Utilitarian principles for imperfect agents

Utilitarian principles for imperfect agents

by

JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL (University of Toronto)

PRINCIPLE B A n action x ought to take place i f and only i f (i) x is contained in a life that is optimum among lives open to the agent of x at this action’s first moment, and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with x and with the same first moment as x satisfies (i).

and

PRINCIPLE S A n action x ought to take place if and only if (i) x is contained in a life optimum among lives securable by the agent of x at this action’s first moment, and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with x and with the same first moment as x satisfies (i).

are discussed in Sobel [1976] where it is argued that of the two S provides better guidance in cases in which actions would be followed by mistakes, since B, while making relevant whether or not an agent could conclude an action were he to begin it makes irrelevant whether or not, were he to begin it, he would conclude it.

Lars Bergstrom agrees that principle B can yield unacceptable results: he observes that it can select actions for which there are better alternatives. He thinks however that S is also (for different reasons) unacceptable and he favors over both his principle.

PRINCIPLE U An action x ought to be done i f and only i f there is some alternative-set A such that (i) x is optimific in A, and (ii) for every expansion A’ of A, x or some variant of x is optimal in A’ or some expansion of A’.

There is however a difference between principles U and B that I think should for Bergstrom tell for B over U. And there is a reason for favoring principle S over both B and U. These points are developed in Section I. Then, in Section 11, I take up possible difficulties with principle S and defend it against them. 8 - Theoria 3:1982

114 JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL

My interest throughout this paper is in principles as guides, or (to be more explicit) as non-probabilistic first approximations to principles of rational choice. I make no claims regarding the relative merits of S and the others as moral principles or as parts of either descriptive or prescriptive moral theories, and I think all principles discussed are if viewed in these ways implausible. No utilitarian theory seems right as a description of ordinary moral consciousness. (See Urmson [197.5].) And there are probably good reasons for resisting reforms and maintaining existing non-utilitarian patterns of moral reasoning. They seem to serve, and may be essential to, important social ends. (See Sobel [1972], but consider Mackie [1980], pp. 1.54-1.56.)

Technical terms in principles as well as certain simplifying assumptions are explained in Sobel [1976] and Bergstrom [1977]. These explanations are glossed here as the argument requires.

I. Principles B and U

A. U-‘oughts’ that would preclude the agent’s doing ‘the best he cart’. It can happen for agent-identical incompatible actions x and y that would have the same first moments that while y is the best action that is open principle U would have the agent do x. I think that Bergstrom should find this possibility decisive against U, for I think that he holds that an agent ought always to do ‘the best he can’ in the sense of an action whose consequences would be as good as those of any action that is open. (I endorse ‘doing the best one can’ only in another sense, viz. , securing a best life among those securable. But my views are not presently relevant.) And Bergstrom says that if agent-identical actions x and y are incompatible and would have the same first moment, then “it is quite impossible that both . . . are obligatory.” (Bergstrom [1977], p. 90.) But then in a situation in which there is a unique best open action, it will not be the case that any action with the same first moment that is incompatible with it ought to be done. Here, however, is an abstract case in which just this happens:

UTILITARIAN PRINCIPLES FOR IMPERFECT AGENTS 115

a1 b l cl

Figure I d2 e2

The agent in Case I has at most two moments of choice. Fully specific minimal actions a l , b l , and cl are open and exhaustive of his options at 11, and each of these actions is an instantaneous action that would take place at t l . If a1 takes place then t l is the agent’s last moment of choice, otherwise d2 and e2 are instantaneous fully specific minimal actions open and exhaustive of his options at t2. Five lives are open to the agent at t l . Numbers measure their consequences, the bigger a number the better a life’s consequences. We do not say what the agent will do, but we do stipulate that were b l to take place though it could be followed by d2 (thus the dots) it would be followed by e2 (which conditional is indicated by an arrow). Similarly, while c l could be followed by d2 it would be followed by e2. Finally, we assume that numbers measure not only consequences of lives but also consequences of actions that would secure these lives: thus the consequences of a1 would be better than those of bl , since 61 would secure life (bl , e2), and the consequences of action (bl & d2) would be better than those of (cl & e2) . In Case I,

O ” ( 4 >

for (i) a1 is optimific in alternative-set (al , b l , cl), and (ii) this alternative set has no expansion in the case. It has no ‘horizontal’ expansion since its members are fully specific, and it has no ‘vertical’ expansion since a1 has no ‘vertical’ variant (no action is open that entails it, and that would have a longer interval). [al, (bl & d2), (cl & e2)] is not an expansion of (al, b l , cl) since members of an expansion must be ‘time-identical,’ and (for Bergstrom) actions are ‘time-identical’ only if they would have not only the same first moment but the same interval. So Ou(al) in Case I , but in this case ( b l , d2) is the best life that is open at t l which leaves us free to


stipulate as we now do that (bl & d2) is best among actions (both specific and non-specific) then open. Actions a1 and (61 & d2) would have the same first moment and are of course incompatible. As claimed, principle U would have the agent do something, a l , incompatible with his doing the best action that is open to him, (b l & d2).'

Principle B selects (bl & d2) in Case I and to this extent should recommend itself to Bergstrom over U. But B can select actions that would have worse consequences than would some of their alternatives (for example, B selects bl in Case I even though its consequences would be worse that those of a l ) , a feature Bergstrom finds unacceptable. A response to difficulties with principle B that Bergstrom might find appealing is,

PRINCIPLE B* A n action x ought to take place if and only i f (i) x is contained in a life that is optimum among lives open to the agent of x at this action's first moment, (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with x and with the same first moment satisfies (i), and (iii) x does not have an alternative whose consequences would be better than those of x.

This principle would always have an agent do the best action that is open to him. This should recommend B* to Bergstrom over U. And B* never selects as obligatory an action whose consequences would be worse than those of an alternative. (Though B* selects (bl & d2) in Case I , it does not select bl . ) This should recommend B* to Bergstrom over B.

B. Mis-direction by principles B and B* in no-present-fault cases. Principles B* and B are similar as guides: invariably, beginning

' While (61 & d2) is the best action open it is not optimum in an alternative set in the case and is not selected by principle U along with the incompatible action a l . This principle's problems with the case are not that bad (though I at first thought they were). Action (61 & d2) is not optimum in an alternative set because it is not a member of an alternative set. In particular, though it is a member of [(bl & d 2 ) , (bl & e2), (cl & d 2 ) , (cl & e2)] this set is not an alternative set since it is not jointly exhaustive: the agent can avoid it by doing a l . I owe this latter observation to Bergstrom.


what B* would have done will be beginning what B would have done. These principles can differ in the fullness of their guidance, for example, in Case I while both would have one do (bl & dl), only B also explicitly prescribes b l . But such differences can make no difference in practice, and these principles are I think alike in giving bad guidance in some cases. Consider this case:

a1 bl

Figure 2 c2 d2

Add to the kind of assumptions made for Case I that in this case the agent suffers at t l from no defect of heart or mind. Assume for one thing that numbers measure not only values of lives but his present preferences among them, and for another that he understands his situation. Note that while we assume that the agent is presently sound of heart and mind, we do not insist that whatever he did at t l he would remain so, indeed it is part of the case that were a1 to take place then something would be wrong at t2. Perhaps his preferences would no longer be right or he would no longer be clear about his options, or perhaps he would be less than perfect in heart and mind in some other way, but in any case something would be wrong since he would then do d2 despite the fact that c2 would secure a better life and have better consequences. For a story suited to this structure, assume that drinks will be offered at 9 and 10 P . M . , that the agent can accept or reject a drink at 9, and that whatever he does then, he will be able to accept or reject a drink at 10. It would be best to have one drink early, not as good to have it late, and worst to have either no drink or two. But one drink would lead this agent to another. If he accepted at 9, his self-control, which is intact at 9, would be somewhat weakened and though he would know better and would not have to, he in fact would succumb to temptation and accept another drink at 10. In this kind of case it seems clear that principles B and B* would give bad guidance. Each selects (a1 & c2) despite the fact that beginning this action would through no


present fault of the agent’s lead to a worse life than he is in a position to securee-commencing this action would lead to life (al, d2), and the agent can secure instead life (bl, d2). Principles B and B* would have the agent aim high even in cases in which he knows that through no fault of his this would not work. In such cases the agent ought to lower his sights to what he is up to.2.

11. Principle S

A. Present-fault cases. Suppose that it would be best for an agent to get out of bed but that even if he were to begin he would not complete this act because he has decided to stay in bed and he would remember this decision. (Bergstrom [1977], pp. 97-98. Other writers have discussed similar cases. See McKinsey [1979], p. 388, and Goldman [1978], pp. 199-200.) This case evidently in- volves present error, for the sleepy agent does not it seems prefer what would be best. And in this case aiming high would not work because present errors would persist, though perhaps aiming high would work if only these errors were not present in the first place. Problems raised by such cases were set aside in the paper in which principle S was introduced, which “paper, while assuming no present mistakes, studie[d] the relevance only of past, and what would be future ones.” (Sobel [1976], p. 208.) And principle S can seem improperly tolerant of present mistakes.

’ My objection to (a1 & c2) in Case I1 is not that commencing this action would lead to a mistake (consider Bergstrom [1977], p. 93) but that commencing it would be a mistake since it would lead to a worse life than the agent is in a position to secure. In a situation of the structure,

Figure 3 c2 d2 beginning ( b l & d2) would lead to a mistake but would not I think be a mistake since it would secure the best life that is securable.


A modification of S suggests istelf. Let a life L be ideally securable at t if and only if (i) supposing that the agent of L were at t free of all mistakes of heart and mind, L would be open at t , and (ii) there is a fully specific minimal action x with first moment t such that x is in L and, if x were to take place and the agent were free of all mistakes of heart and mind at t, then each action in L subsequent to x would take place. The modified principle that suggests itself is,

PRINCIPLE S’ An action x ought to take place if and only i f (i) x is contained in a life optimum among lives ideally securable by the agent of x at this action’s first moment, and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with x and with the same first moment as x satisfies (i).

I do not have an analysis of the condition of present correctness but some things can be said in clarification. For the special case in which what lives are open is not a function of the agent’s present state of heart and mind,3 we can say that he is of perfectly sound mind only if he knows what lives are open to him, of perfectly good heart only if his preferences for lives go by their values, of perfectly sound mind only if he knows which lives are presently securable, and of perfectly sound heart and mind only if his dispositions, for example, his intentions, are consistent with his knowledge and preferences. On the negative side, it is not a part of the condition of present correctness of heart and mind that the agent be able to resolve, decide, or intend to live just any of the lives open to him, for he can know of some that he would not complete if he were to begin them. For the same reason he may not be able to want to live some lives open to him, he may not be able to want to live the best life open to him: he is to prefer it so that if he had a choice he would choose it, but if he knows he would not live it even if he began it I think he cannot want to live it as distinct from wishing that he were going to. And it is not part of the condition of present correctness of heart

Just which lives are open to an agent is apt to be a function of his state of heart and mind in cases in which actions of others are partly determined by their expectations regarding his actions.


and mind that the agent be able to settle what will be his condition of heart and mind or what his actions will be at times to come.

Relations between our principles are complex. Principle B ad- dresses itself to lives open at a time, s’ to lives ideally securable at this time, and S to lives then actually securable, but while lives actually securable at a time are of course then open, lives only ideally securable need not be. Principle B makes irrelevant what would be future mistakes and (supposing these are different) what would be future mistakes supposing no present ones of heart or mind. Principle S’ makes relevant what would be future mistakes supposing no present ones of heart or mind but (to the extent that these are different) ignores what would be future mistakes given the agent’s actual state of heart and mind. And principle S makes relevant what would be future mistakes while (again to the extent that these are different) ignoring those that would take place supposing no present ones of heart and mind. To make plainer relations between principles we consider a case with the structures,

actual structure ideal structure a1 bl cl a1 bl cl

Principle B attends to the five lives actually open, ignores the fact that another would be open supposing no present mistakes of heart or mind, ignores the fact that c l would be followed by a mistake even supposing no present ones of heart or mind, and selects (cl & e2). Principle S’ attends only to the three lives that would be ideally securable, notes that supposing no present mistakes of heart or mind 61 would be followed by a mistake, ignores the fact that (actually) a1 would be followed by a mistake, and selects (a1 & d2). Principle S attends to the three lives that are actually securable and to the fact that cl would be followed by a mistake, ignores the fact that supposing no present mistakes of heart or mind 61 would be followed by a mistake, and selects (61 & d2).


The main difference between principles S and S’ is that S’ distin- guishes between future mistakes that would be dependent upon and would flow from present mistakes of heart and mind, and future mistakes that would take place even supposing no present ones of heart or mind. According to S’ only these latter mistakes are relevant to what an agent ought to do. In contrast, S makes what would be future mistakes relevant even if they would be dependent upon and would flow from present defects of heart or mind. These principles give the same guidance in no-present-fault cases and I think give better guidance than B and B*. They give different guidance in some present-fault cases and the question is which gives better guidance in these cases.

Consider a situation with the structures,

actual structure ideal strucuture hl

For a story suited to these structures suppose again that drinks will be offered at 9 and 10 P.M. and that it would be better to have one drink early, worse to have one drink late, and worst to have either no drink or two. And again suppose that one drink would lead to another, but suppose this time that this is because the agent’s present preferences do not go by the values just reviewed and he has already decided to take as many drinks as are going. We leave unexplained why his preferences do not go by values: perhaps he mistakenly thinks that at this party the more drinks the better; perhaps he knows this is not so but likes his drink and does not care; or perhaps his wrong preferences have other sources. Whatever the exact reasons for them we make it a part of the story that if his preferences at 9 P.M. were in proper order they would remain in order so that one drink at 9 (al) would not lead to another at 10 (d2) but would lead rather to no drink at 10 (c2). According to principle S the agent in such a case ought to commence (61 & d2),


while according to S’ he ought instead to commence (a1 & c2). But if he commenced (a1 & c2) then he would not complete it (see the actual structure above) and would live a worse life than he would if he commenced (bl & d2). We should not I think simply ignore this fact just because it would not be a fact if the agent were presently perfect in heart and mind. The agent is not presently perfect in heart and mind, and proper guidance-properly realistic guidance which if followed would have him making the best of his present moment of choice-takes into account this fact and indeed every fact that is relevant to what would be the consequences of his various possible present efforts. Principle S provides such guidance. While principle S’ selects minimal actions which for a utilitarian ‘ideally ought’ to take place (actions that would have best consequences were the agent presently perfect in heart and mind), principle S selects actions that I think actually ought to take place (actions that would have best consequences given the actual situation includ- ing the agent’s actual state of heart and mind). Perhaps at one time the agent ought to have taken steps to improve what was to be his state of heart and mind at the present moment, but either he took no such steps or the steps he took were not sufficient to perfect his state, for actual and ideal structures differ for in Case V. But whatever its history the first moment of V is ‘now’ and I think the agent ought to make the best of it and of himself as he is. He should secure the best life that is presently and actually securable.

According to a principle recently promoted by Holly Goldman an agent ought to live the best life among those lives he can live in the sense that he would live them if he wanted to. (Goldman [1978], p. 202, principle 4.) But it seems that a life that is open in this sense-a life that an agent would live if he wanted to live it-need not be an actually securable life, and conversely. Principle 4 is related to principles B and S somewhat as is principle S’, and like principle S’ it can enjoin a life that the agent would not live even if he were to begin it and enjoin a life the commencement of which would secure a life worse than the best ones that are securable. For this reason I favor principle S over 4. I favor S over 4 for more or less the same reasons that I favor S over S’. (Main differences between principles 4 and B derive from the fact that a life open in the sense of principle


4-a life that would be lived if the agent wanted to live it-need not be open in the sense of principle B-it need not be a life that can be presently continued and that is such that were it continued to any future time within it it could be continued beyond that time. A life open in the first sense need not be open in the second, and conversely.)

It has been suggested that an action is rational if and only if it would take place given ‘optimal cognitive and conative inputs’ or ‘fully informed and criticized preferences for actions.’ (Brandt [1979].) Reason’s capacity for influencing conduct would be fully employed in the case of such an action which would be determined by reason to the greatest extent possible (for the agent in the case). So it can seem plausible that such actions would be rational, and it can seem that they would be best and what ought to be done (either in ‘subjective’ senses or, if there are no objective values, in unquali- fied senses). (See Brandt [1979], pp. 14-16, and consider Falk [1947-19481.) But there are problems with these views, for perhaps what an argent would do were his preferences fully informed and criticized would then have best consequences but would now, given his actual state of heart and mind, have relatively bad consequences. And what an agent ought to do should it seems depend on what the consequences of his action’s would (actually) be and not on what they would be under one or another counterfactual hypothesis concerning his heart and mind. I do not say that these consequences should be assessed in terms of actual preferences: that assessment may be right for identifying rational actions, but an assessment in terms of fully informed and criticized preferences seems right for the identification of best actions and what (‘subjectively’) ought to be done. But whether what is at stake is rationality or what would be best, and whether actual or informed preferences are most relevant, it is I think actual consequences and how actions would actually work out that should be assessed. “A man’s future good on the whole [and his ‘subjectively best’ action] is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the [actual!] consequences of all different lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and adequately realised in imagination at the present point of time.” (Sidgwick [1962], pp. 111-117.) “The right or best way


for us to live or act,” is not always “what the archangel would pronounce to be so if he addressed himself to the question,” if this question is what in our circumstances he, in his wisdom and conative perfection, would do and what would be right and best for him. (Hare [1981], p. 46.) For we are not archangels and what would work out best for him might not work well for us.

B. S-‘oughts’ that would be interrupted by or would contain S- mistakes. It can happen that an action that according to principle S ought to take place would be interrupted by an S-mistake. (Bergstrom [1977], p. 96.) Consider the structure,

Figure 6 d2 e2

Suppose that if the disjunctive action (b l v cl) were to take place, b l not cl would take place: let that be the way in which (bl v c l ) would be done. Then though [(bl v c l ) & e2] is contained in the best securable life and is thus an S-‘ought’, it would be interrupted by an S-mistake. If this action were to begin, that is, if (b l v c l ) were to take place, then by hypothesis b l would take place, and b l would be followed by the S-mistake d2. So [(bl v c l ) & e2], though an S-‘ought’, if begun would be interrupted by the S-mistake d2. (I rely here on the inference-from [(p v q ) El-+ p] and [p 0- r) to [(p v q ) 0- r]-rather than hypothetical syllogism which is not valid for ‘a+’-conditionals.)

S-’oughts’ can be interrupted by S-mistakes, but no fully specific S-‘ought’ can be so interrupted. Indeed no such S-‘ought’ can be interrupted. Fully specific S-‘oughts’ begin with fully specific minimal actions that secure lives that contain these fully specific S- ‘oughts’. But what is important about a principle as a guide is what fully specific actions it enjoins, which means that anomalies such as the one illustrated in the previous paragraph that pertain only to other ‘oughts’ can be tolerated. Given the complex character of the


S-‘ought’ [ (b l v cl) & e2] it is neither surprising nor disturbing that it can be interrupted by an S-mistake.

There, is however, a related anomaly that attaches even to fully specific S-‘oughts’. Such ‘oughts’ can contain S-mistakes. (Bergstrom [1977], p. 101, and Sobel [1976], p. 218, n. 3.) This happens in Case 111, n. 1, and also in,

Figure 7 c2 d2

In this case (b l & d2) is a fully specific S-‘ought’ and yet were it done d2 would be done though it would when its time came be an S- mistake. Principle S could be modified to avoid such results. Let a life L conform f rom time t to principle S if and only if the fully specific minimal action in L with first moment t satisfies clause (i) of principle S, and the fully specific minimal action in L with first moment t* would satisfy this clause if, for every t’ such that t 5 t’ < t* , the fully specific minimal action in L with first moment t’ were to take place.

PRINCIPLE S* An action x ought to take place if and only if (i) x is contained in a life that conforms from the first moment of x with principle S, and (ii) no agent-identical action incompatible with x and with the same first moment as x satisfies (i).

No fully specific S*-‘ought’ can contain an S*-mistake. Does S* improve upon S? The important thing to say is that it is

not important whether or not it does, at least not for me given my preoccupation with principles as guides, for as guides S and S* are effectively equivalent. They enjoin the same fully specific minimal actions and a life would conform with one if and only if it con- formed with the other.

126

Conclusion

The opposition between principle B (as well as Bergstrom’s U) and principles S’ and S (as well as Goldman’s principle 4) is important. Even more important are the issues that divide principles S’ and S. And of the lot I think that principle S is the best guide. I think that an agent should make the best of his moments of choice, that he should at each secure a life that is best among those that are then securable. Realism is I think the key. Whether aiming high would not work because of present faults or quite independently of any such faults, when it will not work an agent should not do it. Rather he should always do the best he can-at every moment he should do what will secure a best life he can then secure. Proper guidance- -properly realistic guidance-will ask of him nothing less and of course nothing more.

References

RICHARD B. BRANDT. A theory of the good and the right, Oxford 1979. LARS BERGSTROM. “Utilitarianism and future mistakes,” Theoria, vol. 43 (1977), pp.

W. DAVID FALK. “ ‘Ought’ and motivation,” Proceedings of The Aristotelian society,

HOLLY S. GOLDMAN. “Doing the best one can,” Values and morals, eds. A. I .

R. M. HARE. Moral thinking: Its levels, methods, and point, Oxford 1981. J. L. MACKIE. Hume’s moral theory, London 1980. MICHAEL MCKINSEY. “Levels of obligation,” Philosophical studies, vol. 35 (1979),

HENRY SIDGWICK. The method of ethics: Seventh edition, London 1962. JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL. “The need for coercion,” Coercion: Nomos XIV, ed. J . R.

JORDAN HOWARD SOBEL. “Utilitarianism and past and future mistakes,” Noiis, vol.

J . 0. URMSON. “A defence of intuitionism,” Proceedings of The Aristotelian society,

84-102.

VOI . 48 (1947-1948).

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pp. 385-395.

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10 (1976), pp. 195-219.

V O ~ . 75 (1974-1975), pp. 111-119.

Received on July 15, 1982. Revised version received on September 24, 1982.

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Utilitarian principles for imperfect agents