VALENZUELA VS UNSON32 PHIL 19 OCTOBER 20, 1915

PONENTE: Johnson, J.:

FACTS: On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of 34 parcels of land in Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna. With such, respondents Pedro Unson and Felix Unson presented their opposition to the registration of a portion of lot No. 1 which portion is known as lot No. 1-A, representing a stone wall, simply, constructed between lot No. 1 and the lot belonging to the said objectors. This wall extends from the street running in front of the lots owned by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots, for a distance of about thirty meters. It is about 38 centimeters wide and separates the lots claimed by the parties. At intervals along the wall, there are buttresses, which are constructed on both sides of the wall. About midway between the street and the rear end of the lots, resting on the wall, there is a kitchen belonging to the defendants which is about forty years old. About 8 meters from the street there is a cross wall, on the property of the plaintiff, which is joined to the wall in question. Along the street and in front of the lots, there is a sidewalk which is in front of the properties wherein it divides on the plaintiffs side of the wall. The wall appears to have been built as one wall. The plaintiffs attempt to show, in support of their claim of ownership of the wall that the kitchen referred to above was built so as to rest upon the wall, by the express permission given by them to the objectors, or their predecessors. That fact is strongly denied by the objectors. They claim that the kitchen was built without permission and without the objection on the part of the plaintiffs. Later a motion for a rehearing was made by the petitioners. Upon a consideration of said motion, the lower court, on the 15th day of December, 1913, modified that part of its first decision relating to lot No. 1-A, and declared that the same was a party wall. The lower court did not decree the registration of the wall. From the decision the objectors appealed to this court. The petitioners did not appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said wall belongs to the petitioners and registrable in their name.

HELD: No. Article 572 of the civil code states that When there is no title or exterior marks or proofs to the contrary, there is a presumption that a dividing wall between two adjoining properties is a party wall. Considering the fact that both parties have used the wall for the purpose of supporting the structures on their respective lots, that the plaintiffs have a wall joined to the wall in question and that they and the defendants have used as a partial support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character of the testimony with respect to ownership of the wall, we are of opinion that the said wall is a party wall that it belongs to the petitioners and objectors jointly. One of two or more joint owners of land cannot have the same registered against the opposition of the other joint owners.

DECISION: The judgment of lower court be affirmed without any finding as to costs, so ordered.

ACEBEDO V. ABESAMIS217 SCRA 186 GR NO. 102380 JANUARY 18, 1993

PONENTE: CAMPOS, Jr., J

FACTS: The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in QC and Caloocan. Said estate allegedly has unsettled claims. The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners, and the others are the private respondents. Due to prolonged pendency of the case, respondents-heirs filed a motion for approval of sale. The said sale involved properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City. It was further stated in said motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the P6 million paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money and the balance of P6 million more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct Administrator Herodotus to sell the properties mentioned in the motion. Petitioner-administrator interposed an Opposition to Approval of Sale to alleging that some of the heirs have sold some real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak without his knowledge, approval of this court, and of some heirs. Petitioners moved to be given a period of 45 days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than P12 million. The case was set for hearing. Petitioners have not found any buyer so they asked the court for an in extendible period of 30 days to look for a buyer. Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly his signature was made to appear. After he confronted the notary public he revoked his notarial act on it. Petitioner filed civil action to secure the declaration by the court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and Absolute Sale. The period lapsed without having found a buyer and petitioner Demosthenes sought to nullify the orders granting them several periods. After seven long months, petitioner-administrator filed another Opposition to Approval of Sale, maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the coup detat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the Properties and the court ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a conference but still the parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So the parties agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping while petitioners negotiate for higher price. Petitioners filed a supplemental opposition to the approval of the Deed. Respondent Court issued the challenged order approving the conditional sale in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in the said properties and ordered administrator Herodotus to sell the remaining portions of the said properties also to Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the heirs. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and private respondents filed their Opposition. Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of petitioners were denied. Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it for lack of merit. Heirs filed a Motion for Execution of the Order. Petitioners then filed this petition forcertiorari.ISSUE: Whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties.

HELD: Yes. In the case of Dillena vs. CA, this court made a pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provisionstating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.

DECISION: Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SALAS VS. JARENCIO46 SCRA 734 AUGUST 30, 1972

PONENTE: ESGUERRA, J.

FACTS: On February 24 1919, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgement declaring the City of Manila the owner of in fee simple of a parcel of land in the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila. Pursuant to said judgment, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued in favour of the said City, Original Certificate of Title covering the abovementioned parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favour ofPura Villanueva. The Municipal Board of Manila, presided by the then Vice- Mayor Antonio Villegas adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City Proper as Bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska streets as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Later, a bill was filed in the House of Representatives but was then revised by Representatives Cases, Raquiza and Yiguez.The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the president and became Republic Act No. 4118. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE: Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?

HELD: Theconclusionoftherespondentcourtthat Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the City without compensation is, therefore,unfounded. Inthe lastanalysisthe land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefitofthepeoplethereinforwhomthe State can legislate in the exerciseofits legitimate powers. Ifit is a patrimonialproperty, why should the City of Manila be requesting the President to make the representation tothelegislatureto declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said landbelongstotheStateandwassimply grantedinusufructtothe CityofManilafor municipal purposes.

DECISION:The appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with free and untrameled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118.

EDU VS. GOMEZG.R NO. L-33397 JUNE 22, 1984

PONENTE: Relova, J.

FACTS: This case involves a model Volkswagen, bantam car owned by Lt. Walter A. Bala of Clark Airbase, Angeles City,and registered at the Angeles City Land Transportation Commission Agency. The Office of the Commission on Land Transportation received a report on August 25, 1970 from the Manila Adjustment Company that the abovementioned car was stolen. Petitioners Eduardo Domingo, Carlos Rodriguez, and Patricio Yambao, agents of Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, with the Land Transportation Commission, recognized subject car in the possession of private respondent Lucila Abello and immediately seized and impounded the car as stolen property. Likewise, petitioner Romeo F. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant to Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec. 4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or otherwise not properly registered." Lucila Abello filed a complaint for replevin with damages in respondent court, impleading petitioners, praying for judgment, among others, to order the sheriff or other proper officer of the court to take the said property into his custody and to dispose of it in accordance with law. On February 18, 1971, respondent judge of the then Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order for the seizure of the personal property. With respect to the replevin filed by private respondent Lucila Abello, respondent Court of First Instance Judge found that the car in question was acquired by Lucila Abello by purchase from its registered owner, Marcelino Guansing, for the valuable consideration of P9,000.00, under the notarial deed of absolute sale, dated August 11, 1970; that she has been in possession thereof since then until February 3, 1971 when the car was seized from her by the petitioners who acted in the belief that it is the car which was originally registered in the name of Lt. Walter A. Bala and from whom it was allegedly stolen. Finding for the private respondent, respondent judge held the replevin case in favor of her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the right to seize and impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 is tenable.

HELD: No. Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads: Sec. 60. The lien upon motor vehicles, any balance of fees for registration,re-registration or delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor vehicle concerned. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and impound subject property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.

DECISION: The petition is hereby DENIED.

CRUZ VS CAG.R. NO. 122904. APRIL 15, 2005

PONENTE: Tinga, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners Thelma Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, as well as Arnel Cruz. Petitioners filed said case on February 11, 1983 against Arnel Cruz and herein private respondents Summit Financing Corporation (Summit'), Victor S. Sta. Ana and Maximo C. Contreras, the last two in their capacities as deputy sheriff and ex-officio sheriff of Rizal, respectively, and Ramon G. Manalastas in his capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal. In the Complaint alleged that petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Rizal. Yet the property, which was then covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 495225, was registered only in the name of Arnel Cruz. According to petitioners, the property was among the properties they and Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of Delfin Cruz, husband of Adoracion Cruz. consequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial Partition agreed in writing to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the properties although they had been subdivided and individually titled in the names of the former co-owners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition. This arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement executed on August 23, 1977 or a day after the partition. On June 4, 1980, a Real Estate Mortgage was constituted on the disputed property then covered by TCT No. 495225 to secure the loan obtained by Arnel Cruz thru Nelson Tamayo from respondent Summit. Then in their complaint before the RTC, petitioners asserted that they co-owned the properties with Arnel Cruz, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence, they argued that the mortgage was void since they did not consent to it. In ruling in favor of petitioners, the trial court declared that with the execution of the Memorandum of Agreement, petitioners and Arnel Cruz had intended to keep the inherited properties in a state of co-ownership. The trial court stated that respondent Summit should suffer the consequences of incorrectly assuming that Arnel Cruz was the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property. It found respondent Summit negligent in its failure to inquire further into the limitations of defendant Cruz's title. Thus, the trial court declared that only the undivided share of Cruz in the mortgaged property was validly transferred to respondent Summit although it granted petitioners' prayer for nullification, per the dispositive portion of its Decision. reconsideration of the decision. Petitioners insist that the Memorandum of Agreement 'expressly created a pro-indiviso co-ownership over the property. Thus, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the mortgage considering that it was executed without their knowledge and consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is still common-ownership between the parties over the property?

HELD: Yes, the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal shares of the following registered real properties and That as a result of said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned and the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her. That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of their respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these presents do hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition. Furthermore the Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting parties herein up to and until the last lot is covered by the deed of partial partition above adverted to shall have been disposed of or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares received by each of them. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the parties only bound themselves to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties. The agreement does not direct reconveyance of the properties to reinstate the common ownership of the parties. To insist that the parties also intended to re-establish co-ownership after the properties had been partitioned is to read beyond the clear import of the agreement and to render nugatory the effects of partition, which is not the obvious or implied intent of the parties.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41298 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

FRANCISCO VS. PAEZ54 PHIL 239 JANUARY 14, 1930

PONENTE: Romualdez, J.

FACTS: In the complaint of Marcelo Francisco, plaintiff, he claims a right of way, upon payment of indemnity, across defendant Paezs land; that the latter recognize the plaintiffs ownership of a piece of land of 23.46 square meters, that he vacate it, and that the defendant indemnify him for the damages arising from said occupation. Respondents Timoteo Paez and Ricardo Jabson answered with general denial and further claims that his right has already prescribed and plaintiff has no right since there is another possible way, which is shorter and less prejudicial respectively. The Court of First Instance of Manila held that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the land and house built by Paez upon payment of its value or to compel Paez to buy the land which is P20 per square meter. The plaintiff appealed this judgment questioning the court in not holding the issue on right of way. The trial court held that the plaintiff can no longer obtain the reliefs he sougt his action is barred by the statute of limitations. Under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the action to recover ownership or possession of real property, or an interest therein may only be exercised within ten years after the cause of said action arises. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs right of way over defendants Paezs land has prescribed or imprescriptible.

HELD: Although it is true that easements are extinguished by non-user for twenty years (art. 546, No. 1, Civil Code), the case at bar, does not deal with an easement which has been in use, and the legal provision just cited is only applicable to easements which being in use are later abandoned. Legal easements may be extinguished by non-user, but only with respect to the actual form or manner in which they have been exercised; and the right or the power to claim the exercise of the legal easement does not prescribe, as happens especially in the right of way and the easement of waters. In the case of intermittent easements, such as the right of way, the waiver must be, if not formal and solemn, at least such as may be obviously gathered from positive acts; and therefore, the mere fact that the plaintiff and his predecessors refrained from claiming the easement, without any positive act to imply a real waiver, does not bring the case within the purview of article 546, No. 5, of the Civil Code.

DE LA CRUZ VS. RAMISCAL450 SCRA 449 FEBRUARY 4, 2005

PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Respondent Olga Ramiscal owned a property located at 18th avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City while Petitioners Elizabeth De la Cruz and Alfredo De la Cruz owned a property with an area of 85 square meters registered in the name of the latters mother at the back of the respondents property. Petitoners enclosed with a gate, fence, and roof a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent as their pathway to and from 18th avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. The respondent leased her proper to Phil. Orient Motors which owned a property adjacent to that of the respondent. The Phil. Motors later on sold its property to San Benito Realty. Thereafter, it was found out that respondent owned the pathway used by the petitioners through an engineer who surveyed the properties. When there was no settlement between the parties in Barangay proceedings, the respondent filed a civil case seeking for the demolition of the structure and further asserted that there is an existing right of way other than his property as evidenced by the subdivision plan presented by the respondent. The petitioners admitted that they used his property but with his knowledge and consent. It was on 1976, that respondent constructed on her property of a motor shop but petitioners opposed the building of perimeter wall as it would render their property without any adequate ingress and egress and so they asked respondent to give them a pathway on the eastern side of her property but offered them the northern side which is the subject of the case. The petitioners were made to sign a document waiving their right to ask for an easement along the eastern side of the said property and it was submitted to the person in charge of the construction of the motor shop. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the petitioners for it was beyond the reglementary period. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way

(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way being used by petitioners.

HELD:(1) No. An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person. The statutory basis for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code. In this case, Petitioners failed to show competent evidence other than their bare claim. The hands of this Court are tied from giving evidence to petitioners self-serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by respondent for the following reasons: First, petitioners didnt produce evidence as to the agreement. Second, the head of the construction has no authority. Moreover, the conferment of a legal easement of right of way under article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.

( 2) No. the essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defedants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is acceded to the complainant. The second and third elements are certainly lacking here. As borne by the records, it was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by petitioners was part of her property.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

PALERO-TAN VS. URDANETA JR.A.M. NO. P-07-2399/558 SCRA 28 JUNE 18, 2008

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS: On July 8, 2005, complainant Edna Palero-Tan, Court Stenographer III discovered that her ring and bracelet worth fifteen thousand pesos (Php 15,000), which she kept in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office were missing. She informed her officemates about it, but nobody claimed to have seen it. Complainant claimed that the only person who was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was respondent Ciriaco Urdaneta Jr., utility worker of the same court. On July 28, 2005, an officemate, Altone, confided to her that he heard from his landlady, Nable, that respondent and his wife Milagros had a quarrel because the latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse. Milagros suspected that respondent bought the jewelry for his mistress. Complainant approached the RTC judge, Judge Faluche and relayed to him the information she gathered. Milagros confirmed the information to Judge Faluche. Respondent in his answer denied that he stole the jewelry. He claimed that he found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet on June 29, 2005, and took it for safekeeping with the intention of returning them to whoever was the owner. However, his wife, on June 30, 2005 found them and accused him of having an affair. To stop the wifes nagging, he threw the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house. On the day that the complainant is asking about them, respondent did not speak out not until Judge Faluche confronted him and after his wife had already disclosed the evident facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents bare denial of any personal interest in the pieces of jewelry can be given credence.

HELD: No. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his officemates that he found something. Article 719 of the Civil Code, explicitly requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities.

QUEVADA VS. COURT OF APPEALS502 SCRA 233 / G.R NO. 140798 SEPTEMBER 19, 2006

PONENTE: Azcuna, J.FACTS: Before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the plaintiff/respondent said that he is the lessor of a parcel of land with a residential house in Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in 1994, he and defendant/petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease for the period from August 15, 1994 to August 15, 1995, at a monthly rental of 2,500.00. After expiration of the lease, they entered into another Contract of Lease, commencing from August 15, 1995 to April 15, 1996. After the expiration of the extended Lease, the petitioner continued possessing the premises, but without payment of any reasonable compensation. Because of the petitioners refusal to vacate the premises, private respondent referred the matter to the barangay court for conciliation.On January 20, 1998, private respondent served upon the petitioner a notice to vacate the leased property within a period of fifteen (15) days, to pay 5,000 rental starting May, 1996, and every month thereafter until the premises shall have been vacated. On the other hand, petitioner answered that as early as November 1985, he built a house on the lot which was finished in 1986 and occupied the house as his residence. A Lease of Contract was executed for him to pay the rentals at 2,500.00 a month, but only with respect to the land and as an assurance that as soon as petitioner would be in financial position to do payment, the former will transfer the title to the latter. The private respondent did not give him a chance to pay the purchase price and refused to accept the monthly rental of the lot. Because of his refusal, petitioner opened an account in trust for the private respondent where the monthly rentals could be deposited. Petitioner added that there was an implied trust by virtue of the true agreement whereby the purchase price of the lot would be paid by the private respondent and for the latter, later on, to transfer the title after he shall have paid the purchase price. The MeTC of Manila, Branch 30, ruled in favor private respondent. Petitioner appealed, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VII, affirmed the decision of MeTCs Decision. Petitioner then went on appeal again asking for reversal of the RTC Decision. The CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming the appealed decision. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review by Marcelito D. Quevada, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:1. Whether the action for ejectment is proper

2. Whether such action can be brought by private respondent who is not the titled owner of the property3. Whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the value of the house on the property

4. Whether there is an implied trust

HELD:1. The action for ejectment or, more specifically, unlawful detainer or desahucio is under the proper jurisdiction of the MeTC. The Lease Contract was not extended again after its expiration on April 15, 1996. Petitioners continued use and occupancy of the premises without any contract between him and private respondent was by mere tolerance or permission of the latter. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner.

2. Private respondent may bring the action for unlawful detainer, even though he is not the titled owner of the leased property. Such action has for its object the recovery of the physical possession or determination of who is entitled to possession de facto of the leased premises, not the ownership of the lot and not its legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.

3. Petitioner should be paid for the value of the portion of the house covered by the lease, to be offset against rentals due. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

4. There is no implied trust. Petitioner fails to support his assertion that such has been created in his favor and that the purchase of the land by private respondent is for and in his behalf.

DECISION: The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 53209, dated September 16, 1999 and November 11, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED BUT WITH THE MODIFICATION that the case is REMANDED to the court a qou.

CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE VS. BERCILLESG.R. NO. L-40474 AUGUST 29, 1975

Ponente: Concepcion, JR., J.

FACTS: The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The City Council of Cebu, through Resolution 2193 , declared the terminal portion of M.Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. The City Council of Cebu passed Resolution 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder. The City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered (LRC N-948; LRC Record N-44531). The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which maybe the object of a common contract?

HELD: YES. When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.

DECISION: The order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside.

SANTOS VS. BERNABE54 PHIL 19 NOVEMBER 6, 1929PONENTE: Villa-Real, J.

FACTS: Urbano Santos, plaintiff, deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe. At the same time, Pablo Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of Tiongson and Santos were mixed together and cannot be separated. Later on, Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. So Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of attachment and the Court granted it. Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had already proceeded with the attachment, so Santos files a complaint. Santos contends that Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay attached by the sheriff as part of those deposited in the warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment thereof, Tiongson claimed that the cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own.

HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately. Ther being no means to separate out of the palay attached and sold, the following rule prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by will of one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3php per cavan.DECISION: The judgement appealed from is hereby modified. Pablo Tiongson is ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos.

ALDOVINO V. ALUNAN IIIGR NO. 102232 MARCH 9, 1994

PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Due to the execution of Executive Order No. 120 (particularly Section 29), which provided for the reorganization of the Ministry of Tourism, several incumbents who were not assigned to new positions lost their employment. Now petitioners seek the relief provided to their co-workers as adjudged by the several preceding cases of Mandani, Abogar and Arnaldo. The Solicitor General who contends that unlike the petitioners in the above mentioned cases, the petitioners in the case before the bench have slept on their rights for it had taken them four years to present an action- hence laches has set in. Petitioners contend that such was the case for upon loss of employment, many had to return to far flung provinces where the only news they could receive was from the slow, and often unreliable word of mouth.

ISSUES:1. Whether Laches has set in.

2. Whether Petitioners have slept on their rights.

3. Whether public respondents may raise prescription.

HELD:1. NO. Laches should not be seen as mere ordinary prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches concerned with the effect of delay. Laches in a question of inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or in relation to the property. I the case at bar, if ever invoked, (laches) must rule in favor of the petitioners and the intervenors who were unjustly injured y public respondents unlawful acts . The prejudice from the high-landed violation of the rights of the petitioners and intervenors resulting in their loss of employment is far more serious than the inconvenience to public respondents in rectifying their own mistakes.

2. NO. Picketing with placards demanding immediate reinstatement could not be any less than written demands sufficient to interrupt the period of prescription. Incidentally, even the picketing of the premises and the placed placards demanding their reinstatement could not be any less than written demands sufficient to interrupt the period of prescription.3. NO, for prescription must yield to the higher interests of justice. At the late stage, the court refused to consider prescription not only because it was never raised and therefore foreclosed, but incidentally, prescription must also give way to the higher interests of justice.DECISION: Petition GRANTED

VITUG VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 82027 MARCH 29, 1990

PONENTE: Sarmiento, J.

FACTS: This is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U.S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitugs estate with her (Mrs. Vitug) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate. On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties velonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interest, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, the allged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as increment thereto. According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from the savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila. On April 22, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account no.35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allgedly no ground for reimbersment. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for concealment of funds belonging to the estate. Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorhip agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.

ISSUE: Whether or not the survivorship agreement between spouses Romarico Vitug and Dolores Vitug is valid?

HELD: There is no demonstration here that the survivorhip agreement had been executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by tyhe respondent court in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account no. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets of Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.

DECISION: Decision and resolution set aside.REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 108926 JULY 12, 1996

PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS: Subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly Pamplona), Las Pias, Rizal, now Metro Manila with an area of 45, 295 sq. m. was first owned by Santos dela Cruz. Said subject property was subsequently bought by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. When Gil Alhambra died, an extrajudicial partitioning was made by his heirs and registered said property under their names. On 5 July 1966, they executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage deeding the subject property to Democrito O. Plaza (Plaza, for brevity). Upon receipt of the full payment, they executed a Release of Mortgage on 1 August 1968. After the sale, he took possession of the property and paid the taxes due thereon for the years 1966 up to 1986, and declared it in his name on 1985. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the caretaker and administrator thereof. On 14 November 1986, Plaza filed a petition which was amended on 17 July 1987 for the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property. On 14 June 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Makati confirmed Plazas title over the property which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 8, 1993. On 24 February 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity) filed its opposition to said registration alleging among others that: a) Plaza and his predecessors in interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior to that, b) the muniments of title and tax declarations as well as tax payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by Plaza, and c) the subject property pertains to the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not Plaza has established actual possession of the property

2. Whether or not said property being the subject of a housing project of the government may hinder ones claim over it

HELD:1. After Plaza has taken possession of the subject property, he paid the taxes due thereon and declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and B-013-01391. The existence of such are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of the owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

2. The existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 679 did not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves to be the owner of the said property since property covered under such law is only withdrawn from sale or any settlement for it is reserved for the purpose intended by the law. Thus, the Plazas ownership over the property must be respected and he cannot be barred from having the land titled under his name.

OO VS. LIMGR NO. 154270 MARCH 19, 2010

PONENTE: Bersamin, J;

FACTS: On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of the OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa; that Lot No. 943 of the Balambang Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to Louisa by Spouse Diego Oo and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oo), the lots registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oo (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of spouses Oo, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Louisa a notarized document denominated as confirmation of sale, which was duly filed in the Provincial Assessors Office of Cebu. Zosimo Oo and the petitioner Teofisto Oo (Oos) opposed Lims petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo. On account of the Oos opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a compliant for quieting of title, averring additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oos be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be cancelled and new certificate of title be issued in the name of Louisa in lieu of said OCT. In their answer, the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Louisa; and that the confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic. In its decision dated July 30, 1996, the RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Louisa Narvios-Lim (Louisa), Lims deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest. Appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC on January 28, 2002. Petitioners motion for reconsideration through the resolution dated June 17, 2002.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession.

HELD: 1. Quieting of Title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, uncertainty-affecting title to real property. The petitioners contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgement pursuant to which the title was declared. The avertment readily show that the action was neither a direct or collateral attack on the OCT for Lim only asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lims mother, and resultantly should be cancelled.

2. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. However prescription was not relevant to determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.

PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 150301 OCTOBER 2, 2007

PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Municipality of Navotas assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from petitioner Philippine Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation located inside the Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). The assessed taxes had remained unpaid despite the demands made by the municipality which prompted it, through Municipal Treasurer Florante M. Barredo, to give notice to petitioner on October 29, 1990 that the NFPC will be sold at public auction on November 30, 1990 in order that the municipality will be able to collect on petitioners delinquent realty taxes which, as of June 30, 1990, amounted to P23,128,304.51, inclusive of penalties. Petitioner sought the deferment of the auction sale claiming that the NFPC is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 977, it (PFDA) is not a taxable entity.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay real property tax.

HELD: Local government units, pursuant to the fiscal autonomy granted by the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code, can impose realty taxes on juridical persons19 subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Code:

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following: taxes, fees, charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.

Nonetheless, the above exemption does not apply when the beneficial use of the government property has been granted to a taxable person. Section 234 (a) of the Code states that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions is exempted from payment of the real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."

Thus, as a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality of the national government, is exempt from real property tax but the exemption does not extend to the portions of the NFPC that were leased to taxable or private persons and entities for their beneficial use.

In light of the above, petitioner is only liable to pay the amount of P62,841,947.79 representing the total taxes due as of December 31, 2001 from PFDA-owned properties that were leased, as shown in the Summary of Realty Taxes Due Properties Owned and/or Managed by PFDA as per Realty Tax Order of Payment dated September 16, 2002.

LAUREL VS GARCIAG.R. NOS. 92013 & 92047 25 JULY 1990

PONENTE: Guitierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS: As part of the indemnification to the Filipino people of their losses during the second World War, a Reparations Agreement was entered into by the Philippines and Japan. The agreement stipulated that reparations valued at $550 million will be paid to the Filip[inos within 20 years. As a result, the Philippines was able to acquire four properties in Japan including the lot in question, known as the Roponggi property which consists of the land and the building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy having an area of 3179 sq. m. and located at 306, Roponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. The other properties that were acquired were the Nampeidai Property, the Kobe Commercial Property and the Kobe Residential Property. The Roponggi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy but was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 to facilitate repairs. The repairs never materialized for lack of funds. Thereafter, a proposal was made to then President Corazon Aquino to lease the Roponggi property to the Kajima Corporation, however, the Aquino administration failed to act favorably on this proposal. Instead, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 3 on August 11, 1986 creating a committee which would study the disposition/utilization of properties in Japan. Adminstrative Orders 3-A, B, C and D also followed afterwards. On July 25, 1987, President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 296 which allowed non-Filipi9no citizens to benefit from the reparation goods in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The Philippine properties in Japan were specifically named in the Order. This was met by public opposition; however, the Roponggi property was twice put into bidding. The first bidding was a failure and the second one did not materialize. A third bidding was to be conducted; however, the Court restrained it through the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, petitioners Salvador H. Laurel and Dionisio S. Ojeda filed separately petitions for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Petitioner Ojeda's petition contained also a prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to disclose to the public the sale of the Roponggi property. Petitioners contend that the Roponggi property is of the public domain and is incapable of appropriation. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Roponggi property has ceased to be a property of the public domain and the disposition of such property is governed by Japanese law and not Philippine law.ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Roponggi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the Philippine Government.2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roponggi property.

HELD:1. No. The Roponggi property is a property of the public domain; hence it is not capable of being appropriated. The said property is outside the commerce of man and cannot be alienated. The Ropoongi property is classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420of the Civil Code as a property of the State intended for some public service. Indeed, respondents' contention that the property has ceased to become a property of the public domain is untenable since no formal declaration was made by the government regarding such matter. The abandonment of the Roponggi property to supposedly make it a patrimonial property is not a definite way of converting the public character of the property to a private one. It is true that the Philippine Embassy was transferred to Nampeidei but this does not relinquish the Roponggi property's original purpose. As such, the Roponggi property remains as property of public dominion and is unappropriable.

2. No. The concurrence of both the executive and legislative branches is needed in the sale of the said property. The president cannot convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will; conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by Congress. Respondents' contention that the CARP Law withdrew the public character of the Roponggi property is untenable since the said law only enumerates possible sources of funding to augment agrarian reform. It does not divest the Roponggi property of its public character. Moreover, the Senate's Resolution No. 55 asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roponggi property does not withdraw the property from puiblic domain much less authorizes its sale. It is merely a resolution.

DECISION: Petitions granted. Temporary Restraining Order made Permanent.

PEARL & DEAN (PHIL.) INCORPORATED VS. SHOEMART INCORPORATEDG.R. NO. 148222 AUGUST 15, 2003 409 SCRA 231

PONENTE: CORONA, J.

FACTS: Pearl and Dean Phil. Inc. (PDI) Is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of advertising display units simply referred to as light boxes and was able to secure a Certificate of Copyright Registration. Sometime in 1985 PDI negotiated with Shoemart, Inc. (SMI) for the lease and installation of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa. Since the latter was under construction, SMI offered SM Makati and SM Cubao, to which PDI agreed. PDIs General Manager submitted for signature the contracts to SMIs Advertising Promotions and Publicity Division Manager; however only the contract for SM Makati was returned signed. PDI General Manager wrote to SMI inquiring about the contract for SM Cubao but the latter did not bother to reply. Instead, SMIs Counsel informed PDI that it was rescinding the contract for SM Makati due to non-performance of the terms. PDI said it was without basis and pushed for the signing of the contract for SM Cubao.Two years later, Metro Industrial Services, the company formerly contracted by PDI to fabricate its display units, offered to contract light boxes for Shoemarts chain of stores, to which SMI approved. After the contract was terminated, SMI engaged the services of EYD Rainbow Advertising Corporation to make 300 units of light boxes.Sometime in 1989, PDI received reports that exact copies of its light boxes were installed at SM City and in the fastfood section of SM Cubao. Upon investigation, PDI found out that North Edsa Marketing Incorporated (NEMI) was set up primarily to sell advertising space in lighted display units. PDI sent a letter to SMI and NEMI enjoining them to cease using the subject light boxes and to remove the same from SMIs establishments. It also demanded for the discontinued use of the trademark Poster Ads and the payment of compensatory damages in the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00). Upon receipt of the demand letter, SMI suspended the leasing of 224 light boxes and NEMI took down its advertisements for Poster Ads from the lighted display units. Claiming that both SMI and NEMI failed to meet all its demands, PDI filed the instant case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages. The RTC of Makati decided in favour of PDI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Dissatisfied, PDI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1) Whether or not there was copyright infringement.

2) Whether or not there was patent infringement.

3) Whether or not there was trademark infringement.

4) Whether or not unfair competition was performed by SMI.HELD:1) No. Copyright was limited to the drawings alone and not to the box itself. Being a mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It can cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description.

2) No. There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been issued since whatever right one has to the invention covered by the patent arises alone from the grant of patent. Petitioner never secured a patent which could have protected its invention. To be able to effectively and legally preclude others from copying and profiting from the invention, a patent is a primordial requirement.

3) No. The failure of PDI to secure a trademark registration for specific use on the light boxes meant that there could not have been any trademark infringement since registration was an essential element thereof.

4) No. There can be no unfair competition on the law on copyrights. Poster Ads is a generic term.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.

BENITEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 104828 JANUARY 16, 1997 266 SCRA 242

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-meter parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank. Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a 361-square-meter lot. They filed with the Regional Trial Court against petitioners for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which private respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter. Private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70 square-meter-lot, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey was conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters of their property was occupied by petitioners house. Despite verbal and written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. Private respondents filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC of San Juan decided in favour of the former. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed said decision. On further appeal, the respondent court found no merit in petitioners plea. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:(1)Whether or not prior possession is a condition in an action for ejectment.

(2)Who has the option to sell the land?

HELD:(1)No. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment. That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents purchase does not negate the latters case for ejectment.

(2)The option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds, plants, or sows on, belongs to the landowner.

TAN VS DE LA VEGAG. R. NO. 168809 10 MARCH 2006

PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS: The respondents are co-owers of a parcel of land measuring 159, 576 sq. m. located in Marikina, Rizal, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No. 257152, issued on June 20, 1969. The said property contained the lot in dispute, Lot 89, having an area of 54, 197 sq. m. On a 29, 945 sq. m. portion of Lot 89, Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent No. 495269 on July 31, 1971 and OCT No. 711 on August 11, 1971. Upon his death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and TCT No. 186516 was issued to his heirs namely Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete and Myrna M. Quirante (defendant heirs). Sometime in April 1992, the defendant heirs caused the ejectment of the occupants of the said poriton of land of Lot 89. The defendant heirs then sold the said property to the New Atlantis Real Estate and Development, Inc. (Corporation) which was represented by its President, Victor C. Salvador thereby cancelling TCT No. 186516 and issuing TCT No. 271604 on Novemebr 14, 1994. Thereafter, the Corporation sold the questioned lot to petitioners on Novemebr 17, 1994 cancelling out TCT No. 271604 and giving rise to TCT No. 272191. On August 3, 1992, a complaint was then filed by respondents before the RTC of Pasig City for quieting of title and for the declaration of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269, OCT No. 711 and TCT No. 186516 against the defendant heirs, the Secretary of the DENR, the Director of thge Land Management Bureau and the Register of Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later amended to implead the petitioners herein. The respondents contend that the free patent of Macario Mencias and the derivative titles from it are void since the lot covered by said patent and derivative titles are well within Lot 89 of the respondents. As such, the lot is already of private ownership and is incapable of acquisition through a free patent. In their Answer, the defendant heris contend that Lot 89 was never part of respondents' TCT No. 257152. The respondents' title was said to be a derivative of OCT No. 730 and not OCT No. 734 which covered Lot 89. Defendant heirs further contended that the respondents' title is a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046 which covers a parcel of land in San Juan, Rizal measuring about 356 sq. m. only. They also raised the defense of laches and prescription. On the other hand, petitioners raised the defense of good faith as they were not aware of the existence of such a cloud on the title. They said that their title had no annotations that the property was still in lis pendens. On March 4, 2003, respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. Hence, on March 21, 2003, the trial court rendered an order in favor of respondents. Petitioners appealed to the Court of appeals but the trial court's order was affirmed. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but was denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant case.

2. Whether or not a void title may be the source of a valid title.HELD:1. No. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party's answer to raise an issue. If an answer, therefore, denies specifically the material averments of the complaint, then a judgment on the pleadings would be naturally improper. In this case, the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings filed by the parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the presentation of evidence. What the trial court has done is not a judgment on the pleadings but a summary judgment. However, a summary judgment is not warranted in this case as there are issues which call for a full blown trial.

2. Yes. The rule is that a void title may be the source of a valid title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Since good faith is always presumed, it was premature for the trial court to conclude that petitioners were not purchasers in good faith. In the absence of evidence showing the contrary, bad faith, which is never presumed, cannot be charged against petitioners. Hence, the circumstances warrant that petitioners' title is valid although it may be subsequently declared void.

DECISION: Petition granted. Case remanded to the RTC of Pasig City.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITYGR NO. 133250 JULY 9, 2002

PONENTE: Carpio, J.

FACTS: During the time of then President Marcos, the Commissioner of Public Highways entered into a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim foreshore and off-shore areas of the Manila Bay. Among the stipulations was the construction of certain phases of a Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. For the construction, the CDCP would be paid with fifty percent of the reclaimed lands from the sea. In 1995, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into a JVA (Joint Venture Agreement) with AMARI Coastal Bay Development Corporations for the exploration and development of the Freedom Islands. It is noteworthy, however, that the JVA did not undergo public bidding. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations conducted an investigation of the said contract and came up with the finding that the lands sought to be transferred to AMARI are lands of public domain which are not classified as alienable. Hence the certificate of title covering the Freedom Islands and the JVA were illegal. Then President Ramos would create a legal task force impressed with the duty of determining the legality of the JVA. The body would uphold its validity. In 1998, petitioner in his capacity as a taxpayer filed for an instant for mandamus with the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner so avers that the government and the people are to lose billions of pesos from the sale of the reclaimed lands, and that such a sale or agreement would be in violation of the Constitution which prohibits the sale of inalienable lands of the public domain to corporations.

ISSUE: Whether the governmentcan sell such a property to a private party.

HELD: NO. Until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of public domain are for the legislature to passlaw authorizing such a sale. Since then and now, the president has not been granted authority to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into non-agricultural lands.

DECISION: Petition GRANTED.

BENIN V. TUASON57 SCRA 531

PONENTE: ZALDIVAR, J.

FACTS: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing the same allegations. In Civil case number 3621, they alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of lands located in La Loma, Caloocan. That they inherited the said land and their predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely and peacefully, cultivated it, and exclusively enjoyed the fruits harvested there from. That in 1933, herein plaintiffs registered their claims of ownership over said lands; that they declared said lands for taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Dec. No. 2429 and sometime in 1942, evacuees from Manila during the World War II, with the permission of plaintiffs, constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged that sometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the defendants, particularly J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing equipment, illegally entered and started demolishing and destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees as well as the improvements and permanent improvements therein. In 1953 they discovered for the first time that their lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration/defendants. The plaintiffs also alleged that the registered owners mentioned in OCT No. 735 had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of 8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the original application, were never published. And that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and were cultivating the lands; and that during, before, and even after the issuance of OCT No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void.ISSUE: If a buyer knows at the time of purchase that the lot he is acquiring, is in the possession o a person other than the seller, is he necessarily a buyer in bad faith?

HELD: He is not necessarily a buyer in bad faith. After all, a possessor is not necessarily the owner of the property possessed. Besides, he may possess only a portion of the land involved, or his possession may be with the knowledge and tolerance of the owner. The rights of a mere possessor are unavailing as against a seller who is armed with Torrens Title over the property involved.

FARRALES VS. CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIOG.R. NO. L-24245 APRIL 11, 1972 44 SCRA 239

PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J.

FACTS: Leonor Farrales, plaintiff, was the holder of a municipal license to sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building where she had her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a temporary shack on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section, Baguio City Market, without seeking prior permit or permission from any city official. When the police threatened to demolish this shack, Plaintiff sought injunction before the Court of First Instance (CFI) which asked her to show proper permit. Upon failure of Plaintiff to comply with the order, the police demolished the shack. Plaintiff cited the police for contempt but this Court, in an order dated September 19, 1956, denied Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff amended her complaint so as to include as Defendants the policemen whom she claims did the demolishing but was dismissed. Hence, plaintiff appealed from the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals and subsequently certified by the latter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance.2) Whether or not the police officers are liable for damages in extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

HELD: 1) The Supreme Court held that the shack was in fact a nuisance. In the first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people. 2) According to Article 707 of the same Code, a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only two cases:

(1) if he causes unnecessary injury, or

(2) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance. In the present case, no unnecessary injury was caused to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. Under the circumstances there is absolutely no ground to award damages in favor of the appellant.

DECISION: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.

JOAQUINO VS REYESG.R. NO. 154645 JULY 13, 2004

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-respondents in this case. Rodolfo Reyes died on September 12, 1981.At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, with whom she begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all surnamed Reyes. During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the house and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in favor of Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-90293 covering the said property was issued in the name of petitioner only on July 20, 1979. Thus respondents filed a Complaint for reconveyance and damages, dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal alleging that Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and Company with an income of P15, 000.00 a month and, after retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits and emoluments in the amount of P315, 011 in which respondent wife was not the recipient of any portion of the said amount. Respondent further alleges that the house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila was executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of [petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino and that the funds used to purchase this property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as Joaquino was without the means to pay for the same. That petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the purchase price. Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty payment thereof, he secured a life insurance policy with Philam Life Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation and that the monthly amortizations of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be paid out of his Philam Life Insurance policy. The RTC held that the property had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the life insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his salaries and earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner was financially capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered her to surrender possession of the property to the respective estates of the spouses. This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:1) Whether the property, the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila), is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and Milagros.2) Whether or not the purchase and the subsequent registration of the realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to Milagros.

HELD:1. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage, unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to the CPG.For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of the marriage. All told, respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal.More important, they have established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.

2. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.The prohibition against donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter would be better situated than the former. Article 87 of the Family Code now expressly provides thus:Art. 87.Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

FABIE VS. GUTIERREZ DAVIDNO. L-123. DECEMBER 12,1945

PONENTE: OZAETA, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, a property owned by private respondent Juan Grey, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie Grey. In June 1945, Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against herein respondent Ngo Boo Soo(Ngo Soo), alleging in her amended complaint that the defendant is occupying the premises located at 372-376 Santo Cristo on a month-to-month rental payable in advance not later than the 5th of each month; that the defendant offered to pay Php300.00 monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month, beginning the month of April 1915, for the said premises including the one door which said defendant, without plaintiff's consent and contrary to their agreement, had subleased to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based on the fact that the plaintiff badly needs the saidhpuse to live in, as her house was burned by the Japanese during the entry of American liberators in the City which was located at No. 38 Flores, Dominga, Pasay; that defendant was duly notified on March 24 and April 14, 1915, to leave the said premises, but he refused. Plaintiff then prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid rentals. However, the defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a tenant of the premises in question; that he was renting it from its owner and administrator Juan Grey; and that plaintiff is merely a usufructuary whose only right is to receive the whole of such income. Such contention by the defendant was affirmed by Juan Grey and added that Fabie, as a usufructuary, she has no right or authority to administer the said premises nor to lease them nor to evict tenants, which right and authority are vested in the intervener as owner of the premises. Thus, the complaint in intervention was dismissed. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila the latter dismissed the case; and the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff was denied by Judge Jose Gutierrez David, who sustained the opinion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to select the tenants of the property to which she is the usufructuary.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner, Josefa Fabie, has such right because a usufructuary is allowed to administer and manage the property, to collect rents and to make the necessary repairs. Included in this right to administer is the right to select the tenant over the premises, presently held by the petitioner in usufruct.CALTEX PHILS. INC. VS. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALSG.R. NO. L-50466 MAY 31, 1982PONENTE: Aquino, J.

FACTS:This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty. The realty tax on said equipment amounts to P4,541.10 annually (p. 52, Rollo). The city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. The Board, which was in its decision of June 3, 1977 that the said machines and equipment are real property under the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974. The decision was reiterated by the Board in its resolution of January 12, 1978, denying Caltex's motion for reconsideration, a copy of which was received by its lawyer on April 2, 1979.On May 2, 1979 Caltex filed this certiorari petition wherein it prayed for the setting aside of the Board's decision and for a declaration that t he said machines and equipment are personal property not subject to realty tax. We hold that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo, 61 Phil 709).ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery already enumerated are subject to realty tax.Held:Yes. This issue has to be resolved primarily under the provisions of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Under, Sec. 38 of the said law: Machinery shall embrace machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and apparatus attached to the real estate. It includes the physical facilities available for production, as well as the installations and appurtenant service facilities, together with all other equipment designed for or essential to its manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes. The equipment and machinery, are considered as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered personalty. "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle might be considered personal property."The questioned decision and resolution of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals are affirmed. The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit.

VILLANUEVA VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. NO. 105607 JUNE 21, 1993PONENTE: GRIO-AQUINO, J.:FACTS: Milagros Donio-Teves was the owner of Jumils Octagonal Garden Cockpit (Jumils cockpit) constructed in Bais City, in the 1960's. Under Zoning Ordinance No. 62 passed in 1977, the cockpit was within a prohibited district. For this reason, the then Mayor Genar Goi refused to renew the mayor's permit applied for by Teves for 1981. Instead, he issued it in favor of William L. Fleischer, the owner of the newly built Bais City Cockers Cockpit (Bais cockpit). The controversy that ensued reached the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC for short) which ruled i