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CONTENTS

FOREWORD xi

PART I: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTIONGiuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kummel 3

PART II: CONFLICT RESOLUTION

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND DEVELOPMENTManas Chatterji 9

TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN LATINAMERICA: BASIC LINES

Jaime Garc a Covarrubias 53

THROUGH LITTLE STEPSy

: INFORMALNETWORKS IN PEACEFUL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Bandana Purkayastha 63

PART III: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Giuseppe Caforio 79

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CIVIL-MILITARY GAP ISSUES AND DILEMMAS: ASHORT REVIEWMaja Garb 83

CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CIVILMILITARYRELATIONS IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: THE CASEOF BULGARIA

Yantsislav Yanakiev 93

THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARYAND THE PARENT SOCIETY: THE GERMAN CASE

Sabine Collmer 115

THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARYAND ITS PARENT SOCIETY IN ITALY

Giuseppe Caforio 127

THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARYAND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN ROMANIA

Marian Zulean 151

THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARY

AND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SLOVENIAMaja Garb and Ljubica Jelus ic 171

THE CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THE MILITARYAND THE PARENT SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Lindy Heinecken and Richard Gueli 193

SPAIN: AN EQUATION WITH DIFFICULTSOLUTIONSRafael Mart nez and Antonio M. D az 213

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IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP IN CIVIL-MILITARYRELATIONS IN SWEDEN?Alise Weibull 249

IS THERE A CULTURAL GAP BETWEEN THEMILITARY AND THE PARENT SOCIETY? ANANALYSIS OF SWITZERLAND

Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, Dominik Allenspach, Michael

Born and Karl W. Haltiner

265

PART IV: WOMEN, CONFLICT AND THE MILITARY

WOMEN IN AN INSECURE WORLDMarie Vlachova 299

RAPE IN WAR: REALITIES AND REMEDIESJune A. Willenz 313

CHALLENGING PSYCHOSOCIAL RESPONSES TOFEMALE CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT

Pamela Bell 331

INTEGRATING THE OTHER: THE BUNDESWEHRAND WOMEN SOLDIERS

Gerhard Kummel 343

FACTORS THAT LIMIT THE TRUE INTEGRATIONOF WOMEN AT MILITARY ACADEMIES

Heidi L. Smith and Christopher J. Luedtke 369

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PART V: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE MILITARY

CARING LEADERSHIP: PREPARING LEADERS TOCARE FOR SOLDIERS AND FAMILIES

Todd Woodruff 393

MULTINATIONALITY AS A CHALLENGE FOR

ARMED FORCESPaul Klein and Karl W. Haltiner 403

TOTAL FORCE IN IRAQ: A FAILURE OF POLICY ORIMPLEMENTATION?

Roger Thompson 415

KOREAN RESERVE FORCES: THEIR MISSIONRECONSIDEREDDoo-Seung Hong 425

DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION AS A LATINAMERICAN PHENOMENON

Jaime Garcia Covarrubias 431

PART VI: MOTIVATION IN PEACE SUPPORT

OPERATIONS

WHO WANTS TO GO AGAIN? MOTIVATION OFGERMAN SOLDIERS FOR AND DURINGPEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Maren Tomforde and Jorg Keller 443

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MOTIVATION AND JOB SATISFACTION OFSLOVENIAN SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN IN PEACEOPERATIONS

Ljubica Jelusic and Maja Garb 457

MOTIVATION AND MISSION SATISFACTION IN THE5TH SWISSCOY CONTINGENT

Jonathan Bennett, Rolf P. Boesch and Karl W. Haltiner 467

PART VII: MILITARY UNIONISM

INDEPENDENT REPRESENTATION IN THE BRITISHARMY: HAS THE TIME FINALLY ARRIVED?

Richard Bartle 481

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE CANADIANFORCES: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS

Kelly Farley, Rick Walker, Harry Bondy andDan Mendoza

497

MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIANARMED FORCES IN THE TURN FROMCONSCRIPTION TO PROFESSIONAL FORMAT

Eraldo Olivetta 519

SOUTH AFRICA: TEN YEARS OF MILITARYUNIONISM

Lindy Heinecken 527

PART VIII: THE TURKISH MILITARY IN TRANSITION

INTRODUCTIONA. Kadir Varoglu 553

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THE TURKISH MILITARY ETHOS AND ITSCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE NATIONAL TURKISHCULTURE

A. Kadir Varoglu, Unsal Sgr and Erbil Is-n 557

OPINIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS ONDEMOCRACY AND INTERVENTIONS OF THEMILITARY IN TURKEY

Bahattin Aksit, Ayse Serdar and Bahar Tabakoglu 565

THE TURKISH MILITARY ACADEMY FROM AGENDER PERSPECTIVE

Ceyda Kuloglu 575

A UN TYPE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: DILEMMAS

OF MILITARY OBSERVER MISSIONS IN THEEXAMPLE OF UNOMIGMesut Uyar 583

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A UN TYPE CONFLICT

MANAGEMENT: DILEMMAS OF

MILITARY OBSERVER MISSIONS IN

THE EXAMPLE OF UNOMIG

Mesut Uyar

1. INTRODUCTION

Peace support operations and the role of the United Nations is gettingimportant in changing the global power system. But generally peace sup-

port missions are creating new problems while trying to solve the original

ones. In this presentation I will try to examine the relative effectiveness

of the UN in the military observer missions, which is the most common type

of UN peace support operations. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia

(UNOMIG) is used to show their relative effectiveness in the current world

system by means of differentiating the problems they are facing. After

showing the common problems, I will give special emphasis to the genuine

problems of UNOMIG. First of all we have to take a brief look at theorigins of military observer missions. During the long Cold War, the UN

had to engage in conflict resolution/management in a world widely divided

between two superpowers. The Security Council (SC) suffered lots of prob-

lems to handle conflicts without jeopardising the interests of the superpow-

ers. So in most of the cases (except Korea and Congo) the SC did not

Military Missions and their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th

Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 2, 583594

Copyright r 2005 by Elsevier Ltd.All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1572-8323/doi:10.1016/S1572-8323(05)02037-0

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authorise the necessary military forces to the conflict areas. Instead the SCpreferred to send interpositional forces with light arms or military observers

without arms after getting the consent of the conflicting parties. Currently

we are calling this approach traditional peacekeeping. By experiences gained

on the ground and in the SC it was understood that the best and easiest

reaction is establishing a UN military observer mission (UNMOM) (Mack-

inlay, 1996, pp. 911; British Army, 1995, pp. 12/27). According to this

limited and conservative logic this process must follow standard steps: First

an armed conflict between two states; second a stalemate that nobody is able

to defeat the other side completely; third conflicting states ask the UN toenforce a ceasefire; fourth the SC authorises neutral military observers to

monitor a ceasefire and to achieve some other limited objectives, according

their mandate; fifth conflicting states try to reach a peaceful solution by

diplomatic negotiations with the help of the UN; sixth agreement is reached

and end of UNMOM. In short, the duty of the military observers is to

monitor the ceasefire and the restrictions agreed to by both parties in a

geographically limited area for a limited time. But in reality, diplomatic

negotiations often do not provide fast and lasting solutions. UNMOMs

have remained and temporary missions turned into permanent ones. Theanswer to the question why is that they are economically cheap operations

and politically easier to maintain than to remove. Most of the UNMOMs

that were established in different continents are still going on without an end

in sight (Brahimi et al., 2000, p. 3).

2. THE FOUNDATION OF UNOMIG

The disintegration of the Soviet Union was painful and bloody, particularlyin newly independent Georgia. The legacy of history, Soviet ethnic policies

and conflicting interests created a suitable atmosphere for civil wars in

Georgia. Initial troubles began in South Ossetia and later in Abkhazia.

Numerous attempts to solve the real and imaginary problems failed. The

actual fighting was begun after the entrance of the Georgian National

Guard in Abkhazia on 14 August 1992. Georgian forces easily captured the

capital city Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia. Abkhazs managed to stop the

Georgian advance further north. The fighting between ill-trained and hastily

formed units was immediately turned to ruthless inter-communal fighting.The SC members were reluctant to deal with the issue as Georgia was seen

as an area of Russian influence. Russia took the lead and brokered an

agreement between Georgians and Abkhazs on 3 September 1992. But both

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sides violated this agreement and others that followed. Abkhaz forces re-inforced with alleged volunteers from Russia and heavy weapons from

Russian stocks launched a major offensive to Sukhumi and managed to

capture the city on 27 September 1993 (MacFarlane, 1997). At the end of

December 1993 all Georgian troops withdrew from Abkhazia except some

remaining units in the Kodori valley. The intense communal fighting left

10,00015,000 dead and forced more than 200,000 people (most of them

Georgians) to flee from Abkhazia.

UN reactions to the conflict were too little and came too late. The UN

Secretary General tried to use diplomatic means by appointing a specialenvoy on 11 May 1993. When the initial diplomatic negotiations did not

succeed, the SC approved the deployment of a limited number of military

observers on 9 July 1993 (UNSCR 849). The advance team arrived in Ab-

khazia on 8 August 1993. UNOMIG was formally founded on 24 August

1993 (UNSCR 858) to monitor the 27 July 1993 Ceasefire Agreement. UN-

OMIGs deployment did not help to stop the conflict; it suspended all op-

erational activities after the breakdown of the agreement. With the

mediation of Russia the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the Agree-

ment on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces in Moscow on 17 May 1994.Both sides agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force from the

Commonwealth of Independent States (ClS) to act as an interpositional

force between the two sides and to give consent to UNOMIG for moni-

toring the implementation and observing of the conduct of the CIS peace-

keeping force (CISPKF). On 21 July 1994 (UNSCR 937) the SC expanded

UNOMIGs mandate and increased the strength to 136 military observers.

The new mandate gave three main objectives to the mission: (a) monitoring

and verification of the Moscow Agreement by conducting regular patrols;

(b) observing the operation of CISPKF; and (c) maintaining close contactswith all sides to safeguard an orderly return of the refugees and internally

displaced persons (IDPs).

Over the years, the UN has continued its diplomatic activities to promote

a peaceful and lasting solution to the problem and the return of refugees and

IDPs. Despite all efforts too little results have been achieved. The peace

process has come to an impasse. The SC is renewing the mandate every 6

months without attempting to solve the impasse by using other types of

peace support operations. The general situation in the conflict area re-

mained mostly calm but unstable. Unexpected factors came to the surfacelike widespread criminality and lawlessness. UNOMIG continued to carry

out its mandate by means of daily ground patrols from its headquarters in

Sukhumi and the two sector headquarters at Gali and Zugdidi, as well as

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through regular helicopter patrols. But repeated incidents showed that mil-itary observers are not able to handle sporadic crises and ill-equipped to deal

with criminality. And occasionally the observers themselves fell victim to the

assaults and had to stop all operational activities for some time (Solomon,

2001; UN AgencyUNDPI, 1996, pp. 571588).

3. DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PROBLEMS

Currently, everybody on the ground is accusing UNOMIG for everythingthat is going wrong. Authorities of both sides are blaming UNOMIG more

than they blame each other. The local population is asking everything

ranging from medical help to the erasers for the students from military

observers who have no means to meet the requests. Personnel of NGOs and

all other aid organisations are frequently writing reports that UNOMIG is

not providing necessary security to their convoys and officials on the

ground. The CIS peacekeepers are not happy with UNOMIG and see it as a

burden. Even the individual military observers are voicing their frustration

with UNOMIG. International and national media are highlighting theachievements of the OSCE Mission in South Ossetia and give much atten-

tion to the alleged blunders of UNOMIG. In short, UNOMIG turned out to

be an ideal scapegoat for every interested party.

Is it possible and proper to blame UNOMIG for not doing enough in

Abkhazia? As far as we are concerned the answer is absolutely No! Without

differentiating the problems and seeing them from new perspectives we can-

not blame UNOMIG or any other UNMOMs. And of course we cannot find

ways to solve problems like Abkhazia and improve the ways to deal with it.

The problems that UNOMIG is facing are mostly not unique and they donot fall into one simple category. In fact, UNOMIG is facing three different

categories of problems. And two categories of problems are common issues

for all UNMOMs. I will mention the basics of the first two categories and

will focus on the third category, which is unique to UNOMIG.

3.1. Nature of UNMOMs

The first category of problems is related to the nature of observer missions.As I have already mentioned observer missions are traditional type

of peacekeeping operations. They are temporary missions with limited

objectives. That means if you want a successful UNMOM operation you

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have to formulate a clear, credible, achievable and adequately resourcedmandate. You also need to have a time table, good organisation (military

and civilian) and strategic planning. UNMOMs are effective in inter-state

conflicts when both sides give up actual fighting and give consent to the UN.

So you need responsive governments who could maintain control on their

troops and security forces and who at the same time, are reasonable and

rational enough for every sort of dialogues. But after 1990 most of the

conflicts are intra-state conflicts between a state and groups trying to es-

tablish their own spheres of sovereignty. In most of the cases conflicting

sides have difficulty to control their so-called military units and their lead-ership is widely divided with divergent aims. Additionally they have neigh-

bours who are willing to use the conflicts for their own benefits. Traditional

UN sanctions are not effective against these types of loose political groups

who can act irrationally and find illegal economic means to support them.

The GeorgianAbkhaz conflict is a very good example in this sense. It is

an intra-state conflict between a newly founded state and an ethnically dis-

tinct minority group trying to establish its own state. And they have a

neighbour the Russian Federation hoping to reestablish an effective

political and economical control of the former Soviet territory. Both sideshave difficulty to control their military and security forces. Their leaders and

societies are divided on several issues. Widespread criminality, illicit goods

trafficking and human rights violations are also part of the scene. In terms

of mandate, UNOMIG is again a good example of what not to do. Except

monitoring ceasefire agreements, it is not a clear and achievable mandate.

UNOMIG has limited means to observe the CISPKF operations and ab-

solutely no means to help a safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs. It

is interesting to note that UNOMIG is the only UNMOM operation, which

is charged with the duty of safe and orderly return of refugees and IDPs.According to both sides the mandate is far from credible. There is no time

table and strategic planning. And of course there is no exit strategy. (Solo-

mon, 2001, 218f, 222f).

3.2. Operational Conditions

The second category of problems is related to operational conditions. By

saying operational conditions I am not only including geography, topog-raphy, demography and infrastructure, but also political, historical, eco-

nomical and socio-cultural settings. Operational conditions are the most

important barriers for the success of any peace support operation. And of



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course we have limited means to control them. In this sense the GeorgianAbkhaz conflict shows all the trademarks of an ideal conflict. Abkhazia is a

strategically located region between Russia and Trans-Caucasia. The im-

portance of the regions oil resources is widely acknowledged and is reflected

in growing American geopolitical interest in the region. With its suitable

climate and terrain, Abkhazia was a touristic attraction of the former Soviet

Union and at the same time an ideal place for agriculture. It has a multi-

ethnic population. According to the 1989 Soviet census ethnic Georgians

constituted 45.7%, Abkhazs 17.8%, Armenians and Russians 14.6% and

16.8% respectively of the population. But historically Abkhazs see the re-gion as a distinctly Abkhaz entity. Past Russian and Soviet politics made the

ethnical claims more disputable. Even though Soviet economic policies cre-

ated multinational cities like Sukhumi and Tkvarcheli with frequent inter-

ethnic interactions, it also created nationally compact populations at the

level of villages. Force relocations, using ethnic groups against each other,

trying to separate the community in every respect, frequent policy changes

and the like provided fertile ground for future conflicts. Whether the actual

fighting started intentionally or not ethnic cleaning was the major visible

outcome. Initially Abkhaz civilians fled during the Georgian advance andlater Georgian civilians ran away when the tide had turned (Dale, 1997).

Widespread human rights violations inflamed the already existing ethnic

suspicions. The volatile atmosphere of the neighbouring region and the

availability of large numbers of mercenary type volunteers and stocks of

weapons were the other factors that affected the outcome. In short, Ab-

khazia had all the ingredients for an ethnic conflict and all the complexities

and difficulties as barriers for a lasting solution.

3.3. Problems Unique to UNOMIG

The last category of problems is unique to UNOMIG. It is the reluctance of

the SC members to handle a conflict in a Russian area of interest and the

relative reluctance of the UN to organise a peacekeeping mission after fail-

ures like UNOSOM and UNPROFOR. So from the very beginning an

observer mission was the only suitable alternative.

3.3.1. CISPKFWhen the SC refused to send interpositional peacekeepers, Russia used

the opportunity to send peacekeepers under its control. Russia got the

authorisation of the conflicting parties in the Moscow Agreement and from

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the CIS in June 1994. Although nominally a CISPKF, it was and still is anentirely Russian force. The CISPKF was deployed in July 1994 and took

over the responsibility from Russian troops that separated the two sides

since November 1993 (Danilov, 1999). From the very beginning CISPKF

became a problem for UNOMIG. The conflict parties do not see it as a

peacekeeping but a Russian force trying to protect Russian interests in the

region (Finch, 1996). Criticism of the operations of the CISPKF increased

sharply after its evident failure to enforce its mandate to return the IDPs.

First of all the quality and quantity of Russian troops are limited. The size

of the force remained around 1,500, which is far from enough. In terms ofquality their command, communication, intelligence and logistics are very

poor. Officers and soldiers are very young and without proper peacekeeping

training. Secondly their strategic and tactical attitude to peacekeeping is also

problematic. Instead of conducting aggressive patrols, observation and

providing security they prefer to establish platoon sized checkpoints and

remain indoors except for logistical activities. The outcomes of poor train-

ing, leadership and logistics are widespread corruption, looting, illicit goods

trafficking and bullying the civilians (MacFarlane, 1997, pp. 517520; Da-

nilov, 1999; Fuller, 2002, 2003). Thirdly joint operation with UNOMIG isvery limited and sometimes counterproductive. Several UNOMIG patrols

were targeted after being seen with CISPKF vehicles. And most of the time

civilians are reluctant to talk in front of CISPKF officials. At the same time

UNOMIG is seen as playing a secondary role in peacekeeping because of

the presence of CISPKF. Even though CISPKF is creating lots of problems

its presence is still needed because its presence is deterring both sides

from large scale armed hostilities. But the ideal solution is replacing

CISPKF with a more effective multinational force. Even traditional type

UN interpositional peacekeepers will help to improve the situation drasti-cally (MacFarlane, 1999).

3.3.2. IDPs

The second problem is managing the safe and orderly return of the IDPs.

After the end of hostilities more than 2,00,000 ethnic Georgians from Ab-

khazia remained as IDPs. After the enforcement and monitoring of the

ceasefire agreement the IDP problem turned out to be the main problem to

be solved in order to reach a peaceful solution. Until now all the efforts to

organise the return of the IDPs have failed. The Abkhaz side is evidentlyreluctant to surrender the demographic advantage gained after the escape of

the Georgians from Abkhazia. So everybody is expecting UNOMIG to find

a peaceful way to force Abkhazs to accept the IDPs. But this is not easy. The



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ruthless conflict, abuses and crimes against each other, high levels of cas-ualties, extensive damage to the infrastructure and the like have already

created a big barrier for reconciliation, which is absolutely necessary for

peaceful coexistence and a lasting solution. (Greenberg Research, 1999; The

International Peace Academy and Best Practices Units of UNDPKO, 2002,

pp. 34, 37). All the indicators show that both sides are far from reconcil-

iation. Without the necessary preparations and without providing their

physical security the return of the IDPs is a recipe for a renewal of hostilities.

The May 1998 Gali clashes are a good example of the outcome of an

uncontrolled return. The Gali district is at the ceasefire line and nearly 96% ofthe pre-conflict population were Georgians. More than 40,000 IDPs returned

back to Gali permanently or temporarily after the end of hostilities. UNHCR

and other International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs rendered humani-

tarian aid to these people. However Georgian partisan and militia groups

tried to use the spontaneous return of the IDPs to recapture the Gali district.

After sudden militia attacks Abkhaz forces launched a sweeping operation

against them. Many homes and schools that were rebuilt after the ceasefire

were destroyed and more than 35,000 people were displaced once again.

UNOMIG and CISPKF were unable to do anything to protect civilians andkeep both sides apart. At the end the prestige of UNOMIG was damaged

beyond repair (Fuller, 1998a,b; Hansen, 1999; Dale, 1997; MacFarlane,

1997). After the May 1998 clashes UNHCR and most IOs and NGOs

stopped humanitarian aid and began to wait for the improvement of the

situation. But the IDPs once again began to return back home spontaneously.

The only organisation available on the ground was UNOMIG, which had no

means to meet these demands. It was and still is a frequent occurrence to see

IDPs voicing their frustration to military observers because military observers

are the only persons, who would not harm them and listen to their complaintspatiently. UNOMIG managed to launch quick-impact projects to help im-

prove the conditions of IDPs in 2001 only. At the same time UNOMIG

encouraged NGOs to cover immediate humanitarian concerns. In this way

UNOMIG began to take on the responsibilities of UNHCR in Abkhazia

(Annan, 2004a, pp. 78; Beau, 2004). In short, the mandate to assist the

return of the IDPs is a mission impossible. UNOMIG is trying to do eve-

rything in its power but is always falling victim to biased criticism.

3.4. Criminality

The political and diplomatic deadlock and both sides failure to enforce public

order and security created a power vacuum. Criminal groups immediately

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seized the opportunity. Unfortunately some of the alleged militia and partisangroups also turned to criminal activities to finance their operations. Extortion,

kidnapping, robbery, looting, illicit goods trafficking, killings and the like

become daily events especially in the lower Gali district. So currently crime is

the biggest danger for the fragile ceasefire.

In the beginning UNOMIG showed no interest in crime except reporting

the available information about criminal incidents. But after 1998 crime

became the main concern for everybody. UNOMIG had to deal with crim-

inal incidents, but, as a military observer group, lacks the means to do so.

When military observers tried to get information about the incidents andgangs they became targets. Gangs attacked UNOMIG patrols to force them

not to get into their lucrative business as the example of the June 2000

ambush of Hotel Team in lower Gali shows (Global IDP Georgia, 2000,

pp. 1013). After much discussion the SC decided to strengthen the capacity

of UNOMIG by adding a civilian police component to the mission. The first

10 officers were deployed in November 2003. But the deployment of the

remaining members has been delayed because of Abkhaz refusal to

accept them. The main duty of the civilian police is to help local security

departments to conduct their duties effectively and professionally by meansof giving training and equipment. Some Georgian police officers have

already been chosen to participate in the OSCE Kosovo Police School.

The impact of this new policy will become clear in a few years (Annan,

2004b, pp. 56).

3.5. Military Observers

The strength of every organisation depends upon the values of its members.This is also true for UNOMIG. Even though the UN gained much expe-

rience from many peacekeeping operations, it still needs an overall approach

to training, evaluating and controlling the military personnel assigned to

diverse missions. The UNs manual on selection and training of UNMOs

has clearly stated the necessary qualities and standards. But it is not easy to

apply the rules in the field. UNOMIG is lucky mission by means of coun-

tries contributing military observers. Nearly all the contributing countries

have a professional army above world average. The current composition of

UNOMIG is 116 military observers from 23 countries, 15 European, 5Asian, 2 American and 1 North African. Most other UN missions are

heavily dependent on third world countries military personnel. There is

already a discussion going on about this cheap mercenary trend. UNOMIG



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is also suffering from several problems with observers. I will only list someof my observations without accusing any country but the general system:

(1) More than half of the military observers do not have previous peace-

keeping experience or training. A 1 week long orientation training is not

enough to overcome this deficiency. That means at least 1 month is needed

to train novice observers before getting any contribution from them.

(2) For some observers serving in the mission is just about getting additional

wage.

(3) It is nearly impossible to send back observers who do not have the

necessary standards or have violated important rules or regulations. Theevaluation system is just not working.

(4) The mission language, English, is a big problem. Nearly a quarter of the

observers does not speak English sufficiently. This problem gets worse

during operational patrols and in emergency cases.

(5) An important percentage of observers has difficulty to perform oper-

ational patrols because they lack some basic military qualities like driv-

ing off-road military vehicles, using maps and navigating, guiding

helicopters, emergency rescue etc.

(6) Communication with local people is also creating problems. Most of theobservers do not speak local languages and depend on locally hired

interpreters. In the OSCE Mission to Georgia which is operating in

South Ossetia its is obligatory for observers to speak Russian. That is

one of the important factors for the relative success of the OSCE.

(7) Some observers are coming from very poor countries. Even the condi-

tions of the IDPs are better than the conditions of some people in their

home countries. So they are suffering problems to understand the com-

plaints of the locals and to evaluate the humanitarian needs of the re-

spective population.(8) Observers from some countries are not welcome by different local au-

thorities. For example Georgians do not like Russian observers and

Abkhazs do not like US observers.

(9) Some countries are sending observers for a 6 months term only. So

observers have just barely learnt their trade when they return back home.

There are also some problems related to UNOMIGs organisation and

general policy:

(1) The main problem is the frequent rotation of observers. The average

time of serving in one operational team is 3 months. Only some indi-

viduals manage to serve more than 4 months in the same team. So most

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of the observers never learn more than the basics about the teams areaof responsibilities (AORs).

(2) There are one main HQ, two sector HQs and one liaison HQ, which

means there are more staff positions than operational team duties. Ob-

servers with talents and able to speak English fluently are picked for staff

duties, leaving the operational value of the teams problematic.

(3) The contributing countries are reluctant to take risks for their observers.

That means that in any life threatening situation all operations would be

discontinued for the time being.

(4) After a decade the local population and sometimes the media still do notunderstand why UNOMIG is in Georgia. The mission needs reliable

channels for information. By this way UNOMIG could explain its mis-

sion, capabilities and would be able to mobilise NGOs, the media and

the local population.

(5) UNOMIG does not have a satisfactory de-briefing and lessons-learned

system. So the valuable experiences of the observers are remaining with

themselves. It is sometimes impossible to learn what had happen even a

year ago. Local mayors, directors and people are tired of answering the

same questions again and again after every rotation.(6) The sectors have difficulty to follow and understand what is happening

on the other side and gaining access to events.

4. CONCLUSION

As a conclusion even though UNOMIG proved itself a learning organisa-

tion and military observers are trying to do their best, UNOMIG is not a

successful peacekeeping mission like other UNMOMs. It has many prob-

lems and limited means to overcome them. As we have already discussedmost of the problems are beyond the power of UNOMIG. But even under

these conditions some of the problems can be solved without waiting for a

concrete change in Abkhazia or the UN peace support operational system.

To improve the relative effectiveness of UNMOMs we need to differentiate

the problems and to focus on the ones that a respective mission has the

means to overcome. By this way UNMOMs will be more successful and will

not waste their limited means on impossible issues.

REFERENCES

Annan, K. (2004a). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia.

S/2004/315 UN, New York.



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Annan, K. (2004b). Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia.S/2004/26 UN, New York.

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