Utah Response to SB54

8/18/2019 Utah Response to SB54

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PARKER DOUGLAS (8924)Utah Federal SolicitorDAVID N. WOLF (6688)Assistant Utah Attorney GeneralOFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL350 North State Street, Ste. 230P.O. Box 142320Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2320Telephone: (801) 538-9600Facsimile: (801) 538-1121E-mail: [email protected]: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UTAH REPUBLICAN PARTY,

Plaintiff,

UTAH DEMOCRATIC PARTY, a registered political party of Utah,

Plaintiff and Intervenor,

v.

GARY R. HERBERT, in his Official Capacityas Governor of Utah, and SPENCER J. COX,in his Official Capacity as Lieutenant Governorof Utah,

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO UTAHREPUBLICAN PARTY’S

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TODOCKET ORDER 77.

Case No. Case No. 2:16-cv-00038-DN

Judge David Nuffer

Magistrate Judge Evelyn J. Furse

Defendant Lieutenant Governor Spencer J. Cox ( “Defendant” or “Lt. Governor”) submits

his R esponse to Utah Republican Party (“URP”) Memorandum In Response to Docket Order 77

Case 2:16-cv-00038-DN Document 84 Filed 04/14/16 Page 1 of 17

mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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(doc. 80 ).

1. SB54, As Interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Republican Party v. Cox,2016 UT 17 , Does Not Impermissibly Burden the Party’s Constitutional Rights.

In Utah Republican Party v. Cox , the Utah Supreme Court determined that the plain

language of Utah Code § 20A-9-12(d) requires a qualified political parties ( “QPP ”) to “permit its

members to seek access to nomination for electoral office by either or both the signature-

gathering method or the convention method. ”1 Therefore, to be a QPP, URP must allow its

members to choose to seek the P arty’ s nomination by collecting signatures on a nominating

petition.

URP contends that Utah Code § 20A-9- 12(d)’s provisions that allow prospective

candidates to choose to seek the Party’s nomination for elected office by collecting signatures

violates its associational rights protected by the First Amendment. Specifically, URP complains

that the statute interferes with its right to control its internal procedures. Contrary to URP’ s

positon, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that Utah Code § 20A-9-12(d) “does not amount to

internal control or regulation of the party by the State.” 2 As a matter of Utah statutory

interpretation, the Utah Supreme Court found that Utah Code § 20A-9- 12(d) “ does not . . .

purport to mandate [to a political party] the adoption of any provisions in its constitution,

bylaws, rules, or other internal procedures. ”3

In this case, deferri ng to the Utah Supreme Court’s interpretation of Utah law should give

this Court no pause. This Court previously rejected URP’s contention that SB54 interferes with

its internal procedure and concluded that:

1 Id. ¶ 12.2 Id. ¶ 6.3 Id .


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Not all regulation of a party’s internal proces ses is prohibited orconstitutionally questionable. Today, “[n]early every State in the

Nation now mandates that political parties select their candidates fornational or statewide office by means of primary elections.”” As theSupreme Court in Clingman stated:

To deem ordinary and widespread burdens like these severe wouldsubject virtually every electoral regulation to strict scrutiny,hamper the ability of States to run efficient and equitable elections,and compel … courts to rewrite state electoral co des. 4

Moreover, this Court, in accord with more than forty years of Supreme Court precedent,

has repeatedly recognized that: “the State can constitutionally require the Party to select its

candidates through a primary election and the State can lawfully c ertify the Party’ s candidates

who receive the most votes in the primary election as the candidates to appear on the general

election ballot. ”5 The Utah Supreme Court also affirmatively noted its “doubt as to whether the

Republican Party has raised any legitimate constitutional arguments that the State may not

regulate the election process and favor particular measures to increase access to the ballot.” 6 It is

against this backdrop that URP renews its arguments that the Party can unilaterally control the

process by which prospective candidates gain access to the primary ballot.

The Case Law Upon Which URP Relies Does Not Support The Party’s Position.A.

URP cites Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214 (1952) in support of its contention that its internal

rules ov erride the State’s ability to cer tify candidates to the ballot through a signature-gathering

process. Ray is not on point. Ray involved certification of electors to proceedings for

nomination to federal Presidential and Vice-Presidential primaries. In Ray , the chairman of the

Alabama Democratic Party Executive Committee refused to certify Mr. Edmund Blair as a

4 First case, doc. 144, p. 18 ; doc. 75, p. 7 (citations omitted).5 First case, doc. 144, p. 17; doc. 75, p. 7. 6 Utah Republican Party v. Cox , 2016 UT 17 at ¶ 7 .


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candidate for presidential elector in the Democratic primary after Blair refused to sign an oath

that he would “aid and support the nominees of th e National Convention of the Democratic Party

for President and Vice –President of the United States.” 7

The Court in Ray ruled on a Twelfth Amendment claim concerning the selection of

presidential electors. The Supreme Court directly addressed the comparative associational rights

of political parties and candidates and co ncluded that “a political party’ s exclusion of candidates

[for presidential elector] from a party primary because they will not pledge to suppo rt the party’s

nominees is a method of securing party candidates in the general election, pledged to the

philosophy and leadership of that party.” 8 Ray merely stands for the proposition that a party may

condition the candidacy of a person seeking to be a member of a state’s elector al committee on

the party’s decision that its electors must agree to pledge fealty to the ultimate nominee at

convention, not to the party.

The issue in Ray was whether Alabama could “bar a political party to require a pledge to

support nominees of the national convention.” 9 That is not the issue here. Whether Utah’s

Election Code prohibits political parties from administering a pledge or loyalty test is not in

dispute. The issue in this case is one of process, not ideology. The question presented here is

whether the State may certify candidates to the ballot who comply with the QPP signature-

gathering process. URP has not objected to or otherwise sought to disqualify any prospective

candidate based on his refusal to sign the disclosure and certification forms identified in section

8.0 of URP’s bylaws.

7 Id . at 215 . 8 Id . at 227 (emphasis added).9 Id. at 231 .


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Moreover, in Ray , the party’s ability to condition participation of the state’s electors was

by operation of rights conferred on the party under Alabama statute. 10 The Ray case arose in the

context of the Twelfth Amendment and does not stand for the proposition that a candidate in

every primary must “comply with the rules of the party,” 11 but rather, at best, only that

candidates who seek to be delegates at the national convention can be required to do so. And

that requirement in Ray was by operation of a statutory right granted to the party under Alabama

law. 12 There is no analogous right or provision in Utah law.

URP’s relianc e on Cousins v. Wigoda is similarly misplaced. Like the court in Ray, the

Cousins court addressed issues related to the rights of political parties vis-à-vis the National

Political Party Convention. In concluding that “the party’s convention was the proper forum for

determining intraparty disputes as to which delegates should be seated, ” the Court observed that

“[t]he States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection

of Presidential and Vice- Presidential candidates.” 13 The rationale in Cousins was not the

protection of the party’s associational rights but, rather that “[t]he Convention serves the

pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this national

interest is greater than any interest of an individual State. ”14

Moreover, twenty-five years after the Cousins decision and in a context far more

analogous to this case, the United States Supreme Court held “that a state may require parties to

10 Id . at 219-20 . 11 See URP Br. at 4 (quoting Ray, 343 U.S. at 230 ) 12 See id. at 219-20 ; 229- 30; 231 (“ Where a state authorizes a party to choose its nominees for electorin a party primary and to fix the qualifications for the candidates, we see no federal constitutionalobjection to the requirement of this pledge .”) (emphasis added).13 Cousins v. Wigoda , 419 U.S. 477, 489-490 (1975) . 14 Id. at 490 .


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6/17

6

use the primary format for selecting their nominees, in order to assure that intraparty competition

is settled in a democratic fashion.” 15 The Supreme Court has further recognized: “[A]s a practical

matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if

some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process,” 16 Accordingly,

states have enacted comprehensive and complex statutory schemes governing elections. Each

provision of a state's election code “inevitably affects— at least to some degree — the individual's

right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends.” These restrictions are,

however, generally permissible in light of the state's important regulatory interests, so long as

they are reasonable and non-discriminatory.

Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992) also does not further URP’s cause. In

Duke , the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether political parties can exclude from participation in

party primaries candidates who hold views that are inconsistent with the party's ideology. The

court relied on political parties' associational rights to approve the use of state presidential

candidate selection committees to control candidate access to the party primary ballot .17 Under

15 Cal. Dem. Party v. Jones , 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) ).16 Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) . 17 See id. at 1533 . The procedural history of Duke v. Cleland is tortured and complex. First, Duke claimedthat the actions by the State Committee and the Secretary of State violated his constitutional rights, andrequested a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction pursuant to 42U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent the printing of the primary ballots. The district court denied the temporaryrestraining order and the injunction. See Duke v. Cleland , 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga.) , aff'd, 954 F.2d 1526(11th Cir. 1992) . Duke then filed an amended complaint and asserted an additional claim under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 that challenged the validity of the Georgia presidential primary candidate selection statute itself.See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399 (11th Cir. 1993) . The district court dismissed the case on the ground thatthere was no state action, but this finding was overturned on appeal. The court of appeals found that thecandidate selection committee was “an arm of the state” and thus their decision constituted state action,

but the court could not decide the merits of the action on the record provided by the lower court. Seeid. at 1404-06 . On remand, the district court held that the candidate selection statute was constitutional,and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 517 (N.D. Ga. 1995) , aff'd subnom. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996) (Duke III ).


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Georgia state law, a committee comprised of the party's two leaders in the legislature and the

chairperson of the state party chooses which names are placed on the primary ballot. 18 If all three

party members on the committee agree that a name should not be put on the ballot, the Secretary

of State does not print the name on the ballot.

Before the 1992 Georgia Republican Presidential Primary, David Duke, a former Ku

Klux Klan member and white supremacist, sought to participate in the election, but the party

committee voted to reject his attempt to gain access to the ballot.t. 19 Duke claimed that his

associational rights, and the rights of his supporters to vote for him, were violated because “the

Republican members of the Committee excluded [him] from the Republican primary ballot

because of his political beliefs.” 20 The issue in the case was: Did the party ’s right to determine

the boundaries of its association trump Duke's right to associate with the party of his choice? 21

The court concluded, “Duke [had] no right to associate with the Republican Party if the

Republican Party ha[d] identified Duke as ideologically outside the party.”

Unlike the Duke case, the URP has not objected to the inclusion of any candidate on the primary

ballot because of his ideology. Nor has any candidate sought placement on the ballot over the Party’s

ideological objection. Instead, URP claims that it has a constitutional right to control the process

through which party members seek n omination, and that Utah’s Election Code impermissibly regulates

the Party’s internal procedures. Contrary to URP’s assertions, however, Duke does not support the

Party’s contention that the State must defer to the Party’s internal procedures when creatin g a process

18 See Duke , 954 F.2d at 1533 . 19 See id . at 1527 . 20 Id . at 1530 . The Georgia Republican Party Chairman, Alec Poitevint, admitted that the party deniedDuke because of his political views: “'There is no room for disciples of Hitler on the Republican

presidential ballot.”' Duke , 5 F.3d at 1404 n.5. 1993).21 See id.


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through which candidates access the ballot. In contrast to URP’s positon, the party excluded Duke

without resorting to the party's internal political processes. 22 The exclusion took place, by operation

of Georgia statute, before any party members were involved (except the three party leaders).

The Duke case does not support URP’s argument that SB54’s provisions interfere with party

autonomy. Georgia’s statutorily defined procedure enabling state officials to remove party

candidates does not protect the party's autonomy. Rather, such a statute infringes on that

autonomy by allowing three party leaders to circumvent the wishes of the majority of the party’s

members.

Under Duke , a party can deny primary ballot access to a presidential party primary by the

vote of three party bosses if invested with that power under state law . Of course, no such grant of

authority exists under Utah law. Unlike Georgia, Utah law does not provide Party leadership

with the right to remove candidates who are otherwise properly certified to the ballot.

The QPP Provisions Do Not Run Afoul of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.B.

URP contends that “ [t]o qualify as a QPP, the URP must give up its First Amendment right to

control the process by which it selects its nominee s for public office.” 23 URP employs circular reasoning

based on a false assumption to arrive at its preferred conclusion. URP unilaterally proclaims it has a First

22 As Judge Kravitch noted in dissent, if the associational rights of the political party permitted the“exclusion of candidates from a primary ballot, the very purpose of a primary would disappear.” Duke ,954 F.2d at 1539 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). In conclusion, she summed up the real motivation behind the

party's actions:

The Republican Party of Georgia and the state seek to exclude Duke fromthe primary ballot because they believe that the party will sufferembarrassment and adverse publicity by virtue of his candidacy for theRepublican nomination. No political body, however, has a constitutionalright to freedom from embarrassment ....

Id. at 1539 .

23 Doc. 80, p. 6 .


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Amendment right to control the process through which candidates seek the Par ty’s nomin ation.

Based on this false assertion, URP then claims that the St ate cannot condition URP’ s choice to

be a QPP on relinquishing this self-proclaimed constitutional right.

As previously explained, there is nothing unconstitutional about a process that allows

prospective candidates access to the primary ballot by collecting signatures. This Court has

already affirmed the constitutionality of the signature gathering process contained withi n Utah’s

Election Code. 24 And a myriad of Courts uniformly recognize that a “state has a legitimate

interest in requiring a showing of a ‘significant modicum of support’ before it prints on the state

election ballot the name of a political party and its sl ate of candidates.” 25 “The [Supreme] Court

has clearly upheld requirements that a request for ballot access be supported by some significant

number or percentage of petitioners.” 26 Therefore, it is not unconstitutional for the State to

require candidates to show the requisite support by collecting signatures in order to access the

ballot.

URP’ s unconstitutional condition argument also ignores the fact that both the RPP and

QPP routes all ow candidates to seek the Party’ s nomination by collecting signatures. By

24 See doc. 75 . 25 Arutunoff , 687 F.2d at 1378 . 26 Libertarian Party of Florida, 710 F.2d at 793 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 740 (5% requirement notfacially unconstitutional); American Party of Texas, 415 U.S. at 783 & n.15, 788 – 89, 94 S.Ct. at 1307 &n.15, 1309 – 1310 (upholding statute imposing on minority parties “lenient” 1% requirement which wascoupled with other “somewhat burdensome” requirements, and requiring independent candidates to obtainsignatures of 3% or 5% depending on office); Jenness, 403 U.S. at 432, 442, 91 S.Ct. at 1976 (5% ofthose eligible to vote in previous election is constitutional); see also Swanson, III v. Worley, 490 F.3d 894(11th Cir. 2007) (finding Alabama’s statute requiring signatures from 3% of electors who cast vote forGovernor in last election constitutional); Cartwright v. Barnes , 304 F.3d 1138, 1141-42 (11th Cir.2002) (reaffirming constitutionality of Georgia’s 5% signature requirement); Rainbow Coalition of Okla.v. Oklahoma State Election Bd. , 844 F.2d 740, 741-42, 744 (10 th Cir. 1988) (upholding Oklahoma statuterequiring signatures of 5% of the number of votes cast in the most recent election); Rogers v. Corbett , 468F.3d 188, 195 (3rd Cir. 2006) (upholding Pennsylvania statute requiring candidate of minor political partyto obtain signatures of 2% of votes cast on last election).


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choosing to become an RPP, URP candidates would seek the P arty’s nomination by signature

gathering only; URP candidates could not access the primary ballot by way of the Party’s

convention. 27 This does not present an “unconstitutional condition,” becau se URP does not have

a constitutional right to nominate its candidates by convention. “[T]he State may require

political parties to use the primary format for selecting their nominees.” 28 Thus, the State would

be well within its rights to limit access to the primary ballot to signature gathering identified for

RPP’s. Providing QPPs with the additional choice to nominate candidates through the P arty’s

convention does not render the statutory process unconstitutional. 29 As the Utah Supreme Court

recognized:

The statute does not require the Republican Party to seek certificationas a qualified political party, and it does not purport to mandate theadoption of any provisions in its constitution, bylaws, rules, or otherinternal procedures. A registered political party that chooses tofunction as such incurs no obligation under section (12)(d). 30

That the signature gathering requirements contained in section 20A-9-408 may be

unconstitutionally restrictive if QPP candidates could not utilize the P arty’s convention to access

the ballot does not change the analysis. URP has confused the constitutionality of signature

requirements in the context of evaluating reasonable ballot access with the assessment of the

scope of the Party’s associational rights at issue in this motion. This Court has already

determined the signature requirements found in Section 408, coupled with the access provided

through the party’s convention , constitute reasonable access to the ballot. 31 Likewise, the Court

27 See Utah Code § 20A-9-403 . 28 Doc. 170, p. 16 . 29 See doc. 75 . 30 Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 2016 UT 17, ¶5 . 31 See doc. 75 .


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also found the RPP provisions contained in 20A-9-403, including its signature gathering

requirements, to be constitutional. 32

And finally, the unconstitutional choice which this Court found to exist with respect to

the unaffiliated voter provision contained in Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(a) is no longer at issue.

The forced association that accompanied the State’s requiring the party to open its primary to

unaffiliated voters, is no longer present. 33 Instead, URP’s Complaint “when distilled to its

essence, is that a partisan ballot open only to those voters chosen by the party itself, nonetheless

burdens parties’ associational rights because a candidate may seek the party’s nomination against

the wishes of the party’s leadership.” 34 However, URP does not possess a First Amendment

right to dictate the process through which its members seek the nomination. The Party’s attempt

to exclude members of its own party to collect signatures and, thereby, seek the Party’s

nomination in a primary election is not a right protected under the First Amendment.

2. URP Statement That it Will Not "Comply With The Requirements of the QPPStatute as Confirmed in [The] Opinion," Utah Republican Party , 2016 UT 17 , § 11,Is Contrary to its Prior Position.

The Utah Supreme Court expressly noted that:

[C]ounsel for the Republican Party in this case made the followingstatement to the federal district court . . .: “If state law says that wehave to allow both routes and if that is what the Supreme courtdecides and if we have elected to be a QPP, then we would have tofigure out a way how to change our constitution and by-laws to

conform the state law.” 35

32 Doc. 170, p. 14; Doc. 207, p. 30 . 33 See doc. 215 ¶¶ 1-3 (declaring the unaffiliated voter provision unconstitutional as applied to URP.)34 Alaska Independence Party v. Alaska , 545 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2008) . 35 See also February 4, 2016 hearing transcript at 44:4-8 (Doc. 42 ).


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At the February 4, 2016 hearing before this Court, counsel for the Republican Party further

confirmed that “the reason that we brought this case and the reason that we're trying to expedite

[an answer to the first certified question] . . . is we want a responsive answer so that we can

comply with the law, whatever the law requires . . . .” 36 After having twice confirmed that URP

would comply with the Utah Supreme Court’s clarification of a QPP’s obligations under the

statute, URP now asserts that it will not comply with the QPP requirements as clearly established

by the Utah Supreme Court. URP should be required to honor and abide by to its prior

representations to this Court or be estopped or sanctioned for contempt. As in all adversarial

proceedings, a party should not be allowed to take contrary positions as such practices thwart the

substantive and procedural integrity of the judicial process.

3. There Is No URP Rule, Regulation, Procedure, Bylaw or Other Provisions WhichExpressly Prohibits, Limits, or Penalizes A Member From Using the SignatureGathering Process.

At the hearing held on February 4, 2016, URP’s counsel admitted that the Party’s

Constitution and Bylaws do not exclude from Party membership those members who chose to

collect signatures to access the ballot:

THE COURT: I've got more questions for you. You quote some provisions of the party constitution bylaws in the complaint. Andlet's see. Is it the bylaws? Yeah. The constitution bylaws inParagraph 18. Now, Mr. Wolf raised a hypothetical that if you --that it might be that the Republican Party would have a provisionthat if you seek the nomination gathering -- or signature gathering

right, you can't be a member. Nothing you have in yourconstitution and bylaws says that now.MR. TROUPIS: No. It simply says you have to comply with therules.THE COURT: And the rules are that you only have a conventionroute; is that right?

36 Id. at 43:4-8 (Doc. 42 ).


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MR. TROUPIS: That's correct. 37

URP contends that its rules “only permit URP member s to seek the party’s nomination

via convention. ”38 URP similarly claims that “[o]nly R epublican candidates who have properly

filed for elected public office as required by law and meet the URP Bylaws shall be considered at

Convention.” 39 URP’s statements do not address the issue. The Lt. Governor agrees that URP’s

rules establish a process for its members to seek the P arty’s nomination by partici pating in the

Party’s convention. However, there is no rule, regulation or provision within URP’s bylaws or

constitution that preclude, prohibit, prevent or penalize a member from utilizing the signature

gathering process to seek the Party’s nomination.

While the First Lawsuit was pending, URP amended its Constitution and Bylaws. 40

URP’s Constitution provides that “Party membership is open to any resident of the State of Utah

who registers to vote as a Republican and complies with the Utah Republican Party Constitution

and Bylaws, and membership may be further set forth in the Utah Republican Party Bylaws.” 41

URP’s Bylaws do not further define the criteria for membership in the Party. URP’s Bylaws

require that:

Candidates who wish to run for any federal or statewide office shallsign and submit a certification that they will comply with the rules and

processes set forth in the Utah Republican Party Constitution and theseBylaws and a disclosure statement to State Party Headquarters at least30 days prior to the State Party Convention. The disclosure statementshall specify either: (1) "I have read the Utah Republican PartyPlatform. I support that Platform and accept it as the standard bywhich my performance as a candidate and as an officeholder should be

37 February 4, 2016 Transcript at 43:14-44:2 (Doc. 42 ).38 Doc. 80 , p. 2 (emphasis added).39 Id. at 19 . 40 Compare doc. 69-1, p. 1-9 and 69-2, p. 1-11 with doc. 177-1, p. 2-13 and 177-1, p . 15-23 . 41 Doc. 177-1, p. 2 , Art. IC.


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evaluated. I certify that I am not a candidate, officer, delegate nor position holder in any party other than the Republican party." Or (2) "Ihave read the Utah Republican Party Platform. Except for the

provisions specifically noted below, I support that Platform and acceptit as the standard by which my performance as a candidate and as anofficeholder should be evaluated. I certify that I am not a candidate,officer, delegate nor position holder in any party other than theRepublican party." 42

Conspicuously absent from URP’s Bylaws is any restriction on candidates collecting

signatures to access the primary ballot. All the Bylaws require is that a candidate who chooses to

seek the Party’s nomination through the Party’s convention agrees to comply with the procedures

governing the Party’s convention and provide the requisite disclosu re statement. And candidates

who refuse to sign the disclosure statement are not expelled from the Party. Instead, “[s]hould

any candidate fail to submit the Disclosure Statement, the Party Chairman will announce this

failure immediately prior to balloting for that candidate's office. ”43

Thus, URP’s claim that Utah Code Ann. § 20A-9-101(12)(d) unconstitutionally interferes

with the Party’s right to define its membership is not correct, in part, because URP’s membership

requirements do not conflict with state law. Accordingly, allowing QPP members to exercise

their choice to seek their Party’s nomination by collecting signatures , as expressly provided by

Section 101(12)(d), does not conflict with URP’s definition of its membership or otherwise

interfere with URP’s internal procedures. And URP’s curious reliance on its incorporation of

Robert ’s Rules of Order does not change this result.

42 Id. , p. 22 , § 8.0.43 Id. § 8.0B; see also Evans depo. Doc. 69-4, 54:1-5 (acknowledging “if they choose not to sign it, thenthe consequence would be me communicating that to those delegates that this particular candidate haschosen not to sign the Candidate Disclosure.”)


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4. Robert ’s Rules of Order Does Not Provide a Process Through Which the UtahRepubl

Documents

Utah Response to SB54