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T879-20K – TMA02 Christoph Jaschek L4562898
1
Analysis of the violent conflict in Colombia
Part 1: Introducing the Colombian Conflict
In 2020 I did a three-month internship at the Latin American regional office of terre des
hommes in Bogotá, Colombia. Terre des hommes is a German nongovernmental organization
working in the international development sector and promoting the rights of children and
youth. During my internship, I got in contact with local peace advocates and Human Rights
defenders. Because of this personal experience, I chose to conduct the conflict analysis on the
violent conflict of Colombia.
This essay traces the conflict back to its root causes which were unequal access to land as well
as poverty and political exclusion (Zapata, 2019). In the 1960s, this situation culminated in the
creation of rebel movements, in Spanish guerillas, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), among others. Furthermore, their
violent support for poor peasants caused the establishment of paramilitary groups that fought
for the interests of the political elite and wealthy landlords.
During the last decades, the clash between paramilitary, guerillas and national security forces
lead to severe violations of Human Rights, millions of internally displaced people and
thousands of dead fighters and civilians. Even if the FARC and the administration of then-
president Juan Manuel Santos signed a peace agreement in 2016, the situation remains
challenging and complex. Developments in recent years and the critical position of incumbent
president Iván Duque signify a serious threat for the fragile peace in Colombia.
To conduct a conflict analysis - i.e., to investigate interdependencies and dynamics between
the different parties involved in this complex conflict - can highlight important steps and
actions to be taken in order to “sustain this peace in the post-conflict environment, as well as
provide truth and justice for all those harmed by the violence” (Zapata, 2019).
rebels movementsLoyal to
government
Colombia Rebels movementsguerillas
Actors
Part 2: The Conflict Analysis
Urban population(mainly citizens of Bogotá)
interestto continue urban lifestyle without spendingto much state resources in countryside
interaction
not directly affected by theconsequences of the violent conflict
only indirectly affected e.g. through theconflict's impact on the national economy
not much interaction with rural communities
powerin a national referendum the urban population wasable to reject the first version of the peace agreement
incentives
as long as the conflict does not affect theurban life in a more severe way, there is noincentive to find a peaceful solution
TNC(Transnational Coporations)
interestexploit natural resources in Colombia
agrobusiness, coal and gold, among others
interactionsupported by national government and paramilitary
in opposition of rural communities and rebel movements
power overall economic power to influence actors
incentives
fighting means higher risks and higher commodity prices
victory of rebel movements would result in loosingaccess to Colombian natural resources
ELN(National Liberation Army)
interestestablish a Christian and communist regime
fight against poverty, corruption and political exclusion
interactioncontinous fighting against miliary and paramilitary
no active participation in peace negotiations
power
financing via kidnapping and the extortion of money from oil companies
participation in the production and distribution of illegal drugs
very present in rural Colombia
incentives no interest in end of conflict to not face democratical elections
USA(hegemonial power)
interest
during Cold War: prevent communismfrom spreading in the Americas
during 21st century: To fight the war on drugs
interaction
support conservative forces in the country
high influence in UN Security Council
support UN Verification Mission in Colombia
power military support for national government
incentivesstabilize the situation and establish orderaccording to the Colombian government
United Nations
interest international community in favour of peace and development
interactionparticipation in peace dialogues
since 2017: United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia
powerthere is no peacekeeping operation in Colombia
use of international political power to promote peace
incentives provide support to the peace process
FARC(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
interestfight against imperialism, capitalism and the establishment of large-scale pivately owned farms
fight for rights of rural peasants and their legal access to land
interactiondecades of fighting against military and paramilitary
successful peace negotiations with president Santos from 2012 to 2016
power
participation in the production and distribution of illegal drugs
source of funds: ransom, illegal mining, taxation of various forms of economic activies
very present in rural Colombia
incentives commited to transform into a legitimate political party and enter the democratic process
Rural population(mainly indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities)
interestcriminal activities as magnet and escape for rural youth
access to economic development and education
interactionno interaction with political elites
suffer massive violations against Human Rights
powerhardly any political or economic influence in decision making
millions were internally displaced
incentives promote peace and end violent conflict
Paramilitary
interest fight for interests of clients
interactionmilitas sponsored by TNC, politicians and elite landowners
co-operation with Colombian Military
powerparticipation in the production and distribution of illegal drugs
responsible for majority of Human Rights violations
incentivesescalate the war to sustain economic gains
enter territories that were left by FARC after signing peace agreement
Military Forces of Colombia
interestre-establish peace and stability
realize state monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
interactioncooperation with paramilitary
military support by USA
power high funding and well equipped
incentivesfight for rights of political elite and landlords
support 2016 peace deal
Actors V1.1.mmap - 26.01.2021 - Christoph Jaschek
Structures
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+-+civil society pomotes peace
national as well as regionalmovements promote peace
social movements played an importantrole during peace negotiations that ledto final agreement
disarmament
in the first decade of the 21 centuryseveral paramilitary groups were disarmed
as part of the peace agreement of 2016, FARCfighters handed over their guns to the UN
high military budget
during the last 50 years, militaryexpenditure has grown constantly
more than 3% of GDP isdedicated for military budget
escalating war
in the beginning, the conflict was alow-level conflict without great impact onnational economy or politcal stability
in the further course, periods ofviolent ecalation alternated with morepeaceful moments
violations of human rights
all parties fighting in Colombia areresponsible of severe violations ofHuman Rights
80% of the victims of aprox. 2.000massacres committed between 1980and 2012 were civilians
weak state presencein rural areas
the Colombian state is not able to provide basicstate services such as infrastructure, electricity,security or education in many rural areas
local populations express mistrust against anygovernment activity; politicans not only have toincrease state presence but also win people's'minds and hearts'
political instability
fightings, trauma and personal relationsbetween politicans, industry owners and militarypersonal decease faith in political system
president Duque wants to renegotiate largeparts of the 2016 peace agreement andparts of the FARC are remobilising again
structural violence
indirect violence is built into the structure andshows up as unequal power and consequentlyas unequal life chances (Galtung 1969)
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communitiesare systemically excluded from society
power centeredin Bogotá
horizontal inequality: unevendistribution between societal groups onthe basis of ethnic and regional factors
Bogotá is the political and economic centre ofthe country, but from many rural communitiesit takes several days to travel to the capital
recruitment byparamilitary and guerilla
either direct recruitment as fighters orindirect recruitment e.g. for thecultivation of illicit crops
paramilitary and guerilla groups offera sense of belonging and constanteconomic income to local population
lack of education andemployment opportunities
only 50% of Colombian population had atleast some secondary education
unemployment rate of aprox. 10%fuels large informal sector
US military support
USA fought against the spread ofcommunism in the Americas
USA fights against drug productionand trafficking
unequal access to assets
landlords enjoy priviledged access to land
peasants and indigenous communitiesstruggle to remain landowners
economic crisis
most of the time, Colombia runs a trade deficit
economy is based on mineral extraction and istherefore facing a stagnation because of thepandemic and low global oil prices
state deficit
government debt is equivalent to 48.4% of the country's GDP, all time high
in 19 of the last 20 years, governmentrecorded a budget deficit
corruption / rent seeking
Colombia ranks 96 out of 180 in TransparencyInternational's 2019 Corruption Index
culture of rent seeking dominates thinking ofgovernment, police and private corporations
wealth of natural resources
resources like coal and gold are extracted byinternational corporations
local communities do not profit fromextraction but have to face theenvironmental, social and economic damages
lack of democracyand judicialaccountability
current president Iván Duque is accused of electoral fraud
amnesties granted to fighters of paramilitary andguerilla in the frame of transitional justice preventaccountability for violations of Human Rights
key
political
economic
law, order and justice
war, violenceexogenous
geography
cultural
social
drug productionand smuggling
revenue from drug selling has becomean important way of funding forparamilitary and guerilla
connection between internationaldrug cartels and local production
Structures V1.1.mmap - 26.01.2021 - Christoph Jaschek
Key
internationalnationallocal / regional
Dynamics
different actors accuse eachother of not realizing importantaspects of the peace deals
UN and NGO community promotedpeace agreements all the time
guerillas supported byCuba and Venezuela
military and paramilitarysupported by USA
in total, ten peace treaties weresigned but, until now, none resultedin a stable and long-term peace
aim to find a military solutionfor the conflict alternated withincentives to peace negotiations
rural population is in strongsupport of peace deals as theysuffer most under the daily violence
urban population is notdirectly affected by conflictand remain skeptical
Break up of peaceagreements
international drugcartels distribute anddeliver drugs worldwide
war against drugs by USA
military intervention to preventproduction of drugs fail
Colombian state failes toaddress social, politicaland economic causes fordrug production
economic incentives for poorpeasants to cultivate plantsthat fuel drug production
economic incentives forparamilitary and guerillas tobecome active in smuggling
DrugsAssassinations ofHuman RightsDefenders
increase pressure onnational actors to protectHuman Rights activists
preoccupied and helplessinternational community
state tries to implementprograms to protectHuman Rights Defenders
but state is not able toaddress systemic rootcauses of the problem
helplessness and fear
rural population hassense of being left alone
fighting against an invisible force
State services byGuerilla
2016 peace agreement
rural population hassense of being left alone
guerilla and paramilitary fill up powervacuum and offer state services such asinfrastructure, security and economicsupport for local peasants
mistrust against state officialsbecause of corruption
central national governmentis incapable to deliverfundamental state services inrural areas of Colombia
enormous inequalities betweendifferent regions in terms of statepresents, education opportunitiesand health care provision
international support for building state capacities international support for good governance
observer states during peace talks:Chile and Venezuela
UN and ICRC promoted logistical support
direct support by Norway and Cuba
transitional justice mechanismsare implemented in order torealize peace agreement
national government andrepresentatives of the FARCsign a historic peace treaty
but several rebel movements andparamilitary groups still remain active
demobilising FARC causes apower vacuum that is filledby paramilitary groups
rural population is longingfor peace agreement
Dynamics V1.2.mmap - 26.01.2021 - Christoph Jaschek
T879-20K – TMA02 Christoph Jaschek L4562898
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Part 3: Key findings
In this part, I will focus on three crucial topics, which are (1) the most important root cause,
(2) the FARC as protector of rural communities and (3) how the government not only has to
improve state services but also must rebuild the trust of local population into the state as
protector and provider of essential services like infrastructure, education and health services.
1. In the second edition of his book Systems of Violence Richani (2013) mentions the
“tremendous land and wealth inequities” as one of the fundamental origins of the
Colombian conflict. The prioritization of wealthy landlords and agroindustry over
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities caused political, economic and social
exclusion. In the module material Mohan (2020) named this phenomenon horizontal
inequality which is a form of structural violence as described by Galtung (1969). This
form of violence is built into the structure of the system and manifests itself through
unequal opportunities in life and systemic discrimination. The last decades added illicit
crops, narcotrafficking and the violent struggle to exploit natural resources to the
conflict which made it even more complex and more difficult to find adequate
measures to establish peace.
2. In this context local communities suffer from a systemic absence of state institutions.
The only state officials they encounter from time to time are soldiers trying to maintain
safety without addressing the root causes mentioned above. In this power vacuum
steps the guerrilla and acts as a protector. They secure “protection to peasants on land
holdings and guarantee minimum prices for both coca and agricultural products” (Le
Billon, 2014). For example, FARC levied taxes on beer consumption and redistributed
tax revenue to build a local school and offer education to local communities (Richani,
2013). It is inappropriate to compare these actions taken by the guerilla with a welfare
state. Nevertheless, they are able to offer services to local communities which the
Colombian state hasn’t done over many decades.
3. After the ratification of the peace treaty in 2016 the tasks for the Colombian
government are tremendous. The state has to build up the capacities to secure
minimal living standards in every region of its territory and must secure that all
Colombian benefit from education, health care facilities and boosted local economies.
However, only increasing the scope of state services will not be enough. An even
greater challenge for the state is to overcome the “lack of trust in the government”
T879-20K – TMA02 Christoph Jaschek L4562898
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(Zapata, 2019) which is a result of previous failures, broken promises and widespread
corruption. To rebuilt trust between the state and its citizens means to win the
people’s hearts and minds. The state has to understand, that instead of soldiers it
needs teachers, medical doctors, engineers, social workers, passionate civil servants
and honest judges to rebuild trust. However, in the last thirty years, the Colombian
government has signed ten peace agreements. Until now, peace remained elusive and
incomplete (Zapata, 2019) mainly because of the complexity of the conflict which
includes many different actors, interdependent structures and constantly changing
dynamics.
By simply signing another peace treaty, it is impossible to put all these aspects in order, to
overcome destroyed relationships, to support over five million internally displaced people and
to guarantee holding Human Rights violators for their actions to account. The international
community, government and national parliament as well as regional movements have to work
together to find a new future for their land and to find peaceful ways to mediate between
conflict parties. In the best-case scenario, it will last decades to unfold this process and to
establish the right conditions for long-lasting peace in Colombia.
Part 4: Personal Reflection
Already during the introduction of the conflict analysis framework, I became aware of several
shortcomings regarding the visualization of the results in form of a table. From my point of
view, tables do not offer a good overview over the different sections of the framework.
Furthermore, tables do not permit any cross connections between different table entries to
show interdependencies, e.g., in the actor section there is no possibility to show how these
actors depend on each other. While working on the conflict analysis I focused not only on the
content (What?) but also on different possibilities to visualize the content in other forms
(How?).
This process has helped me to bring order to my mental model of the Colombian conflict. Since
my internship in Bogotá, I spent many hours reading and thinking about this situation. I tried
to make sense to the complex interdependencies which is necessary to understand the peace
agreement of 2016. Despite my efforts, my sense making remained messy and chaotic. There
were to many interests, actors and perspectives to integrate in a holistic narrative of the
T879-20K – TMA02 Christoph Jaschek L4562898
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conflict. However, in the last weeks, the application of the conflict analysis framework has
helped me to bring order into my confusing mental model of the conflict. Arranging all the
different dimensions and views according to actors, structures and dynamics supported me to
appreciate the complexity of the conflict and to decrease the level of chaos.
With the conflict analysis as background, I am now able to understand the peculiarities of the
current post-conflict situation as well as the huge challenges that the peace treaty is facing. If
it only addresses some consequences and symptoms, it will fail, too. In order to establish long-
term peace in Colombia, it has to approach the systemic root causes of the violence which
were outlined in this analysis.
T879-20K – TMA02 Christoph Jaschek L4562898
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References
Galtung, J. (1969) Violence, Peace and Peace Research, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no.
3, pp. 167/91.
Le Billon, P. (2014) Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and the Politics of Resources, New
York, Oxford University Press.
LeResche, D. (2005) The Significance of Procedural Justice for Peace Making Processes
[Online]. Available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/sib/egm/paper/Diane%20-
LeResche.pdf (Accessed April 2015).
Mohan, G. et.al. (2020) ‚The Political Economy of Conflict’, T879 Week 10 Chapter 4: The
Political Economy of Conflict [online]. Available at https://learn2.open.ac.uk/mod/-
oucontent/view.php?id=1614656 (Accessed 07 January 2021).
Richani, N (2013) Systems of Violence, Second Edition: The Political Economy of War and
Peace in Colombia, State University of New York Press, Albany. Available from: ProQuest
Ebook Central. (7 January 2021).
Zapata, S. V. (2019) James Meernik, Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt y Mauricio Uribe-López (eds.).
As War Ends. What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional
Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press.