Ussocom Pub 1

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 15AUGUST 2011

DOCTRINEFOR

SPECIALOPERATIONS

United States Special Operations Command7701 Tampa Point Blvd.

MacDill AFB, FL 33621-5323

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

FOREWORD

After ten years of continuous war, the special operationscommunity can be proud of its service and the legacy of thosewho came before them. However, despite recent successesagainst long-time threats, we cannot grow complacent.Instead, we must remain vigilant against the complexemerging dangers that will continue to threaten our Nationfor years to come.

Many elements of the joint force are doctrine-basedinstitutions whose capabilities range the spectrum of militaryoperations. However, the unique challenges of today’s globalsecurity environment frequently demand more than justa military solution. In most cases, responses to thesechallenges require a joint, interagency and multi-nationalapproach. SOF have been and will continue to be keyingredients to these solutions, sometimes in a supporting role,but more recently, in a supported role. For this reason, it isimperative that all components of our force have adoctrinal reference from which to find the principles, theframework, and essential elements that define specialoperations.

USSOCOM PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR SPECIALOPERATIONS

USSOCOM Publ ica t ion 1 , Doctr ine for Spec ia lOperations, is the foundational special operations manual,and its publication is consistent with USSOCOM’s legislatedresponsibility to develop SOF doctrine. It also provides thekey linkage between SOF and joint doctrine while clarifyingmany definitions and misperceptions about specialoperations. While authoritative in nature, USSOCOMPublication 1 is designed to be adaptive enough to offer apoint of departure to address the fluid nature of today’soperational environment. This gives SOF the latitude tosustain the focus, wisdom, and intellectual agility that arehallmarks of our operations.


ERIC T. OLSONAdmiral, U.S. NavyCommander

PREFACE

ScopeThis publication is the U.S. Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM) doctrinal foundation for specialoperations. It describes the nature, operational framework,organization, employment, and synchronization of SpecialOperations Forces (SOF) and their unique contributionsto achieving national security strategy and objectives.

PurposeU.S. Code, Title 10, Section 167 and Department of DefenseDirective 5100.01 assign the Commander, USSOCOM theresponsibility and authority to develop special operationsdoctrine. Accordingly, this publication outlines the nature ofspecial operations, force composition, command and control,and how best to synchronize and employ SOF to meet globalchallenges. Furthermore, this document enables SOF tospeak with a common and understood voice by providingupdated terminology and overarching concepts for the fullrange of special operations now and in the future.

ApplicationPublication 1, Doctrine for Special Operations, the capstoneUSSOCOM doctrinal publication, applies to SOF at everylevel and informs the combatant commanders, combatsupport agencies, other Department of Defense, U.S.Government departments and agencies, and internationalmilitary and civilian partners. Further, this document


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complements Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the ArmedForces of the United States, and is authoritative butnot prescriptive. Due to the current dynamic securityenvironment, special operations doctrine, terminology,and applications must be consistent yet adaptive.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1. Nature of Special Operations� History� Special Operations Imperatives� USSOCOM Organizations and Functions

Section 2. Special Operations Environment� Strategic Appreciation� Operational Framework� Core Operations and Activities

Section 3. Organizing for Special Operations� Special Operations Force Generation� Special Operations Command and Control

Section 4. Employing Special Operations Forces� Mission Selection Criteria� Special Operations across the Range of

Military Operations� Global and Regional Campaigns� Synchronizing Special Operations Forces during

Global Campaigns

Section 5. ConclusionAcronyms


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SECTION 1.NATURE OF SPECIALOPERATIONS

Special operations are “special” because their successdepends on long-term relationships with indigenous forcesand populations and knowledge of the cultural, societal,economic, and political environments in which they occur.Special operations improve a nation’s security capabilities,foster or counter insurgencies, dismantle terrorist networks,counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and addressother irregular adversaries. The greater the environmentalknowledge and extent of relationships, the more likely theoutcome will be successful. This, more than any other singlefactor, defines the nature of special operations.

HistorySpecial Operations Forces (SOF) have been a significant

U.S. military capability from their earliest days. During theFrench and Indian War, colonial rangers used guerrillatactics to create chaos among the French and their Indianallies. Militia irregulars harassed supply lines and gatheredintelligence against the occupying British Army and itsTory sympathizers during the Revolutionary War. In theCivil War, Mosby’s Rangers gained fame for conductinglightning raids against Union Army lines of communicationand infrastructure.

Throughout World War II, many SOF operated in theEuropean and Pacific theaters such as the combinedCanadian-American force that fought in Italy and France.1


The first modern Ranger unit also fought throughout Europeand gained prominence for scaling the cliffs at Pointe du Hocduring Operation OVERLORD. In the Pacific theater,Merrill’s Marauders conducted deep penetration strikesagainst Japanese supply lines and infrastructure throughoutBurma. In the Philippines and New Guinea, the AlamoScouts gathered intelligence and raided enemy rear areas andare remembered for supporting the Cabanatuan raid that freedover 500 prisoners of war (POW). Further, World War IIsaw the beginnings of Naval Special Warfare and thedevelopment of naval scouts and raiders and establishmentof the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT). In the Pacific,Marine Raider Battalions were organized, trained, andequipped to conduct strategic strikes and raids deep inJapanese held territory.

Another World War II organization was the Office ofStrategic Services (OSS), which is the direct predecessor ofspecial forces and U.S. Special Operations Command(USSOCOM). OSS personnel infiltrated behind enemy linesin Europe and the Pacific to support resistance movements,perform sensitive information operations, and collectintelligence against the Axis powers. Additionally, the OSSestablished clandestine capabilities to gather intelligenceoutside of theaters of war.

After World War II, each of the Services developedspecial operations capabilities tailored to their requirements.During the Korean War, Naval UDTs supportedamphibious landing operations. The Army established the

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United Nations Partisan Forces-Korea, which operated inremote island bases adjacent to the North Korean coastlinein support of North Korean Partisan raids, harassment ofsupply lines, and recovery of downed pilots.

During the Vietnam War, Army Special Forces, NavySEALs, and Air Force Air Commandos played critical rolesin counterinsurgency (COIN) and advising and assistingindigenous forces. In other cases, units like MilitaryAdvisory Command-Vietnam, Studies and ObservationGroup penetrated hostile areas, gathered intelligence, anddisrupted enemy logistics. Late in the war, an attemptedrescue of American POWs at Son Tay prison in NorthVietnam found no POWs but demonstrated successfulexecution of a highly complex special operation.

The lessons of successful special operations in Vietnamwere difficult to retain in the U.S. political environment inthe late 1970s. SOF were ill-funded, remained under thepurview of their parent Services, and seldom operatedtogether. These conditions contributed to the failure ofOperation EAGLE CLAW, the attempted rescue ofAmericans held hostage by Iran in 1980, and to operationaldifficulties in Operation URGENT FURY, the rescueoperation in Grenada.

These operational problems resulted in a series ofinquiries and led to the Nunn-Cohen amendment to theNational Defense Appropriations Act of 1987. Nunn-Cohenrequired establishment of a joint headquarters for specialoperations and authorized a budget for it. Thus, on 16 April3


1987, the Department of Defense (DoD) establishedUSSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. After itsestablishment, USSOCOM became a proactive, strategicallyfocused headquarters with joint SOF employed worldwide insupport of theater commanders in peacetime, a major theaterwar, multiple contingencies, and the counterterrorism effort.

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, as part ofOperation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, SOFwere organized to support Afghan militias seeking to topplethe Taliban regime. With only a few hundred U.S. personnel,and in less than 60 days from the start of major operations,SOF seized the country from Taliban and its terrorist allies.

In March 2002, Operation ANACONDA combinedelements of Afghan, SOF, conventional, and allied forces intheater to destroy enemy forces and capture senior Talibanand al Qaeda leaders. Major lessons were learned from thesuccesses and failures of ANACONDA about unity ofcommand, interagency coordination, and integration of SOFwith conventional and allied forces.

In Afghanistan and Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOMin 2003), SOF were initially employed, in conjunction withthe joint force, to support the national objectives of removingdestabilizing regimes from power. However, in both theaters,the mission evolved with SOF leading the way in stabilizingthe nations and fighting the remaining insurgency. SOFcapabilities were applied to support civil authorities, train,advise and assist the new government’s defense forces, andengage the popular movements supporting the new regimes.

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While operations in Iraq andAfghanistan have dominatedthe landscape and demand for SOF capabilities and resourceshas soared, USSOCOM has maintained a watchful eye onthe rest of the world and in 2006 was given responsibilityby the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to synchronizecounterterrorism operations. Variants of ENDURINGFREEDOM were implemented in the Horn of Africa,trans-Saharan Africa, and the Philippines.

USSOCOM has taken a long-term approach ofengagement throughout the world while forging enduringpartnerships and contributing to regional stability. Thebalance of direct and indirect action, the combination ofhigh-end tactical skills, and the understanding of theoperational context of their application is the core of specialoperations.

Special Operations ImperativesThe nature of special operations is further defined by the

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who conduct them.SOF are carefully selected for physical excellence, maturity,judgment, adaptability, and ability to make good decisionsunder pressure. SOF are trained in languages and culture;special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures; andprovided with equipment designed or modified for specialoperations.

As the result of their selection, training, equipment, andcultural attunement, SOF are able to operate in small teamsin friendly, politically sensitive, uncertain, or hostile

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environments to achieve U.S. objectives independently orwith or through indigenous forces and populations. SOF areable to conduct a wide range of missions, often of high risk,and in a clandestine or low visibility mode when required.

The 12 special operations imperatives are the foundationfor planning and executing special operations in concert withother forces, interagency partners, and foreign organizations.The imperatives have informed special operationsthroughout history and will continue to shape them in thefuture.

• Understand the Operational Environment. SOFachieve objectives by understanding and developing plans toact within the realities of specific operational environments,including diplomatic, political, military, economic, financial,social, informational, infrastructure, legal, psychological,and others. They must know the friendly and hostiledecisionmakers, objectives and strategies, and how theyinteract. SOF must remain flexible and adapt operations tochanging realities, anticipate changes, and exploit fleetingopportunities.

• Recognize Polit ical Implications. Whe t h e rconduct ing opera t ions independent ly or incoordination with partners, SOF must be aware of thepolitical effects of their actions. SOF must anticipate anambiguous strategic and operational environment wheremilitary factors are not the only concern. Special operationsfrequently create conditions for non-military activities

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to occur within indigenous populations and civil institutionsto achieve U.S. and partner-nation (PN) objectives.

• Facilitate Interagency Activities. Most specialoperations occur in an interagency environment wherein U.S.Government (USG) departments and agencies are workingtoward common national objectives as part of a country teameffort. SOF must actively and continuously coordinate theiractivities with all relevant parties.

• Engage the Threat Discriminately. Specialoperations missions often have sensitive politicalimplications. Therefore, commanders must carefully selectwhen, where, and how to employ SOF. Special operationsmay be applied with precision to minimize collateral effects,in a concealed or clandestine manner so that only the effectsare detectable, or through the actions of surrogate orindigenous military or other security forces.

• Anticipate Long-Term Effects. SOF must view eachdiscrete problem in its broader political, cultural, andmilitary context. They must develop a long-term,problem-solving approach that considers shifting end states.They must accept legal and political constraints to avoidstrategic failure while achieving tactical success. SOF mustnot jeopardize the success of national and theaterlong-term objectives with their desire for immediate orshort-term effects.

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• Ensure Legi t imacy and Credibi l i ty ofSpecial Operations. There are significant legal andpolicy considerations for special operations. Legitimacy isthe most crucial factor in developing and maintaininginternal and international support. Legitimacy is broader thanthe strict legal definition and includes the moral and politicallegitimacy of a government or resistance organization.Legitimacy is determined by the people of the nation and theinternational community based on their collective perceptionof the credibility of its cause and methods. Withoutlegitimacy and credibility, SOF will not receive the supportof indigenous elements that are essential to success.

• Anticipate Information Effects. Special operationshave significant information effects that are amplifiedby the pervasive electronic media environment andgrowing influence of social networks. Some actionsmay be conducted specifically to produce a desiredsocial or military outcome. SOF commanders mustcons ider and incorpora te the potential impact ofinformation into all their activities.

• Operate with and through Others. Aprimary role ofSOF is to assess, train, advise, assist, and equip indigenousmilitary, paramilitary, civil security forces, and civilinstitutions. The supported non-U.S. forces then serve asforce multipliers in the pursuit of U.S. national securityobjectives with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost.Efforts must be seen as supporting a foreign

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government or group who retain primary ownership of thesuccess or failure of the effort.

• Develop Multiple Options. Adaptability, flexibility,innovation, and the application of these characteristicsenable SOF to maintain their strategic and operational agility.SOF develop a broad range of options and contingency plansenabling them to shift from one option to another before,during, and after mission execution to provide flexiblenational and regional options.

• Ensure Long-Term Engagement. SOF mustrecognize the need for persistence, patience, and continuity ofeffort. SOF programs should build capacity with the goal ofenabling the partner to maintain them without further U.S.assistance. U.S.-funded programs can be counterproductiveif a government or population becomes dependent on themand funding ends. Special operations must, therefore, bedurable, consistent, and sustainable.

• Provide Sufficient Intelligence. Intelligence willremain an indispensible precursor to the conduct of specialoperations, whether they are kinetic or non-kinetic inexecution. Intelligence support to the SOF operator requiresa powerful combination of forward-based and robustreach-back capabilities as well as a blending of organic SOFcapacity and external conventional force and national-levelintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)capabilities. Developing area expertise, providing persistent9


surveillance, and pursuing constant collaboration amongnetworked intelligence units and interagency elementssupporting SOF are crucial to mission success.

• Balance Security and Synchronization. Securityconcerns often dominate special operations, butover-compartmentalization can exclude key SOF andnon-SOF personnel from the planning cycle. SOFcommanders must resolve these conflicting demands onmission planning and execution. Insufficient security maycompromise a mission; conversely, excessive security mayjeopardize a mission.

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AUNIQUE ORGANIZATION


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USSOCOM Organizations and FunctionsUSSOCOM is a unified combatant command with

Military Department and defense agency-like responsibilities.U.S. Code Title 10, Section 167 and Department of DefenseDirective (DoDD) 5100.01 tasks USSOCOM withperforming the department-like functions of organizing,training, equipping, and providing combat-ready personnelfor employment by the geographic combatant commander(GCC). Additionally, the Unified Command Plan and otherstrategic guidance direct USSOCOM to synchronize DoD’sglobal campaign planning against terrorist networks,including their use of WMD. USSOCOM may be directedto conduct global operations as well. As such, USSOCOMis a unified combatant command but also has authoritiesand responsibilities in common with the departments.

USSOCOM’s main responsibilities include programming andmaintaining the Major Force Program (MFP)-11 budget;developing special operations strategy, doctrine, and tactics;ensuring the interoperability of SOF; conducting pre-crisisplanning; and commanding continental U.S. (CONUS)-basedSOF. Furthermore, USSOCOM advises the SecDef throughthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) on the sizeand composition of the SOF provided by the Services.

To accomplish these responsibilities, USSOCOM iscomprised of five key subordinate organizations. Fourare Service components, and one is a subordinate unifiedcommand.

• U.S . Army Specia l Operat ions Command(USASOC). Trains, equips, and provides Army SpecialOperations Forces (ARSOF). Special forces are experts inunconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense(FID). They are trained to operate in small teams, conductraids and strikes, carry out reconnaissance and surveillance,and interdict hostile targets through, with, and by indigenousand PN forces. Rangers are special light infantry able to seizeairfields in hostile environments, conduct raids and strikes,and conduct other high-risk missions. Special OperationsAviation helicopters infiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOFand conduct armed escort, reconnaissance and surveillance,and electronic warfare. Military information supportoperations (MISO) specialists provide support to GCC/Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) information

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operations and chief of mission public diplomacy effortsthrough multimedia communications. Civil affairs (CA)support GCCs and chiefs of mission military and civilobjectives by engaging indigenous populations and civilinstitutions.

• Na v a l S p e c i a l Wa r f a r e C o mm a n d(NAVSPECWARCOM). Trains, equips, and providesSEALs who operate in small teams, conduct strikes andraids, carry out reconnaissance and surveillance, work withsurrogate and indigenous forces, and counterWMDmissions.SEALs have unique capabilities to engage hostile shipsand execute missions in ground, maritime, or riverineenvironments. Their capabilities include submersible systemsthat deliver and recover SEALs and special boat units thatoperate a variety of maritime and riverine special boats.

• Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC).Trains, equips, and provides highly trainedAir Force SpecialOperations Forces (AFSOF). AFSOF employ specializedairpower using unique fixed-wing and tilt-rotor aircraft toinfiltrate, exfiltrate, and resupply SOF and conduct precisionaerial fire against fixed and moving targets. Further, theyconduct specialized refueling; combat search and rescue; andradio, television, and short wave aerial broadcasts. Air crewsuse terrain following and avoidance systems to conductlow-level operations under the cover of darkness and/oradverse weather for clandestine, deep penetration of hostile,sensitive, or politically denied airspace. AFSOF provide a13


unique set of combat aviation advisors who assess, train,advise, assist, and equip indigenous military personnel,civil security forces, and civil institutions with fixedand rotary-wing aircraft as well as supported personnel.Additionally, AFSOF provide specialized intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance personnel and capabilities toprovide SOF commanders with detailed near-real-time,all-source intelligence products. Finally, Special TacticsTeams control air traffic, establish air assault landing zones,direct close air support for strike aircraft and gunships, takemeteorological and oceanographic observations, and provideadvanced trauma care.

• Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command(MARSOC). Trains, equips, and provides Marine CorpsSpecial Operations Forces (MARSOF) to conduct strikes andraids and reconnaissance and surveillance. They also provideMarine Special Operations Teams that operate independentlyor as part of larger units to advise and assist foreign forces,including maritime, naval, indigenous, and surrogate forces.

• Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).Develops special operations doctrine and tactics, techniques,and procedures to ensure interoperability of SOF withconventional forces. JSOC conducts training, coordinatesexercises, identifies acquisition requirements, and procuresmateriel to accomplish its integration responsibilities.

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SECTION 2.SPECIALOPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT

The character of conflict is changing the way state andnon-state actors interact. Insurgents, violent extremists,criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies areexploiting gaps in rule sets developed for yesterday’s morepredictable world. In the evolving strategic environment, oldparadigms are yielding to new forms of conflict withdifferent preconditions and catalysts. The increasingcomplexity of the environment makes problem identificationand definition difficult, ambiguous, and mutable. Problemsonce considered local or regional will increasingly becomemore global and interconnected, and parallel systemsfor governance and economics will compete withtraditional systems.

Strategic AppreciationStrategic appreciation is a way to think about complex,

ill-structured problems generated by the convergence ofmeta-trends and strategic challenges. The evolution of theglobal strategic environment is driven by the convergenceof meta-trends interacting with strategic security challenges.A meta-trend is a convergence of trends and is transforma-tional in nature regarding the global strategic environment.Meta-trends assume new characteristics when placed in theperspective of the evolving speed, scale, scope, global reach,and other key drivers. Strategic appreciation recognizes thatthe dynamic nature of the environment requires using a15


different lens to view the interactions of a complex systemand drives SOF strategy and requirements.

Strategic appreciation informs how SOF can bestcontribute to national security. The overarching purpose ofspecial operations is to protect the U.S. and its interestswhile promoting international security. Based on the currentstrategic environment, SOF possess unique capabilities toaddress four primary strategic challenges that threaten theU.S. and international security:

• Transnational violent extremist networks.Countering the transnational threat posed by violentextremist networks remains a national priority. SOF areuniquely suited to combat violent extremist organizations andcontribute to the creation of a global environmentinhospitable to transnational violent extremism.

• States disregarding international norms. Thestrategic landscape continues to be shaped by the nexusof powerful states and regional instability/weak states. Thisallows states to disregard international norms andconventions, directly threatening regional and internationalstability. Many of these states will continue to expand theirglobal influence through illicit networks, requiringcontinuous preparation of the environment (PE) andassessment to determine appropriate actions. USSOCOMwill continue to maintain capabilities and capacities tosupport USG efforts to dissuade, deter, coerce, disrupt, and,if necessary, defeat aggressor states that have not complied

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with the will of the international community.

• States that face internal collapse. An increasingintersection of crime with instability, including harvestingand trafficking of natural resources, will fuel conflict anddegrade the rule of law. Failing and failed states are catalystsfor further regional instability, afford safe havens for violentextremist and transnational criminal organizations, providetransit points for terrorist and criminal financing, are sourcesfor extremist recruiting efforts, and threaten the security ofnuclear weapons and material. USSOCOM will refine anddevelop capabilities and capacities supporting USG effortsto help prevent key states from failing and to increase theirability to provide security for their populations.

• Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation.The strategic challenge for countering WMD proliferationand delivery lies in understanding the growing nexus oftransnational crime, violent extremism, illicit traffickingnetworks, and cyber networks. Whether it is for states,violent extremists, or non-state actors, new deterrence anddissuasion rule sets are required. USSOCOMwill refine anddevelop capabilities and capacities supporting USG effortsin WMD Proliferation.

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Operational FrameworkSOF provide unique capabilities to address the

four strategic challenges described above. Their globalperspective, understanding of transnational threats andnon-state actors, and ability to operate in concert with U.S.and international partners make SOF ideally suited to addressnetworked adversaries and the transnational nature ofaggressor state influence. SOF engage with strategicregional partners, thereby establishing and strengthening therelationships required to defeat a network. By developing andstrengthening these partnerships, SOF work to containregional CT issues. SOF’s unique ability to operate in remotelocations and build capacity provides strategic options tomeet the challenges of operating in failed or failing states.

To address strategic challenges and enable ongoingengagement with host governments and USG interagencyelements to predict and prevent conflict, SOF utilize thefollowing approaches:

• An intelligence-enabled, networked force able topursue terrorist threats and their supporting networks todeter, preclude, and preempt actions counter to USG nationalsecurity interests.

• A population-focused, networked force to influence,enable, and integrate friendly nations, partners, andpopulations.

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Figure 1. Special Operations Forces Operational Framework


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• A force to deter, disrupt, or defeat aggressor states andtheir surrogates. The SOF Operational Framework (Figure 1)depicts complex relationships in the context of meta-trendsand strategic challenges. It emphasizes the networked natureof special operations to address the primary strategicchallenges.

Figure 2.Special Operations Forces Core Operations and Activities


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Core Operations and ActivitiesSOF conduct Core Operations and Activities (Figure 2)

within the Operational Framework using unique capabilitiesand under conditions in which other forces are not trainedor equipped to operate. Core Operations are the operationalcontexts within which SOF operate while Core Activitiesare unique capabilities that SOF apply for that operationalcontext.

Core OperationsCore Operations are the military missions for which SOF

have unique modes of employment, tactical techniques,equipment, and training to orchestrate effects, often inconcert with conventional forces. The Core Operations areas follows:

• CounteringWeapons ofMass Destruction (CWMD).CWMD refers to nonproliferation (NP), counterproliferation

(CP), and WMD consequence management. WMD arechemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN)weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causingmass casualties. CWMD excludes the means of transportingor propelling the weapons where such means is a separableand divisible part from the weapons. SOF has a roleprimarily in NP and CP by providing expertise, materiel, andteams to support GCCs to locate, tag, and track WMD;conducting interdiction and other offensive operationsin limited areas as required; building partnership capacity forconducting CP activities; conducting MISO to dissuadeadversary reliance onWMD; and other specialized technicalcapabilities. USSOCOM is the lead combatant commandfor synchronizing planning for operations against terroristuse of WMD and supports U.S. Strategic Command’ssynchronization responsibility for overall CWMD planning.

• Counterinsurgency (COIN). COIN refers to thecomprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeatinsurgency and to address core grievances. SOF areparticularly suited for COIN operations because of theirregional expertise, language, and combat skills, and abilityto work among populations and with or through indigenouspartners.

• Counterterrorism (CT). CT operations includeactions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectlyto influence and render global and regional environments

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inhospitable to terrorist networks. SOF often conduct CToperations through clandestine or low visibility means. SOFactivities within CT include, but are not limited to,intelligence operations, attacks against terrorist networks andinfrastructures, hostage rescue, recovery of sensitivematerial, and non-kinetic activities to counter ideologies ormotivations hospitable to terrorism.

• Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID operationsinvolve participation by civilian and military agencies of agovernment in any of the action programs taken by anothergovernment or other designated organization to free andprotect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,terrorism, and other threats to its security. SOF’s primary roleis to assess, train, advise, and assist host nation (HN)military and paramilitary forces. The goal is to enable theseforces to maintain the HN’s internal stability and toaddress the causes of instability.

• Stability Operations. Stability Operations encompassvarious military missions, tasks, and activities conductedoutside the U.S. in coordination with other instruments ofnational power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secureenvironment and to provide essential government services,emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarianrelief. Stability operations are aimed at reducing threatsfrom state fragility and instability. Enduring stabilityoperations -- consisting of high-quality, low-profile SOF

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engagement conducted in concert with U.S., interagency,international, and HN partners -- can mitigate the risk oflengthy post-conflict interventions. Stability operations alsoinclude tasks performed after a natural or man-made disasteras part of a humanitarian-based intervention or duringmajor operations and campaigns to establish conditionsthat enable civilian authorities following cessation oforganized hostilities.

• Support to Major Operations and Campaigns.These are operations in support of conventional forces as partof a GCC operation or campaign involving major combatforces. Although major operations and campaigns arecharacterized by armed conflict between nation-states,the character of these operations includes a hybrid oftechnologically advanced capabilities and conventionalcombat forces. Typical SOF support to major operations andcampaigns includes UW, special reconnaissance (SR), directaction (DA), MISO, and CA.

• Unconventional Warfare (UW). UW enables aresistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, oroverthrow a government or occupying power by operatingthrough or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla forcein a denied area. UW can be conducted as part of a GCC’soverall theater campaign or as an independent, subordinatecampaign.When conducted independently, the primary focusof UW is on political-military objectives and psychological

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objectives. When UW operations support conventionalmilitary operations, the focus shifts to primarily militaryobjectives; however, the political and psychologicalimplications remain. UW includes military and paramilitaryaspects of resistance movements and represents theculmination of a successful effort to organize andmobilize the civil populace against a hostile governmentor occupying power. From the U.S. perspective, the intentis to develop and sustain these supported resistanceorganizations and to synchronize their activities to furtherU.S. national security objectives. SOF assess, train, advise,and assist indigenous resistance movements to conduct UWand, when required, accompany them into combat.

Core ActivitiesCore Activities are operationally significant, unique

capabilities SOF apply in different combinationstailored for an operational problem set. Core Activitiescan be applied independently or in combination as part ofa commander’s campaign, operation, or activity. The CoreActivities are as follows:

• Civil Affairs Operations (CAO). CAO enhancethe relationship between military and civil authorities.CAO require coordination with other governmentalagencies, international governmental organizations,nongovernmental organizations (NGO), indigenouspopulations and institutions, and the private sector. CAO

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include population and resource control, foreignhumanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to civiladministrations, and civil information management. CAOperformed in support of special operations are characterizedby smaller CA teams or elements, generally without thesupport of larger military forces, acting in isolated, austere,and, in many cases, politically sensitive environments.

• Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and othersmall-scale offensive actions conducted as a specialoperation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitiveenvironments , which employ special ized mil i tarycapabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, ordamage designated targets.

• Hostage Rescue and Recovery. Hostage rescue andrecovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions thatinclude offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt,and respond to terrorist threats and incidents, includingrecapture of U.S. facilities, installations, and sensitivematerial.

• Interdiction and Offensive Weapons of MassDestruction Operations. Special operations CWMDoperations include two of the eight military mission areas:interdiction and offensive operations. Interdiction operationstrack, intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop thetransit of WMD, its delivery systems, or related materialsincluding dual use, technologies, and expertise. WMD25



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offensive operations are actions to disrupt, neutralize, ordestroy a WMD threat before it can be used, or to detersubsequent use of such weapons.

• Military Information Support Operations (MISO).MISO convey selected information and indicators to foreignaudiences to influence their emotions, motives, objectivereasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Thepurpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudesand behaviors favorable to the joint force commander’s (JFC)objectives. Dramatic changes in information technology andsocial networking have added a new, rapidly evolvingdimension to operations, and the ability to influence relevantaudiences is integral to how SOF addresses local, regional,and transnational challenges.

• Preparation of the Environment (PE). PE is anumbrella term for actions taken by or in support of SOF todevelop an environment for current or future operations andactivities. SOF conduct PE in support of GCC plans andorders to alter or shape the operational environment to createconditions conducive to the success of a full spectrum ofmilitary operations. The regional focus, cross-culturalinsights, language capabilities, and relationships ofSOF provide access to and influence nations where thepresence of conventional U.S. forces is not warranted. Referto USSOCOM Directive 525-16, Preparation of theEnvironment, and Directive 525-5, Advanced Special


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Operations, for additional information.

• Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA involves DoDactivities that contribute to unified action by the USG tosupport the development of the capacity and capabilityof Foreign Security Forces (FSF) and their supportinginstitutions. SFA supports the professionalization and thesustainable development of the capacity and capabilityof FSF, supporting institutions of host countries, andinternational and regional security organizations. SFA mustdirectly increase the capacity and/or capability of FSF and/ortheir supporting institutions. SFA activities assist hostcountries to defend against internal and transnational threatsto stability. However, the DoD may also conduct SFA toassist host countries to defend against external threats;contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip,and advise another country’s security forces or supportinginstitutions.

• Special Reconnaissance (SR). Reconnaissance andsurveillance actions are conducted as a special operation inhostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments tocollect or verify information of strategic or operationalsignificance, employing military capabilities not normallyfound in conventional forces.

• SOF Combat Support (CS) and Combat ServiceSupport (CSS). SOF units generally have limited organicCS and CSS elements, so they normally require additional


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Service-provided CS and CSS to accomplish missions. Dueto the high-demand, low-density nature of CS, SOF requestthese assets through the chain of command or once in theaterthrough the allocation process. With CSS elements,SOF usually deploy with enough CSS to internally supportfor limited durations of time until theater support structurescan be established under the Common User Logisticsagreements. Typical Service-provided CS and CSScapabilities required to augment or replace SOF CS/CSSorganic capabilities are listed below:

Combat Service Support• Supply• Maintenance• Transportation• Health service support• Explosive ordnancedisposal

• Field services• Legal support• Finance services• Building and maintainingsustainment bases

• Assessing, repairing,and maintaininginfrastructure

Combat Support• Indirect fires• Chemical• Engineer• Intelligence• Information Operations• Military police• Signal• Aviation (recon, signalsintelligence, mobility,strike, and IO)

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Due to the nature, scope, and remote environments in whichSOF often operate, theater support structures are notalways available. This is a significant challenge because SOFhave limited organic CS and CSS support. Despite increasesin SOF organic CS and CSS force structure, a gap remainsdue to escalating demands for SOF and the current operationstempo.


SECTION 3.ORGANIZING FOR

SPECIALOPERATIONS

SOF are organized and generated to support nationalstrategies, global campaign plans, and theater plans. SOFalso link force organization and generation to interagencystrategies and plans as part of a whole-of-governmentapproach. SOF are either assigned to GCCs, or Commander,USSOCOM (CDRUSSOCOM) may deploy forces insupport of GCC/TSOC requirements. USC Title 10 assignsUSSOCOM the function to validate and prioritize SOFrequirements in support of global and theater campaignsand operations.

Special Operations Force GenerationAs the Joint Force Provider for SOF, CDRUSSOCOM

allocates SOF to address GCC requirements. USSOCOMplans to respond to GCC SOF requirements through a SpecialOperations Force Generation (SOFORGEN) process (Figure3). Ultimately, SOFORGEN will serve to track the forcegeneration cycles of its components as well as leverageexisting Global Force Management processes to ensurepredictable access to Service-provided capabilities. This willalign, package, train, project, and sustain special operationsforce packages, including those critical Service-providedcapabilities, to address GCC planned and contingencyrequirements across the range of military operations.

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Special Operations Joint Task ForceASOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF force

package that allows USSOCOM to more efficiently provideintegrated, fully-capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCsand JFCs. The modular nature of the SOJTF packagepermits its capabilities to be included/excluded as requiredby the TSOC/GCC. A SOJTF (Figure 4) is composed offour elements:

• Headquarters Element. This element provides thecommand and control (C2) of SOF. The SOJTF mayaugment existing structures (e.g., a core C2 capabilitycreated from a GCC’s TSOC) or, if requested by theTSOC/GCC, provides the full C2 capability for the specialoperations force.

Figure 3. Special Operations Force Generation Process


SOFORGEN will generate a fully capable and enabled forcepackage presented as a Special Operations Joint TaskForce (SOJTF) in support of GCC crisis response, limitedcontingencies, and major operations and campaigns.

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• SOF. This element includes ground and maritime SOFto augment any assigned Theater Mission Forces (TMF)and includes special operations air component assets toprovide/expand theater SOF aviation capabilities. WithSecDef approval, this element may also include a NationalMission Force (NMF) TF that enables a theater SOFcommander to coordinate and synergize TMF and NMFeffects within the joint operations area.

• SOFOrganic CS and CSS Capabilities. This elementmay include, but is not limited to, aviation, fires, intelligenceand communications. These forces are limited in sizeand capability and often require augmentation fromconventional forces.

• DoD Agency and Service-Provided Capabilities.This element may include intelligence, communication, fires,mobility, transportation, force protection, base operatingsupport, and maintenance assets. Further, this elementmay include conventional combat units as required toaccomplish the mission. DoD agencies and Service-providedcapabilities are critical components of SOJTF packages, andtheir effects are optimized by integrating them with SOFunits during planning, training, deployment, missionrehearsal, and mission execution.

The final two elements of the SOJTF -- organic specialoperations CS and CSS capabilities and Service and DoD


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agency-provided capabilities -- integrate the critical enablingforces necessary for the special operations commander todirect and conduct joint or combined special operations.

When provided to a GCC, the SOJTF force package willintegrate within the established JFC special operationsorganizational construct. The SOJTF headquarters elementin tegra tes in to or, i f reques ted , es tab l i shes theoperational-level special operations headquarters (e.g., JointTask Force [JTF]). The other three elements of the SOJTFforce package integrate as subordinate TFs and SpecialOperations Task Forces (SOTF). For GCC crisis response,limited contingencies, and major operations and campaigns,the operational-level headquarters will normally be led by aspecial operations flag officer. O-6 special operationsofficers usually command TFs, and O-5 special operationsofficers usually command SOTFs. The GCC or JFC maydesignate the senior SOF commander as the Joint ForceSpecial Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).

Figure 4. Elements of a Special Operations Joint Task Force


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Special Operations Forces Command and ControlSpecial operations C2 needs to be flexible, innovative,

and responsive given the dispersed, dynamic, and small-scalenature of special operations. SOF operational commanders,because of the depth of experience and regional expertise oftheir forces, exercise decentralized C2. Additionally,decentralized C2 facilitates the time-sensitive decisions oftenrequired for special operations.

Organizations• Theater Special Operations Command. To provide

the necessary unity of command, each of the GCCs (exceptCommander, U.S. Northern Command) has established aTSOC as a subordinate unified command. U.S. NorthernCommand maintains a special operations division within itsoperations directorate that serves as theater special operationsadvisor to the commander. The TSOC is the primary theaterSOF organization capable of performing broad, continuousmissions uniquely suited to SOF capabilities and is theorganization through which a GCC exercises C2 over SOF.The TSOC commander is responsible for the day-to-dayactivities of assigned and attached SOF and is the seniorspecial operations advisor to the GCC.

• Joint Forces Special Operations ComponentCommander. The commander within a unified command,subordinate unified command, or JTF responsible to theestablishing commander for making recommendations on the


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proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or madeavailable for tasking SOF and assets, planning andcoordinating special operations, or accomplishing suchoperational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC isgiven the authority necessary to accomplish missions andtasks assigned by the establishing commander.

• Joint Task Force. A JTF is a joint force that isconstituted and so designated by the SecDef, a combatantcommander, a subunified commander, or an existingJTF commander.

• Special Operations Command – Forward. ASpecialOperations Command – Forward (SOC-FWD) is a small,strategically placed operational level headquarters. TheTSOC commander may establish SOC-FWDs in keylocations to provide a persistent extension of the TSOC.CDRUSSOCOMmay augment a SOC-FWD with personneland forces as requested by the TSOC/GCC. If conditionswarrant greater SOF engagement, a SOC-FWD cantransition to a JTF.

Liaison ElementsBecause SOF operations and activities cross areas under

authority of others (battlespace owners, chiefs of missions,etc.), placing SOF Liaison Officers (LNO) to ensure the freeflow of information is essential. These SOF LNOs must havea firm understanding of the SOF commander’s critical


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information requirements and information management planaddressing appropriate vertical and horizontal informationflow. In turn, battlespace owners and other operational unitsnormally provide the SOF commander with LNOs whoclearly understand their commander’s intent and plans.Additionally, the TSOC extends their C2 through the use ofdistributed SOF operations that include Special OperationsLiaison Officers (SOLO), special operations forces liaisonelements, or other scalable SOF nodes. The TSOCs use ofdistributed, scalable C2 nodes assures access, understanding,and influence with PN military and U.S. missions.

Unity of CommandAchieving unity of command of SOF is challenging

because of diverse missions and the small size of units thatoften operate across large geographic areas with indigenousforces and among populations. The guiding principle is toplace all SOF under a single special operations commanderwith the requisite command authorities to direct all forcesemployed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity ofcommand also requires that two commanders do not exercisethe same authorities over a force at the same time.

SOF command authorities derive from U.S. Code Title10, Section 164, as implemented by Joint Publication 1,Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. As withconventional forces, the SecDef assigns SOF to jointcommands: CONUS-based SOF to USSOCOM andtheater-based SOF to the respective geographic command.


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Combatant command (COCOM) lies with the combatantcommander, who may delegate operational control (OPCON)or tactical control (TACON) or establish support relationshipsamong subordinate commanders. Normally, the GCCassigns SOF and delegates OPCON to the TSOC. The TSOCcommander may further delegate OPCON or TACON tosubordinate special operations commanders to enablesufficient latitude for decentralized execution.CDRUSSOCOM may deploy and temporarily attach forcesto the GCC. When this occurs, CDRUSSOCOM normallydelegates OPCON or TACON to the GCC.

Similar to command authorities, operational authoritiesto conduct activities and operations derive from U.S. CodeTitle 10, plus sections of Titles 22 and 50 as expressed inoperational execution orders. SOF commanders at all levelsseek authorities to fund and support advisory and assistanceefforts with indigenous forces and facilitate operatingprocedures. An example of a relevant authority is Title 10,U.S. Code, Section 1208 that funds SOF preparation andemployment of traditional and irregular indigenous forcesin support of counterterrorism operations. Further, SOFcommanders may seek changes to rules of engagement toobtain supplemental permissions to address unique situations.Authorities enable operations and need to accommodatelong-term sustained engagements as well as time-sensitiveoperations.


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Command and Control ArchitecturesExercising SOF C2 requires an architecture that is

flexible, innovative, and integrated with other DoDinformation systems. The full spectrum of special operations,from staff functions to war, occur on the DoD’s GlobalInformation Grid (GIG). The SOF Information Enterprise(SIE) is the USSOCOM portion of the GIG. The SIEprovides network independence, maintains connectivity intothe GIG, and links SOF across the GCCAOR and around theworld. This connectivity shortens the decision cycle forSOF commanders and operators, allows rapid informationsharing, and enables efficient C2.

Interagency Collaboration and InternationalEngagement

Inherent to SOF is their ability to operate as a member ofan interagency and international team, which is required foreffective synchronization of SOF’s activities and operationswithin an interagency and coalition environment. SOFroutinely work with the Department of State (DOS),Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and otherUSG departments and agencies as well as foreign militariesand civil institutions to exchange information andintelligence, plan, and coordinate operations. At the heart ofinteragency collaboration and international engagement areInteragency Task Forces (IATF), Joint IATFs, and similarorganizations composed of intelligence and operations


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personnel from the USG and international partners. TheNational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), wherecounterterrorism organizations work together, is the ultimateIATF because of its statutory tasking and multi-agency staff.USG organizations establish collaboration centers toconduct day-to-day coordination necessary for whole-of-government solutions to counterterrorism and other nationalstrategies.

USSOCOM established an IATF to build and maintainrelationships with other USG departments and agencies, theprivate sector, and international partners. The IATF improvesdeterrence and responds to specific threats or incidents.USSOCOM has three primary institutional mechanisms thatpromote long-term, mutually beneficial relationships:

• IATF. The USSOCOM IATF works collaborativelywith the interagency community focusing on complex CTnetworks and problems. USSOCOM’s IATF identifiesdiscrete problems and opportunities to foster interagencycollaboration for USSOCOM by leveraging uniqueinteragency authorities, resources, and capabilities in orderto expose, disrupt, dismantle, and defeat threats. SpecialOperations Support Teams (SOST), comprised of select SOFpersonnel working full time with designated interagencypartners, facilitate whole-of-government approaches that arebeyond the ability of SOF alone to execute. The IATF’saccess to USG departments and agencies provide agile reachback to forward-deployed SOF to assist in efforts to


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accomplish their mission in concert with interagencypartners. The IATF’s focus on the nexus of crime and terrorextends the ability of SOF to leverage the authorities of otheragencies. Regional expertise of special operations units andthe ability to act with a small footprint frequently makeSOF an ideal choice for interagency collaboration.

• Strategic Engagement Network. USSOCOMcollaborates with experts from academia, think tanks,business, NGOs, and across the private sector to benefit fromtheir knowledge of macro and micro-regional environments.The best information or approach is often found inunclassified venues. SOF identify, link, and leverage relevantexperts.

• International Engagement Program (IEP). SOFnurture lasting relationships with priority PNs and build aglobal network to share understanding of the environmentand provide interoperability. By maintaining an enduringpresence in key areas, SOF prepare for future contingenciesand build mutually beneficial relationships. One IEPinitiative is the SOLO program. SOLOs are experiencedSOF officers stationed in PNs to develop enduringrelationships with HN SOF who are placed and resourcedby CDRUSSOCOM and under OPCON of the TSOCcommander. Similarly, SOF exchange officers from key PNsare stationed at USSOCOM and its subordinate commands.Other IEP initiatives include both Partnership DevelopmentTeams (PDT) and SOF representatives. PDTs are tailored


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staff visits in support of the TSOC to enhance HN SOFcapabilities. SOF representatives are special operations-qualified officers who are members of the country team, workclosely with the SOLO and PDTs, and serve as SOF subjectmatter experts in PNs where significant opportunities existfor bilateral SOF cooperation and synchronization.

Overall, the efforts of SOF liaison representatives, SOST,IATF, Strategic Engagement Network, and IEP providecollaboration and exchange of intelligence, information,capabilities, plans, and operations to unify whole-of-government efforts. SOF use their global communicationscapabilities, place personnel with the right language andregional knowledge, and use their relationships with otherUSG personnel and indigenous military and civilian partnersto ensure that special operations contribute in consonancewith U.S. theater and country team objectives.

Of special importance to SOF is coordination with theDOS. Collaboration with DOS occurs at DOSMain, NCTC,the various IATFs, and with chiefs of mission at keyembassies across the world. Placement of special operationsrepresentatives, as well as other members of the countryteam, in a U.S. mission for an extended period is normallyaccomplished through the National Security DecisionDirective (NSDD)-38, Staffing at Diplomatic Missions andTheir Overseas Constituent Posts. NSDD-38 places SOFrepresentatives under the general direction and authority ofthe chief of mission; however, the individuals remain underthe command of the respective GCC.


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SOF SustainmentThe Departments of the Army, Navy, and U.S. Air Force

provide Service-common logistic, financial, andadministrative support as well as contracting and projectmanagement to special operations headquarters and forces asdirected in DoDD 5100.3. CDRUSSOCOM, directly orthrough the USSOCOM Service component commands,provides MFP-11-funded administrative and logistic supportto all CONUS-based, forward-assigned and attached SOF.For SOF personnel serving in U.S. missions under theauthority of NSDD-38, the administrative and logisticsarrangements are established within the NSDD-38 process.


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SECTION 4.EMPLOYING

SPECIALOPERATIONS FORCES

To support global and regional campaign plans,commanders use SOF across the spectrum of conflict.Crucial decisions commanders and planners face are when,where, and how to employ SOF to achieve assignedobjectives. Because of SOF’s distinctive characteristics, theiremployment differs from conventional forces.

Mission Selection CriteriaTo maximize SOF effectiveness, commanders should

evaluate potential missions for appropriateness, feasibility,and supportability based on the following criteria:

• Is this an appropriate mission for SOF? SOF shouldbe applied against strategic and operational objectives thatrequire SOF unique skills and capabilities. If the objectivesare not of operational or strategic importance, then SOFshould not be used. SOF should not be used as a substitutefor other forces.

• Does this mission support the campaign orcontingency plan? SOF missions should directly supportthe JFC’s plan.

• Is this mission operationally feasible? SOF are notstructured for attrition or force-on-force warfare. Planners


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must take into consideration the vulnerability of SOF unitsto larger, heavily armed, or mobile forces.

• Are the required resources available to supportthe mission? Many SOF missions require integrated andinteroperable support from other forces. Support includesprotection, sustainment, air support, intelligence,communications, and logistics. Even though an objectivemay be vulnerable to SOF, deficiencies in supportability mayaffect the likelihood for success.

• Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Inanalyzing acceptability, commanders must recognize the highvalue and limited resources of SOF and ensure that mission’spotential benefits are measurable and in balance with itsinherent risks. Risk assessment should consider potentialloss of SOF, equipment, and the effects on U.S. diplomaticand political interests.

Special Operations across the Range ofMilitary Operations

During military engagement and security cooperationactivities, the TSOC develops supporting plans, conductsjoint and combined training and exercises, and conducts otheractivities and operations with U.S. and foreign armed forcesand civilian organizations. The purpose is to shape theenvironment by building trust and confidence, sharinginformation, coordinating mutual activities, fosteringrelationships, maintaining influence, developing allied and


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friendly military and civilian capabilities, and providingpeacetime and contingency access to critical regions. Inaddition, SOF may conduct other operations such as COIN,FID, and UW during GCC engagement and securitycooperation activities.

During crisis response, the TSOC commander respondsto time-sensitive threats or incidents. The TSOC mayprovide an element to the GCC survey and assessment teamthat deploys to the crisis site, provides on-site information,and coordinates with other U.S. organizations and hostcountry officials. SOF are often part of noncombatantevacuation operations, humanitarian assistance/disasterrelief operations, and rescue and recovery operations.

For limited contingency operations, the GCC may directthe TSOC commander to employ SOF in small-scale,limited-duration operations or as a significant part of majoroperations of extended duration involving combat. Thespecial operations command structure will depend upon thelevel of complexity, duration, and resources required bythe circumstances. For smaller contingencies, the TSOCcommander may exercise C2 from the TSOC headquartersor a SOC-FWD. Larger contingencies may require theGCC commander to request a SOJTF package to augment aSOC-FWD or create a JFSOCC or a Joint Special OperationTask Force (JSOTF).

Throughout major operations and campaigns, the GCCmay direct the TSOC commander to employ SOF in supportof large-scale combat operations. Operation IRAQI


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FREEDOM in Iraq and Operation ENDURING FREEDOMin Afghanistan are examples of complex, large-scaleoperations. In consultation with the GCC, the TSOCcommander develops command arrangements for specialoperations in major operations and campaigns.

Global and Regional CampaignsCDRUSSOCOM and the GCCs employ SOF against

adversaries as established in global and regional campaignplans. While regional campaign plans have been theplanning norm, the advent of transnational adversaries addeda new requirement for DoD: global campaign plans thatsynchronize efforts among the combatant commanders andcombat support agencies.

The SecDef tasked CDRUSSOCOM to develop theglobal campaign plan to counter Al Qaeda and similartransnational terrorist organizations. Understanding theglobal nature of the planning and synchronizationenvironment is essential to employing SOF because of theagility and flexibility global campaigns require.

The need to address national policy and strategies in aglobal framework versus regional requires a new level of warthat has existed in practice since the SecDef first taskeddevelopment of global campaigns plans. The currentthree-level model -- strategic, operational, and tactical --places all campaign planning at the regional operational level.Global Employment of the Force and Global ForceManagement Implementation Guidance require a level ofplanning between the National Strategic and Operational


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Levels: the Global Strategic Level (Figure 5) whereinnational strategy and objectives are addressed in a global,rather than regional, framework to plan for inherentlytransregional threats that exceed the authority of a singleGCC.

The Global Strategic Level of War is the level at whichglobal campaigns are planned, resourced, sequenced, andsynchronized to accomplish global national securityobjectives and guidance. Activities at this level link nationalobjectives and guidance to global campaign plans, allocatemilitary forces and other capabilities, and establish militaryobjectives for regional campaigns and operations in supportof global campaigns.

Figure 5. Levels of War - The SOF Perspective


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Synchronizing Special Operations Forces duringGlobal Campaigns

Traditionally, SecDef employs SOF by directing theCJCS to issue deployment orders temporarily attachingCONUS-based forces to each geographic command. TheSecDef normally delegates OPCON of SOF to the relevantGCC. Each GCC employs SOF independently to achievetheater operational objectives. Regional attachment,however, does not facilitate campaigns against globaladversaries who are unhindered by GCC AOR boundariesand diminishes SOF’s ability to synchronize and engagetransregional adversaries.

An alternative approach to commanding SOF in globalcampaigns is to use the Title 10, Section 167 and the UnifiedCommand Plan authority for CDRUSSOCOM tocommand SOF missions. Exercising this authority withinSecDef-established support command relationships enablesglobal synchronization of SOF capabilities againsttransregional threats. The support relationship is, by design,unique and flexible because supporting forces are neitherassigned nor attached to the supported command. Instead,the supporting commander, CDRUSSOCOM, and supportedGCCs agree on tasks, priority of efforts, integration, andsustainment of the supporting force as set forth in SecDefestablishing directives. This creates global unity of commandbecause CDRUSSOCOM retains COCOM of CONUS-basedSOF operating in GCCAORs. The GCC retains COCOM ofassigned theater SOF. This support relationship facilitates

coordination among the GCCs and enables CDRUSSOCOMto optimize the utilization of SOF across multiple theaters inpursuit of transnational threats.

The supported GCC exercises general direction of thesupporting effort, including designation and prioritization oftargets and objectives, timing and duration of the supportingaction, and other instructions necessary for coordination andefficiency to achieve a common goal. Normally, thesupported GCC manages target coordination and integratesair support and joint tactical air strikes; provides reception,staging, onward movement, integration, basing, logistics, andforce protection; and conducts information operations andstrategic communications.

CDRUSSOCOM ascertains the needs of the supportedGCC and fulfills them within existing capabilities consistentwith SecDef priorities and requirements. CDRUSSOCOMdetermines the intelligence collection plan, forces, tactics,methods, procedures, communications, and advises andcoordinates with the supported GCC concerning theemployment and limitations of support.


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SECTION 5.CONCLUSION

SOF collaboration within DoD, with interagencyorganizations, and with foreign militaries and governmentsis essential to achieve the level of situational awarenessnecessary to understand complex environments anddetermine the effects needed to achieve tactical, operational,and strategic objectives. The understanding of what, how, andwhy regional events occur relies increasingly on globalperspectives and relationships. Integration of knowledgederived from a global perspective with nuanced regional andlocal understanding accounts for much of SOF success andwill be crucial in the future.

The challenges of complex and ambiguous futureoperating environments will be met with experienced andcapable operators, commanders, and staffs leading andsupporting a full range of activities and operations. SOF willmeet the threats of today and the challenges of tomorrow withingenuity, perseverance, skill, and professionalism. In a timeof high operational tempo, SOF will continue to operate withand through indigenous forces, engage adversaries in the unlitspaces of the world well ahead of the sound of guns, and willremain a critical component of national strategies, globalcampaign plans, and theater plans.

Cultivating innovation within SOF remains a priority andshapes their ability to influence the preconditions forconflict, adapt to the circumstances on the ground, and


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influence indigenous forces and populations where theoutcomes of future conflicts will be determined. Futurechallenges require forward-thinking and institutional agilityto improve and expand tactical and operational level skills,equipment, and systems. Innovative people and methods,efficient execution of budgets, and full use of authorities arecritical to the continued agility and adaptability of SOF.

Major GeneralWilliam J. Donovan, Director of the OSS,stressed that his forces have “an eagerness to try things nottried before, an ability to think and act independently, and theflexibility to seek and pursue all effective means to defeatthe enemy.” As in the past, these words remain significanttoday and will carry SOF into the future.

ACRONYMSAFSOC Air Force Special Operations CommandAFSOF Air Force Special Operations ForcesARSOF Army Special Operations ForcesC2 command and controlCA civil affairsCAO civil affairs operationsCDRUSSOCOM Commander, USSOCOMCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCOCOM combatant commandCOIN counterinsurgencyCONUS continental U.S.CP counterproliferationCS combat supportCSS combat service supportCT counterterrorismCWMD countering weapons of mass destructionDA direct actionDoD Department of DefenseDoDD Department of Defense DirectiveDOS Department of StateFID foreign internal defenseGCC geographic combatant commanderGIG Global Information GridHN host nationIATF Interagency Task ForceIEP International Engagement Program


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ISR intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance

JFC joint force commanderJFSOCC Joint Forces Special Operations

Component CommanderJSOC Joint Special Operations CommandJTF Joint Task ForceMARSOC Marine Corps Forces

Special Operations CommandMARSOF Marine Corps

Special Operations ForcesMFP major force programMISO military information

support operationsNAVSPECWARCOM Naval Special Warfare CommandNCTC National Counterterrorism CenterNGO nongovernmental organizationNMF National Mission ForceNP nonproliferationNSDD National Security Decision DirectiveOPCON operational controlOSS Office of Strategic ServicesPDT Partnership Development TeamsPE preparation of the environmentPN partner nationSecDef Secretary of DefenseSIE Special Operations Forces

Information Enterprise

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SOC-FWD Special Operations Command - forwardSOF Special Operations ForcesSOFORGEN Special Operations Force GenerationSOJTF Special Operations Joint Task ForceSOLO Special Operations Liaison OfficerSOST Special Operations Support TeamsSOTF Special Operations Task ForceSR special reconnaissanceTACON tactical controlTF task forceTMF Theater Mission ForcesTSOC Theater Special Operations CommandU.S. United StatesUDT Underwater Demolition TeamUSASOC U.S.Army Special Operations CommandUSG U.S. GovernmentUSSOCOM U.S. Special Operations CommandUW unconventional warfareWMD weapons of mass destruction

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Documents

Ussocom Pub 1