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Why Chinese farmers obey the law: Pesticide compliance in Hunan Province, China

Yan, H.

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Appendix

Part A The Legal Context of the Pesticide Case

A.1 The Legal Framework of the Pesticide Case in China

Figure A.1 The legal framework of the pesticide case in China

As illustrated in Figure A.1, at present, relevant laws, rules and regulations

concerning pesticide and vegetable safety regulation in China mainly include:

National laws

National regulations

National provisions

Local regulations

Local administrative measures

Local provisions

Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China

Law of the People’s Republic of China of Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products

Agricultural Law of the People’s Republic of China

Regulations on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China

Regulations on Pesticide Administration

The Measures for the Implementation of Regulations on Pesticides Administration

Provisions for Safe Use of Pesticides

The Provisions on the Administration for Restricting the Use of Pesticides

…

Regulations of Hunan Province on Agricultural Environmental Protection

Administrative Measures on the Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products of Hunan Province

Interim Provisions of Discretion of Agricultural Administrative Penalty of Hunan Province

…

…

Measures for Implementation of Examinations of Pesticide Operational Conditions

…

…

280 APPENDIX

Laws and rules concerning pesticide and vegetable safety regulation at the national level

Food Hygiene Law of the People’s Republic of China115

Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China116

Agricultural Law of the People’s Republic of China117

Law of the People’s Republic of China of Quality and Safety of Agricultural

Products118

Regulations on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law of the People’s

Republic of China119

Regulations on Pesticide Administration120

The Measures for the Implementation of Regulations on Pesticide

Administration121

Other related national laws and rules

115

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shipin Weisheng Fa (Food Hygiene Law of the People’s Republic of China) was the first state-legislated food safety law in the People’s Republic of China. It was adopted at the 16

th Session of the 8

th standing committee of the National People’s

Congress on 30 October 1995, and according to Article 104, Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, it was abolished as of 1 June 2009. 116

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shipin Anquan Fa (Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China) was adopted at the 7

th Session of the Standing Committee of the 11

th National

People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 28 February 2009, and it is effective as of June 1, 2009. 117

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongye Fa (Agricultural Law of the People’s Republic of China) was adopted at the 2

nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 8

th National People's

Congress on 2 July 1993 and was amended at the 31st Meeting of the Standing Committee of the

9th

National People's Congress on 28 December 2002. It went into effect on 1 March 2003. 118

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Nongchanpin Zhiliang Anquan Fa (Law of the People’s Republic of China of Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products) was adopted at the 21

st

meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th

National People’s Congress on 29 April 2006 and went into effect on 1 November 2006. 119

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shipin Anquanfa Shishi Tiaoli (Regulations on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China) was adopted at the 73

rd Standing Committee Meeting of the State Council on 8 July 2009 and has been effective

from the date of issuance. 120

Nongyao Guanli Tiaoli (Regulations on Pesticide Administration) was promulgated by Decree No. 216 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on 8 May 1997 and amended in accordance with the Decision of the State Council on Amending the Regulations on Pesticide Administration on 29 November 2001. 121

Nongyao Guanli Tiaoli Shishi Banfa (The Measures for the Implementation of Regulations on Pesticide Administration) was adopted by Decree No. 20 of the Agricultural Ministry of the People's Republic of China and went into effect on 24 July 1999 and was amended by Decree No. 18 of the Agricultural Ministry in 2002, Decree No. 38 of the Agricultural Ministry in 2004 and Decree No. 9 of the Agricultural Ministry in 2007.

APPENDIX 281

Regulations and provisions concerning pesticide and vegetable safety

regulation at the local level: taking Hunan province as an example

Regulations of Hunan Province on Agricultural Environmental

Protection122

Administrative Measures on the Quality and Safety of Agricultural

Products of Hunan Province 123

Interim Provisions of Discretion of Agricultural Administrative Penalty of

Hunan Province124

Other related local regulations and rules

A.2 The Regulatory Framework of the Pesticide Case in China

122

Hunansheng Nongye Huanjing Baohu Tiaoli (Regulations of Hunan Province on Agricultural Environmental Protection) was published at the 32

nd meeting of the Standing Committee of

the 9th

Hunan Provincial People’s Congress on 29 November 2002 and went into effect on 1 February 2003. 123

Hunansheng Nongchanpin Zhiliang Anquan Guanli Banfa (Administrative Measures on Quality and Safety of Agricultural Products of Hunan Province) was adopted by the 58

th

standing meeting of the Provincial People’s Government and went into effect on 1 August 2005. 124

Hunansheng Nongye Xingzheng Chufa Ziyou Cailiangquan Shiyong Zanxing Guiding (Interim Provisions of Discretion of Agricultural Administrative Penalty of Hunan Province) was promulgated by the Agricultural Bureau of Hunan province on 26 February 2001.

282

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a

APPENDIX 283

As illustrated in Figure A.2, China has a multilevel and multifunctional

pesticide and vegetable safety control system. According to relevant laws, rules and

regulations,125

the responsibilities of the relevant regulatory divisions at the

national and local levels are introduced as follows:

Food Safety Committee of the State Council; the State Council shall establish the

Food Safety Committee, with the responsibilities determined by the State

Council.

State Administration on Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and subordinate

bureaus; the authorities for the administration of industry and commerce

under the State Council shall be responsible for food distribution according to

the law and the requirements of the State Council.

Ministry of Health (MOH) and subordinate bureaus; the health authorities

under the State Council are responsible for the overall coordination of food

safety, food safety assessment, development of food safety standards,

publishing of food safety information, development of the certification

conditions for qualification of the food inspection and testing agencies,

specification of the inspection and testing, and investigating and treating

significant food safety accidents.

General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine

(AQSIQ) and subordinate bureaus; the authorities for quality supervision,

inspection and quarantine under the State Council shall be responsible for the

supervision and management of food production according to the law and the

requirements of the State Council.

State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) and subordinate bureaus; the

authorities for FDA under the State Council shall be responsible for the

catering service according to the law and the requirements of the State Council.

The administrative departments for health, agriculture, quality supervision,

industry and commerce and FDA at the county level or above shall strengthen

communication and close cooperation, exercise the rights and bear the

responsibilities according to the work division.

Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and subordinate bureaus; the administrative

departments for agriculture under the people's governments at or above the

county level shall be responsible for the supervision and control of the quality

125

They are mainly Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China (cited from: www.lawinfochina.com/), Regulations on Pesticide Administration (translated and published by GOV.cn, Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, http://english.gov.cn/), and Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (translated and published by CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/).

284 APPENDIX

and safety of agricultural products. Agricultural products here refer to the

primary products from agriculture, i.e., the plants, animals, microorganisms

and their products obtained in the course of agricultural activities.

Specifically, the competent administrative department of agriculture of the

State Council is responsible for the pesticide registration and pesticide

supervision and administration throughout the country. The competent

administrative departments of agriculture of the people's governments of

provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central

Government shall assist the competent administrative department of

agriculture of the State Council in conducting pesticide registration within

their respective administrative areas, and are responsible for the pesticide

supervision and administration within their respective administrative areas.

The competent administrative departments of agriculture of the people's

governments at the county level and the people's governments of cities divided

into districts and autonomous prefectures are responsible for the pesticide

supervision and administration within their respective administrative areas.

Ministry of Environmental Protection (MOEP) and subordinate bureaus also

have some responsibilities related to pesticide and vegetable safety; the

competent department of environmental administration under the State

Council shall conduct unified supervision and management of the

environmental protection work throughout the county. The competent

departments of the environmental protection administration of the local

people’s government at or above the county level shall conduct unified

supervision and management of the environmental protection work within

areas under their jurisdiction.

APPENDIX 285

Part B Key Variables and Measurements

Table B.1 Dependent variables and measurements Dependent variables

Summary of questions asked in dialogues (see below in details)

Coding method

Compliant Noncompliant

Compliance behavior 1: use of types of pesticides

Which pesticide(s) do you usually use on what vegetables for what pests

or diseases? (您现在主

要使用的农药有哪些

呢？它们分别用来治什

么虫呢？ 分别用在哪些

蔬菜上呢？)

Does not indicate in any way that he/she has applied or will apply any type of illegal pesticides

In any way indicates that he/she has applied or will apply any type of illegal pesticides

Compliance behavior 2: the disposal of pesticide containers

How do you usually dispose of pesticide containers after pesticide application? (

您一般打完药后农药袋

子怎么处理呢？）

In any way indicates that he/she generally disposes by means of recycling or burying in ground far away from water sources and residential areas or other legal ways

In any way indicates that he/she generally disposes of pesticide containers by throwing away on farm or in village, or other illegal ways

Compliance behavior 3: time interval

What is your general time interval between the last pesticide applying and vegetable

harvesting? （您一般打

完药后过几天采摘呢？）

In any way indicates that he/she generally harvests vegetables at least a week after pesticide spraying

In any way indicates that he/she generally harvests vegetables within a week after pesticide spraying

286 APPENDIX

Table B.2 Amoral calculation and measurement Amoral calculation Summary of questions

asked in dialogues (see below in details)

Coding method

Positive Negative

Operational cost-benefit calculation of compliance

How is your behavior (legal or illegal) in comparison with the alternatives

126 (illegal or

legal) in terms of price and effectiveness (for use of types of pesticides)/ cost and earnings (for a

time interval)? （跟其他

人的做法相比（不合法或

者合法），您的做法(合法

或者不合法)成本是不是

更加低呢？效益怎么样

呢？）

In any way indicates comparing with the violation behavior, any of the two specific compliance behaviors is less costly and more effective/profitable127

/ (Cb-Cc) > (Vb-Vc)

128

In any way indicates comparing with the violation behavior, any of the two specific compliance behaviors is more costly and less effective/profitable /(Cb-Cc) < (Vb-Vc)

Deterr-ence

Detection probability

Assume that someone similar to you violates the use of types/disposal/time interval, is there a possitibilty of being

found out? (如果有一个

跟您一样种菜的人做了

（三种具体的违法行为中

的一种），他/她有可能被

发现吗?）

In any way indicates a possibility of being discovered by the inspection bureau/other sources

In any way indicates no possibility of being discovered by the inspection bureau/other sources

Height of the detection probability

How high is the possibility? By whom? (

被发现的可能性怎么样呢

？被谁发现呢？)

In any way indicates a high possibility of being discovered

In any way indicates a low possibility of being discovered

Sanction impact

What negative and the most serious effects would happen if being

punished? (如果他被处

罚的话，会有什么后果

呢？最严重的后果是什

么？）

In any way indicates an impact of punishment

In any way indicates no or a low impact of punishment

126

Notice that only two pesticide behaviors are compared, since it is assumed in advance that there is no interaction of operational cost-benefit calculation and disposal of pesticide containers according to the pilot study, the vegetable farmers indicated that there is no direct and obvious costs and benefits calculation concerning disposal. 127

For the specific coding method for more costly but more profitable middle cases, please see C1 in Part C. 128

(Cb-Cc) > (Vb-Vc) indicates that the benefits of compliance minus the costs of compliance are greater than the benefits of violation minus the costs of violation.

AP

PE

ND

IX

287

Tab

le B

.3 L

egit

imac

y an

d m

easu

rem

ent

Leg

itim

acy

K

ey i

nte

rvie

win

g q

ues

tio

ns

Co

din

g m

eth

od

P

osi

tive

N

egat

ive

Mix

ed

Elu

sive

/mis

sin

g

Des

crip

tive

so

cial

no

rms

of

com

pli

ance

Do

mo

st s

imil

ar o

ther

veg

etab

le f

arm

ers

do

th

e sa

me

as y

ou

do

on

(an

y o

f th

e th

ree

spec

ific

pes

tici

de

beh

avio

rs)?

（其

他大

多数

像您

一样

种菜

的也

是像

您这

样做

吗？

）

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

th

at m

ost

sim

ilar

o

ther

s co

mp

ly w

ith

th

e ru

les

on

an

y o

f th

e th

ree

spec

ific

pes

tici

de

beh

avio

rs

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

th

at m

ost

sim

ilar

o

ther

s d

o n

ot

com

ply

w

ith

th

e ru

les

on

an

y o

f th

e th

ree

spec

ific

p

esti

cid

e b

ehav

iors

Mo

rals

W

hat

do

yo

u t

hin

k o

f p

eop

le w

ho

do

(an

y o

f th

e

thre

e sp

ecif

ic v

iola

tio

n b

ehav

iors

)? (您

对做

了（

三

种具

体的

违法

行为

中的

一种

）的

行为

怎么

看？

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

in

su

ch c

on

dit

ion

s th

e la

w s

ho

uld

be

ob

eyed

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

in

su

ch c

on

dit

ion

s th

e la

w

sho

uld

no

t b

e o

bey

ed

Gen

eral

du

ty

to o

bey

D

o y

ou

ag

ree

wit

h t

he

foll

ow

ing

sta

tem

ent:

p

eop

le s

ho

uld

ob

ey t

he

law

, eve

n i

f it

is

a b

ad

law

, eve

n i

f it

is

no

t en

forc

ed, o

r ev

en w

hen

th

e

cost

s o

f o

bey

ing

it

are

hig

h?

(您同

意这

种说

法吗

：

国家

制定

了法

律，

不管

它是

好法

还是

坏法

，不

管

政府

有没

有去

执行

它，

或者

说不

管我

们是

不是

要

付出

很大

的代

价，

我们

都应

该遵

守)

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

p

osi

tive

vie

ws

on

ge

ner

al d

uty

to

ob

ey

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

n

egat

ive

view

s o

n

gen

eral

du

ty t

o o

bey

In

an

y w

ay i

nd

icat

es t

hat

h

e/sh

e h

as n

o i

dea

ab

ou

t th

e ge

ner

al d

uty

to

ob

ey/i

t is

har

d t

o s

ay/d

isre

gar

d f

or

law

s

288

AP

PE

ND

IX

Tab

le B

.4 L

egit

imac

y an

d m

easu

rem

ent

(co

nti

nu

ed)

Leg

itim

acy

K

ey i

nte

rvie

win

g q

ues

tio

ns

Co

din

g m

eth

od

P

osi

tive

N

egat

ive

Mix

ed

Elu

sive

/mis

sin

g

Pro

ced

ura

l ju

stic

e D

o y

ou

ag

ree

wit

h t

he

foll

ow

ing

sta

tem

ents

: o

ffic

ers

of

the

loca

l ag

ricu

ltu

ral

bu

reau

are

h

on

est;

dec

isio

ns

of

loca

l ag

ricu

ltu

ral

bu

reau

are

alw

ays

fair

; ove

rall

, h

ow

do

yo

u

asse

ss t

he

wo

rk o

f th

e lo

cal

agri

cult

ura

l

bu

reau

? (您

同意

这两

种说

法吗

：总

体上

来

说，

农业

局工

作人

员是

讲诚

信的

；农

业局

在

下面

处理

问题

时做

的决

定是

公正

的. 总

体上

您觉

得农

业局

的工

作做

的怎

么样

?)

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

po

siti

ve

view

s to

war

d a

ll

thre

e q

ues

tio

ns

con

cern

ing

p

roce

du

ral

just

ice

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

neg

ativ

e vi

ews

tow

ard

all

th

ree

qu

esti

on

s co

nce

rnin

g

pro

ced

ura

l ju

stic

e

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

po

siti

ve

view

s to

war

d a

ny

on

e o

r tw

o o

f th

e th

ree

qu

esti

on

s co

nce

rnin

g

pro

ced

ura

l ju

stic

e

In a

ny

way

in

dic

ates

th

at

he/

she

has

no

id

ea a

bo

ut

any

of

the

thre

e q

ues

tio

ns,

or

can

no

t g

ive

any

jud

gm

ent

as h

e/sh

e h

as n

ever

dea

lt w

ith

lo

cal

agri

cult

ura

l b

ure

au o

ffic

ers

or

the

off

icer

s n

ever

co

me

APPENDIX 289

Table B.5 Capacity and measurement

Capacity Key interviewing questions

Coding method

High Low

Ability to obey

Financial ability What was your family

gross earning last year?

(您家去年的毛收入大概

是多少呢？)

In any way indicates family income > 40,000 RMB

In any way indicates family gross income < 40,000 RMB

Technical ability

If you have technological difficulties, to whom do you often turn for help? Have you ever taken part in any technological training? Organized by whom?

(如果您有技术上的困

难，一般向谁求助呢？您

曾经参加过任何蔬菜方

面的技术培训吗？是谁

组织的呢？)

In any way indicates low necessity of technical support or indicates high necessity of technical support but sufficient technical training opportunities

In any way indicates high necessity of technical support but insufficient technical training opportunities

Legal knowledge

Do you know if the state has published any rules on use of types of pesticides/disposal of pesticide containers/time interval? If yes, please specify. How do you

know this? (您知道国家

有关于（三种农药行为中

的任一种）方面的法律法

规吗？如果知道的话，

具体规定是什么呢？您

是从哪里知道的呢？)

In any way indicates relevant legal knowledge on use of types of pesticides/disposal of pesticide containers/time interval from the law/other sources

In any way indicates irrelevant legal knowledge on use of types of pesticides/ disposal of pesticide containers/ time interval

290 APPENDIX

Part C The Specific Coding Method for Independent and

Dependent Variables

From what is shown in Tables B-1 to B-4, if interviewees give untruthful answers,

their compliance and compliance determinants are defined in a rigid way, that is,

vegetable farmers indicate in any way that any noncompliance should be defined as

a violation, and they indicate any compliance in any way, then it should be defined

as obedient. Specifically, for these who indicated in any way that they have applied

or will apply any type of illegal pesticides on vegetables are defined as

noncompliant129. The interviewer should first figure out the vegetable farmers’ own

language on what to call all kinds of pesticides through the pilot study as well as

figure out which illegal ones are used most frequently. Respondents were first asked

to reply to an open-ended question on which kinds of pesticides they usually use on

vegetables. After volunteering types of pesticides as best they can, the interviewer

then asked them about the most commonly used illegal ones to assure that all

possibly forbidden and restricted pesticides are checked. Vegetable farmers who

indicated generally disposing of pesticide containers by throwing them away on the

farm or in the village or in other inappropriate ways are defined as noncompliant;

these who indicated generally picking vegetables one week after pesticide spraying

or spraying pesticides only after vegetable harvesting are defined as compliant.

Notice that compliance with the time interval was defined in a compromise way as

in current China the situation is that vegetable farmers can rarely comply strictly

with the safety interval. Different types of pesticides demand different time

intervals. In rural China, most vegetable farmers apply medium-toxic or low-toxic

pesticides which demand a longer time interval than biological pesticides. Generally

speaking, vegetables should not be picked within a week after spraying

medium-toxic or low-toxic pesticides. The questions about disposal of pesticide

containers and time interval are not so sensitive and the interviewee often gave

truthful answers, because they regard them as normal things that frequently happen

in rural areas.

C1 Operational cost-benefit calculation of compliance

If indicated in any way: behavior A (compliant) is cheaper/ less costly and more

effective/ more profitable than behavior B (violated), it is coded as positive;

129

For the selection of types of pesticides, please see the chart of types of pesticides, D4, Part D.

APPENDIX 291

If indicated in any way: behavior B (violated) is cheaper/ less costly and more

effective/ more profitable than behavior B (complaint), it is coded as negative.

Notice that for middle cases if: behavior A (compliant) is more expensive but

more effective/profitable than that of behavior B (violated), it is coded as positive,

and vice versa. The coding method here is based on how vegetable farmers

themselves weigh both aspects. As they indicated, pesticide effectiveness/earning is

the most important aspect that influences their final gain, while pesticide cost is

generally not that important. On the one hand, the costs of pesticides only take up a

small proportion of their gross income; on the other hand, these who choose the

more costly behavior believe that it is more effective and can guarantee their

harvest, although they need to pay a higher price. So for them the price is not the

key factor that affects their general calculation of compliance.

C2 Deterrence

C2.1 Detection probability

If indicated in any way: a probability of being discovered, it is coded as positive;

If indicated in any way: no probability of being discovered, it is coded as negative.

C2.2 Height of detection probability

If indicated in any way: a high possibility of being discovered, it is coded as

positively high;

If indicated in any way: a low possibility of being discovered, it is coded as

negatively high.

C2.3 Sanction impact

If indicated in any way: a sanction impact, it is coded as positive;

If indicated in any way: no or a low sanction impact, it is coded as negative.

Notice that in the research, sanction impact rather than sanction severity is

examined. For vegetable farmers who indicated some economic or financial impact

like “our vegetables would be prohibited from being sold on the market” or “no one

would come to buy our vegetables” or “loss of Guanxi and thus financial loss” or

other sanctions ultimately affecting their earnings, it is coded as positive.

Nevertheless, based on some vegetable farmers’ indications about how they

292 APPENDIX

themselves weigh the impact, they mostly regard the sanction impact as severe as

they are generally poor and mainly live from vegetable production.

C3 Descriptive social norms of compliance

C3.1 If indicated in any way: most similar other vegetable farmers comply with the

rules on any of the three pesticide behaviors, it is coded as positive;

C3.2 If indicated in any way: most similar other vegetable farmers do not comply

with the rules on any of the three pesticide behaviors, it is coded as negative.

C4 Morals

C4.1 If indicated in any way: negative views on any of the three relevant violation

behaviors, it is coded as positive;

C4.2 If indicated in any way: positive views on any of the three relevant violation

behaviors, it is coded as negative.

C5 General duty to obey

C5.1 If indicated in any way: in such conditions the law should be obeyed, it is coded

as positive;

C5.2 If indicated in any way: in such conditions the law need/should not be obeyed,

it is coded as negative.

C5.3 If indicated in any way: he/she has no idea about this question/it is hard to

say/disregarding the law, it is coded as elusive/missing.

C6 Procedural justice

C6.1 If indicated in any way: positive views on all three questions of procedural

justice, it is coded as positive;

C6.2 If indicated in any way: negative views on all three questions of procedural

justice, it is coded as negative;

C6.3 If indicated in any way: positive views on any one or two of the three questions

concerning procedural justice, it is coded as mixed;

C6.4 If indicated in any way: he/she has no idea about any of the three questions, or

cannot give any judgment as he/she has never dealt with local agricultural bureau

officers or the officers never come, it is coded as elusive/missing.

C7 Ability to obey

APPENDIX 293

C7.1 Financial ability (using annual family gross income as a proxy)

C7.1.1 If indicated: family income > 40,000 RMB130

, it is coded as high131

;

C7.1.2 If indicated: family gross income < 40,000 RMB, it is coded as low.

C7.2 Technical ability (using the subjective need of technology as a proxy)132

C7.2.1 If indicated: no necessity of technical assistance or high need of technical

assistance but sufficient technical training opportunities, it is coded as high;

C7.2.2 If indicated: high need of technical assistance but insufficient technical

training opportunities, it is coded as low.

C8 Legal knowledge133

C8.1 If indicated: relevant134legal knowledge (on use of types of pesticides/disposal

of pesticide containers/time interval) from the law/other sources, it is coded as

high135;

130

Notice that here according to the Chinese Peasant Economic Status Report published by the China Rural Institute of Central China Normal University in 2012, the average family cash income in rural areas in 2011 was 38,894.38 RMB. Thus, in this research, we set 40,000 RMB as the standard level for analyzing vegetable farmers’ financial ability to obey the law. For these farmers who earn less than the average family income, it is more difficult for them to obey the law at the cost of family income. Hence, in this study we defined these who earn less than the average family as these who have low financial ability to comply. 131

Here compared to defining a positive/negative ability to obey, it is better to define a high/low ability to obey, as it is very difficult to decide on which level of financial ability that vegetable famers have engouth to obey the law; rather, we can say that the higher their financial ability, the higher their ability to obey. 132

Here technical ability was indirectly measured by asking farmers’ subjectively reported need of technology including the necessity of technology and the technical opportunity of obtaining technical training. 133

Notice that here vegetable farmers responded to questions about what the law dictates rather than the right thing or the proper thing to do. For these who indicated legal knowledge from relevant parties or by reading instructions, they also indicated legal knowledge as they thought that the state publishes the rules on the pesticide instructions, or through other parties. 134

Here instead of defining correct/incorrect, relevant/irrelevant legal knowledge is measured as it is difficult for farmers to indicate correct legal knowledge as exactly what the law says. Similar to the ability to obey, here high/low legal knowledge is measured. 135

Notice that here legal knowledge is defined as a compromise. Specifically, for the use of types of pesticides, it is clear that these who can state all the types of prohibited pesticides are defined as having a high legal knowledge, but it is not necessary for farmers to name all the types of prohibited pesticides. They just need to indicate that these highly-toxic pesticides are prohibited for use on vegetables or only these low-toxic ones are permitted for use on vegetables, and also indicated that they can know about which specific highly toxic pesticides are prohibited by consulting relevant parties like the pesticide sellers or enforcement officers

294 APPENDIX

C8.2 If indicated: irrelevant legal knowledge (on use of types of pesticides/disposal

of pesticide containers/time interval), it is coded as low.

Part D Flowcharts on Specific Interviewing Questions for

Vegetable Farmers

The research employs a dialogue strategy to deal with some challenges during the

interviewing process. Taking the measurement of the operational cost-benefit

calculation of compliance as an example, the first challenge is the sensitivity, that is,

asking the respondents directly about comparing legal behavior with illegal will

make the whole conversation more sensitive. Here the approach is to ask smoothly

through a dialogue leading them to state what they do (legal or illegal) and what is

the opposite of that (illegal or legal), and then to compare the two. Consider for

instance a dialogue below:

The interviewer: Which pesticide/pesticides in the chart do you usually use on

what vegetable for what pest or disease? (shows the respondent a chart of collected

types of pesticides (most frequent ones with mixed legal and illegal types))

Respondent A: Now I use some bio-pesticides like Avermectins for killing

pests, and Fenaminosulf ( 敌 克 松 ) for sterilization … But I do not use

Methamidophos (甲胺磷，a type of illegal pesticides). It is too toxic. I sometimes

use Carbofuran (呋喃丹, a type of illegal pesticides)…

The interviewer: Do most similar others use Carbofuran？

Respondent A: Yes. It is for killing soil insects…

The interviewer: Any other alternatives?

Respondent A: Yes. A lot of new brands can kill soil insects.

The interviewer: In comparison with these new alternatives, is carbofuran

cheaper?

or cooperatives or associations. This is consistent with the rules on types of pesticides, because according to the rules, these prohibited pesticides are all highly toxic or extremely toxic ones. Second, for these who indicated that based on the rules, pesticide containers should be disposed of by recycling or burying in the ground or burning are defined as having a high legal knowledge. Third, these farmers who indicated that the general safety interval is one week based on the rules are defined as having relevant legal knowledge. These who did not directly indicate the general time interval, but instead indicated that they can learn about safety interval by reading pesticide instructions or consulting other relevant parties like these who indicated having relevant legal knowledge. Here the two kinds of discourses are both consistent with the law, as according to the law, the regulated actors should obey the safety interval based on the pesticide instructions. Generally, the basic rule for safety interval is seven days. But the specific time interval on the pesticide instructions varies from three days to seven days or even longer, so both are coded as indicating having relevant legal knowledge.

APPENDIX 295

Respondent A: Yes, I think it is cheaper.

The interviewer: How about its effectiveness?

Respondent A: The effectiveness is better. (Quotes from case D.T.No.2)

The second challenge is about the misunderstanding. In the study, the

interviewees are vegetable farmers who are generally less well educated. If the

questions are asked too broadly, it may be too abstract for them to understand the

question. So questions like costs and benefits are operationalized into simpler ones:

is pesticide A or B cheaper than the alternatives? How about its effectiveness? The

specific dialogues for each variable are illustrated below in the format of flowchart.

D1 First questions

D2 Main questions D2.1 Compliance behavior one: use of types of pesticides

The interviewer picks one type of illegal pesticide the respondent uses and asks: Do most similar others like you use the

same as you do？

The interviewer picks one or some types of legal pesticides the respondent uses and asks: Do most similar others like you use the same as you

do？ Do they have any alternatives (or what did you use before or are there any old brands)? Do they have any alternatives?

If not

Where do you usually buy pesticides? Why go there? (open question)

The interviewer shows the respondent a chart of collected types of pesticides (most frequent ones with mixed legal and illegal types) and asks: Which pesticide(s) in the chart do you usually use on what vegetable for what pest or disease? (open question, for the chart, please see C4 Chart of types of pesticides)

If the respondent indicates in any way that he/she hasn’t applied or will not apply any type of illegal pesticides

--- For financial ability

How long have you grown vegetables? How many acres of vegetables do you plant? Do you plant alone? Or does someone else help you? How old are you? What is your educational background? (open question)

What kind(s) of vegetables do you plant? Where do you sell your vegetables? How was your business last year? What was your family gross earning last year? (open question)

296 APPENDIX

Flowchart of interviewing questions I

If the respondent indicates yes

If the respondent indicates yes

If not If not

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

The interviewer asks: What do most similar others use? (make sure the interviewee talks about legal types)

The interviewer asks: Any alternatives? Or what else do you use? Or are there any other brands? Or assume someone uses the alternatives (make sure the interviewee talks about legal types)

The interviewer asks: What do most similar others use? (make sure the interviewee talks about illegal types)

The interviewer asks: Any alternatives? Or what did you use before? Any any old brand? Or assume someone uses the alternatives (make sure the interviewee talks about illegal types)

The interviewer asks: In comparison with the alternatives, is what you use cheaper? How about its effectiveness? (open question)

What do you think of people who use the alternatives to control serious pests? (open question)

What do you think of people who use the pesticide (the illegal type picked) to

control serious pests? (open question)

The interviewer asks: Assume that someone similar to you applies X (one type of illegal pesticide), can they be found out? (open question)

If no If yes

By whom? How high is the possibility? (open question)

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

Do you know if the state has published any rules on use of types of pesticides? If yes, please specify. How do you know that? (open question)

APPENDIX 297

D2.2 Disposal of pesticide containers

Flowchart of interviewing questions II

The interviewer asks: How many pesticide containers do you often have after pesticide spraying each time? Do you take them home? If not, how do you usually dispose of them? (open question)

If the respondent indicates in any way that he/she generally disposes by means of recycling or burying in ground far away from water sources and residential areas or other legal ways

If not

If not

What do you think of people who do the same as you do for disposal? (open question)

Do most similar other vegetable farmers do the same as you do for disposal?

If the respondent indicates yes

Do most similar other vegetable farmers do the same as you do for disposal?

If the respondent indicates yes

What do you think of people who do the alternatives for disposal? (open question)

If not If yes

By whom? How high is the possibility? (open question)

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

The interviewer asks: Asssume that someone similar to you throws pesticide containers everywhere, can they be found out? (open question)

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

Do you know if the state has published any rules on the disposal of pesticide containers? If yes, please specify. How do you know that? (open question)

If not

298 APPENDIX

D2.3 Time interval

If not

The interviewer asks: What is your general time interval between last pesticide applying and vegetable picking? (open question)

If the respondent indicates yes

If not

If the respondent indicates yes

If not

A test question: What would someone similar to you do whose vegetables need to be harvested and sold if he just applied pesticides? (open question)

If the respondent indicates in any way that he/she generally harvests vegetable at least a week later after pesticide spraying

The interviewer asks: Do most similar others do the same as you do

The interviewer asks: Do most similar others do the same as you do

What do you think of people who do the same as you do for time interval? (open question)

The interviewer asks: Any alternatives? Or assume someone does the alternatives (make sure the interviewee talks about illegal time interval)

The interviewer asks: What do most similar others do? (make sure the interviewee talks about illegal time interval)

The interviewer asks: Any alternatives? Or assume someone does the alternatives (make sure the interviewee talks about legal time interval)

The interviewer asks: What do most similar others do? (make sure the interviewee talks about legal time interval)

The interviewer asks: in comparison with the alternatives, is what you do cheaper? How about the profit? (open question)

The interviewer asks: in comparison with the alternatives, is what you do cheaper? How about the profit? (open question)

What do you think of people who do the alternatives for time interval?(open question)

APPENDIX 299

Flowchart of interviewing questions III

D2.4 General duty to obey and procedural justice

D3 Final questions

Have you ever read any law or law-related documents? (open question)

If you have technological difficulties, to whom do you often turn for help? Have you ever taken part in any technological training? Organized by whom? (open question)

--- For technical ability

Do you know if the state has published any rules on time interval? If yes, please specify. How do you know that? (open question)

If no

If yes

By whom? How high is the possibility? (open question)

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished? (open question)

Do you know if the state has published any rules on time interval? If yes, please specify. How do you know that? (open question)

The interviewer asks: Assume that someone similar to you deals with the time interval inappropriately, can they be found out? (open question)

Do you agree with the following statement: people should obey the law, even if it is a bad law, even if it is not enforced, or even when costs of obeying it are high? Why? (open question)

Do you agree with the following statements: officers of the local agricultural bureau are honest; decisions of local agricultural bureau are always fair; overall how do you assess the work of the local agricultural bureau? (open question)

300 APPENDIX

D4 Chart of types of pesticides

Below are selected types of pesticides (in Chinese), including illegal ones;136

they

were listed by referring to relevant laws, rules and regulation, and legal ones were

selected by consulting the local agricultural officers, village leaders and several

vegetable farmers. Then all the selected legal and illegal pesticides were mixed to

avoid untruthful answers. It is notable that all types of prohibited highly toxic

pesticides as well as some most frequently used pesticides are included in the chart,

but these illegal and extremely highly toxic pesticides are excluded, except DDT,

BHC and chlorphenamidine, because they are seldom applied by farmers based on

the pilot interview. Another reason is that these extremely highly toxic ones were

prohibited in the early 1980s, and are now seldom sold on the rural market. Thus,

there are 22 illegal ones included in the chart.

The types of pesticides in bold are high-ly toxic (only visible to the

interviewer), and these in brackets are some old brand names that may still be used

by vegetable farmers.

Chart of types of pesticides

阿维菌素

（灭虫灵）

毒·氯氰

（除虫净） 高效氯氰菊酯

溴氰菊酯

（敌杀死）

氰戊菊酯

（速灭杀丁）

甲基对硫磷

(甲基 1605)

氯氰菊酯

（灭百可） 啶虫脒

哒螨灵 甲拌磷

(3911/西梅脱) 克螨特

甲胺磷

(多灭磷)

敌敌畏 多菌灵 农地乐

（好乐士） 辛硫磷

毒死蜱

（乐斯本）

对硫磷

(1605)

甲霜灵·锰锌

（瑞毒霉锰锌）

磷胺

(大灭虫/迪

莫克)

克百威

(呋喃丹) 甲基异柳磷

杀虫双

（杀虫丹）

甲基硫环磷

(甲基棉安

磷)

136

For the prohibited pesticides, according to No. 194 and No. 199 of the Announcement of Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, 18 extremely highly-toxic types of pesticides are completely prohibited by the state, and the other 19 highly-toxic types are prohibited for application on vegetables, fruit trees, teas and traditional Chinese herbal medicines. types of pesticides are prohibited by the state; according to No.274, No. 322 and No.632 of the Announcement of Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, 5 of

the 19 highly-toxic organophosphorus pesticides, methamidophos(甲胺磷), parathion-methyl (

甲基对硫磷), Parathion（对硫磷）, Monocrotophos（久效磷）and Phosphamidon（磷胺）are completely prohibited for use in agriculture.

APPENDIX 301

定虫隆（抑太保

/7899）

苯线磷(力满库/克线

磷/线威磷)

霜脲氰·锰锌

（克露/霜露）

硫环磷

(棉安磷

/乙基硫环

磷)

灭线磷 (丙线磷/

益收宝)

吡虫啉

（一遍净、蚜虱净）

涕灭威 (铁灭克/丁

醛肪威才)

三唑酮

（粉锈宁）

氧化乐果 地虫硫磷

(地虫磷/大风雷)

恶霜·锰锌

（杀毒矾）

氢氧化铜

（可杀得）

乐果 滴滴涕 百菌清 代森锰锌

敌克松 氯唑磷

(异唑磷)

丙森锌

（安泰生）

久效磷

(纽克瓦/铃

杀)

爱多收（丰产素、

谷粒宝）

腐霉利

（速克灵）

特丁硫磷

(特丁磷)

乙酰甲胺磷

（高灭磷）

甲基托布津 氟虫腈

（锐劲特） 康宽

氟虫脲

（卡死克）

治螟磷

(苏化 203)

内吸磷

(1059) 普尊

丁硫克百威

（好年冬）

蝇毒磷

(蝇毒硫磷)

溴虫腈

（除尽/虫螨腈） 六六六

毒·辛

（地虎净）

Part E Measuring Compliance and Compliance Motivations for

CsQCA

Brief interview questions as well as the specific scoring arrangement based on

csQCA methods and tools are shown below in Table E.1.

Table E.1 Measuring compliance and compliance variables for csQCA Items Brief introduction of

interview questions Scoring arrangement 0 1

Compliance behaviors

Use of types of pesticides

Which pesticides do you usually use on what vegetables for what pests or diseases?

In any way indicates that he/she has applied or will apply any type of illegal pesticides

Does not indicate in any way that he/she has applied or will apply any type of illegal pesticides

Disposal of pesticide containers

How do you usually dispose of pesticide containers after pesticide application?

In any way indicates that he/she generally disposes by means of recycling or burying in ground far away from water sources and residential areas or other legal ways

In any way indicates that he/she generally disposes of pesticide containers by throwing away on farm or in village, or other illegal ways

302 APPENDIX

Table E.2 Measuring compliance and compliance variables for csQCA (continued) Items Brief introduction of

interview questions Scoring arrangement 0 1

Time interval What is your general time interval between the last pesticide applying and vegetable picking?

In any way indicates that he/she generally harvests vegetables at least a week after pesticide spraying

In any way indicates that he/she generally harvests vegetables within a week after pesticide spraying

Compliance variables

Amoral calculation

Deterrence (Becker, 1968; Thornton et al., 2005; Winter & May, 2001)

Assume that someone in the same business area with you does (any of the three specific violation behaviors), can they be found out? How high is the possibility? By whom? What negative and most serious effects would happen if punished?

In any way indicates low possibility of being discovered by the inspection bureau/other sources as well as no sanction impact

In any way indicates high possibility of being discovered by the inspection bureau/other sources as well as an sanction impact

Operational cost benefit calculation of compliance (Kagan & Scholz, 1984; Winter & May, 2001)

How is your behavior (legal or illegal) in comparison with the alternatives (illegal or legal) in terms of price and effectiveness (for use of types of pesticides)/ cost and earnings (for a time interval)?

In any way indicates comparison with the violation behavior, any of the two specific compliance behaviors is less/more costly and less effective/profitable

In any way indicates comparison with the violation behavior, any of the two specific compliance behaviors is less/more costly and more effective/profitable

Legitimacy

Descriptive social norms of compliance (Cialdini, 2007; Tyran et al., 2002)

Do most other vegetable farmers do the same as you do on (any of the three specific behaviors)?

In any way indicates that most other vegetable farmers do not comply with the rules on (any of the three specific pesticide behaviors)

In any way indicates that most other vegetable farmers comply with the rules on (any of the three specific pesticide behaviors)

Morals (Tyler,1990)

How do you think of people who do (any of the three specific violation behaviors)?

In any way indicates in such conditions the law should not be obeyed

In any way indicates in such conditions the law should be obeyed

APPENDIX 303

Table E.3 Measuring compliance and compliance variables for csQCA (continued) Items Brief introduction of

interview questions Scoring arrangement 0 1

General duty to obey (Tyler, 1990; McGraw & Scholz, 1991)

Do you agree with the following statement: people should obey the law, even if it is a bad law, even if it is not enforced, or even when costs of obeying it are high?

In any way indicates negative views on general duty to obey

137

In any way indicates positive views on general duty to obey

Procedural justice (Tyler 1990 )

Do you agree with the following statements: officers of the local agricultural bureau are honest; decisions of local agricultural bureau are always fair; overall, how do you assess the work of the local agricultural bureau?

In any way indicates negative views or mixed views toward the three aspects concerning procedural justice

138

In any way indicates positive views toward all three aspects concerning procedural justice

Capacity

Ability to obey (Winter & May, 2001; Kagan & Scholz; 1984)

What was your family gross earning last year?

In any way indicates family gross income < 40,000 RMB

In any way indicates family income >40,000 RMB

Legal knowledge (Winter & May, 2001; kim, 1998)

Do you know if the state has published any rules on (use of types of pesticides/disposal of pesticide containers/time interval)? If yes, please specify. How do you know this?

In any way indicates irrelevant legal knowledge on (use of types of pesticides/disposal of pesticide containers/time interval) from the law/other sources

In any way indicates relevant legal knowledge on (use of types of pesticides/disposal of pesticide containers/time interval) from the law/other sources

From what is shown in Table E-1, compliance behaviors and compliance

determinants are defined in a binary way. For pesticide compliance, any way

vegetable farmers indicate any noncompliance should be defined as absent and

scored as 0, and any way they indicate any compliant, it should be defined as

present and scored as 1. Notice that here only vegetable farmers’ annual family gross

income in the last year was used as a proxy for their ability to obey, without

137

Notice that for cases who indicated elusive/missing discourses concerning general duty to obey, they were coded as missing. 138

Notice that for cases who indicated elusive/missing discourses concerning procedural justice, they were coded as missing.

304 APPENDIX

considering the technical ability. As discussed in chapter 5, vegetable farmers’

indications about technical ability including necessity of technical support and

opportunity of getting sufficient technical support turn out to be quite similar and

less comparable and thus are ignored as an index for measuring ability to obey.

These farmers whose reported annual family gross income was 40,000 RMB or more

are defined as indicating the presence of a high annual family gross income and

thus scored as 1, and vice versa. Notice that procedural justice here is defined in a

rigid way. For these who in any way indicate positive views on all three aspects

concerning procedural justice, procedural justice is defined as present; otherwise, it

is defined as absent.

Part F CsQCA Analysis

The steps of csQCA analyses for the three pesticide behaviors are given below.

Table F.1 Truth table for use of types of pesticides

Capacity Amoral calculation Legitimacy No. of cases V O

A B C D E F G H I J

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 10 1 O1

0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 1 O2

0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 9 1 O3

1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 1 O4

0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 7 1 O5

0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 7 1 O6

0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 5 1 O7

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 1 O8

0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 O9

1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 O10

0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 O11

1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 O12

0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 O13

1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 O14

0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 O15

Note: V = value of use of types of pesticides; O= original combinations of characteristics; A = family gross income 2011; B = legal knowledge direcetly from the law; C = legal knowledge from other sources; D = deterrence from the state; E = deterrence from other sources; F = operational cost-benefit calculation of compliance; G = descriptive social norms of compliance; H = morals; I = generally duty to obey; J = procedural justice; frequency cutoff: 2; consistency cutoff: 0.8.

APPENDIX 305

Table F.2 CsQCA solutions for use of types of pesticides

P S No. of cases

O1a P1. b* C * F * G * H * I * j

S1.Medium capacity * medium amoral calculation * high legitimacy

48

P2. a * b * C* E * F * G * H* j

S2.Medium capacity * high amoral calculation * medium legitimacy

27

P3. a * b * d * e * F * G * H * I * j

S3. Low capacity * medium amoral calculation * high legitimacy

9

P4. a * b * C * D * E * F * G * H * I

S4. Medium capacity * high amoral calculation * high legitimacy

10

O1b P5. b * C * d * e * f * g * h * i * j

S5.Medium capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

4

P6. a * b * C * d * e * f * g * h * j

5

Note: O1a = logically possible patterns for compliance as present; O1b = logically possible patterns for compliance as absent; P= simplified patterns based on csQCA logic and tools; S = simplification in the broader categories; the lower-case letters represent the absence of a given causal factor; * signifies logical AND; abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a).

Table F.3 Simplified pattern chart for use of types of pesticides

P Original combinations of characteristics O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O

10 O 11

O 12

O 13

O 14

O 15

P1 × × × × × × × × P2 × × × × P3 × × P4 × × P5 × × P6 × ×

Abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a), F-1 (b).

Table F.4 Truth table for disposal of pesticide containers

Capacity Amoral calculation Legitimacy No. of cases V O

A B C D E G H I J

1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 O1

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 O2

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 O3

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 1 O4

1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 1 O5

1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 1 O6

0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 1 O7

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 11 0 O8

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 O9

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 O10

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 O11

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 O12

0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 O13

1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 O14

306 APPENDIX

Table F.5 Truth table for disposal of pesticide containers (continued)

Capacity Amoral calculation Legitimacy No. of cases V O

A B C D E G H I J

1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 O15

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 14 0 O16

Note: V = value of disposal of pesticide containers; frequency cutoff: 2; consistency cutoff: 0.8; abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a).

Table F.6 CsQCA solutions for disposal of pesticide containers

P S No. of cases

O2a P1. b * c * d * e * G * H * j

S1. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * medium legitimacy

22

P2. b * d * e * G * H * I * j

S2. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * high legitimacy

24

P3. A * b * C * e * G * H * I * j

S3. High capacity * low amoral calculation * high legitimacy

11

O2b P4. b * c * d * e * g * I * j

S4. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

34

P5. a* b * d * e * g * I * j

29

P6. a * b * c * d * e * g * h * i

9

P7. A * b * c * d * e * g * H * j

S5. Medium capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

4

Note: O2a = logically possible patterns for compliance as present; O2b = logically possible patterns for compliance as absent; abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a), F-1 (b).

Table F.7 Simplified pattern chart for disposal of pesticide containers

P Original combinations of characteristics O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O

10 O 11

O 12

O 13

O 14

O 15

O 16

P1 × × × × × P2 × × × × P3 × × P4 × × × × P5 × × × × P6 × × P7 × ×

Abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a), F-1 (b).

APPENDIX 307

Table F.8 Truth table for time interval

Capacity Amoral calculation Legitimacy No. of cases V O

A B C D E F G H I J

1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 O1

0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 8 1 O2

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 6 1 O3

1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 O4

1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 O5

1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 1 O6

0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5 1 O7

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 0 O8

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 0 O9

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 0 O10

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 O11

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0 O12

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 O13

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 O14

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 O15

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 O16

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 O17

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 O18

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 O19

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 0 O20

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 0 O21

Note: V = value of time interval; frequency cutoff: 2; consistency cutoff: 0.8; abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a).

Table F.9 CsQCA solutions for time interval

P S No. of cases

O3a P1. b * C * d * e * F * G * H * j

S1. Medium capacity * medium amoral calculation * medium legitimacy

18

P2. A * b * C * d * e * F * H * i * j

S2. High capacity * medium amoral calculation * low legitimacy

4

P3. a * b * d * e * F * G * H * I * j

S3. Low capacity * medium amoral calculation * high legitimacy

14

P4. A * b * C * e * F * G * H * I * j

S4. High capacity * medium amoral calculation * high legitimacy

7

O3b P5. a * b * d * e * f * g * j

S4. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

36

P6. b * d * e * f * g * I * j

S5. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

42

P7. a * b * C * d * e * f * g * h * i

S6. Low capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

5

P8. a * b * c * d * e * f * g * h * I

S7. Medium capacity * low amoral calculation * low legitimacy

14

308 APPENDIX

Note: O3a = logically possible patterns for compliance as present; O3b = logically possible patterns for compliance as absent; abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a), F-1 (b).

Table F.10 Simplified pattern chart for outcome O3

P Original combinations of characteristics O1

O2

O3

O4

O5

O6

O7

O8

O9

O 10

O 11

O12

O13

O14

O15

O 16

O 17

O 18

O 19

O 20

O 21

P1

× × × ×

P2

× ×

P3

× ×

P4

× × × ×

P5

× × × × × × × ×

P6

× × × × × × × ×

P7

× ×

P8

× ×

Abbreviations: see Table F-1 (a), F-1 (b).

Part G Additional Interviews

Prior to the formal interviews with vegetable farmers, some semi-structured

interviews were conducted with several farmers to collect some detailed and

directive information. In addition, local pesticide regulatory officers (informants in

the local agricultural bureau and some other relevant informants), village

committee members, relative insiders in agricultural integration organizations

(vegetable cooperatives with large farms, vegetable cooperatives or associations

cooperating with local vegetable farmers with small farms) and related informants

in agricultural materials companies (pesticide operation stores or pesticide

operation branches) were selected for semi-structured interviews to collect

supplementary materials. All of these interviews were mainly conducted by

conversations and observation. It was felt to be much more important to know

about things rather than measure things. The detailed interview questions are listed

below separately.

G1 Preparatory interviews with several vegetable farmers in the pilot phase

This was an essential and preparatory stage for the formal case interviews. It served

to provide information and materials, seeking for an appropriate way to draw up the

formal case interview questions, and checking and getting truthful answers. Several

APPENDIX 309

vegetable farmers were selected and interviewed. In order to collect truthful and

honest answers, the interviewer selected these farmers who trusted her the most

and these whom she knew well, these with experience in vegetable planting who

were well-known in the village because of vegetable planting were also considered.

The detailed interview outline is given below.

The interviewer showed every vegetable farmer the chart of types of pesticides

and asked them the following:

G1.1 How do vegetable farmers recognize and name the kinds of vegetable pesticides

on the chart139

? Do they continue to call them by their brand name? Or do they

begin to use the changed common names or simplified common names? If neither,

how do they recognize and name these pesticides now? By the pesticide producer or

the trademark?

Note: these questions are designed to figure out the farmers’ own language of

what they call different kinds of pesticides, which is helpful when asking them

questions about pesticide usage in their own languages and to overcome any

misunderstanding. After asking the question, the interviewer should note down the

farmers’ own way of naming the kinds of pesticides.

G1.2 Are there any changes in the vegetable farmers’ use of types of pesticide?

If yes, since when? Why did that happen? Which pesticides did vegetable

farmers use before?140 (let farmers speak first and then show them the chart and ask

them to identify items). Can vegetable farmers continue to buy these old pesticides?

If yes, from where? Which pesticides do vegetable farmers usually use now? (show

them the chart and ask them to identify first and then supplement).

If no, what types of pesticides do vegetable farmers usually use? (show them

the chart and ask them to recognize first and then to supplement).

139

According to Article 8, The Procedures for the Administration of Pesticide Labels and Guidelines, Article 2 Decree No.009 of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China, and Decisions about Revising Measures for the Implementation of Regulations on Control of Agricultural Chemicals, pesticide names refer to pesticide common names or simplified common names, which came into effect on 8 January 2008. 140

In 2002, 37 types of extremely toxic and highly toxic pesticides were prohibited for use on vegetables by the Ministry of Agriculture, including 18 types of pesticides that were no longer permitted to be used, while the remaining 19 types were prohibited for application on vegetables, fruit trees, teas and traditional Chinese herbal medicines. (For more details, please see Announcement No. 199 of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China).

Later in 2003, five high-ly toxic organophosphorus pesticides (methamidophos(甲胺磷)，

parathion-methyl（甲基对硫磷），Parathion（对硫磷），monocrotophos（久效磷）and

Phosphamidon（磷胺）) were completely prohibited for use in agriculture (For more details, please see Announcement No. 322 of the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China.)

310 APPENDIX

Note: these questions were designed to clarify whether there had been a big

change in the use of pesticide types after the change of pesticide regulations, and to

simplify the types of pesticides in the chart while making sure that some frequently

used pesticides are listed. These illegal types should not be deleted. The interviewer

should mark and remember these pesticides frequently used by farmers, and

supplement the banned pesticides in the chart. Also delete these types they never or

seldom use.

G1.3 What are the main functions of pesticides listed in the chart (including these

types supplemented during the above process)? Are there any alternatives for each

pesticide listed?

Note: these questions are designed to understand the main functions of all

kinds of pesticides, and to seek alternatives for each illegal pesticide, which is

helpful for comparing legal and illegal alternative pesticides (specifically for

measuring the operational cost-benefit calculation of compliance). Note that the

interviewer should write down the functions of pesticides and ask about the

functions of these illegal pesticides as well as figure out their possible alternatives.

G1.4 What kinds of pesticide containers pesticides are usually used? How do

vegetable farmers dispose of these containers? Are there different methods of

disposing of different kinds of containers?

Note: these questions are designed to clarify the vegetable farmers’ possible

disposal methods.

G1.5 How do vegetable farmers deal with the time interval between the last pesticide

application and vegetable harvesting? What is their general time interval? Do they

have any rules? If so, how do they decide on the time interval? According to

traditional experience? Or by the nature of different types of pesticides? Or by the

weather? Or by vegetable quotation? Or by reading the pesticide instructions? Or

by asking other farmers in the village?

Note: these questions are designed to understand the vegetable farmers’

considerations of the time interval between the last pesticide application and

vegetable marketing, which is helpful for seeking a suitable and

non-confrontational method for interviewing respondents and checking their

answers.

G1.6 Did the local government organize any pesticide training courses? If yes, which

agencies conducated them? For whom? Did they publicize any rules concerning the

APPENDIX 311

use of types of pesticides, or disposing of pesticide containers, or time interval?

How? Was there any influence on the farmers’ pesticide behaviors?

G1.7 What do you think about the local agricultural bureau’s pesticide regulatory

measures? Are they doing a good job?

Note: these questions are designed to understand the enforcement

performance of the local pesticide regulatory agency as well as its effect on pesticide

compliance, which is helpful for obtaining background information on the objective

pesticide enforcement.

G2 Interviews with some local pesticide regulatory officers (officers in the local

agricultural bureau or other informants)

The interviewer first sought possible “guanxi” in the local agricultural bureau and

then introduced herself to the agency that as a sociologist who would like to learn

about the pesticide laws and rules. Then she conducted interviews with some

relevant officers based on the pre-designed interview outline. During the process,

she encouraged the dialogues to flow in a certain order and allowed the informants

to continue the dialogues themselves. She paid attention to the conversation

continuity and gave some appropriate guidance when they digressed from the

subject. The interview outline is presented as follows.

G2.1 What are the responsibility divisions of the local agricultural bureau (e.g., the

agricultural law enforcement brigade)? What is their daily working schedule for

pesticide regulation (e.g., pesticide market investigations; random field inspections;

training for vegetable farmers; forecasts of diseases, pests and weeds; activities of

organizing and promoting safe and effective pesticides, etc.)?

G2.2 What are the training services or instructions carried out to promote vegetable

farmers’ legal, quality and safety awareness of vegetable products and safety level of

pesticide application (e.g. financial support; publicity of basic knowledge of

pesticide laws and rules; basic knowledge of pesticides, and technological

knowledge of pesticide application; promotions of awareness of applying pesticides

in correct ways, etc.)?

G2.3 What are the enforcement instruments of the agricultural law enforcement

brigade? What are its enforcement resources (including quantity and quality of law

enforcement officers, funds, etc.)?

312 APPENDIX

G2.4 What do you think of the performance of the local vegetable farmers’ pesticide

compliance behavior? To what extent do they comply or not comply? Do you have

any ideas about why they comply or do not comply? Do you have any suggestions

for regulating farmers’ pesticide compliance behavior?

G2.5 Please indicate if any critical pesticide violation cases of vegetable farmers

happened in the past 5 years. What happened? What were the results?

Note: the interviewer should pay attention to writing down some other useful

information during the conversation and process of observation. If possible, the

interviewer should accompany officers on an inspection, focus on aspects including

how they choose inspection areas, how many cars they have, what they do if they

find someone is violating pesticide laws and rules, how the farmers respond to

them, how they issue sanctions and are the farmers deterred, do they help farmers if

the farmers do not know about the law and what do they do, etc.

G3 Interviews with some local village committee members

G3.1 What are the population and geographic characteristics of your village? (e.g.

number of villagers, number of vegetable farmers, male and female ratio, arable

land area, vegetable planted area, vegetable species, the constitution of vegetable

farmers, history of village development, and the development of vegetable

production, etc.)

G3.2 Are there any vegetable associations or cooperatives in the village? How do

they operate?

G3.3 What do you think about the performance of the local vegetable farmers’

pesticide compliance behavior? To what extent do they comply or not comply? Do

you have any ideas about why they comply or do not comply? Do you have any

suggestions for regulating the farmers’ pesticide compliance behavior?

G3.4 What do you think about the local agricultural bureau’s pesticide regulatory

measures? Are they doing a good job?

Note: the interviewer should pay attention to writing down some other useful

information during the conversation and process of observation.

APPENDIX 313

G4 Interviews with some insiders in agricultural integration organizations

(vegetable cooperatives, vegetable associations or farmer-based vegetable

cooperatives)

G4.1 How does your organization operate? Do you have any regulations? Do you

cooperate with local farmers, and how does the organization regulate their pesticide

behavior? Do you have any contact with the local enforcement agency?

G4.2 What do you think about the local vegetable farmers’ pesticide compliance

behavior? To what extent do they comply or not comply? Do you have any ideas

about why they comply or do not comply? Do you have any suggestions for

regulating the farmers’ pesticide compliance behavior?

G4.3 What do you think about the local agricultural bureau’s pesticide regulatory

measures? Are they doing a good job?

Note: the interviewer should pay attention to writing down some other useful

information during the conversation and process of observation.

G5 Interviews with some informants in the agricultural materials company

(pesticide operational stores or pesticide operational branches)

G5.1 What are the main sources of the vegetable pesticides sold in your company?

Which one(s) sell(s) best? Have you ever stocked unqualified or fake pesticides? If

yes, have you ever taken any actions to protect your rights and benefits? If yes, what

happened? What were the results?

G5.2 Do you know of any governmental initiatives prohibiting the use of highly and

extremely toxic pesticides? What do you think about this? Does it affect your

pesticide business (both negative and positive)?

G5.3 What do you think about the local vegetable farmers’ pesticide compliance

behavior? To what extent do they comply or not comply? Do you have any ideas

about why they comply or do not comply? Do you have any suggestions for

regulating the farmers’ pesticide compliance behavior?

G5.4 What do you think about the local agricultural bureau’s pesticide regulatory

measures? Are they doing a good job?

314 APPENDIX

G5.5 Do you think that some pesticide operation branches or stores in the rural

areas still sell any prohibited highly or extremely toxic pesticides? Which one(s)?

Note: the interviewer should pay attention to writing down some other useful

information during the conversation and process of observation.

Summary

Why Chinese Farmers Obey the Law:

Pesticide Compliance in Hunan Province, China

Huiqi Yan

The goal of this study is to analyze pesticide compliance in China. By doing

so, this study seeks to provide a more comprehensive understanding of

compliance and some feasible and adaptive suggestions for enhancing

pesticide enforcement effectiveness in China. It seeks to benefit from both

qualitative and quantitative methods, and uses a larger N qualitative

approach which allows for systematic analysis and in-depth exploration.

Chapter 1 begins by describing the weak implementation of Chinese

laws and rules, and emphasizes the necessity and importance of a

compliance perspective in China that focuses on why the regulated actors

obey or break the law. It reviews some recent compliance and pesticide

compliance literature in both developed and developing economies. The

theoretical and methodological relevance as well as innovations are

presented by illustrating the gaps in the existing literature. Building on all

these, this chapter proposes the main research questions.

The first one is: what are the main factors and how do they interact to

shape vegetable farmers’ pesticide compliance or violation behavior in Hunan

Province in China? The second one is: what are promising strategies to

coordinate and strengthen pesticide regulation in China, with the aim to

increase pesticide compliance? The third one is: what are the theoretical

implications from this pesticide compliance study in the Chinese regulatory

context for regulatory compliance theory?

In order to define and understand pesticide compliance better, this

chapter briefly introduces the background and legal context of the pesticide

case, including the legal framework, and the regulatory divisions and

responsibilities. Specifically, this study focuses on three aspects to measure

316 SUMMARY

vegetable farmers’ pesticide compliance: use of types of pesticide, disposal

of pesticide containers, and time interval between pesticide spraying and

vegetable harvesting. It also concentrates on the county agricultural bureau

responsible for enforcing pesticide compliance locally. The last two sections

of this chapter deal with research limitations and an outline of the other

chapters.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework underlying this study. It

operationalizes compliance into three aspects: definition, causality and

measurement of compliance. It defines compliance and regulatory

compliance, proposes compliance motivations, and explains how to

measure compliance in a specific regulatory context. Specifically,

compliance is understood here as the regulated actor’s conformance with

regulatory laws and rules. Eight individual compliance variables were

examined: (1) operational cost-benefit calculation, (2) deterrence, (3)

descriptive social norms, (4) morals, (5) general duty to obey the law, (6)

procedural justice, (7) ability to obey, and (8) legal knowledge. These

variables were classified into three broad categories: amoral calculation,

legitimacy and capacity.

Subsequently, chapter 2 addresses the methodology by illustrating the

process of case selection and case interview, the specific data measurement,

and the coding method. This study employed a stratified sampling method

for selecting respondents. Altogether, 119 vegetable farmers in ten villages

in three counties of Hunan Province in China were selected, with

complementary interviews with another 31 informants or insiders during

the case interview period. Three specific case interview phases were done:

the pilot study phase, the in-depth case interview phase, and the

supplementary material and data analysis phase. The three phases

coherently connect with one another, with the preceding phase preparing

for and supporting the next. In the pilot study phase, some background

information and a refined and structured interview question outline were

prepared; in the in-depth case interview phase, a specific dialogical strategy

was employed for conducting in-depth interviews with respondents, which

enabled the interview to flow naturally; some supplementary materials

were collected after the interview period. All the data collected were

analyzed by means of descriptive data analysis, texts and quotes. In

addition, a specific crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis method

SUMMARY 317

(referred to as csQCA) was employed to analyze how all the variables

defined interact to produce compliance. Finally, this chapter examines the

vegetable farmers’ self-reported pesticide compliance behavior. The

majority of them indicated compliance with rules on the use of types of

pesticides, but fewer of them indicated compliance with rules on disposal

and time interval.

Chapter 3 begins by exploring the first compliance paradigm: amoral

compliance calculation. It seeks to examine how the vegetable farmers’

perceptions of amoral calculation (including operational cost-benefit

calculation and deterrence) affect their pesticide compliance behavior. In

this study, the variable of operational cost-benefit calculation is used to

help analyze compliance by looking at how the actors make rational amoral

decisions on how to use pesticides based on their expected costs and their

yields or gross return. The variable of deterrence helps analyze compliance

by examining how the regulated actors are motivated by threats of possible

costs with regards to punishments or legal sanctions. A subjective utility

approach, built on a specific dialogical scheme, is employed to look at how

the regulated actors perceive the amoral calculation elements.

Based on the collected data, this chapter concludes that, first, the

operational cost-benefit calculation of compliance is almost always

positively associated with the vegetable farmers’ pesticide compliance,

while deterrence has more mixed results, especially with quite a few

compliant farmers reporting low deterrence. Second, both elements of

amoral calculation were shown to be highly contextual, with clear

differences among different vegetable farmers, showing the relevance of the

idea of “deterrability” and the benefits of using a subjective dialogical

approach to amoral calculation. Some offenders (cooperatives or

associations instead of individual vegetable farmers) and offences (use of

types of pesticides instead of disposal and time interval) are more

susceptible to deterrence. Other factors such as their geographic location,

the nature of the vegetables they plant, and their knowledge and

experience also contribute to variations in their subjective amoral

cost-benefit calculation. However, this chapter finds that context is not

everything as even very similar farmers can have different calculations, and

thus more individualistic elements such as personality and individual

preferences and knowledge may be involved.

318 SUMMARY

Chapter 4 analyzes how the legitimacy of law is related to compliance.

The vegetable farmers’ perceptions of legitimacy elements, including

descriptive social norms, morals, general duty to obey the law and

procedural justice, as well as how such perceptions stimulate or hinder

their pesticide compliance behavior are examined. Specifically, descriptive

social norms assume that regulated actors are motivated by what most

similar others do (social legitimacy), morals look at the regulated actor’s

intrinsic moral judgment (moral legitimacy); general duty to obey the law

assumes that regulated actors’ compliance behavior is shaped by their belief

in the legitimacy of the state power of imposing regulations (systematic

legitimacy); procedural justice examines the regulated actors’ discernment

of the enforcing officers’ honesty, the enforcement authorities’ procedural

fairness, and the overall assessment of the enforcement agencies

(procedural legitimacy).

Based on the collected data, this chapter concludes that, in general,

there is compliance legitimacy which is situational. Except for procedural

justice, the farmers’ indicated descriptive social norms of compliance,

morals, and general duty to obey the law are situational and circumstantial.

The three elements of legitimacy are shown to be rather contextual and

highly varied among different vegetable farmers in different settings. The

variations might be explained by variables including the type of vegetable

farmer, the geographic location, the type of the vegetables they plant, their

education level and pesticide training and knowledge, the local economic

development, and their personal experience with pesticide compliance or

other relevant experiences. The farmers’ perceived or indicated descriptive

social norms of compliance as well as morals being positively related to

their self-reported compliance behaviors is a situational issue. In other

words, vegetable farmers only report compliance when they focus on either

of the two elements. However, there seems to be no obvious association

between their indicated general duty to obey the law as well as their

perceptions of procedural justice and their reported compliance behavior.

Chapter 5 deals with the third compliance paradigm: capacity.

Capacity consists of two elements: ability to obey and legal knowledge. The

former assumes that the regulated actors’ compliance is shaped by their

ability to obey the law; the latter analyzes compliance by looking at the

regulated actors’ knowledge about the relevant laws and rules. This chapter

SUMMARY 319

analyzes the vegetable farmers’ indicated financial and technical abilities

(using annual family gross income and reported need of technology as

proxies) as well as knowledge of pesticide rules, and how the indicated

capacity elements influence their pesticide compliance behavior.

Based on the systematically collected data from the 119 vegetable

farmers, this chapter concludes that, first, there is a moderate relationship

between the vegetable farmers’ legal awareness and their compliance

behavior, with these who indicate high awareness of legal rules more

frequently indicating compliance. Moreover, the farmers’ different sources

of legal knowledge also influence their pesticide compliance differently,

with these who indicate obtaining legal knowledge directly from the law or

translated by an official source more frequently indicating compliance.

Second, the vegetable farmers’ indications of capacity elements vary. For

financial ability, such a variation could be explained by some circumstantial

variables like the type of vegetable farmer, the geographic location, the

local economic development and the local governmental policies. For

technical ability (using reported need of technology as a proxy) little

variation was found, although the vegetable farmers showed varied legal

knowledge. Moreover, they specified differing legal and extralegal actors

providing legal translation. Such variations could be largely explained by

the type of vegetable farmer and the pesticide behaviors studied.

Furthermore, vegetable farmers tend to choose legal translators by the

trustworthiness and consistency of the sources. Third, no obvious

association was found between the vegetable farmers’ financial ability

(using annual family gross income as a proxy) and their pesticide

compliance behavior.

In contrast to the previous three chapters, which examined categorized

compliance variables, Chapter 6 seeks to understand better how all the

compliance variables interact to shape compliance. Using csQCA logic and

tools, this chapter explores the data in two ways: (1) by discussing the

interaction between all individual variables and seeking to explore (a)

path(s) through which variables interact to produce compliance, and (2) by

discussing the interaction between the variables when grouped into the

“ideal” types found in existing compliance literature: capacity, amoral

calculation and legitimacy.

320 SUMMARY

This chapter draws conclusions as follows: first, complex paths were

found with plural and contingent combinations of variables leading to

compliance; second, the csQCA data do not confirm the approach of the

“ideal” types. Plural constellations of the three broader categories rather

than singular ones were seen. Nevertheless, the ideal typical approach

could be used as a tool, to some extent, to simplify complex patterns and

understand how variables interact to produce compliance, as well as

figuring out the possible underlying compliance dynamics.

Chapter 7 concludes the research. It starts by summarizing the results.

Building on these findings, it presents some key theoretical and

methodological insights as well as regulatory and policy implications. From

the theoretical perspective, this research shows the significance of

exploring how variables behave, the variation of key compliance variables,

contextual and subjective explanations for variations of variables; variations

of variables shape variations in compliance and many explanatory paths for

compliance. From the methodological perspective, this research shows

insights by means of a larger N qualitative method study which features

both in-depth qualitative understanding and enlarged representativeness of

the respondents, a subjective utility approach and a “dialogical” strategy,

and the use of the csQCA method to analyze compliance.

With regards to regulatory and policy implications, in general, a form

of responsive regulation is suggested. Specifically, it should follow a

case-specific enforcement strategy, combining a mix of regulatory

approaches and engaging various parties. Meanwhile, such combinations of

approaches and broader engagement should particularly respond to the

contextual and subjective conditions of the regulated actors.

Finally, some possibilities for future research are discussed, such as

explorations of the influence of individual preferences and personality on

compliance behavior, explorations of the influence of much broader social

and political contexts on compliance, focusing on the perspective of

pesticide regulators, and usage of other QCA tools and techniques.

Samenvatting

Waarom Chinese Boeren Zich aan de Wet Houden:

Naleving van pesticidenwetgeving in de provincie Hunan,

China

Huiqi Yan

Dit proefschrift beschrijft een onderzoek naar naleving van wetgeving

omtrent gewasbeschermingsmiddelen, oftewel “pesticidenwetgeving”, in

China. Hierbij wordt geprobeerd om een uitgebreider beeld te verschaffen

van naleving en om enkele geschikte en toepasbare suggesties te doen voor

het verbeteren van de effectiviteit van handhaving van pesticidenwetgeving

in China. Er wordt geprobeerd te profiteren van de voordelen van zowel

kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden en er is gebruik

gemaakt van een grotere “n” kwalitatieve benadering, hetgeen

systematische analyse en diepte-onderzoek mogelijk maakt.

Hoofdstuk 1 begint met een beschrijving van de zwakke implementatie

van Chinese wetten en regels en benadrukt de noodzaak en het belang van

een nalevingsperspectief in China dat zich focust op waarom men zich wel

of niet aan de wet houdt. Recente literatuur over naleving en naleving van

pesticidenwetgeving in zowel economisch ontwikkelde landen als

ontwikkelingslanden wordt besproken. De theoretische en

methodologische relevantie en vernieuwingen worden gepresenteerd door

de hiaten in de bestaande literatuur te belichten. Op basis hiervan, worden

in dit hoofdstuk de centrale onderzoeksvragen uiteengezet.

De eerste onderzoeksvraag is: wat zijn de hoofdfactoren en hoe

beïnvloeden ze elkaar bij het genereren van nalevingsgedrag of schending van

pesticidenwetgeving door groentetelers in de provincie Hunan, China? De

tweede onderzoeksvraag is: wat zijn veelbelovende strategieën om de

pesticidenwetgeving in China te coördineren en versterken met als doel de

naleving van pesticidenwetgeving te verbeteren? De derde onderzoeksvraag

322 SAMENVATTING

is: wat zijn de theoretische implicaties voor theorie over naleving van

regelgeving (“regulatory compliance theory”) naar aanleiding van dit

onderzoek naar naleving van pesticidenwetgeving in de Chinese

wetgevingscontext?

Om de naleving van pesticidenwetgeving beter te definiëren en

begrijpen, worden in dit hoofdstuk kort de achtergrond en wettelijke

context van pesticiden geïntroduceerd, inclusief het wettelijke kader en de

regulerende instanties met hun verantwoordelijkheden. Deze studie focust

specifiek op drie aspecten om naleving van pesticidenwetgeving door

groentetelers te meten: het gebruik van verschillende typen pesticiden, het

weggooien of recyclen van pesticide verpakkingsafval, en de tijdsspanne

tussen het besproeien van groentegewassen met pesticiden en de oogst.

Daarnaast wordt gekeken naar het landbouwbureau op county-niveau dat

verantwoordelijk is voor de handhaving van lokale naleving van

pesticidenwetgeving. De laatste twee delen van dit hoofdstuk bespreken

onderzoeksbeperkingen en geven een overzicht van de erop volgende

hoofdstukken.

In hoofdstuk 2 wordt het onderliggende theoretisch kader van het

onderzoek gepresenteerd. Hierbij wordt naleving in drie aspecten

geoperationaliseerd: de definitie, de causaliteit en de meting van naleving.

Naleving en naleving van wet- en regelgeving worden gedefinieerd,

motivaties voor naleving worden gesuggereerd, en er wordt uitgelegd hoe

naleving te meten in een specifieke wet- en regelgevingscontext. Om

precies te zijn, wordt hier onder naleving verstaan: het conformeren van

“de gereguleerde burger” met regulerende wetten en regelgeving. Acht losse

variabelen van naleving worden onderzocht: (1) praktische kosten-baten

berekeningen, (2) afschrikking, (3) descriptieve sociale normen, (4) morele

waarden, (5) de algemene plicht tot naleving van de wet, (6) justitieel

procedurele rechtvaardigheid, (7) de mogelijkheid om de wet te na te leven

en (8) kennis van de wet. Deze variabelen worden ingedeeld in drie brede

categorieën: amorele berekeningen, legitimiteit en capaciteit.

Vervolgens wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de methodologie bestudeerd door het

proces te beschrijven van de casusselectie en casus-interviews, van

specifieke datameting en van de coderingsmethode. Bij dit onderzoek is

gebruik gemaakt van een gestratificeerde samplingsmethode voor het

selecteren van respondenten. In totaal zijn 119 groentetelers geselecteerd

SAMENVATTING 323

uit tien dorpen in drie counties van Hunan waarbij aanvullende interviews

zijn gedaan met nog eens 31 informanten of “insiders” tijdens de

casus-interview periode. Er waren drie specifieke fasen van de

casusinterviews: de pilot study fase, de fase van diepte-interviews en de fase

van verzameling van aanvullend onderzoeksmateriaal en van data-analyse.

Deze drie fasen waren logisch met elkaar verbonden, waarbij elke volgende

fase tijdens en in de vorige fase voorbereid en ondersteund werd. In de pilot

study fase werd enige achtergrondinformatie en een verfijnde en

uitstippeling van vragen voor het gestructureerde interview voorbereid. In

de diepte-interviews fase werd een specifieke dialogische strategie

toegepast voor het afnemen van de diepte-interviews, welke zorgde voor

een vloeiend verloop van de interviews. En daarna werd enig aanvullend

onderzoeksmateriaal verzameld. Alle verzamelde data werden geanalyseerd

met behulp van beschrijvende data analyse, teksten en citaten. Daarnaast

werd gebruik gemaakt van de specifieke crisp-set methode van Kwalitatief

Vergelijkende Analyse (crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis,

“csQCA”) om te analyseren hoe alle gedefinieerde variabelen elkaar

beïnvloeden om naleving te bewerkstelligen. Tot slot wordt in dit

hoofdstuk zelf-gerapporteerd nalevingsgedrag van pesticidenwetgeving van

groentetelers bekeken. De meerderheid van hen gaf aan de regelgeving na

te leven met betrekking tot het gebruik van verschillende soorten

pesticides, maar minder mensen gaven aan de regelgeving na te leven met

betrekking tot afvalafhandeling en tijdsspanne tussen pesticidegebruik en

oogst.

Hoofdstuk 3 begint met de bestudering van het eerste

nalevingsparadigma: amorele berekening van naleving. Hierbij wordt

gepoogd te onderzoeken hoe het nalevingsgedrag met betrekking tot

pesticidenwetgeving bij groentetelers beïnvloed wordt door hun percepties

over amorele berekening, met daaronder de variabelen van praktische

kosten-baten berekeningen en afschrikking. In dit onderzoek wordt

praktische kosten-baten berekening gebruikt voor de analyse van naleving

door te kijken naar hoe men rationeel amorele beslissingen maakt met

betrekking tot pesticidengebruik op basis van verwachte kosten en baten of

bruto-rendement. Afschrikking wordt gebruikt voor de analyse van naleving

door te kijken naar hoe men gedreven wordt door de dreiging van

eventuele kosten met betrekking tot straffen en wettelijke sancties. Een

324 SAMENVATTING

subjectieve utiliteitsbenadering, gebaseerd op een specifiek dialoogschema,

wordt gebruikt om te bestuderen hoe men aankijkt tegen deze elementen

van amorele berekening.

Op basis van de verzamelde data wordt in dit hoofdstuk allereerst

geconcludeerd dat praktische kosten-baten berekening van naleving bijna

altijd positief geassocieerd is met naleving van pesticidenwetgeving door

groentetelers, terwijl afschrikking meer wisselende resultaten oplevert,

voornamelijk doordat een redelijk aantal van de zich aan de wet houdende

boeren laag scoort op afschrikking. Ten tweede blijken beide elementen

van amorele berekening hoog contextueel te zijn, met duidelijke verschillen

tussen verschillende groentetelers, wat de relevantie van het idee van

“afschrikbaarheid” en het belang van een subjectieve dialogische

benadering bij amorele berekening laat zien. Sommige overtreders

(samenwerkingsverbanden of verenigingen in plaats van individuele

groentetelers) en overtredingen (gebruik van verschillende soorten

pesticiden in plaats van het wel of niet weggooien en de tijdsspanne tussen

gebruik en oogst) blijken vatbaarder voor afschrikking. Andere factoren

zoals geografische locatie, het soort geteelde groenten en kennis en

ervaring dragen ook bij tot variaties in subjectieve amorele kosten-baten

berekening. Desalniettemin, blijkt in dit hoofdstuk dat context ook niet

alles kan verklaren, aangezien zelfs zeer vergelijkbare boeren verschillende

berekeningen maken en individualistischer elementen zoals

persoonlijkheid en individuele voorkeur en kennis dus mogelijkerwijs een

rol spelen.

In hoofdstuk 4 wordt geanalyseerd hoe legitimiteit van recht

gerelateerd is aan naleving. De percepties van groentetelers over elementen

van legitimiteit (o.a. bestaande uit: descriptieve sociale normen, morele

waarden, de algemene plicht tot naleving van de wet en justitieel

procedurele rechtvaardigheid) worden onderzocht, alsook hoe deze

percepties het nalevingsgedrag op het gebied van pesticidenwetgeving

bevorderen of verminderen. Nader beschouwd, wordt bij descriptieve

sociale normen aangenomen dat men beïnvloed wordt door wat de meeste

soortgelijke anderen doen (sociale legitimiteit); bij morele waarden wordt

gekeken naar iemands intrinsiek morele oordeel (morele legitimiteit); bij

de algemene plicht tot naleving van de wet wordt aangenomen dat

nalevingsgedrag gevormd wordt door eenieders geloof in de legitimiteit van

SAMENVATTING 325

de staat bij het opleggen van regelgeving (legitimiteit van het systeem); bij

justitieel procedurele rechtvaardigheid wordt eenieders

onderscheidingsvermogen onderzocht van zowel de eerlijkheid van de

wetshandhaver als van de procedurele eerlijkheid van de handhavende

autoriteiten, alsook eenieders algehele beoordeling van de handhavende

instanties (procedurele legitimiteit).

Op basis van de verzamelde data, wordt in dit hoofdstuk

geconcludeerd dat er in het algemeen sprake is van situationele legitimiteit

van naleving. Behalve de procedurele rechtvaardigheid, zijn de door de

boeren aangegeven descriptieve sociale normen van naleving, alsook hun

morele waarden en de algemene plicht tot naleving van de wet, situationeel

en weinig betekenend. De drie elementen van legitimiteit blijken tamelijk

contextueel en zeer gevarieerd te zijn onder verschillende groentetelers in

verschillende settingen. Deze variatie kan mogelijk verklaard worden door

variabelen zoals het type groenteteler, de geografische locatie, het soort

geteelde groenten, opleidingsniveau, training en kennis op het gebied van

pesticiden, de lokale economische ontwikkeling, en persoonlijke ervaringen

op dit gebied of andere relevante ervaringen. De positieve relatie tussen de

door de boeren waargenomen of aangegeven descriptieve sociale normen

van naleving of morele waarden en de zelfrapportage van nalevingsgedrag

is ook een situationele kwestie. Met andere woorden: de groentetelers

rapporteren slechts naleving wanneer zij zich focussen op één van de twee

elementen; er lijkt geen duidelijk verband te zijn tussen hun

gerapporteerde nalevingsgedrag en hun aangegeven gevoel van algemene

plicht tot naleving van de wet of hun perceptie over procedurele

rechtvaardigheid.

Hoofdstuk 5 heeft betrekking op het derde nalevingsparadigma:

capaciteit tot naleving. Deze capaciteit bestaat uit twee elementen: het

vermogen om de wet te gehoorzamen en wettelijke kennis. Bij het eerste

element wordt aangenomen dat naleving gevormd wordt door eenieders

vermogen de wet te gehoorzamen; bij het tweede element wordt naleving

geanalyseerd door te kijken naar eenieders kennis over relevante wetten en

regels. In dit hoofdstuk worden de door de groentetelers aangegeven

financiële en technische vermogens geanalyseerd (waarbij het jaarlijks

bruto inkomen per gezin en de gerapporteerde behoefte aan technologie als

indicatoren gehanteerd worden) alsook hun kennis over de pesticiden

326 SAMENVATTING

regelgeving en hoe de aangegeven capaciteitselementen hun

nalevingsgedrag op het gebied van pesticidenwetgeving beïnvloedt.

Gebaseerd op de systematisch verzamelde data onder de 119

groentetelers, wordt in dit hoofdstuk allereerst geconcludeerd dat er een

middelmatig verband is tussen het wetsbesef van de groentetelers en hun

nalevingsgedrag: diegenen die aangeven een sterke mate van wetsbesef te

hebben, geven aan vaker de wet na te leven. Bovendien blijken de

verschillende bronnen van wettelijke kennis van de boeren ook van

verschillende invloed te zijn op hun naleving van pesticidenwetgeving:

diegenen die aangeven dat ze hun wettelijke kennis direct van de wetstekst

of van een vertaalde officiële bron hebben, geven vaker aan

pesticidenwetgeving na te leven. Ten tweede wordt geconcludeerd dat de

capaciteitselementen die door de groentetelers aangegeven worden,

verschillen. Op het gebied van financiëel vermogen kan dergelijke niet

wetsgerelateerde variatie verklaard worden door allerlei variabelen zoals

het type groenteteler, de geografische locatie, de lokale economische

ontwikkeling en lokaal overheidsbeleid. Op het gebied van technische

vermogens werd (bij gebruik van gerapporteerde behoefte aan technologie

als indicator) weinig variatie gevonden, maar de groentetelers hadden wel

verschillende wetskennis. Bovendien specificeerden ze verschillende

juridische en niet-juridische bronnen van de juridische vertalingen.

Dergelijke variaties kunnen grotendeels verklaard worden door het type

groenteteler en nalevingsgedrag dat bestudeerd wordt. Verder hebben

groentetelers de neiging om juridische vertalers of vertalingen te kiezen op

basis van betrouwbaarheid en consistentie van de bronnen. Ten derde

wordt er geen duidelijk verband gevonden tussen de financiële capaciteiten

van de groentetelers (waarbij het jaarlijks bruto inkomen per gezin als

indicatoren gehanteerd wordt) en hun nalevingsgedrag op het gebied van

pesticidenwetgeving.

In de voorgaande drie hoofdstukken worden de verschillende

gecategoriseerde variabelen van naleving onderzocht. In hoofdstuk 6 wordt

vervolgens geprobeerd te kijken naar hoe alle nalevingsvariabelen elkaar

beïnvloeden en zo naleving vormgeven. Met behulp van csQCA logica en

instrumenten, worden in dit hoofdstuk de data op twee manieren

geëxploreerd: (1) door de interactie tussen alle individuele variabelen te

bespreken en te bekijken hoe de variabelen elkaar beïnvloeden en zo

SAMENVATTING 327

naleving bewerkstelligen; en (2) door de interactie tussen de variabelen te

bespreken in gegroepeerde vorm: op basis van de “ideale” type

nalevingsmotivaties uit de bestaande literatuur over naleving: capaciteit,

amorele berekening en legitimiteit.

In dit hoofdstuk worden de volgende conclusies getrokken: ten eerste

worden complexe patronen gevonden via welke meervoudige en

onwillekeurige combinaties van variabelen tot naleving leiden; ten tweede

blijken de csQCA data de benadering van het “ideale” type

nalevingsmotivaties niet te bevestigen. Er was eerder sprake van

meervoudige dan van eenvoudige constellaties van de drie bredere

categorieën. Desondanks kan deze benadering tot op zekere hoogte

gebruikt worden als instrument om complete patronen te vereenvoudigen

en om te begrijpen hoe variabelen elkaar beïnvloeden en zo naleving

bewerkstelligen, alsook om de mogelijke onderliggende nalevingsdynamiek

te achterhalen.

Hoofdstuk 7 is het afsluitende hoofdstuk van het proefschrift. Hierin

worden eerst de resultaten samengevat. Op basis van deze bevindingen

worden vervolgens enkele belangrijke theoretische en methodologische

inzichten alsook implicaties voor regelgeving en beleid gepresenteerd.

Vanuit theoretisch perspectief toont dit onderzoek het belang van

bestudering van hoe variabelen zich gedragen, de variatie van

fundamentele nalevingsvariabelen en contextuele en subjectieve

verklaringen voor variaties van variabelen: variaties van variabelen dragen

bij tot verschillen in naleving en in de vele verklarende patronen via welke

naleving ontstaat. Vanuit methodologisch perspectief toont dit onderzoek

inzichten aan de hand van een grotere “n” kwalitatieve studie welke zowel

inzicht geeft door kwalitatieve diepte studies als door de vergrote

representativiteit van de respondenten, een subjectieve utiliteitsbenadering

en een “dialogische” strategie, alsook door het gebruik van de csQCA

methode om naleving te analyseren.

Met betrekking tot implicaties op het gebied van regelgeving en beleid

wordt, alles beschouwend, casus-gerelateerde responsieve regulering

voorgesteld. Nader bekeken, zou bij regulering een casus-specifieke

handhavingsstrategie gevolgd moeten worden met daarbij een combinatie

van gemixte reguleringsbenaderingen waarbij verschillende partijen

betrokken worden. Daarnaast zouden zulke combinaties van benaderingen

328 SAMENVATTING

en bredere betrokkenheid vooral moeten een antwoord moeten zijn op de

contextuele en subjectieve omstandigheden van gereguleerde personen.

Tot slot worden een aantal mogelijke onderwerpen voor verder

onderzoek besproken, zoals onderzoek naar de invloed van individuele

voorkeuren en persoonlijkheid op naleving, onderzoek naar de invloed van

veel bredere sociale en politieke contexten op naleving, onderzoek met een

focus op het perspectief van de handhavers van pesticidenwetgeving en

onderzoek met gebruikmaking van andere QCA onderzoeksinstrumenten

en -technieken.