~13 eillil employc par I'infanterie mOlOrisee de 101 Rifle Urigade. 27 VII char Challenger avec une piece 17 pound etait employe par Ic:s 8th Hussan de la 7th Armoured Division. 28 TransjXlrteur Windsor de la section anti-tank, 15I(5Ih Queen's Regi melll 1945.

Planches en couleur A Les insignes de la division, comme portCs sur les voiturc:s el quelquefois sur les vetements, furent changes de la rondelle blanche au jerboa rougc, debut 1940. Celul-ci, avcc Ie je:rboa sur un carreau blanc, elaiem employes simuhanemelll pcndant les annees 1943- 44: I'auribut noir sur I'epaulet fUI inlroduit en 1944- 45·

Le lableau d ' organisation dcmontre la division en mai 194'2. Les panneaux el les ehiffres colores ctaicllt portes sur les voilU res de diflerentes unites divisionnclles; Ics atlributs de easquette indiquelll Its regimen15 qui equipaient eo unitesdansl'organisaliondivisionnelleacetteepoquc. Dalula 71h Armoured Division 10 palllleaUX ctles chiffres d'unite etaient d'habitude allies a I'attribut de division dans un seul insigne, I'attribut de division place au-dessus de celui de l'unite.

B L1 frontiere Egypt-Libyecli 1940. A gauchese trouve une automobile blindec, un Rolls Royce 19'24, avec I'equipagequl porte les berets brUludes 11th Hussars. Remarquez les bandeaux rouges etl'abscnee d 'atlributs. Un lance-corporal du King's Royal Rifle Corps el un Lieutenant du mCllle regiment parle a\·ec un Private du Royal Army Sen ·ice Corps. Lc chevron dc rang du Rifleman CSt en noir, distinction rcgimentale, el I'oflieier porte Ie ealot vert des rangs commissionnCs du regiment, avec I'emblcllle du cor-dc-chasse en argent sur une coearde rouge. Lcs deux homllICS portelli 101 cienturc, Ics bretelles elc. de I'annec 1937. l..esoldat RASC porte Ie casque colonial a I'ancicnne mode, avec I'anribut en couleurs regimentalcs; les troupes dll frOllt se deparlirent de I'habitude en 1940. A drol le se trouvc un Vicken Light Tank Mk VIB du 1St Royal Tank Regiment I'«]uipage porle toujours la s.-,.Iopen e noire du RTR des premieNi mois de ]a gucrre. Observcz les insignes individucls de division et d'unile sur Ie dcvant du char, eequi n'Clait pas rare a ce temps-Ia. Dans Ie fond vous voyez un camion Morris 3oeWt, pcint cn beige pale et avec des plaques matricules egyptiennes.

C Divisional Support Group, Rczegh, novembre 1941. Par les temps froids et pluvieux Its troupes portaient Ics pardcssus, Ics veSlcs en cuir, el mcme Its bones en caoutchouc.

Dans Ie fond , a ga uche, vous vo)'ez l'i:quip.1ge du '25pdr canon de campagne du lSI Ficld Regiment, Royal Arlillery. Au centre se tient Brigadier 'Jock' Campbell, Victoria Cross, dans son break Ford adaptc it. voilUre de quartier general. A droile rcmarqucz ['equipage de deux hommes d 'ull Brcll , avec les allributs dans Ie cou1cun dll 2nd Bn, 'nle R ifle Brigade. Observez le:s munitions et les effe15 dispenCs panout , el Ie M P38 allemand; les milraillettes en manquaiel1 t a celie pcriode-I:1. Dans Ie fond, .j droite, se trouvent un mortier 2 inch et un Boys ·55 inch fus il anI i-lank.

39

D Une routt, en Hollandc. '944- 45. A ga uche se lient un private de 13 '3' (Queens) Infantry Brigade,av« Ie casque, modele [944,el un (usil N04 Mk I. II porte une vale en CUiT aussi un bloUJi()Il a I'eprcuve du vtm, ((nUe leopard dislribuee pour la premiere fois pour Its operations en NorvCgc mais garclee par quelques unites ulterieurtmcnt. Dalls Ie fond vous voye;: un oflici cr dll RE~'IE sur un BSA B.30 mOlocyclcnc, et un char Cromwell des 8th H ussarsavec insignes de division el d 'uniti:. La lOurel1e est camouR&: de ueillage en fil de fer et des lambc:aux . Au cemre se tiell! un lance-corporal, mOlocyclislc de la j\·l ilitary Police de la division, armed 'un milrailletlc Stell el d 'un pistoict. Dans Ie fond, it d roi le, se trouve un cha r Stuart Mk V de la re<:onnaissancc Iroop des 81h Hussars, dont on a enleve la tourelle, CI montca la place une mitraillette '50 inch. A droite vous voyel unjeep du dctaehement Royal Engineers, et un officier qui [)()rte une salopeue d'hiver de I'equipage de char et [e calOi vert ct couleur de I'or, particuticr aux officiers des 8th Hussars.

E Emblemes et camouflage. ( I ) Char AI3 1941 avec emblemes du 3 Troop, A Squadron, r~imcmsuperieurdc la brigade. (2) LcsslylesdilfCrenu d'indicalion des timiles de poids sur les ponu. (3) Un canon Pries t 105111111, 5th Royal Horse Art illery, en Italie '943- observel Ie dcssous peint en blanc. (4) Les drapeaux etaient chan~es chaque jour en code de reconnaissance. A _ commandant , lroisieme reg1ll1em dans [a brigade. B. commandant, A Squadron, deuxicme regiment. C _ char de 2 T roop, regiment cadet. (5) Lcs emblcmcs d'escadron peinu sur les voitures blindees. La couleurs indiquell t la superiorite des regimcnts ct les automobiles blindecs se servcnt du blanc: A _ Commandan t cn second, HQSquadron, regimcnt superieur. B- 3 T roop A Sc:luadron, deuxiblle regiment. C _ HQB Squadron , regiment cadet. D =commandalll, C Company, bataiUon d 'i nfanterie mOlOriseede la brigade blindee. (6) Voiture de camp .. 1gne un Daimler Dingo d'un mCdecin milit;tire du regiment blindee. (7) Signes de reconnaissance aerien ne sur Its toia des voilures : A - 194' , B_ t942, C _ 1942- 43, D .. '943- 45. (8) Panneaux dercconnalssallceemployesell T Ullisie et ell Italic (A) etdans ledi:serl (8 ). (9) Auto-chenille 75mm, , tth Hussan, 1944. ( lOA et B) Styles typiques des noms de chars, pas souvent utilises. ( I IA el B) Styles Iypiques de numeros matricutes d'un char et d'une ambulance. ( 12) Camouflage d 'hiver d'ull Daimler lI .. lk I autOmobile blindee des 11th Huss.11"S, 1944- 45·

O'be r scbrift I Ein Universal Carrier cines mOlorisierten Infanteriebataillonsmil italicllischen Kriegsgefallgenen, [940. Die Bordbewaffnung des Fahn:eugs iSI eine Boys Panlerabwehrkanone (PAK) und ein Bren, lcichtes M-G, aufciner Fliegerab­wehmlontierung (im Bilde ilbel"logen). ~ Eine Bofors 37mm PAK ; nicht die EinheilS ..... alfe Hirdas brilische Heer, sondem in [940, wegen l\-tangel an anderer Waffen, in die Division als NotlOsung eingeHihrt. 3 Ein Crusader ~'I k II Panler von 'A' Squadron, 4 Troop, 3rd Count y of London Yeoma nry. Typisches Ruhepausebild. Die vielen Klamollen alii Panler heachten! i Stuart und Crusader Mk I Panler in der Wuste, aplit 1941. Die Tamfarbe ist hellbeigeohne irgendwelcher Markicrung. 5 Panzer und Las tkraftwagen (LKW) brechen von einem Nachtlager auf. Crusader und Grant Pamer sind im Bilelc : die ersten mit dem 'A' Squadron Drcicckabzeichen und dem ilalienischen Wahlspruch : 'Avanti! Avanli!' 6 Ein Fordson 15 CWI LKW. JOOe Infanteriegruppc cines motorisienen Infanterielugs wurde in cinCIII solchen ' Vagen transportierl. 7 Ocr Chevrolet 3-ton LK W. Das Alllwechsfahrteug konnte cinen ga nzen Zug ciner mOlomierten Infanteriebrigade transportieren, und hatle auch viele alldere Transportaufgaben 7.U verrich[en. 8 Das White-Ruxtall 18-ton Pan­urtransport fahneug; es wurde spitler durch das Scammell Transportfahr.t:eug enellt. 9 Ocr Humber Mk I I I Panlerwagen ineiner typischen \VilStenSlene. Die vielen lusa [lIichen Klamotten und die Turmname 'Clara' beachten! 10 Gram Panzer aufciner 'Vilstenebene. Ocr Panler im Vordergrund tmgt am Turm das viereckige Ableichen dcr 'B' Schwadron.

I I Ein Daimler Dingo Panzcnpiihwagen vom 4th Field Squadron. Royal f.ngineen. Typisch ist das kombinierte laklische Divisions - und Einheitsab­lcichen. I~ Die Mk l l 6-pound PAK, VOIl der Division ab Mille 1942 benutzt. In Nordafrika wurde sic auf einem LKW getragen. 13 Solche elektrische Minensuchgemte wurden kurt vor der Schlacht lU EI Alamein geleifert. Ii RegimenlSveroondpta tl mit Austin K2 Krankenwagen in der WilsIe. 15 Motoraustausch in einem Stuart Panler. 16 Ein 3-inch ,,·IOner im Einsatl, halien, 1943. 17 Fahneuge des DivisiotUaabs in Pompeii; links ein Dorchester Panlentabsfahneug. Rommel hal im Wilstenkerieg einen erbeutelen Dorches­ter in gebrauch genommen. 18 [in Sherman Panler in halien. Die T arnf:1Tben sind beige und schwan, am Turm das "A' Squadron Dreieckabzeichen und die rot-weiss-rote Erkcnnungstafd. 19 Oat ·Nr. 19' Funkgemt, Einhcltsfllnkgerlit for Panzer und andere Fahrtellge in der 1.weiten Kriegshalfte. ~o l'ionicl'e schlagen cine 'Sailey nridge' cine Fluss in h alien.

~I Ein Bedford 3-lOn LKW de normal Truppentransporlwagen 1944- 45' ~It Die Scammel Zugrnaschine, als 'Bergepanler' cingesctzl. ~3 Die 'Sexton' '25-pounder selbstfahrhaubitlell , Frankrcich 1944. 24 M [0 Achilles 17-pounder Jagdpanler in der Normandie. Das Panzerabwehrregilllcnt der Division hatle cine U .. 1t1erie solcher Fahneugen. ~5 40mm Bofon Fliegerabwehrkanoncn (FLAK ), De­utschland 1944. Dicsc Kanone, in vielen Abarten, war die nonllalc leich[e FLAK der brilischen Armee den ganttn Krieg hindurch. ::t6 Humber Panlerspahwagen und M3 Halbkettenfahneug der 4th AmlOured Brigade. Ocr l'lumber wurd~ innerhalb der 7th Armoured Division von verschiedenen Stiibetl und "on den Illh Hussars, der 1\·13 von der Rifle Brigade (molorisierlen Inr:Ulteriercgimelll) bcnutzt. 27 Ein 'Challcnger' Pam:er mil 17-pounder Kanone, von den Auflarunguegimcnt, I I th Division. 28 Ein Windsor T ransportkcuenr..hrl.eug des l'all7.erabwehr.t:ugcs, Ist{5th Queen's Regiment. [945.

Farbtafeln A Das Divisionsableic.hen, auf FahrJ.eugen und manchmal auf Bekleidung gelragen, erfuhr einige l\nderungen : luent ein weisser Kreis, dann (im F riihjahr 1940) eine rOte Springmaus. letz[ere und eine Springmaus au,f einem weissen Viereck wurden 1943- 44 aile beide :w sehell . Dat schwane A.rmelablciehen erschien erst 1944- 45. .

Der Starke- und Ausrilstungsnachwcis (STAN ) leigt den Divisiollswsland im Mai [942. Die farbigen Schilde mil den Nummern wurden auf den Fahneugen der verschiedenen Divisionseinheiten getr.tgen. Die Milllenabzcichen sind die der Regimelller, die sich 1.U dieser Zeit inncrhalb der Division befanden. In der 7th Armoured Division war es ilblich das Divisionsableichcll und Einhei tswap­pen gleichlei[ig, mit denl crstcren nach oben, zu tragen.

B Oil' Grenle zwischen A.gypten und Lybien, [9-10. Links ei n Rolls Royce M [924 Panlerwagen mit einer iksatlUng der Illh HU$S..1n - braune Berets mit dunkelrotem Kop£band, ohne Mililenableichen. Ein Lance-Corporal und ein leulnant des King's Royal Rifle Corps unterhalten sich mil cinem Private des Royal Army Service Corps. Ocr Riflemall tmgt sein DiellStgradableichen (Winkel) in schwan - ein RcgimentHradition. Ocr Offilier tragt das grune Offiziersschiffchen des Regiments mit si lbernem J agdhomemblem auf roter Kokarde. Beidc Manner tragen die Kampfausrilstung M [937. Ocr RASC­soldat tragt den altmodischen Sonnenhelm mit dem Abzeichen in Re­gi mcntsfarben . Ocr Helm wurden von den Kampftruppen schon 1940 aufgegeben.

Reclm ei n Vickers Light T ank Mk V I B Yom ,st Royal Tank Regiment. Wah rend den cnlen Kriegsmonalen wurde das RT R mit den scwarl.cn Panlerkombinalionen ausgestatle[. Die gelrennlen Divisions und Einheits..1b­leichcn vorne am Panler bemerkcn; so etwas kam haufig IU dieser Zeil vor. 1m Hintergrund cin Morris 30-<:wl LKW, hellbeige und mit agyptischen 7.ivilell Kennlcichens.schilden.

C Divisional SUPI)()rt Group, Sidi Rezegh, November 194" Vorilbergehend war das Weller sagar kah und nass und die Truppen lOgen dann Mantel, Lederwams und Gummistiefd an. Links im Hintergrund steht die hesalling cines 2s-pdr Fddgeschulzcs "om lSI Field Regimen t, Royal Arlillery. In der Mille Brigadier 'J ock' Campbell 'Victoria Cross' inseinem ford Kombifahn:eug,das in cin Stabsfahrtcug verwandelt wordell ist. Rcchudiezwei-Mann Bcsa[zungeinen Bren Icichten M -Gs. Sie tragen die Ableichenr:lrben des 2nd Balallions The Rifle Brigade.

Die umherliegenden Munition, Gerat und die erbeutete deutsche M P 38 beachten! Solche Maschinenpistolen waren in diesen Tagen hum lU haben . Recha in Hintergrund stehen ein 2-inch Moner und cine Boys '55-inch PAK .

D Eine StrassenS1.ene in Holland, 19H- 45. Links cin Soldat (private) der 13 1 (Qucens) Infantry Brigade mit dcm Helm M 1944 und dem Gewehr NO.4 Mk I. Er tragt ein Lederwams und die windfeste Tarnjacke, die luerst rur die Operation in Norwegen lugeteih wurden, die aber in einigen Einhciten im spiileren Gebrauch bliehen. 1m Hintergrund cin Offizier der REr..·IE auf ci nem MOlorrad BSA B.30 und cin Cromwell Panler von den 81h Hussars mit kombiniertcn Divisions- und Einheitsabzcichen. DerTunn ist mit Drahtnetzund Stoflfetlcn gctarnt worden. In der Mittc ci n Lance-corporal Motorradfahrerdcr Divisions MilitaT))()lilclkompagnie. Als IkwaffnulIg hat er cine Pistole und cine S[en M-I'. Rechu im Hinlergrund ein Stuart Mk V Panzer der Reconnaissance Troop der 8th Hussars, ohne Turm und mit einem lUsat7.lichen -50-inch M-C. RechlS ein J eep dcr Divisions-Royal Engineerabteilung und ein Offizier der 8th Hussan in der PanzerbeS..1tlungswintcrkombi nation und dem griln-goldenen Regimentsschiffchen.

E Fahr.t:eugablcichen und Tarnfarhen. ( I ) Ein A 13 l)anzer, 1941 , mit den Abzcichen \'Om 3 Troop, A Squadron YOm rangal tcs ten Regiment der Brigade. (2) Verschiedene Briickengewichtsmarkierungen. (3) [ine ' Priesl ' J05mm selbstfahrende Kanone vom 5th Royal Horse Artillery, Italien, '943. Die weisse Rohrunterscite bemerken! (4) Radioanten nenwimpcl, die von T ag IU Tag in einer hcs timmlen Reihenfolge als Erken nungschiffre gewechscll wurden: A _ Chef des drillen RegimenlS der Brigade. B _ Chef, 'A' Sq uadron, des zweiten Regiment. C .. Panzer "om 2. Troop de Jlingsten Regimenu. (5) Panlerkompanieerkennungsableichen (die Farbenlelgen die Rangordnung cler Rcgimenter ; Radpanlerkampfwagcn lind Sp .. 'ihwagen trugen weiss) A ",Slellvertretellder KOlnpallIeche r, HQ Squadron des rangaitcslen Regi­menu. B_ 3. Troop, 'A' Squadron des zweitell Regiments. C= 'B' Squadron ­Stab des jilngslen Regiments. 0 = Kompaniechef, 'C' Company eines mOt­orisierten Infanteriebatallons einer Panlerbrigade. (6) Daimler Dill,lto Pan­zerspiihwagen cines Regimentsartztes cines PanlerregimenlS. (7) Erken­nUIlgS"l.eichell, die fUr Flugzeuge oben auf Fahneugen allgebraeht wurden: A - I94I, 13 - 1942, C - 1942- 43, 0 - 1943- 45. (8) Erkennungstafel (A) a.us I[alien und Tuncsien, (B) in der Wilste. (9) 75mm Halkettenselbslfahrlafettevon den 11th H Uss.1r1, 1944. ( [oA und B)-Ikispiele verschicdener Panzernamen, die ab und zu 1.U sehen waren. ( [ IA und U) - Ikispicle typischer Panzer- und Krankenwagenkennziffer. (12) Wintertarnfarben cines Daimler Mk I Pan­zerspiihwagen von den I [Ih Hussars, [944- 45.

O SPREY· VANGUARD

A seri es 01 books describing th e key units and weapons systems . of the Second World War, prepared by leading military experts

for the enthusiast and modell er, and ilili stratil~g authentic details of unirorms, in signia. annour and supporting vehicles, camouflage, markings and weapons.

Avec annotations en fran~s sur les planches en couleur

Mit Aufzeichnungen auf deutsch tiber die Farbtafeln

ISBN 0 85045 281 3

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